Rule 31 - Consolidation or Severance

1. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116463, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 403

Facts: Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) is a corporation engaged in dredging

operations throughout the Philippines. It was awarded a dredging, flood control and other
related projects by the DPWH. NIC proceeded with the project pursuant to the specific
work schedule and plan approved by the DPWH. It had accomplished 95.06% of the
required total volume of work or P184,847,970.00 worth of services. However, DPWH paid
only 79.22% of the accomplished work. NIC filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against the Republic of the Philippines, thru the DPWH. In defence, DPWH
contended that the contracts were awarded without any public bidding and that the
corporate officers of NIC connived with some of the officials of DPWH in falsifying certain
public documents to make it appear that NIC completed a major portion of the projects,
when no dredging work was actually performed.

A case for four counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of
RA No. 3019 was filed against NIC and the DPWH officials. However, the resolution of the
office of the Special Prosecutor finding probable cause was only approved almost five (5)
years from the filing of the case.

Petitioner filed for a motion to consolidate civil cases and criminal cases. They argued that
the civil case for collection and the criminal case arose from the same incidents and involve
the same facts. Defendant, NIC, seeks to dismissed the petition on the ground that it was
not served on time. The motion was denied by lower court because jurisdiction over the
cases is vested with different tribunals.

Issues:
 Whether the petition was filed on time?
 Whether the civil cases and criminal cases be consolidated?

Held:

1st Issue

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, and as applied in several cases, "where
the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day." Petitioner filed the petition on 11 September 1994, which is a Sunday. Thus
the petition was filed on time on 12 September 1994, the next working day, following the
last day for filing.

2nd Issue
Consolidation is a matter of discretion with the court. Consolidation becomes a matter of
right only when the cases sought to be consolidated involve similar questions of fact and
law, provided certain requirements are met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid
multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary expense.

The civil case, for collection of sum of money, and with the criminal cases cannot be
consolidated for two reasons. First, the Sandigan Bayan has no jurisdiction over the
collection case. Second, the Rules of Court do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a
third-party complaint in a criminal case.

2. Espinoza v. UOB, G.R. 175380, 22 March 2010, 616 SCRA 353

FACTS: A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession (an ex parte proceeding)
and an action questioning the validity of extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings (an
ordinary action) may not be consolidated after the lapse of the one year redemption
period.

Firematic Philippines sought a loan from United Overseas Bank. It was represented by
the spouses Espinoza who owned the company. They mortgaged four parcels of land as
collateral for the loan. Firematic defaulted on the loan and the properties were auctioned
off to the highest bidder. The highest bidder was UOB. The certificate of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds along with an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership of the property.UOB, respondent, then filed an ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC. This was opposed by the petitioners who
moved for the consolidation of the proceedings (the issuance of the writ of possession
and an action for nullification of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and certificate
of sale of the property subject of this case. The RTC granted the motion of the petitioners
and consolidated the cases. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus at
the CA. This too was granted. RTC order was reversed and set aside.

ISSUE: W/N a case for the issuance of a writ of possession may be consolidated with
the proceedings for the nullification of extra-judicial foreclosure.

HELD: No. The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the
filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond if the redemption
period has not yet lapsed. If the redemption period has expired, then thefiling of the bond
is no longer necessary. Any and all questions regarding the regularity and validity of the
sale is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding and such questions may not be
raised as a justification for opposing theissuance of a writ of possession.In other words,
the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It
 is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit ofone party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted
without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.
An ex parte petition forissuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is
a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a
foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another
for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. On the other hand, by its nature, a petition for nullification or annulment of
foreclosure proceedings contests the presumed right of ownership of the buyer ina
foreclosure sale and puts in issue such presumed right of ownership. Thus, a party
scheming to defeat the right to a writ of possession of a buyer in a foreclosure sale who
had already consolidated his ownership over the property subjectof the foreclosure sale
can simply resort to the subterfuge of filing a petition for nullification of foreclosure
proceedings with motion for consolidation of the petition for issuance of a writ of
possession. This is not allowed as it will render nugatory the presumed right of
ownership, as well as the right of possession, of a buyer in a foreclosure sale, rights
which are supposed to be implemented in an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession.The only exception would be if the writ of possession were filed for before
thelapse of the 1 year redemption period. This was not so in this case as the period had
already lapsed.

Rule 33 - Demurrer to Evidence

1. Radiowealth Finance Co v. Sps Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA
288

Lessons Applicable: Demurrer to Evidence

Laws Applicable: Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court (Civil Procedure)

FACTS:
• March 2, 1991: Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally
executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory
Note for P138,948 without need of notice or demand, in instalments of P11,579.00
payable for 12 consecutive months leaving the period for the instalments blank. Upon
default, the late payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month shall be added to each unpaid
installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
• June 7, 1993: Radiowealth filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit
and collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the Spouses’ check
payments, the demand letter dated July 12, 1991, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card,
another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he
did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of these
 pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.
• July 29, 1994: Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action
• RTC: Dismissed for Radiowealth’s failure to substantiate the claims, the evidence it
had presented being merely hearsay
• CA: reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings
o During the pretrial, through judicial admissions or the spouses admitted the
genuineness of the Promissory Note and demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Their only
defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments were to
begin.

2. ISSUES:
1. W/N the spouses can still present evidence after the appellate court’s reversal of
the dismissal on demurer of evidence (Civil Procedure)

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Appealed Decision is MODIFIED. Ordered to PAY

P138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per month beginning April 2, 1991 until
fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as attorney’s fees.

1. NO.
• Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
• Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to
present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court
agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them
and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own
evidence
• The appellate court shall resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations

2. Casent Realty v. Philbanking, G.R. No. 150731, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 390

FACTS: Casent Realty Developmet Corp. executed two promissory notes in favor of
Rare Realty. These promissory notes were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan that
Rare Realty obtained from Philbanking wherein a Deed of Assignment was executed. When
Rare Realty failed to pay its debt, the bank went after the security of the loan. The bank
demanded payment based on the promissory notes issued by Casent Realty Corp to Rare
Realty by virtue of the deed of assignment. On a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent
Realty satisfied its obligation by executing a Dacion en pago. Philbanking filed for a
complaint for the collection of payment against Casent based on the promissory notes.
Casent Realty, in its answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was already executed which
extinguished its obligation. Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition which alleged
that: (1) the grounds relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not
insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered
in evidence and evaluated; and (3) since respondent failed to file a Reply, then all the new
matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
respondent alleged that the trial court gravely erred because the promissory notes were
not covered by the Dacion, and that respondent was able to prove its causes of action and
right to relief by overwhelming preponderance of evidence. It explained that at the time of
execution of the Dacion, the subject of the promissory notes was the indebtedness of
petitioner to Rare Realty and not to the Bankthe party to the Dacion. It was only in 1989
after Rare Realty defaulted in its obligation to respondent when the latter enforced the
security provided under the Deed of Assignment by trying to collect from petitioner,
because it was only then that petitioner became directly liable to respondent.

The appellate court ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be
resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts
presented and the law. Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the
Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at
issue. It added that the court a quo should have resolved whether the two promissory notes
were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioners demurrer was granted, it had
already lost its right to present its evidence.

ISSUE: Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? If

yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the
complaint?

HELD: Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.

In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we defined a demurrer to evidence as an objection by one of the

parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.[21]

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is

whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence
contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case,
excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue.[22] However, the plaintiffs evidence
should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The facts referred to in
Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining
matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial
notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the
only exclusion being the defendants evidence.

3. GMA v. Central CATV, G.R. No. 176694, 18 July 2014, 730 SCRA 85

FACTS:
 P together with the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Audiovisual
Communicators, Incorporated, Filipinas Broadcasting Network and Rajah Broadcasting
Network, Inc. filed with the NTC a complaint against the respondent to stop it from
soliciting and showing advertisements in its cable television (CATV)system pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order (EO) No. 205
 P alleged that the phrase "television and broadcast markets" includes the
commercial or advertising market.
 R admitted the airing of commercial advertisement on its CATV network but alleged
that Section 3 of EO No. 436, which was issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on
September 9, 1997, expressly allowed CATV providers to carry advertisements and other
similar paid segments provided there is consent from their program providers
 R filed a motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence claiming that the evidence
presented by the complainants failed to show how the respondent’s acts of soliciting
and/or showing advertisements infringed upon the television and broadcast market
 NTC - granted the respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint
 NTC - ruled that since EO No. 205 does not define "infringement," EO No. 436
merely clarified or filled-in the details of the term to mean that the CATV operators may
show advertisements, provided that they secure the consent of their program providers.
 NTC - consider the documents attached to the respondent’s demurrer to evidence
showed that its program providers have given such consent, still formed part of the records
and the NTC is not bound by the strict application of technical rules
 NTC- the insertion of advertisements under EO No. 436 would result in the
alteration or deletion of the broadcast signals of the consenting television broadcast
station, its ruling necessarily results in the amendment of these provisions
 NTC - require the CATV operators within the Grade A or B contours of a television
broadcast station to carry the latter’s television broadcast signals in full, without alteration
or deletion. This is known as the "must-carry-rule.
 CA - upheld the NTC ruling, due to the failure of EO No. 205 to define what
constitutes "infringement," EO No. 436 merely filled-in the details without expanding,
modifying and/or repealing EO No. 205. The NTC was also correct in modifying or
amending the must-carry rule under MC 4-08-88 as the NTC merely implemented the
directive of EO No. 436.
 Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.

Issues: Whether the CA erred in affirming the order of the NTC which granted the
respondent’s motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence.

Ruling: deny the petition for lack of merit.

 The remedy of a demurrer to evidence is applicable in the proceedings before the
NTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9, Part 9 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure which
provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court.
 Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied
he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
 In other words, the issue to be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer
to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for based on the facts and
the law.
 The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the
merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the
plaintiff’s evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence.
 The "facts" referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the
Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial
admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial,
admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence.
 NTC considered both the insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and the
insufficiency of the complainants’ evidence in light of its interpretation of the provisions of
EO No. 205 and EO No. 436.
 In the present case, the NTC proceeded against the very nature of the remedy of
demurrer to evidence when it considered the respondent’s evidence, specifically the
certifications attached to the respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Despite the petitioner’s
objections,26 the NTC disregarded the rule on demurrer by allowing the submission of the
respondent’s evidence while depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to question,
examine or refute the submitted documents
 It should not have resolved the case through the remedy of demurrer but instead
allowed the respondent to formally present its evidence where the petitioner could
properly raise its objections. Clearly, there was a violation of the petitioner’s due process
right.

Rule 34 - Judgment on the Pleadings

1. Asian Construction v. Sanneadle, G.R. No. 181676, 11 June 2014, 726 SCRA 226

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money filed by respondent
against petitioner. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent executed a
Memorandum of Agreement wherein respondent was engaged to supply and erect
insulated panel systems at various pavilions for an agreed amount of US$3,745,287.94.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner made various payments amounting

to US$3,129,667.32 leaving a balance of US$615,620.33. Respondent claims that it made
several written demands for petitioner to pay the said balance, but the latter continuously
refused to heed its plea.

Thereafter, petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim.4

Respondent then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Answer
admitted all material allegations of the Complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an issue.
Thus, respondent deems that petitioner’s Answer, in effect, admitted the existence of the
Memorandum of Agreement and its failure to pay the balance despite repeated demands.

In a Judgment5 dated October 6, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
rendered in favor of respondent.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against said decision. However, the same was
denied.

Thus, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. Thus, CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the RTC decision.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution.

ISSUE: whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper.

HELD: YES.

Judgment on the pleadings is governed by Section 1, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which reads:

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to tender an
issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections
8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.

Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner acknowledged having entered into a Memorandum of

Agreement with respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of US$615,620.33.

We note that respondent’s complaint for a sum of money is based mainly on the alleged
failure of petitioner to pay the balance of US$615,620.33 under the Memorandum of
Agreement. Quoting petitioner’s Answer, it is obvious that it admitted the foregoing
material allegations of the complaint.

While petitioner allegedly raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of non-
forum shopping, no legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar
respondent from seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative
defenses, petitioner’s denial neither made a specific denial that a Memorandum of
Agreement was perfected nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of said
agreement.

The defenses raised by [petitioner] cannot prevent the [respondent] from seeking the
collection of the amount of US$615,620.33. The express terms of the Memorandum of
Agreement, the genuineness and due execution of which are not denied by the [petitioner].
It cannot assert the said defenses in order to resist the [respondent's] claim for the
aforesaid sum of money, especially where it has been sufficiently shown by the allegations
of the Complaint and the Answer that the [petitioner] is clearly liable for the payment
thereof.

2. Sunbanun v. Go, G.R. No. 163280, 2 February 2010, 611 SCRA 320

FACTS: Petitioner Doris U. Sunbanun is the owner of a residential house

located at No. 68-F Junquera Street, Cebu City. On 7 July 1995, respondent Aurora B. Go
leased the entire ground floor of petitioner's residential house for one year which was to
expire on 7 July 1996. As required under the lease contract, respondent paid a deposit of
P16,000 to answer for damages and unpaid rent. To earn extra income, respondent
accepted lodgers, mostly her relatives, from whom she received a monthly income of
P15,000. Respondent paid the monthly rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove
away respondent's lodgers by telling them that they could stay on the rented premises only
until 15 April 1996 since she was terminating the lease. The lodgers left the rented
premises by 15 April 1996, and petitioner then padlocked the rooms vacated by
respondent's lodgers.

On 10 May 1996, respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner. Respondent
alleged that she lost her income from her lodgers for the months of April, May, and June
1996 totaling P45,000. Respondent, who worked in Hongkong, also incurred expenses for
plane fares and other travel expenses in coming to the Philippines and returning to
Hongkong.

On the other hand, petitioner argued that respondent violated the lease contract when she
subleased the rented premises. Besides, the lease contract was not renewed after its
expiration on 7 July 1996; thus, respondent had no more right to stay in the rented
premises. Petitioner also moved to dismiss the complaint in the trial court for failure to
comply with prior barangay conciliation.

During the pre-trial, petitioner moved for the case to be submitted for judgment on the
pleadings considering that the only disagreement between the parties was the correct
interpretation of the lease contract. Respondent did not object to petitioner's motion. The
trial court then directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda, after which the
case would be considered submitted for decision.[4]

In its decision dated 28 March 2000, the trial court held that the case is not covered by the
barangay conciliation process since respondent is a resident of Hongkong. The trial court
noted that petitioner did not controvert respondent's allegation that petitioner ejected
respondent's lodgers sometime in March 1996 even if the contract of lease would expire
only on 7 July 1996. The trial court found untenable petitioner's contention that subleasing
the rented premises violated the lease contract. The trial court held that respondent's act of
accepting lodgers was in accordance with the lease contract which allows the lessee "to use
the premises as a dwelling or as lodging house." Thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to
pay respondent actual damages of P45,000 for respondent's lost income from her lodgers
for the months of April, May, and June 1996, and attorney's fees of P8,000.

Both parties appealed before the Court of Appeals. On 30 September 2003, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondent and modified the trial court's decision.
Aside from actual damages and attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals also ordered petitioner
to pay moral and exemplary damages and the cost of the suit.

ISSUE:

1. WON the CA erred in affirming the award of actual damages by the Trial Court
2. WON the CA erred in modifying the judgment of the Trial Court and awarding moral
and exemplary damages and costs of suit in favour of respondent.
3. WON the CA erred in affirming the award of attorney’s fees.

HELD: No. Petition is without merit.

In this case, the trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings. Section 1, Rule 34 of the
Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a
party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. [7] A judgment
on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded,[8] and is based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.

Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth
of her own allegations and without giving respondent the opportunity to introduce
evidence, is deemed to have admitted the material and relevant averments of the
complaint, and to rest her motion for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties.

3. GSIS v. Prudential, G.R. No. 165585, 20 November 2013, 710 SCRA 337

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) with GSIS insuring all real and personal properties
mortgaged to it by electrical cooperatives under an Industrial All Risks Policy (IAR
policy).12 The total sum insured under the IAR policy was ₱16,731,141,166.80, out of
which, 95% or ₱15,894,584,108.40 was reinsured by GSIS with PGAI for a period of one
year or from March 5, 1999 to March 5, 2000.13 As reflected in Reinsurance Request Note
No. 99-15014(reinsurance cover) and the Reinsurance Binder dated April 21, 1999
(reinsurance binder), GSIS agreed to pay PGAI reinsurance premiums in the amount of
₱32,885,894.52 per quarter or a total of ₱131,543,578.08.16

While GSIS remitted to PGAI the reinsurance premiums for the first three quarters, it,
however, failed to pay the fourth and last reinsurance premium due on December 5, 1999
despite demands.

On November 15, 2001 PGAI, filed a Complaint for sum of money (complaint) against GSIS
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1634.

PGAI alleged, among others, that: (a) after it had issued the IAR policy, it further reinsured
the risks covered under the said reinsurance with reputable reinsurers worldwide such as
Lloyds of London, Copenhagen Re, Cigna Singapore, CCR, Generali, and Arig;18 (b) the first
three reinsurance premiums were paid to PGAI by GSIS and, in the same vein, NEA paid the
first three reinsurance premiums due to GSIS;19 (c) GSIS failed to pay PGAI the fourth and
last reinsurance premium due on December 5, 1999;20 (d) the IAR policy remained in full
force and effect for the entire insurable period and, in fact, the losses/damages on various
risks reinsured by PGAI were paid and accordingly settled by it;21 (e) PGAI is under
continuous pressure from its reinsurers in the international market to settle the
matter;22 and (f) GSIS acknowledged its obligation to pay the last reinsurance premium as
it, in turn, demanded from NEA the fourth and last reinsurance premium.

In its Answer,24 GSIS admitted, among others, that: (a) its request for reinsurance cover
was accepted by PGAI in a reinsurance binder;25 (b) it remitted to PGAI the first three
reinsurance premiums which were paid by NEA;26 and (c) it failed to remit the fourth and
last reinsurance premium to PGAI.27 It, however, denied, inter alia, that: (a) it had
acknowledged its obligation to pay the last quarter’s reinsurance premium to PGAI;28 and
(b) the IAR policy remained in full force and effect for the entire insurable period of March
5, 1999 to March 5, 2000.29 GSIS also proffered the following affirmative defenses: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action against GSIS because the non-payment of the last
reinsurance premium only renders the reinsurance contract ineffective, and does not give
PGAI a right of action to collect;30 (b) pursuant to the regulations issued by the Commission
on Audit, GSIS is prohibited from advancing payments to PGAI occasioned by the failure of
the principal insured, NEA, to pay the insurance premium;31 and (c) PGAI’s cause of action
lies against NEA since GSIS merely acted as a conduit.32 By way of counterclaim, GSIS
prayed that PGAI be ordered to pay exemplary damages, including litigation expenses, and
costs of suit.

PGAI filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings34 averring that GSIS essentially admitted
the material allegations of the complaint, such as: (a) the existence of the MOA between
NEA and GSIS; (b) the existence of the reinsurance binder between GSIS and PGAI; (c) the
remittance by GSIS to PGAI of the first three quarterly reinsurance premiums; and (d) the
failure/refusal of GSIS to remit the fourth and last reinsurance premium.35 Hence, PGAI
prayed that the RTC render a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Section 1, Rule 34 of
the Rules of Court (Rules). GSIS opposed36 the foregoing motion by reiterating the
allegations and defenses in its Answer.

RTC issued an Order37 (January 11, 2002 Order) granting PGAI’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings. It observed that the admissions of GSIS that it paid the first three quarterly
reinsurance premiums to PGAI affirmed the validity of the contract of reinsurance between
them. As such, GSIS cannot now renege on its obligation to remit the last and remaining
quarterly reinsurance premium.

Dissatisfied, GSIS filed a notice of appeal.

PGAI filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. RTC issued an Order52 (February 14,
2002 Order) granting PGAI’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, conditioned on the
posting of a bond. It further held that only the GSIS Social Insurance Fund is exempt from
execution. Accordingly, PGAI duly posted a surety bond which the RTC approved through
an Order53dated February 19, 2002, resulting to the issuance of a writ of execution54 and
notices of garnishment55 (February 19, 2002 issuances), all of even date, against GSIS.

GSIS – without first filing a motion for reconsideration (from the said order of execution) or
a sufficient supersedeas bond56 – filed on February 26, 2002 a petition for
certiorari57 before the CA against the RTC and PGAI.

CA rendered a Decision63 dismissing GSIS’ petition, upholding, among others, the validity of
the execution pending appeal pursuant to the RTC’s February 14, 2002 Order as well as the
February 19, 2002 issuances. It found that the impending blacklisting of PGAI constitutes a
good reason for allowing the execution pending appeal (also known as "discretionary
execution") considering that the imposition of international sanctions on any single local
insurance company puts in grave and immediate jeopardy not only the viability of that
company but also the integrity of the entire local insurance system including that of the
state insurance agency. It pointed out that the insurance business thrives on credibility
which is maintained by honoring financial commitments.

Separately, GSIS also assailed the RTC’s January 11, 2002 Order which granted PGAI’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings through an appeal.
GSIS averred that the RTC gravely erred in: (a) rendering judgment on the pleadings since
it specifically denied the material allegations in PGAI’s complaint; (b) ordering execution
pending appeal since there are no justifiable reasons for the same; and (c) effecting
execution against funds and assets of GSIS given that RA 8291 exempts the same from levy,
execution and garnishment.

CA ruled that judgment on the pleadings was proper since GSIS did not specifically deny the
genuineness, due execution, and perfection of its reinsurance contract with PGAI.73 In fact,
PGAI even settled reinsurance claims during the covering period rendering the reinsurance
contract not only perfected but partially executed as well.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s January 11, 2002 Order rendering judgment
on the pleadings?

HELD: NO

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. The rule is stated
in Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules which reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.

In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not
comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 890 and 10,91 Rule 8
of the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings.92

As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings

without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted.

In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of
PGAI’s complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted
that: (a) it made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance
binder effective for one year;94 (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium
payments to PGAI;95 (c) it failed to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium
installment;96 and (d) it received demand letters from PGAI.97 It also did not refute the
allegation of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims during the reinsured period. On the
basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did not err in affirming the propriety
of a judgment on the pleadings.

GSIS’ affirmative defense that the non-payment of the last reinsurance premium merely
rendered the contract ineffective pursuant to Section 7798 of PD 612 no longer involves any
factual issue, but stands solely as a mere question of law in the light of the foregoing
admissions hence allowing for a judgment on the pleadings. Besides, in the case of Makati
Tuscany, the Court already ruled that the non-payment of subsequent installment
premiums would not prevent the insurance contract from taking effect; that the parties
intended to make the insurance contract valid and binding is evinced from the fact that the
insured paid – and the insurer received – several reinsurance premiums due thereon,
although the former refused to pay the remaining balance.

Rule 35 - Summary Judgments

1. Tan v. De La Vega, G.R. No. 168809, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 538

FACTS: respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of
Free Patent No. 495269, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 711 and Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 186516, against the heirs of Macario Mencias (defendant heirs), namely,
Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M. Cadete, Myrna M. Quirante; and the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Director of the Land
Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later
amended to implead herein petitioner purchasers of the disputed lot and to nullify TCT No.
272191 issued in their name.

Sometime in April 1992, respondents learned that the defendant heirs are causing the
ejectment of the occupants of a 29,945 square meter portion of Lot 89; and that Macario
Mencias was able to obtain Free Patent No. 495269 on July 31, 1971, and OCT No. 711 on
August 11, 1971, over said portion. Upon Macario's death, OCT No. 711 was canceled and
TCT No. 186516 was issued to the defendant heirs on July 5, 1990. By virtue of a Deed of
Sale inscribed on November 14, 1994, TCT No. 186516 was further cancelled and TCT No.
271604 was issued on the same date in favor of New Atlantis Real Estate & Development,
Inc., (Corporation) represented by its President, Victor C. Salvador, Jr. The questioned lot
was thereafter sold by the Corporation to petitioners. TCT No. 271604 was thus cancelled
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 272191 was issued to petitioners on November 17, 1994.

In their Answer, the defendant heirs contended that Lot 89 was never part of respondents
TCT No. 257152 which originated from OCT No. 730. Respondents own exhibits, i.e., the
documents purportedly issued by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibits E and F), show that Lot 89
was covered by OCT No. 734 and not OCT No. 730. Defendant heirs further stated that
respondents TCT No. 257152 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 22395 which is a mere
reconstitution of TCT No. 45046. On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that
they are purchasers in good faith and for value and that they have no knowledge of any
defect in the title of the Corporation from whom they purchased the controverted lot. The
notice of lis pendens alleged to have been inscribed in TCT No. 186516 on August 4, 1992
does not appear in the Corporations title, TCT No. 271604 nor in their title, TCT No.
272191. Absent said notice, petitioners claim that they cannot be charged with knowledge
of any defect in the Corporation's title.
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat, public defendants Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Director of Land Management
Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina, were declared in default. Therefore,
Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the trial
court.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the assailed order of the trial
court. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a resolution dated July 6,
2005. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: whether a judgment on the pleadings is proper in the instant case.

HELD: Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is
whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the
pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys
answer to raise an issue.[14]The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does
not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the
adverse partys pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal
with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of
the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would
nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would
naturally be improper.

In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings
because the pleadings filed by the parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the
presentation of evidence.

In any case, a summary judgment is likewise not warranted in this case as there are
genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no
real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no
genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed
or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to determine the validity of TCT
No. 22395 from which respondents title (TCT No. 257152) was derived. As alleged by
defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046, which per
verification from the Register of Deeds of Rizal pertain to a different piece of land
measuring only about 356 square meters and located in San Juan, Rizal. These allegations
were never refuted by respondents, hence, they cannot be simply brushed aside by the trial
court.

2. Evangelista v. Mercator Finance, G.R. No. 148864, 21 August 2003, 409 SCRA
410

FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of titles against respondents.
 Petitioners claimed being the registered owners of five (5) parcels of land contained
in the Real Estate Mortgage executed by them and Embassy Farms
 They alleged that they executed the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of "Mercator" only
as officers of Embassy Farms and they did not receive any proceeds from the loan
evidenced by a PN.
 they contended that the mortgage was without any consideration as to them since
they did not personally obtain any loan or credit accommodations
 There being no principal obligation on which the mortgage rests, the real estate
mortgage is void
 Mercator admitted that petitioners were the owners of the subject parcels of land
 It contended that since P and Embassy Farms signed the PN as co-makers, aside
from the Continuing Suretyship Agreement, also executed to guarantee the indebtedness of
Embassy Farms, and the succeeding promissory notes restructuring the loan, then
petitioners are jointly and severally liable with Embassy Farms.
 Due to their failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the
mortgaged properties are valid
 R asserted that they are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, relying on
the validity of the title of Mercator
 Both respondents likewise assailed the long silence and inaction by petitioners as it
was only after a lapse of almost ten (10) years from the foreclosure of the property and the
subsequent sales that they made their claim.
 Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that except as to the amount
of damages, there is no factual issue to be litigated.
 Petitioners opposed the motion for summary judgment claiming that because their
personal liability to Mercator is at issue, there is a need for a full-blown trial.
 The RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. It
held:
 A reading of the promissory notes show (sic) that the liability of the signatories
thereto are solidary in view of the phrase jointly and severally. On the promissory note
appear (sic) the signatures of Eduardo B. Evangelista, Epifania C. Evangelista and another
signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below the words Embassy Farms, Inc. It is crystal clear
then that the plaintiffs-spouses signed the promissory note not only as officers of Embassy
Farms, Inc. but in their personal capacity as well(.) Plaintiffs(,) by affixing their signatures
thereon in a dual capacity have bound themselves as solidary debtor(s) with Embassy
Farms, Inc. to pay defendant Mercator Finance Corporation the amount of indebtedness.
That the principal contract of loan is void for lack of consideration, in the light of the
foregoing is untenable.
 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Thus,
petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, but again were unsuccessful.

Issue: W/N the court a quo erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the order of the trial court granting respondents
motion for summary judgment despite the existence of genuine issues as to material facts
and its non-entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law.

Ruling:
Summary judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The crucial question in a motion for summary
judgment is whether the issues raised in the pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown
by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means
an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. To forestall
summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of
genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of
fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable finding of fact could
return a verdict for the non-moving party. The proper inquiry would therefore be whether
the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a
full-blown trial.
In the case at bar, there are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not
deny that they obtained a loan from Mercator. They merely claim that they got the loan as
officers of Embassy Farms without intending to personally bind themselves or their
property. However, a simple perusal of the promissory note and the continuing suretyship
agreement shows otherwise. This documentary evidence proves that petitioners are
solidary obligors with Embassy Farms.
The petition is dismissed. Treble costs against the petitioners.

