Intuition and its Role in Strategic Thinking

by

Gisle Henden

A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian School of Management

for the Degree of Dr. Oecon

Series of Dissertations 4/2004

BI Norwegian School of Management

Department of Strategy and Logistics

1
Gisle Henden:
Intuition and its Role in Strategic Thinking

© Gisle Henden
2004

Series of Dissertations 4/2004

ISBN: 82 7042 6393

ISSN: 1502-2099

BI Norwegian School of Management

P.O.B. 580
N-1302 Sandvika
Phone: +47 67 55 70 00

Printing: Nordberg Hurtigtrykk

To be ordered from:

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Mail: bi.sandvika@norli.no

2
Intuition and its Role in Strategic Thinking
Abstract

Even though intuition is recognized as imperative in strategic thinking management literature

is surprisingly silent on the issue. This inquiry thus provides an historical and hermeneutic
review of philosophical, psychological and management theory on intuition. It reveals that
philosophers conceive intuition as rational while psychologists tend not to. Philosophers do so
primarily because intuition is anchored in Ideas, Forms and Archetypes, which are perceived
as a priori laws governing and conditioning all existence. The argument is that intuition is the
ontological foundation for any normative theory of rationality. Implications for the rationality
debate are discussed.

Three levels of intuition are discerned and contrasted with analytical thinking. The first and
second levels correspond to intuitions from the personal and collective unconscious
experience respectively. They can be either introverted or extraverted. The third level
corresponds to what some philosophers call the non-dual, integral state of mind.

An empirical study including personal interviews with 105 Norwegian top managers indicate
that in strategic thinking more emphasis is put on intuition than analysis, especially in
exploration of new terrain and technology. They define intuition primarily in accordance with
level one. In describing its key features they focus on foresight, new ideas and synthesis.
Finally Myers Briggs Type Indicator® was applied, revealing that they have a strong
personality preference for intuition.

Key words: Intuition, Analysis, Rationality, Strategic Thinking.

3
Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank Professor Mark P. Kriger for his willingness to take on and
supervise a doctoral student who at the outset showed clear signs of a rather unconventional
mindset. A thesis proposal suggesting research on holonomic and intuitive thinking might be
controversial to many seniors educated in the positivistic tradition. Secondly I would like to
thank Professor Fred Wenstøp who provided excellent advise on statistics and methodology.

The scholars at Department of Strategy, the friendly staff at the library, the many colleagues
and friends, in particular Per Grøholt and Hans Solli-Sæther, all contributed and made the
journey a tremendously rich learning experience. Financial support from Norwegian School
of Management BI and Norges Rederiforbund, and not to forget the 105 respondents, made
the project possible.

Finally, I am grateful that family and previous teachers and supervisors have nurtured the
spark, required in order to compete the many hills encountered along the road.

Gisle R. Henden
Sandvika, February 23rd 2004.

4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Intuition and its Role in Strategic Thinking

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Theoretical Rationale and Objectives 7

1.2 Empirical Rationale and Objectives 10

2 INTUITION IN PHILOSOPHY

2.1 Introduction 12
2.2 Socrates and Plato 14
2.3 Immanuel Kant 22
2.4 Henri Bergson 30
2.5 Buddhism 39
2.6 Conclusion 47

3 INTUITION IN PSYCHOLOGY

3.1 Introduction 48
3.2 Carl Gustav Jung 51
3.3 Recent Works on Intuition 63
3.4 Dual Process Theories 80
3.5 Conclusion 86

4 INTUITION AND RATIONALITY

4.1 Introduction 84
4.2 What is Rationality? 84
4.3 Intuition as Ontological Foundation for Normative Rationality 88
4.4 Normative Intuition 92
4.5 Conclusion 97

5 INTUITION IN STRATEGY

5.1 Introduction 97
5.2 Strategy Defined 98
5.3 Strategic Decision Making 99
5.4 Strategic Thinking 106
5.5 Conclusion 113

5
6 RESEARCH METHOD

6.1 Research Problem, Objectives and Questions 113

6.2 Research Model, Variables and Questionnaire Items 115
6.3 The Sample 120
6.4 Data Collection Procedure 121
6.5 Validity Issues 123

7 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY AND FINDINGS PART I

7.1 Introduction 125

7.2 Intuition Defined by Norwegian Top Managers 125
7.3 The Role of Intuition in Strategic Thinking 129
7.4 MBTI® Personality Profiles of Top Managers 134
7.5 Conclusion 136

8 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY AND FINDINGS PART II

8.1 Introduction 139

8.2 Intuition versus Analysis in Strategic Decisions 140
8.3 Intuition and Experience 144
8.4 Intuition and Decision Quality 145
8.5 Validity and Reliability of the Study 147
8.6 Conclusion 153

9 CONCLUSION

9.1 Theoretical Implications of the Study 155

9.2 Implications for Strategic Thinking 159
9.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 162

REFERENCES 167

APPENDIX

A The Interview-Guide
B Sample Description

6
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Theoretical Rationale and Objectives

Why is it that philosophers define intuition as rational and superior to analytical thinking
while psychologists tend not to? Anyone acquainted with the heuristics and biases literature
has noted that intuition is conceived as a largely unconscious, biased, automatic and effortless
cognitive process.1 Those familiar with philosophy know that here intuition is considered
supreme intelligence and according to Plato the apprehension of it, is rather to be thought of
as a revelation which can only follow upon a long intellectual training.2 Indeed this is an
intriguing issue. It is so to speak a Copernican reversal in our history of epistemology. The
objective of this inquiry is to painstakingly track the evolution of this elusive concept from its
origins to modern day folklore and in this way address the question; what is intuition?

More specifically I start by carving out the rationale applied by the philosophers revealing
that they provide a substantial body of theory on intuition. Being equipped with their coherent
view on intuition, it is confusing to find a differing and fragmented view in psychology.
Osbeck notes: “it suffers from vague and multiple uses of the term, association with diverse
experimental phenomena, and from minimal effort to integrate these in a consistent way.”3 No
wonder management theory is silent on the issue. The problem however is that top managers
recognize intuition as pivotal in strategic thinking and decision making. An exploratory study
aiming at conceptual clarification may thus usefully inform the field of strategy. The
theoretical inquiry is thus to serve also as a separate contribution.

Intuition in Philosophy
The structure of the first chapter then is this: In each paragraph there are three main issues that
I work at. The first issue is the definition of intuition. This will be elaborated at some length.
The second and equally important issue is the distinction between analytical and intuitive
thinking. As this is indeed an intricate matter I do not intend to contribute in the debate.
Within the scope of this thesis there is little space for it. Rather I try in a hermeneutic spirit to
present one authentic view, which apparently is properly justified. Finally, as science is
characterized by a distinct methodology it is of relevance to see how these two orientations of
mind are anchored in different methods.4 Concerning the choice of authors I have diligently
scrutinized the field of philosophy aiming at the authorities on the subject. There are others as
well that could add a point or two. However, in considering the limitations of this thesis we
are probably well off with Plato, Kant, Bergson and the Buddhist doctrine.5 The table below
summarizes their methods.

1
Gilovich, Griffin, Kahneman, 2002, p. 51. Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 658, Epstein, 1996, p. 390.
2
Cornford, 1955, p. 206.
3
Osbeck, 1999, p. 229. See also Hogarth, 2001, p. 4-6.
4
Nachmias, 1996, p. 3.
5
Spinoza, Descartes, Husserl, Croce and Whitehead would be other relevant contributors.

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Methods of; Rational Intuition Analytical Thinking
Plato Dialogue Dianoia
Kant Synthesis Analysis
Bergson Metaphysical Science Physical Science

Intuition in Psychology
As Jung is the only psychologist who has provided a proper theory of intuition, this third
chapter starts off with his contribution. He did discover very interesting aspects of both the
personal and collective unconscious and because these repositories are claimed to be the main
domains of interest for intuition his account is of relevance to this study. In accordance with
Jung then and the core argument of the philosophical account three levels of intuition are
discerned. This is suggested as a main theoretical contribution of the thesis.

Personal Unconscious Collective Unconscious

Introverted Intuition Level One Level Two
Extraverted Intuition Level One Little or no Awareness
Integral Intuition Level Three Level Three

Then the historical and chronological account is taken one step further focusing on the more
recent works on intuition. They include dual process theories. In many ways dual process
theories are a reversed reflection of the philosophical distinction between the analytical and
intuitive state of mind, in the sense that now controlled, analytical thinking is considered
superior. Such an elongated frame of reference aids us in delineation and validation of
constructs to be applied in the empirical research.

Intuition and Rationality

Epistemology and strategic thinking are intrinsically related to the issue of rationality. Much
research has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed
normative according to various models of decision-making and rational judgment. This gap
between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic biases
in human cognition. However, Stanovich and West suggest four alternative explanations that
preserve the assumption that human behaviour and cognition is largely rational.6 They posit
that the gap is due to performance errors, computational limitations, the wrong norm being
applied by the experimenter, and different construal of the task by the subject. In this fourth
chapter I go along with Stanovich & West and work on the third interpretation namely that the
wrong norm is applied. The argument in brief is that intuition is the ontological foundation for
any normative theory of rationality. Thus I advocate that our normative view of rationality
and strategic thinking can benefit from a better understanding of intuition and by the method
of intuitive equilibrium.
Intuition in Strategy

6
Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 645, 649.

8
Chapter five starts with a definition of strategic thinking. Apparently, strategic thinking is a
unified perception revealing a unique and consistent set of activities propelling the company
into what it is to be. It is context-rich in the sense that it is anchored in both internal and
external analysis. When key aspects of strategic thinking are compared with those that define
intuitive thinking intrinsic similarities are discovered. Secondly strategic decision-making and
bounded rationality are discussed. March’s work on logic of consequence and appropriateness
resembles aspects of the distinction between analytical and intuitive thinking as well as the
one between reasoning system one and two elaborated in dual process theories. Finally, in
their comprehensive coverage of the strategy field de Wit & Myer ask: what is the
fundamental nature of strategic thought processes? They emphasize analytical and intuitive
cognition without providing any theory on intuition.7 Thus, right here the current work may
prove its worth.

1.2 Empirical Rationale and Objectives

Getting a product to market a few weeks earlier, responding to customer inquiries a little bit
faster, squeezing another penny out of cost, improving quality one small step further,
capturing another point of market share, these are the obsessions of managers today according
to Porter, Hamel and Prahalad.8 If this is correct there may be little to gain from further
increase in operational efficiency. How then should we proceed further? One suggestion is to
understand the nature of intellectual capital and how to think. While the notion of strategic
thinking has been increasingly used in the literature over the past two decades it has up to the
1990’s been applied mainly in generic terms, and thus without a specific meaning.9 However,
Mintzberg’s work is illustrative of a growing line of research efforts where the term is not
merely a catchall for all sorts of notions about strategic management.10 Rather, he approaches
strategic thinking as a particular way of thinking with specific characteristics. He claims that
strategic planning is an analytical process with the aim to program already identified
strategies. The result is a plan. Strategic thinking on the other hand is a process of intuitive
synthesis, where the outcome is an integrated perspective of the enterprise. Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki argue that strategists do rely on a mixture of analysis and intuition and conclude
that: “studying intuition is a way to create a more realistic view of how strategic decision
makers actually think.”11

In brief, the research problem is that even though intuition is recognized as imperative in
strategic thinking, management literature is surprisingly silent on the issue. I thus had to look
elsewhere. Unfortunately, the situation is similar in psychology. Here conceptual development
remains meager and thoroughly elusive. Shirley & Langan-Fox in their review of the
literature find that “researchers and scholars do not agree on what intuition actually means
and bring differing perspectives to its study from many disciplines.”12 Hill observes that aside

7
De Wit & Meyer, 1998, p. 70-75.
8
Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, p. x. Porter, 1998, p. 43, 59.
9
Porter, 1980, 1985. Generic strategies can never delineate what is unique to the individual firm.
10
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 273-274, 291. See also de Wit & Myer, 1998, p. 69, Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, Porter,
1998, Papadakis & Barwise, 1998, Fredrickson, 1985, 1986, and McGinnis 1987.
11
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 33. See also Eisenhardt, 1989 and 1999.
12
Shirley & Langan-Fox, 1996, p. 563. Osbeck, 1999, p. 229, Bastick, 1982, p. 8-9, Fishbein, 1987, p. ix, 3,
Baylor, 2001, p. 243, Hogarth, 2001, p. 5.

9
from the works of Carl Jung there are extremely few references to intuition in the
psychological literature.13 In trying to explain these problems, Osbeck emphasizes the
widespread tendency to ignore or misrepresent the philosophical heritage of intuition.14 Thus
we are not only justified in borrowing from philosophy but also forced to. The research
problem is thus focused in the question: What is intuition?

Theory construction is therefore the primary research objective. I come at this objective from
two approaches. One is a rather thorough cross-disciplinary theoretical inquiry of intuition
aiming at conceptual clarification and the other is an empirical study. The former is also to
serve as a separate contribution. Concepts are the most critical element in any theorizing
because they guide what is captured.15 As the literature on the issue is rather scarce and
fragmented, an historical and hermeneutic approach is conducted. The theoretical inquiry and
review is two-fold. The first issue of concern is how intuition is defined in philosophical,
psychological and management theory. What is intuition? It is a question that has intrigued
philosophers and psychologists alike from the very origin of their traditions. Usually intuitive
thinking is contrasted with discursive or analytical thinking and this will be my approach as
well. The ambition is not to uncover and discuss the numerous weaknesses of intuition. This
is already properly done by a number of excellent researchers.16 Rather, the intent is to
explore the concept. In this way, the aim is to delineate main aspects, and valid dimensions
which may facilitate the empirical research. Secondly, I discuss how the concept of intuition
relates to rationality. The puzzling fact discovered is that philosophers conceive of intuition as
rational and superior to analytical thinking while psychologists tend not to.

The other approach of this work is an exploratory empirical study, which is three-fold. First, I
interviewed a sample of 105 Norwegian top managers from the private sector about how they
perceive intuition and its role in strategy. Interpreting their replies, applying the
philosophical, psychological and management theory lenses, was undertaken to facilitate
further refinement of the concept. Second, I tested certain tentative and preliminary aspects of
the concept considered relevant in this managerial context. This was done by a cross-sectional
study in which the same 105 respondents were asked to both score and rank the items of an
intuition and analysis scale with respect to two different decisions of their own. That is, they
were asked to evaluate their emphasis on intuition and analysis and the corresponding
decision quality. In order to have multiple measures, they finally completed the Myers Briggs
Type Indictor® which indicates whether they have a personality preference for intuition in
perception and judgment. Given the research problem the empirical study also aims at a
contribution to our knowledge of how top managers think about their intuitive and analytical
thinking in strategic decision-making.

13
Hill, 1988, p. 138. See also Westcott, 1968, p. 32.
14
Osbeck, 1999, p. 229. The reference to philosophy is limited to one sentence in Hogarth, 2001 p. 15.
15
Ghauri et al. 1995, p. 17.
16
Dawes et al. 1985, p. 1671. Kahneman, et al. 1985, p. 416. Hammond, et al. 1997, p. 144.

10
The four research questions then are:

1 How is intuition conceived in philosophical, psychological and management theory, and

how is it related to normative rationality?

2 How are intuition and its role in strategic thinking perceived by Norwegian top managers?

3 Do Norwegian top managers have a personality preference for intuition as indicated by

Myers Briggs Type Indicator®?

