Edd Butagaz La Goulette - Chapitre 6 Part 1

Website of LA GOULETTE
Hazard Study
Chapter 6: Detailed analysis of hazards and

their consequences on the environment
Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

analysis of hazards and their consequences
on the environment
SUMMARY
- - -
1. INTRODUCTION................................................. .................................................. ............................... 7
1.1. ................................................. OBJECTIVES .................................................. ............................... 7
1.2. CHOOSING SCENARIOS ............................................... .................................................. ........... 7
1.3. GENERAL PARAMETERS MODELING .............................................. ........................ 9
2. Characterization of PHENOMENES DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF CURRENT .................. 10
2.1. MODELING OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA .............................................. ................ 10
2.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere ................................. ............ .................................................. ......... 10
2.1.2 BLEVE of a tractor trailer ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.3 BLEVE of a small truck .................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.4 BLEVE a bottle 13 kg ........................ ................... ................................................ 16
2.1.5 BLEVE a bottle 35 kg ........................ ................... ................................................ 18
2.1.6 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the app online rovisionnement boat .......... 20
2.1.7 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line int erconnexion .............................. 25
2.1.8 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line so utirage spheres upstream
shoes......................................... ....... .................................................. ..................... 28
2.1.9 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line tr downstream ansfer pumps
to rides ....................................... ......... .................................................. .................. 32
2.1.10 VCE / Jet ignited following the rupture of a line Power supply carousel 35 ...........
2.1.11 VCE / Jet ignited following the rupture of a line Power supply or hose
position P35 .......................................... ...... .................................................. ......................... 37
2.1.12 UVCE / Jet ignited after tearing the arm truck loading (12.A)
or the transfer line to the charging station bulk ment (12.B) .......................... 39
2.1.13 UVCE / Jet ignited after a break of stitching ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.1.14 UVCE / Jet ignited following a flange leak ca nalizing ................................. 44
2.1.15 UVCE / Jet ignited following the opening of a valve of ................................ 48 online
2.1.16 UVCE / Jet ignited following the opening of a valve sphere ............................. 50
2.1.16.1 Opening a sphere valve following a fire ex dull ................................ 50

2.1.16.2 Opening a sphere valve following a surrem pleating ........................ 52
2.1.17 UVCE / Jet inflamed following a gasket leak knew r pump ................................... 54
2.1.18 UVCE - Secondary Explosions ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.1.19 gas oil pool fire (inside and outside retention) .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.1.20 Fire in the paint booth .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 Page 2/127


on the environment
2.1.21 Fire in the warehouse paintings ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2. SUMMARY OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA .............................................. ........................ 64
3. EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOMINOES ......................... ..................... .................................................. .71
3.1. ANALYSIS DOMINO EFFECTS OF INTERNAL ............................................. .......................... 71
3.1.1 Effects related to dominoes BLEVE ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere ................................. ............ .................................................. .71

3.1.1.2 BLEVE truck (penalizing case of a large truck carrier) ........................ 73
3.1.2 Effects related to dominoes UVCE ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.1.3 domino effects associated with inflamed jets ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.1.4 fire-related domino effects .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1.4.1 gas oil pool fire ............................. ................ .............................................. 78

3.1.4.2 Fire in the paint booth .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1.4.3 Store Fire ................................ ............... ................................................. 79
3.1.5 If projectiles ................................ ............... .................................................. .......... 79
3.2. ANALYSIS DOMINO EFFECTS RELATED INDUSTRIES NEIGHBOR ................................ 80
3.2.1 VIVO ENERGY Tunisia ................................ ............... .................................................. .... 80
3.2.2 Silo Cereals ..................................... ........... .................................................. ................. 81
3.2.3 STLR ................................................. .................................................. ............................... 81
3.2.4 SCPCI ................................................. .................................................. .............................. 81
3.2.5 TOTALGAZ ........................................... ...... .................................................. ..................... 82
3.2.6 OIL Lybia .......................................... ...... .................................................. ........................ 82
3.2.7 TOTAL FUEL ................................... ............. .................................................. ... 82
3.2.8 STEG Berth ................................... ............. .................................................. ....... 82
3.2.9 transmission pipelines of dangerous products ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4. Characterization of PHENOMENES DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF KINETIC ............... 84
5. Characterization of PHENOMENES DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF CHANCE

OCCURRENCE ............................................... .................................................. ............................ 86
6. Characterization of PHENOMENES HAZARDOUS ON AN ACUTE .................. 90
7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND ACCEPTANCE OF RISKS ......................................... 116
7.1. SUMMARY OF THE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RISK (INTENSITY / CHANCE /

KINETIC) ................................................ .................................................. ......................... 116
7.2. POSITIONING OF ACCIDENTS IN THE MATRIX CRITICALITY ......................... 122
7.3. ASSESSMENT OF RISK ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENTS ............... 123
7.3.1 risk analysis check ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123


on the environment
7.3.2 future improvements tracks ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3.3 Conclusion ......................................... ........ .................................................. ................... 127
List of annexes
- - -
Annex 6-1: Mapping hazards ......................................... ............................ 10

Annex 6-2: Nodes Site butterflies BUTAGAZ of La Goulette ..................................... .................. 86
Annex 6-3: Textual F EIN CN and safety barriers ........................................... .. 87
Annex 6-4: Study of the variation in distances from the effects of BLEVE according to the level
filling spheres ............................................. .................................................. ............. 126
List of Figures
- - -
Figure 1: Current criticality matrix of potential major accidents BUTAGAZ La Goulette. 122
List of paintings
- - -
Table 1: leakage diameters used for the leakage scenarios flange .................................... ... 45
Table 2: Site congested areas BUTAGAZ La Goulette ....................................... ............... 57
Table 3: Indeed distances to different regulatory thresholds of accident scenarios
BUTAGAZ La Goulette ............................................... .................................................. .................. 65
Table 4: domino effects caused by an explosion in a crowded area ........................ 77
Table 5: Kinetics of potential major accidents BUTAGAZ La Goulette ............................ 84
Table 6: Probability Class of hazards of La Goulette BUTAGAZ ................ 87
Table 7: Summary of potential major accidents BUTAGAZ La Goulette .......................... 116


on the environment
References
- - -
[R1] Order of 29 September 2005 on the development and consideration of the probability, kinetics, intensity and effects of the serious
consequences of potential accidents in danger studies of classified installations subject to authorization (decree said PCIG) - French
regulations
[R2] Order of 29 September 2005 amending the Decree of 10 May 2000 as amended relating to the prevention of major accidents
involving dangerous substances or preparations present in certain categories of classified installations
Protection
the environment subject to authorization - French regulations
[R3] Fragments Hazards from failure of pressurized liquefied gas vessels I. HOLDEN, REEVES, Chem.E.Symposium Series No. 93,
1985.
[R4] Assessment of the performance of safety barriers, European Project ARAMIS 2004
[R5] Integration of probabilistic dimension in risk analysis - DRA 34 - Operation j, INERIS, 2006
[R6] Guide to the state of the art on the silos - Version 3 - Working Group of the Ministry of Ecology,
Energy, Sustainable Development and Spatial Planning - 2008
[R7] Analysis of air-oil explosion in free society - deterministic and probabilistic studies of accident scenario - A. Lannoy, EDF - Bulletin of
the Directorate of Studies and Research - Series A No. 4 - 1984
[R8] Circular of May 10, 2010 summarizing the methodological rules for hazard studies, the assessment of the risk reduction process to
source and technological risk prevention plans (PPRT) in facilities classified for the protection of the environment - French
regulations