3. BPI v. Sps. Yu, G.R. No. 184122, 20 January 2010, 610 SCRA 412

FACTS:
Spouses Yu, doing business as Tuanson Trading and Tuanson Builders Corporation,
borrowed various sums totaling P75m from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC).
For collateral, they executed real estate mortgages over several of their properties
including certain lands located in Legazpi City owned by Tuanson Trading.
Unable to pay their loans, the Sps Yu and Tuanson Builders requested a loan
restructuring, which the bank, now merged BPI, granted. By this time, the Sps Yu loan
balance stood at P 33.4m The restructured loan used the same collaterals with the
exception of TCT 40247 that secured a loan of P1.6m
Despite the restructuring, however, the Sps Yu still had difficulties paying their loan.
They asked BPI to release some of the mortgaged lands since their total appraised
 value
far exceeded the amount of the remaining debt. BPI ignored their request. Sps Yu withheld
payments on their amortizations. Thus, BPI extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged
properties in Legazpi City and in Pili, Camarines Sur.
Sps Yu sought the annulment of the foreclosure sale by court action against BPI
and the winning bidder Magnacraft Development Corporation. In the course of the
proceedings, Sps Yu and Magnacraft entered into a compromise agreement that affirmed
the latter’s ownership of 3 out of the 10 parcels of land auctioned. By virtue of this, the
court dismissed the complaint against Magnacraft, without prejudice to the Yus filing a new
one against BPI.
On October 2003, the Sps Yu filed their new complaint before the RTC against
BPI for recovery of alleged excessive penalty charges, attorney’s fees, foreclosure
expenses that the bank caused to be incorporated in the price of the auctioned
properties.
BPI essentially admitted the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for P39m
corresponded only to Sps Yu debt as of date of filing of the petition. The notice of the
auction sale said that the total was inclusive of interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fee and
expenses of this foreclosure.
BPI further admitted its bid of P45m for all the auctioned properties. BPI also
admitted that Magnacraft submitted the highest and winning bid of P45.5m. The sheriff
turned over this amount to BPI. According to BPI, it in turn remitted to the Clerk of Court
the P400k difference between its bid price and that
of Magnacrafts. Although the proceeds of the sale exceeded the P39m stated in the notice of
sale by P6m, the bid amount increased because it now included litigation expenses and
attorneys fees as well as interests and penalties as recomputed.
BPI admitted that it also pushed through with the second auction for the sale of a lot
in Pili, Camarines Sur that secured a remaining debt of P5.5m BPI made the lone bid of
P1.7m
The Yu’s had three causes of action against BPI.
First. The bank imposed excessive penalty charges and interests: over P5 million in
penalty charges computed at 36% per annum compared to the 12% per annum that the
Court fixed in jurisprudence. In addition, BPI collected a 14% yearly interest on the
principal, bringing the combined penalty charges and interest to 50% of the principal per
annum.
Second. BPI also imposed a charge of P4m in attorney’s fees, the equivalent of 10%
of the principal, interest, and penalty charges.
Third. BPI did not provide documents to support its claim for foreclosure expenses
of P446k and cost of publication of P518k.
As an alternative to their three causes of action, the Yu’s claimed that BPI was in
estoppel to claim more than the amount stated in its published notices. Consequently, it
must turn over the excess bid of P6m
After pretrial, the Yu’s moved for summary judgment, pointing out that based on
the answer, the common exhibits of the parties, and the answer to the written
interrogatories to the sheriff, no genuine issues of fact exist in the case. The Yu’s waived
their claim for moral damages so the RTC can dispose of the case through a summary
judgment
Initially, the RTC granted only a partial summary judgment. It reduced the
penalty charge to 12% per annum until the debt would have been fully paid but maintained
the attorney’s fees since BPI already waived the amount that formed part of the attorney’s
fee and reduced the rate of attorney’s fee to 10%. The RTC ruled that facts necessary to
resolve the issues on penalties and fees had been admitted by the parties thus
dispensing with the need to receive evidence. BPI appealed to CA which affirmed RTC’s
decision.
Still, the RTC held that it needed to receive evidence for the resolution of the issues
of (1) whether or not the foreclosure and publication expenses were justified; (2) whether
or not the foreclosure of the lot in Pili, Camarines Sur, was valid given that the proceeds of
the foreclosure of the properties in Legazpi City sufficiently covered the debt; and (3)
whether or not BPI was entitled to its counterclaim for attorney’s fees, moral damages, and
exemplary damages.
The Yu’s moved for partial reconsideration. They argued that, since BPI did not
mark in evidence any document in support of the foreclosure expenses it claimed, it may be
assumed that the bank had no evidence to prove such expenses. The Yu’s also pointed out
that BPI did not dispute the fact that the proceeds of the sale of the properties in Legazpi
City fully satisfied the debt. Thus, the court could already resolve without trial the issue of
whether or not the foreclosure of the Pili property was valid.
Further, the Yu’s sought reconsideration of the reduction of penalty charges and the
allowance of the attorney’s fees. They claimed that the penalty charges should be deleted
for violation of R.A. 3765 or the Truth in Lending Act. BPIs disclosure did not state the rate
of penalties on late amortizations. Also, the Yus asked the court to reduce the attorney’s
fees from 10% to 1% of the amount due. RTC reconsidered its earlier decision and
rendered a summary judgment:
1. Deleting the penalty charges imposed by BPI for noncompliance with the Truth in
Lending Act;
2. Reducing the attorney’s fees to 1% of the principal and interest;
3. Upholding the reasonableness of the foreclosure expenses and cost of publication, both
with interests;
4. Reiterating the turnover by the Clerk of Court to the Yus of the excess in the bid price;
5. Deleting the Yu’s claim for moral damages they having waived it;
 6. Denying the Yus
claim for attorney’s fees for lack of basis; and
 7. Dismissing BPIs counterclaim for moral
and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for lack of merit considering that summary
judgment has been rendered in favor of the Yu’s.
BPI appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the case presented no genuine issues of fact such as to warrant a
summary judgment by the RTC – Yes
2) Where summary judgment is proper, whether or not the RTC and the CA a) correctly
deleted the penalty charges because of BPIs alleged failure to comply with the Truth in
Lending Act; b) correctly reduced the attorney’s fees to 1% of the judgment debt; and c)
properly dismissed BPIs counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
and litigation expenses.

HELD:
A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or
the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact.
In this case, the Court explained that to resolve the issue of the excessive charges
allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look at a) the
pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate
mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the
admissions and other disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the
parties admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of these
documents but also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for
the reception of the evidence of the parties.
BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues
that the parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were valid
and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether
or not the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from
questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with
Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and
publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act.
But, the Supreme Court held that these are issues that could be readily
resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings and the admissions of the
parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or item of fact that it would have
wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would have been such a great waste of time
and resources.
Although BPI failed to state the penalty charges in the disclosure statement, the promissory
note that the Yus signed, on the same date as the disclosure statement, contained a penalty
clause. The Court has affirmed that financial charges are amply disclosed if stated in the
promissory note. In this case, the promissory notes signed by the Yus contained data,
including penalty charges, required by the Truth in Lending Act.
As for the penalty charges, the court finds the ruling of the RTC in its original decision
reasonable and fair. Thus, the penalty charge of 12% per annum or 1% per month is
imposed.
The award of attorneys fee may likewise be equitably reduced. The CA correctly affirmed
the RTC Order to reduce it to 1% based on the following reasons: (1) attorneys fee is not
essential to the cost of borrowing, but a mere incident of collection; (2) 1% is just and
adequate because BPI had already charged foreclosure expenses; (3) attorneys fee of 10%
of the total amount due is onerous considering the rote effort that goes into extrajudicial
foreclosures.

3. Olivarez Realty v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, 9 July 2014, 729 SCRA 544

FACT S: Benjamin Castillo was the re gistere d owner of a parcel of land

located in Laurel, Batangas, cove red by Transfe r Ce rtifi cate of Title No. T -
19972. The Phi lippine Tourism Aut hority alle ge dly clai med ownership of
the same pa rcel of lan d base d on Transfe r Ce rtificate of Title No. T -
18493. On April 5, 2000, Ca stillo and Oli vare z Realty Corporation,
represented b y Dr. Pablo R. Oli vare z, e ntered into a cont ract of conditiona l
sale ove r the p ropert y. Under the dee d of conditional sa le,
Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty Corporation
for P 19, 080,490.00 and Oli vare z Realty Corporati on assumes the
responsibility of t aking necessa ry legal a ction t hru Court t o have the
claim/title TCT T -18493 of Phil ippine Tourism Authorit y ove r t he above -
described prope rty be nullifie d and voide d wit h the full assistan ce of
Castillo.

On September 2, 2004, Castillo file d a complaint for act ion for re scission
against Oliva rez Realty Corporation and Dr. Oli vare z with
the Regi onal Trial Court of Tanauan Cit y, Batangas. Ca stillo allege d that Dr.
Oliva rez convince d him int o se llin g his propert y to Oli vare z Realt y
Corporation on t he representation that the corporation shall be
responsible in clearing the p ropert y of t he ten ants and in payin g t he m
disturbance comp ensation. Howe ve r, the corporati on only paid
2,500,000.00 of the purchase p rice a nd faile d to comply the terms of t he
conditiona l sale. Despite deman d, Oli vare z Rea lty Corporation refuse d t o
fully pa y the purchase pr ice.

In thei r answe r, Oli vare z Rea lty Corporation an d Dr. Oli va rez admitted that
the corporati on on ly pai d P2, 500,000. 00 of the purchase price. In t heir
defense, defen dan ts alle ge d that Castillo faile d to "fully assist " t he
corporation in fi li ng an action again st the Philippine Tourism Aut horit y.
Neither did Castillo clear t he property of the tenants within six months
from the si gning of the dee d of con diti onal sale.

On March 8, 2006, Castillo file d a motion for summary judgment and/or

judgment on the p le adings. He argue d that Oli vare z Realt y Corporati on and
Dr. Oli vare z "sub stantially a dmitte d the mate rial a llegation s of his
complaint." Should judgment on the pleadings be imp rope r, Castillo argue d
that summa ry judgment may still be rendere d as there is no genuine issue
as to any materia l fact.

The trial court found that Oli vare z Realty Corporati on and Dr. Oliva rez’s
answer "substanti ally a dmitted t he mate rial alle gati ons of Castillo’s
complaint an d di d not raise an y gen uine issue as t o a ny mate rial fact. "
Oliva rez Realt y Corporati on and Dr. Oliva rez appeale d to the Court of
Appeals which a ffirmed in toto the trial court’s deci sion. Hence, this
petition for re view on certiorari.

ISSUE: Is summa ry judgment ren de red the Regi onal Trial Court correct ?

RULING: The summary judgment is correct. An issue of material fact exists

if the answer or re sponsive plea ding filed specifi cally de nies the materia l
allegation s of fact set forth in the complaint or pleadin g. If the issue of fact
"requi res t he presentatio n of evi den ce, it is a genuin e issue of fact."
Howeve r, if the i ssue "could be re solved judiciously b y plain resort " to t he
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other paperson file, the issue of fact
raised is sham, an d the t rial court ma y resolve t he a cti on through summa ry
judgment.

A summa ry j udgment is usually dist inguishe d from a judgment on the

pleadings. Un der Rule 34 of t he 1997 Rules of Ci vil Procedure, trial ma y
likewi se be dispen sed with and a case deci de d through judgment on the
pleadings if the an swer file d fails to tender an issue or otherwise a dmits
the materia l alle gat ions of t he clai mant ’s pleadin g.

Judgment on t he pleadings is proper when the answe r fi led fails to ten der
any issue, or othe rwise admits the material allegations in the com plaint.
On the other hand, in a summary judgment, the answer fi led tende rs issues
as specific denia ls and affi rmati ve defenses a re plea de d, but the issues
raised a re sham, fictitious, or othe rwise not genuine.

In this case, Oliva rez Realt y Corporati on admitte d that it did not fully pa y
the purchase pri ce as agree d upon in the deed of condi tional sale. As to
why it withheld pa yments from Ca stillo, it set up the following a ffirmative
defenses: First, Castillo di d not fi le a case to voi d the Philippine Tou rism
Authorit y’s tit le to the prope rty; se cond, Casti llo di d n ot clea r the lan d of
the tenants; t hird, Castillo alle gedly sold t he property t o a thi rd person,
and the sub seque nt sale is current ly being litigate d beforea Que zon
City court.

Conside ring that Olivare z Realt y Corporation an d Dr. Oliva rez’s answe r
tendere d an issue , Castillo p roperly availed himse lf of a moti on for
summa ry judgmen t. Howeve r, the issues ten dere d b y Oli vare z Realt y
Corporation an d Dr. Oli vare z’s answe r are not genuine i ssues of ma te rial
fact. These a re issues that can be resolved judi ciously by plain resort to the
pleadings, a ffi davit s, depositions, and othe r papers on file; ot herwise,
these issues are sham, fictitious, or pa tently un substantia l.

Castillo’s a llege d failure to "ful ly assi st" the corporation in fi ling the case
is not a defense. As the tria l court said, "how can Castillo assist t he
corporation when t he latter di d not file the action in t he first place ?"

Neither can Oli varez Rea lty Corporation argue that it refused to fully pay
the purchase price due t o t he Phi lippine Tourism Authori ty’s a dverse clai m
on the propert y. The corporation knew of this a dve rse claim when it
entered int o a cont ract of conditiona l sale. It e ven ob ligated itself un de r
the deed of conditi onal sa le to sue the Philippine Tourism Aut horit y. This
defense, the refore, is sham.

As de monst rated, t here are n o gen uine issues of materia l fact in thi s case.
These a re issues t hat can be resolve d judiciously by plain resort to t he
pleadings, affidavits, depos itions, and other papers on file. As the
trial court found, Olivare z Realt y Corp oration ille gally wi thheld payments
of the purchase p rice. The trial court did n ot err in ren derin g summary
judgment.

Rule 36 - Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

1. Shimizu Phils. Contractors v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, 20 June 2012, 674 SCRA 65

Summary: Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. The
complaint sought Php 2,329,124.60 as actual damages for the breach of contract.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Dismissal for the case without citing the basis nor
the reasons therefor. The court held that when a complaint is dismissed for failure to
prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on
the merits. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaints dismissal so
that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for
the dismissal. The dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how
and why Shimizu failed to prosecute its complaint. Where the reasons are absent, a
decision (such as the dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a
nullity.

Facts: The petitioner Shimizu claims that Leticia Magsalin, doing business as Karens
Trading, had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation,
and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioners Makati City condominium
project called The Regency at Salcedo. The breach triggered the agreements termination.
When Magsalin also refused to return the petitioners unliquidated advance payment and to
account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to
respondent FGU Insurance Corporation demanding damages pursuant to the surety and
performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance at the RTC of Makati.
The complaint sought P2,329,124.60 as actual damages for the breach of contract. FGU
Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the
corresponding officers return declared that both she and Karens Trading could not be
located at their given addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new addresses could
not be determined.
FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Shimizu filed its opposition to
the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for
reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an answer. To assist the RTC in
acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, Shimizu filed a motion for leave to serve summons on
respondent Magsalin by way of publication. Shimizu then filed its reply to FGU Insurances
answer

FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. Attached to
the motion was the subject complaint, with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and
Concordia Garcia named as third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three
had executed counter-guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it executed for
the subcontract with Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally liable in the
event it is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488.

RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by
publication on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.
The TC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a
motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet
filed their answer. The motion was granted.

Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge
about the surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin. Of the (3)
persons named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer to the third-party
complaint; the officers returns on the summons to the Garcias state that both could not be
located at their given addresses. Incidentally, Shimizu claims, and Baetiong does not
dispute, that it was not served with a copy of Baetiongs answer.

Shimizu now argues before us that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party
complaint, had failed to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a
motion to serve summons by publication should have been filed for this purpose. The
petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the
status of the summons to the third-party defendants

On Dec 16, 2003, the RTC issued a worded Order of Dismissal, dismissing Civil Case No. 02-
488: “For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED”

The RTC denied Shimizu’s motion for reconsideration prompting the latter to elevate its
case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition for review

FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
argued that the appeal raised a pure question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings
before the issuance of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order.

Shimizu, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised questions of fact in the appeal stating
that “While, the instant appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same involves
questions of fact based on the records of the case. It must be emphasized that the lower
court’s dismissal of the case based on alleged failure to prosecute on the part of plaintiff-
appellant was too sudden and precipitate.”

The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioner thus filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the dismissal order is proper?
 2. Whether the dismissal order conforms to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:
1. YES. The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its
conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion,
but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under

Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the December 16,
2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to
be a dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not
expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with
prejudice.” As a prejudicial dismissal, the dismissal order is also deemed to be a
judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488
can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a
complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
2. NO. As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order
conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid
judgments and final orders. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a
complaints dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine
the prima facie justification for the dismissal. The dismissal order clearly violates
this rule for its failure to disclose how and why Shimizu failed to prosecute its
complaint. Thus, neither Shimizu nor the reviewing court is able to know the
particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal.

A void decision, however, is open to collateral attack. While we note that the validity
of the dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was
never raised by the petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court
is vested with ample authority to review an unassigned error if it finds that
consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just
decision in an appeal. In this case, the interests of substantial justice warrant the
review of an obviously void dismissal order.

2. Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400

FACTS:
The funding for the Agno Rover Flood Control Project, a public works project, was to be
derived primarily through a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).
DPWH constituted a Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) for the purpose of conducting
international competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract. Among the 6 pre-
qualified bidders are present intervenors Daewoo and China International.

Nolasco, invoking his right as a taxpayer, prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained
from awarding the contract to Daewoo and have Daewoo disqualified as a bidder. He
alleged having obtained copies of "Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH
Consultant". He said that based on the reports, Daewoo's bid was unacceptable and the
putative award to Daewoo illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the
Filipino taxpayers.

March 27, 2002: the RTC of Manila dismissed Nolasco's petition. According to the RTC, it
was a suit against the State, which had been sued without its consent. Meanwhile, BAC
resolved to recommend the award of the contract to Daewoo as it has the lowers bid;
DPWH Secretary Datumanong approved (i.e signed) the recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was a suit against the State without its consent.