4 Is intuition more or less emphasized compared with analysis in strategic thinking and
decision making?

11
2 INTUITION IN PHILOSOPHY

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we find a consistency in how philosophers have treated intuition. The intricate
epistemology of European philosophy turns on the distinction between intuitive and analytical
thinking. In the succeeding brief exposition we find, that without exception the intuitive state
of mind is perceived as superior to the analytic, discursive, dualistic state of mind. Slightly
different arguments are provided but essentially, they all agree in that intuition gives access to
the intelligible world of pure reason. Thus, they all define it as rational and intellectual while
analytical thought is seen as relative, incomplete and fragmented. Philosophers do so
primarily because intuition is anchored in Ideas, Forms and Archetypes, which are perceived
as a priori laws governing and conditioning all existence. The coherency discovered, equip us
with a rather strong bias when we in psychology find a different view. In psychology, the
main tendency is to treat intuition as some sort of unconscious, automatic and biased
processing devoid of proper rational qualities. This controversy may have implications for the
rationality debate.

In each paragraph of this chapter, I work at three main issues. The first issue is the definition
of intuition. It is elaborated at some length. The second and equally important issue is the
distinction between intuitive and analytical thinking. As this is indeed an intricate matter, I do
not intend to contribute in the debate. Within the scope of this thesis, there is little space for it.
Rather, I try in a hermeneutic spirit to present one authentic view, which apparently is
properly justified. Finally, it is of relevance to see how these two orientations of mind are
anchored in a method. For Plato it is dianoia and dialogue. For Kant it is the analytic and
synthetic method and for Bergson it is the scientific versus the metaphysical method.
Concerning the choice of authors, I have diligently scrutinized the field of philosophy and
psychology, aiming at the key authorities on the subject. There are others as well, that could
add a point or two. Nevertheless, in considering the obvious limitations this philosophical
account is subdued to in this thesis, we are probably well off with Plato, Kant, Bergson and
the Buddhist doctrine.17

A brief synopsis then, may prepare the reader and facilitate an understanding of the somewhat
difficult arguments to come. Plato is arguing that the primary weakness of the analytical or
discursive intellect is that it is compelled to employ assumptions and because it cannot rise
above these does not travel upwards to a first principle. It starts from unquestioned
assumptions, i.e. postulates, axioms, definitions, and reasons from them deductively down to
a conclusion. The premises may be true and the conclusions may follow but the whole
structure hangs in the air until the assumptions themselves are shown to depend on an
unconditioned principle. Rational intuition moves in the other direction, from an assumption
up towards a principle, which is not hypothetical. In doing so a proportion is discovered, in
which the visible world has been divided. It is corresponding to degrees of reality and truth,
so that the likeness stands to the original in the same ratio as the sphere of appearances to the
sphere of knowledge.

17
Spinoza, Descartes and Husserl are other main contributors.

12
In his delineation of space and time as Forms of pure or rational intuition, Kant claims that
intuition is characterized by being a necessary, infinite, innate, subjective, co-operative and a
priori representation. Furthermore, it is a singular whole preceding any part and with
immediate representations in it not under it. Intuition is contrasted with the main product of
the discursive intellect, conception. According to Kant, concepts mediate and generalize. It is
a symbolic representation of a class or genus, and refers to features and marks that several
things have in common.

For Bergson the situation is similar. He contrasts intuition with the analytical talents of the
discursive intellect. According to him, they are not different cognitive systems but two sides
of one thinking activity. An activity powered by the spirit. The thinking activity goes in one
direction when it applies a discursive, conceptual, analytic quantitative and external
perspective and in the opposite direction when it sympathizes with the qualitative and
enduring psychological reality. Bergson thus copies Plato who defines rational intuition as the
eye of the psyche or soul. The fixed concepts of the discursive intellect may be extracted by
our thought from mobile reality but there are no means of reconstructing the mobility of the
real with fixed concepts. The discursive intellect is therefore bound to misunderstand the fact
of motion and change. For Bergson then, intuition is primarily occupied with metaphysics or
spiritual science, while the discursive intellect is primarily employed in the study and analysis
of matter and physical science.

This latter view is elaborated in Buddhist doctrine. Here it is maintained that when the mind is
oriented solely towards the empirical, towards the data provided by the six senses, and applies
the discursive intellect, it comprehends conceptual, differentiated, analytic, explicit
knowledge and evidence.18 When directed towards the eight and ninth class of consciousness,
achieved by a turning away from the outside world of objects, to the inner world of enduring
oneness and completeness, the energy that sustains their organic unity is intuitively
discovered. The claim is that this results in liberation and autonomy. Where Buddhism is
clearer, than the other exponents, is in its emphasis on intuition as a stabilizing and central
point of balance. It is upholding the coherence of its contents by being the center of reference.
The intuitive state of mind is thus a mixture and a meeting point between the first six senses
or classes of consciousness on the one side, and class eight and nine on the other. The latter
correspond to Jung’s notions of the personal and collective unconsciousness. It is their
common ground, with no body of its own and it is in this sense it is an immediate and
singular synthesis, as Kant argues. In this chapter, it is thus indicated that it is reasonably
clear that the mind has a duality to it. It is also argued that it is intuition that facilitates a
transcending of its more severe limitations.

18
In Buddhism, thoughts are recognized as objects of perception. Thus, they define this as a sixth sense.

13
2.2 Socrates and Plato 427-347 BC

Greek philosophy and especially the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition distinguished between an

ordinary inferential kind of thought often called discursive thought, and a kind of thought,
which is non-discursive or intuitive. The usual term for the former in Greek is dianoia for the
latter nous and noesis. It goes back to some of the most famous passages in Plato and
Aristotle such as the divided line in the Republic and the Metaphysics XII, which discusses
God's thought. Then the Neoplatonists combined Plato and Aristotle, added certain features of
their own and thus created the notions that are listed below. Emilsson argues that the
distinction lived on throughout the Middle Ages and to some extent beyond even if it
eventually ceased to be in ordinary use. Aspects of it played a role for some of the great early
modern philosophers. Descartes, Pascal and Spinoza are some examples. The concept of
intuition is very much behind Spinoza's notion of seeing things sub specie aeternitatis.19
Likewise, there is indeed something of this ancient distinction at work in Kant's notions of
intuition and understanding.

Of the many characteristics attached to intuition only one has survived in mainstream
Anglophone philosophy, namely the notion of non-inferential knowledge. Though, the idea
that there is some foundation of knowledge which itself is not inferred from anything else has
of course been fiercely attacked, according to Emilsson. In continental philosophy matters are
more complicated. Some other aspects of intuition survive there, partly through German
idealism.20 Werner Beierwaltes and others have shown it to be directly influenced by
Neoplatonism as well as by Plato and Aristotle and partly through Bergson who drew directly
on Plotinus.21 Emilsson also notes that various other aspects of the ancient intuition now are
making a comeback into philosophical currency for instance through the holism of Quine and
Davidson. The ancient notions then as they appear in Plotinus are listed below.22 Here I will
not attempt to discuss them at any length though we will return to them later on.

Intuitive Thinking Discursive Thinking

Non-inferential Inferential
A-temporal Temporal
Grasps all at once (totum simul, athroos) Grasps objects piecemeal
Non-propositional Propositional
Non-representational Representational
Infallible Fallible

The enduring significance of Platonic philosophy is unquestioned. Some will have it that
almost everything written in European philosophy is, footnotes to Plato.23 Its main tenet, have
survived to this very day and is vitalized by modern physics. Roger Penrose, claimed to be the
greatest mathematical physicist alive writes; “To me the world of perfect forms is primary (as
was Plato’s own belief) – its existence being almost a logical necessity – and both the other
two worlds are its shadows.”24 David Bohm agrees; “it is commonly believed that the content

19
Emilsson, 2000, p. 1. See also Parkinson, 2000, p. 287-309, Gosling, 1973 and Tredennick, 1933.
20
To Kant idealism is every system, which maintains that the sensible world does not exist in the form in which
it presents itself to us. This position is typified in Kant’s mind, by e.g. Plato and Descartes, who are rationalists.
21
Emilsson, 2000, p. 1.
22
Ibid. See also Resnik & Orlandi, 2003, p. 305.
23
Vlastos, 1975.
24
Penrose, 1994, p. 414-417. He refers to the mental and physical world.

14
of thought is in some kind of reflective correspondence with ‘real things’, perhaps being a
copy, or image, or imitation of things, perhaps a kind of ‘map’ of things, or perhaps (along the
lines similar to those suggested by Plato) a grasp of the essential and innermost forms of
things.”25 In discussing implications of quantum physics Popper concludes that: “As with
Plato the emphasis upon antecedent causes and geometrical cosmology is preserved .”26
Platonic epistemology then stress that rational intuition is the supreme state of mind and this
is coherent with Kantian and Bergsonian doctrine, which will be elaborated in the succeeding
paragraphs. Only two issues will be mentioned here: First, a very brief note on the divided
line presented in the Republic and then an equally brief note on the unique world argument
from Timaeus. The divided line is the backbone in Plato’s epistemology and it illustrates the
relationship between rational intuition and discursive thinking. The unique world argument is
utterly intuitive and it is thus instrumental in revealing additional aspects of Plato’s view on
intuition. The latter is included for a second purpose. The intent is that it will facilitate my
interpretation of Kant’s account on intuition. The synopsis given is derived mainly from the
works of Francis M. Cornford.27

The Divided Line

In Plato’s view, there are five stages of cognition, which are illustrated by a divided line and
in the famous allegory of the cave. The realm of sensible appearances and shifting beliefs is
contrasted with the realm of the intelligible or the eternal and unchanging Forms. The former
corresponds to some degree with Kant’s notion of a posteriori and the latter to a priori.
Indeed, it also resonates with Bergson, and his distinction between physical and metaphysical
science.28 Moreover, we might say that elements of this classical distinction, is still with us,
but now turned upside down in the notions of conscious and unconscious. That is, intuition
used to be equivalent with supreme rationality and intelligence while it is now often related to
unconscious, biased, irrational and automatic processing. This ‘Copernican reversal’ in our
history of epistemology is an issue we will return to in the chapter on intuition in psychology.
The vertical line then, is divided into two main parts whose inequality symbolizes that the
visible world has a lower degree of reality and truth than the intelligible.29 The two parts also
correspond to two faculties of mind: Knowledge of the real and Belief in appearances, both of
which differ in clearness and certainty.30

25
Bohm, 1981, p. 53. See also Bohm, 1993, 1994, Hannay, 1990, Jahn, 1987 and Hawking, 1988.
26
Popper, 1989, p. 189, 206. See also Heisenberg, 1971, 1979, Churchland, 1984 and Capra, 1996.
27
Cornford and Taylor are recognized as main authorities on Plato’s cosmology. See Taylor, 1928.
28
Kolstad, 1998, p. 110. For Bergson, the scientific method primarily requires use of the intellect, while
intuition is especially suitable when the metaphysical method is in use. The former is inclined to study the
material, the latter the spiritual.
29
Each part is then subdivided in the same proportion as the whole line. If imagining is A, belief B, discursive
thinking C, and knowledge D, we have that A+B : C+D = A:B = C:D.
30
Cornford, 1955, p. 176. See also Shorey, 1935, 509D-511E, p. 104-117. The lower part of the line is by Plato
first called the visible, but later the field of doxa. Both opinion and belief are inadequate, he argues. “Doxa and
its cognates denote our apprehension of anything that seems to exist, like sensible appearances and phenomena.”
It also includes that which seems to be true like opinions or beliefs, and what seems right e.g. legal and
deliberative decisions, and the many conventional notions of current morality, which vary from place to place
and from time to time.

15
 Objects States of Mind
THE GOOD RATIONAL INTUITION Noesis
FORMS KNOWING Episteme
MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS DISCURSIVE THINKING Dianoia
VISIBLE THINGS BELIEF Pistis
IMAGES IMAGINING Eikasia

Imagining
Specifically then, the lowest form of cognition is called eikasia. “The word defies translation,
being one of those current terms to which Plato gives a peculiar sense, to be inferred from the
context. It is etymologically connected with eikon, which means image or likeness, and with
eikos, which means likely. Thus, it can mean likeness (representation), likening (comparison)
or estimation of likelihood (conjecture).” Cornford suggests imagining as the least
unsatisfactory rendering. “It seems to be the wholly unenlightened state of mind, which takes
sensible appearances and current moral notions at their face value.” This state of mind is
comparable to those in the cave who see only images of images, he argues.31 Plato’s exact
wording may provide additional information: “One of the two sections in the visible world
will stand for images. By images I mean first shadows, and then reflections in water, or in
close-grained, polished surfaces, and everything of that kind.”32

Belief
The higher section of physical appearances corresponds to common-sense belief or pistis. “It
is a belief in the reality of the visible and tangible things commonly called substantial. In the
moral sphere it would include ‘correct beliefs without knowledge’.” True beliefs are sufficient
guides for action, but are insecure until based on knowledge of the reasons for them, Cornford
points out.33 Again, Plato’s own words are: “Let the second section stand for the actual things
of which the first are likenesses, the living creatures about us and all the works of nature and
of human hands. Will you also take the proportion in which the visible world has been divided
as corresponding to degrees of reality and truth, so that the likeness shall stand to the original
in the same ratio as the sphere of appearances and belief to the sphere of knowledge.”34 Here
it is made explicit to us that there is a similarity and correspondence in and between all levels
of reality. The challenge for the philosopher is for her to intuit this.

Discursive Thinking
The focus of higher intellectual training then, is to detach the mind from individual
appearances, and to familiarize it with the universal and the a priori, to use Kantian
terminology. Higher education is to facilitate an escape from the prison of physical
appearances by training the intellect, first in mathematics and then in moral philosophy. The
use of visible diagrams and mathematical models as imperfect illustrations of the Forms is
instrumental as a bridge carrying the mind across from the visible to the intelligible, Cornford
argues. The mind must learn to distinguish between the two. Each branch of mathematics
starts from unquestioned assumptions i.e. postulates, axioms, definitions and reasons from
31
Ibid. p. 217.
32
Ibid. p. 219.
33
Ibid. p. 217-218.
34
Ibid. My italics.

16
them, deductively. The premises may be true and the conclusions may follow but the whole
structure hangs in the air until the assumptions themselves are shown to depend on an
unconditioned principle.35 Such a state of mind is called dianoia, which is the ordinary word
for thought or thinking. For Plato dianoia is reasoning from unquestioned premises to
conclusion, it is equivalent to discursive thinking and it falls short of perfect knowledge,
Cornford argues.36 It is similar to Kant’s verstand and it is a point we will return to later.

Because these historical sections on discursive thinking, knowledge and intuition are of
special relevance to our reading of Kant and Bergson, as well as for later chapters, the entire
argument is included. In considering how to divide the part, which stands for the intelligible
world, Plato delineates three sections. In the first section of discursive thinking, “the mind
uses as images those actual things which themselves had images in the visible world and it is
compelled to pursue its inquiry by starting from assumptions and travels not up to a principle
but down to a conclusion. In the second section of knowledge the mind moves in the other
direction, from an assumption up towards a principle which is not hypothetical; and it makes
no use of the images employed in the other section but only of Forms and conducts its inquiry
solely by their means.”37 When we later turn to Bergson, we will see that he is advocating a
similar view. He states that intuition and the discursive activity of our intellect are not
different organs but two sides of the same thinking activity. An activity powered by the spirit.
The thinking activity goes in one direction when it applies a discursive, conceptual,
quantitative, analytic and external perspective and in the opposite direction when it intuitively
sympathizes with the metaphysical and psychological reality. Plato also gives an example
illustrating how discursive thinking works:

“You know, of course, how students of subjects like geometry and arithmetic begin by postulating odd and even
numbers, or the various figures and the three kinds of angle, and other such data in each subject. These data they
take as known; and having adopted them as assumptions, they do not feel called upon to give any account of
them to themselves or to anyone else, but treat them as self-evident. Then, starting from these assumptions, they
go on until they arrive, by a series of consistent steps, at all the conclusions they set out to investigate. You also
know how they make use of visible figures and discourse of them, though what they really have in mind is the
originals of which these figures are images: they are not reasoning, for instance, about this particular square and
diagonal which they have drawn, but about the square and the diagonal; and so in all cases. The diagrams they
draw and the models they make are actual things, which may have their shadows or images in water; but now
they serve in their turn as images, while the student is seeking to behold those realities which only thought can
apprehend. This then, is the class of things that I spoke of as intelligible, but with two qualifications: first, that
the mind, in studying them, is compelled to employ assumptions, and because it cannot rise above these, does not
travel upwards to a first principle; and second, that it uses as images those actual things which have images of
their own in the section below them and which, in comparison with those shadows and reflections, are reputed to
be more palpable and valued accordingly.”38

Knowing
Dianoia suggests discursive thinking, or reasoning from unquestioned premises to conclusion,
whereas noesis is constantly compared to the immediate act of vision and suggests rather the
direct intuition or apprehension of its object, Cornford argues.39 The method or technique of
discursive thinking is contrasted with the one of true knowledge and rational intuition, which
is dialogue. Dialogue then, is a philosophic conversation carried on by question and answer,

35
This principle may be conjectured to be Unity itself, Cornford argues.
36
Cornford, 1955, p. 218.
37
Ibid. p. 219.
38
Ibid. p. 220. My italics.
39
Ibid. p. 218.

