III.

Equal Protection of Law

VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and ARCA

G.R. No. L-29646 || November 10, 1978 || FERNANDEZ, J.
(employment permit)
FACTS
● This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Manila, which declared Ordinance No. 6537 of the
City of Manila null and void.
● Ordinance No. 6537
○ Title: “An Ordinance Making It Unlawful for Any Person Not a Citizen of the Philippines to be Employed in
Any Place of Employment or to be Engaged in Any Kind of Trade, Business or Occupation within the City
of Manila without First Securing an Employment Permit from the Mayor of Manila; and for Other Purposes.”
○ Section 1 of the Ordinance provides:
■ “Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any
kind of position or occupation or allowed directly or indirectly to participate in the functions,
administration or management in any office, corporation, store, restaurant, factory, business firm,
or any other place of employment either as consultant, adviser, clerk, employee, technician, teacher,
actor, actress, acrobat, singer or other theatrical performer, laborer, cook, etc., whether temporary,
casual, permanent or otherwise and irrespective of the source or origin of his compensation or
number of hours spent in said office, store, restaurant, factory, corporation or any other place of
employment, or to engage in any kind of business and trade within the City of Manila, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila, and paying the necessary fee therefor to
the City the City Treasurer: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons employed in diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries and in technical assistance programs agreed upon by the
Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective
households, and members of different congregations or religious orders of any religion, sect or
denomination, who are not paid either monetarily or in kind shag be exempted from the provisions
of this Ordinance.”
○ Section 4 of the Ordinance provides:
■ “Section 4. Any violation of this Ordinance shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of
not less than three (3) months but not more than six (6) months or by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos (P100.00) but not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00), or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That in case of juridical
persons, the President, the Vice-President or the person in charge shall be liable.”
● Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, then filed a petition with the CFI of
Manila
○ He prayed a WPI and TRO be issued to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537
○ He also prayed that Ordinance No. 6537 be declared null and void on the ff grounds:
■ As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is
discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation
■ As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations,
imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration
and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus,
violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers
■ It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution
● Respondent Judge Arca ruled in favor of private respondent
○ WPI was issued
○ Ordinance No. 6537 was declared null and void
● Hence, this petition by the Mayor of the City of Manila
● Petitioner’s contentions:
○ The respondent judge committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that Ordinance No. 6537 violated
the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation.
■ The rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures
■ Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the
state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature
○ Respondent judge likewise committed a grave and patent error of law in ruling that Ordinance No. 6537
violated the principle against undue designation of legislative power.
 ○ Respondent judge further committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that Ordinance No.
6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S
● W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation — YES
● W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated the principle against undue designation of legislative power — YES
● W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution — YES

HOLDING
● RTC Decision (which declared Ordinance No. 6537 null and void) AFFIRMED.

RATIO
● RE: Uniformity in taxation
○ Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be considered regulatory in nature.
■ The first part requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor, and
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits. Therefore, it is regulatory in character.
■ But the second part, which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee’s fee, is not regulatory but a
revenue measure.
■ There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment.
■ It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
○ The requirement of a P50.00 fee is unreasonable
■ It is excessive, and it also fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it.
○ The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification
■ However, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
■ The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual
or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive
● RE: Undue delegation of legislative power
○ Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion.
■ It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits,
such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent
an activity per se lawful.
○ Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the
mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
● RE: Due process and equal protection
○ The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
○ Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood.
○ While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.
■ This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
■ The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.

ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC. v. ORMOC CITY

G.R. No. L-23794 || February 17, 1968 || BENGZON, J.P., J.
(law specific for Ormoc Sugar Central)
FACTS
● This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of Leyte, which upheld the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964
of the Municipality Board of Ormoc
 ○ This ordinance imposes that “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the
United States of America and other foreign countries.”
● Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
○ March 20, 1964 — P7,087.50
○ April 20, 1964 — P5,000
○ TOTAL = P12,087.50
● Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the CFI of Leyte, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor. They alleged that:
○ The ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of:
■ The equal protection clause
■ The rule of uniformity of taxation
○ The ordinance is also invalid as it imposes an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Section 2287 in part states:
■ “It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon
goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose
an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of
bridges or otherwise, shall be void.”
○ The tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and
under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose
○ The tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act
2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar
● Defendant’s Answer:
○ The tax ordinance was within defendant city’s power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act
○ The ordinance did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations
● The CFI rendered a decision
○ Upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance
○ Declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all
other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter
● Hence, this petition

ISSUE/S
● W/N constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of
taxation, were infringed — YES

HOLDING
● CFI Decision REVERSED. Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Defendants-appellees are
ORDERED to REFUND P12,087.50 to plaintiff-appellant.

RATIO
● The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated. It does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation.
○ A classification is reasonable where:
■ It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences
■ These are germane to the purpose of the law
■ The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present
■ The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class
● It is clear that the questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites of reasonable classification, for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
○ It is true that, at the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
○ Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
■ The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax.
■ As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.
● Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
 ○ At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being
then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, EXEC. SEC.