on the environment
Glossary
- - -
ARAMIS : Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries in the context of Seveso II Directive
BLEVE : Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
F EIN : Frequency of occurrence of the Event Initiator
LPG : Liquefied Petroleum Gas
INERIS : National Institute for Environment and Risks
IPS : equipment or setting Important For Safety
LIE : Lower Explosive Limit
LSE : Upper Explosive Limit
OMMP : Office of Merchant Navy and Ports
NC : Confidence level of a safety barrier
PFD : dangerous failure probability of a crash barrier
PhD : Dangerous phenomenon
POI : Internal Operations Plan
SCPCI : Tunisian Company for Intermediate Chemicals
SEI : Threshold Irreversible Effects
SALT : Threshold Lethal Effects
SALTS : Threshold Effects Lethal Significant
HNS : National Society of Petroleum Distribution
STEG : Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas
STLR : Tunisian Company of Lubricants Rades
NWT : The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research
UFIP : French Union of Petroleum Industries
(U) VCE : (Unconfined) Vapor Cloud Explosion


on the environment
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. OBJECTIVES
The objective of the detailed risk assessment is to characterize the accidents identified in terms of probability, kinetics, intensity and
severity.
1.2. CHOICE OF SCENARIOS
The choice of the scenarios studied mainly in connection with the risk detailed analysis was based on the preliminary risk analysis
presented in Chapter 5.
It was made at a meeting held at the end of the working groups on risk analyzes. This choice has the following approach:
• Highlighting for each section studied, the main feared events and their consequences;
• Choice modeling scenarios based on their interests in working group underlined preliminary risk analysis:
- in major effects;
- in significant and aggravating domino effects depending on the vulnerability (neighboring facilities near) the place of leak
chosen.
• Analysis of the representativeness and completeness of the selected scenarios.


on the environment
Remember, the accidents considered in the remainder of the study and that could cause hazards are:
1. BLEVE of a sphere,
2. BLEVE of a tank transport truck,
3. BLEVE of a tank small trucks,
4. BLEVE a bottle 13 kg,
5. BLEVE a bottle 35 kg
6. UVCE / Jet ignited following the rupture of the vessel supply line (diameter 6 ''),
7. UVCE / Jet ignited following the rupture of the interconnection line (diameter 6 ''),
8. UVCE / Jet ignited following the breakage of the spheres withdrawal line upstream of the pumps (diameter 8 ''),
9. UVCE / Jet ignited following the termination of the transfer line downstream of the pumps to rides (diameter 3 ''),
10. VCE / Jet ignited following the rupture of the carousel of the supply line (diameter 3 ''),
11. UVCE / Jet ignited following the termination of the supply or hose line position P35
12. UVCE / Jet ignited following the tearing of the truck loading arm (diameter 3 '') or out of the transfer line to the bulk loading
station (diameter 4 ''), 13 UVCE / Jet ignited following to a rupture of stitching (diameter ½ ''),
14. UVCE / jet ignited flange leakage result on lines (2 '', 3 '', 4 '', 6 '', 8 ''),
15. UVCE / Jet ignited following the line of valve opening,
16. UVCE / Jet ignited following the opening of ball valve,
17. UVCE / Jet inflamed following a leak in pump packing,
18. confined areas (storage areas for bottles and truck parking areas)
19. gas oil pool fire (inside and outside retention),
20. Fire in the paint booth.
21. Burning of paint storage warehouse


on the environment
1.3. MODELING PARAMETERS GENERAL
The parameters considered are:
- Weather: F3 (15 ° C) and D5 (20 ° C);
- roughness parameter: 0.17, which corresponds to an industrial area type environment;
- Relative Humidity: 70%, which is representative of most regions in Tunisia;
- Averaging time: 18.75 s, value recommended in the literature to study the consequences of a flammable product;
- Source overpressure effects: the center of the explosive cloud;
- containment level: 4 corresponds to an explosion in a free field of a turbulent cloud of LPG, a severity index of 4 corresponds to
a pressure at the edge of the cloud 100 mbar;
NB: a larger multi-energy index is considered in case of explosion in a crowded area.
- The pumps of the LPG carrier, such as the site, are positive displacement pumps and does not pack in case of zero discharge
pressure;
- Product: BUTAGAZ site can receive pure butane or a mixture of butane and propane, butapro containing at most 25% by weight
of propane.
According to the scenarios considered, or butane, or the butapro, will provide the shell results. Indeed, the characteristics of the
products do not affect the same way on source term calculations and dispersion, and it is difficult to know a priori what the
product penalizing. Main differences between the two LPG their mass (butane is heavier than the butapro), and their boiling
point (that of the butane is higher than that of butapro). Therefore, we will proceed as follows for models:
o For scenarios BLEVE: butane will be retained. The butane are BLEVE
in fact more important than BLEVE butapro because, for a similar burst pressure, the intensity of thermal effects
(effects majorants) substantially depends on the mass of product contained in the reservoir.
o For scenarios UVCE / flash-fire : modeling will be conducted to

both products because it is impossible to anticipate in advance the results, but only the upper bounds results will be
presented in the report.


on the environment
2. Characterization of PHENOMENES HAZARDOUS TERM E INTENSITY
2.1. MODELING OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA
The graphical representation of hazards is represented on a site plan in Annex 6-1:
Annex 6-1: Mapping hazards
2.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere
Definition
This scenario corresponds to the BLEVE of a butane tank or 2000 m³ butapro filled
88.7% following a tank containment loss due an outdoor heat stress (domino effect).
Assumptions and input data
Product: butane;
Volume of the sphere: 2000 m 3;
filling rate max: 88.7%; Design pressure of the sphere: 12
bar;
set pressure of the valves, check as burst pressure: 13.2 bar; isentropic expansion coefficient butane / butapro: 1.1.
Results
thermal effects
Specific data PHAST software 6.6 for the calculation of thermal effects are:
Amount of product considered: 2000 x 580 x 0.887 = 1 029.10 3 kg; Model used to calculate the source term
"catastrophic failure"; Model used to calculate the thermal effects of BLEVE: Model TNO.
750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 10/127 Page


on the environment
The characteristics of the fire ball and effects distances obtained for a target at 1.5 m from the ground are the following:
Ray duration
291 m 31 s
Distance threshold from

Threshold
emission source
Threshold significant lethal effects

730 m
(1800 (kW / m²) 4/3)
Threshold first lethal effects

Significant (1000 (kW / 977 m
m²) 4/3. s)
Threshold irreversible effects

1218 m
(600 (kW / m²) 4/3. s)
overpressure effects
The energy of the explosion is calculated with the formula Brode (the presence of the ground is taken into account in the calculation)
and distances overpressure effects are determined from charts Baker (see Chapter 4).
Irreversible
Threshold
effects
lethal effects Threshold
threshold
around the area indirect effects
Threshold delimiting the
Threshold very serious of the grave on humans by
domino area of
damage to structures dangers for
effects hazards to
glass
human life breakage 1
Life
Value incident
500 mbar 300 mbar 200 mbar 140 mbar 50 mbar 20 mbar
overpressure threshold
Distance to the source of the

68 92 117 146 311 622
explosion (m)
The effective burst of energy E ex is, 5.3 10 10 J.