17
and seeking to render, or to receive from a respondent an account of some Form.40 In this
participatory state of mind visible illustrations are no longer available and the movement is
not downward, deducing conclusions from premises, but upward examining the premises
themselves and seeking the ultimate principle on which they all depend. It is suggested that if
the mind could ever rise to grasp the supreme Form, The Good, it might then descend by a
deduction confirming the whole structure of moral and mathematical knowledge. This state of
mind is called rational intuition or intelligence and knowledge in the full, perfect sense, that
is, episteme.41 Plato maintains that: “Then by the second section of the intelligible world you
may understand me to mean all, that unaided reasoning apprehends by the power of dialogue,
when it treats its assumptions, not as first principles, but as hypotheses in the literal sense,
things ‘laid down’ like a flight of steps up which it may mount all the way to something that
is not hypothetical, the first principle of all; and having grasped this, may turn back and,
holding on to the consequences which depend upon it, descend at last to a conclusion, never
making use of any sensible object, but only of Forms, moving through Forms from one to
another, and ending with Forms.”42 This sentence is signifying a main position in European
epistemology, namely that intuition is to be understood as a state of mind able to achieve an
intelligent and rational comprehension of the intimate interplay of Reason and that which
comes about of Necessity. In yet other words it perceives the intrinsic relationship between
spirit and matter.

As dialogue is pivotal a fuller account could be appreciated.43 However, here we must limit
ourselves to Plato’s comments. The defect of the studies occupying discursive thinking is that
the various branches are not seen synoptically as one connected whole. The object of dialogue
is to secure a final confirmation and a synoptic view of all mathematical knowledge in
connexion with the whole of reality, Cornford argues.44 We can relate this to Kant’s synthetic
method and to Bergson’s metaphysical method, another point that we will hold in reserve.
Plato inherited this method from Socrates. Normally the respondent is putting forward his
hypothetical attempts at analysis or definition of the concept in the form of necessary and
sufficient conditions that are thought to capture all and only instances of the concept in
question. Socrates then refutes the definition by pointing out various counterexamples. That is
situations, where the proposed definition yields a result that conflicts with our intuition about
the concept in question. In this way Socrates is facilitating improvement of the definition.
Justice for example, is defined as “nothing more nor less than telling the truth and paying
back anything we have received.” Socrates responds that: “Suppose, for example, a friend
who had lent us a weapon were to go mad and then ask for it back, surely anyone would say
we ought not to return it. It would not be ‘right’ to do so; nor to tell the truth without reserve
to a madman.”45 It would be unjust. After a proposed analysis or definition is overturned,
dialogue continues until the definition is immune to intuitive counterexamples. On a side-
note we should add that in this method is seen the seeds of many connotations attached to
intuition for instance its global, unique, absolute, and integral character. Also, in the chapter
on intuition and rationality it is argued that the later Plato refines this method in such a way
that it differs slightly from the Socratic approach.

40
Ibid. The higher method is in the text called Dialectic, a word, which since Hegel has acquired misleading
associations. In the Republic, it simply means dialogue, Cornford argues.
41
Ibid. p. 218-219.
42
Ibid. p. 221.
43
Bohm, 1996. See this book for elaboration of Dialogue.
44
Cornford, 1955, p. 245.
45
Ibid. p. 7.

18
Plato then argues that: “At any rate, no one will maintain against us that there is any other
method of inquiry which systematically attempts in every case to grasp the nature of each
thing as it is in itself. .. . When the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of barbarous
ignorance, this method gently draws it forth and guides it upwards. .. . It is not the what kind
but the what that the soul seeks to know.”46 Here we learn that Plato is more optimistic than
Kant is, in terms of knowing the thing in itself. It is also clear that it is with the eye of the soul
that we can intuit it. This organ of perfect knowledge must be turned around from the world
of physical appearances together with the entire soul, until the soul is able to endure the
contemplation in the brightest region of being and the intelligible world.47 Episteme, or
perfect knowledge as revealed by rational intuition is thus to be found by looking primarily
not out but in to the psychological reality, a point emphasized by Bergson and Jung as well.

Rational Intuition
As a further refinement of his view on perfect intelligence and utmost reality Plato elaborates
on the Good as the highest object of knowledge. However, this upper section of the intelligible
world is not easily unveiled. On the contrary it represents the philosopher’s stone and Socrates
refutes to define it. “The apprehension of it is rather to be thought of as a revelation which can
only follow upon a long intellectual training.”48 According to Cornford this supreme Good
makes the world intelligible just like a work of human craftsmanship becomes intelligible
when we see the purpose it is designed to serve. “As thus illuminating and accounting for the
rational aspect of the universe the Good is analogous to the Sun, which, as the source of light
is the cause of vision and of visibility and also of all mortal existence.”49

Plato starts his peculiar line of reason by pointing to the fact that hearing and sound do not
stand in need of any third thing, without which the ear will not hear, nor sound be heard. The
same is true for all the other senses, except the eyes. “You may have the power of vision in
your eyes and try to use it, and colour may be there in the objects; but sight will see nothing
and the colours will remain invisible in the absence of a third thing peculiarly constituted to
serve this very purpose.”50 By analogy Plato thus alludes to the rationale that in the visible
world the Sun stand in the same relation to vision and visible things, as the Good itself bears
in the intelligible world to rational intuition and intelligible objects. The next step in his
reasoning is the crucial one of the mind’s orientation. “When you look at the colours of things
irradiated only by the fainter luminaries of the night the eyes are dim. When the Sun is
shining, the same eyes see distinctly.” This comparison is then applied to the soul. “When its
gaze is fixed upon an object irradiated by truth and reality, the soul gains understanding and
knowledge and is manifestly in possession of intelligence. But when it looks towards the
twilight world of things that come into existence and pass away, its sight is dim and it has
only opinions and beliefs which shift to and fro, and now it seems like a thing that has no
intelligence.”51

46
Ibid. p. 248. My italics.
47
Ibid. p. 227. “There may well be an art, whose aim would be to effect this very thing, the conversion of the
soul, in the readiest way; not to put power of sight into the soul’s eye which already has it, but to ensure that,
instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be.” See also Noddings & Shore, 1984.
48
Ibid. p. 206. This being in flat contradiction to the Heuristic and bias tradition where intuition is considered a
rapid, automatic, biased, effortless cognitive process. See Gilovich, Griffin, Kahneman, 2002, p. 51, 436-37.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid. p. 212.
51
Ibid. p. 213.

19
Having established the importance of right orientation of the mind, Plato concludes that:
“This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them
his power of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of Goodness. It is the cause of
knowledge and truth; and so, while you may think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do
well to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of
still higher worth.”52 Moreover, the final and subtle point is this: “The Sun not only makes the
things we see visible, but also brings them into existence and gives them growth and
nourishment; yet he is not the same thing as existence. And so with the objects of knowledge:
these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and
reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in
dignity and power.”53 We may thus suggest that in Plato’s view rational intuition is
functioning a little like the illuminated film lens in a cinema, accompanied as it is by the mind
of the producer. In this account we also recognize the many theories about the enlightened
mind and the speculations about a ‘third eye’, first popularised by Descartes who identified it
with the pineal gland.

These then, are the essential arguments of the brief epistemology of Plato. However, the
allegory of the cave adds some vital information. Unfortunately, there is no room for it here,
but we may include a key point emphasized by Thomas Kuhn, in his insightful exposition of
scientific revolutions; “Imagine what would happen if he went down again to take his former
seat in the cave. Coming suddenly out of the sunlight, his eyes would be filled with darkness.
He might be required once more to deliver his opinion on those shadows, in competition with
those prisoners who had never been released, while his eyesight was still dim and unsteady.
They would laugh at him and say that he had gone up only to come back with his sight ruined;
it was worth no one’s while even to attempt the ascent. If they could lay hands on the man
who was trying to set them free and lead them up, they would kill him.”54

The Unique World Argument

Every thing in the phenomenal world of appearances is in an incomplete way, part of the
manifold of Forms, according to Plato. That is, in the Archetypes, to use Jung’s terminology.
The Forms on the other hand are complete, their reciprocal relation being a well-defined and
unambiguous one. Rational intuition then, may be understood as an increasing awareness of
this synthetic or integral relationship, a point emphasized by Kant and Bergson, as well. The
unique world argument then, serves as perhaps the best example given by Plato, on how the
world of appearances participates in the intelligible world of Being and Forms. If we
understand it, we may reveal aspects of the ‘true’ nature of intuition, as defined by
philosophers. We will return to it in the chapter on intuition and rationality.

“What was the living creature in whose likeness he framed the world? We must not suppose that it was any
creature that ranks only as a species, for no copy of that which is incomplete can ever be good. Let us rather say
that the world is like, above all things, to that Living Creature of which all other living creatures, severally and
in their families, are parts. For that embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living creatures, just as
this world contains ourselves and all other creatures that have been formed as things visible. For the god,
wishing to make this world most nearly like that intelligible thing, which is best and in every way complete,
fashioned it as a single visible living creature, containing within itself all living things whose nature is of the
same order.”55

52
Ibid. p. 214.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid. p. 225-226. See Kuhn, 1975.
55
Cornford, 1937, 30C-31B, p. 39-40. My italics.

20
The argument is full of oddities. We are told that the kind, of which the world is the only
instance, is living-thing-in-general. The world as a whole is one living thing, the World-
Animal. Though, it is not any particular species or specific kind of living thing, it is rather a
singular whole. This is a point of some importance to my interpretation of Kant, and his
definition of intuition as a singular representation. Because the world is one single undivided
whole and a unique copy of that living creature which embraces and contains all other living
creatures, it is both individual and universal. It is a synthetic relationship between its
individual traits and its universal traits. It is single, but not separated. It is unique, and
embedded. It partakes of as well as in, much like a white wave-crest in a black wave. “The
argument is remarkable in the sense that it is one of only a few passages in the Platonic
corpus, which deal simultaneously with relations both between a Form and its phenomenal
representations, and between Forms.”56 Forms are portrayed canonically as paradigms and the
relation of Form to particular is portrayed canonically as that of likeness, or more precisely, as
the relation of original to image. 57 This is also the case in holography, which by Pribram is
suggested as a model of how intuition works.58

Time
Before we turn to Kant and Bergson, who argue that time and intuition have an intrinsic
relationship, though without saying much about time, we should take note of Plato’s view.
“Time came into being together with the Heaven, in order that, as they were brought into
being together, so they may be dissolved together.” In virtue then, of this plan and intent of
the god, for the birth of Time, the planets were made to define and preserve the numbers of
time. Moreover, the planets are living creatures with an intelligent soul, and they are bound
together with living bonds. The month comes to be when the Moon completes her own circle
and overtakes the Sun; the year, when the Sun has gone round his own circle, it is argued.
“The periods of the rest have not been observed by men, save for a few; and men have no
names for them, nor do they measure one against another by numerical reckoning. They
barely know that the wanderings of these others are time at all, bewildering as they are in
number and of surprisingly intricate pattern.”59 With Plato then, we have the somewhat
puzzling conclusion, that supreme intelligence and rational intuition is able to look directly at
the Sun and contemplate its nature, not as it appears when reflected in water or any alien
medium, but as it is in itself, in its own domain. This is achieved by the eye of the soul
looking primarily not out on the world of physical appearances but in to the universal domain
of Forms.60 Turning then to Kant who anchors the Forms of Plato in the individual as inherent
and innate Forms that we synthesize with the empirical material provided by the senses, we
find ourselves in an individualized version of Plato’s more universal approach.

56
Mohr, 1985, p. 11-12. Mohr argues that in this passage, Plato’s deep intent is to show off the machinery of the
Ideal theory. This because he in 33A, only two pages later, achieves his surface aim of showing that the world is
unique, on grounds completely independent from, and much less contentious than those found at 30C-31B.
There he simply argues that since the demiurge did not leave behind any materials unused in his crafting out of
which another world might be formed, the world, which he did form, is necessarily unique. See also Mohr, 1986.
57
The relevant paragraphs here are 31A and 30C-D. We may relate this passage to what we read on the
Smaragdine Table, and indicate an Hermetic influence; “True, without error, certain and most true; that which is
above is as that which is below, and that which is below is as that which is above, for performing the miracles of
the One Thing; and as all things are from one, by the mediation of one, so all things arose from this one thing by
adaptation ….” Randolph, 1871, p. 1. For a modern discussion, see Gilovich et al. 2002, p. 203.
58
Pribram, 1971, 1991, 1998. See also Pribram, in Gunter, 1987, p. 171, and Talbot, 1991.
59
Cornford, 1937, 38C-39E, p. 60. See also Winfree, 1987 and Sorabji, 1983, for a modern exposition of Time.
60
Cornford, 1955, 514A-521B, p. 225. Such an intimate correspondence and interplay between macrocosm and
microcosm, was for the Greeks firmly embedded in the art of astrology, and it continued its influence all the way
up to Newton and Kepler, who published books on the issue in 1602.

21
2.3 Immanuel Kant 1724-1804

Bergson is recognized as the advocate of intuition in European philosophy, and we will turn
to him in a minute. Here it suffices to say that his exposition of intuition, in many ways, is
intrinsically related to the notion of time. This is also the case with Plato and Kant. In this
respect, Bergson is indebted to both. Kant then, is indeed another main proponent of intuition,
and no discussion on the subject should leave him out. Kant, as well as Bergson and Plato,
supposed that we possess two distinct cognitive capacities, both of them rational and
intellectual, namely intuition or anschauung, and understanding, or verstand. Verstand is by
Kant, defined only in its logical or discursive employment, Kemp Smith and Falkenstein
argues.61 We may thus be correct in suggesting that Kant here is echoing Plato, and his upper
part of the divided line. More specifically, I would like to advocate that we interpret Kant’s
notion of verstand, as similar to Plato’s discursive thinking, and I intend to make this
plausible as we go along. This distinction is the main one in my thesis, and its relevance is
reflected in dual-process theories of modern psychology. They are discussed in the succeeding
chapter.62 There are two Formen der Anschauung then, namely time and space, and twelve
Formen der Verstand, where cause and effect are recognized as the more important ones.63
Kant’s Copernican revolution then, is imposing upon us the idea that these forms are innate in
us and that we in fact, do synthesise them with the material provided by the senses. Thus, his
epistemology is split into a posteriori and a priori awareness, where the latter is independent
of empirical sense confirmation.