G.R. No. 148208 || December 15, 2004 || PUNO, J.
(Classification based on salary; relative constitutionality)
FACTS:
● Petition seeking to enjoin respondents from further implementing the last proviso Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653 “New
Central Bank Act”, which allegedly provides for class legislation regarding Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
between two groups of employees:
○ BSP officers (exempted from SSL)
○ Rank-and-file; salary grade of 19 and below (not exempted from SSL)
● Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653 provides that:
○ Compensation structure shall be instituted, and the Monetary Board shall make its own system to conform
closely as possible to principles provided under RA 6758 “Salary Standardization Law” (SSL)
○ Compensation and wage structure of employees under Salary Grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed in the SSL

Petitioner’s Contentions (Central Bank Employees Assoc.):

● Unconstitutional classification between employees-- not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
violates equal protection clause of the Constitution
○ Contains a separability clause, which provides for allowance for declaration of unconstitutionality
● Not germane to the purposes of Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653; which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in the BSP
● Does not appear in original and amended versions of House Bill, nor in the original Senate Bill
○ It was merely a product of amendments during Senate deliberations without showing its relevance to
objectives of the law
○ Even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried BSP employees
● GSIS, SSS, LBP, DBP personnel are exempted from SSL coverage; within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
gov’t financial institutions (GFIs) the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon
● Caused demoralization among BSP rank-and-file and resulted in gross disparity between compensation
○ 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since implementation of proviso

Respondents’ Contentions:
● BSP: Does not violate equal protection clause; it can stand constitutional test, provided it be construed in harmony
with other provisions, such as “fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP”
● SolGen: Valid; classification is based on actual/real differentiation

ISSUE/S:
● W/N the Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653 violates the equal protection clause -- YES

HOLDING:
● Petition GRANTED, SEC. 15(C) of RA 7653 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO:
● Under the present standards of equal protection, Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653 is valid; shown by the legislative
deliberations, the exemption of certain BSP officers from SSL was intended to address the lack of
competitiveness in attracting competent officers and executives
○ If the end result did lead to a disparity of treatment, this was unintended

Requisites of a Valid Classification:

1. Reasonable, based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences
2. Must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. Must apply equally to each member of the class

● HOWEVER, the enactment of subsequent laws renders the continued application of the proviso a violation of
the equal protection clause (Laws exempting all other rank-and-file employees of GFIs from the SSL were
enacted)
Re: Relative Constitutionality
● A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances; thus if in its
practical operation a statute becomes arbitrary/confiscatory, its validity is open to inquiry/investigation in the
light of changed conditions
○ A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation

Re: Subsequent Enactments = Consequential Unconstitutionality of Sec. 15(C)

● The charters of SSS, SBGFC, LBP, DBP, GSIS, HGC, PDIC were amended, with expressly or impliedly
exempting all their employees from the coverage of SSL, stated somewhere in the amended charter, resulting in
the unconstitutionality of proviso in RA 7653
○ Within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon
○ 11 years after amendment of BSP charter, rank-and-file of other GFIs were granted exemption, which was
specifically denied to rank-and-file of BSP
● Subsequent enactments constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonableness of the continued operation of the assailed proviso
○ 1st level of scrutiny: Constitutionality of the classification
○ 2nd level of scrutiny: Oppressive results of enacted law
● Enactment being pursuant to “policy determination by the legislature” justifies inequality of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file vs. officers of BSP, but does not justify inequality of BSP rank-and-file vs. other
GFIs rank-and-file
● Equal protection includes prohibiting the enactment of laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly

Re: Classification of BSP rank-and-file vs. other GFIs rank-and-file

● There exists no substantial distinctions to differentiate BSP rank-and-file from other GFIs rank-and-file
○ Legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as one distinct class, separate from
governmental entities
● PD 985: State policy to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and qualification requirements
○ Even under PD 985, GFIs and GOCCs were already identified as a distinct class among gov’t
employees (Sec. 2 of PD 985 allows for them to establish additional financial incentives)
○ The same favored treatment is made for GFIs and GOCCs under the SSL
● BSP and all other GFIs/GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL,
which was to be governed by:
○ Just and equitable wages, w/ the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable
levels
○ Basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector
● Under RA 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation
and position classification, however enactment of BSP charter implicitly exempted the Monetary Board from
SSL and limiting employees with positions under SG19 to those rates prescribed under the SSL
○ Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed, with each one explicitly exempting all
employees of each GFI from the SSL

Re: SSL exemption

● Legislative deliberations justify exemption from SSL based on the need to “fulfill the mandate of the institution
concerned”:
○ GOCC/GFI is proprietary in character
○ GOCC/GFI in direct competition with their counterparts in the private sector, in terms of hiring and retaining
personnel too
○ GOCC/GFI were experiencing difficulties filling up positions with competent personnel
● SSL-exemption inextricably linked to and based on factors common to the 8 GFIs:
○ Pivotal role in economy
○ Necessity of hiring and retaining qualified personnel to carry out GFIs mandate
○ Recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive
● There are no characteristics peculiar only to the 7 GFIs or their rank-and-file to justify exemption which BSP
rank-and-file employees were denied-- Congress created a “preferred subclass within government employees”
which is arbitrary and superficial, not based on substantial distinctions
● Exemption from SSL is a privilege well within the legislative prerogative to give or deny, but its subsequent
grant to the rank-and-file of 7 other GFIs and continued denial to BSP’s rank-and-file is a breach of the
latter’s right to equal protection
 ○ Validity of exercise of legislative power must be measured by the exercise in and by itself, AND the
legal effects of such

(read with *British American Tobacco v. Sec of Finance)

BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. CAMACHO and PARAYNO, JR. (RESOLUTION)

G.R. No. 163583 || April 15, 2009 || YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
(expansive tax category)
FACTS
● To implement RA 8240, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, 2 which
classified the existing brands of cigarettes as those duly registered or active brands prior to January 1, 1997.
○ New brands, or those registered after January 1, 1997, shall be initially assessed at their suggested retail price
until such time that the appropriate survey to determine their current net retail price is conducted.
○ In June 2001 British American Tobacco introduced into the market Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights
and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes, with a suggested retail price of P9.90 per pack. 3 Pursuant to
Sec. 145 (c) quoted above, the Lucky Strike brands were initially assessed the excise tax at P8.96 per pack.
● On February 17, 2003, Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003, amended Revenue Regulations No. 1-97 by providing,
among others, a periodic review every two years or earlier of the current net retail price of new brands and variants
thereof for the purpose of establishing and updating their tax classification.
○ Pursuant thereto, Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 5 was issued on March 11, 2003, prescribing the
guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol
products.
○ Subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003 6 was issued on August 8, 2003 to implement the revised
tax classification of certain new brands introduced in the market after January 1, 1997, based on the survey of
their current net retail price.
○ The survey revealed that Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights, and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights, are sold
at the current net retail price of P22.54, P22.61 and P21.23, per pack, respectively.
○ Respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue thus recommended the applicable tax rate of
P13.44 per pack inasmuch as Lucky Strike's average net retail price is above P10.00 per pack.
● Thus filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 61, a petition for injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
1032. Said petition sought to enjoin the implementation of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97,
9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new
brands of cigarettes, in violation of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution.
○ The trial court rendered a decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue
Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003

ISSUE/S
● W/N the classification freeze provision violates the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the
Constitution — NO

HOLDING
● MR DENIED.

RATIO
● In the instant case, there is no question that the classification freeze provision meets the geographical uniformity
requirement because the assailed law applies to all cigarette brands in the Philippines.
○ And, for reasons already adverted to in our August 20, 2008 Decision, the four-fold test has been met in the
present case.
● As held in the assailed Decision, the instant case neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges on a
fundamental right.
● Consequently, the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face
of an equal protection challenge.
○ It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification."
○ Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving
some legitimate State interest.
● Petitioner's reliance on Ormoc Sugar Co. is misplaced.
 ○ In said case, the controverted municipal ordinance specifically named and taxed only the Ormoc Sugar
Company, and excluded any subsequently established sugar central from its coverage. Thus, the ordinance
was found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because its terms do not apply to future conditions as
well.
○ This is not the case here. The classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all cigarette brands whether
existing or to be introduced in the market at some future time. It does not purport to exempt any brand from
its operation nor single out a brand for the purpose of imposition of excise taxes.

YRASUEGUI v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

G.R. No. 168081 || October 17, 2008 || REYES, R.T., J.
(Obese flight attendant)
FACTS:
● Armando Yrasuegui was a former int’l flight steward of PAL who was dismissed from employment after several
notices and efforts by PAL to allow him time to lose weight and obtain his ideal weight.
○ Stands at 5’8, but the ideal weight is 147-166 (Cabin & Crew Admin Manual of PAL)
● His weight problem started in 1984, when PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave to address his weight
problems
○ Extended leave (1984) -- another leave without pay (1984-1985) -- met required weight, allowed to return to
work (1985-1988) -- weight problem recurred, leave (1988-1989) -- removed from flight duty (1989)
○ 1989: He weighted 209 pounds, and was formally requested by PAL to trim down to his ideal weight and
report for weight checks
■ Informed that he may avail of services of the company physician as well
■ He gained, instead of losing weight
■ PAL Line Administrator personally visited him to check his weight
○ He made a commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager
○ Despite the 90-day period given, he remained overweight, and PAL informed him to remain grounded until
he complies with the weight standard
■ Repeatedly failed to report for weight checks, despite formally being warned that such would have
consequences
■ Nothing was heard of from petitioner until 1992 when he followed up on his case requesting for
leniency
○ November 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violating company
standards
○ June 1993, he was informed that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost
leniency extended to him for almost 5 years, his services were terminated, effective immediately
● Filed an MR, but same was denied so he filed for illegal dismissal against PAL
● Labor Arbiter: Held that he was illegally dismissed, ordering reinstatement and payment of backwages + 5% atty’s
fees
○ Weight standards were reasonable in view of nature of the job
○ Need not be complied with however, since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties
○ If it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions where weight would not be a negative factor
● NLRC: Affirmed LA’s ruling, also ordering reinstatement + backwages and allowances/other benefits
○ Obesity (tendency to gain weight uncontrollably) is a disease in itself; no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct on part of petitioner
○ Weight standards were reasonable
● CA: Reversed NLRC decision, there was grave abuse of discretion
○ NLRC looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations
○ Weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s position, failure to
adhere to weight standards is an analogous cause
○ Element of willfulness cited in NLRC decision is irrelevant w/ re: legality of dismissal
○ Not willfulness, but reasonableness, to be considered

Petitioner’s Contentions (Yrasuegui):