HELD: Yes. An unincorporated government agency such as the DPWH is without any
separate juridical personality of its own and hence enjoys immunity from suit.
It cannot be said that the DPWH was deemed to have given its consent to be sued by
entering into a contract, for at the time the petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had not
yet entered into a contract with respect to the project. The presumption is that the State
and its elements act correctly unless otherwise proven.

An obiter dictum is a nonessential, welcome and sublime like a poem of love in a last will or
unwanted and asinine as in brickbats in a funeral oration. It is neither enforceable as a
relief nor the source of a judicially actionable claim. However, by reason of its non-binding
nature, the pronouncement does not generally constitute error of law or grave abuse of
discretion, even if it proves revelatory of the erroneous thinking on the part of the judge. It
is chiefly for that reason that this petition is being denied, albeit with all clarifications
necessary to leave no doubt as to the status and legal effect of the controvertible Order
dated 6 September 2002 issued by Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr. (Petitioner) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 32.

3. Obra v. Badua, et al., G.R. No. 149125, 9 August 2007, 529 SCRA 621

FACTS:
 The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents
against Anacleto and Resurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and
Crisanta Badua
 R alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned Bacnotan,
La Union, were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas.
 Their only access to the national highway was a pathway traversing the northern
portion of petitioners property and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases
and Baduas.
 Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking
respondents access to the national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the
fence, but petitioner refused
 P averred that R failed to satisfy the requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code in order to establish an easement of right-of-way
 P alleged that respondents had another access as ingress and egress to the public
road other than the one traversing her property.
 The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an answer; consequently, they were
declared in default.
 On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint.
 It held that respondents were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their
claim of an easement of right of way
 the applied easement of right-of-way on the northern portion of petitioners
property was not allowed. The said Decision became final and executory
 Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which
again restricted the use of respondents’ new pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by
petitioner’s action, respondents filed on March 6, 2001 a Motion to Enforce
 They alleged that the Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based on the
existence of a new pathway which they had been using since 1995.
 RTC granted the said motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was rejected in the trial courts
 TC held that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioners’ representation
that she was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her property as an
alternative pathway. Since the southern portion was an agreed pathway, petitioner could
not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking
the passage.

Issue: W/N the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a property
not the subject of a pending case (particularly Civil Case No. 5033)

Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.

 The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive part
of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties.Thus,
where there is a conflict between the fallo and the ratio decidendi or body of the decision,
the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the
opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. The rule applies when the
dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal, and can
wholly be given effect without need of interpretation or construction.
 When a court rules that the case or complaint is dismissed, then it is concluded that
the cause of action embodied in the allegations of the initiatory pleading has no merit or
basis, and the prayer is consequently denied.
 Apparently, no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of
this new pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the Court on petitioners
property in Civil Case No. 5033. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the southern portion
had no basis.
 More importantly, the case was dismissed by the RTC, meaning no relief was
granted by the court to respondents. Granting arguendo that the issue on the entitlement to
respondents of a right-of-way over the southern portion was likewise raised and was
implicit from the pleadings; nevertheless, respondents, by the dismissal of the case, were
not granted any affirmative relief by the trial court. As such, the trial court clearly erred in
issuing the March 20, 2001 Order which granted a relief not found in the fallo of the
decision.
 It is plain to see that such act of constructing the fence was subsequent to the
Decision and could not have been covered by said judgment.
 In the new case, respondents are obliged to prove all the essential elements of the
easement of right-of-way a requirement which they failed to satisfy in Civil Case No. 5033.
 The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of an
easement of right-of-way over the pathway located south of petitioners property,
nevertheless, concluded that the said passage was an agreed or voluntary easement of
right-of-way which petitioner should respect.
 The trial court was in error.
 It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final judgment
and is left only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any amendment or alteration
which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
 More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it
should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and
ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by
respondents.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the assailed March 20, 2001 and June 20, 2001
Orders are null, void, an

Rule 39 - Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

1. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Abella, G.R. No. 143510, 23

November 2005, 476 SCRA 1

FACTS:
The property in dispute is a parcel of land covered by tax declaration in the name of herein
respondents, the heirs of Don Manuel I. Abella. According to herein petitioner said parcel of
land had been donated to him by respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange for masses to
be offered once a month in perpetuity for the eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I.
Abella. Respondents, on the other hand, deny such allegation and counter that petitioner
encroached and fenced off the subject parcel of land without their consent.

Hence, the Heirs of Abella filed a forcible entry case before the MTC of Naga against
the petitioner.

The judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the MTC’S Decision was
affirmed by the RTC (Branch 22). Thus, the Decision was appealed by the respondent to CA.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC (Branch 22) by denying Abella’s petition for review.
While the case was pending before the CA, ABELLA filed another case before RTC (Branch
24) against the petitioner, for Quieting of Title involving the same property subject matter
of MTC (Forcible Entry). RTC branch 24 rendered decision in favor of Heirs of Abella
declaring them as the rightful owner of the subject property and that the herein defendant
has no rightful claim of ownership over the same.

The Decision was appealed by petitioner to CA, which later affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Thus, the petitioner appealed the CA’s decision before the Supreme Court, said appeal was
dismissed holding that there was no reversible error committed by the appellate court.

Both Decisions in the Forcible Entry case and in the Quieting of Title case are now final and
executory.

The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute the Decision in the Forcible Entry case, MTC denied
the motion for execution.

ISSUE:
WON the decision in Quieting of Title case was supervening event in the Forcible Entry
case?
HELD: YES.

The finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never agreed to donate the
property or to allow petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the
forcible entry case.

The foregoing findings totally foreclose petitioners belated claim that even if title over the
property remained with respondents, he is nevertheless entitled to possession thereof.
Since respondents never made the alleged donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual
basis for petitioner to claim the right of possession over it.

Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the decision of the quieting
of title constitutes a supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment
in the forcible entry.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Court explained thus:

... The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates
when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final
judgment that is subject to only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues
even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment.
 ...
One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the
existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances
which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which
the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
existence at that time.

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment
in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also
attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and
the concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in
the forcible entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively
declared the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.

2. Lu v. Siapno, A.M. MTJ-99-1199, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 181

Francisco Lu is the defendant in a civil case for ejectment raffled to respondent Judge
Orlando Ana F. Siapno of the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan and docketed
as Civil Case No. 4112. In his administrative complaint, Francisco Lu alleges that he filed an
Answer with Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint[1] for ejectment which was later
amended. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] the ejectment case on the ground that
plaintiffs therein were no longer the owners of the land in question, the same having been
sold to the Shahanis on February 7, 1995 and later transferred in the names of the latter
under TCT No. 202393. On September 7, 1995, respondent Judge Siapno rendered
judgment[3] against Lu which decision was allegedly received by Lu's counsel on September
13, 1995.[4] A notice of appeal[5] was filed on the same day. On September 11, 1995, MTC-
Clerk of Court Celestina Corpuz issued a Writ of Execution[6] which was allegedly
implemented by Sheriff Domingo S. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 45 who forcibly ejected Lu from the premises.

While on appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 47 issued a
preliminary mandatory injunction and declared the writ of execution earlier issued by the
MTC-Urdaneta, Pangasinan to be null and void.[7] On February 5, 1996, RTC-Branch 47
rendered judgment modifying the MTC-judgment by deleting the paragraph "(I)n
accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued."[8] Hence, Lu filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals on February 21, 1996 which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 39875.[9] Meanwhile, plaintiff's counsel filed on February 19, 1996 a Motion for
Execution[10] with MTC which was granted by respondent Judge Siapno granted in the
Order dated February 22, 1996[11] allegedly without notice and hearing. The writ of
execution was issued by Clerk of Court Corpuz on the same day.[12]
On April 2, 1996, Atty. Joselino Viray, plaintiff's counsel, filed an Ex-parte Motion to
Withdraw deposit praying that the amount deposited in the municipal treasurer be
withdrawn in order to satisfy the judgment. Said motion was granted in the Order dated
April 2, 1996.[13] On April 23, 1996, Atty. Viray filed a Motion for Special Demolition which
was likewise granted by respondent Judge Siapno, allegedly without notice and hearing, in
his Order of May 20, 1996 which order was later amended on May 21, 1996 as the first
order directed the plaintiff therein, instead of the sheriff, to demolish the structure on the
subject property.[14] On the same date, May 21, 1991, Sheriff Lopez immediately
implemented the order of demolition by serving a copy of the said order upon
complainant's wife and proceeding to demolish the structure, building and other
improvements on the land in question.[15] The order of demolition was allegedly received
by complainant's counsel on May 28, 1996.[16]

Hence, this complaint for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, abdication of
official function and gross misconduct.

Respondent Siapno denied all the accusations against him. He filed his Comment and
Answer to the complaint against him. On the charge of gross incompetence in the
performance of his duties for not dismissing Civil Case No. 4112, respondent Judge argues
that complainant Lu filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that the land subject
of the controversy was already sold to the Shahanis but since the said case is governed by
the Rules on Summary Procedure, the court did not take action on Lu's motion to dismiss
being a prohibited pleading.

As regards the charge of gross ignorance of the law for rendering a decision providing in its
dispositive portion the issuance of a writ of execution without notice and hearing,
respondent Judge contends that he did not issue a writ of execution implementing the
decision since it was his Clerk of Court Celestina Corpuz who signed the writ of execution
without his authority. Respondent Judge further denies the charge of partiality and bias in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant (herein complainant) in the subject case.
He denied having committed a mistake in allowing the motion to withdraw deposit since
his decision has been affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and under the rules, the decision
of the latter is immediately executory. The motion for demolition was likewise granted in
view of the affirmance of his decision ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the
premises. Hence, respondent Judge prays for the dismissal of the instant case for lack of
merit.

In the Counter-Affidavit (Answer) of respondent Sheriff Lopez, he alleges that the writ of
execution dated September 11, 1995 was not implemented because of the appeal of the
MTC-decision to the Regional Trial Court which nullified the writ; that he was not the one
who implemented the writ of execution but a certain Eduardo Ramos, the Deputy Sheriff of
RTC-Branch 47 since Lopez was detailed as sheriff of the office of the Clerk of Court from
October 1989 up to April 1997; that per Sheriff's Return dated February 23, 1996, it was
Sheriff Ramos who implemented the writ of execution, a copy of the writ and the order
having been served upon Lu who voluntarily vacated the premises; that he (respondent
Lopez) implemented the order of demolition since there was no restraining order issued by
the Court of Appeals while the case was pending appeal and that complainant Lu already
voluntarily vacated the premises; and that a copy of the order of demolition was served
upon Lu's wife, Elvie, who allegedly refused to sign therein. Respondent Sheriff Lopez
claims that he performed what he believed to be his ministerial duty.

Respondent Sheriff Lopez filed a Manifestation stating that he applied for optional
retirement to take effect May 9, 1998 and requesting that the amount of P20,000.00 be
retained to answer for any penalty that may be meted out to him. His request was denied in
this Court's Resolution dated March 24, 1999.

The case was referred to Judge Modesto C. Juanson of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta
City, Branch 46 for investigation, report and recommendation. He made the following
findings: (1) on the charge of gross incompetence in the performance of his duties against
respondent Judge, the same is belied by the RTC-decision dismissing the appeal which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals; (2) on gross ignorance of the law, the investigating judge
opined that it was Clerk of Court Corpuz who prepared, signed and issued the writ of
execution without consulting the respondent Judge thereby absolving the latter from any
responsibility; (3) on the charge of abdication of his official function, the investigating
judge was of the view that respondent Judge should not be faulted by the unauthorized
action of her clerk of court.

As regards respondent Sheriff Lopez, the investigating Judge found him guilty for violating
the rights of complainant Lu without giving the latter five (5) days notice to remove his
personal belongings.

Hence, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation:

"1. Respondent Siapno is exonerated in all the charges;

2. Respondent Lopez is meted a penalty of P10,000.00 with warning that repetition of the
same shall be dealt with severely;

3. Celestina Corpuz, not being charged, but on the principle of res ipsa loquitor be meted a
fine of P10,000.00 with the warning that repetition of the same shall be dealt with
severely."

In the Memorandum dated February 10, 2000, the Court Administrator

recommended, inter alia, that the: (1) respondent Judge likewise fined in the amount
of P10,000.00 each. The Court Administrator opined that the respondent Judge erred in
including in the dispositive portion of his decision the directive that "(I)n accordance with
the Rules, let the Writ of Execution be issued" and by doing so, respondent Judge had no
other intention but to see to it that the decision is "immediately executed" without any
further action on the part of the plaintiffs therein.
In the Resolution dated February 28, 2000, this Court forwarded the charge against Atty.
Joselino A. Viray to the Office of the Bar Confidant, for appropriate action, the latter having
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

We agree with the Court Administrator that respondent Judge Siapno is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law when he rendered judgment providing, in the dispositive portion, for
its immediate execution. It should be noted that the Regional Trial Court, while affirming
the judgment of the respondent Judge, nevertheless deleted that portion of the decision
providing for immediate execution. Basic is the rule that a judge may not order execution of
judgment in the decision itself.[17] Section 21 of the Rules on Summary Procedure likewise
provides that the decision of the regional trial court is immediately executory. Even if
immediately executory, there must first be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for
that purpose. In an ejectment case, the adverse party is entitled to notice before execution
can be ordered.[18] In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, respondent Judge
showed gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. The lack of malicious
intent, however, cannot completely free respondent Judge from liability. When the law is
elementary, so elementary not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[19]

As regards the charge of partiality and bias in favor of the plaintiffs, we find the same to be
unsubstantiated. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is not enough; there
should be adequate evidence to prove the charge.[20]

Clerk of Court Corpuz admitted that she issued and signed the writ of execution without
consulting the respondent judge. Sheriff Lopez likewise admitted that the writ of execution
dated September 11, 1995 was not implemented because of the appeal to the RTC which
nullified the writ. He claims, however, that he was not the one who implemented the
second writ of execution but it was Mr. Eduardo Ramos of the RTC-Branch 47. In the
Sheriff's Return dated February 23, 1996 submitted by Ramos, it appears that Lu vacated
the subject premises voluntarily.

As regards the writ of demolition, Sheriff Lopez argues that although the RTC-decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter did not issue any restraining order, thus the
implementation of the order of demolition following the return of the writ issued on
February 22, 1996.

The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff must be held responsible. The issuance of the writ of
execution and its subsequent implementation without motion and hearing and at the time
the copy of the judgment has not yet been received by defendant's counsel, was precipitate
and against all sense of fair play. Lu's counsel received the MTC-decision on September 13,
1995 and filed a notice of appeal on the same day. However, the writ of execution was
issued by Clerk of Court Corpuz on September 11, 1995 and was implemented by Sheriff
Lopez on said date. Clearly, there was a violation of the rules of procedure. Even in the Rule
on Summary Procedure, a judgment must first be given to the losing party before it can be
executed.[21]
Moreover, as found by Investigating Judge Juanson, Sheriff Lopez removed the personal
belongings of Lu without giving the latter five (5) days notice to remove the same or to
obtain remedies somewhere. Under the Rules of Court, the immediate enforcement of a
writ of execution in ejectment cases is carried out by giving the defendant notice of such
writ, and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a reasonable period,
normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only after such period that the sheriff
enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant and his personal
belongings.[22] And if demolition is involved, there must first be a hearing on motion and
due notice for the issuance of a special order under Section 14, Rule 39.[23]

While we agree with the recommendation of both the Court Administrator and the
Investigating Judge imposing a fine upon respondent Sheriff Lopez in the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), we find the same to be too harsh. So too is the fine imposed
upon respondent Judge as recommended by the Court Administrator. Accordingly, the
amount of fine is reduced to five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) in both cases.