1 Good practice of the profession, the distance of pressure effect of 20 mbar threshold is taken as twice the effective distance obtained for a pressure of 50 mbar.


on the environment
2.1.2 BLEVE of a tractor trailer
Definition
This scenario corresponds to a BLEVE butane or butapro tractor trailer filled to 85%, following a tank containment loss due to external
heat stress (domino effect).
Product: butane; Volume truck: 45 m 3;
filling rate max: 85%;
set pressure of the valves, check as burst pressure: 19 bar; isentropic expansion coefficient butane / butapro: 1.1.
Results
thermal effects
Amount of product considered: 45 x 0.85 x 580 = 22,2.10 3 kg; Model used to calculate the source term
Ray duration
84 m 12 sec


on the environment
The threshold distance

Threshold
from the source (m)

98
(1800 (kW / m²) 4/3)

Significant (1000 (kW / 167
m²) 4/3. s)

226
(600 (kW / m²) 4/3. s)
Irreversible
Threshold
effects
threshold
domino area of
effects hazards to
glass
Life
Value incident

22 29 37 47 99 198
explosion (m)
The effective burst of energy E ex is 1.7.10 9 J.



on the environment
2.1.3 BLEVE of a small truck
Definition
This scenario corresponds to a BLEVE a small trucks or butane butapro filled to 85% following a tank containment loss due to external
thermal aggression (domino effect).
Product: butane; Volume truck: 26 m 3;
filling rate max: 85%;
set pressure of the valves, check as burst pressure: 19 bar; isentropic expansion coefficient butane / butapro: 1.1.
Results
thermal effects
The specific parameters PHAST software 6.6 for the calculation of thermal effects are:
Amount of product considered: 26 x 0.85 x 580 = 12,3.10 3 kg; Model used to calculate the source term
Data from the fire ball and effects the distances obtained for a target at 1.5 m from the ground are the following:
Ray duration
70 m 10 s


on the environment

Threshold
the source

54 m
(1800 (kW / m²) 4/3)

Significant (1000 (kW / 117 m
m²) 4/3. s)

167 m
(600 (kW / m²) 4/3. s)
Irreversible
Threshold
effects
threshold
domino area of
effects hazards to
glass
Life
Value incident

18 24 31 39 83 166
explosion (m)
The effective burst of energy E ex is 9,9.10 8 J.



on the environment
2.1.4 BLEVE a bottle 13 kg
Definition
This scenario corresponds to a BLEVE a bottle of 13 kg 90% full after a loss of containment of the bottle due to an external mechanical
or thermal aggression (domino effect).
Product: butane;
Bottle Capacity: 28.4 l; filling ratio max 90%, or 13 kg;
test pressure selected as the burst pressure: 30 bar; isentropic expansion coefficient butane /
butapro: 1.1.
Results
thermal effects
Model used to calculate the source term "catastrophic failure"; Model used to calculate the thermal effects of
BLEVE: Model TNO.
Ray duration
7m 2s


on the environment

Threshold
the source

Not reached*
(1800 (kW / m²) 4/3)

Significant (1000 (kW / Not reached*
m²) 4/3. s)

Not reached*
(600 (kW / m²) 4/3. s)
* The fireball is not important enough for the effects thresholds are reached by radiation.
Irreversible effects
Threshold lethal
threshold
effects around Threshold
Threshold very delimiting the
the area of the indirect effects on
serious damage Threshold area of hazards
grave dangers to humans by
on domino effects to human life
human life breaking
structures
windows 1
Value incident
300 mbar 200 mbar 140 mbar 50 mbar 20 mbar

3m 4m 5m 10 m 20 m
explosion
The effective burst of energy E ex is 1.7.10 6 J.



on the environment
2.1.5 BLEVE a bottle 35 kg
Definition
This scenario corresponds to a BLEVE a bottle of P35 (41 kg of butane) filled to 90% following a loss of containment of the bottle due
to an external mechanical or thermal aggression (domino effect).
Product: butane; : Liquid;
Bottle Capacity: 84 l; filling ratio max 90%, or 35 kg;
test pressure selected as burst pressure: 30 bar; isentropic expansion coefficient butane /
butapro: 1.1.
Results
thermal effects
The specific parameters PHAST software 6.6 for the calculation of thermal effects are:
Model used to calculate the source term "catastrophic failure"; Model used to calculate the thermal effects of
BLEVE: Model TNO.
Ray duration
11 m 2s


on the environment

Threshold
the source

Not reached*
(1800 (kW / m²) 4/3)

Significant (1000 (kW / Not reached*
m²) 4/3. s)

Not reached*
(600 (kW / m²) 4/3. s)
* The fireball is not important enough for the effects thresholds are reached by radiation.
Irreversible effects
Threshold lethal
threshold
effects around Threshold
Threshold very delimiting the
the area of the indirect effects on
serious damage Threshold area of hazards
grave dangers to humans by
on domino effects to human life
human life breaking
structures
windows 1
Value incident

4m 5m 7m 14 m 28 m
explosion
The effective burst of energy E ex is 5,0.10 6 J.



on the environment
2.1.6 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line of boat supply
Definition
This scenario involves the breaking of the ship supply line diameter 6 ''. It is the loss of containment of the line, either on the pier or just
downstream of the automatic valve on site.
This scenario would lead to loss of containment or butapro butane in liquid form. This loss of containment could potentially result in:
- A flammable gas cloud,
- An explosion if ignited delayed this cloud,
- A jet ignited because of its low ignition energy, in an immediate rejection ignition.
The release of product to the atmosphere comes:
- receiving LPG carrier, the discharge rate of the pump LPG carrier,
- emptying of inventory downstream of the line (the spheres are filled at the top, the gas inventory that might escape from the
sphere following the breakdown is neglected).
Two cases were considered:
- a rupture line at the pier,
- a break in the line on site, just downstream of the automatic valve site.
Assumptions and input data - Case 1: break on the pier
Upstream of the break (LPG carrier side):
Product: butapro (75% butane - propane 25%); : Liquid;
Diameter of the leak: 6 '', or 150 mm (pipe diameter); Pressure: 8 bar (discharge pressure of the LPG
carrier pumps); Temperature: 4 ° C (the product is cooled on the LPG carrier for reception); Flow rate: 45
kg / s (rate of filling of the spheres); discharge height: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.