● His dismissal does not fall under the Labor Code (It does, ideal weight is a continuing qualification)
● Continuing adherence to the weight standards is not a bona fide occupational qualification
● He was discriminated against because other overweight employees similarly situated were promoted instead of being
disciplined, violation of the equal protection clause (One who alleges has burden of proof; failed to prove this)
● His violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since “no action has been taken by the company” regarding
his case since 1988
● Claims that obesity is a physical abnormality/illness (Court did not accept this)
 ● BFOQ is a statutory defense, in absence of statute providing for it, cannot justify his dismissal (Consti, Labor Code,
RA 7277 contain provisions similar to BFOQ)

ISSUE/S:
● W/N obesity can be a ground for dismissal under Labor Code -- YES
● W/N dismissal for obesity is predicated on the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification defense -- YES
● W/N there was undue discrimination in petitioner’s dismissal -- NO

HOLDING:
● Petition DISMISSED. CA Decision AFFIRMED + Yrasuegui entitled to separation pay of 1/2 month’s pay for every
year of service + regular allowances

RATIO:
Re: Obesity under Labor Code
● “Qualifying standards” - norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired; they apply prior to
employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet to be hired, and they apply
after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job to keep his job
○ An employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of w/n
failure to qualify was willful or intentional
○ That petitioner was able to reduce weight during the period given shows that it is possible; petitioner himself
claimed that he could do it
○ Petitioner cited a case wherein the person involved was well over 100 pounds the ideal weight-- petitioner in
this case is not morbidly obese and the cited jurisprudence shall not have bearing
● Obesity of petitioner becomes an analogous cause under Labor Code that justifies his dismissal; may be
unintended but is nonetheless voluntary
○ CA: Voluntariness means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions
○ Gross and habitual neglect = considered voluntary although it lacks element of intent, but is also a recognized
just cause

Re: Dismissal under BFOQ

● Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons with specific requisites unless the employer can show
that such requisites are actual qualifications for performing the job
● To justify a BFOQ, employer must prove:
1. Employment qualification is reasonably related to essential operation of the job
2. There is factual basis for believing that all/substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform duties of occupation
Meiorin Test in determining w/n employment policy is justified, employer must:
● Show that it adopted standard for purpose rationally connected to performance of the job
● Establish that standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish work-related purpose

● PAL as a common carrier, has the obligation to safely transport its passengers with extraordinary diligence;
pursuant to this, it imposed weight standards for cabin crew with the primary objective of flight safety
○ Body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors in emergency situations
○ No need to individually evaluate ability, undisputed that an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a
slim one
○ Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility; in an emergency situations, it is critical that cabin
crew make the most of the limited time and demonstrate agility-- that which an obese flight attendant
may not possess

Re: Discrimination
● Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming supposed cabin crew allegedly similarly situated
with him, substantial proof must be shown as to how and to prove the differential treatment between them
○ Failed to indicate their ideal weights and all other circumstances, relevant data that could have adequately
established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL
○ Misplaced invocation of Bill of Rights (not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals)

Re: Reinstatement
● The option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer
 ○ There is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in
accordance with the order of LA, petitioner even duly received the return to work notice, and affixed
his signature
○ Petitioner failed to prove that he complied with his return to work order, nor does it appear on record that he
actually rendered services from the moment he was dismissed
Re: Separation Pay
● Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay, but may be granted as an act of “social
justice” or based on “equity”, but it is required that the dismissal:
1. Was not for serious misconduct
2. Does not reflect on the moral character of the employee

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SITON and SAGARANO

G.R. No. 169364 || September 18, 2009 || YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
(vagrancy)
FACTS
● This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Order of the Davao City RTC, which declared Art. 202 of the
RPC unconstitutional.
● Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202(2) of
the RPC in two separate Informations.
○ This is because the accused were willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San
Pedro and Legaspi Streets in Davao City, without any visible means to support themselves nor lawful and
justifiable purpose.
○ Article 202 of the RPC provides:
■ “Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and
who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
justifiable purpose;

5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or
both, in the discretion of the court.”
● Respondents were directed to submit their counter-affidavits, but instead, they filed separate Motions to Quash on the
ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
○ The MTC denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits.
○ The MTC also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power.
○ The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that
there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants
and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
■ Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut
the evidence.
● Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Davao City.
○ They directly challenged the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the
crime of vagrancy under Art. 202(2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of
 violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing
ordinary peaceful acts.
○ They likewise claimed that Art. 202(2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
● The State, through the OSG, argued that:
○ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes.
○ Article 202(2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this
presumption.
● The Regional Trial Court then issued the assailed Order granting the petition, and declaring Art, 202(2) of the RPC
unconstitutional.
○ The RTC opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause.
○ It held that the “void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes.
○ They used Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, as a precedent.
■ “The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present
runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable
classification between those covered by the law and those who are not.”
■ “Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or
inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case
offending.”
■ “Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised
Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have
no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum
around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its
constitutionality.”
● Hence, this petition
● Petitioner’s contentions:
○ Every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
○ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
○ Respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under
the standards set out by the Courts.
○ The State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police
power.
● Respondents’ contentions:
○ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines does not have a limited application.
○ Article 202(2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal
protection of the laws.
■ The due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is
adequate to declare Article 202(2) unconstitutional and void on its face.
■ The presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.

