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48 Safety Aspects of Industrial Dryers

Article · November 2006

DOI: 10.1201/9781420017618.ch48

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Adam S Markowski Arun Mujumdar

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 Safety Aspects of Industrial Dryers
48 Adam S. Markowski and Arun S. Mujumdar

CONTENTS

48.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1133

48.2 The Process Factor............................................................................................................................. 1135
48.2.1 Nature of Fire and Explosion Hazards in Dryers ................................................................. 1135
48.2.2 Material Characterization Procedure .................................................................................... 1136
48.2.2.1 Explosiveness......................................................................................................... 1137
48.2.2.2 Combustibility ....................................................................................................... 1138
48.2.2.3 Dust Explosion Characteristics ............................................................................. 1138
48.2.2.4 Thermal Decomposition Characteristics ............................................................... 1140
48.2.3 Hazards with Flammable Vapors .......................................................................................... 1143
48.2.4 Hybrid Mixtures .................................................................................................................... 1145
48.2.5 Identification of Ignition Sources .......................................................................................... 1145
48.2.6 Selection of Operating Conditions ........................................................................................ 1145
48.3 The Engineering Factor ..................................................................................................................... 1146
48.3.1 Design Consideration ............................................................................................................ 1146
48.3.2 Fire and Explosion Precautions ............................................................................................ 1146
48.3.3 Fire and Explosion Prevention .............................................................................................. 1147
48.3.3.1 Inerting .................................................................................................................. 1147
48.3.3.2 Avoiding Formation of Dust Clouds .................................................................... 1147
48.3.3.3 Excluding All Ignition Sources.............................................................................. 1147
48.3.4 Explosion Protection ............................................................................................................. 1148
48.3.4.1 Venting .................................................................................................................. 1148
48.3.4.2 Suppression ........................................................................................................... 1151
48.3.4.3 Containment.......................................................................................................... 1153
48.3.4.4 Explosion Isolation Systems .................................................................................. 1153
48.3.5 Fire Dust Protection.............................................................................................................. 1153
48.3.6 Explosion Hazards and Protection in Ancillary Units .......................................................... 1154
48.3.7 Reliability of the Protective Systems ..................................................................................... 1154
48.3.8 Application to Some Common Dryers .................................................................................. 1155
48.3.9 A New Development in Safety Dryer Assessment ................................................................ 1155
48.4 The Management Factor.................................................................................................................... 1155
48.4.1 Plant Operation ..................................................................................................................... 1155
48.4.2 Maintenance and Training .................................................................................................... 1158
48.5 The Procedure for Safe Plant Dryer Design ...................................................................................... 1159
References .................................................................................................................................................... 1159

48.1 INTRODUCTION ers at risk is considerably greater in the food industry

The statistics of industrial accidents show that drying
should be regarded as a potentially hazardous oper-
ation that has brought a number of reported incidents
with serious results for personnel and equipment [1,2].
The data indicate that the accident rate per 105 work-
than, e.g., in the chemical industry. Approximately
8 to 9% of all dust explosions in the food industry is
related to the drying operation (Figure 48.1). The
other data for the period 1967–1983 in the German
sugar industry indicate that drying contributes to
37% of all accidents [3], whereas in the French milk

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

 %
20
10
Transport Milling Silos
systems
FIGURE 48.1 Distribution of explosion location for dust explosion in the food industry. (From W. Hamm, The Chemical
Engineer, 8–9: 22–25 (1984). With permission.)
industry an average of four major accidents in spray
dryers were reported annually [4]. Based on 89 acci-
dents that happened in 1965–2000, 415 people were
injured and 16 fatalities were reported in The Accident
Database [5]. It is worth to note that in most cases of
spray dryer accident in the food industry fire was
observed whereas an explosion experienced in <10%
[6]. The above reports underline the importance of
safety from fire and explosion hazards in dryers and
in the ancillary equipment.
Drying is particularly prone to fire and explosion
hazards because it is a process in which external heat
sources are applied.
Most of the materials, whether natural products
or synthetic organic products, are combustible or sen-
sitive to heat as well as are exposed to elevated tem-
perature in the air.
All possible ignition sources may be present in
dryers.
There are three factors that influence the potential
for fire and explosion: (1) process; (2) engineering; and
(3) management.
The process factor is associated with the charac-
terization of material being dried and the physical
conditions to which it is subjected. This is a very
important consideration because it enables for the
recognition and assessment of fire and explosion
hazards. For this factor, the basis of safety is the
prevention methods (e.g., drying in an inert atmos-
phere, elimination of the formation of explosive mix-
tures, and rigorous exclusion of all possible ignition
sources).
The engineering factor relates to the plant layout,
its location, the equipment used, and its engineering
standards. Special attention should be paid to the
design stage at which safety and reliability rely upon
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Dryers Burners Classifiers Separators Other
the application of various codes of practice and
standards. This is a basis for prevention of the fire
explosions hazards. Within this factor, the philosophy
of safety is based on the acceptance of the possibility
of fire and explosion and provision of a method for
protecting personnel and equipment from its conse-
quences (protection method).
Usually, each drying plant being part of a chemi-
cal plant is under last protection layer that is emer-
gency response that may essentially mitigate the
impact of a fire or explosion to human, property,
and environment.
Within the management factor, which usually ac-
counts for majority of industrial accidents, the most
important tool is a risk assessment, which examines
the hazards associated with the drying operation and
on that basis safety prevention and protection meas-
ures are designed. Besides these all operating, house-
keeping, and maintenance procedures as well as
training systems are defined by the management
based on the risk assessment.
In view of the diversity of the nature of material
handled and types of dryers, it is not possible to
present any universal answer to the above-mentioned
factors. However, many of the general values regard-
ing the process, engineering, and management factors
are commonly applicable to all types of dryers. These
are given here, but one must remember that each
material and dryer should be assessed individually,
taking all steps possible to provide adequate safety. It
is worth emphasizing that the application of different
precaution methods in drying processes is a statutory
requirement in many countries; e.g., the Factories
Act of 1961 (in the United Kingdom) requires all
practicable precautions to be taken to prevent an
explosion wherever an explosion dust is involved.
Similar requirements are in Germany (Störfall VwV),
the United States, and the other European Union
countries. The EU ATEX Directives 94/9/EC is fully
applicable to dryers [7]. An excellent guide to safety in
drying operations has been prepared and published
in a revised version by the Institution of Chemical
Engineers of Great Britain [8].
48.2 THE PROCESS FACTOR
48.2.1 NATURE OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS
IN DRYERS
The simultaneous presence of three basic condi-
tions is required for fire and explosion to occur
(Figure 48.2)
1. Fuel (e.g., flammable dusts, solvents, or hybrid
mixtures)
2. Oxygen (air)
3. Ignition source with sufficient energy
When any of these three basic conditions is miss-
ing, no explosion can occur.
The majority of powdery, fibrous, and granular
products processed in dryers contain fuels. Moreover,
fine combustible dust, when dispersed in air, can form
a reactive mixture leading to explosion, which may
trigger others as dust is dislodged by a primary event.
Frequently, the material can accumulate within a
dryer in the form of deposits (in places unswept by a
drying agent) or residues because the dryer may not
have been cleaned before start-up. As a result of the
accumulation, the overheating process may take
place. The risk is substantially increased if a flam-
mable solvent is being evaporated from the material
or a mixture of combustible dust and flammable gas
or vapor occurs (e.g., a hybrid mixture).
The air generally used as a drying agent contains
enough oxygen for combustion and also all types of
ignition sources may be present during drying. More-
over, drying is a very complex unit operation that
may include other operations like pneumatic convey-
ing, separation, storage, and direct/indirect heating
Fuel (dust)
Ignition
Oxidizer
source
Confined vessel
(or partially)
FIGURE 48.2 Fire and/or dust explosion components.
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
systems, which by the nature of the process may
bring about a fire and explosion hazard. As a conse-
quence, the following hazards may appear:
1. Fire (i.e., combustion of dust, which means a
chemical reaction of a combustible and gaseous
oxidant with resultant production of flame and
burning gases)
2. A dust explosion (i.e., flame propagation through
a confined dispersed dust with pressure gener-
ation by combustion)
3. A deflagrating or detonating explosion
4. An uncontrolled thermal decomposition of ma-
terial producing extensive damage
Based on the nature of the reaction exhibited
by materials when heated, they may be classified as
follows:
1. Deflagrating or detonating explosives
2. Materials that exhibit violent exothermic reac-
tion even in the absence of air (e.g., certain
peroxides)
3. Materials that undergo exothermic oxidation or
decomposition in layer, bulk, or fluidized form,
or that can disperse into flammable clouds in air
The differentiation between a detonation type of
combustion and deflagration is based on the velocity
of combustion zone. According to NFPA Standard
69 (1986) edition the deflagration is defined as a
propagation of combustion zone at a velocity that is
less than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium.
The opposite feature is characteristic for the deton-
ation type of the velocity combustion.
Types 1 and 2 require a specialized drying tech-
nique and are not discussed in this chapter. The dry-
ing of solids of type 3 can be safely carried out by
proper control of operating conditions and by pro-
viding adequate precautionary measures.
The hazards with combustible materials can be
divided into:
. Ignition of dust clouds
. Ignition of hybrid mixture
. Ignition of dust layer or deposits
. Ignition of bulk powder
Ignitions of dust clouds are due to oxidation reactions
whereas ignitions of dust layer or bulk powder are
Fire/explosion
due to self-ignition or exothermic decomposition.
The optimum condition for ignition and subse-
quently for the combustion process is when the par-
ticle separation allows sufficient air to get to each
particle, but the particles are close enough for the
heat release to support burning of adjacent particles.
Such conditions are met mainly in a dispersional
dryer in which dust clouds are formed. As a result
of a dust cloud ignition, fire dispersion or explosion in
a confined place or flash fire in open space may take
place. The ignition of a dust layer and bulk powder
results in burning by smoldering or flame. Transition
from fire to explosion and vice versa can readily occur.
An overall assessment of fire and explosion hazards in
dryers is presented in Figure 48.3.
48.2.2 MATERIAL CHARACTERIZATION PROCEDURE
An extensive series of laboratory tests have been
conducted in various countries to enable the investi-
gation of fire and explosion characteristics of
materials to be made. The testing apparatus and
procedures differ from one country to the other,
although there are some common points. The tests
used to be made on a laboratory scale and the results
obtained were extrapolated to full scale, always
giving some uncertainty. Also, the test procedures
may not reflect exactly the condition in a parti-
cular type of dryer. Therefore, it is recommended
that published data may be used carefully and indi-
vidual tests on the particular dust concerned may
be required.
The most comprehensive ranges of tests, which
are already standard in their countries, have been
made in the United Kingdom, the United States,
and West European countries [9–14]. In addition to
these testing methods, there are special methods that
have been developed by specific industries for certain
processes and products. As far as drying operations
are concerned, ICI Ltd. (United Kingdom) [15] and
CIBA-Geigy (United Kingdom) [8] have set up such
procedures.
As a result of these established procedures, data
regarding the explosion characteristics of many prod-
ucts already exist [14–16,19–21]. With the product not
tested previously, the following characterization pro-
cedure is recommended (Table 48.1).