on the environment
Downstream of the break (side fixed installations):
Diameter of the leak: 6 '', or 150 mm (pipe diameter); Pressure: saturated vapor pressure;
Temperature: 4 ° C;
downstream piping length up areas: 730 m, 13 m 3 product; Hand: product contained in the pipeline (or 13 m 3);
discharge height: 1 m; rejection of direction:
horizontal.
Assumptions and input data - Case 2: break on the site
Upstream of the break (LPG carrier side):
Diameter of the leak: 6 '', or 150 mm (pipe diameter); Pressure: 8 bar (discharge pressure of the LPG
carrier pumps); Temperature: 4 ° C (the product is cooled on the LPG carrier for reception); Flow rate: 45
kg / s (rate of filling of the spheres); discharge height: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.
Downstream of the break (side fixed installations):
downstream piping length up spheres: 100 m, 2 m 3 product; Hand: product contained in the pipeline (that is 2 m 3);
horizontal.


on the environment
source term
Case 1: Out on the pier
The following table shows the characteristics of the source term calculated by the Phast 6.6 software. The model "Line Out" is used to
calculate the source term. Note that the discharge gives rise to the formation of a web.
Out of the supply line -

pier
Upstream (LPG Downstream

Contribution
carrier side) (sphere side)
Debit 45 kg / s 36.7 kg / s
Temperature - 21 ° C - 21 ° C
Speed 60 m / s 66 m / s
liquid fraction 0.86 0.86
Drop diameter 45 37
duration 3600 s 205 s
Therefore, during the first 205 seconds, rejection is fed by contributions upstream and downstream of the break, then from 205 s, only
the upstream contribution (LPG carrier side) continues to fuel leakage. The term representative source of double contributions is as
follows (calculation made in accordance with Chapter 4):
Out of the supply line - Apponteme nt
Contribution Upstream Downstream + uphill
Debit 81.7 kg / s 45 kg / s
Speed 63 m / s 60 m / s
Drop diameter 41 45


on the environment
Case 2: break on website
Out of the supply line -

pier
Upstream (LPG Downstream

Contribution
carrier side) (sphere side)
Debit 45 kg / s 36.7 kg / s
Speed 60 m / s 66 m / s
Drop diameter 45 37
Therefore, during the first 32 seconds, rejection is fed by contributions upstream and downstream of the break, then from 32 s, only the
upstream contribution (LPG carrier side) continues to fuel leakage. The term representative source of double contributions is as follows
(calculation made in accordance with Chapter 4):
Out of the supply line - Apponteme nt
Debit 81.7 kg / s 45 kg / s
Speed 63 m / s 60 m / s
Drop diameter 41 45


on the environment
Results
The results are presented in tables below. In the disadvantageous configuration (F3), the distance the LEL to 155 m for the case 1 and
149 m in case # 2.
overpressure effects from the discharge point thermal effects
Distance (m) Distance (m) to the Distance (m) to the Distance

Distance SALTS (m)
threshold 140 mbar threshold of 50 mbar threshold of 20 mbar SEL (m) Distance
SEI (m)
UVCE / F3 Not reached 257 517 155 155 171

flash-fire
D5 Not reached 185 359 140 140 154

Case 1

flash-fire
Case 2 D5 Not reached 185 357 139 139 153
The effect distances associated jet ignited do not depend on the place of the fracture. The results are identical to the case 1 to the pier
and the case 2 on site.
thermal effects
flame length
Distance (m) Distance (m) Distance (m)

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 90 176 199 229

Jet ignited D5
79 165 187 218


on the environment
2.1.7 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line interconnection
Definition
This scenario involves the breaking of the interconnection line of BUTAGAZ sites and TOTALGAZ diameter of 6 ''. We consider a
transfer to TOTALGAZ BUTAGAZ product (in the opposite direction, this scenario is identical to a boat receipt).
- delivery of product from the BUTAGAZ spheres, the discharge flow rate of LPG pumps,
- the drain downstream inventory of the line (to TOTALGAZ).
Pump station LPG BUTAGAZ has 5 pumps, capable of providing each 32.5 m 3 / h. In the case of a transfer of product through the
interconnection line, it is assumed that the pumps 5 are in operation.
Upstream of the break (BUTAGAZ side):
Diameter of the leak: 6 '', or 150 mm (pipe diameter); Pressure: 17 bar (discharge pressure of
LPG pumps); Temperature: 20 ° C;
Flow rate: 5 x 32.5 x 580/3 600 = 26.2 kg / s of butane or 5 x 32.5 x 557/3 600 = 25.1 kg / s of butapro (transfer rate to
TOTALGAZ); discharge height: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.


on the environment
Downstream of the break (TOTALGAZ side):
Product: Butapro (75% butane - propane 25%); : Liquid;
Length of the interconnection pipeline: 720 m, an inventory of 13 m 3;
horizontal.
source term
Out of the interconnection line
Upstream (LPG Downstream (line

Contribution
pumps) interconnection)
Debit 25.1 kg / s 51.7 kg / s
Speed 103 m / s 103 m / s
Drop diameter 15 microns 15 microns
Therefore, during approximately the first 140 seconds, the rejection is fed by contributions upstream and downstream of the break,
then from 140 s, only the upstream contribution (LPG pump side) continues to fuel leakage.


on the environment
The term representative source of double contributions is as follows (calculation made in accordance with Chapter 4):
Out of the interconnection line
Debit 76.8 kg / s 25.1 kg / s
Speed 103 m / s 103 m / s
Results
The results are presented in tables below. In the disadvantageous configuration (F3), the distance the LEL to 174 m.

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 267 520 174 174 191

UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 181 341 147 147 162
Are in parentheses under each distance booster effect: the distance between the source of the rejection and the center of the explosion and the
explosive penalizing mass of penalizing explosion.
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 84 163 183 210

Jet ignited D5
73 153 174 201


on the environment
2.1.8 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line withdrawal spheres upstream of
pumps
Definition
This scenario relates to the breaking of the withdrawal line of the diameter of spheres 8 '', upstream of the pumps, and closer to the
sphere.
This scenario would lead to loss of containment or butapro butane in liquid and emptying of the sphere. This loss of containment could
potentially result in:
Only the upstream contribution (sphere side) is taken into account. The downstream contribution consisting of inventory of fluid
contained in the pipe 8 '' located between the rupture site and pumps, is neglected.
Amount of product considered: 2000 m 3;
height of liquid in the tank: 12 m;
Consideration of retention (S = 847 m 2);
horizontal.