ISSUE/S
● W/N Art. 202(2) of the RPC is constitutional — YES

HOLDING
● Petition GRANTED. Decision of Davao City RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Art. 202(2) of the RPC is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO
● The streets must be protected. This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202(2) belongs.
○ These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society.
○ These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated
with the struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.
○ Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts — from public indecencies and immoralities,
to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct.
■ The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities and their
adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society.
 ■ Public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.
● Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed.
○ Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but
for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community.
○ Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct.
● Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive.
○ It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time
which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a
justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
○ Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye
on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties.
○ The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-31195 || December 21, 2009 || VELASCO, JR., J.
(Pending bills for cities; cityhood laws)
FACTS:
Procedural Issues/Facts:
● Consolidated Petitions by League of Cities, City of Iloilo, Mayor of Iloilo, etc. assailing the constitutionality of 16
laws (cityhood laws) that converted municipalities into a city, and seeking to enjoin COMELEC from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to these subject laws
● Nov. 16, 2008 - SC en banc granted the petitions and nullified the 16 laws
○ LGUs moved for reconsideration, averring validity of factual premises were not considered in the pleadings -
- MR denied
○ 2nd MR was filed
● SC voting 6-6, denied 2nd MR
○ LGU filed motion to amend, and to declare such as unresolved
● SC declared motion adverted to, however Justice Leonardo-De Castro + Justice Bersamin, moved to grant MR,
because the entry of judgment was effected before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed
within 15-day period counted from the receipt of Resolution
○ 6-6 vote on the MR reflected a divided Court
○ Inconclusive 6-6 vote was the last vote on the issue of w/n cityhood laws infringe the Consti
○ ART. 8, SEC 4(2): “...cases involving constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and
decided with a concurrence of a majority of Members who took part in deliberations on the issues”
● Motions of LGUs must be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of validity/invalidity is
secured, ART. 8, SEC. 4 exacts a majority vote in determination of a case involving constitutionality of a
statute
○ Justice Puno: 6-6 deadlocked vote does not reflect “the majority of Members” and cannot write a rule with
precedential value
○ Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid/technical application of the rules in the altar of
expediency
○ When Court en banc is divided in opinion, the case shall again be deliberated on and if after such no decision
is reached, the original action shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, judgement appealed from is affirmed
● By a vote of 6-4, Court granted respondent LGUs MR

Substantive Issues/Facts:
● 11th Congress: 57 cityhood bills were filed, 33 of which eventually became laws, and 24 remained not acted upon
○ Later developments saw the introduction to amend the Local Gov’t. Code (LGC)
■ RA 9009: To increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20M
average annual income to P100M locally generated income
● 12th Congress: HR adopted a Joint Resolution seeking to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose conversions were not acted upon during the previous Congress
 ○ This Joint Resolution was not approved by the Senate though
● 13th Congress: HR re-adopted Joint Resolution
○ Again, Senate failed to approve of the Joint Resolution
○ Senator Nene Pimentel however asserted that passage of such would allow a wholesale exemption from
the income requirement, so he suggested the filing by the HR of individual bills to effectuate those
municipalities into cities and forwarding them to Senate
○ Following this, 16 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills, all containing a provision exempting it from
the P100M income requirement
● Both Houses of Congress had approved of the individual cityhood bills and eventually lapsed into law, each
directing the COMELEC, within 30 days from approval, to hold plebiscites on whether or not voters approve of the
conversion

Petitioner’s Contentions:
● Unconstitutional for violating Sec. 10, Art. 10
○ Criteria for becoming a city strictly limited to only those written in the LGC
● Violates equal protection clause because provides for exemptions from the P100M income requirement
● Wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of IRA set aside for all cities under LGC
● Deliberations on the cityhood bills and joint resolution were undertaken in 11th and/or 12th Congress; such
deliberations are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing cityhood laws passed
during the 13th Congress; Congress not being a continuing body

ISSUE/S:
● W/N the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution and/or equal protection clause -- NO

HOLDING:
● Petition DISMISSED. Cityhood laws VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO:
Re: Must be strictly only in LGC
● The power to create political subdivisions/LGUs is essentially legislative in character, but even without any
constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, boundaries of a province, city, or municipality.
○ Provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions “in accordance with the criteria
established in the local gov’t code” subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned
● The only conceivable reason why the Consti employs the clause “in accordance with the criteria established in
the LGC” is to lay stress that it is the Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria-- does not
mean that specifications shall come only from the LGC
○ When the 1987 Consti speaks of the LGC, reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws,
let alone the 1991 LGC
○ At the time of adoption of the 1987 Consti, BP 337 (then LGC) was in effect, framers of 1987 Consti if
they really wanted to isolate embodiment of criteria only in LGC, they would have actually referred to
BP 337-- would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in the Art.
10, Sec. 3
● Congress can via a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment, impose the verifiable criteria of viability
○ Congress through the cityhood laws, decreased the income criterion but without necessarily being
unreasonably discriminatory, by reverting to the P20M what it earlier raised to P100M

Re: RA 9009
● Rationale behind enactment of RA 9009 to amend LGC 1991 based on Senator Pimentel’s speech: “There is a
mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities… the nation will be a nation of cities and no
municipalities, thus the financial requirement shall be raised”
○ Floor exchange between Sen. Pimentel and Sen. President Drilon: Not fair to make RA 9009 retroact to those
bills already pending in the Senate for conversion into cities, thus they will not be affected by the passage of
such
● The intent is the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent

Re: Deliberations made 11th and 12th Congress, only passed on 13th
● Deliberations having been made in the previous Congresses before passage is immaterial; what is important is
that the debates, deliberations, proceedings of Congress, aids in the interpretation of the law
Re: Equal Protection Clause
● Respondent LGUs are entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned, since they are artificial
persons; cannot invoke equal protection clause
○ LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be reduced is presumptuous; cannot already stake a claim
on the IRA as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated
○ Conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect the status as a political unit, but not its property
● Fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality-- all persons/things similarly situated be
treated alike, both as to rights and privileges concerned
● Requisites of Valid Classification
● Favorable treatment accorded to the 16 municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction;
they are substantially different because they had pending cityhood bills before passage of RA 9009, and had
already met the income criterion under LGC 1991
○ It was only due to extraneous circumstances that the bills remained unacted upon by Congress
○ Sen. Lim’s speech: Much of the proponents of 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the
effectivity of the law, events hindered the Congress from acting on said bills (Impeachment of Estrada,
May 2001 elections, jueteng scandal, EDSA PP2)
● To deny the respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to 33 other municipalities
is tantamount to denying them protection under equal protection clause
○ Exemption clause would only apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the
passage of RA 9009, and were compliant with LGC 1991
○ Existence of cities consequent to approval of the now challenged cityhood laws is now an operative fact

QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189698 || February 22, 2010 || PUNO, C.J.
(appointive official)
FACTS
● This is a MR filed by respondent COMELEC, seeking to reverse the Decision of the SC (December 1, 2009)
● December 1, 2009 SC Decision (penned by J. Nachura)
○ Granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.
○ Declared as unconstitutional:
■ The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369
■ Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
■ Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
■ Ground — violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth
○ Paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions
of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena
● COMELEC’s arguments in MR:
○ The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the
participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity
○ The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential
treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and
substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law
○ The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth
○ There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such
reversal

ISSUE/S
● W/N assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Consti — NO

HOLDING
● MR GRANTED. December 1, 2009 Decision of SC REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petition DISMISSED. Assailed
provisions declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO
● Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
○ The foregoing issue has already been ruled by the SC in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
○ It is held in this case that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as
there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.
 ■ The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification.
■ The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
■ Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
■ The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected
to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.
■ On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority.
■ Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
○ In this case, stare decisis applies.
● Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
○ The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction.
○ What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
○ Requisites of a valid classification/test of reasonableness:
■ The classification rests on substantial distinctions
■ It is germane to the purposes of the law
■ It is not limited to existing conditions only
■ It applies equally to all members of the same class
○ In the assailed Decision, it was acknowledged that the 1st, 3rd and 4th requisites of reasonableness were
satisfied.
■ It holds, however that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is
not germane to the purpose of the law, because “whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.”
○ In addressing a societal concern, the Legislature must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby
creating some inequity as to those included or excluded.
■ Nevertheless, as long as “the bounds of reasonable choice” are not exceeded, the courts must defer
to the legislative judgment.
■ The fact that a legislative classification does not include all classes will not render it
unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.
■ There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied.
○ The burden show that the law creates a classification that is “palpably arbitrary or capricious,” is upon the
person who challenges the law as violative of the equal protection clause.
■ This person must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, W/N the Legislature
cited those bases as reasons for the enactment.
■ In the case at bar, the petitioners failed — and in fact did not even attempt — to discharge this
heavy burden.
○ Under our constitutional system, it is the Legislature that is given the authority to balance competing interests
and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times.
■ Therefore, the SC cannot interfere with this.
● Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
○ Mancuso v. Taft was a decision of the First Circuit of the US CA (March 1973), which struck down as
unconstitutional a similar statutory provision.
○ The assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
■ The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms – freedom
of expression and association
■ Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to
strict equal protection review
■ While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public
work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner
as to render them unconstitutional
○ This reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. The US SC effectively overruled Mancuso.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495 || April 21, 2014 || REYES, J.
(equal protection)
FACTS
● Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
● On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped
her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
● As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and
the accused-appellant.
○ It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm.
○ However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed.
■ He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
■ His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual
ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
● One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed.
○ Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously
order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
○ KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation.
■ Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor.
■ Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
○ The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not
feeling well.
○ The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her
panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her
legs.
○ The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them.
She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
○ As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don’t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”
● Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because
he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.
● In his defense, Jumawan argues that the two incidents were consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim
were a legally married and cohabiting couple.
○ He argues that consent is presumed between a cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proven.
○ Furthermore, the case should be viewed and treated differently from an ordinary rape case and that the
standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof should be adjusted on the ground that
sexual community between a husband and wife is a mutual right and obligation.

ISSUE/S
● W/N there should be a different standard for marital rape – NO

HOLDING
● CA Decision AFFIRMED

RATIO
● The consent theory of Jumawan has already been superseded by global principles and international conventions such
as:
○ CEDAW – The PH as State Party to the CEDAW, recognizes that a change in the traditional role of men as
well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
○ UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women – Identified marital rape as a species of
sexual violence.
● Based on these conventions, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage.
○ A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her,
and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
 the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997 – note that this law reclassified rape as a crime
against a person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity)
● Furthermore, to treat marital rape cases from non-marital rape cases in terms of their elements and in the
rules of evidence infringes on the equal protection clause.
○ Under this doctrine, similar subjects should not be treated differently.
○ As discussed under RA 8353, the definition of rape pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator’s own spouse.
○ The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between
rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection
to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
■ To uphold the argument of Jumawan would discriminate against married rape victims over
unmarried ones because it deprives them the penal redress equally granted by law to ALL
rape victims.

VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833 || April 7, 2015 || REYES, J.
(equal protection)
FACTS
● This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, certiorari and declaratory relief, with prayer for TRO and/or WPO,
assailing the the policy of the JBC, requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicant to second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with GADALEJ.
● September 18, 2012 — the petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court.
● September 27, 2013 — he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following RTCs:
○ Branch 31, Tagum City
○ Branch 13, Davao City
○ Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur
● December 18, 2013 — JBC’s Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner through a
letter that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations.
○ ^same date — the petitioner sent them an email
■ He sought reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants
■ He protested the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination
● February 3, 2014 — the petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer through a letter that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc
○ However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld
■ This is because of JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level
courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least 5
years
■ Since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list
● Hence, this petition
● Petitioner’s contentions:
○ The Consti already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more
○ The JBC’s 5-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Consti
○ The JBC’s 5-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for
Equal Opportunity of Employment
○ The requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of RA 85575 should not be merely
directory and should be fully implemented
○ He has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Consti and by Congress, since he has already
complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law
● Respondent’s contentions (JBC and OSG):
○ The petition is procedurally infirm
■ The writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal
function under the Consti to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, because the JBC is not a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
■ The remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal
right that needs to be protected
○ The assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses
 ■ The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who
have served at least 5 years and those who have served less than 5 years is valid as it is
performance and experience based
■ There is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature

ISSUE/S
● W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts is constitutional — YES

HOLDING
● Petition DISMISSED.

RATIO
● RE: Procedural Issues
○ The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
■ The JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
■ However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the
petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s
constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with
GADALEJ in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
■ The SC can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court’s power of supervision
over the JBC.
○ The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC’s policy.
■ The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
■ The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial.
○ The petition for declaratory relief is improper.
■ “An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance.”
■ “The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of
the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.”
● RE: Equal Protection
○ While the 1987 Consti has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the
JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
■ The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC’s
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the Pres.
■ However, the Consti did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in
determining applicants’ qualifications.
■ In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing
its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Consti and law for every position.
■ The JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified
among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
○ The equal protection clause of the Consti does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction.
■ What it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
■ Requisites of a valid classification (not in this case, but it’s good to take note of these)
■ It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences
■ These are germane to the purpose of the law
■ The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present
■ The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class
■ If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
 ○ In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional
requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.
○ Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a
violation of the equal protection clause.
■ The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition.
■ The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which
may be measured by experience, among other factors.
■ “Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the
stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven
competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.”
■ “for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it
would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on
the bench.”
○ The classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
■ Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with 5 year experience and those with
less than 5 years of experience, like the petitioner.
■ The classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose.
○ Therefore, the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Said policy is valid and
constitutional.
● RE: Due Process
○ The assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is
confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government.
○ Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the SC, it is not covered by the publication requirements of
the Administrative Code.

FERRER, JR. v. BAUTISTA, et al

G.R. No. 210551 || June 30, 2015 || PERALTA, J.
(equal protection)
FACTS
● The Quezon City Council enacted 2 ordinances:
○ Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) of Quezon City, an imposition of a special assessment that will collect 0.5%
on the assessed value of land in excess of Php 100,000.
■ The special assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account.
○ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Collection Fees imposing fees on residential properties based on
the land/floor area.
■ It shall be deposited solely and exclusively in a special account under the general fund to be utilized
for garbage collection.
● Jose Ferrer Jr. owns property in Quezon City. He questions the validity of the 2 city ordinances.
● On the matter of the SHT, Ferrer contends that:
○ The Quezon City Council has no power to impose the SHT.
○ SHT violates the rule on equality because is in the form of a penalty imposed on real property owners
because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a
class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes o
SHT is consfiscatory or oppressive.
● On the matter of the imposition of Garbage Fees, he contends that:
○ It violates the rule on double taxation; and
○ It violates the rule on equality because the fees are collected from only domestic households and not from
restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more
than residential property owners.

ISSUE/S
● W/N the Socialized Housing Tax was valid — YES
● W/N the imposition of Garbage Fee was valid — NO

HOLDING
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the
“Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,” is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On
the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon
City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with
reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement.

The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In
contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.