Analytic & Synthetic Judgment

Furthermore, he develops the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment, where the
former is recognized by its logical confirmation, e.g. it is necessarily true that either it rains,
or it does not. This is analytic and a priori, because we do not need empirical confirmation to
comprehend that this is true. In principle, all analytical judgment can be verified in this way.
Tentatively, we may relate the analytic mode to discursive thinking or verstand, and the
synthetic mode to intuition. This is in agreement with Bergson. Synthetic judgments then, are
much more common and more problematic. The synthetic a posteriori judgment is
characterized by not being self-contradictory. This is of course the case with most judgments.
However, a second criteria is involved. Empirical sense confirmation is required, in order to
establish whether it is a true judgment or not. We can judge that an apple is rotten but only
empirical sense confirmation can establish whether this is true or not. That is, the Forms and
sense confirmation will in this case provide the synthesis of three things; namely the Forms,
the apple and rotten, and in this way confirm or disconfirm the judgment.

These distinctions will be especially relevant when we turn to our discussion of rationality,
which by Elster is defined as proper judgment or “the capacity to synthesize vast and diffuse
information that more or less clearly bears on the problem in hand, in such a way that no
element or set of elements is given undue importance.”64 In his thin theory of rational
judgment, logical consistency is the only criteria. This corresponds to analytic judgment. In a

61
Kemp Smith, 1979, p. 81. Falkenstein, 1991, p. 171-172.
62
Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 658.
63
The other Formen der verstand are: unity and multiplicity, thing, reality, possibility, negation, being &
necessity, contraction, community. The question that we would like to consider is to what degree these Forms
are naturally applied by a discursive intellect.
64
Elster, 1983, p. 16. My italics.

22
succeeding chapter, intuition and rationality will be interpreted in the Platonic and Kantian
scheme. The controversial suggestion is that intuition is rational.

The notion of synthetic a priori judgment is the more challenging one to Kant, and to most of
his readers, we may add. It is also the crux of the matter in his metaphysical deduction of pure
reason. Essentially, he argues as already mentioned, that the Forms are something we apply to
any empirical experience, and that they must be anchored in us. Our self guarantees that these
Forms can be applied at all. Furthermore, our self-consciousness is a synthesis and a unity in
it-self. As such, it is in the end also the instrument that facilitates and guarantees a synthesis
with any judgment. In other words, because the unity of our self-consciousness necessitates
such a synthesis, Kant calls it transcendental. He is of course here borrowing from Descartes.
This argument is among the more important ones in the entire history of philosophy and of
special relevance to my line of reason. In summarizing then, we have that:

Synthetic Judgment Analytical Judgment

A priori Rational Intuition + Unity of self-consciousness Discursive Thinking
A posteriori Empirical Intuition

This two-faculty account of cognition then, or dual processes as modern psychologists will
have it, lies at the foundation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Almost everything he has to
say in the Critique of Pure Reason presupposes it. However, it is also problematic. “At the
outset of the Critique, Kant simply assumes the validity of the distinction between intuition
and verstand, without in any way attempting to justify it.” In addition, one looks in vain
through the Kantian corpus for any explanation that might legitimate it, Falkenstein argues.65
Even more intriguing, is that Kant does not always draw the distinction in the same way.
“Most notoriously, he presents two quite different accounts of intuition, defining it in some
places as a singular representation, and in others as immediate cognition.” Recently, this issue
has been focused in a number of articles.66 Though, there is no doubt that concepts or Begriffe
is Kant’s name for the representations the discursive intellect delivers, and that the distinction
between intuition and concept is of utmost importance for understanding Kant’s critical
philosophy. For as Kant himself claimed: “All the distinctive claims of this philosophy rest on
and develop out of a detailed account of the way all our cognition of things requires both
intuitions and concepts.”67 Unfortunately, interpreting Kant’s distinction between intuition
and concept remains a vexed matter.

There are three issues then, I will work at. The first issue is Kant’s notion of pure, non-
sensuous, rational, intuition. Pure here signifies that which is absolutely a priori and which
originates from reason itself.68 Specifically, I start by delineating Kant’s line of argument,
when establishing time and space as the two Forms of pure intuition. In this way, we may
come fairly close to the nature of pure or intellectual intuition, as perceived by Kant. Another
purpose is also involved. In scrutinizing his line of reason, we make explicit key elements in
his account of rationality. This will equip us with arguments that prove useful later on.69 The

65
Falkenstein, 1991, p. 165.
66
Kelley, 1997, p. 289. He refers to Hintikka 1969, Parson 1969, Thompson 1972, Wilson 1975, Mitscerling
1981, Gram 1982, Gloy 1984, and Kolb 1986. See also Falkenstein 1991, and Smit 2000, p. 235.
67
Smit, 2000, p. 235. See also Falkenstein, 1991, p. 172, Weathersston, 1991, and Weinberger, 1997.
68
Kemp Smith, 1979, p. 1-2.
69
Falkenstein, 1991, p. 172. Intelligence or rationality is by Kant, defined as the faculty of a subject, by which it
has the power to represent things, which cannot by their own quality come before the senses of that subject.

23
next step is then to contrast intuition with discursive thinking through its main product,
concepts. As this is indeed an intricate matter, I do not at all intend to contribute in the debate.
Rather, I try to present one view that apparently is properly justified.70 Finally, the third issue,
which is to be addressed briefly, is Kant’s distinction between the analytic and the synthetic
method.

Time and Space as Forms of Pure Rational Intuition

Kant’s conception of space is given in four arguments. They will be outlined below. Then, his
conception of time will follow. This summary is derived directly from Norman Kemp Smith’s
commentary to The Critique of Pure Reason, which authority is widely recognized.71 Finally,
I attempt to extract key characteristics of pure, rational intuition.

1 The first argument is that space is not an empirical concept, abstracted from outer experience. “For in order
that certain sensations be related to something outside me (e.g. to something in another region of space from that
in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside (and alongside) one
another, and accordingly as not only (qualitatively) different but as in different places, the representation of
space must be presupposed.”72 As a subjective form that lies ready in the mind, as a potentiality, space precedes
experience, and powers the co-operation and generation of it.

2 The second argument is that space is a necessary representation, and consequently it is a priori. The proof
given by Kant is that it is impossible to imagine the absence of space, though it is possible to imagine it as
existing without objects to fill it. “A representation, which it is impossible for the mind to be without, is a
necessary representation. Necessity is one of the two criteria, of the a priori. This proof of the necessary
character of space is therefore also a proof of it being a priori and in a psychological not logical sense.” The first
argument proves that space is a subjective necessity, and the second argument, that it is a necessary objective
ingredient.73

3 The third argument seeks to show that space is not a discursive or general concept, but an intuition. “As we
intuitively apprehend not only the space of the object which affects our senses, but the whole space, space cannot
arise out of the actual affection of the senses, but must precede it in time.”74 We can represent only a single
space, Kant argues. For though we can speak of many spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same single
space. “The parts of space cannot precede the one all-comprehensive space. They can be thought only in and
through it. The parts, which compose a concept, on the other hand, precede it in thought. Through combination
of them, the concept is formed. Space cannot, therefore, be a concept. Only in an intuition does the whole
precede the part. In a concept, the parts always precede the whole. Intuition stands for multiplicity in unity,
conception for unity in multiplicity. Space must therefore be an intuition.” Kant also stresses that a concept
always refers indirectly, to a plurality of individuals. Intuition is directly related to a single individual, Smith
argues.75

4 The fourth argument is again, intending to prove that space is an intuition, not a general concept. This is
proved by reference to the fact that space is given and determined, as an infinite magnitude. This key
characteristic of our space representation cannot be accounted for if it is regarded as a concept. “A general
conception of space would try to abstract out those properties and relations, which are common to all spaces, and
could not possibly determine anything in regard to infinite magnitude. For since spaces differ in magnitude, any
one magnitude cannot be a common quality. Moreover, a general conception, which abstracts out common
qualities from a plurality of particulars, contains an infinite number of possible different representations under it,
but it cannot be thought as containing an infinite number of representations in it.” Space must, however be
thought in this latter manner, for it contains an infinite number of coexisting parts. Since, then, space cannot be a
concept, it must be an intuition.76

70
This view is represented by e.g. Houston Smit and Rudolf Steiner.
71
Kemp Smith, 1979, p. 99-112 and 123-128.
72
Ibid. p. 99.
73
Ibid. p. 103.
74
Ibid. p. 106.
75
Ibid. p. 105. See Palmer, 1963, for peculiar research demonstrating the role of space in the navigation of birds.
76
Ibid. p. 108-109.

24
Time as the other Form of pure, rational intuition, is especially interesting due to the pivotal
importance it has in Platonic cosmology and in Bergson’s doctrine on intuition. The latter will
be elaborated in the next paragraph. Kant then, is arguing in the following way;

1 The first argument is in all respects the same as the first argument on space. The thesis is that the
representation of time is not of empirical origin. “The idea of time does not originate in, but is presupposed by
the senses. When a number of things act upon the senses, it is only by means of the idea of time that they can be
represented whether as simultaneous or as successive. Nor does succession generate the conception of time; but
stimulates us to inform it. Thus the notion of time, even if acquired through experience, is very badly defined as
being a series of actual things existing one after another. For I can understand, what the word after signifies only
if I already know what time means. For those things are after one another which exist at different times, as those
are simultaneous which exist at one and the same time.”77

2 The second argument is again the same as the second argument on space, namely that it is given a priori.
Proof is found in the fact that it cannot be thought away, Smith notes. “There is an innate subjective necessity,
and from this follows objective necessity, as far as all appearances are concerned. Time may be necessary to
appearances, once appearances are granted.”78

3 The third argument differs only slightly, from that given in regard to space.

4 The fourth argument differs fundamentally, from that considered in regard to space, and must therefore be
independently analyzed. The thesis is again that time is an intuition. “Proof is derived from the fact that time is a
representation in which the parts arise only through limitation of one single time, and in which therefore the
whole must precede the parts. The particular times will always arise as secondary products.”79

In summarizing then, we have that rational or pure intuition is characterized by being a

necessary, infinite, innate, psychological, subjective, co-operative and a priori representation.
Furthermore, it is a singular whole that precedes any part, and with immediate representations
in it, not under it. Let us then turn to a comparison with the discursive intellect and its main
product, Begriffe or concepts.

Intuition versus Conception

Before we contrast the workings of intuition with that of conception, a few remarks about
empirical or sensuous intuition are perhaps necessary. It differs from pure or a priori
intuition, primarily in that it refers to an external percept, e.g. objects.80 They are both
synthetic in their approach, and how this relates to the analytic method is further discussed in
the next paragraph. A strict division between the two types of intuition is perhaps
illusionary.81 For Bergson it is. In many ways, it resembles Jung’s notion of extraverted
intuition, which will be elaborated later on. Kant then, defines empirical intuition as
knowledge, which is in immediate relation to objects. It is thus clear that he has in mind its
distinction from conception, which is related to objects only indirectly, Kemp Smith argues.82

77
Ibid. p. 123.
78
Ibid. p. 123-124.
79
Ibid. p. 125. Kant’s view is especially interesting, when compared with modern science, which has virtually
nothing to say about time. More specifically, Penrose argues that; “according to general relativity, time is merely
a particular choice of coordinate in the description of the location of space-time event. There is nothing in the
physicists’ space-time descriptions that singles out time as something that flows. Indeed, physicists quite often
consider model space-times in which there is only one space dimension in addition to the single time dimension;
and in such two-dimensional space-times there is nothing to say which is space and which is time.” Penrose,
1994, p. 384. See also Penrose & Hawking, 1996, Feynmann, 1997, Heidegger, 1972 and Jaques, 1982.
80
Parson, 2000, p. 310. Parson argues that a factor that makes intuition rational is the absence of an
accompanying event like an external perception. See also Sher & Tieszen, 2000.
81
Rational intuition is characterized by its synoptic qualities, and thus it embraces empirical intuition.
82
Kemp Smith, 1979, p. 79. See also the fourth argument on space.

25
Kant also argues that all representations consciously referred to an object are either intuitions
or concepts and that intuition is immediate and singular, the concepts mediate and generalize.
A concept is thus a symbolic representation of a class or genus, it refers to features and marks
that several things have in common.83 Around the above mentioned passages a rather lengthy
debate has arisen, which can be traced to modern psychology as well. On the one side, there
are those who emphasize that intuition is to be understood in terms of singular representations
and on the other side are those who favor the immediacy view.84 Is there a chance that this
controversy can be reconciled?

Let us start by looking again at the contrast between intuition and discursive thinking or
cognition. According to scholastic theory, a discursive cognition is one, which requires mental
discourse that is the drawing of a conclusion, not immediately evident to the mind by a
process of reasoning. Discourse, therefore, has stages and it takes time. Intuition is the
opposite – it occurs immediately. Whereas all God’s thinking was supposed to be intuitive,
the human cognition was supposed to be largely discursive, Falkenstein argues.85 For Kant,
our verstand is exclusively discursive, in principle it is incapable of an intuitive cognition and
it is essentially a classificatory function. Rather than representing objects, as such it reflects
on representations obtained from elsewhere and from these it infers or extracts, in a discursive
manner, specific differentia features and marks. Concepts or Begriffe is thus Kant’s name for
the representations that the discursive intellect delivers. Kant adhered to this doctrine more
stringently than his predecessors did, Falkenstein argues.86

The major problem then is perhaps not so much the discursive nature of our verstand, but
rather the immediacy and singularity of our intuition. What exactly does it mean? No one
seems to be able to provide a cogent account of singularity, Kelley writes.87 Though, Kant
says something that may prove useful, namely that “it is a mere tautology to speak of general
or common concepts, a mistake based on a wrong division of concepts into general, particular,
and singular. Not the concepts themselves, only their use can be divided in this way.”88 So,
what are we to make of this? Let us start by looking at the essence of pure or rational
intuition. It is defined as a universal and undivided whole that precedes any part, and with
representations in it. I suggest that we interpret the meaning of this as identical to the meaning
inherent in Plato’s unique world argument, which was presented earlier on.

Apparently, there are intrinsic similarities. To recapitulate: “Let us rather say that the world is
like that Living Creature of which all other living creatures are parts.” When we scrutinize
Plato’s argument, it becomes clear that The Creator’s Model is one where individual or
singular wholes are embedded in universal and undivided wholes. My reading then of Kant is
this; what he is trying to convey is that intuition is a representation or mental picture of the
undivided whole, which is immediately present in every part of the whole. The difficulties we
have with the term singularity are thus to some extent resolved. It is to be comprehended as

83
Kelley, 1997, p. 290. Smit, 2000, p. 235-236. The word mediate originates in the Latin mediare, and its
meaning is e.g. to reconcile differences. The concept thus occupies a middle position, between intuition and
percept.
84
Ibid. p. 289.
85
Falkenstein, 1991, p. 171.
86
Ibid. p. 172. ”This doctrine was a constant of his philosophy, figuring in ID (10), in the Critique
(A230=B283), in Prolegomena 46 (Ak 4 333), and given its fullest exposition in 1-16 of his lecture on logic (Ak
9, 91-100), published only a few years before his death.”
87
Kelley, 1997, p. 290-291. The most noteworthy proponents of the singularity view are Parson and Hintikka.
Figuring on the other side, are e.g. Kelley and Falkenstein. Apparently, Smit tries to reconcile them.
88
Ibid.

26
an individual part where the undivided whole is innate and where this part is not separated but
intimately embedded, integrated, and one with the universal, like a hologram or a human cell
in a body.89

To make my interpretation more persuasive and to bring this inquiry one step further we still
need a more detailed and precise description of the immediacy of intuition. To facilitate this
we may quote Steiner who was an arduous student of Kant: “An abstract concept taken by
itself has as little reality as a percept taken by itself. The percept is the part of reality that is
given objectively, the concept the part that is given subjectively, through intuition.”90 Our
mental organization then, tears the reality apart into these two factors. One factor presents
itself to perception, the other to intuition. Only the union or synthesis of the two, that is, the
percept fitting systematically and orderly into the universe, constitutes the full reality.91 An
observed object of the world thus remains unintelligible to us until we have within ourselves
the corresponding intuition, which adds that part of the reality, which is lacking in the object
of perception. What appears to us in observation as separate parts then becomes combined bit
by bit, into one singular piece, through the coherent, unified world of our intuitions.