on the environment
Note :
In order to refine the modeling of this scenario, we will consider the pressure losses induced on the flow by the presence of the flap
from the bottom of the storage area.
The expression of the losses can be translated as follows for flow:
2
ρu
ΔP = ξ *
2
with: Δ p: pressure loss (Pa);
ξ: the pressure loss coefficient (SI);
ρ : The density of the product (kg / m 3);
u: velocity of the fluid (m / s).
In order to reflect the loss of singular charge induced by the bottom valve into a regular pressure drop can be taken into account by the
Phast software, it is necessary to determine the pressure loss coefficient ξ the bottom valve.
This coefficient is determined from data providers (WHESSOE). The following formula is used:
Cv KQ ΔP
= * *
ρ
with: Q: the volume flow rate in the gap (m 3 / s), Q = flow S, S is the section of the
pipe in m 2;
K: a constant for converting the original formula, expressed in Anglo-Saxon units in the International System units, K =
2,88.10- 5;
Cv: a coefficient representing the hydraulic resistance of the bottom valve, depending on the leakage diameter, given
supplier (Cv = 1103, for an 8 inch pipe);
2
• S •
From this relationship, we get: ξ = 2* • • , is ξ = 1.95.
• cv
* K •


on the environment
Moreover, in the Phast software, the coefficient ξ, corresponding to a linear pressure drop is expressed as follows:
4* f *L 2
ξ = with f =
[ 3 )]
2
D +2 2 Ln (5k/ D
With L: the length of the pipe (m);
D: pipe diameter, 0.2 m;
k: the roughness of the pipe or 0,0457.10- 3 m.
Starting from this last relationship, the e quivalente length of pipe, ie the DN pipe length 8 '' to cr
REA the same pressure drop as the
bottom valve, is estimated to be 15 m.
source term
The following table shows the characteristics of the source term calculated by the Phast 6.6 software. The model chosen for evaluation
of the source term is the "Line Out" model with a pipe length of 15 m (taking account of the bottom valve).
Note that the discharge gives rise to the formation of a web.
Out of the spheres bleed pipe
Debit 159.1 kg / s
Temperature - 21 ° C
Speed 99 m / s
liquid fraction 0.77
Drop diameter 17 microns
duration 3600 s


on the environment
Results
The results are presented in tables below. In the disadvantageous configuration (F3), the distance the LEL reached 228 m.

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 338 655 228 228 251

UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 248 458 193 193 213
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 115 226 255 293

Jet ignited D5
100 213 242 281


on the environment
2.1.9 UVCE / Jet ignited after breaking the line downstream transfer pumps to
rides
Definition
This scenario relates to the breakage of the transfer line downstream of LPG pumps to the rides (diameter 3 '').
Only the upstream contribution (side pumps) is counted. The downstream contribution, consisting of the product inventory contained in
the pipe 3 '' located between the rupture site and the SKID is neglected.
The rejection of LPG obtained from the rupture of the pipe is determined by the maximum pump flow. For simultaneous operation of
the two carousels, the simultaneous operation of three pumps is required. So upper bound, the selected flow rate will be the equivalent
to the operation of three pumps. Each pump can provide a flow rate of 32.5 m 3 / h.
Product: butane / butapro (75% butane - propane 25%); : Liquid;
Diameter of the leak: 3 '', or 75 mm (diameter of the pipeline); Pressure: 17 bar (discharge pressure of
LPG pumps); Flow to carousel: 32.5 x 3 = 97.5 m 3 / h (3 pumps transfer rate); Temperature: 20 ° C;
discharge height: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.


on the environment
source term
The following table shows the characteristics of the source terms calculated by the software Phast
6.6. The model used for the evaluation of the source term is the model "Line break".
Knowing that neither product is not found to be upper bound on this scenario, the results are presented for butane and for butapro.
Note that butane releases result in the formation of groundwater.
Out of the transfer line to the carousel
Product Butane Butapro
Debit 15.7 kg / s 15.1 kg / s
Temperature - 0.5 ° C - 21 ° C
Speed 62 m / s 101 m / s
Results

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)

flash-fire
D5 Not reached 82 156 66 66 72

Butane

flash-fire
D5 Not reached 77 143 67 67 74

Butapro


on the environment
thermal effects
flame length
(M) Distance (m) Distance (m) Distance (m)

SALTS SALT SEI
jet ignited F3 45 86 96 110
Butane D5 40 80 91 105
Butapro D5 37 74 84 97


on the environment
2.1.10 VCE / Jet ignited following the breakdown of the li ESG carousel supply
Definition
This scenario involves breaking the carousel supply line, downstream of SKID (diameter 3 ''). It would lead to the loss of containment
or butapro butane in liquid form inside the filling hall.
Only the upstream contribution (SKID side) is taken into account. The downstream contribution, consisting of the product inventory
contained in the pipe 3 '' located between the rupture site and the carousel is neglected.
This loss of containment could potentially result in:
- A contained explosion in the filling hall in case of ignition delay of this cloud,
Product: butane;
leak rate: 4.33 kg / s (carousel feed rate); Temperature of discharge: 20 ° C; Height
of rejection: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.
An LPG leak in the filling hall is likely to lead to the contained explosion of a gas cloud. Knowing that the filling hall of BUTAGAZ is not
particularly crowded, the sizing factor of the explosion will not clutter but the speaker resistance. It is therefore proposed to use the
method based on the graphs Baker to determine the overpressure effects that would result from the explosion of the filling hall.
Dimensions of the filling hall: L x W x H = 48 x 26 x 4.15 m, a total volume of 5616 m 3;
Static burst pressure of the hall; Silo according to the Guide INERIS [R6], for a cell provided with a metal roof (surface than can
reasonably be considered a éventable surface), static burst pressure is between 100 and 200 mbar . A value of 200 mbar
envelope is used for the filling hall.


on the environment
Pressure at the time of the break: according to the work of A. Lannoy -edf [R7], the pressure at the time of the break is taken
equal to 3 times the static pressure of ruin, or to the lobby to 600 mbar,
expansion coefficient isentropic: 1.4 (representative of the combustion gas air / LPG).
Term source (jet fire)
The following table shows the characteristics of the source term calculated by the Phast 6.6 software.
Out of the carousel supply line
Debit 4.33 kg / s
Temperature - 0.5 ° C
Speed 62 m / s
duration 3600 s
Results
The results are presented in tables below.
overpressure effects from the discharge point

thermal effects
Distances thresholds (m)
500 300 200 140 50 20 Distance

Distance SALTS (m) SEI Distance
mbar mbar mbar mbar mbar mbar SEL (m) (m)
Lobby Not Limited around the lobby

29 37 46 99 198
Explosion reached filling
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 26 48 54 62
Jet ignited D5
23 45 51 59


on the environment
2.1.11 VCE / Jet ignited following the breakdown of the li gne supply or hose Position
P35
Definition
This scenario involves the rupture of one of two taps of the supply line of the P35 position. These tappings (extended flexible) DN are
½ '' and run from the filling hall to position P35.
This scenario would lead to loss of containment or butapro butane in liquid form outside the filling hall.
Only the upstream contribution (filling hall side) is taken into account. The downstream input, consisting of an inventory of product
contained in the stitching ½ '' located between the rupture site and the position P35 is neglected.
Diameter of the leak: ½ '' or 12.5 mm (diameter of the nozzle or hose); Pressure rejection: 12 bar (pressure
imposed by the SKID); Temperature of discharge: 20 ° C; Height of rejection: 1 m; rejection of direction:
horizontal.


on the environment
source term
The following table shows the characteristics of the source term calculated by the Phast 6.6 software. The model used for the
evaluation of the source term is the "Leak" model.
Out feed stitching the P35 station
Debit 2.85 kg / s
Speed 88 m / s
duration 3600
Results