Is material No
suitable for Consider
thermal drying? alternatives

Yes

Can cloud of Can material

No No
material form in bulk or form
dryers or ancillaries? deposits or layers?

Yes Yes

Select sample
for testing

Do explosibility Do thermal
tests and decomposition
classify dusts tests

No Does material Yes Yes Does exothermic No

propagate flame? activity take place?

Fire/explosion hazard No thermal

No fire/explosion
safeguards required decomposition
hazard
hazard

FIGURE 48.3 Overall assessment of fire and explosion hazards in dryers.

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

TABLE 48.1
Material Characterization Procedure

Tests on Chemical structure Explosive Unsuitable for

Material
explosiveness materials thermal drying
Oxygen balance
Incombustible No precaution on
Small flammability test materials fire/explosion

Combustible
materials

Tests on Tests on dust or Tests on thermal

combustibility vapor explosion decomposition

Propagation Explosibiity Exotherm characteristics

characteristics MEC/LFL/MOC TA, TL, TB, (dT/dt)

Ignitability Sensitivity Consequence of decomposition

MIT, MIE (dP/dt)max, VG

Smoldering Violence Self-heating

Pmax, (dP/dt)max TC, d

Fire-fighting systems Safeguard systems

48.2.2.1 Explosiveness Oxygen Balance—An explosive material under-

goes oxidative decomposition in the presence of oxy-
In order to identify materials that may be accepted for gen under certain conditions of temperature,
drying, it should be determined whether or not they pressure, and composition, thereby releasing a lot of
have properties associated with deflagrating or deton- energy and a large volume of simple oxidation prod-
ating explosives. Such an initial examination is based ucts. The oxygen availability within the compound is
on the laboratory tests concerning the following: often a fairly good estimate of its explosive nature.
Oxygen balance, computed from oxygen availability,
1. Chemical composition when compared against known explosives, provides
2. Oxygen balance the indication of explosibility.
3. Small-scale flammability tests For a compound with carbon, hydrogen, and oxy-
gen in the ratio given by CxHyOz and stoichiometry of
Chemical Composition—The explosibility of a ma-
combustion given by
terial can be attributed mostly to the presence of some
functional groups in its molecular structure. Some of  
these functional groups are: Y Z Y
C x Hy Oz þ X þ  O2 $ X CO2 þ H2 O
4 2 2
1. Those affecting the explosive nature directly,
e.g., aliphatic and aromatic nitro groups, ni-
trate ester, and nitramine the oxygen balance is defined as
2. Those indirectly concerned with explosibility,
e.g., azide, azo, nitroso, acetylene, peroxide, 16  (2X þ Y =2  Z)  100
Oxygen Balance ¼
and perchlorate molecular weight
3. Those that make some contribution to explosi-
bility, e.g., hydroxyl, ether, amino, carbonyl,
Computed values for some of the known explosives
and sulfonic acid
are nitrobenzene, 162.6; trinitrotoluene, 74.0; and
It should be noted that this list is not exhaustive. glyceryl trinitrate, þ3.5.