To anyone who is incapable of finding intuitions corresponding to the things, the full reality
remains inaccessible, Steiner argues.92 Houston Smit is advocating a similar view:
“Explaining Kant’s positive conception of the immediacy of intuition, that is, the way
intuition relates to an object simply through itself, would require examining his account of
synthesis. For synthesis is the act of mind that produces intuitions, in a fashion analogous to
the way reflection produces concepts. …. This act of synthesis is the act that orders
appearances into the whole representation of a single phenomenal world …… Insofar as
appearances have this ordered relation to each other, and constitute such grounds of
cognition, they constitute empirical intuitions.”93 A unified mind is thus characterized by
rational intuition, as contrasted with a discursive or fragmented one.

Kant defines intuition, as a singular and immediate representation, and concepts as something
that mediate. The word representation, or vorstellung, is thus pivotal. We have discussed the
terms singular and immediate now let us look at representation. It is by Kant, employed in the
widest possible meaning. It covers any and every cognitive state, and is equivalent to his term
gemüt or mind.94 This is somewhat vague. Poppelbaum thus suggests that we interpret
representation as the mental picture, which the thinker forms to represent the concept in her
individual way.95 If this is correct, we have that intuition is a universal, singular, undivided,
unified mental picture, and that this mental picture can be focused and operated in and
through individuals, who use various concepts to mediate between percept and intuition.

As the meaning of representation is not clearly distinguished by Kant, we may again quote
Steiner who defines a mental picture as a percept in him self and as an individualized
concept.96 “I know that something happens in me while I am observing a tree. When the tree

89
All the information required to build a whole human being is embedded in each single cell!
90
Steiner, 1964, p. 213, xvi. The German word Wahrnehmung, like the English ’perception’ can mean either the
process of perceiving or the object perceived as an element of observation. Steiner uses the word in the latter
sense, and the word percept, though not in common use, does avoid the ambiguity.
91
Thus, we have Geistwissenchaft und Naturwissenschaft, Spiritual Science and Natural Science.
92
Steiner, 1964, p. 73, 84.
93
Smit, 2000, p. 265. My italics.
94
Kemp Smith, 1979, p. 81, 104.
95
Steiner, 1964, p. xvii.
96
Ibid. p. 49, 84.

27
disappears from my field of vision, an after-effect of this process remains in my
consciousness – a picture of the tree. This picture has become associated with my self during
my observation. My self has become enriched; its content has absorbed a new element. This
element I call my mental picture of the tree.”97 Mental pictures may also evolve from within.
He concludes, in accordance with Kant and his notion of synthetic a priori, that we should
never have occasion to speak of representations or mental pictures if we did not experience
these mental pictures in the percept of our own selves. Perceptions would then come and go;
the I should let them slip by. In summarizing, we can visualize the relationship between
intuition, mental picture and concept, in the following way:

Intuition

Concept Mental Picture Percept

Reality shows itself to us as percept and concept. The subjective representative of this reality
shows itself to us as mental picture. We may hypothesize that intuition provides the larger and
singular picture, where individualized pictures are nested, connected and embedded. It is the
wallpaper, against which all perception and conception can be seen. It is a source, which so to
speak provides the glue that connects concept and percept. It is also the faculty synthesizing
them into more encompassing concepts and a grander scheme. To conclude this paragraph
then, we can list the main differences between intuition and conception in a table.

Rational Intuition Conception

Representation in it Representation under it
Immediate Mediate
Direct Indirect
Given Derived
Non-discursive Discursive
Singular General
Whole precedes the part Parts precedes the whole
Multiplicity in unity Unity in multiplicity

The Analytic and Synthetic Method

Kant’s central problem is, as we have already indicated, focused in the question; How are
synthetic a priori judgments possible? Kant personally believed that the possibility of valid a
priori synthetic judgment is proved by the fact that we have the sciences of mathematics and
physics. In Prolegomena, he argued that they are synthetic, not analytic, and because they are
not empirical, they have to be synthetic a priori. This is only possible, if mathematics can be
said to be contingent upon time and geometry upon space. Being so, there were for Kant two
very different methods, which could be employed in accounting for their possibility, the
synthetic or progressive, and the analytic or regressive.98

97
Ibid. My italics.
98
Kemp Smith, 1979, p. 44.

28
The synthetic method then, starts from given, ordinary experience, to discover its conditions,
and from them to prove the validity of knowledge that is a priori. The analytic method, start
from given a priori synthetic judgments, assuming them as valid. The synthetic method may
easily be confounded with the analytic method. For in the process of its argument it makes use
of analysis, Kemp Smith points out. “By analyzing ordinary experience in the form in which it
is given, it determines the fundamental elements of which knowledge is composed, and the
generating conditions from which it results. From these the validity of the a priori principles
that underlies mathematics and physics can be directly deduced.”99

Kemp Smith thus argues that the fundamental differentiating feature of the so-called synthetic
method is not its synthetic procedure, since it employs an analytical method in the most
difficult portion of its task. Rather, it is its attitude towards the one question of, the validity of
a priori synthetic knowledge. It does not postulate this validity as a premise, but proves it as
consequence of conditions, which are independently established. By a preliminary regress
upon the conditions of our de facto consciousness, it acquires data from which it is enabled to
advance by a synthetic, progressive or deductive procedure to the establishment of the validity
of synthetic a priori judgment.100

The analytic method, on the other hand, does not attempt to prove the validity of a priori
knowledge. “It seeks only to discover the conditions under which such knowledge, if granted
to exist, can possess validity.”101 In addition, it seeks to discover to what degree its
paradoxical and apparently contradictory features can be viewed as complementary to one
another, Kemp Smith notes. The conditions, thus revealed, will render the validity of
knowledge conceivable, will account for it once it has been assumed, but they do not prove it.
The validity is a premise. The whole argument rests upon the assumption of its truth. The
conditions are postulated only as conditions. Their reality becomes uncertain, if the validity,
which presupposes them, is itself called in question. If we attempt to reverse the procedure,
and to prove validity from these conditions our argument must necessarily adopt the synthetic
form. This involves the prior application of a very different and much more thorough process
of analysis.102

Kemp Smith thus maintains that the distinction between the two methods may be stated as
follows. “In the synthetic method, the grounds which are employed to explain a priori
knowledge are such as also at the same time suffice to prove its validity. In the analytic
method, they are grounds of explanation, but not of proof. They are themselves proved only
insofar as the assumption of validity is previously granted.”103 Kemp Smith adds that the
analytic procedure, which is involved in the complete synthetic method, ought for the sake of
clearness, to be classed as a separate, third, method. It is because this new transcendental
method is an integral part of the complete, synthetic method that the synthetic method alone
serves as an adequate expression of the Kantian standpoint.104 There is no doubt, that the
synthetic and the analytic method, in important respects, are copies of Plato’s two distinct
methods. In addition, when we turn to Bergson, we will see the same structure in his two
methods. The following table thus summarizes our main findings:

99
Ibid. My italics.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid. p. 45.

29
Methods of; Rational Intuition Discursive Thinking
Plato Dialogue Dianoia
Kant Synthetic Analytic
Bergson Metaphysical Science Physical Science

2.4 Henri Bergson 1859-1941

Henri Bergson, recognized as the advocate of intuition in European philosophy, argues that a
comparison of the definitions of metaphysics and the various concepts of the absolute leads to
the discovery that philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergence, agree in distinguishing
two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. “The first implies that we move round the
object, the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are
placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a
point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the
relative, and the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute.”105 The
former is characteristic of the discursive intellect, the latter of intuition. These are the first
lines, in his celebrated essay An Introduction to Metaphysics, first published in 1903.

Henri Bergson was born in the year, which saw the publication of the Origin of Species. His
philosophy can be interpreted in the light of this theory of biological evolution. This theory
was further developed by Darwin’s followers to include the understanding that the human
intellect and the process of thinking are designed for wholly practical purposes. Their aim is
to help the individual adjust himself to his world and to facilitate action. This conception also
forms an essential part of Bergson’s doctrine. The intellect is regarded by him as a kind of
instrument or tool employed in the service of life.106 I will apply the same structure as in the
preceding sections on Plato and Kant, and work at three issues. First, I will elaborate
Bergson’s distinction between intuition and the analytical nature of the discursive intellect.
Secondly, examples on the workings of intuition are given. As time is pivotal in this respect, a
paragraph will be devoted to this issue. I will end with an outline of Bergson’s method of
intuition, the metaphysical.

Intuition & Intellect

In early writings of Bergson, intuition is described as intellectual, in accordance with Plato
and Kant. This is also the case in An Introduction to Metaphysics. When the original text
appeared modified in 1934, this has changed. Here the intellect is seen as different from
intuition. As this change may be pivotal, for intuition and its more recent connotations,
especially within psychology, we need to know why Bergson did this. In a footnote, he
mentions that the distinction between intellect and intuition is sharpened, due to an increasing
need for precision.107 What does he mean? A letter to Jacques Chevalier from 1920 reveals
that: “As my use of the word intelligence is wider than that of Kant, I could call intuition
intellectual. Though, I prefer to call it supra-intellectual. This is because I find it best to limit
the use of the word intellect, to the discursive talents of our spirit.” Moreover he defines the

105
Bergson, 1949, p. 21.
106
Ibid. p. 10.
107
Kolstad, 1998, p. 107. Kolstad refers to La pensée et le mouvant.

30
intellect as the attention spirit gives to matter, and intuition as the attention spirit gives to life,
that is, to itself.108

Intuition and intellect are thus not different organs, but two sides of one and the same thinking
activity. An activity powered by the spirit. The thinking activity goes in one direction when it
applies a discursive, conceptual, analytic quantitative perspective, and in the opposite
direction when it sympathizes with the qualitative and psychological reality. Here Bergson
copies Plato, who defines rational intuition as the eye of the soul.109 “This organ of perfect
knowledge must be turned around from the world of physical appearances, together with the
entire soul, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation in the brightest region of being
and the intelligible world.”110 For Bergson, intuition is thus primarily occupied with inductive
metaphysics or spiritual science, while the discursive intellect is primarily employed in the
study of matter and physical science.111 This relationship can be illustrated in the following
way:

Metaphysics Intuition Thinking Intellect Physical Science

A few words of reflection may be legitimate here, as they bear directly on a core argument of
the thesis. Plato draws a distinction between the intelligible world, and the world of
appearances. His notion of discursive thinking, dianoia, is attached to the former. For Kant,
the situation is similar. He draws a distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. His
notion of discursive thinking, verstand, is also related to the intelligible world, or the a priori.
The new and confusing element introduced by the later Bergson, is thus that his notion of
discursive thinking, made equivalent to intellect, is fallen from the a priori, intelligible world,
down to an occupation in the cave, where its primary interest is the world of physical
appearances.

With Bergson, we therefore have the contradictory situation, that the intellect no longer
occupies a place in the intelligible world. Its character and memory is from now on, gradually,
becoming devoid of soul. Rational intuition is thus left alone with the intelligible,
metaphysical, spiritual agenda, and the intellect is solely in charge of the more solid affairs.
The trend continues today, when the discursive intellect is regarded by many as rational and
intuition as irrational, automatic and biased. This then, is one reason why I do not focus in on
the heuristics and biases tradition. Let us thus look more closely at Bergson’s main
distinction, the one between intuition and analysis which only later turns into the one between
intuition and intellect.

108
Ibid. p. 108. My italics.
109
Psyche means soul, and it is peculiar that psychological literature, hardly, refers to it.
110
Cornford, 1955, p. 227.
111
Kolstad, 1998, p. 110.

31
Intellectual Analysis
Analysis is for Bergson, as it is for Kant, the operation, which reduces the object to elements
already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. It separates, divides
and dissolves the unity. To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something
other than itself. “All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a
representation taken from successive points of view. From there we note as many
resemblance’s as possible, between the new object, which we are studying, and others, which
we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object, around
which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end, the number of its points of
view, in order to complete, its always incomplete, representation. Ceaselessly it varies its
symbols, striving to make perfect, its always imperfect, translation. It goes on, therefore, to
infinity.”112

Bergson argues that it is easy to see that the ordinary function of positive science is analysis.
“Positive science works, above all, with symbols. Even the most concrete of the natural
sciences, those concerned with life, confines themselves to the visible form of living beings,
their organs and anatomical elements. They make comparisons between these forms, they
reduce the more complex to the more simple; in short, they study the workings of life in what
is, so to speak, only its visual symbol.”113 In this line of reason, we recognize Plato’s
description of dianoia, or discursive reasoning, which uses as images those actual things
which themselves have images, in the realm of physical appearances. Dianoia proceeds, as we
know, from premises to conclusion, without questioning the assumptions upon which the
premises ultimately rests, thus it falls short of perfect knowledge, or episteme.

Turning then to the discursive intellect, we find Bergson arguing that it has, in a similar way,
certain inherent limitations in its way of functioning. Normally it apprehends the world
externally as a collection of things in space. The very language we use to describe the world is
saturated with spatial terms and metaphors. Secondly, the intellect deals with the world by
means of discrete units capable of being counted or measured, like dollars, kilometers, kilos,
pages, etc. Thirdly, the intellect treats the world as though it were fundamentally static and
immobile. The fixed concepts of the discursive intellect may be extracted by our thought from
mobile reality, but there are no means of reconstructing the mobility of the real with fixed
concepts.

This is for Bergson the most serious limitation of all. For it means that, the intellect is bound
to misunderstand the fact of motion and change. Like a camera lens, it can only form a picture
of a process by transforming the latter into a static image or series of images. “Duration can
be presented to us directly in an intuition, it can be suggested to us indirectly by images, but it
can never be enclosed in a conceptual representation.”114 These limitations, he argues, are
clearly seen in the most typical product of the intellect, namely the natural sciences. For the
sciences, seek always to state their results in mathematical terms. One result of this has been
that phenomena like motion and time are analyzed into a succession of points.115 As time is of
great significance to Bergson’s understanding of intuition, we will delve deeper into it, below.

112
Bergson, 1949, p. 24.
113
Ibid. My italics.
114
Ibid. p. 30.
115
Ibid. p. 10-11. See also Cornford, 1931. On a side-note we could mention that the scholastic record he left
behind was one of uniform brilliance, including a national prize in mathematics.

32
Before we contrast intellectual analysis with intuitive synthesis, we should take further note of
Bergson’s view on conception, so that we provide the reader with continuity from Plato and
Kant. Concepts, especially if they are simple, have the disadvantage of being symbols,
substituted for the object they symbolize. When examined closely, we find that they retain
only that part of the object, which is common to it and to other objects. Thus, they can never
reveal what is essential and unique in the object. Concepts offer a comparison between similar
objects. Also, we easily persuade ourselves that by setting concept beside concept we are
reconstructing the whole of the object, with its parts, obtaining so to speak its intellectual
equivalent. There precisely is the illusion, Bergson argues. “These concepts, laid side by side,
never actually give us more than an artificial reconstruction of the object, of which they can
only symbolize certain general and, in a way, impersonal aspects. It is therefore useless to
believe that with them we can seize a reality of which they present to us the shadow alone.”
Plato’s allegory of the cave is here looming in the background.