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 43 m 81 m 35 35 39
UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 29 m 53 m 25 25 28
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 21 m 38 43 49
Jet ignited D5
18 m 36 41 47


on the environment
2.1.12 UVCE / Jet ignited following the tearing of b ras truck loading (12.A) or of the transfer line to the loading station v
rac (12.B)
Definition
This scenario involves the tearing or rupture of the loading arm trucks butane / diameter butapro 3 ''.
Note: the failure scenarios of the transfer line to the bulk loading would result in the same modeling. Indeed, although the transfer line
is DN 4 '', the flow of the upstream contribution would be unchanged because it is imposed by the pumps, and flow of the downstream
contribution would also be unchanged because it is the loading arm , DN 3 '', which requires rate limiting to this flow.
- the pump station LPG, the pump delivery rate,
- emptying the truck.
The break is expected at the end of loading, the truck is filled to 85%.
Upstream of the break (LPG pump side):
Diameter of the leak: 3 '', or 75 mm (diameter of the loading arm); Pressure: 5 bar (truck filling
pressure); Temperature: 20 ° C; Flow: 32.5 m 3 / h (truck loading rate); discharge height: 1 m; rejection
of direction: horizontal.


on the environment
Downstream of the break (truck side):
Diameter of the leak: 3 '', or 75 mm (diameter of the loading arm); Pressure: saturated vapor pressure;
Amount of product in the truck: 18.5 tons; discharge height: 1 m;
rejection of direction: horizontal.
source term
evaluation of the source term is the model "Line break". Note that the discharge gives rise to the formation of a web.
Wrenching truck loading arm
Upstream Downstream
Contribution
(pump side) (truck side)
Debit 5.03 kg / s 12.78 kg / s
Speed 103 m / s 103 m / s
Drop diameter 15 15
Therefore, during the first 1 about 450 seconds, the rejection is fed by contributions upstream and downstream of the break, then from
1450 s, only the upstream contribution (pump side) continues to fuel leakage. The term representative source of double contributions is
as follows (calculation made in accordance with Chapter 4):


on the environment
Wrenching truck loading arm
Debit 17.81 kg / s 5.03 kg / s
Speed 103 m / s 103 m / s
Drop diameter 15 15
Results

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 120 234 87 87 96

UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 84 156 72 72 80
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 45 85 95 109
Jet ignited D5
39 80 90 104


on the environment
2.1.13 UVCE / Jet inflamed following a creep rupture piq
Definition
This scenario involves breaking a stitch from one of the site lines. Conservatively, the largest stitch diameter is selected for modeling, a
DN ½ inch.
Product: Butane; : Liquid;
Diameter of the leak: ½ '' or 12.5 mm (diameter of the tapping); Pressure: 17 bar
(discharge pressure of LPG pumps); Temperature: 20 ° C; discharge height: 1 m;
rejection of direction: horizontal.
source term
stitching Out ½ ''
Debit 3.4 kg / s
Speed 98 m / s
duration 3600 s


on the environment
Results

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 47 89 38 38 42
UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 32 58 28 28 31
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 23 41 46 52
Jet ignited D5
20 38 43 50


on the environment
2.1.14 UVCE / Jet inflamed following a flange leak on pipeline
Definition
This scenario involves the leak flange of one of the pipes of the site. The successful leak diameter depends on the diameter of the pipe
(see Table 1).
Pressure: 17 bar (discharge pressure of LPG pumps); Temperature: 20 ° C; discharge
height: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.
Calculation of leakage diameter
The modeling of flange leakage was modeled according to the sectoral gaps as defined in the Blue Guide UFIP (French Union of
Petroleum Industries) in July 2002:
" This gap is representative of seal leaks. It illustrates the release of a seal on an area between the clamping bolts. "
= π A DIA ×b (α 360 / ) × ep (m 2)
With input data:
DIA, the outer diameter of the seal (m),
α , the angle between bolts (°)


on the environment
ep, the game or the spacing of the joint inducing leakage (m).
The spacing of the joint was considered to 2 mm. The diameters of leakage to consider depending on pipe diameters are shown in the
following table:
Pipe diameter (in mm) Number of α Surface Leak diameter to be

bolts (in) (mm²) considered (in mm)
DN 200 (8 inches) 12 30 104.7 11.6
DN 150 (6 inches) 12 30 79.8 10.0
DN 100 (4 inches) 8 45 78.5 10.0
DN 75 (3 inches) 8 45 59.8 8.7
DN 50 (2 inches) 8 45 36.6 7.1
Table 1: leakage diameters selected for ios sce trailing flange
source term
Leaking flange
Diameter of the pipe

8 '' 6 '' and 4 '' 3 '' 2 ''
Debit 2.9 kg / s 2.2 kg / s 1.6 kg / s 1.1 kg / s
Temperature - 0.5 ° C - 0.5 ° C - 0.5 ° C - 0.5 ° C
Speed 98 m / s 98 m / s 98 m / s 98 m / s
liquid fraction 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Drop diameter 17 microns 17 microns 17 microns 17 microns
duration 3600 s 3600 s 3600 s 3600 s


on the environment
Results
The results are presented in tables below. In the disadvantageous configuration (F3), the distance the LEL reached 35 m for a leak in a
pipe 8 '', 30 m for leakage on a pipe 4 '' or 6 '', 24 m for leakage on a pipe 3 '' and 17 m for leakage on a pipe 2 ''.

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)

flash-fire
D5 Not reached 28 51 25 25 28
Cana 8 ''
UVCE /
F3 Not reached 35 65 30 30 33
flash-fire
Cana 6 '' and

D5 Not reached 22 41 19 19 21
4 ''

flash-fire
D5 Not reached 18 33 15 15 17
Cana 3 ''

flash-fire
D5 Not reached 13 24 10 10 11
Cana 2 ''


on the environment
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
Cana 8 '' D5 18 36 40 47
Cana 4 '' and 6 '' D5 16 31 35 41
Cana 3 '' D5 14 28 31 36
Cana 2 '' D5 12 23 26 30


on the environment
2.1.15 UVCE / Jet ignited following the opening of a valve line
Definition
This scenario involves opening a line valve site. Conservatively, the diameter of the larger valve is used for the modeling, a DN ½ ''.
Diameter of the leak: 1/2 '' or 12.5 mm (diameter of the valve); Pressure: 19 bar (valve set
pressure); Temperature: 20 ° C; discharge height: 1 m; Directorate of rejection: vertical.


on the environment
source term
line break valve ½ ''
Debit 3.6 kg / s
Speed 101 m / s
duration 3600 s
Results
The results are presented in tables below. Remote LEL reached 3 m (horizontal component).

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 14 33 3 3 4
UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 12 28 3 3 4
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 15 27 32 41
Jet ignited D5
13 27 33 40


on the environment
2.1.16 UVCE / Jet ignited following the opening of a valve sphere
2.1.16.1 Opening a sphere valve following an external fire
Definition
This scenario involves opening a valve of the spheres of the site. This opening could follow an external fire and then imply a loss of
containment butane / butapro in the liquid state.
Diameter of the leak: 6 '', 150 mm (the diameter of the valve outlet section is 8 '' but it is preceded by a section constriction in 6
'', taking into account restrictions in the modeling );
Pressure: 13.2 bar (valve set pressure); Temperature: 20 ° C; discharge
height: 20 m; Directorate of rejection: vertical.
750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 50/127 Page


on the environment
source term
Opening a ball valve
Debit 397.2 kg / s
Speed 258 m / s
Drop diameter 3 .mu.m
duration 3600 s
Results
The results are presented in the table below. The results are presented in tables below. In the disadvantageous configuration (F3), the
distance the LEL reached 23 m (horizontal component).