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

 If the oxygen balance of the compound is >200,
the compound should be considered as being poten-
tially explosive and these materials cannot be ther-
mally dried.
Small-Scale Flammability Tests—The final exam-
ination is made by exposing a small-scale sample (1 to
2 g) to flame. Violent reaction will confirm the neces-
sity of further explosiveness testing. A full account of
the above-mentioned tests is available [8].
Additional information on explosibility of a ma-
terial is provided by thermochemistry. All materials
with endothermic heat of formation can release this
stored energy upon decomposition and must there-
fore be regarded as hazardous substance [20]. A list of
reactive chemicals and their associated hazards is
given by Bretherick [21].
48.2.2.2 Combustibility
Combustibility properties are necessary to assess the
type and magnitude of any fire associated with a
material. These properties can be markedly affected
by physical properties of the material and external
factors. No universally accepted testing method is
available. The basic data on combustibility may be
obtained by a burning test and combustion test [8,9].
The essential information is required on the rate and
type of exhibited propagation (flame or smoldering)
and ignition temperature observed under one set of
conditions may be changed substantially by a change
of condition.
Based on the procedure developed by CIBA-Geigy
[8], the material is rated from 1 to 6 depending upon its
reaction to an electrically heated platinum wire. The
sum of the two ratings is then taken as the overall
index of the drying hazard and subsequently a hazard
classification is determined (Table 48.2). Products with
a hazard class Tr 3 should not be dried in heated
vessels since safe handling of the dry product cannot
be assumed.
TABLE 48.2
Classification of Drying Hazards by
CIBA-Geigy Ltd.
Total Rating Hazard Class Remarks
2–4 Tr 0 No fire hazard
5–7 Tr 1 Slight fire hazard
8–10 Tr 2 Fire hazard
11–12 Tr 3 High fire hazard
Source: From Preventing of Fires and Explosions in Dryers—A
User Guide, 2nd ed., Institute of Chemical Engineers, Rugby,
UK (1990).
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
48.2.2.3 Dust Explosion Characteristics
Many dusts, when dispersed in air, form a cloud or
suspension. Clouds of combustible dusts are generally
explosible and, when ignited, result in an explosion in
a confined space (e.g., drying chamber) or a flash fire,
developing little hazardous pressure, in an open
space. For a dust to be explodable, the particle size
must be small enough to give an adequate reactive
surface area, and the dust cloud sufficiently dense and
uniform to propagate the combustion reaction. Par-
ticles greater than about 500 mm in diameter are
unlikely to cause explosions, although during drying
a comminution process may take place that produces
fine powder much smaller in diameter. Generally, the
explosion of a dust cloud can occur only when all the
following conditions are met:
1. Dust concentration lies within the explosive
limits
2. Required oxygen concentration is available
3. An ignition source of sufficient energy is
present
Flammable dusts mixed with air exhibit an explo-
sive range having upper and lower limits (Figure 48.4).
The upper limit for dusts is difficult to establish; the
lower limit, called the minimum explosive concentra-
tion (MEC), as the lowest concentration of suspended
dust capable of propagating flame, may be in the range
of 0.02 to 0.085 kg of product/m3 of air for polyethylene
and coffee, respectively. Such conditions may be met in
all types of dryers except for tray and band dryers. The
range of explosible concentrations is strongly influ-
enced by many parameters, e.g., the particle size, par-
ticle shape, moisture content, the position and nature of
the ignition source, and more. In all dispersional dryers,
in which the material is dispersed in air, it is necessary
to accept that a dust cloud of explosible concentration
can form.
The required oxygen concentration is expressed
by minimum oxygen concentration (MOC) to sup-
port combustion; this varies between 3 and 15% (v/v)
Flame quenched
Upper Typically
limit 2−10 kg/m3 air
Explosion
risk
Lower Typically
limit 0.01−0.5 kg/m3 air
Flame cannot
be sustained
FIGURE 48.4 Dust explosivity limits.
as measured experimentally at 8508C, depending
on the chemical nature of the dust, its particle size,
moisture content, and temperature.
The sensitivity of a dust cloud to ignition is deter-
mined by the minimum ignition temperature (MIT)
and minimum ignition energy (MIE). The MIT and
MIE are determined by standard tests described in
detail by Palmer [9] and Field [12].
The MIT is especially relevant in problems involv-
ing a relatively large heated area of a plant, e.g., the
surface of a dryer, and represents a maximum tem-
perature that should never be exceeded. Typical val-
ues have been determined to be 370, 500, and 5758C
for sugar, cocoa, and coal, respectively.
The MIE is particularly relevant in ignition by
sparks. Typical values have been shown to be 30,
120, and 50 mJ for sugar, cocoa, and coal, respect-
ively, and are strongly dependent on the particle size:
the finer the dust, the more easily it can be ignited
[11]. The main application of MIE is in relation to the
static electricity hazard. It has been reported that the
majority of incidents occur with sparks having igni-
tion energy below 25 mJ [13].
The course of an explosion of a combustible dust
in a closed vessel is shown in Figure 48.5.
There are two main factors governing the violence
of explosion: (1) the maximum explosion pressure
Pmax and (2) the maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/
dt)max. The severity of explosion of a dust cloud can
Pmax
P, Pa
Slope (dP/dt)max
t, s
(a)
P, Pa
V = 20 m3
V = 1 m3
V = 1 dm3
t, s
(b)
FIGURE 48.5 The course of explosion.
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
be described by measuring the pressure rise occurs
during an explosion. As can be seen in Figure 48.5a,
the pressure continues to rise inside the vessel until
explosion pressure Pmax has been reached. In the
rising portion of the pressure curve, an inflection
point occurs at which the slope of the curve is the
greatest. It gives the explosion rate of pressure rise
(dP/dt)max. The Pmax for dryers operating at atmos-
pheric pressure does not exceed 900 kPa and can de-
velop rates up to 10 kPa/s. The effect of vessel
volume, types of dust, and presence of flammable
solvent is quantitatively shown in Figure 48.5b, Fig-
ure 48.5c, and Figure 48.5d, respectively.
The violence of explosion parameters has been
determined for many years in the United King-
dom and the United States in the Hartmann bomb
apparatus of 1.3-L mm capacity (Figure 48.6a) [9].
Today, an alternative method that is generally
preferred, following extensive research and deve-
lopment in Switzerland, is the 20-L sphere test with a
10,000-J chemical igniter [11,14] (Figure 48.6b).
Methods of qualifying explosion severity in the vessel
have been described [22] and widely accepted in
Europe [23].
These test series and data are used to determine an
additional explosion parameter—the maximum rate
of pressure rise normalized to a volume of 1 m3 (Kst).
The explosion parameter is expressed in the form of
the ‘‘cube root’’ law:
Dextrin
P, Pa
Coal dust
t, s
(c)
PVC dust and solvent vapors
P, Pa
simultaneously present
(hybrid mixture)
PVC dust not explosive
t, s
(d)
 Pressure (dP=dt)max V 1=3 ¼ Kst
transducer
Combustion tube where V is the volume of the vessel and Kst is the
dimensional constant characteristic of a particular
dust (kPa~m/s). The maximum explosion pressure
Brass electrodes Electrode Pmax and the maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/
insulation dt)max are used to design the explosion protection
system and are discussed below.
Spark gap
Reported values for the explosion parameter Kst
Mushroom-shaped
deflector vary over a range for a particular material, e.g., from
Brush tube Air reservoir 2.8  103 to 34  103 kPams1 for pigments and
Dispersion cup
from 5.8  103 to 13  103 kPams1 for milk. The
Full−port Pressure
solenoid valve differences are connected with the variations in chem-
gauge
ical formulation of samples and differences in particle
Air
size. According to Bartknecht [14], the variation in
moisture content may be less significant.
Experimental data on dust explosibility enable the
(a)
classification of dust into dust explosion hazard classes.
Stainless steel Igniter cables Such a classification applied in different countries is
sphere presented in Table 48.3. The determination of the
Perforated
Water in dust explosion hazard class is required not only to
dispersion assess dust explosion risk, but also to define statutory
ring requirements as well as to assist in the identification
Exhaust
Pressure of protective measures for different hazard classes.
port (Table 48.4), presents a selected data for dust
transducer
explosivity [16-21].
Pressurized
Igniter dust chamber 48.2.2.4 Thermal Decomposition Characteristics
(detonator)
In almost all dryers, there is a buildup of deposits on
Water out Pressure
the inner surface of the drying chamber or an accu-
gauge
mulation of dust layer in some dead areas. The
material may also be stored in bulk form at the
(b) bottom of some dryers and in bins, hoppers, silos,
or bags. Ignition of such a material can occur not
FIGURE 48.6 Apparatus for testing dryer explosion char- only by typical high-temperature sources (i.e., elec-
acteristics for organic powders. trical sparks or incandescent particles), but also by

TABLE 48.3
Dust Classification Systems

Country Test Criterion Dust Class Reference No.

Great Britain Horizontal tube Ignition and flame Group A (explosive) 9

<13008C propagation
Vertical tube
Inflammator Group B (nonexplosive)
United States Physical properties Explosivity index IE 17
of dust Group A (weak explosion); IE ¼ 0.1
Ignitability Group B (moderate); IE ¼ 0.1 to 1.0
Result of ignition Group C (strong); IE ¼ 1.0 to 10
Group D (severe); IE ¼ 10
Federal Republic of Sphere test Dimensional constant 23
Germany, Switzerland (volume 1 m3) Kst in ‘‘cube root’’ law St 0 (nonexplosive); Kst/kPam/s
St 1 (weak); 0 < Kst < 200 kPam/s
St 2 (moderate); 200 < Kst < 300 kPam/s
St 3 (strong); Kst > 300 kPam/s

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

TABLE 48.4
Explosibility Characteristics of Various Dusts

Type of Dust MEC, kg/m3 MIT, 8C MIE, J Pmax. kPa (dP/dt)max Dust Classification
105  105, kPa/s
Cloud Layer IE St

Metal powders
Aluminum flakes 0.045 650 760 0.050 5.80 1400.0 >10.0 3
Magnesium 0.040 620 490 0.040 6.40 630.0 10.0 2
Silicon (96% Si) 0.110 790 — 0.100 6.40 840.0 0.9 1
Agricultural products
Cocoa 0.045 470 370 0.030 5.40 211.0 13.7 1
Coffee 0.085 720 — 0.016 6.20 360.0 0.1 1
Grain dust (wheat, maize,
barley, and oats) 0.055 430 230 0.030 9.20 140.0 9.2 1
Corn 0.055 400 — 0.040 7.80 413.0 6.9 1
Corn starch 0.045 400 — 0.040 7.30 516.0 9.5 1
Cotton linters 0.500 520 — 1.920 5.02 275.0 <0.1 1
Egg white 0.140 610 — 0.640 3.99 344.5 <0.1 1
Malt barley 0.055 400 250 0.035 6.54 303.0 5.5 1
Milk, skimmed 0.05 490 200 0.050 6.54 158.0 1.4 1
Potato starch 0.045 440 — 0.025 8.26 551.0 20.9 2
Rice dust 0.051 440 240 0.050 6.50 183.0 2.3 1
Soya protein 0.045 530 460 0.060 6.90 239.0 2.0 1
Sugar, powdered 0.045 370 400 0.030 7.70 352.0 9.6 1
Wood flour, pine 0.035 470 — 0.040 7.78 378.0 9.9 2
Pittsburgh coal 0.055 610 180 — 5.80 160.0 1.0 l
Plastics
Cellulose acetate 0.040 420 — 0.015 5.85 248.0 >10.0 1
Epoxy 0.020 540 — 0.015 6.60 420.0 10.0 1
Nylon 0.030 500 430 0.020 6.70 280.0 10.0 1
Phenolformaldehyde 0.030 490 — 0.010 6.50 775.0 10.0 1
Polycarbonate 0.025 710 — 0.025 5.30 241.0 — 1
Polyurethane foam 0.025 550 — 0.015 6.60 254.0 — 1
Polyethylene 0.020 450 — 0.010 5.50 516.0 10 2
Polypropylene 0.020 420 — 0.030 5.30 356.0 10 1
Polystyrene latex 0.020 500 — 0.015 6.81 482.0 — 1
Polyvinyl acetate 0.040 550 — 0.160 4.75 689.0 — 1
Rayon 0.055 520 — 0.240 7.37 117.0 — 1
Rubber, synthetic 0.030 320 — 0.030 6.40 213.5 — 1
Urea molding comp. 0.085 460 — 0.080 6.13 248.0 1.0 1
Drugs and chemicals
Aspirin 0.050 660 — 0.015 6.06 >689.0 2.3 2
Nitropyridone 0.045 430 — 0.035 7.64 >689.0 >10.0 2
Vitamin B 0.035 360 — 0.060 6.95 413.0 8.3 1
Adipic acid 0.035 550 — 0.060 5.78 >186.0 1.9 1
Benzoic acid 0.030 620 Melts 0.020 5.23 378.9 >10.0 1
Bisphenol A 0.020 570 — 0.015 6.13 585.6 >10.0 2
Diphenyl 0.015 500 — 0.020 5.64 689.0 >10.0 2
Salicylanilide 0.040 630 Melts 0.020 6.13 330.0 5.8 1
Sulfur 0.035 190 220 0.015 5.37 323.0 >10.0 1

low-rate atmospheric oxidation (self-heating) or ther-
mal decomposition due to chemical reaction induced
by exposure to heat.
These can take place when the rate of heat gener-
ation in the material QR (which strongly increases
exponentially with temperature according to Arrhe-
nius dependence) exceeds the rate of heat losses QL
(which increases only linearly with temperature)
as shown in Figure 48.7. It may lead to run-
away, increases in temperature of the material and

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.