And he continues; “Besides the illusion there is also a very serious danger. For the concept
generalizes at the same time as it abstracts. The concept can only symbolize a particular
property by making it common to infinity of things. It therefore always more or less deforms
the property by the extension it gives to it.”116 So if we are bent on reconstructing the object
with concepts, everything will depend on the weight we attribute to this or that concept.
Though, this weight will always be arbitrary, due to the fact that the concept extracted from
the object has no weight, being only the shadow of a body. From this line of reason, he
concludes that simple concepts not only divide the concrete unity of the object into numerous
symbolical expressions, they also divide philosophy and science into distinct schools that
carries on with the others a game that will never end. The challenge posed to metaphysics, is
to transcend concepts in order to reach intuition.117 No wonder the concept intuition is elusive.

Intuitive Synthesis
Intuition then, as opposed to intellectual analysis, is for Bergson, an immediate and higher
synthesis.118 His use of the word immediacy does not differ significantly from Kant’s, and the
reader may refer to that discussion. Larsson, in his reading of Bergson, argues that the use of
the word intuition almost always indicates a synthesis, and that it is the direct antonym to
discursive thinking and nothing else. In discursive thinking one thing is perceived after
another, without holding on to the preceding. Intuition on the other hand, manages to hold on
to the manifold of the preceding, and to see it in one enduring picture.119 In this view,
intuition is a sort of long-term memory. Kolstad adds that it is a synthesis working on several
levels, that is, with degrees of density and rhythm.120 It works horizontally as the opposite to
analysis and discursive thinking, in the rather dense domain of ‘hard’ natural science, as well
as in less dense psychological and spiritual realms. Both a horizontal and a vertical movement
thus characterize intuition. It is an increasing awareness of this synthetic or integral
relationship. The analytic activity participates in the unity of duration and intuition is in no
way alien to it. Reality does not share with us an intuition of its inner nature, until we

116
Ibid. p. 28, 38. Thinking usually consists in passing from concepts to things, and not from things to concepts.
When an object is brought under several concepts, we normally say that we have a broad and comprehensive
knowledge of the object. Concepts also generally go together in couples and represent two contraries.
117
Ibid. p. 30.
118
Kolstad, 1998, p. 109.
119
Larsson, 1925, in Kolstad, 1998, p. 109. See also Lazey, 1989.
120
Bergson may have in mind the Pythagorean doctrine of harmony of the spheres. See Burkert, 1972.

33
painstakingly have acquainted ourselves with its outer manifestations.121 We may illustrate
this relationship in the following way:

Higher Levels Metaphysical Science

Intuition Analysis

Lower Levels Physical Science

For the sake of clearness, we should here repeat that Bergson draws a general distinction
between two directions of our thinking effort, as is the case with Buddhism as well.122 One is
the attention spirit gives to matter the other is the attention spirit gives to life, that is, to itself.
The former is typically the discursive intellect, while the latter is normally assigned to
intuition. Each of these, is again subdivided into an exteriorized action oriented focus, and an
interiorised focus, which is reflected in Jung’s notions of the introverted and the extraverted
intuition.123 These divisions may be related to the different levels of intuition in the following
way:

The higher levels of intuition emphasise the internalised focus. A peculiar and important
aspect of this level is the counter analysis, or in other words, the analysis of the analysis.
Intuition here utilizes analysis with the aim of dissolving the concepts, and the imperfect,
relative knowledge construed by ordinary analysis. This approach is in important respects,
identical to Plato’s dialogue and to Kant’s synthetic method. The counter analysis resonates
very well with the transcendental analytic method, which is integral to the complete synthetic
method. In working this way intuition is approaching a flowing state of mind best
characterized as a consciousness, which is conscious of it-self.124 It has liberated itself in and
through the ever-rolling stream of time. How this goes about will be delineated in a separate
section below. The main difference between the counter analysis and the interiorised
discursive intellect is thus that the latter stops short at a lower level of conceptual reflection
and abstraction.

The lower levels of intuition correspond mainly to the exteriorized focus and may be seen as
instinct. Often instinct is discussed in relation to intuition. Here it suffices to say that for
Bergson, all organic life is seen as a flowing stream that in its evolution towards self-
consciousness, move in two directions; towards intuition and instinct or towards discursive
thinking. The bee then, in its instinctive attack upon its victim has a knowledge that in regard
to its object is perfect and absolute. It knows exactly where to hit. The key difference between
instinct and intellect is thus that the instinct relates to the content, the intellect to the form. If
the instinct could postpone its often, immediate action and reaction, and be disinterested in its
object and reflect upon itself, it would reveal the secrets of life, Bergson maintains. The

121
Kolstad, 1998, p. 109, 112.
122
Yamaguchi, 1969, p. 77. The author compares the thinking-methods of Zen Buddhism and Bergson.
123
Jung, 1971, 366-370, 398-403.
124
Kolstad, 1998, p. 102. A similar point is made by Fichte in; I think that I think.

34
knowledge that is inherent in the instinct is thus by intuition made conscious, and thought.125
How intuition is capable of transcending analysis and the discursive intellect completely, is
indeed more difficult to explain. Bergson starts by giving these subtle examples:

Examples of Intuition
“Were all the photographs of a town, taken from all possible points of view, to go on
indefinitely completing one another, they would never be equivalent to the solid town in
which we walk about. Were all the translations of a poem into all possible languages to add
together their various shades of meaning and, correcting each other by a kind of mutual
retouching, to give a more and more faithful image of the poem they translate, they would yet
never succeed in rendering the inner meaning of the original. Or suppose that I wished to
communicate to someone who did not know Greek the extraordinarily simple impression that
a passage in Homer makes upon me; I should first give a translation of the lines, I should then
comment on my translation, and then develop the commentary; in this way, by piling up
explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer to what I wanted to express;
but I should never quite reach it.”126

“When you raise your arm, you accomplish a movement of which you have, from within, a
simple perception; but for me, watching it from the outside, your arm passes through one
point, then through another, and between these two there will be still other points; so that, if I
began to count, the operation would go on forever. Viewed from the inside, then, an absolute
is a simple thing; but looked at from the outside, that is to say, relatively to other things, it
becomes, in relation to these signs which express it, the gold coin for which we never seem
able to finish giving small change.”127 Bergson here alludes, to the ancient philosopher Zeno
of Elea, and his famous example of a flying arrow. It is easy to show that it does not really
move, Zeno says. For at each instant of its flight it occupies one and only one point of space.
This means that at each instant the arrow must be at rest, since otherwise it would not occupy
a given point at that instant. However, its whole course is composed of such points. Therefore,
the arrow does not actually move at all. The moral to be drawn from Zeno’s paradoxes is for
Bergson, not that motion is impossible, but rather that it is impossible for the intellect to
comprehend motion. These examples are somewhat problematic, but will be easier to interpret
when we have discussed Bergson’s notion of time and duration. Here it suffices to say that
they reflect the main tenet of Plato’s epistemology, namely the dynamic between original and
image.

Time & Duration

From the above examples, it is clear that we must not confuse intuition with mere feeling or
emotion. Nor should we think of it as depending on some special faculty having a non-natural
origin. Intuition is rather a series of acts, of direct participation in the immediacy of
experience. It is integral experience. It can be accomplished by making an effort to detach
oneself from the demands of action, by inverting the normal attitude of consciousness, and
immersing oneself in the current of direct awareness. The result will be cognition of reality
that must be expressed in metaphors or fluid concepts quite different from the static
abstractions of logic. In so far as, this reality is communicable at all. “There is one reality, at
least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own

125
Kolstad, 1998, p. 102-104. See also Bailey, 1960, p. 103, and 1974, p. 120.
126
Bergson, 1949, p. 22-23.
127
Ibid. p. 23

35
personality in its flowing through time - our self which endures. We may sympathize
intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves.”128 The
inner life is variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of direction, and cannot be
represented by concepts, that is, by abstract, general, or simple ideas. No concept can
reproduce exactly the original feeling we have of the flow of our conscious life. If a man is
incapable of getting for himself the intuition of the constitutive duration of his own being, no
concept will ever give it to him, according to Bergson.

Metaphysics must therefore begin by applying its method to the inner experience of the
individual he argues. The personality in its flowing through time, is a ceaselessly changing
process. The term which best conveys the character of this process is duration, la durée or
pure time. Here we arrive at Bergson’s most original conclusion. Absolute reality as revealed
by intuition is the ever-rolling stream of time. Immediately, we recognize that this is in line
with the reasoning of Plato and Kant, and we should remember that Plato provides us with a
perspective of time that is deep, and rich in nuances. On a side-note, we should mention that
Taylor argues that Bergson’s argument applies as much to space as to time.129 In order to
contrast duration with the mathematical and ‘spatialized’ time of the intellect, Bergson offers
certain additional comments. Duration is a heterogeneous flux or becoming. It is irreversible,
straining always towards the future. It is continually creating newness or novelty, and hence it
is intrinsically unpredictable. It is the inexhaustible source of freedom. Its living reality can
never be communicated by images or concepts, but must be directly intuited.

However, if intuition has the mobility of duration as its object, and if duration is of a
psychical nature, the attentive reader may wonder if not the philosopher then is confined to
the exclusive contemplation of him or herself. Bergson argues in accordance with Kant, that
this would be to misconceive the singular nature of duration, and its essentially active
character. It would be failing to see that intuition alone permits us to go beyond idealism, as
well as realism, to affirm the existence of objects inferior and superior to us, to make them
coexist without difficulty.130 Plato phrased this only slightly differently, maintaining that
rational intuition reveals the intrinsic interplay between the works of Reason and the world of
physical appearances. It is an increasing awareness of this synthetic or integral relationship.

Analysis of Duration
Duration is of pivotal importance to Bergson’s notion of intuition, and even though it is close
to a hopeless task, he embarks upon an analysis of it. If I seek to analyze duration, I am
compelled, by the very nature of the concepts and of analysis, to take two opposing views of
it, with which I then attempt to reconstruct it, he says. “I shall have to say, for example, that
there is, on the one hand, a multiplicity of successive states of consciousness, and, on the
other, a unity which binds them together.”131 He starts by considering duration as a
multiplicity. “It will then be necessary to add that the terms of this multiplicity, instead of
being distinct, as they are in any other multiplicity, encroach on one another; and that while
we can no doubt, by an effort of imagination, solidify duration once it has elapsed, divide it
into juxtaposed portions and count all these portions, yet this operation is accomplished on the

128
Ibid. p. 24-25. My italics. See also Moore, 1996, and Michon, 1985.
129
Taylor, 1928 p. 689-690. Of the many critical comments Bergson receives on the issue of time, F. Pillon and
Taylor are main opponents. They agree in that the measurement of time would be absolutely impossible if it
were, as Bergson assumes, wholly indirect. See also Kolstad, 1998, p. 154 and Sorabji, 1983.
130
Bergson, 1949, p. 45-46.
131
Ibid. p. 46.

36
frozen memory of the duration, on the stationery trace which the mobility of duration leaves
behind it, and not on the duration itself.”132 Bergson thus argues that if there is a multiplicity,
it bears no resemblance to any other multiplicity we know, as if echoing Plato and his one
unique world argument, which we did discuss.

Then he goes on to consider duration as a unity. “Shall we say, then, that duration has unity?
Doubtless, a continuity of elements which prolong themselves into one another participates in
unity as much as in multiplicity; but this moving, changing, colored, living unity has hardly
anything in common with the abstract, motionless, and empty unity which the concept of pure
unity circumscribes.”133 The question then, posed by Bergson, is this: Shall we conclude that
duration must be defined as unity and multiplicity at the same time? His conclusion is that
however much we manipulate the two concepts, we never obtain anything, which resembles
the simple intuition we have of duration. “When I replace myself in duration by an effort of
intuition, I immediately perceive how it is unity, multiplicity, and many other things besides.
These different concepts, then, were only so many standpoints from which we could consider
duration. Neither separated nor reunited have they made us penetrate into it.”134 However, by
intuition we do penetrate into it, facilitating inner, absolute knowledge of the duration of the
self by the self.

Kant used different words but meant much the same, when proving that our transcendental
unity of self-consciousness gives us synthetic a priori knowledge. Duration then, will be the
synthesis of unity and multiplicity. According to Bergson there is, and can only be, one single
duration, that in which our consciousness habitually works. To summarize then, we can list
the main differences between intuition and analysis as perceived by Bergson. We recognize
that essentially, they are similar to the ones provided by Plotinus on intuition and discursive
thinking and to those mentioned by Kant on intuition and conception.

Rational Intuition Analysis

Metaphysical Science Physical Science
Spirit Matter
Qualitative Quantitative
Synthesis Analysis
Complete Incomplete
Absolute Relative
Simple Complex
Original & Unique Copy
Real Symbolic
Unification Fragmentation
Integrates Separates
Enduring & Dynamic Static

132
Ibid. p. 30.
133
Ibid. p. 30-31.
134
Ibid. p. 31.

37
The Metaphysical Method
The main elements in Bergson’s metaphysical method then, is discussed above, and Bergson
gives a summary of it, which we include here. For Plato, dialogue represents the method most
suitable to rational intuition. For Kant, it is the synthetic method. Bergson calls his method
metaphysical, and it is clear that they all share intrinsic similarities and intentions, namely to
reveal the nature of the rational, intelligible world of perfect knowledge, which is to be found
by looking primarily not out, but in to the psyche which means soul. In this domain the Ideas,
Forms and Archetypes are found and rational intuition see them reflected and integrated in the
world of physical appearances. Such an emphasis is indeed, also firmly embedded in the
Tibetan tradition, of three years long dark room retreats, as final exam in the monasteries.135

1 “There is a reality that is external and yet given immediately to the mind. This reality is mobility. Not things
made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states exist. Rest is never more
than apparent, or, rather, relative. The consciousness we have of our own self in its continual Heraclitean flux
introduces us to the interior of a reality, on the model of which we must represent other realities. All reality,
therefore, is tendency, if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction.”136 This view is shared
by Popper, who in his thorough comparison of quantum physics and philosophy, argues in agreement with
Aristotle that: “To be is both to be the actualization of a prior propensity to become, and to be a propensity to
become.”137 Apparently, quantum physics approves of Bergson’s doctrine, and Gunther gives an account on this
subject.138

2 Bergson stresses that our mind, which seeks for solid points of support, has for its main function in the
ordinary course of life that of representing states and things. “It takes, at long intervals, almost instantaneous
views of the undivided mobility of the real. It thus obtains sensations and ideas. In this way the discursive
intellect substitutes for the continuous the discontinuous, for motion stability, for tendency in process of change,
fixed points marking a direction of change and tendency.”139 Bergson argues that this substitution is necessary to
common sense, to language, to practical life, and to positive science. “When our discursive intellect follows its
natural bent, it proceeds in this manner, by solid perceptions and stable conceptions.” A crucial point in his line
of reasoning is thus that the discursive intellect starts from the immobile, and only conceives and expresses
movement as a function of immobility. “It takes up its position in relative and ready-made concepts, and
endeavors to catch in them, as in a net, something of the reality which passes. This is certainly not done in order
to obtain an internal and metaphysical knowledge of the real, but simply in order to utilize the real.”140 It is thus
not difficult to agree in one of his main conclusions, namely that, in doing so, it lets that which is its very essence
escape from the real.