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 94 217 23 23 26

UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 92 213 21 21 24
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 98 107 153 205

Jet ignited D5
85 111 149 193


on the environment
2.1.16.2 Opening a ball valve due to overfilling
Definition
This scenario involves opening a valve of the spheres of the site. This opening could follow overfilling and then imply a loss of
containment butane / butapro in the liquid state.
Diameter of the leak: 6 '', 150 mm (the diameter of the valve outlet section is 8 '' but it is preceded by a section constriction in 6
'', taking into account restrictions in the modeling );
Flow limited to spheres filling rate, that is to say 45 kg / s Temperature: 4 ° C; discharge height:
20 m; Directorate of rejection: vertical.


on the environment
source term
Opening a ball valve
Debit 45 kg / s
Speed 48 m / s
duration 3600 s
Results
The results are presented in the table below. The results are presented in tables below. In the disadvantageous configuration (F3), the
distance the LEL reaches 35 m (horizontal component).

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 70 148 35 35 39

UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 63 134 31 31 35
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 65 82 102 130
Jet ignited D5
60 75 94 121


on the environment
2.1.17 UVCE / Jet inflamed following a leak garni pump ture
Definition
This scenario involves the filling leak on one of LPG pumps. This scenario would lead to loss of containment or butapro butane in liquid
form.
Product: Butane; : Liquid;
Pressure: 17 bar (discharge pressure of LPG pumps); Temperature: 20 ° C; discharge
height: 1 m; rejection of direction: horizontal.
Calculation of leakage diameter
Modeling pump gasket on leaks was performed according to the annular gaps as defined in the Blue Guide UFIP (French Union of
Petroleum Industries) in July 2002:
"Gap corresponding to the leak of a pump of mechanical seal. The annular section is defined by the pump shaft and the inner
diameter of the rolling ring mounted at the end of the stuffing box. We only consider the failure simple mechanical seals. "
We define b AT , section of the leak, as below:
× π × [( ]
2 2
A b= 0, 25 + DIA) ep- DIA (m 2)
with: DIA diameter of the pump shaft to the right of the mechanical seal,
ep, the diametral clearance of the rolling ring
For our study, ep is taken equal to 0.001 m, and the diameter of the pump shaft is taken to be 38 mm. The section of the drain is
equal to 60 mm 2 for an equivalent leakage diameter of 9 mm.


on the environment
source term
packing leakage on pump
Debit 1.8 kg / s
Speed 97 m / s
duration 3600 s
Results

Distance SALTS (m)
SEI (m)
F3 Not reached 30 55 26 26 29
UVCE /
flash-fire
D5 Not reached 18 35 15 15 17
thermal effects
flame length

(M)
SALTS SALT SEI
F3 17 30 34 39
Jet ignited D5
15 29 32 37


on the environment
2.1.18 UVCE - Secondary Explosions
For each scenario previously assessed using multi-energy method, we consider below the effects of secondary explosions that can
occur in congested or confined areas affected by the LEL.
The table on the next page shows the different zones considered congested or confined site. It also shows, for each of these areas, the
distances corresponding to different pressure levels. Distances are calculated from the geometric center (centroid) of the area and are
calculated using the PHAST 6.6 with multi-energy approach software.
For a relatively congested area, the degree of containment is set to 6. This value corresponds to a maximum overpressure at the
edge of the cloud of 500 mbar and a flame propagation speed in the cloud 150 m / s.
The volume of the zone is calculated from the maximum floor space that can be hindered, multiplied by the maximum height of the
area.
For tankers, we retain a height of 3 meters. For storage bottle racks, we retain a height of 4.5 m (6 stacked crates).
The free volume considered is the volume which then calculates the explosive mass. For example, parking areas tankers, we
removed, the volume of the area, the volume of tanks (45 m 3 by way of lump truck). For areas bottle crates, we considered a
congestion rate of 30%.

Table 2: Site congested areas BUTAGAZ La estimated
1279 2646
378 495
free
volume (m
3
)
Butane Butane Butane Butane Product
/ Butapro / Butapro / Butapro / Butapro
Website
explosive
102 209
30 40 mass
(kg)
of LA
Degree
GOULETTE Hazard Study C
and their impact on the environm
6 6 6 6
generous
Page 57/127 of containment
500 mbar
18 22 12 13
Goulette
40 50 27 29 Maximum
56 75 38 41
75 96 50 55
184 234 122 134
419 534 280 306


on the environment
2.1.19 gas oil pool fire (in and out sounded we)
Definition
This scenario corresponds to a diesel spillage, following a loss of containment of the tank or its equipment. The product is spread,
either in the entire retention or outside retention. In the presence of an ignition source, the length of material ignites resulting in a sheet
of fire
Two cases were considered:
- a fire in the retention of the gas oil storage for trucks and vehicles (Case 1)
- fire off retention in the diesel fuel tank to the fire groups (case 2).
Decomposition products formed are conventional combustion products of a fire, mainly carbon oxides, whose toxic effects are
generally covered by the thermal effects. Thus, only the thermal effects of the fire are discussed below.
It is agreed that the main features of this scenario:
Case 1:
Product: Diesel; Hand: 16
m 3;
Dimension retention: 6.3 x 5 m, 31.5 m 2;
Retention volume: 13 m 3.
Case 2:
Product: Diesel; Hand: 2.5
m 3;
The tank is not on retention, soil is concreted.
It is assumed the entire inventory flows on the ground. For a concrete floor, it is common practice to retain a minimum thickness of ply
of 1 cm. Therefore, for an inventory of
2,5m 3 a sheet surface of 250 m 2 is retained.


on the environment
The assumptions and intermediate outcomes to fire thermal effects calculations are presented in the table below. The models used are
detailed in Chapter 4.
Case No. 1 (of Case 2 (without

retention) retention)
Surface fire / equivalent diameter 31.5 m 2 / 6 m 250 m 2 / 18 m
Mass flow of combustion

0.055 kg / m 2 / s 0.055 kg / m 2 / s
Characteristic value hydrocarbons
Radiance flames
82 kilowatts / m 2 34 kilowatts / m 2
Correlation Mudan and Croce for hydrocarbons
Height of the flame

11 m 24 m
Correlation Thomas
Results
Distances effects to thermal thresholds were obtained taking into account the previously calculated data and in accordance with the
method of "solid flame" described in Chapter 4. The effect distances are searched for a target located 1.5 m above the ground.
For the case 1 (rectangular retention), the dist ance of effects are indicated for two targets placed differently with respect to the fire
wall: one facing the width, and the other side to length of the building . In case # 2 (area f had circular), the effects distances are given
for a target located opposite the flame wall. The distances from the wall of flame.
As an indication, the distance thresholds 16 kW / m 2 and 20 kW / m 2 were reported.
SALTS (8 SEL (5 SEI (3