Rate of heat
es
on
oss
tl
a ti
ea
er
en
H g
at
He
MIT
FIGURE 48.7 Thermal decomposition phenomenon.
subsequently to smoldering combustion that even-
tually may break into flame.
Characterization of an exothermal behavior of the
material involves a determination of the temperature
at which exothermicity is first detected and then the
rate, magnitude, and nature of the subsequent decom-
position. Such data can be produced by the applica-
tion of techniques known as differential thermal
analysis (DTA) and differential scanning calorimetry
(DSC) [11].
These techniques have some limitations connected
with the small scale of the experiments and they dif-
ferentiate between conditions in the experiment and
in the dryer. Therefore, ICI Ltd. of the United King-
dom has developed its own ICI Screening Test based
on the measurement of the temperature at which
exothermic activity is first detected during the heating
30
% of materials
20
10
50
FIGURE 48.8 Distribution of material exothermal temperature TA, TL, TB. (From N. Gibson, D. J. Harper, and R.L. Rogers,
Plant/Operations Progress, 4(3): 181–189 (1985). With permission.)
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Thermal of the sample under controlled conditions (an exo-
decomposition thermal onset temperature for the material in layer
QR
hazard TL; in bulk TB; and aerated TA) [15]. Test methods
QL take into account more conditions that can be met in
dryers (e.g., the effect of chemical composition of the
material, physical properties, influence of external air,
effect of bulk or scale, and the time cycle of the heat
exposure).
For material with self-heating capabilities col-
lected and stored in the bulk form, the most import-
ant is the discharge temperature, which cannot exceed
the onset temperatures for self-heating Tc. Detailed
data on the self-heating are given by Bowes [24].
There are also some important practical points of
which one has to be aware:
T
. Contamination of the material by lubricating oil
from the equipment (e.g., the atomizer in a
spray dryer) decreases MIT
. During start-up and shutdown, some parts of
the dryer may have a higher temperature than
during normal operations
. Any smoldering layer may ignite into a
flame when disturbed and as a consequence
can result in a flash fire or an explosion;
such deposits should be extinguished by a
gentle water spray before cleaning operation
begins
The summarized results of wide research made by
Gibson et al. [15] for the exothermal onset temperat-
ures for >200 samples of different organic chemicals
are shown in Figure 48.8. The obtained data on the
material in the form of bulk powders, layers, and
aerated powders are used for the selection of safe
operating conditions that simultaneously preserve
good product quality.
30
TA
TL
% of materials
20
10
150 250 350 50 150 250 350
T, ⬚C TB, ⬚C
48.2.3 HAZARDS WITH FLAMMABLE VAPORS

Combustible concentration
Thermal drying of any combustible solid or liquid Saturated
UFL)
produces a vapor that can form a flammable mixture vapor−air
ble limit (
mixtures r flamma
with oxygen if only the vapor concentration is in the Uppe
right range. Similar to dust explosions, a vapor ex-
plosion can occur under the following conditions:
Mist Flammable
mixtures
. A vapor concentration is within lower flamma-
bility limits (LFLs) and upper flammability Lowe
r flam
limits (UFLs) mable
limit (
. Minimal oxygen concentration (MOC) is LFL)
reached
. An ignition source of sufficient energy is present
Flash Autoignition T
point (FP) temperature (AIT)
The presence of the flammable vapor in air makes the
mixture more susceptible to ignition and the propa-
gation of flame through the mixture of reactants is FIGURE 48.9 Flammability characteristics of an idealized
vapor–air mixture.
even more rigorous than that for dusts dependent on
the overall conditions.
The general relationship between flammability most organic solvents in air, is around 1 to 2% by
parameters of an idealized flammable air mixture is volume at room temperature. The flammability limits
shown in Figure 48.9, whereas Table 48.5 presents can also be calculated on the basis of the stoichiomet-
some flammability data for selected organic liquids. ric amount required to sustain combustion.
The terms lower explosibility limit (LEL) and Adequate equations for flash calculation are set
upper explosibility limit (UEL) are also used; they up in Table 48.6.
are synonymous with LFL and UFL, respectively. The LFL is largely independent of the oxygen
The LFL and UFL can be determined experimen- concentration in the gas, whereas the upper limit is
tally and LFL, which is more relevant to drying for strongly dependent. These are also affected by tem-

TABLE 48.5
Flammability Data for Selected Organic Liquids

Limit of Flammability in Air, % v/v

Compound Flash Boiling Autoignition Minimum O2 for
Lower Upper Point, 8C Point, 8C Temperature, 8C Ignition (Average), % v/va

Ethanol 3.3 19.0 13 78 363 10.5

Methanol 6.0 36.0 12 64 385 10.0
Isopropanol 2.0 12.7 12 83 399 —
Isobutanol 1.7 10.6 28 107 415 —
n-Butanol 1.4 11.2 29 343 —
Acetone 2.15 13.0 20 56 465 13.5
Diethylether 1.9 36.0 45 35 160 10.5
Ethyl acetate 2.0 11.5 4 77 426 b
n-Hexane 1.1 7.5 22 69 223 12.0
n-Heptane 1.05 6.7 4 98 204 —
n-Octane 1.0 6.5 13 126 206 —
Gasoline 1.4 7.4 38 38–204 180–456 —
Benzene 1.3 7.1 11 80 498 11.2
Toluene 1.3 7.1 4 111 480 —
m-Xylene 1.1 7.0 27 139 527 —
a
The data on minimum O2 for ignition are for nitrogen as the inert diluent.
Source: From Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases and Volatile Solids, NFPA No. 325M, National Fire Protection
Association, Boston (1977).

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

TABLE 48.6
Formulas for Calculation of Explosibility Parameters

Description Equation Remarks Reference No.

Flash point of liquids, TFP, 8C TFP ¼ 0:683TBP  71:7, or Recommended for hydrocarbons; 25
P PFP ¼ vapor pressure at
TFP ¼ f (PFP ) closed-cup flash point;
1 þ (N  1)4:76
P
PFP ¼ ; TFP ¼ f (PFP )
1 þ (N  1)4:76
TBP ¼ boiling point, 8C
N—number of atoms of oxygen for
combustion of one molecule of fuel
PFP
Flammability limits of vapor, % v/v LFL ¼ 100 M, X, Y ¼ stoichiometric number of 26
P
atoms of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen,
0:55  100
LFL ¼ respectively, in molecule of fuel
4:76M þ 1:19X  2:38Y þ 1
Recommended for hydrocarbons
3:50  100
UFL ¼ Deviation for nonorganic compounds
4:76M þ 1:19X  2:38Y þ 1

1 1
Flammable vapor mixture LFLm ¼ P
n ;UFL ¼ P
n Yi ¼ mole fraction of component i
Yi Yi
LeChatelier’s rule LFLj UFLj n ¼ number of combustible species
i¼1 i¼1
 
XB
1 100
100  XB
Mixture of flammable vapor (A) LFLm ¼ LFLA XB ¼ % v/v of nonflammable
XB
with nonflammable component (B) 100 þ LFLA component B in mixture
100  XB
Flammability limits of vapor LFLT ¼ LFL25 [1  0:75(T  25)=DHc ] DHc ¼ heat of combustion, kcal/mol
Dependence on temperature T, 8C LFLT ¼ LFL25 [1 þ 0:75(T  25)=DHc ]
Dependence on pressure UFLP ¼ UFL þ 20:6(lgP þ 1) P ¼ absolute pressure, MPa
 