As regards Clerk of Court Corpuz, she was not impleaded in the instant administrative
complaint and should be given her day in court. The Court Administrator is directed to
institute a separate administrative case against her.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Orlando Ana F. Siapno of the

Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

For gross abuse of authority, respondent Sheriff Domingo S. Lopez, Sheriff IV of the
Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 45 is FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

They are likewise warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely by this Court.

The Court Administrator is further directed to institute the appropriate administrative case
against Clerk of Court Celestina Corpuz.

SO ORDERED.

3. RCPI v. Lantin, No. L-59311, 31 January 1985, 134 SCRA 395

FACTS: On September 8, 1978, Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World

Association of Law Students (WALS), sent two cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one
addressed to Mohammed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union, and the other to
Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States.

The cablegrams were, in turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign
destinations. The telegram to Taha advised him of Rodriguez's pending arrival in Khartoum
on September 18, 1978, while the telegram to Merger advised her of the scheduled WALS
conference in Khartoum. Rodriguez left the Philippines on September 15, 1978. On
September 18, 1978, he arrived in Khartoum, Sudan at 9:30 in the evening. Nobody was at
the airport to meet him.
Due to the lateness of the hour, he was forced to sleep at the airport. He lined up five (5)
chairs together and lay down with his luggages near him. Because of the non-receipt of the
cablegram, Taha was not able to meet him. Worse all preparations for the international
conference had to be cancelled.

Furthermore, Fernando Barros, the Vice-President, arrived the next day from Chile,
followed by the other officers from other countries except Diane Merger, the organization's
secretary. It turned out that the wire sent by Rodriguez to Merger was delivered to the
address on the message but the person who delivered it was told that the addressee was no
longer staying there. This fact was not accordingly reported to Rodriguez in Metro Manila.
The undelivered cablegram was not returned by the correspondent abroad to Globe for
disposition in the Philippines,

On December 8, 1978, Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages in the

amount of P45,147.00, moral damages in the amount of P250,000.00,' and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 against RCPI and GLOBE.

TC – ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the defendants to jointly and severally to
pay the plaintiff the total sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P213,148.00) by way of damages and to pay the costs of this suit.

On May 26, 1980, Rodriguez filed a "Motion for Execution Before Expiration of Time to
Appeal" relying on Rule 39, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court alleging that the appeal
is clearly dilatory and that the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment illusory and
ineffective. An opposition to the motion was filed by RCPI on June 3, 1980 and by GLOBE on
November 18,1980.

Respondent court of first instance granted the said motion.

Upon consideration of the Motion for execution pending appeal, the opposition thereto and
the arguments in open court by the parties, and finding that:
a) the appeal was for the purpose of delay, there being breach of contract, and defendants'
evidence being weak or feeble;
b) plaintiff is willing to put up a bond in the amount of P213,148.00 to answer for damages
if the decision is reversed on appeal
The Court grants the motion. Let writ of execution pending appeal be issued upon the filing
of a bond by plaintiff in the sum of P213,148.00. Said bond should be filed within ten (10)
days from receipt of this order.

On February 5, 1981, the same court issued another order which reads as follows:
The bond pursuant to the order of January 21, 1981, is approved. Let writ of execution of
judgment pending appeal be issued forthwith.
On February 10, 1981, GLOBE filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order and
expressed its desire to put up a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution. This
motion was denied in an order dated February 17, 1981. Even before the issuance of this
order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent Sheriff, on February
13, 1981, insisted on levying on the funds and assets of petitioners RCPI and GLOBE,
prompting them to file an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. This urgent motion
was likewise denied.

On February 17, 1981, RCPI and GLOBE filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. On February 20, 1981, the Court of Appeals issued a restraining
order enjoining the lower court from further proceeding with the civil case and from
enforcing the writ of execution until further orders.

CA - .dismissed the petition for lack of merit and upheld the validity of the question orders

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it declined to disturb the
judgment of the trial court on the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal?

HELD: NO.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court may, in its
discretion, order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the
motion and the special order shall be included therein.
The rule specifically vests the court with the exercise of discretionary power. The
requisites for the court's valid exercise of the discretion to order execution pending appeal
are: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2)
there must be good reasons for issuing the execution, and (3) the good reasons must be
stated in a special order.
In its questioned decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the nature of execution
pending appeal as an exceptional remedy which must be interpreted restrictively, citing the
many ruling cases on this point. At the same time, what was before the appellate court was
not the application of a general rule but the exception thereto, the special reasons or
circumstances warranting execution pending appeal.
The court likewise noted that the questioned order made reference to the reasons averred
in the motion which appeared to it to be good and which it found to be sufficient
compliance with the law (Joven v. Boncan, 67 Phil. 252). It noted the finding of the trial
court that the appeal interposed by the petitioners was not based on strong grounds, which
finding is again a good reason for execution pending appeal. (Presbitero v. Rodas, 73 Phil.
300; Iloilo Trading Center and Exchange v. Rodas, 78 Phil. 789)
The petitioners pit their arguments against the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the
Court of First Instance on the special nature of the circumstances warranting the exercise
of discretionary power, the weak defenses at trial and weak reasons on appeal, and the
nature of the evidence upon which the decision is based. Insofar as actual and
compensatory damages are concerned, we find insufficient cause to restrain the exercise of
discretionary power.
The merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution
pending appeal (City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 98). However, the facts
and circumstances clearly brought out during trial cannot help but influence
whether or not an appeal appears to be dilatory and whether or not there are
sufficient reasons including considerations of justice and equity to justify a
departure from the regular procedures regarding execution.
3.
4. Stronghold Ins. v. Felix, G.R. No. 148090, 28 November 2006, 508 SCRA 357

FACTS: Respondent Gloria Dee Chong is the owner of the Fuso truck with Plate No. PWH
512. The vehicle was insured by petitioner Stronghold Insurance Company under
Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 279675.3 The comprehensive motor car insurance policy for
P15,306.45 undertook to indemnify the insured against loss or damage to the car and death
or injury caused to third persons by reason of accident.

While the policy was in effect, the vehicle figured in an accident along National Highway in
Brgy. Palihan, Hermosa, Bataan resulting in the death of four (4) persons while seriously
injuring three (3) others. Two (2) vehicles were also heavily damaged as a result of the
accident. Pursuant to the provisions of the insurance contract, respondent Chong filed a
claim for the recovery of the proceeds of her policy in the amount of P550,000.00.

The claim was, however, denied by the insurance company on the ground that at the time
the accident took place the driver of the insured vehicle was heavily drunk as shown in the
Pagpapatunay issued by Barangay Chairman Rafael Torres and the Medico Legal Certificate
which was signed by a certain Dr. Ferdinand Bautista.

The denial of the claim prompted respondents to initiate an action for the recovery of sum
of money against petitioner before the RTC of Caloocan City. Respondent alleged that their
claim was unjustly denied by the insurance company. They argued that there was no
sufficient proof to support the claim of the petitioner that the driver was drunk at the time
of the incident underscoring the lack of mention of such crucial fact in the police blotter
report documenting the incident. For lack of justifiable reasons to avoid the policy,
respondents insisted that petitioner is liable to deliver their claim pursuant to the terms of
the insurance contract.

In refuting the allegations in the complaint, petitioner averred that the intoxication of the
driver of the insured vehicle legally avoided the liability of the insurance company under
the policy. Petitioner further claimed that the insured violated Section 53 of Republic Act
No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) which prohibits driving of motor vehicles
under the influence of alcohol.

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. During the hearing, both parties
adduced testimonial and documentary evidence to support their respective positions.
On 7 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision7 in favor of the respondents thereby
ordering the petitioner to deliver the amount of P550,000.00 representing the proceeds of
the insurance contract. According to the court a quo, petitioner failed to prove by prima
facie evidence that the driver of the insured vehicle was indeed under the influence of
alcohol at the time of the accident thereby making the avoidance of the policy unjustified
under the circumstances.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC that there was no violation
of the contract of insurance but deleted the award for exemplary damages. Resonating the
ruling of the trial court, the appellate court dismissed the pieces of evidence presented by
the petitioner as mere hearsay without evidentiary value.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proven during the trial that the driver of the insured vehicle
was intoxicated at the time of the accident thereby precluding the respondents from
claiming the proceeds of the insurance policy.

HELD: Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, it miserably failed to prove the fact of
intoxication during the trial. Aside from the Medico Legal Certificate and the Pagpapatunay,
which were stripped of evidentiary value because of the dubious circumstances under
which they were obtained, the petitioner did not adduce other proof to justify the
avoidance of the policy. It must be emphasized that the RTC doubted the authenticity of the
Medico Legal Certificate because of the attendant alteration and tampering on the face of
the document. In adopting the findings of the trial court, the appellate court reiterated the
evidentiary rule that the party alleging violation of the provision of the contract bears the
burden of proof to prove the same.

Notably, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in
his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant's. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to
evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing, than that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

In this case, the lack of statement to the effect that the driver was under the influence of
alcohol in the said report is too significant to escape the attention of this Court.

This case involves a contract of insurance, the authenticity and validity of which was
uncontested. In exempting insurers from liability under the contract, proof thereof must be
clear, credible and convincing. Fundamental is the rule that the contract is the law between
the parties and, that absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, it shall be enforced to the letter
by the courts.
 5. Heirs of Sangkay v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 141447, 4 May 2006,
489 SCRA 401

FACTS:
 Macabangkit Sangkay was the owner of a 227,065-square-meter parcel of land
located in Iligan City. When he died intestate, the property was subdivided into nine
parcels and subsequently titled to his heirs.
 Said Heirs declared their properties for taxation purposes in their respective names.
 In 1979, NAPOCOR constructed an underground three-kilometer long tunnel
traversing the properties of the Heirs, about 100 meters beneath the surface and wasd
used for the operation of NAPOCOR’s Hydro-Electric Project
 The Heirs were not informed that such underground tunnel had been constructed;
neither did NAPOCOR compensate them for the use of their property
 The Heirs filed a complaint for damages and recovery of possession of the property
with alternative prayer for just compensation against NAPOCOR
 They prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor after due proceedings, to wit:
 1. Directing defendants to remove and dismantle its underground tunnel
 2. To pay plaintiffs a monthly rental from 1979 up to the time the defendant vacates
the sub terrain of the land of plaintiffs
 3. Either by the removal of the tunnel or by paying just compensation to plaintiffs;
 4. To pay moral damages and exemplary damages
 5. Pay attorney’s fees
 6. Such other relief deemed just and equitable under the circumstance
 The RTC declared that the construction of the underground tunnel affected the
entire area of the Heirs’ property. Consequently, plaintiffs lost the agricultural, industrial,
commercial and residential value of the land.
 Before NAPOCOR was served with a copy of said Decision, the Heirs filed an Urgent
Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal, alleging that execution pending appeal
was justified, considering the trial court’s finding that it (NAPOCOR) had acted in bad faith
in constructing the tunnel.
 NAPOCOR opposed the motion, It contended that the Heirs failed to prove that it
acted in bad faith when it constructed the tunnel
 D claimed that heirs were never deprived of the beneficial use of their land
 The trial court issued the Special Order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and awarded 70% of the money judgment, or P79,472,750.00, upon the filing of
a P1,000,000.00 bond
 Monthly rentals, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fee and cost are excluded
from the execution pending appeal
 NAPOCOR before the CA via petition for review on certiorari claiming that
respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
 The CA rendered judgment granting the petition and set aside the assailed orders of
the trial court.
 According to the CA, under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the act revising the
charter of NAPOCOR, any action by any person claiming compensation and/or damages
shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-way, transmission lines, substations,
plants or other facilities shall have been established; after the said period, no suit can be
brought to question the same
 The Heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied for lack of
merit on January 13, 2000
 Petitioners allege that the CA erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of
respondent NAPOCOR on its finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing the Special Order

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion in granting petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal of its decision and
supplemental decision in the amount of P79,472,750.00

Ruling:
 The rule is that execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceedings upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been perfected. However, the trial court may
grant execution before the expiration of the period to appeal upon motion of the prevailing
party provided that it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, and there are good reasons for
such execution to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
 As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, execution of the
judgment or final order pending appeal is discretionary. It is the exception to the rule that
only a final judgment may be executed, hence, must be strictly construed. Execution
pending appeal should not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances
 The CA ruled correctly when it held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted private respondents’
motion for execution pending appeal in the absence of good reasons to justify the grant of
said motion.
 The Rules of Court do not enumerate the circumstances which would justify the
execution of the judgment or decision pending appeal.
 The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a court to
issue a writ of execution pending appeal.
 The mere posting of a bond will not justify execution pending appeal.
 The well-established rule is that it is not for the trial court to determine the merits
of the decision it rendered and use the same as basis for its order allowing execution
pending appeal.
 In light of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
 For lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

6. Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, 14 March 2007, 518 SCRA 334

FACTS:
In a decision in 1976, CFI granted the application filed by the Lirio spouses for registration
of title to a certain lot
The said decision become final and executor in 1977
In 1982, the judge of CFI directed the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Petitioner Ting filed an application to register title to the same lot
with the RTC of Cebu
The respondents, heirs of Lirio, filed their Answer calling attention to the 1976 decision
which had become final and executor in 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of
Ting’s application on the ground of res judicata
The RTC dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata
Petitioner argues that although the 1976 decision had become final and executor in 1977,
no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority.
Petitioner contends that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration and that a certain
Engr. Rafaela Belleza claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous
and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land
Management Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in
court.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it
is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of
the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They
are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral
land registration proceedings.

As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or

order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

ISSUE: WON Section 6 of Rule 39 of Rules of Court is applicable in the Land Registration
Proceedings?

HELD: NO.
This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the
winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

7. Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 123

Facts: Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (or "Muntinlupa RTC"; Branch
276), presided over by Hon. Norma C. Perello (or "respondent judge"), was an action for
revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. (or "private respondent")
against Adelaida Infante (or "petitioner").
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (or "Makati RTC"; Branch 60) in an action for specific performance and
damages which became final and executory on November 16, 1994. The dispositive portion
read:
26. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B. INFANTE is ordered to do the following
within thirty (30) days from finality hereof:
26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN BUILDERS, INC. the following: (a) the
complete plans (lot plan, location map and vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power of
Attorney; (c ) Real Estate Tax clearance; (d) tax receipts; (e) proof of up to date
payment of Subdivision Association dues referred to in the "CONTRACT TO SELL"
dated November 10, 1986 (Exh. A or Exh. 1);
26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase 3-A1, Ayala
Alabang Subdivision covered by TCT No. 114015 for P500,000.00 in favor of the
plaintiff;
26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and other taxes
which the Bureau of Internal Revenue may assess in connection with the sale
mentioned in the preceding paragraph and to submit to the plaintiff proof of such
payment;
26.1.4. To secure the written conformity of AYALA CORPORATION to the said
sale and to give such written conformity to the plaintiff;
26.1.5. To register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to
AYALA CORPORATION the certificate of title issued in the name of plaintiff pursuant
to such registration;
26.2 Upon the compliance of the defendant with the preceding directives, the
plaintiff must immediately pay to the defendant the sum of P321,918.25;
26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
26.4 The Complaint for moral and exemplary damages is DISMISSED;
26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment) on the
grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and
that venue was improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.
On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an order which reads:
The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.
Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by the Makati Regional Trial Court,
but it must be emphasized that at that time there was still no Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa City, then under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that
cases from this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the creation of the
Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters involving properties located in
this City, and cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be
litigated before these Courts.
The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared the plaintiff as the
owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City. It is this judgment which is
sought to be enforced thru this action which necessarily involves the interest,
possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa city and
adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying that the complaint should be filed in the
latter City where the property is located, as there are now Regional Trial Courts
hereat.
Defendant may answer the complaint within the remaining period, but no
less than five (5) days, otherwise a default judgment might be taken against her.
It is SO ORDERED.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge for "erroneously holding that Civil Case No. 01-
164 is a revival of judgment which declared private respondent as the owner of a parcel of
land located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the judgment rendered by the (Makati RTC) in
Civil Case No. 15563 sought to be enforced necessarily involves the interest, possession,
title and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City."
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and damages before
the Makati RTC is a personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment
therein is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the action for revival
of judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City where private respondent and
petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the subject action for revival
judgment is "quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real
property"; and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is
situated.
On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling in favor of herein
private respondent. The CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the complaint for revival of judgment is
an action in rem which was correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the disputed real
property is located.
Held: No. Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the
lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule
does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court
where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant
resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the
venue of actions in general.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action
for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules
on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property,
or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place
where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real
actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a
real action or a personal action.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory judgment
has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala
Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in
connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver
to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private respondent. The
same judgment ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon
petitioner's compliance with the aforementioned order. It is further alleged that petitioner
refused to comply with her judgment obligations despite private respondent's repeated
requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the action for revival of
judgment. Private respondent then prayed that the judgment be revived and a writ of
execution be issued to enforce said judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right to have
the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private
respondent has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or
interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason
for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights
over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects
private respondent's interest over real property.1avvphi1
 The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should
indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.

