Analysis
Committed to Change, or Changing
Summary: Geopolitical realities
seem to have once more elevated
Turkey’s importance in American
foreign policy decisions. In the past,
Turkey’s strategic importance and
America’s reliance on it had an
inverse relationship to the deepen-
ing of Turkish democracy.
Today, the stability of Turkey neces-
sitates that the country maintain its
democratic orientation and that all
its political actors commit them-
selves to this goal. One of the major
tests of the Obama administration
in its relations with Turkey may very
well be whether it will treat Turkish
democracy as a fundamental good
or an expendable one.
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Commitments?
Turkish-American relations under a new U.S. president
by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — Two weeks prior to the
U.S. presidential election, the October
survey of Metropoll found that nearly
39 percent of Turks wanted Barack
Obama to be the next U.S. president
and only 14.1 percent wanted John
McCain. Of those surveyed, 45 percent
were either not interested or thought it
did not matter who was elected the next
U.S. president.
On the eve of election night, as talk
shows on the U.S. elections proliferated
across television channels in Turkey, it
transpired that many members of the
punditry had a high discomfort level
with an Obama presidency. Particularly,
former diplomatic corps representa-
tives openly displayed their displeasure
with such a choice in fear that such a
move could jeopardize bilateral rela-
tions. As Amberin Zaman explained in
“Turkey and the United States Under
Barack Obama: Yes They Can,” indeed
the only reason for such animosity was
the president-elect’s open support for
a genocide resolution. U.S. Senator and
now Vice President-Elect Joe Biden’s
record on Cyprus and the Armenian
genocide resolution, as well as his
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Sabah. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
Kurdophile views (his partiality for a
highly autonomous if not independent
Kurdistan in Iraq) was also duly noted.
Such a degree of insularity or self-
centeredness cannot be very healthy
for a country that wishes to play and
will be asked to play an important role
in regional affairs during the Obama
presidency. On the one hand, Turkey
and Turks from all walks of life desire
to be taken seriously, take pride in their
country’s recent performance as a me-
diator in regional conflicts, and support
a more activist foreign policy. On the
other hand, there is very little toler-
ance for acts or policies on the part of
Turkey’s allies and friends that may not
entirely satisfy Turks’ expectations. This
intolerance is particularly accentuated
on the issue of the Armenian genocide
resolution and the fight against the
separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) when it comes to the United
States.
Many Turks shared the world’s enthusi-
asm for the election results but this did
not stop others from questioning either
the authenticity of the president-elect’s
Analysis
image and views, or to doubt that he would make a difference.
Some welcomed the change that the Obama administration
promised to bring in both the domestic and foreign policies
of the United States. They welcomed the possibility of a more
cooperative approach to world politics on the part of the new
U.S. administration. They also believed that the symbolism
of the election for American democracy would help re-kindle
the drive for democracy throughout the world that had been
discredited under the Bush administration. In short, their
logic was that a development that would be good for the world
could not be bad for Turkey.
Those who rejoiced in the presidential victory of Barack
Obama expect him to hold Turkey to higher standards on
human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Precisely for this
same reason, others are uncomfortable and would have
preferred a Republican administration that would just pay
lip service to such issues and shape its relations with Turkey
on the basis of strategic and security concerns. Such a U.S.
administration would have little to say about the ongoing
hardening of the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government’s policy vis-a-vis the Kurds, and its
blatant disregard for freedom of expression and of the press.
It would not raise the flag on rising police brutality and
torture, and would not put undue pressure on the govern-
ment to revitalize the moribund EU accession process.
No matter which way the Obama administration goes, there
is no doubt that a new page will be turned in Turkish-
American relations. These relations went through a
turbulent period under U.S. President George W. Bush and
have only begun to recuperate following the November 5,
2007 meeting between President Bush and Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The U.S. president’s
decision to provide the Turkish Armed Forces with action-
able intelligence about the PKK went a long way in both
improving the American image in the country and in re-
establishing trust between institutions.
I argued in an earlier analysis piece that both the govern-
ment and the armed forces were ready and willing to
improve relations. On the American side there is recogni-
tion that Turkey’s cooperation will be necessary for almost
all the thorny issues that the new U.S. administration will
tackle, from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Caucasus. The two
sides have a clear common interest in coordinating efforts
2
“Those who rejoiced in the
presidential victory of Barack
Obama expect him to hold Turkey
to higher standards on human
rights, democracy, and rule of law.”
for energy security and for stabilizing the Caucasus.
With such a loaded agenda, the United States and Turkey will
need to understand one another’s motives, concerns, and per-
spectives clearly. Redefining the common interests of Turkey
and the United States—a task that was due immediately after
the end of the Cold War but was not undertaken—is a neces-
sary step. In the wake of the Iraq war and the many failures of
the Bush administration in its policies toward the Middle East,
Turkey cannot be expected to put America’s global interests
over its own regional interests.
Over the course of the past decade, Turkey’s policy toward
the region has taken a new direction in reflecting political
imagination for the region. Favoring diplomatic engage-
ment, egalitarian relations, and regional initiatives, this latest
political approach began to take shape at the end of the 1990s
but found its full manifestation under the AKP govern-
ment. Turkey’s much-appreciated mediation between Syria
and Israel, the opening to Armenia, and the desire to play a
constructive role between Iran and the United States all stem
from this approach.
Based on the president-elect’s preferences for diplomacy
over confrontation, there should be plenty of room for the
two allies to cooperate. Indeed, in Iraq when troop
withdrawal begins, Turkey will be asked to be of assistance.
In Afghanistan, if a negotiated truce is reached that will
include the Taliban, Turkey’s historical ties with that country
and with Pakistan for that matter might come in handy for
the arduous process of nation-building that is the only
guarantor of peace and stability in the long-run.
However, it is also imperative that in this new period the
Analysis

mechanics of the relationship change as well. Rather than Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
asking Turkey to cooperate with the United States on policies
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
singularly decided upon in Washington, an effort should
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
be made to devise policies in a more collaborative fashion.
national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkey’s myriad connections in Russia and Iran ought to be
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
taken into consideration before Ankara is asked to participate
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
in policies that might harm its vital interests.
About GMF
Turkish officials and the public in general will look for
American support for fair resolution of the Cyprus conflict The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
and for more committed American assistance in fighting the nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
PKK in northern Iraq. Begrudgingly but steadily, Turkey has dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
taken steps to recognize the political reality of the Kurdistan between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
regional government. The chances are high that relations individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
between Ankara and Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital, will convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
not have to go through Baghdad in the near future. However, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
there are two preconditions for such a development. The first address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
is the isolation, weakening, and elimination of the PKK in supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
northern Iraq. The second is the continuation of the special in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th anniversary of the
status of Kirkuk, keeping that city out of sole Kurdish control. Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance,
GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In
Geopolitical realities seem to have once more elevated addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices
Turkey’s importance in American foreign policy decisions. in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
In the past, Turkey’s strategic importance and America’s Bucharest.
reliance on it had an inverse relation to the deepening of
Turkish democracy. In other words, during the Cold War
Turkey’s democratic deficits were not of much concern for
Washington. Today, the stability of Turkey necessitates that
the country maintain its democratic orientation and that
all its political actors (the military, the judiciary, and all its
political parties) commit themselves to this goal. One of the
major tests of the Obama administration in its relations with
Turkey may very well be whether it will treat Turkish democ-
racy as a fundamental good or an expendable one.

If Washington continues to rigorously support Turkey’s EU

accession process and insists forcefully that Ankara show the
same enthusiasm as it did between 2002 and 2004, it will have
passed the test.