3 The next point is consequently, that fixed concepts may be extracted by our thought from mobile reality, but
there are no means of reconstructing the mobility of the real with fixed concepts. Here Bergson adds a pivotal
argument that makes it easier to understand Kant’s definition of intuition as a singular and immediate
representation, and concepts as something relative, that mediate. However, even though we fail to reconstruct the
living reality with stiff and ready-made concepts, it does not follow that we cannot grasp it in some other way:

135
Riencourt, 1950, p. 247-248. The same ritual is to be found in many cultures, e.g. the Egyptian.
136
Bergson, 1949, p. 49-54.
137
Popper, 1989, p. 205. “Propensity may be described as a generalization of dynamism. This view is developed
into a relational theory in which relational structures, instead of inhering in each material thing, may be
characterized by potentialities. The world is full, as with Parmenides, in the sense that the void, the vacuum, has
a structure, and is itself a field of propensities, which are real. Like the moving tealeaves, in a cup. The dualism
of the full and the empty, matter and space or field, is, up to a point, preserved, as a distinction between the
realization of a propensity, and the propensity to be realized. As with Plato, the emphasis upon antecedent causes
and geometrical cosmology is preserved, and used to describe the distribution of matter in the world. The theory
of vorticular movement and fluids of the Cartesians is preserved in the form of the law of conservation of
energy. Their action at vanishing distances is preserved in the form of the field theory. Central forces, which
correspond to the Aristotelian inherent potentialities, give place to fields of potentialities of a relational
character.”
138
Gunter, 1987, p. 271-303, 308-343. See also Gunter, 1969.
139
Bergson, 1949, p. 50.
140
Ibid.

38
4 “Our intelligence can follow the opposite method. It can place itself within the mobile reality, and adopt its
ceaselessly changing direction; in short, can grasp it by means of that intellectual sympathy which we call
intuition.”141 This is extremely difficult according to Bergson. The mind has to do violence to it-self. It has to
reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually thinks. It has perpetually to revise, or rather to recast,
all its categories. In this way, it will attain to fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its sinuosity’s and
of adopting the very moment of the inward life of things. Bergson concludes in accordance with Plato and Kant,
that this is the only way to build a progressive philosophy.

5 “This inversion has never been practiced in a methodological manner; but a profoundly considered history of
human thought would show that we owe to it all that is greatest in the sciences, as well as all that is permanent in
metaphysics.”142 Metaphysics, which aims at no application, can and usually must abstain completely from
converting intuition into symbols. Liberated from the obligation of working for practically useful results, it will
indefinitely enlarge the domain of its investigation. What it may lose in comparison with natural science in
utility and exactitude, it will regain in range and extension.143 “Though mathematics is only the science of
magnitudes, and though mathematical processes are applicable only to quantities, it must not be forgotten that
quantity is always quality in a nascent state. It is natural then, that metaphysics should adopt the generative idea
of our mathematics in order to extend it to all qualities, that is, to reality in general.”144 The object of
metaphysics is thus to perform qualitative differentiations and integrations, Bergson argues.

6 “The reason why this object has been lost sight of, and why science itself has been mistaken in the origin of the
processes it employs, is that intuition, once attained, must find a mode of expression and of application which
conforms to the habits of our thought, and one which furnishes us, in the shape of well-defined concepts, with
the solid points of support which we so greatly need. In that lies the condition of what we call exactitude and
precision, and also the condition of the unlimited extension of a general method to particular cases.”145 Bergson
thus argues that a truly intuitive philosophy would realize the much desired, union of science and metaphysics.

2.5 Buddhism

Not surprisingly, we find, in eastern philosophy, intricate and comprehensive epistemologies.

They facilitate our reading of their European counterpart, and are indeed, well worth
mentioning when intuition is concerned. Here we will limit ourselves to a sketch of certain
perspectives found in Buddhism, more specifically, its treatise of the seventh class of
consciousness, which is the dual mind. Apparently, there are only minor changes in between
the different Buddhist traditions on this issue.146 Let us start then, with the early Tibetan
Buddhism, and the works of Lama Anagarika Govinda, who is recognized as an authority on
the subject. In his Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism, he inquires into the eight-folded path,
leaving us with many good suggestions on how to develop autonomy. Autonomy is, according
to Elster, a pivotal component in rational judgment, thus we will return to it, in a separate
chapter on intuition and rationality. Elster also suggests that autonomous desires “are those
deliberately chosen, acquired or modified by an act of will or by a process of character
planning, like we find it in Buddhism.”147

141
Ibid. p. 51.
142
Ibid. p. 52
143
Ibid.
144
Ibid. p. 53.
145
Ibid.
146
Govinda, 1969, p. 73-80. See also Sangharakshita, 1998, p. 51-64. Although the Yogãcãra contradicts the
standard Abhidharma teaching, the same meaning shines through.
147
Elster, 1983, p. 21, 44. See also Elster, 1986, p. 233.

39
On this path to autonomy, the mind is a key. “The mind alone is the radiant jewel, the
philosopher’s stone, from which all things borrow their temporal reality.”148 In brief, the
human individual and experience is in Buddhism defined as a collaboration of five aggregates
or groups, called skandhas. These are descriptions of the individual’s active and reactive
functions of consciousness. As with Plato and Bergson they are seen in a sequence of
increasing density and materiality, or in increasing subtlety, dematerialization, mobility,
spiritualization and re-vitalization.149

According then, to Govinda, the first and most dense group of material form and corporeality
comprises the past elements of consciousness, represented by the body; the present elements,
as the sensation or idea of matter; and the future or potential sensuous elements in all their
forms of appearance. It is the epistemological object, and is traditionally described in terms of
the four great elements. The second group of feelings includes all reactions derived from
sense-impressions as well as from emotions arising from inner causes, e.g. feelings of bodily
pleasure and pain, mental joy and sorrow, indifference and equanimity. The third group of
perceptions of the discriminating awareness and representation includes the reflective as well
as the intuitive faculty of discrimination. The fourth group of mental formations or form-
crating forces and tendencies of the will represents the active principle of consciousness, the
character of the individual; namely, the karmic consequences caused by conscious volition or
choice.150

Although the skandhas represent different functions, they are anchored in a synthetic
ontology: “Whatever there is of feeling, perception, and mental formations, it is mutually
connected, not disconnected; and it is impossible to separate the one from the other and to
show up their difference. Because what one feels, that one perceives, and what one perceives,
that one is conscious of.”151 This is in accordance with Bastick, who writes that: “The
intuitive process is dependent upon the interaction of emotional states and cognitive
processes. It is evident from the feeling of satisfaction and reductions in tensions that
accompany an insight that emotional involvement plays a part in intuitive processes. A whole
body unifying theory is needed to describe intuitive processes.”152

The fifth skandha is consciousness and it is of special relevance and concern to us. Before we
embark upon the discussion of its nature, the bold statement of the Yogãcãra tradition is worth
mentioning. Here it is claimed that there is really only one skandha, namely mind only, and
the other four that we have mentioned above, are only manifestations of it.153 It comprises,
combines, and co-ordinates all the previous functions and represents the potentiality of
consciousness, in its pure, unqualified form. Nine kinds of consciousness are discerned, the
first five being our familiar senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. They represent a
discriminating, or judgmental awareness to use Jung’s terminology. That is, the eye with
respect to form, the ear with respect to sound, and so on. Some authors feel more comfortable
in using the word perception, when describing these first five senses.154 Consciousness is not
easy to define. However, one can begin to define it in an ostensive way by contrasting
situations where it is present and absent. That is, situations where one is conscious of
148
Govinda, 1969, p. 59.
149
Ibid. p. 70-72.
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid. “In the same way the different colors of a rainbow cannot be separated from it or from each other, and
have no existence or reality in themselves, although they are perceived by the senses.”
152
Bastick, 1982, p. 133.
153
Sangharakshita, 1998, p. 19, 51-52. In some respect, this position is close to the one of Berkeley.
154
Ibid. He refers to e.g. Guenther and Yeshe Guyaltsen. See also Williams, 1989, p. 90.

40
something as opposed to not being conscious or aware of that thing.155 The five senses will
then facilitate consciousness, but they differ from mind itself, which belongs to the seventh
class of consciousness.

The Sixth Class of Consciousness

The sixth class corresponds in many ways to the discriminating awareness of the discursive
intellect, and it does not have a special elevated position above the other five senses. It sorts
out, co-ordinates, integrates and judges the results of the five kinds of sense-consciousness,
followed by attraction or repulsion, and the illusion of an objective world.156 However, the
Buddhist viewpoint, most interestingly, also recognizes thoughts themselves, as objects of
perception. Just as objects flow through one’s visual field, so does objects fly through one’s
cognitive field. “One could even say that, in a sense, one’s thoughts are even less a part of
oneself than the objects of the other five senses, because it would seem that one has rather less
control, generally speaking, over what one thinks than over what one sees, hears, tastes,
smells, and feels.” Sangarakshita thus argues that it seems unreasonable to identify oneself
with a realm of experience over which one seems to have so little control.157 This aspect of
consciousness is therefore to some degree a mechanical or reactive process of perceiving
mental objects, which may indeed be intricately constructed and constituted.

There is yet another aspect of the sixth class of consciousness, translated by Guenther as
categorical perception. And here, a very interesting twist is introduced. It is argued that in
addition to the mind’s awareness of the impressions presented to it by the five senses, there is
awareness of ideas that arise independently of sense perception, out of the mind itself.158 This
latter aspect is of three kinds. “First of all, there are the ideas and impressions that arise in the
course of meditation, as when one experiences light that doesn’t have its origin in any sense
impression but comes from the mind itself. Then, secondly, there are functions such as
imagination, comparison, and reflection.”159

Here Sangarakshita gives an example to illustrate his point. In some cases, we may experience
that our immediate impression of a person is that he or she is untrustworthy. This may of
course be a subtle sense impression, but the reason may also be that we have met in the past,
someone who appeared similar to this person, and who turned out to be untrustworthy. In this
latter case, one’s impression would come under the heading of categorical perception.
“Thirdly, there are images perceived in dreams, which again come not from sense impressions
but directly from the mind itself. Categorical perception, in short, covers any perception that
does not come in through the physical senses. It is the perception of all kinds of mental
operations, including recollections of experiences that originally came through the senses and
also things that were never experienced through the senses at all.”160 As intuition is often
defined as ideas and images that arise out of the mind it-self, it is of interest to keep this
Buddhist perspective in mind for a moment. Because, when we turn to the seventh and eight
class of consciousness, we find distinctions and nuances that provide a sharp focus on
intuition.

155
For a proper exposition on consciousness, see e.g. Max Velmans, 2000.
156
Sangharakshita, 1998. p. 54. See also Govinda, 1969, p. 73.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid. The word being translated into categorical perception is mano-vijnãna.
159
Ibid. p. 55. My italics.
160
Ibid.

41
The Seventh Class of Consciousness
The seventh class is the mind itself and it is intrinsically dual. That is, the mind is either
dualistic in its functioning or it is not. In the latter case, it is intuitive. Why this is so, becomes
clearer as we inquire into the eight and ninth classes of consciousness. Thus, we will return to
intuition later on. Here it suffices to say that the mind can be said to be an overlapping
between the first six senses and the eight & ninth class of consciousness. This is illustrated in
the model presented a little later on. Apparently, the crux of the matter is, as Plato, Spinoza,
Descartes, Kant, Bergson, and Jung all pointed out as well, the orientation and state of mind.
Is it towards matter, towards spirit, or does it strive towards a unified, that is, intuitive state. In
the first case, it is primarily oriented towards the first six classes of consciousness, and in the
latter, it is a synthesis of the first six, with the eight and ninth classes, which resembles the
personal and collective unconscious of Jung. Buddhism indicates that in the former situation
the mind usually operates in a dualistic mode, which is called afflicted, defiled and tainted.
Whatever it experiences, it interprets in terms of a subject and an object – subject as self, and
object as world or universe. Everything is seen in terms of pair of opposites: good and bad,
true and false, right and wrong, existence and non-existence, and so on. The mind is here
characterized by the sixth level of consciousness, and by the numerous talents of the
discursive intellect, that we have discussed earlier on. Of course, this dualistic mode of
discriminative awareness or consciousness characterizes the way in which we usually live our
lives.

There is within this thesis little space and time for the issue of dualism, thus my comments on
it will be only superficial.161 The conventional Western view is, as we have seen, that thought
remain part of oneself as a subject, set against a separate world of objects. However, this is
perhaps a limited viewpoint. “It is akin to what William Blake calls the ratio of the senses, the
split-off intellect, representing a process of induction from a narrow field of experience.”162
Here you observe, conceptualize and generalize from the limited field of sense experience.
When you look out, you construe a world of actually existing material objects, and when you
look within, you construe an actually existent ego. The enlightened and intuitive mind, we are
told, is completely free of such dualism. Between the experience of non-duality and our
ordinary, everyday dualistic consciousness, there is obviously a great gulf; and to move from
the one experience to the other will entail a complete and absolute reversal of all our usual
attitudes.163

Such a reorientation or turning, in the deepest seat of consciousness, is to some degree

reflected in the works of Bergson, and is further explained below. Before we do that, it may
be relevant to mention the rather stunning discovery from quantum mechanics that “there is
no distinction between a wave and a particle.” At high frequencies, the particle aspect is the
more evident, and at low frequencies, the wave aspect is the more evident. “Why this is so, is
impossible to explain in any classical way, it has in it the heart of quantum mechanics, and in
reality it contains the only mystery.”164 The almost universally accepted Copenhagen
interpretation thus states in brief that “objective reality has evaporated, and quantum
mechanics does not represent particles, but rather our knowledge, our observations, or our
consciousness, of particles.”165 The ontological and epistemological implications are

161
For a proper exposition see Velmans, 2000.
162
Sangharakshita, 1998, p. 54.
163
Ibid. p. 51, 54.
164
Feynman, 1995, p. 36, 117. We thus say that the particle has a built in non-local feature.
165
Popper, 1989, p. 35, 174-175. My italics. See also Popper, 1975.

42
profound, causing Popper to conclude that; “A large part of The Logic of Scientific Discovery
was devoted to the problems of quantum theory.”166

Basically, cittamãtra doctrine denies the reality of matter as a separate category from mind.
“The objects of our perception are not external objects as such. They are not objects as
opposed to our-selves - the subject. We perceive mental impressions, that’s all.”167 The
significance of this insight is that if one removes the notion of an object, one also effectively
removes the notion of a subject. In this way one breaks down the notion of an ego that is
separate from the world, to be left with mind only. This mind only is not mind as opposed to
matter, but a completely different conception of mind, according to Sangarashita. “Rather
than being able to make a sharp distinction between subject and object, all one can really say
is that there is a perceptual situation comprising two opposite poles.

One pole is the experience of what I call myself, together with everything I have under my
immediate control; that is the subjective content of the perceptual situation. And then, at the
opposite pole, there is everything and everyone that is independent of my direct control – the
objective content of the perceptual situation.”168 According to Sangarashita, this may not be as
difficult as it sounds. “What it amounts to is that through meditation we come to know that
our flow of perceptions and of experiences really lacks the fixed enduring subjects and
objects, which we have constructed out of it.”169 We may experience only the single, enduring
flow of perceptions and experiences. That is, the flow of perceptions is empty of enduring
entities. Individual life and death comes and goes. What remains, is the substratum, the
implicate order of Bohm, which is empty of those enduring entities.170 The flow of
perceptions themselves nevertheless does exist.

According to Buddhism then, in the Enlightened being, the perceptual situation still occurs,
but one no longer identifies oneself with its subjective content, which means that the whole
perceptual situation is expanded, clarified, illuminated, enlightened.171 The challenge then, is
more one of performing qualitative differentiations and integrations, as Bergson pointed out.
“The Yogãcãra interpretation is thus not so much that there is a thing called mind and a thing
called matter, and that the thing called matter is discovered actually to be mind. It is not as if
discovering that what one thought was a jug is in reality clay. It is more that mind is the term
applied to that undifferentiated substratum which has been polarized into subject and object,
mind and matter. Mind and matter are just symbols for the two poles of the one perceptual
situation, and its sometimes very difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins.”172

In this non-dualistic, intuitive state of mind, the element of resistance to the objective content
of the perceptual situation ceases to exist. Your will is not separate from that of others. It is
more like a thorough identification with others, and with your environment, in general. As
your projections have disappeared, you do not experience other persons or situations as brick
walls that you are coming up against. Such a state of mind then, we may compare to a kind of
reflexive monism.173 As the deeper and elusive nature of intuition is hidden to us, until we

166
Popper, 1989, p. 97-98.
167
Ibid. p. 52.
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid. p. 82-85.
170
Bohm, 1981.
171
Sangharakshita, p. 54.
172
Ibid. p. 52-53.
173
Velmans, 2000, p. 168, 233, 235. The counter analysis of Bergson may lead in this direction.