X Y
Minimum oxygen concentration, % v/v O2 MOC ¼ LFL M þ  Stoichiometric relation 25
4 2
Minimum oxygen concentration: MOCP ¼ MOC  1:5(lgP þ 1) P ¼ absolute pressure, MPa
dependence on pressure P
(100  LFL)
Minimum nitrogen concentration, % v/v N2 MNC ¼   1
4:76 M þ X4  Y2 LFL
 x 
G
Minimum explosible concentration for hybrid mixture MECH ¼ MEC 1 MEC—minimum dust explosible 14
LFL
concentration xG ¼ total % v/v of
flammable vapor
perature (the flammability range increases linearly
with the rise of temperature) and pressure (increased
pressure widens the flammability limits).
If the air is diluted with an inert gas, e.g., nitrogen
or carbon dioxide, the risk of ignition is reduced.
The MOC for ignition varies from 10 to 13.5% by
volume, depending on the type of the vapor and
the inert gas. This feature has been used to develop
self-inertizing dryers.
The most potentially hazardous situations are
likely to occur when flammable substances are used
at temperatures above the flash point, which corres-
ponds to the vapor concentration at LFL. This situ-
ation frequently occurs for solvents encountered in
drying because most of them have the flash point
below room temperature.
Therefore, a careful control of the vapor or oxy-
gen concentration is required even in a feed container
when solvent-wet feedstocks are handled.
48.2.4 HYBRID MIXTURES
A combination of combustible dust and flammable
gas or vapor called a hybrid mixture is of significance
in certain drying operations. Such dust–vapor–air
mixtures are much more susceptible to ignition and
any resulting explosion is more violent than the dust-
alone explosion. Research carried out so far has
established that:
. An explosion may occur even if the concentra-
tion of vapor is well below the LFL and the
dust–air mixture is nonexplosive
. A minimum vapor concentration of the order of
0.2% by volume may cause a marked increase of
Pmax and (dP/dt)max
. Low energy ignition incapable of igniting a given
dust–air mixture may easily cause an ignition of
a hybrid mixture
The properties of hybrid mixture explosions are
not yet available; therefore, until more information is
available, all such mixtures should be treated with
great concern.
48.2.5 IDENTIFICATION OF IGNITION SOURCES
All kinds of ignition sources can be present in dryers.
However, for a particular type of dryer, there are
some major sources with a higher risk of occurrence
that should be well recognized, localized, and possibly
eliminated. An identification of all ignition sources and
their conjunction to hazardous areas is particularly
important when a certain type of hazard takes place.
For the areas where flammable vapors and dusts in
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
both dispersions and layers can be found, the most
common and hazardous ignition sources include elec-
trostatic discharges and electric frictional sparks. Elec-
trostatic discharges can be reduced substantially by a
careful design and application of the approved codes
of practice [11,27,28]. The accumulation of electrostatic
charge by product and equipment is in many cases
directly associated with the process and operations
involved in industrial production. It represents a
source of ignition that can be hazardous not only
under normal circumstances, i.e., without any kind of
plant upset occurring, but also under abnormal condi-
tions. Dust layers or bulk accumulates are especially
sensitive to self-heating or exothermic decomposition.
The risk may be reduced by ensuring proper operating
conditions or by design like ‘‘deposit-free’’ spray dryer
[29]. Since it is not possible to ensure that all ignition
sources are eliminated, it is necessary to introduce a
proper protection system.
48.2.6 SELECTION OF OPERATING CONDITIONS
The operating conditions for a chosen type of dryer
can be selected taking into account the type of hazard
that exists, the particular part of a drying system
where the hazard takes place, and the appropriate
fire and explosion characteristics.
A fire hazard may be safely avoided if the tem-
perature of the material is lower than the relevant
minimum ignition or exotherm onset temperature.
The greatest risk exists in the part of the drying
system where the product moisture content is lowest,
such as the separation units (e.g., cyclones and bags).
Where dust deposits can accumulate, the require-
ments are that the maximum permissible temperature
of the plant surfaces should not exceed two thirds of
the layer MIT. Also, for the dust layer, the time the
material is exposed to heat should be taken into ac-
count as a controlling factor that will determine
cleaning and removal of deposits.
Therefore, an automatic control system that
monitors the temperature at selected locations is
strongly recommended. The explosion hazards will
be successfully eliminated if the dust concentration
is less than the minimum explosible concentration.
This is difficult to achieve for most dispersional
dryers.
The onset exotherm temperature (e.g., layer or
bulk) is to be lower than MIT (e.g., layer or bulk)
and is proposed for the cases in which the change of
material quality occurs before the ignition takes
place. The summary of recommended conditions for
safe plant operation is presented in Table 48.7.
The above proposal is based on the characteristic
controlling parameters for a certain type of hazard
TABLE 48.7
Selection of Operating Conditions

Ignition Hazard Basic Controlling Parameter Recommended Operational Type of Equipment

Temperature T, Dust
Concentration DC, Vapor
and Oxygen Concentration
VC and OC, Respectively

Dust–air mixture Minimum ignition temperature MIT T ¼ MIT508C Spray dryer, fluid dryer,
pneumatic dryer
Onset aerated exotherm temperature TA T ¼ TA(30–508C) Fluid dryer, band dryer
Maximum permissible oxygen OC  (50–70%) MOC Inside dryer and dust recovery
concentration MOC system
Minimum explosible concentration MEC DC < MEC It is not possible to achieve this
for most dryers except for
tray and band dryers
Dust layer or deposits Onset layer exotherm temperature TL T ¼ TL208C Band and tray dryers and
deposits
Bulk dust Onset bulk exotherm temperature TB T ¼ TB508C Bins, hoppers, silos, and bags
Flammable vapor Lower explosive limit LFL VC < 25% LFL Whole drying system
Minimum oxygen concentration MOC OC  (50–70%) MOC Whole drying system
Minimum ignition temperature MIT T < MIT Whole drying system

with a significant safety margin. Selection of a max-
imum drying temperature on the basis of the onset
exotherm temperature has been verified extensively by
Gibson et al. [15]; the temperatures specified do not
place an unacceptable restriction on drying operations.
They have continued to be efficient and economic.
48.3 THE ENGINEERING FACTOR
48.3.1 DESIGN CONSIDERATION
Within the design consideration factor, probably the
most important section is plant layout. Taking into
account the possibility of dust explosion and fire, a
question arises whether a certain type of plant may be
located in a particular place or whether some splitting
of the process on particular operations may be re-
quired. The increased scale of many new industrial
plants means that the volume of the plant providing a
risk of explosion is much greater than it was only a
few years ago.
Therefore, there is a tendency for a large plant to
be situated in an open space. The best arrangement is
to put the plant in a separate structure covered only
with a light roof. If this is not possible, attention
should be given to the situation of collection and
storage, units and furnaces. All those units as far as
possible should be outside the building or inside a
fire-resistant enclosure. Also essential is the position
of the central room and electrical switch rooms and
how they will be affected by fire and explosion.
There are other engineering factors that affect the
fire and explosion hazard, e.g., engineering standards
of the structural steel and foundations, process equip-
ment, heat exchangers, feeding system, fan and
blowers, storage vessels, electrical equipment, instru-
ments, and fire protection and safety equipment. Con-
siderable assistance in design also can be obtained
from relevant codes of practice. The responsibility
for safe operation rests with the manufacturers of
equipment and products as required by national law
(e.g., Factories Act and Health and Safety at Work
Act in the United Kingdom).
48.3.2 FIRE AND EXPLOSION PRECAUTIONS
The basis of safety in plants drying flammable mater-
ials can be prevention and protection of life and
property to the maximum possible extent, assuming
that explosion is inevitable. Fire and explosion pre-
vention can be accomplished by
1. Maintaining the concentration of the flammable
material beyond the range of flammability
2. Maintaining oxygen concentration within
safe limits
3. Excluding all probable ignition sources
Fire and explosion protection can be achieved by
1. Proper venting
2. Containing the severity of explosion
3. Suppressing the fire or/and explosion