RATIO
● RE: SHT
○ Quezon City Government has the power to tax
■ SC held that SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to
impose.
■ Cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs and
projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings.
■ The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects.
■ SC held that the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue.
■ It is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and
homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well.
■ The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the
same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of
life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business
products.
○ There is no violation on the rule of equality.
■ SC held that equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
■ The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
■ Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
■ The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
■ An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law.
■ The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
■ 1. It must rest on substantial distinctions;
■ 2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
■ 3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
■ 4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
■ For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes
are too obvious and need not be discussed at length.
■ The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution.
■ Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled
the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another.
■ It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation.
■ Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation.
○ SHT is not confiscatory nor oppressive.
■ SC held that the tax being imposed is below what RA 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992 (UDHA) actually allows.
■ SC held that while the law authorizes LGU’s to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of
more than Php 50,0000, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value
exceeding Php 100,000.
 ■ Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total
amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity.
■ SC held the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
● RE: Garbage Fee
○ No double taxation
■ SC held that the garbage fee is not a tax.
■ Not being a tax, SC held that there is NO double taxation.
○ BUT, there is a violation of equality
■ SC held that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC
that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay,
and not unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.
■ For the purpose of garbage collection, there is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a
lot, on one hand, FROM an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, on the other hand.
■ Garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a
large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.
■ The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable.
■ The classifications under the ordinance are NOT germane to its declared purpose of “promoting
shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming
the present resources and in generating waste.”
■ Quezon City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount
of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. (i.e. household age and size,
accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to
pay, and actual occupancy of the property).
■ SC held that a lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The
establishment of classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not
unreasonable and does not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity.
■ Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between
those in like circumstances having equal rights and privileges.
■ Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and
without a reasonable fact basis or justification.
■ Also, the penalty imposed in the ordinance lacked the limitation of the interest of 36 months under
the LGC.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206020 || April 14, 2015 || REYES, J.
(equal protection)
FACTS
● This is a petition for certiorari assailing Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
96152 of the COMELEC.
● In 2001, RA 9006 or “Fair Elections Act” was passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
○ “Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. — The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list
groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as
plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda: Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its
equivalent.
○ Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in
not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its
equivalent.
○ Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner thereof,
and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.”
● January 15, 2013 — COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615
○ This resolution provided for the rules implementing RA 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 nat’l and
local elections and subsequent elections
○ Section 7 of the Resolution provides:
■ “SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
■ xxxx
 ■ (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.
■ (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
■ xxxx
■ 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
■ 6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports,
docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
■ The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service
and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as
implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.”
● January 30, 2013 — the petitioner, through by its president, Melencio F. Vargas, sent a letter to the COMELEC
○ They sought clarification as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport
terminals.
○ The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions impedes the right to free
speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
○ The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and
allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles
and transport terminals.
● February 5, 2013 — COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214
○ Denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation
to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
○ “The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport terminals is exactly because
it is public and can be seen by all; and although it is true that private vehicles ply the same route as public
vehicles, the exposure of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is much more compared to private
vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and transport terminals as ‘public places’ under Section 7 (f) of Reso. No.
9615 is therefore logical. The same reasoning for limiting political advertisements in print media, in radio,
and in television therefore holds true for political advertisements in PUVs and transport terminals.”
● Hence, this petition.
● Petitioner’s Contentions:
○ Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the right to free
speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals
■ The prohibition curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the public.
○ There is no substantial public interest threatened by the posting of political advertisements on PUVs and
transport terminals to warrant the prohibition imposed by the COMELEC.
○ The ownership of the PUVs per se, as well as the transport terminals, remains private and, hence, the owners
thereof could not be prohibited by the COMELEC from expressing their political opinion lest their property
rights be unduly intruded upon.
○ Assuming that substantial public interest exists in the said prohibition imposed under Resolution No. 9615,
the curtailment of the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals is much greater than
is necessary to achieve the desired governmental purpose, i.e., ensuring equality of opportunity to all
candidates in elective office.
● Respondent’s Contentions:
○ Privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces that are subject to its regulation.
■ Under the Consti, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, including the power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation utilities.
○ PUVs and private transport terminals hold a captive audience — the commuters, who have no choice but be
subjected to the blare of political propaganda.
■ It is within its constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals
from concurrently serving campaign materials to the captive audience that they transport.
○ Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge on the constitutional
right to freedom of speech.
■ The assailed regulation is within the constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
 ■ The regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity, time, and space for all candidates
— an important and substantial governmental interest, which is totally unrelated to the suppression
of free expression.
■ Any restriction on free speech is merely incidental and is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of the said governmental interest.

ISSUE/S
● W/N Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are valid regulations — NO

HOLDING
● Petition GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 declared
NULL and VOID.

RATIO
● RE: Free Speech
○ Resolution No. 9615, or any part thereof, must not run counter to the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
■ The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.
○ Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on
speech.
■ Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.
■ Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination.
■ Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications,
whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative
or judicial branch of the government.
○ The assailed provisions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.
■ Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with them.
■ Adiong v. COMELEC: The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
○ COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private
persons.
■ The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public commuters,
likewise remains private.
■ Although owners of public transport terminals may be required by local governments to obtain
permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to circumstances affecting the operation of the
transport terminal as such.
○ The freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression.
■ A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life.
● RE: Equal Protection
○ Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the
equal protection clause.
■ Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
■ Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others.
○ The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws to all
citizens of the state.
■ Equality of operation of statutes does not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights.
■ The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different.
■ Requisites of valid classification
 ■ It must be based upon substantial distinctions
■ It must be germane to the purposes of the law
■ It must not be limited to existing conditions only
■ It must apply equally to all members of the class
○ The classification in the case at bar is constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial
distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law.
■ A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties
in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise
or a permit to operate.
■ Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport
terminals
■ The prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV
and transport terminals.
■ As regards ownership:
■ There is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties. The ownership of PUVs and transport
terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private.
■ If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political
ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no
cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
■ In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
■ The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties.
■ Any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals
would be seen by many people.
■ However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments, would also be seen by many
people.
■ Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the
prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
■ Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles
and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates in elections.
■ To stress, PUVs and transport terminals are private properties.
■ The connection between the restriction on the freedom of expression of owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and the government’s interest in ensuring equal time, space, and
opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the COMELEC.