8. Cardinal v. Asset, G.R. No. 149696, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA 103

Doctrine: Judgments; Writs of Execution; An execution must conform to and be warranted

by the judgment on which it was issued; A money judgment does not authorize the
issuance of a writ of possession.

Summary: Marual owns condominium units of Cardinal. Cardinal, due to Marual’s failure
to pay assessment dues, went to the RTC and was able to get a writ of possession of the said
units. However, it appeared that Marual already sold his condominium units to herein
respondent Asset and the deed of sale was registered in the RD of Manila. The issue is
whether or not the issuance of the writ of possession was valid. The court held that The
Decision rendered by the RTC based on the compromise agreement by the parties is
a money judgment, the enforcement of which is provided in Section 9, Rule 39. Nothing in
the above provisions authorizes the RTC to issue a writ of possession over the two
condominium units in favor of Cardinal. CA rendered a decision in favor of Asset.

Facts: Cardinal Building Owners Association, Inc., petitioner, is a corporation organized

and existing under R.A. No. 4726 (Condominium Act). Benjamin Marual is a member of
petitioner association being the owner of two condominium units (1st floor and 2nd floor) at
the Cardinal Office Condominium. Due to Marual’s failure to pay assessment dues in the
amount of P530k, Cardinal filed with the RTC Manila a complaint for sum of money
against him.
During the course of the proceedings, Cardinal and Marual filed with the RTC a
Compromise Agreement, declaring that they have amicably settled their controversy
under the following terms and conditions:
1. Marual binds himself to settle all his outstanding dues and/or assessments to
Cardinal totaling the sum of P381,152.52 in the following manner:
a) P75k upon signing of this agreement as and by way of initial settlement of dues and/or
assessments in the amount of P25k, and attorneys fees: P50k;
b) P21k every 5th day of each month until his account is fully paid.
2. The parties hereby waive their respective claims and counterclaims;
3. Should defendant fail to make good any of the postdated checks, the plaintiff shall
be entitled to execute the judgment of this court, for the full amount of plaintiffs claim of
P381,152.52, plus accruing amounts due in months subsequent and interest and charges.
Should the foregoing be not complied with, the parties further agree that plaintiff may
proceed with the extrajudicial enforcement of its lien under the provisions of the
Condominium Act and the condominiums master deed, and pertinent provisions of
documents covering defendants condominium units at Stanisco Towers (Cardinal Bldg.
Condo).
The RTC rendered a Decision approving the Compromise Agreement and enjoining the
parties to strictly comply with its terms. However, Marual failed to comply with his
obligation, prompting Cardinal to file with the RTC a motion for the execution of the
compromise judgment. Accordingly, the RTC issued a writ of execution. The court
sheriff served a Notice of Levy/Attachment upon Realty on the RD of Manila. It was only at
this time when Cardinal learned that there were prior annotations on the same titles,
thus:
a) On October 7, 1993, Marual mortgaged his two condominium units to Planters
Development Bank, was foreclosed and the said units were sold to the bank at a public
auction. On March 27, 1996, the certificate of sale was annotated of the 2 TCTs
(b) Before the expiration of the period for redemption of the foreclosed realties,
Marual sold the same units to Asset Recovery and Management
Corporation, herein respondent. On February 26, 1997, the deed of sale was registered
in the RD of Manila
(c) On March 4, 1997, Asset filed with the RTC Manila, an action for mandamus to
redeem the condominium units against the bank. The RTC then issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the bank from consolidating in its name the titles or
taking possession of the units, or otherwise disposing of them until further orders from the
court.
Because of this, petitioner filed with the RTC, in the same case for sum of money, a Motion
for Possession of the units. The RTC issued an Order granting the motion and
directing the issuance of the writ of possession.
The Order Accordingly States that: Cardinal is allowed to repossess subject condo units for
(4) years to enable it to recover the aforesaid account of Marual plus reasonable interest.
Cardinal is allowed to lease but not mortgage or sell the condo units to achieve the
objective. Asset is enjoined from interfering in any manner the aforesaid possession by
Cardinal until the foregoing objective is achieved. Further, upon the filing of an indemnity
bond of P2 million, let a writ of possession issue directing a sheriff of the RTC of Manila or
his authorized representative to place Cardinal herein in actual, physical possession of the
2 condo units and to eject Marual and other people claiming rights under him therefrom.
Upon Cardinal’s filing of the required bond, a writ of possession was issued.
Aggrieved, Asset filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the RTC Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Order and the writ of possession which are in variance with the
compromise judgment and the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 95-
74919.
CA Granted this and nullified the RTC Order:
There are four instances when a writ of possession may be issued,
1) in a land registration proceeding (in rem);
2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage;
3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, (quasi in rem), provided that the mortgagor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit,
had intervened; and
4) in execution sales (last par. Of Sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Since the case at bar does not fall under any of these four instances and, in any event, since
it is not claimed that the judgment based on a compromise contemplated the issuance of a
writ of possession to Asset of the condominium units in case Marual, from whom Cardinal
claims to have purchased the same, failed to comply with his obligation under said
judgment based on a compromise, then public respondent's assailed Order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, this review on certiorari. Cardinal contends that the CA decision is not based upon
the Condominium Act.

Issues:
1. Who has a better lien over the condominium units? - Respondent
2. W/N the issuance of the writ of possession was valid – No (CIVPRO ISSUE)

Held:
1. Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726); Liens; In order to have a notice of assessment to be
considered a lien on a condominium unit, the same must be registered in the Registry of
Deeds- The respondent has a superior lien pursuant to the Condominium Act. Section 20 of
R.A. No. 4726 (Condominium Act), provides: (LONG CODAL)
Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly
registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the
time the assessment is made. The amount of any such assessment plus any other charges
thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees) and penalties, as such may be
provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the
condominium assessed when the management body causes a notice of assessment to
be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where such
condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such assessment and
such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a
description of the condominium unit against which the same has been assessed, and the
name of the registered owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an authorized
representative of the management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of
restrictions. Upon payment of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof,
the management body shall cause to be registered a release of the lien.
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration
of said notice of assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration
of restrictions may provide for the subordination thereof to any other liens and
encumbrances. Such liens may be enforced in the same manner provided for by law for the
judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise
provided for in the declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to
bid at foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption as in
cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages. (Underscoring supplied)
Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Manila in order that the amount of such assessment could
be considered a lien upon Marual’s two condominium units. Petitioner’s claim can not be
considered superior to that of respondent. As mentioned earlier, the deed of sale wherein
Marual conveyed to respondent his two condominium units, was registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Manila.

2. The Decision rendered by the RTC based on the compromise agreement by the parties is
a money judgment, the enforcement of which is provided in Section 9, Rule 39.
Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (See codal for full long text)
(a) Immediate Payment on Demand
(b) Satisfaction by levy
 (c) Garnishment of debts and credits

There is nothing in the above provisions which authorizes the RTC of Manila to issue a writ
of possession over the two condominium units in favor of petitioner.
Judgments; Writs of Execution; An execution must conform to and be warranted by the
judgment on which it was issued; A money judgment does not authorize the issuance of
a writ of possession.
The Decision rendered by the RTC based on the compromise agreement by the parties is
a money judgment, the enforcement of which is provided in Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the above provisions which authorizes the
RTC, Branch 4, Manila to issue a writ of possession over the two condominium units
in favor of petitioner.
As we held in Abinujar v. Court of Appeals: A judgment is the foundation of a writ of
execution which draws its vitality. An officer issuing a writ of execution is required to
look to the judgment for his immediate authority. An execution must conform to and be
warranted by the judgment on which it was issued. There should not be a substantial
variance between the judgment and the writ of execution. Thus, an execution is fatally
defective if the judgment was for sum of money and the writ of execution was for the sale of
the mortgaged property As petitioners’ obligation under the compromise agreement as
approved by the court was monetary in nature, private respondents can avail only of the writ
of execution provided in Section 15 (now Section 9), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
not that provided in Section 13 (now Section 10 [c]).

9. Villasi v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, 15 January 2014, 713 SCRA 629

Facts: Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to
construct a seven-storey condominium building located Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of
Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for
collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material
allegations of the complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi
averred that she delivered the total amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter
accomplished only 28% of the project.To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a
Motion for Execution. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located
Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in
the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the names of the
Spouses Garcia. The Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was
mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI and that it could not be levied
upon not being owned by the judgment debtor.

Issue: Whether the general rule on accession can be applied in the case at bar

Ruling: While it is a horn-book doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is,
the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such
rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or
entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld.
When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on
which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such,
the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of
its respective owner.

10. Fermin v. Esteves, G.R. No. 147977, 26 March 2008, 549 SCRA 424

FACTS:
 Mariano Tanenglian (respondent) filed an action for quieting of title and damages
against petitioners
 In a Decision[4] dated 28 June 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5
(trial court) ruled:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
 (a) Ordering the defendants to respect and recognize plaintiffs ownership of
the two (2) parcels of land in question;
 (b) Ordering the defendants to remove their
houses/structures/constructions/improvements from the subject parcels of
land and surrender the possession of the premises they are respectively
occupying to the plaintiff; and
 (c) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the
amount of P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees plus the costs of the suit.
 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in its Decision dated 18
February 1994
 P filed a petition for review before this Court, but it was denied in a Resolution
 The Court denied Arizo, et al.s first and second motions for reconsideration in its
Resolutions dated 15 January 1996 and 4 March 1996, respectively. An Entry of Judgment
was issued on 8 April 1996.
 On December 16, 1996, the trial court granted respondents motion for execution.
 The trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution
 (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the
Court of Appeals
 Petitioners alleged that they were deprived of their right to due process because
they were never made defendants
 P alleged that they entered into the possession and occupancy of the lands as
members of an indigenous cultural community in the honest perception and belief that the
lands formed part of their ancestral lands. Petitioners further alleged that their occupancy
of the lands was not pursuant to any agreement entered into with anyone of the
defendants
 CA - RULED that respondents right to the subject parcels of land had already been
settled with finality, petitioners been in good faith regarding their possession of the land,
they could have intervened in Civil Case No. 925-R, RULED that had petitioners been really
unaware of the proceedings or aggrieved because of the damage posed by the Special Order
of Demolition, they could just have apprised the trial court of their adverse claim and move
for the issuance of the necessary terceria under Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, RULED that since petitioners failed to avail of these remedies or any other
possible remedies in law, they could no longer prevent respondents exercise of his rights of
ownership by belatedly complaining about their supposed property rights
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
 The Court of Appeals denied the motion

Issue: Whether the Special Order of Demolition may be enforced against petitioners who
were not party-defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R

Ruling:
 The generally accepted principle is that no man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by
the court.
 Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action,
and not against one who, not being a party in the case, did not have his day in court. Due
process requires that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against
one who did not have his day in court.
 The remedy of terceria is available to a third person other than the judgment obligor
or his agent who claims a property levied on. In this case, the property was not levied on
and put on auction. The implementation of the Special Order of Demolition would result in
the destruction of petitioner’s property. Further, terceria is not a speedy and adequate
remedy insofar as petitioners are concerned considering that the Special Order of
Demolition ordered the Deputy Sheriff to cause the demolition of all the improvements
immediately after the expiration of the 15-day period granted upon the defendants, their
agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest to remove their
improvements on the premises.
 The Court recognizes the finality of the trial court’s Decision in Civil Case No. 925-
R. However, petitioners are contesting whether their residential structures are within the
area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. Since petitioners are not parties to Civil Case No. 925-
R, respondent has to file the proper action against petitioners to enforce his property rights
within the bounds of the law and our rules. Petitioners right to possession, if any, should be
threshed out in a proper court proceeding.
 When the Court of Appeals referred to the remedy of terceria, it must be referring to
Section 16, Rule 39, not Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property
levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such
person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a
copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by
the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined
by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of
the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property,
to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent
such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate
action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or separate
action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.

11. Cabling v. Lumapas, G.R. No. 196950, 18 June 2014, 726 SCRA 628

FACTS:

The petitioner was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a property
situated in Olongapo City. The Final Deed of Sale was issued by the Sheriff and the title to
the property was duly transferred and was issued to the petitioner on March 23, 2009.

On May 6, 2009, the petitioner filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession
with the RTC.

The RTC issued an order granting the petitioner’s application, and subsequently issued a
Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate.

Respondent Joselin Tan Lumapas, filed a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention as
Party Defendant (with Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Writ of
Possession) and an Answer in Intervention, as a third party in actual possession of the
foreclosed property. She claimed that the property had previously been sold to her by Aida
Ibabao, the property’s registered owner and the judgment debtor/mortgagor in the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, pursuant to a Deed of Conditional Sale.

The RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the implementation of the petitioner’s writ of
possession until after the resolution of the respondent’s motion. The following day, the RTC
denied the respondent’s motion for intervention. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.

Before the CA, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the orders of RTC. The CA dismissed the
petition and affirmed the RTC’s orders.

The petitioner argues that the present case is not an exception to the ministerial issuance
of a writ of possession.
While recognizing the respondent’s actual possession of the subject property, the
petitioner contends that such possession is not adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in the concept of an owner because in a
conditional sale, ownership is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a positive
suspensive condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price.

ISSUE:

WON in the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and the issuance of a
writ of possession is ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure sale.

HELD:

The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages under
Act No. 3135 (as amended), the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the
court after the foreclosure sale and during the redemption period when the court may
issue the order for a writ of possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond.

There is, however, an exception to the rule.

Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to extrajudicial
foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property in a
capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. Thus, the court’s obligation to issue an ex parte
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial when there is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right
adverse to that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.

In the present case, the respondent cannot be said to possess the subject property by
adverse title or right as her possession is merely premised on the alleged conditional sale
of the property to her by the judgment debtor/mortgagor.

The execution of a contract of conditional sale does not immediately transfer title to the
property to be sold from seller to buyer.1âwphi1In such contract, ownership or title to the
property is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition
which is normally the payment of the purchase price in the manner agreed upon.

Under these circumstances, the general rule, and not the exception, applies.