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

 It is to be noted that there is no need to duplicate
any method of protection or prevention. Methods of
dust explosion prevention and protection are de-
scribed in three Institute of Chemical Engineers
(IChemE) guides [30–32] and in References 33 and 34.
48.3.3 FIRE AND EXPLOSION PREVENTION
For materials undergoing exothermic oxidation, the
methods given below will be satisfactory for explosion
prevention, whereas for materials undergoing exo-
thermic decomposition resulting in the release of
large volumes of gases, these methods can be used
only to protect, not to prevent, explosion hazards.
48.3.3.1 Inerting
The principle of inerting is to create an environment
in which combustion cannot take place. Some of the
common inerting agents are N2, CO2, flue gases, and
others. The presence of inert gases causes the concen-
tration of oxygen in the gaseous mixture to be re-
duced below the minimum required for sustaining
combustion, which is used to be within the range of
10% by volume. Inerting also decreases the maximum
explosion pressure and retards the rate of pressure
rise [14].
The MOC determined in the laboratory at 8508C
is a very safe value for most of the dryer applications
in which the operating conditions are never as severe.
Actually, the use of this value results in an unneces-
sary high consumption of the inertizing agent. Hence,
tests should be carried out at conditions that actually
exist in the dryer. Some data on MOC are presented
in Reference 9.
Feed
Heater
Drying
chamber Combustion
air
Product
FIGURE 48.10 Semiclosed cycle (self-inertizing) spray dryer system.
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Recycling a part of the dryer exhaust gases not
only improves the thermal efficiency, but also helps in
reducing the oxygen concentration. Such dryers are
called self-inertizing. An example of such a system is
presented in Figure 48.10.
One more important point is that, during the
start-up of a self-inertizing dryer, initially and for
some time the oxygen concentration is above the
minimum value desired, so the solid feed should not
be started until the concentration reaches the desired
limit. However, when organic solvents are involved,
the drying air must be substituted by inert gas (e.g.,
nitrogen), which recirculates in a closed-cycle system
(Figure 48.11).
48.3.3.2 Avoiding Formation of Dust Clouds
The only safe way of avoiding formation of dust
clouds is to use air velocities at which no entrainment
of dust takes place. In band and tray dryers, the
control of velocity is easier, but this is difficult to
fulfill in dryers that involve suspended-particle pro-
cessing. In general, the nature of the drying operation
is such that dust entrainment is not easy or feasible
for various reasons.
48.3.3.3 Excluding All Ignition Sources
It is imperative to ensure that all the following prob-
able sources of ignition are either removed or con-
trolled to prevent explosion.
Direct Heating Systems—For dryers containing
flammable vapors, direct heating systems are too dan-
gerous to be employed. In such cases, a separate hot
air generator should be provided.
Air
bleed
Fuel
(gas)
Heat
exchanger
Scrubber/ Condensed
condenser water recovery
 Feed Indirect
heater
Drying Atomizer
chamber
condenser
Product
FIGURE 48.11 Closed-cycle spray dryer system.
Hot particles from a heater can also be a potential
risk of ignition. According to accepted practice, the
following precautions should be taken:
1. If recirculation of a part of the exhaust gas is
considered, it is important to make sure that no
dust particles enter the combustion chamber
2. The burners should be cleaned periodically,
and efforts should be made to operate the
burners at a proper air/fuel ratio to ensure
complete combustion
3. The primary and secondary air fans should be
located to take in dust-free air. If this is not
practical, the inlet side of these fans should
contain dust filters, which should be periodic-
ally checked and cleaned.
Electrostatic Discharge—Any metal or good
conductor of electricity can store enough, electrical
energy to exceed minimum spark ignition energy
for dust and vapor clouds (25 mJ for most of the hy-
drocarbons). To prevent such charge accumulation, all
the conducting elements should be grounded. Periodic
checks are necessary to ensure proper inert grounding.
Similarly, nonconductors of high resistivity also
pose a serious problem. In such cases, the resistance
has to be reduced by incorporating some conductive
elements. For example, the extremely high resistance
of synthetic fibers used in bag filters may be reduced
by adding some steel or carbon fibers.
Electrical Equipment—Contact switches, fuses,
circuit breakers, and so on can discharge spark energy
greater than MIE, thereby causing explosion in an
environment containing flammable dust or vapor. It
is necessary to make sure that such electrical equip-
ment does not come in contact with dust or flam-
mable vapor.
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Heat
exchanger
Scrubber Solvent
recovery
Frictional Sparks and Heating—For frictional
sparks and heating, the probable sources of hazards
are: (1) overheated bearings; (2) power drills and similar
tools in which localized heating is likely; (3) frictional
impact with shovels and scoops, which may cause igni-
tion of compounds with low MIE, e.g., peroxides and
sulfur; (4) rotating fan blades touching the casing; and
(5) tramp metals and stones fed with the solid into the
dryer. For all these hazards, standard procedures are
available to take care of various problems [8].
Autoignition—It is worthwhile taking all precau-
tions to ensure that at no stage of drying operation,
including start-up and shutdown, does the material
temperature exceed its autoignition temperature
(AIT). The exhaust gas temperature is a safe way of
controlling the material temperature in a dryer.
Also, ledges, corners, and crevices, e.g., should be
avoided as far as possible to prevent dust layer for-
mation. If unavoidable, periodic cleaning of the dust
deposit is essential.
The decision tree for ignition sources assessment is
shown in Figure 48.12.
48.3.4 EXPLOSION PROTECTION
Explosion protection measures expect the explosion to
take its course, but ensure that it does so safely without
any effects on the personnel and equipment. The three
possible ways of protection from a fire or explosion
are: (1) venting; (2) containing; and (3) suppressing.
48.3.4.1 Venting
The principle of operation of venting is that at a
predetermined pressure rise Pst the vent in the system
opens up, thereby releasing the explosion products
to a safe area. The course of vented explosion is
 Start

Can Is series
Yes
ignition source of equipment
propagate? involved?

Yes No
Are
No Are direct No electrostatic
heating or hot surfaces discharges
Ignition sources present? safeguarded? Yes
should be limited Yes
to one vessel Yes
Do
No Is the MIE sparks from
of dust known? friction or impact
occur?

No Are controls
to prevent spark Yes
ignition taken?
Yes No

Is
Yes spontaneous
heating of the dust
possible?
Not all ignition Is
sources are controlled. No the MIT of the dust
Additional precautions measured?
required Is
electrical
Yes plant zoning
Are done?
No electrical No
ignition sources Yes
controlled?
Yes Have
permit to hot work
in place?
Yes
No

Good engineering
practice to control
over ignition sources

FIGURE 48.12 The decision tree for ignition sources assessment.

shown in Figure 48.13. Venting is a common, often
cheapest, way of protection from explosion. In case
the explosion products are toxic and cannot be re-
leased in the immediate vicinity of the plant, the
explosion products are carried to a safe area by
ducts connected to the vents. Since most dryers op-
erate at low or moderate pressures, a suitable vent-
opening pressure rise is 10 kPa. It is useful to note
that, when vented ducting is used, the peak pressure can
be increased. The increase in the peak pressure rise
is directly proportional to the square of the length of
the ductings.
The important criteria for vent design and
selection are that the vent should open fully at the
designated pressure with very little inertia and should
be perfectly sealed when closed. The principles and

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

 Pressure
Pmax
Unvented
explosion

Pmax—the resultant maximum pressure

Slope (dP/dt)max Pdes—the design pressure
Pdes
Pred —the resultant reduced pressure
Pst—the burst pressure of the vent
Pred Vented
Pst explosion
Vent acts
Time

FIGURE 48.13 The course of vented explosion.

practice of venting have been widely discussed [9–15, The value of K depends upon the designed strength of
23,25,26,32–34]. The main question is vent design. the vessel and the vent-opening pressure. For a vent-
Unfortunately, very little information is available on opening pressure rise of 10 kPa and a maximum ex-
vent design for dryers. Moreover, high-temperature, plosion pressure rise within the vessel of 20 kPa such
flammable dusts, and turbulent contact between gas that the designed strength of the dryer is 40 kPa (twice
and solid further complicate the use of available in- the maximum pressure rise), the value of K can be
formation on vent design in general. Three criteria taken as 3. This value is recommended for the chem-
have been developed for vent area calculation: (1) ical plant handling dusts with dP/dt values up to 700
vent ratio; (2) K factor; and (3) cube root law. to 800 kPa/s measured in a 1.2-L Hartmann bomb
The vent ratio is defined as the ratio of vent area [27]. If the designed strength required for the vessel
to the volume of the vessel. Based on the maximum decreases, the value of K has to be reduced. The
rate of pressure rise in a 1.2-L Hartmann bomb, for variation of maximum pressure rise with K factor is
vessels up to about 30 m3, the vent ratio can be given by Gibson and Harris [36].
selected from Table 48.8. For most carbonaceous In the United States, Germany, and Switzerland,
dusts, 1:5 seems to be a safe vent ratio. the recommended vent areas are based on the experi-
For volumes exceeding 30 m3, the vent ratio mentally measured dependence of the rate of pressure
should be progressively reduced to a limiting value rise on the vessel volume, the ‘‘cube root law’’ defined
of 1:25 m1 for a volume of 283 m3. in Section 2.2. From large-scale venting experiments, a
For estimating vent areas, the concept of K factor series of normographs (or a tabular form) have been
was developed by Simmonds and Cubbage [35]. They derived and incorporated in the German standard
defined K as VDI 3673 [23]. Based on an original work of Bart-
knecht [14], the National Fire Protection Association
cross-sectional area of vessel AC of the United States [34] presents such a series of
K¼ ¼
vent area AV normographs that allow the vent area F to be deter-
mined for the products according to their explosion
characteristics Kst for dust and KG for vapor, vessel
volume V, the vent opening pressure Pstat, and max-
TABLE 48.8 imum pressure during venting Pred. Typical normo-
Recommended Vent Ratio graphs are shown in Figure 48.14. An adequate
equation for the sizing of a relief vent can be found in
Maximum Rate Vent Ratio, m1 Dust Example the monograph of Crawl and Louvar [26]. Table 48.9
of Pressure presents equations for the vent area F1, required for
Rise, kPa/s volume V1, scaled up to that of F2 for volume V2.
A wide variety of explosion relief venting is avail-
<35,000 1/7 Wood, coal, flour,
and coffee
able to the industry. Bursting disks, displacement
35,000–70,000 1/5 Plastics panels, and hinged covers or doors with spring-loaded
<70,000 1/3 Magnesium and aluminum or magnetic catches and automatic trigger vents are all
in use. Selection of the specific type should be based on

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

 Kst, bar·m/sec Maximum pressure during venting
10

20
30
40
50
75
100
150
200
250 Pred, bar·a
300
400 1.2
500 1.3
600 1.4
1.5
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.3
2.6
3.0

100 10 1 0.1 0.1 1 10 100 1000

Vent area, m2 Vessel volume, m3

Venting normograph for dusts, Pstat = 1.1 bar·a

FIGURE 48.14 Normographs for the sizing of vent relief explosion. (From Explosion Venting, NEPA No. 68, National Fire
Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 1988 (presently under revision by the NFPA Explosion Protection Systems Committee.)