Case 1 20 kilowatts / m 2 16 kilowatts / m 2
kW / m 2) kW / m 2) kW / m 2)
effects distances to a target located on the

perpendicular bisector of the length of the 7m 8m 12 m 16 m 21 m
burning area

perpendicular bisector of the width of the 6m 7m 11 m 14 m 18 m
area on fire

Case 2 20 kilowatts / m 2 16 kilowatts / m 2
kW / m 2) kW / m 2) kW / m 2)
effects distances to a target

4 5 14 23 35
facing the burning area


on the environment
2.1.20 Fire of the paint booth
Definition
The scenario modeled here is the fire of the paint booth after inflammation solvents or paints presence.
product flammable / combustible: paint solvents and oil (mainly consisting of ketones and esters);
cabin dimensions: 2 mx 2 m, an area of 4 m 2.
So upper bound from the viewpoint of thermal effects, characteristics of flammable products are used for modeling of the fire.
The mass flow of combustion products are estimated from that of acetone (considered representative ketones) and ethyl acetate
(considered representative esters). According to the literature,
the flux mass flow rate of acetone is
0.040 kg / m 2 / s, and the ethyl acetate is from 0.048 kg / m 2 / s. As a result, upper bound but representatively, we will retain a
combustion rate of 0.048 kg / m 2 / s.
The main assumptions and the intermediate results in the calculations of the thermal effects of the fire are presented in the table
below. The models used are detailed in Chapter 4.
Surface fire / equivalent diameter

4 m2/ 2 m
Surface of the spray booth

0.048 kg / m 2 / s
Product characteristic value
Radiance flames
114 kilowatts / m 2
Correlation and Mudan Croce for liquids
Height of the flame

5m
Correlation Thomas


on the environment
Results
Distances effects are indicated for a target placed on the perpendicular bisector of one of the sides of the paint booth. The distances
from the wall of flame.

kW / m 2) kW / m 2) kW / m 2)
Distances effects to a target

located on one of mediator
4m 4m 6m 8m 10 m
walls of flames


on the environment
2.1.21 Fire in warehouse paint s
Definition
The scenario modeled here is the fire of the warehouse paintings after inflammation solvents or paints.
Product: paint solvents and oil (mainly consisting of ketones and esters);
Inventory: 2000 L and 2400 L paint solvents;
Products are on retention dimensions: 4.5 x 2.7 m (dimensions of the storage magazine).
The mass flow of combustion products are estimated from that of acetone (considered representative ketones) and ethyl acetate
(considered representative esters). According to the literature,
the flux mass flow rate of acetone is
0.040 kg / m 2 / s, and the ethyl acetate is from 0.048 kg / m 2 / s. As a result, upper bound but representatively, we will retain a
combustion rate of 0.048 kg / m 2 / s.
The main assumptions and the intermediate results in the calculations of the thermal effects of the fire are presented in the table
below. The models used are detailed in Chapter 4.
Surface fire / equivalent diameter

12 m 2 / 3,5 m
Surface of the product web

0.048 kg / m 2 / s
Product characteristic value
Radiance flames
100 kilowatts / m 2
Correlation and Mudan Croce for liquids
Height of the flame

7m
Correlation Thomas


on the environment
Results
The effect distances are indicated for two targets placed differently with respect to the fire wall: one facing the width, and the other side
to length of the building. The distances from the wall of flame.

kW / m 2) kW / m 2) kW / m 2)

perpendicular bisector of the length of the 6m 7m 10 m 13 m 16 m
burning area

perpendicular bisector of the width of the 4m 5m 8m 10 m 13 m
area on fire

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Chapter 6: Detailed analysis of hazards and

Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

1. INTRODUCTION................................................. .................................................. ............................... 7

1.1. ................................................. OBJECTIVES .................................................. ............................... 7

1.2. CHOOSING SCENARIOS ............................................... .................................................. ........... 7

1.3. GENERAL PARAMETERS MODELING .............................................. ........................ 9

2. Characterization of PHENOMENES DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF CURRENT .................. 10

2.1. MODELING OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA .............................................. ................ 10

2.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere ................................. ............ .................................................. ......... 10

2.1.2 BLEVE of a tractor trailer ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.1.3 BLEVE of a small truck .................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.1.4 BLEVE a bottle 13 kg ........................ ................... ................................................ 16

2.1.5 BLEVE a bottle 35 kg ........................ ................... ................................................ 18

2.1.13 UVCE / Jet ignited after a break of stitching ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

2.1.14 UVCE / Jet ignited following a flange leak ca nalizing ................................. 44

2.1.16.1 Opening a sphere valve following a fire ex dull ................................ 50

2.1.18 UVCE - Secondary Explosions ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

2.1.20 Fire in the paint booth .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

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Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

2.1.21 Fire in the warehouse paintings ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

2.2. SUMMARY OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA .............................................. ........................ 64

3. EFFECTS ANALYSIS DOMINOES ......................... ..................... .................................................. .71

3.1. ANALYSIS DOMINO EFFECTS OF INTERNAL ............................................. .......................... 71

3.1.1 Effects related to dominoes BLEVE ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

3.1.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere ................................. ............ .................................................. .71

3.1.2 Effects related to dominoes UVCE ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

3.1.3 domino effects associated with inflamed jets ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3.1.4 fire-related domino effects .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

3.1.4.1 gas oil pool fire ............................. ................ .............................................. 78

3.1.5 If projectiles ................................ ............... .................................................. .......... 79

3.2. ANALYSIS DOMINO EFFECTS RELATED INDUSTRIES NEIGHBOR ................................ 80

3.2.1 VIVO ENERGY Tunisia ................................ ............... .................................................. .... 80

3.2.2 Silo Cereals ..................................... ........... .................................................. ................. 81

3.2.3 STLR ................................................. .................................................. ............................... 81

3.2.4 SCPCI ................................................. .................................................. .............................. 81

3.2.5 TOTALGAZ ........................................... ...... .................................................. ..................... 82

3.2.6 OIL Lybia .......................................... ...... .................................................. ........................ 82

3.2.7 TOTAL FUEL ................................... ............. .................................................. ... 82

3.2.8 STEG Berth ................................... ............. .................................................. ....... 82

3.2.9 transmission pipelines of dangerous products ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

4. Characterization of PHENOMENES DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF KINETIC ............... 84

5. Characterization of PHENOMENES DANGEROUS IN TERMS OF CHANCE

6. Characterization of PHENOMENES HAZARDOUS ON AN ACUTE .................. 90

7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND ACCEPTANCE OF RISKS ......................................... 116

7.1. SUMMARY OF THE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RISK (INTENSITY / CHANCE /

7.2. POSITIONING OF ACCIDENTS IN THE MATRIX CRITICALITY ......................... 122

7.3.1 risk analysis check ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

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Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

7.3.2 future improvements tracks ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

7.3.3 Conclusion ......................................... ........ .................................................. ................... 127

Annex 6-1: Mapping hazards ......................................... ............................ 10

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Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 Page 5/127

Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

BLEVE : Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

F EIN : Frequency of occurrence of the Event Initiator

LPG : Liquefied Petroleum Gas

INERIS : National Institute for Environment and Risks

IPS : equipment or setting Important For Safety