12. Hi-Yield Realty v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138978, 12 September 2002, 388
SCRA 655

Facts: Respondents entered into a loan contract amounting to PHP100,000 with Petitioner
thereby mortgaging a parcel of land located in Lumang Dayap, Cainta, Rizal. Upon
respondent's failure to pay the loan upon demand petitioner, thereafter moved for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the said property and a new TCT was transferred in its name.
Respondent claims that he made an offer to pay twice during the redemption period
but was refused by petitioner hence, on the last day of redemption period he filed an action
to the court. When all the interest and other charges were fixed. The court asks respondent
to pay the redemption price to petitioner on a specified date (On or before April 8, 1994)
but petitioner instead thereafter seeks the extension of 45days for it has no sufficient
money. At first the court denied the extension but in another order contradicting its
previous order it allowed respondent the extension to pay within 45 days.
Frustrated, petitioner seeks this court to review the decision of the trial court.

Issue: whether or not the extension of the redemptive period by the trial court was well
within private respondent’s preserved right to redeem?

Held: It was serious error to make the final redemption of the foreclosed property
dependent on the financial condition of private respondent. It may have been difficult for
private respondent to raise the money to redeem the property but financial hardship is not
a ground to extend the period of redemption. The opportunity to redeem the subject
property was never denied to private respondent. His timely formal offer through judicial
action to redeem was likewise recognized. But that is where it ends. The court cannot
sanction and grant every succeeding motion or petition — specially if frivolous or
unreasonable — filed by him because this would manifestly and unreasonably delay the
final resolution of ownership of the subject property.
As a result of the trial court’s grant of a 45-day extended period to redeem, almost
nine (9) years have elapsed with both parties’ claims over the property dangling in limbo,
to the serious impairment of petitioner’s rights. This court calls the trial court’s attention to
the prejudice it has wittingly or unwittingly caused the petitioner. It was really all too
simple. The trial court should have seen, as in fact it had already initially seen, that the 45-
day extension sought by private respondent on April 8, 1994 was just a play to cover up his
lack of funds to redeem the foreclosed property.
The right of redemption should be exercised within the specified time limit, which is
one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. Moreover, the redemptioner
should make an actual tender in good faith of the full amount of the purchase price as
provided above, which means the auction price of the property plus the creditor’s other
legitimate expenses like taxes, registration fees, etc.
Redemptioner’s option when the redemption period is about to expire and the
redemption cannot take place on account of disagreement over the redemption price: may
preserve his right of redemption through judicial action which in every case must be filed
within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce
redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, would have the effect of
preserving his redemptive rights and “freezing” the expiration of the one-year period
provided the action is filed on time and in good faith, the redemption price is finally
determined and paid within a reasonable time, and the rights of the parties are respected.

Three critical dimensions:

 (1) timely redemption or redemption by expiration date (or, as what happened in this
case, the redemptioner was forced to resort to judicial action to “freeze” the
expiration of the redemption period);
(2) good faith as always, meaning, the filing of the private respondent’s action on
August 13, 1993 must have been for the sole purpose of determining the
redemption price and not to stretch the redemptive period indefinitely; and
(3) once the redemption price is determined within a reasonable time, the
redemptioner must make prompt payment in full.

13. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266

FACTS:
Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen
through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto.
Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to
work commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to discover that the
respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8,
2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he
wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and
the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence this
recourse by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
RULING: NO.
Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no
right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent
behind the enactment, and as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our
jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the
complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect
of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.

RES JUDICATA

1. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 379

2. Republic v. Yu, G.R. No. 157557, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 416

3. Degayo v. Dinglasan, G. R. No. 173148, 6 April 2015, 755 SCRA 1

4. Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, 31 October 2006, 506 SCRA 336

Facts: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC
denied the petition.

As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Issue: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of lack of marriage license?

Held: Res judicata applies.

Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the
nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a
splitting of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first
marriage had no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same
when he did not question the absence of a marriage license.
Res judicata – a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment

Rule 57 - Preliminary Attachment

1. PCL Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147970, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 214

2. Professional Video v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 83

3. Metro Inc. et al v. Lara’s Gifts, G.R. No. 171741, 27 November 2009, 606 SCRA
175

FACTS:
 Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged in the
business of handicrafts. Luis and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte are the president and vice-
president of LGD. Frederick Juan and Liza Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc.
 Petitioners and respondents agreed that respondents would endorse to petitioners
purchase orders received by respondents from their buyers in the United States of America
in exchange for a 15% commission, to be shared equally by respondents and James R.
Paddon (JRP), LGDs agent.
 R filed a complaint against petitioners for sum of money and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
 R filed an amended complaint alleging that petitioners defrauded them in the
amount of $521,841.62.
 R also prayed for P1,000,000 as moral damages, P1,000,000 as exemplary damages
and 10% of the judgment award as attorney’s fees. Respondents also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
 The TC granted R prayer and issued the writ of attachment against the properties
and assets of petitioners
 P filed a motion to discharge the writ of attachment
 P argued that the writ of attachment should be discharged on the following grounds:
(1) that the 2001 agreement was not a valid contract because it did not show that there
was a meeting of the minds between the parties; (2) assuming that the 2001 agreement
was a valid contract, the same was inadmissible because R failed to authenticate it in
accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence; (3) that R failed to substantiate their
allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds showing how petitioners defrauded them;
and (4) that respondents failed to establish that the unpaid commissions were already due
and demandable.
 TC granted P motion and lifted the writ of attachment.
 R filed a motion for reconsideration, however denied by TC.
 R filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 March 2006 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.
 TC respondents failed to sufficiently show that petitioners were guilty of fraud
either in incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or in the
performance, found no proof that petitioners were motivated by malice in entering into the
2001 agreement
 CA - the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of
the writ of attachment without requiring petitioners to post a counter-bond

Issue: Whether the writ of attachment issued by the trial court was improperly issued
such that it may be discharged without the filing of a counter-bond

Ruling: No merit.
 The writ of attachment was improperly issued because respondent’s amended
complaint failed to allege specific acts or circumstances constitutive of fraud.
 To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud
must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which
induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To
constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud
should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently
contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention
not to pay, as it is in this case
 The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the
factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred
from the debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.
 The rule that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the
same time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or
dissolved is by a counter-bond[21] is applicable in this case. It is clear that in respondents
amended complaint of fraud is not only alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment, but it is also the core of respondent’s complaint. The fear of the
Court of Appeals that petitioners could force a trial on the merits of the case on the strength
of a mere motion to dissolve the attachment has a basis.

4. Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 453

5. Lim v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, 3 July 2013, 700 SCRA 547

FACTS: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the respondent Sps Lazaro. The RTC
granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon the posting of the
required bond issued the corresponding writ on October 14, 2005. 3 parcels of land owned
by the respondent spouses were levied upon.

The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay
Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of
payments covering the period from September 2006 until October 2013. The RTC rendered
a decision on the basis of the compromise.

Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
annotated on the subject TCTs.

In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere
provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and preserve certain
rights and interests pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been
considered closed and terminated by the rendition of the decision based on the
compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.

HELD: NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule
57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party
to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action;
it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its
pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In
addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by
actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which
an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment,
jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had
under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which
had already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the
obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the
total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains
unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have continued to subsist.
In the earlier case of Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA, the Court ruled that a
writ of attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement
between the parties. In that case the Court held thus:

x x x x
The case at bench admits of peculiar character in the sense that it involves a compromise
agreement. Nonetheless, x x x. The parties to the compromise agreement should not be
deprived of the protection provided by an attachment lien especially in an instance where
one reneges on his obligations under the agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio
Garcia failed to hold up his own end of the deal, so to speak.
xxxx

If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can
easily escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation
where a debtor, in order to buy time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a
compromise agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose of
the provisional remedy of attachment would thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a
declawed and toothless tiger. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should
be restored and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his
preferential lien over the properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation
of the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment
even before judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security
for the satisfaction of the debt put in suit.30 Verily, the lifting of the attachment lien would
be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the
Court, absent any justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.

6. Olib v. Pastoral, G.R. No. 81120, 20 August 1990, 188 SCRA 692

7. Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, L-66321, 31 October 1984, 133 SCRA 141

8. Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan, G.R. No. 203530, 13 April 2015, 755
SCRA 358

FACTS:
 Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez are the
respondents in the complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages filed by
respondent Erlinda Khrishnan
 Erlinda claimed that she is a client of respondent bank wherein she maintained
several accounts including time deposits.
 Erlinda presented her Time Deposits Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for
payment because they have become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the reason
that they were fraudulent.
 Respondent Erlinda likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the
RTC granted
 By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in BPI Family Bank, Calamba,
Laguna and in the Central Bank were garnished.
 P filed an urgent ex-parte Motion to Recall Quash and/or Lift Attachment or
Garnishment (in excess of amounts in the writ).
 R opposed the motion.
 P filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the substitution of their garnished account
 RTC resolved the pending incidents and required the petitioners to justify their
motion to discharge the attachment
 During pre-trial, respondents requested additional time to file a supplemental
motion to justify their earlier motions which was granted and gave petitioners ten (10)
days from receipt within which to comment or opposed it
 RTC issued an order lifting the attachment to which respondent Erlinda filed a
motion for reconsideration
 Petition for certiorari is granted
 P subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
 R judge issued an Order directing respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment bond
in the amount of P35,000,000.00 and petitioners to file a counterbond within ten days from
notice of the filing and approval of the bond of respondent Erlinda. Petitioners moved for
the reconsideration of the said Order which respondent judge denied and granted a period
of fifteen days for respondent Erlinda to file an attachment bond
 Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25, 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00
 P filed a motion for extension of time to comply and/or file the appropriate pleading
and to hold in abeyance the reinstatement of the writ of attachment
 P filed a motion to admit bank property in lieu of counterbond which was opposed
by respondent Erlinda
 R judge denied petitioners' motion in the assailed Order, issued an Order reinstating
the Writ of Attachment dated March 1, 2001 for failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond, and issued an amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment directing respondent
Sheriff Oscar L. Rojas (hereafter respondent Sheriff) to attach the real estate or personal
properties of petitioners in the amount of P28,597,472.70. On June 30, 2011, the sheriff
served the Notice of Garnishment and the Amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment
 P filed an urgent motion to recall, suspend or hold in abeyance and re-examination
of the amended reinstated writ of preliminary attachment
 P filed this petition for certiorari
 CA–dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition and affirmed the Orders of the RTC
reinstating the Writ of Attachment for failure of petitioners to file the required counter-
bond.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision which denied petitioners'
motion praying that bank property be deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-bond

Ruling:

We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may
be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the
action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the
sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against
whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's
demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in
an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by the
applicant, exclusive of costs."
it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the
petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond

Rule 58 - Preliminary Injunction

1. Filipino Metals v. Secretary of Trade and Industry, G.R. No. 157498, 15 July 2005, 463
SCRA 616

2. Power Sites v. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, 24 November 2009, 605 SCRA 196

In Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon, the Supreme Court stated that there is no
“irreparable injury” as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the
petitioner, namely, “immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients”
and the cost of the billboard which is “a considerable amount of money” is easily
quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or
injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona, 115 Phil. 105, 110
(1962)

3. Hernandez v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 145328, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 166

4. G.G. Sportswear v. BDO, G.R. No. 184434, 8 February 2010, 612 SCRA 47

5. Borja v. Salcedo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1746 (formerly OCA IPI No. 10-
1225-RTJ), 26 September 2003, 412 SCRA 110

FACTS:
 In a Complaint, Roger F. Borja accuses Presiding Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the
RTC (Br 32) of San Pablo City of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in
issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) in Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01), without
complying with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Complainant claims that the procedure followed by respondent Judge violated Rule
58 Section 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the following grounds:
(a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the Executive Judge that may issue an ex-parte TRO
good for 72 hours
(b) The notice of raffle was not preceded or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service of summons, with the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit
and bond.
(c) Respondent Judge who was assigned to the case did not conduct the required
summary hearing with notice and in the presence of the parties within 24 hours after the
Sheriffs return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle.
 (d) The TRO was issued ex-parte without the required bond and without alleging
that the matter is of extreme urgency and applicant would suffer grave or irreparable
injury.
(e) Complainant did not ask for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on January
4, 2001 in the morning.
 Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, informed complainant that the subject
matter of his complaint is judicial in nature hence it shall be denied due course as there are
judicial remedies available under the Rules of Court yet to be exhausted.
 Complainant argues that when the law transgressed is elementary, as in the instant
case, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law
 respondent judge submitted her comment and apologized for the delay in its
submission explaining that she, as well as her husband, underwent cataract operation
 She likewise emphasized her denial of partiality, ignorance of the law, bias and so
forth being attributed to her by complainant for the reverse is true as it has been (her)
desire to always observe impartiality, fairness, and dedication in the administration of
justice
 Judge Salcedo issued a Temporary Restraining Order
 Defendant Borja filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Herradura [Salcedo] from the case
and which the latter granted
 Defendant Brion filed a Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order anchored
on the ground that the TRO was issued in violation of Rule 58, Section 4(d) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and is therefore a patent nullity
 The undersigned resolved the Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order; The
undersigned dissolved the TRO because it was issued in violation of Supreme Court
 The undersigned humbly submits that as aforestated, Judge Salcedo inhibited
herself from the case which was thereafter re-raffled to the sala of the undersigned. The
motion to Dissolve TRO had to be resolved.
 this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation
 R judge failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95. No order setting a
summary hearing on the application for temporary restraining order was furnished the
defendants
 A TRO may however be issued ex-parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency that
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such
circumstances, the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72)
hours from its issuance. But such a procedure is not applicable to respondent judge
because she is not the executive judge of RTC, San Pablo City
 Recommendation of OCA
(1) OCA IPI No. 01-1225-RTJ be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
(2) Respondent Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo, RTC, Branch 32, San Pablo City be fined for her
failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95, with a warning that a repetition
of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and
(3) The explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, then RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo
City be ACCEPTED for being meritorious
Issue: Whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be conducted

Ruling:
 The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately
after raffle.
 A TRO can be issued ex parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such
circumstance, the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72)
hours from its issuance. The executive judge is then required to summon the parties to a
conference, during which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the expiry of
the seventy-two hours, the presiding judge to whom the case was raffled shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a
hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be held
 In the present case, there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent judge was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-motive.
 Where this Court pronounced that the failure of respondent therein, as an Executive
Judge, to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the TRO constituted grave
abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
justice for which reason, a fine of P5,000.00 was imposed on respondent judge
there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-motive
 Respondent judge had earlier been apprised of the provisions of Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 and therefore, it cannot be said that she is ignorant of the law. For her
conscious disregard of a a basic rule on the issuance of a TRO, Judge Salcedo must be held
administratively liable not for gross ignorance of the law but for grave abuse of authority
and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice

6. Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 179665, 3 April 2013, 695
SCRA 101

Rule 60 – Replevin

1. Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 529

FACTS: Petitoner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by the
security guard on duty where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located contrary to
the sheriff’s return stating that both the writ and the summons was served upon petitioner.
Nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to
the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC,
however, denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory
period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.
Petitioner argues in the case at bar via the petition on Rule 45 that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of
time. She contends that the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to run in this
case due to the improper service of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.

Issue: WON the denial of counterbond filed beyond the 5 day mandatory period is
erroneous considering the writ was improperly served.

Held: Yes.

Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of
law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin.
However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid
down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. When no attempt is made to
comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or
order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the adverse
party.

The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together
with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are
simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in
accordance with the court’s order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to
allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional
guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

In the case at bar since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending
that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence
to run.

The writ must satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be
directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the
person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also
a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it
seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as
what happened in this case.

Petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin
or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioner’s filing of an application
for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the
improper service.

The trial for the main action shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new
application for replevin should he choose to do so.