cost, operating conditions, and vessel type. Figure 48.15
presents some commonly used explosion vents.
It must be recognized that during the normal
course of explosion, a significant volume of flame
will discharge through the vent opening. For this
reason, the equipment utilizing venting should be
located outdoors or close to external walls so that
the vent duct will be as short as possible, avoiding
any bends. Discharge must be to a safe area. Typical
location of vents in a selected drying system is shown
in Figure 48.16.
Ideally, the best location for an explosion-relief
vent would be as close as possible to the source of
ignition; however, predicting the ignition source is
TABLE 48.9
Scale-Up Equations for Vent Area Calculation
Scale-Up Equations Basis Recommended for
F2/F1 ¼ V2/V1 Vent ratio Dust explosions
F2/F1 ¼ A2/A1 K factor Mainly for vapor explosions
F2/F1 ¼ (V2/V1)2/3 Cube root law Dust and vapor explosions
nearly impossible. Realistically, the vent should be
positioned where it is least affected by internal fit-
tings, which could increase turbulence if the flame
front has to pass through them. The vent may be on
the side or the top of the equipment.
48.3.4.2 Suppression
Explosion suppression is a technique that is activated
when the start of a dust explosion is detected (usually
within the first 10 ms) and arrested during incipient
stages, thus preventing the development of a pressure
that could result in an explosion. The pressure/time
curve for suppressed and unsuppressed explosion is
similar to that for venting (Figure 48.13).
Commercially available equipment for detection
and discharge suppression has been successfully ap-
plied even for the very large volumes typical of silos
and spray dryers [32].
A typical suppression system operates on the
basic principle shown in Figure 48.17. The detector
1 placed inside the dryer casing detects the pressure
wave, before the outburst of flames, and induces the
detonating cap valve 2 to blow the extinguish powder

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.


Steel channel
Greased felt
Rigid sheet Support frame
Explosion vent
Exploded view
Holddown Vent
membrane
Nondrying
bitumastic
cement
FIGURE 48.15 Types of explosion vents.
contained in the bin 3 evenly into the apparatus cas-
ing through the ball nozzle 4. The developing explo-
sion is thus so rapidly being attacked that it cannot
reach its fullest extent, and therefore causes a relative
low pressure rise of only 0.1 to 0.6 bar. An efficient
suppression system will keep the maximum explosion
pressure rise below 10 kPa and the number of sup-
pressors depends on the volume of the plant and
airflow rate, and, according to Bartknecht [14], fol-
lows the cube root law (n ~ V2/3). Suitable suppres-
sants are halogenated hydrocarbons or dried powder,
e.g., sodium bicarbonate, fluorides, cryolite, or ammo-
nium phosphate. Generally, powder is more effective
than halogenated hydrocarbons.
Automatic suppression systems are of particular
use when the dust is toxic and safe discharge of the
explosion products from a vent is not permitted. It is
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Rupture
disc
Channel
frame
Insulation
Section
Base
‘T’ Section
panel supports
Relief
panels
Power-driven
rotary valve
also important to bear in mind that the suppressant
is not effective against exothermic decomposition
reactions resulting in large volumes of gas.
Generally, a limitation of this technique is the
path along which the suppressants can be expected
to travel with a possibly maximum value of 4 m [12],
although Moore [37] reported a successful testing on
a 250-m3 scale. As a general recommendation, it can
be stated that the explosion–suppression systems
are effective against most solvent-vapor explosions,
hybrid-mixture explosions, fuel-droplet explosions,
and dust explosions, provided that the explosibility
constants Kst and KG are <300 Pam/s. For more
severe materials and for weak plants that are located
within a building, e.g., a larger spray dryer plant,
the explosion suppression and the explosion venting
combination are alternatives.
 Vents
Vent Vents Vent Vent

Vent
Vent

Vent
Band dryer
Spray
dryer Fluid-bed
dryer
Flash Batch fluid-
dryer bed dryer
Vents

Vents
Vent
Vent Vent Vent
Vent
Vent

Bins Ducting
or silos
Bag filter
Cylone

FIGURE 48.16 Location of relief vent in various drying systems.

48.3.4.3 Containment 48.3.4.4 Explosion Isolation Systems

Containment involves designing the drying system to
sustain the maximum pressure rise. For dryers oper-
ating at or near atmospheric pressure, this may result
in a vessel design pressure exceeding 900 kPa. As
expected, this is an expensive solution and is worth
considering only for small dryers and for some cases
of vacuum drying.
Suppression or containment systems can be operated
in conjunction with rapid-acting explosion isolation
systems that isolate several interconnected vessels
so an explosion in one vessel does not propagate
through ducting to initiate an explosion in another
vessel. Two types of isolation systems are used: (1)
mechanical and (2) extinguishing, both based on a
fast-acting knife gate valve principle. For details,
please refer Reference 38.

1 3 48.3.5 FIRE DUST PROTECTION

6 5
Protection against fire can be obtained by all the
means used for explosions and also by typical fire-
fighting systems using appropriate extinguishers. The
6 following methods may be applied:

. Gentle water spray

3 . Inert gas blanket
. Steam blanket
. Isolation and an external water spray

2 The selection of an extinguisher depends on factors

4 such as the composition of the dust, its situation, and
the presence of other hazardous materials. The most
FIGURE 48.17 Suppression technique in a fluid-bed dryer. commonly used extinguisher, water, cannot be used
(1, detector; 2, cap valve; 3, bin; 4, ball nozzle; 5, screen for fire involving electric equipment or reactive metals
containing powder; 6, explosion vents). (e.g., aluminum or magnesium). Gases or vapors such

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

as carbon dioxide, nitrogen, or steam may be used as
extinguishing agents for dust fires, especially for dust
that is contained in a relatively gas-tight volume.
Such a vessel should be cut off from adjacent equip-
ment. An alternative to extinguish fire is to allow it to
burn itself out after isolating the vessel concerned,
keeping a spray of cooling water on the outside of
the vessel.
The application of any fire-fighting systems re-
quires that the dust should not be disturbed into a
cloud because burning material is present and may
cause an explosion.
48.3.6 EXPLOSION HAZARDS AND PROTECTION
IN ANCILLARY UNITS
Almost all dryers have to be provided with some type
of heating system. Moreover, continuous-duty dryers
require feeding and discharging arrangements as well
as dust collection units. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider some of the potential fire and explosion
hazards associated with these systems and steps re-
quired to protect them from the hazards.
A comprehensive summary of explosion hazards
and a respective safety measure are presented in
Table 48.10. It should be noted that these suggestions
may be changed or modified depending upon the
specific application and dust properties.
48.3.7 RELIABILITY OF THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
An assured level of safety in a drying operation de-
pends essentially on the reliability of the protective
systems. This means that the system should function
at the time of hazard under given conditions without
failure. However, no single system is perfectly reli-
able. A hazard results when a protective system is
called on to act during a dead period (the fraction of
the time that a protective system is inactive).
On the basis of the hazard analysis (Hazan)
[39,40], the mathematical formula for the hazard
rate H caused by failure of the protective system is
given by
H ¼ f n T n1 [1  exp (DT =n þ 1)]
where f ¼ the failure rate of the protective system to
cope, T ¼ the test interval between maintenance
checks, D ¼ the demand rate, and n ¼ the number
of systems.

TABLE 48.10
Explosion Hazards and Safety Measures in Ancillary Units

Heating System Feeding System Dust Conveying

and Recovery
Direct Indirect

Major hazard Flame and burning particle No Scrap metal and stones Dust deposits
Ignition source Hot particles No Sparks Static electricity and
self-ignition
Safety measures Screen to stop particles Pressure relief valves Magnetic or pneumatic Venting or suppression
separators for toxic dust
For water-wetted dust Automatic spark
detection system
Extinguishing system
For flammable solvent Not applicable Inerting or suppression Inerting Inerting or suppression
Basic design Correct air/fuel ratio Interlocked with Uniform feeding rate Air velocity at
considerations Interlocked with the feeding system Interlocked with heater least 20 m/s in
the airflow conveying system
Inlet and outlet Interlocks Bounding and grounding
Effective seal Incorporating carbon
and metal filaments
in fabric filter
Maintenance Purging before start Inlet air filter cleaning Good house keeping Periodical cleaning
and operation and inspection and inspection
Burners cleaning Outside of heating tubes

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

 Using this formula and a typical figure on the
relief valve failure (f ¼ 0.01/y), test interval T ¼ 1
y, demand rate D ¼ 1/y, and the hazard rate H ¼
0.00393 (once in 254 y for n ¼ 1). The value of
demand rate D influences the extent of protective
measures to prevent drying hazard, whereas the fail-
ure rate depends on the design and the maintenance
of the protective system. When a single protective
system is unreliable, giving an unacceptable hazard
rate, the duplication or triplication of the system is
recommended. The more accurate and reliable pro-
tection system may reduce significantly the safety
margin in operating conditions, which may bring
additional economic effects.
48.3.8 APPLICATION TO SOME COMMON DRYERS
A number of papers published so far on safety aspects
refer to the spray dryer [41–44) and the fluid dryer
[45–47]. Few data refer to other types of dryer [48,49],
like the contact dryer, which generally can be safe-
guarded easier than convective dryers. Table 48.11
provides a summary of the probable hazards associ-
ated with a few industrially common types of dryers
and some hints on the recommended safety measures
to be taken. Once again, it is noted that this tabulated
information on measures and hazards is not exhaust-
ive. The suggested measures may have to be changed
or modified depending upon the specific application
at hand.
48.3.9 A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN SAFETY
DRYER ASSESSMENT
Drying is an operation that may produce a combustible
powder or dust that can cause an explosion under the
drying conditions or produce a flammable solvent that
may form an explosive vapor–gas mixture. As well as
from fluids and gases, hazards can also result from
solids. For such conditions, the machines, equipment
and protection systems are under EU ATEX 10A
Directive 94/9/EC, which is in force since 2003 [7].
There are two main requirements of that directive:
1. Categorization of the machines, equipment and
assignment of an appropriate level of protec-
tion
2. Compulsory to carry out risk assessment to
identify and evaluate any relevant hazard and
on that basis eliminate or minimize the risk by
an appropriate design measure and protective
devices.
Dryers are ATEX category 1, therefore, level of
protection must be very high. On the other hand, the
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
reliability of any safety-critical control system (protec-
tion system) according to standard IEC 61,508 [50] must
represent a particular safety integrity level, i.e., ‘‘SIL.’’
There are four SIL numbers from 1 to 4 expressing
the range of probability of failure on demand. For
category 1 (dryers) the overall protection system
SIL3 is assigned, i.e., the probability of failure on
demand is from 104 to 103/y. These are basic guide-
lines to the risk assessment and selection of particular
protective devices.
The drying risk assessment methodology is dis-
cussed by Rogers et al [51] as well as by Markowski
and Mujumdar [52]. Safety assessment of drying pro-
cesses can also be done using the expert system [53].
48.4 THE MANAGEMENT FACTOR
The normal operation of the plant should be safe,
efficient, and economical. Safety can be effectively
achieved by correct operation and maintenance of
the equipment. Hazardous situations can arise in the
best-designed plant if it is improperly operated or
inadequately maintained, or incorrect instructions
are given. Human error accounts for over 90% of in-
dustrial accidents [51]. Within the management factors,
the most important are the operating and maintenance
procedures, which are common for all industrial equip-
ment. Therefore, there is no special, different recom-
mendation for drying equipment, although each type of
equipment has its own specific characteristics, espe-
cially in terms of operating procedures. Housekeeping
cannot be overemphasized either.
48.4.1 PLANT OPERATION
All employed dryers must be equipped with clear and
comprehensive operating manuals prepared jointly by
the equipment supplier and the plant operating man-
agement. The manual should be learned by the oper-
ators, who are to be trained in recognition of hazardous
situations and risk assessment with the material being
dried. Very useful techniques, known as Hazop (haz-
ard and operability studies) and Hazan (hazard analy-
sis), may be applied successfully in both new and
existing processing plants [39,40].
The operating manual should contain the following:
. Prestart-up checklist
. Start-up procedure
. Normal running
. Normal shutdown
. Emergency shutdown
A special hazard is to be expected during start-
up and shutdown when the process is not in equilibrium
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

TABLE 48.11
Summary of the Probable Hazards and the Recommended Safety Measures for Some Dryer Types

Spray Pneumatic Fluid bed Rotary

Dust cloud ignition Rotary atomizer Yes Mostly in the upper section and in In the bed, no; just above bed and Within the dryer due to fines
the dust recovery section in dust recovery section, generated as a result of attrition
probably yes and breakage
Nozzle atomizer Yes
(countercurrent)
Dust layer ignition Always a probability; hammers or Top bend of dryer is probable In corners if bed is ot properly Depending upon material
air blankets are used to prevent location; sometimes fluidized; large agglomerates characteristics
agglomerates settle at bottom of may not fluidize at all
tube
Bulk ignition At bottom if discharge mechanism Base of the cyclone; if product is On failure of the discharge If drum stops rotating discharge
fails discharged in the silo mechanism; if hot powder goes mechanism fails; hot powder to a
to a silo silo
Flammable vapor Whole system Whole system Anywhere in the system Whole system
Ignition sources All those listed in Section 3.3 All those listed in Section 3.3; static All those given in Section 3.3; static All those given in Section 3.3;
electricity is more likely is more likely friction is likely to be more at the
seals
Safety measures Specially for Flammable vapor and For flammable vapors, it is the Most practical for flammable Recommended for flammable
solid most feasible vapor solvent recovery
Inerting
Venting Top and bottom section of the On the roof for continuous duty Inlet and discharge hoods (vent
vertical tube and side vent for batch area ¼ dryer cross-section)
At the roof or side doors (weight/
area < 40 kg/m2)
Suppressing Not useful Suitability depends upon airflow Use limited to small-length dryers
rate and speed of injection
Useful only for dryers with volume
< 100 m3
ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Containing Feasible Only for small units Feasible

Process specification Air temperature 508C below MIT Bed temperature 208C below MIT Inlet air temperature 508C below
MIT
Only for small units
Inlet air temperature 508C below
minimum ignition temperature
Dust cloud ignition No, due to low air velocity except No, due to low air velocity; Weak explosions during drying and Mostly depends upon type of
at discharge end probable only during emptying unloading are probable material
trays
Dust layer ignition Material on band and that falls off Product in the tray; product spills Not much of a change On shaft and blades of mixer; on
edges of band during charging and emptying inner surface of trough
Bulk ignition Discharge system fails; hot powder Product directly bagged If mixing stops; during discharging If shaft stops rotating; if product
to a silo goes to a silo directly
Flammable vapor Normally not used Whole system Loading and unloading; during Whole system
drying in the vacuum system
Ignition sources All those given in Section 3.3 All those given in Section 3.3; self- All those given in Section 3.3 All those given in Section 3.3;
ignition is more likely heating and frictional sparks
Safety measures Not feasible Feasible for flammable solvents Can be done Preferred for flammable vapor
Inerting Required only when burners in the Feasible and most preferred Required on the roof for cases of On the roof
oven; 6 m apart on the roof exothermic decomposition
involving large volumes of gas
Venting
Suppressing Can be used Not feasible Can be used Only when large free space between
mixer and roof
Containing Not feasible Not feasible Easier to attain in cylindrical unit Most suitable
Process specification Air temperature 208C below MIT Oven temperature 508C below Operating temperature 508C below 508C margin from cross-flow layer
layer ignition temperature bulk ignition temperature ignition temperature
 Start

1 Initial test on material

The process 2 Choice of the dryer

factor

3 Fire and explosion

characteristics

4 Operating conditions
selection

5 Process and equipment

design

The engineering
factor
6 Ignition source
identification

7 Explosion and
fire precautions

8 Risk Risk cost

assessment benefit analysis
The management
factor 9 Safe operating
procedures

10 Maintenance and
training

End

FIGURE 48.18 The procedure in safe plant dryer design.

and it is more likely that control may be lost. Very
essential is online controlling equipment, especially
for air and material temperatures and flow rates. For
evaporation of organic solvents, vapor concentration
monitoring is mandatory. Any instrument malfunc-
tioning, dust leakage, or spillage, and any deviation
from an acceptable range of parameters must be
located and removed. Regular safety reviews should
be carried out, particularly when any changes are to be
made in equipment, feedstock, or operating practice.
A full account of the plant operation safety
requirements can be found in Reference 8.
48.4.2 MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING
Fire and explosion hazard in dryers imposes extra
requirements on plant maintenance. It is important
to apply the general policy in a breakdown case or
prevention measures as well as routine maintenance
and turnaround periods. Special attention should
be paid to maintenance in all safety systems and in
that equipment responsible for the ignition sources.
A work permit should be followed in all maintenance
work, especially performing hot work like welding,
cutting, or soldering.
It is important to appreciate that the main danger
is not necessarily from a primary explosion occurring
within the drying plant. The secondary explosion,
usually caused by dust deposition on surrounding
surfaces, is always devastating; the importance of
good housekeeping cannot be overemphasized.
Adequate training of management and operatives
is necessary to run the plant safely, efficiently, and
economically. The plant should allow not only for
preparation of correct operating procedures, but
also for staff action in emergency conditions.

ß 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

48.5 THE PROCEDURE FOR SAFE PLANT
DRYER DESIGN
On the basis of process, engineering, and manage-
ment factors, a procedure of safe plant design can
be proposed. This procedure may be divided into 10
stages (Figure 48.18) and can be used as a general
guide with possible modifications for special condi-
tions. The selection of the dryer type is based on the
economics of running the dryer. The aspect of dust
fire and explosion is not a restriction for the selection.
However, if options are open, selection should be
based on the explosive properties of the dust and the
level of the fire and explosion hazard (the type of
hazard, the volume of the dust–air mixture, quantity
of deposit within the plant, and the design of the heat
supply). It also should be noted that it is more eco-
nomical to provide necessary safety measures against
a hazard at the design stage so that safety can be built
into the plant, rather than to ‘‘retrofit’’ safety equip-
ment, which can be very costly.
If any change happens in the operation of the
plant dryer, feedstock, or equipment, it is important
to take it into account and consider the plant design
process from the new starting point. Changes in the
feedstock formula may have a substantial effect on its
explosive properties and minor engineering changes
may provide a greater accumulation of dust, which
may eventually ignite, within the plant.
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