Rule 61 - Support Pendente Lite

1. Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, 18 March 2004, 426 SCRA 29

Rule 62 – Interpleader

1. Makati Dev’t. Corp. v. Tanjuatco, G.R. L-26443, 25 March 1969, 27 SCRA 401

2. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, G.R. No. 193494, 12 March 2014, 719 SCRA
88

FACTS:
 On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into
a 10-year contract of lease4over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao
City.
 Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay
rent directly
 Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for
interpleader
 Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly
rental payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be
ordered to litigate their conflicting claims
 Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged
representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the
corporation
 Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was only authorized to "initiate and represent [Zuellig
Pharma] in the civil proceedings for consignation of rental payments to be filed against Lui
Enterprises, Inc. and/or [the Philippine Bank of Communications
 Lui Enterprises filed nullification case against the Philippine Bank of
Communications with respect to several properties it dationed to the bank in payment of
its obligations
 The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was among those allegedly dationed to the
Philippine Bank of Communications
 Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary injunction
 By virtue of the writ of preliminary injunction, Lui Enterprises argued that it should
continue collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case was resolved
 Judge orders, the Philippine Bank of Communications and all its attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other persons assisting the bank, are directed to restrain
from conducting auction sale on the Properties of Lui Enterprises
 Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the
motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late
 Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss
should be filed within the required time given to file an answer to the complaint, which is
15 days from service of summons on the defendant
 Lui Enterprises’ claim that the interpleader case was filed without authority, Zuellig
Pharma argued that an action interpleader "is a necessary consequence of the action for
consignation
 With respect to the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Zuellig Pharma
argued that its pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
 Under the writ of preliminary injunction, auction sale of Lui Enterprises’ properties,
the proceeds of which were supposed to satisfy its obligations to the Philippine Bank of
Communications
 The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion
to dismiss within the reglementary period
 Lui Enterprises did not move for the reconsideration thus heard the interpleader
case without Lui Enterprises’ participation
 Despite having been declared in default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation with
prayer
 Plaintiffs move for execution or implementation of the Order
 status quo order was a necessary implement of the writ of preliminary injunction
follows the plaintiff's right to collect and receive rental payments which he enjoyed prior to
the filing of this case, must be respected and protected and maintained until the case is
resolved
 Status quo simply means the last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded
the actual controversy
 Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals, however found insufficient
 As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained
the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss
four days late
 With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default, the Court of
Appeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that prevented
it from filing its motion to dismiss on time
 the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court since "Zuellig Pharma x x x was
constrained to file the action for interpleader with consignation in order to protect its
interests
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion for reconsideration
Issue: Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati

Ruling: The nullification of deed in dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the
interpleader case. Litis pendentia is not present in this case.
 Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of dation in payment with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao. It sought to nullify the deed of dation in payment through
which the Philippine Bank of Communications acquired title over the leased property. Lui
Enterprises argued that this pending nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of
Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the interpleader case was filed
subsequently to the nullification case, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia:

Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(e)That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit."140 It exists when "another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of actionx x x.” The subsequent action is
"unnecessary and vexatious"142 and is instituted to "harass the respondent [in the
subsequent action]."

The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(1)Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(2)Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and
(3)The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other.144
All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification
of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party
to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial court.
 There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises
filed the first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the
Philippine Bank of Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader
case to consign in court the rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The
interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or
the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
 Lui Enterprises cited Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals147 as authority to set aside the subsequently filed interpleader case. In this cited
case, petitioner Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. entered into a lease contract
with Westin Seafood Market, Inc. The latter failed to pay rent. Thus, Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable
properties inside the leased premises, and scheduled the public sale of the inventoried
properties as they agreed upon in their lease contract.
 In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was filed by Lui
Enterprises against the Philippine Bank of Communications. The interpleader case was
filed by Zuellig Pharma against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications. A different plaintiff filed the interpleader case against Lui Enterprises
and the Philippine Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no identity of parties, and the
first requisite of litis pendentia is absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145

2. Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, 21 January 2015,
746 SCRA 508

FACTS:

1. The Philippine Veterans Bank, pursuant to its mandate to provide financial

assistance to veterans and teachers under Republic Acts 3518 and 7169, established
pension loans for bona fide veterans and beneficiaries, as well as salary loan
products for teachers. As these clientele do not have security other than their
continuing good health or employment, to secure their loans, the PVB devised a
program by charging a premium, a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund
(CRF) from the borrowers. Special Trust Funds were established by PVB for the
loans of its clientele and in case of death of the borrower, the fees charged from him
and credited to the trust funds will be used to fully pay the loan.
2. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas found that PVB’s collection of the CRF violated Section
54 of Republic Act No. 8791 which prohibited banks from directly engaging in
insurance business as insurer. Thus, it wrote the PVB to inform it that CRF is a form
of insurance, based on opinion by the Insurance Commission and should be
discontinued. PVB then stopped collecting the fees.
3. The Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1139 directing the PVB’s Trust and
Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF; and
to preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted CRF pending resolution of
ruling of the Office of the General Counsel of the BSP. The BSP denied PVB’s request
for reconsideration, hence it filed a petition for declamatory relief before the RTC of
Makati City.
4. The Monetary Board moved to dismiss the petition, citing that the petition should
not prosper because of the prior breach of PVB by Section 54 of RA 8791. The RTC
 dismissed the petition for declaratory relief, ruling that the issue of whether or not
PVB violated Section 54 of Republic Act 8791 should be resolved in an ordinary civil
action, not a declaratory relief.
5. Almost year later, it filed a Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration, stating that
it did not receive a copy of the order until September 3, 2008, which the Monetary
Board opposed, alleging that per certification by the Philippine Postal Corporation,
the order was served on respondent on October 17, 2007.
6. The RTC ruling on the motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and ruled that the
collection of the CRF by PVB did not constitute engaging in the issuance business as
an insurer, hence not a violation of Section 54 of RA 8791. Accordingly, it declared
MB Resolution No. 1189 null and void. Its motion for reconsideration denied, it filed
before the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari to contest the RTC
decision, on the issue of whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

ISSUE: Was the petition for declaratory relief proper?

HELD:
 Declaratory relief is an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The
only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instrument or statute
 In CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, the SC that in the
same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition
for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects
of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not
agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the
various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
 In this case, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject
matter for a petition for declaratory relief. The BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-
judicial agency and the MB resolution it issued was in its exercise of quasi-judicial
powers or functions.
o The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB Resolution
emanated from its powers under Section 37 of RA No. 7653 and Section 66
of RA No. 8791 to impose, at its discretion, administrative sanctions, upon
any bank for violation of any banking law.
o The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the
character of its determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may
be imposed upon erring banks, as an exercise of quasi-judicial function

 A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and

other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making. The very definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers.
 o It recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies
in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless
controversies, which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.

 A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of

public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

 Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a quo’s Order dated September 24,
2007, which dismissed respondent’s petition for declaratory relief, had long become
final and executory.
o To recall, said Order was duly served on and received by respondent on
October 17, 2007, as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Philippine
Postal Corporation. Almost a year later, however, or on October 15, 2008,
respondent moved for reconsideration of the court a quo’s Order of
dismissal, claiming it received a copy of said Order only on September 3,
2008.
o Thus, respondent’s self-serving claim should not have prevailed over the
Certification issued by the Philippine Postal Corporation. It was error for the
trial court to entertain it for the second time despite the lapse of almost a
year before respondent filed its motion for reconsideration against said
Order.

3. SJS v. Lina, G.R. No. 160031, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 462

Rule 64 - Review of Judgments and Final Orders and Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit

1. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015, 747 SCRA 1

Rule 65 – Certiorari

1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145

2. Villanueva v. Judicial & Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA
182

3. Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
200670, 6 July 2015, 761 SCRA 586
 4. Tagle v. Equitable PCI, G.R. No. 172299, 22 April 2008, 552 SCRA 424

FACTS: Tagle was assailing RTC order granting writ of possession ifo Equitable,
alleging the property was a family home. Filed a petition for certiorari under R65...

HELD: A petition for certiorari under R65 was not the proper remedy. Should be
under R45, in trying to assail the decision of the CA because

GR: R45 should be the rule resorted to, whatever the proceedings before the CA was, in
going up to the SC
+ requisites for Certiorari should be complied...
HERE: there was still sufficient remedy that Tagle could have resorted to (R45) hence there
was a plain, speedy remedy still available. (even if there was GADALEJ)
*Note: distinguished errors of judgment from errors of jurisdiction!
*can you avail of both?
GR: No. Mutually exclusive, not alternative, cumulative or successive
X: If comply with the period to file, and in other requirements, under both rules 45 and 65
*make a table of the differences!
*Certiorari is an original remedy, while petition for review under Rule 45 is an appellate
remedy
*what are the two pleadings that should be filed if RTC to CA: Notice of Appeal plus
appellant's brief
*if you lose in the CA, then would want to go to SC: file MR (but not required if ordinary
appeal); but can go right away with R45 - in R65, assure that there was no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy
-note also that when you file a motion before CA, there is no need for hearing

5. Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA
562

6. Concepcion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178624, 30 June 2009, 591 SCRA 420

7. Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. Nos. 161106 and 161266, 13

January 2014, 713 SCRA 18

8. Kalipunan v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, 22 July 2014, 730 SCRA 322

Mandamus

1. Calim v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 156527, 5March 2007, 517 SCRA 412

2. Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 211
Rule 67 – Expropriation

1. National Housing v. Heirs Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA 389

2. Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 391

3. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, 3 March 2014,
717 SCRA 601

Rule 68 - Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

1. BPI Family v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 167724, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 472

FACTS.
 Respondent and her late husband Oscar obtained an agricultural sugar crop loan from
Far East Bank & Trust Co. (later merged with BPI) for crop years 1997 and 1998. In
the book of Far East, the loan account was treated as a single account, and evidenced
by 67 promissory notes.
 Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC over their parcel of
land as security of loans on credit accommodation obtained and those that may be
obtained.
 Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the event of failure to
pay the mortgage obligation or any portion thereof, the entire principal, interest,
penalties, and other charges shall be immediately due; and Far East mat foreclose the
same extra judicially.
 For failure to settle outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, Far East sent a final
demand letter to respondent demanding payment.
 Since respondent failed to settle her obligation, Far East filed a petition for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property, but only only for 31 of the
promissory notes.
 During pendency of said case, Far East filed a complaint for collection of money
representing the amounts for the 36 other promissory notes.
 In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the complaint was barred by litis pendentia
for the pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.
 Petitioner presented a loan officer as sole witness, who testified that respondent were
granted a loan, which was a “single loan account.”
 Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the loan officer’s admission,
that there is only one loan account secured by the REM thus barred the personal
action for collection. She insisted that the filing of said complaint should be dismissed.
 Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating that each promissory note constituted a
separate contract.
 The trial court denied the demurrer on the ground that each note covered a loan
distinct from the others.
  Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her to file a certiorari petition under Rule
65 with CA.
 CA granted the petitioner, stating that the remedies sought are alternative and not
cumulative. Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
 Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON collection suit should be dismissed – YES

Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may not
institute one suit for a single cause of action, and, if two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one
is available as a ground for the dismissal of others. The law does not permit the owner of a
single of entire cause of action or an entire or indivisible demand to divide and split the
cause to make it the subject of several actions.

The true rule which determined whether a party has only a single and entire cause of
action is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the
several parts arise from distinct and different acts. As gleaned from the plain terms of the
REM, the real estate of respondent served as a continuing security liable for obligations
already obtainer and obligations obtained thereafter. In this case, the action of petitioner is
anchored on one and the same cause: the nonpayment of respondent. Though the debt may
be covered by several promissory notes and is covered by a real estate mortgage, the latter
is subsidiary to the former and both refer to one and the same obligation. A mortgage
creditor may institute two alternative remedies against the debtor, either to collect debt or
to foreclose mortgage, but not both.

DECISION.
WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

2. Monzon v. Sps. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, 17 September 2008, 565 SCRA 514

Rule 69 – Partition

1. Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 227

2. Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 201252, 16 June 2014, 726 SCRA 482

Rule 70 - Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

1. Acaylar v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 624
 2. Ross-Rica v. Sps Ong, G.R. No. 132197, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 35

FACTS:
The spouses Ong are the original owners of 3 parcels of land which they occupy. They sold
it to
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, which then sold it to Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. The spouses
Ong filed an action to annul the sale and transfer of property to Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty and at present, the case is still pending. In the meantime, an ejectment case was filed
against spouses Ong in the MTC, which ruled against the latter. On appeal to the RTC, the
judgment was affirmed by a decision dated March 1, 1997. The spouses Ong received a
copy of the decision on April 28, 1997.

The spouses Ong first filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC (May 8, 1997) but on the very
next
day filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 23, 1997. The spouses
Ong
received a copy of the order on July 9, 1997. On July 24, 1997 respondents filed with the CA
a
motion for an additional 10 days to file their Petition for Review, which they would
eventually
file on July 30, 1997.

The CA gave their petition for review due course and reversed the decision of the RTC on
the
finding that the action filed was not one for unlawful detainer based on two grounds: that
the
allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the
parties that would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

ISSUES/HELD

Whether the complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful
detainer
properly cognizable by the MTC

- YES. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief
sought. In Javelosa vs. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint
that
there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful
detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient,
without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase “unlawful
withholding”
has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the
beginning,
having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a
right
and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession
from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:

“. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said
lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving
plaintiffs
of the use of their lots;” is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.

Likewise, the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz provides for a liberal approach in considering the
sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, thus:

“. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry
and
detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must
be
restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure
should
be carefully avoided.”

Whether the case should be considered as one for accion reivindicatoria, and thus the
jurisdiction would lie with the RTC

- NO. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real
property.
This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or
possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or
possession
de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial, while
the
issue of ownership is generally unessential. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought
to
recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim
ownership
over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment
case. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the
conclusion would be the same, for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an
ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in
Ganadin vs. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession,
it
does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title
in
Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.

In Drilon vs. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title
over
the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the
MTC
of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale
being
that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and
the
suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed
for
are not the same.

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack.
In Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this:

“. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be
subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding
for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
respondents
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.”

3. Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, 24 September 2014, 736 SCRA 508

4. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Abella, G.R. No. 143510, 23

November 2005, 476 SCRA 1

5. Sunflower Neighborhood Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136274, 3

September 2003, 410 SCRA 318

Rule 71 - Contempt
 1. Inonog v. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, 28 July 2009, 594 SCRA 168

2. Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 616

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed
before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair
Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin. The
Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from employment. The
NLRC rendered a Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declaring that
respondent Go’s separation from employment was legal for it was attended by a just cause
and was validly effected by EHSI, Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the
adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated a
Decision setting aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor
Arbiter adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal dismissal.

EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to receive a copy of the decision through registered mail
on 17 July 2003 while respondent Go received his copy on 21 July 2003.

On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the
receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and
signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of
the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Order dismissing the
illegal dismissal case with prejudice. After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals
decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake
or undue influence. Acting on the motions, the appellate court issued a Resolution
annulling the Order of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be
complied with.

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by respondent Go
through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was based on the aforesaid Motion that
the appellate court issued a Resolution dated 19 November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty.
Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt.

Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set
everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was
respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior
committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part of
respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect
contempt charge without contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court
which rendered the questioned resolution.

In the present case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner
Atty. Regalado’s misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former. Thus, the instant case
was not initiated by the court motu proprio.

The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention with
the categorical mandate of the Rules (a verified petition which has complied with the
requirements of initiatory pleadings must be filed). Respondent Go filed a Manifestation
with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting particulars and
documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion
and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance with the appellate court’s directive,
the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty
of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement of the indirect
contempt action.

Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for
indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its
eyes without offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we,
ourselves, had promulgated.