43
have discovered the workings of the eight and ninth class of consciousness, we postpone
further discussion of it, for a minute.

The Eight & Ninth Class of Consciousness

Classes eight and nine then, are repositories or stores. The former is said to be relative and
the latter absolute, and again this resonates with Bergson. The relative part consists of, or
contains, the impressions left deep in the mind by all our previous experiences. This eight
class is in many ways identical to the personal unconscious of Jung, which we will elaborate
in the next chapter. “Whatever we have done or said or thought or experienced, a trace or
residue of it remains there; nothing is absolutely lost.”174 According to Sangharashita, the
Yogãcãra School conceives of these impressions and consequences, as seeds. They are active
impressions, left like seeds in the soil, and when conditions are favorable, they sprout and
produce fruits. In other words, their incubation period may differ substantially.175

We thus start to see the origin of new ideas, images, and flashes of insight that arise out of the
mind itself. Plato alluded to such a perspective, when warning us to be careful in whom we
listen to, because what goes in, stays. All these seeds in our personal unconscious, sown by
previous actions, thoughts, feelings and deeds, eventually fructifies and evolves into the six
sense perceptions and the activity and state of mind. Right here we find that Buddhism
indicates a causal relationship, between all our previous actions and how our mind works.
Depending then, upon the quality of the seeds, our mind is primarily dualistic or more
intuitively bent. The beauty is in the eye of the beholder. It is precisely this dynamic that may
move us in the direction of autonomy. In the normal case, our dualistic ego-consciousness,
interprets the impressions it receives from the other six senses, as representing an objectively
existing world, and at the same time interprets a reflection in itself of a separate ego.

The absolute aspect of the repository or store is claimed to be Reality itself, and is by certain
traditions called the ninth consciousness. It is immaculate, pure awareness or consciousness,
free from all traces of subjectivity and objectivity.176 While the relative aspect corresponds to
Jung’s notions of the personal unconscious, the absolute aspect resembles the collective
unconscious. Intuitions may originate in both, thus we may discern several levels of intuition.
This issue is further elaborated in the section on Jung. Here it suffices to say that the first and
second level of intuition relates to the personal and collective unconscious, while the third
level is the mature, integral intuition, further described below. The absolute aspect of the
repository then, is continuous, or a duration, if we apply Bergson’s terminology. It is multi-
dimensional, or even non-dimensional awareness in which there is nothing of which anyone is
aware, nor anyone who is aware. It is indeed beyond idealism and realism, to use more
familiar European phraseology. It is awareness without subject and without object, something
scarcely possible for us to imagine.177

The attentive reader would perhaps here like to have somewhat more tangible guidelines to
follow, securing a steady progress towards the intuitive state of mind, where we become one
with reality. Govinda provides us with these directions; “In the moment in which the mind
turns away from sense-consciousness and from the discursive intellect and directs its attention

174
Sangharakshita, 1998, p. 56.
175
This is a technical term used in psychology, which we will discuss in the succeeding chapter.
176
Sangharashita, 1998, p. 56. E.g. the Paramãrtha tradition.
177
Ibid.

44
upon the primordial cause of it’s being, the illusion of the ego-concept becomes apparent.”178
This revelation does not come about through intellectual analysis, or logical conclusions, but
through meditation and the complete coming to rest and relinquishing of all thought-activities,
whereby we create the necessary conditions under which intuition can arise, he argues. We
recognize the same emphasis on the absolute and the inner psychological world here, as with
Plato and Bergson.

Obviously, the reorientation from outer to inner reality is central. However, is this all? Is it
possible to say something more about it that could facilitate our inquiry? Sangharakshita adds
that this reorientation is brought about by the accumulation of pure impressions in the relative
part of the repository. “Through spiritual practice, more and more pure seeds are gathered,
and as these pure seeds accumulate, they put pressure on the impure seeds until in the end the
impure seeds are pushed right out of the repository.”179 When this occurs, the eight classes of
discriminating consciousness are transformed into five modes of pure, that is non-
discriminating awareness or wisdom, represented in the iconography of the five archetypal
Buddhas. Here then, we are touching ground, on the result of the reorientation. The result is a
non-discriminating awareness, or non-judgmental as Jung would say. Is it possible to be even
more specific about what such non-discriminating awareness is about? “It does not mean an
annihilation of sense-activities or suppression of sense-consciousness, but a new attitude
towards them, consisting in the removal of arbitrary discriminations, attachments and
prejudices.”180 The ninth class then, contains e.g. the Ideas of Plato, the Forms of Kant, and
the Archetypes of Jung. They are but different names of much the same realm.

Discrimination here means the biased judgment of things, from the relative standpoint of an
ego, in contrast to an attitude, which is able to view those things in the larger context of the
self. In Buddhism this is phrased as: “from the point of view of fundamental oneness or
wholeness, which is at the bottom of all consciousness and its objects. For only through the
experience or the knowledge that we are not only parts of a whole, but that each individual
has the whole as its basis, being a conscious expression of the whole – only through this
experience are we awakened into reality, into a state of utter freedom.”181 This perspective
aligns very well with the unique world argument of Plato, which we did discuss.

Such a state of mind then, is thus undisturbed by egoism, unruffled by distinction, desires and
aversions.182 In the more poetic words of Govinda it is compared to the ocean, “on the surface
of which currents, waves and whirlpools are formed, while its depth remains motionless,
unperturbed, pure and clear. This level of consciousness transcends all individuation and
limits, is thoroughly pure in its essential nature, subsisting unchanged and free from faults of
impermanence.” David Bohms` acclaimed theory about implicate & explicate order may give
us a conceptual framework that, by analogy, is usable here.183 The rather simple model then,
that perhaps illustrates important aspects of our mind and consciousness, is this:184

178
Govinda, 1969, p. 77. My italics.
179
Sangharakshita, 1998, p. 56. On a side note, this leaves us with a question mark on the utility of the violent
media-picture we are confronted with.
180
Govinda, 1969, p. 80.
181
Ibid. My italics.
182
Ibid. p. 74. He refers to D. T. Suzuki and D. Goddard.
183
Bohm, 1981, p. 144. See also, Bohm, 1994, and Bohm & Hiley, 1993.
184
Govinda, 1969, p. 74.

45
 1 9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
}

The Seventh Class of Consciousness Continued

The model clearly illustrates the immediate and synthetic nature of mature, third level
intuition. It represents the stabilizing and central point of balance, upholding the coherence of
its contents, by being the center of reference. “But for the same reason it is also the cause for
the conception of ego in the unenlightened individual, who mistakes this relative point of
reference for the real and permanent center of his personality.” The mature intuitive state of
mind is thus a mixture and a meeting point between the first six classes of consciousness on
the one side, and class eight and nine on the other. It is their common ground and it anchors
our ego in the self. “The intuitive mind has thus no body of its own, nor any marks, by which
it can be differentiated. The consciousness of class eight and nine is its cause and support, but
it evolves along with the notion of an ego, to which it clings, and upon which it reflects.”185

Because the intuitive mind participates and is integral to all levels of consciousness, it can be
an active ingredient in our body and feelings as well. Depending then, upon the evolution and
quality of all the classes of consciousness, the intuitive mind is able to create an enduring,
harmonic, unified mosaic of patterns, pictures and relations. This may be exemplified by e.g.
Mozart, who six years old composed his first symphony. If the quality is less good, the result
is more likely to be a dualistic and fragmented mind. The intuitive mind is thus the agent
through which the universal consciousness experiences itself and through which it descends
into the multiplicity of things, into the differentiation of senses and sense-objects, out of
which arises the experience of the material world.

To repeat and conclude, when the mind is directed solely towards the empirical, towards the
data provided by the six senses, and applies the discursive intellect, it comprehends
conceptual, differentiated, analytic, inferential, explicit knowledge and evidence. When
directed towards the eight and ninth classes of consciousness, achieved by a turning away
from the outside world of objects, to the inner world of enduring oneness and completeness,
the energy that sustain their organic unity is discovered, resulting in liberation and autonomy.
In Buddhism then, it is argued that the mind becomes a source of error if it is oriented and
directed from the universal towards the individual self-consciousness, while in the experience
of the opposite direction, from the individual towards the universal, it becomes a source of
highest knowledge, or episteme to use Plato’s terminology. “It is that which either binds us to
the world of the senses or which liberates us from it. It is the base metal of the alchemists,
which through magic power is turned into gold, the coal that is turned into diamond, the

185
Ibid. No wonder that research on intuition is a slippery issue. The attentive reader recognizes that Bergson
emphasizes intuition’s access to the absolute, while in Buddhism the focus is on its role as a relative and central
point of balance. The work of Prigogine, 1977, 1984, 1997, may be relevant here.

46
poison that is transformed into the Elixir of Life.”186 It is integral awareness and
consciousness. We may thus say that Kant, in stopping short at the synthetic a priori of our
ego-consciousness, is unable to transcend the limitations of the ego. In a thorough way, he is
strengthening the illusory conception of it. Consciousness per se, is most likely synthetic a
priori, and the challenge posed to our mind, body, feelings, and perception, is to rediscover
and rebuild it. March may thus very well be right in suggesting that we treat the self as a
hypothesis.187 Again, we can summarize our main findings in a table.

The Intuitive State of Mind The Dualistic State of Mind

Balanced Unbalanced
Unified Fragmented
Non-discriminating Discriminating
Coherent Incoherent
Pure Defiled
Multi-dimensional Three-dimensional
Integrates Separates

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, a consistency was revealed, in how philosophers have treated intuition. The
epistemology of European and Eastern philosophy, as it is contained in the works of e.g.
Plato, Spinoza, Descartes, Kant, Bergson, and Buddhism turn on the distinction between
intuitive and discursive thinking. In the preceding brief exposition, I have found that without
exception the intuitive state of mind is perceived as superior to the discursive, analytic,
dualistic state of mind. Slightly different arguments are provided, but essentially, they all
agree in that intuition gives access to the intelligible world of pure reason. Thus, they all
define it as rational and intellectual while discursive thought is seen as relative, incomplete
and fragmented. Philosophers do so primarily because intuition is anchored in Ideas, Forms
and Archetypes, which are perceived as a priori laws governing and conditioning all
existence. The coherency discovered, equip us with a rather strong bias when we in the next
chapter find a different view. In psychology, the tendency is to treat intuition as some sort of
unconscious, biased and automatic processing. This controversy may have implications for
the rationality debate. Tentatively we may suggest that philosophers emphasize vertical
rationality, or consistency between the a priori and the a posteriori, while psychologists are
less inclined to do so.

186
Ibid. p. 75. Intuition is also pivotal in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. See Hanna, 1993, p. 183.
187
March, 1994, p. 262.

47
3 INTUITION IN PSYCHOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Philosophers tend to define intuition as superior to the analytical talents of our mind. They
define it as rational primarily because it is anchored in Ideas, Forms and Archetypes, which
are perceived as a priori laws governing and conditioning all existence. In psychology, we
find a rather different view. When the historical review is continued we learn that in
psychology the tendency is to treat intuition as some sort of unconscious, biased and
automatic processing, inferior to controlled analysis. Why this ‘Copernican reversal’ in our
history of epistemology has taken place, is more difficult to explain. Historically,
psychologists have ignored the notion of intuition.188 Conceptual development thus remains
meager and thoroughly elusive.189 Osbeck notes that “it suffers from vague and multiple uses
of the term, association with diverse experimental phenomena, and from minimal effort to
integrate these in a consistent way.”190

Bastick maintains that intuition has been a baffling and elusive subject for generations. “The
lack of a clear-cut definition and the loose usage of the word has only added confusion to this
nebulous matter.”191 Fischbein points to the fact that “no attempt has been made to identify
systematically those findings, spread throughout the research literature, which could
contribute to the deciphering of the mechanisms of intuition.” Nor has there been extensive
clinical investigation. He adds that “intuition as concept as well as method, revives itself
again and again in philosophical disputes, in the theoretical foundations of science and
mathematics, in ethics and aesthetics, in pedagogy, and yet very little and very seldom in
psychology.”192

Hill argues that aside from the works of Carl Jung, there are extremely few references to
intuition in psychological literature.193 Westcott, who is credited with one of few clinical
studies on intuition, corroborates this view: “The only grand theory of intuition, which has
arisen in psychology, is probably the one presented by Jung.”194 Moreover, we will discover
that it does not provide much new information about intuition. To quote Jung himself: “I say
that intuition is a sort of perception that does not go exactly by the senses, but it goes via the
unconscious, and at that I leave it and say I don’t know how it works.”195 Thus, even though it
is recognized as the only robust theory of intuition, which has arisen in psychology, it is a
meager one. To further prove this point we need only look at the more recent contributions in
cognitive psychology, where intuition hardly receives any space at all. The related concept
soul shares the same destiny.196 This may be a paradox for theoretical psychology as long as
the promise of intuition is perception of the psyche or soul. Thus we are not only justified in
borrowing from philosophy, we are forced to.

188
Shirley & Langan Fox, 1996, p. 563-565, Hill, 1988, p. 137, Osbeck, 1999, p. 229.
189
Baylor, 2001, p. 243. Hogarth, 2001, p. 6.
190
Osbeck, 1999, p. 229.
191
Bastick, 1982, p. 8-9.
192
Fishbein, 1987, p. ix, 3.
193
Hill, 1988, p. 138.
194
Westcott, 1968, p. 32.
195
Jung, 1968, p. 14.
196
Kaufman & Helstrup, 2000, p. 313. Teigen, 1999, p. 412.

48
In trying to explain these problems, Osbeck emphasizes the widespread tendency to ignore or
misrepresent the philosophical heritage of intuition. She writes that the avoidance of
epistemological perspectives on intuition might reflect psychology’s development into an
empirical science.197 “Some more obvious possibilities include methodological constraints,
predominant interest in folk conceptions of intuition, and unfamiliarity with philosophical
literature. Hence a discrepancy between understandings of intuition in psychology and
philosophy is frequently acknowledged without elaboration or defense.”198

Westcott prefers a slightly different explanation. He emphasizes the advent of positivism, and
the rise of analytical philosophy. Here views of reality became suspect, if not properly
supported by demonstrative reasoning and empirical observation. “As psychology began to
make its break from philosophy, the conflicts of the parent were visited upon the child. The
opposition between intuitionism and empiricism has persisted in psychology to the present
day, just as it has in philosophy. Though, in psychology it has taken on many different guises,
some more deceptive than others.”199 Yet another twist is the one presented by Bastick, who
thinks it is partly due to the division between Gestalt and Behaviorist psychologists. “Any
reference to the concept avoided the term intuition and was conducted under designations
such as preconscious concept formation, preverbal concepts, instinctive knowledge, cognitive
reorganization, etc.”200 The rest of the story we know as the heuristics and biases tradition,
where Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman still conceive intuition as automatic, biased, rapid, and
effortless processing.201

I thus start this chapter with Jung who discovered what he termed the personal and collective
unconscious. As these repositories are the main domains of interest for intuition, his account
is indeed of relevance to us. In brief, intuition gives access to both the personal and collective
unconscious, which is identical to the eight and ninth class of consciousness, as described in
Buddhism. The former contains all the accumulated personal experience and knowledge.
These intuitions may be more or less certain and mature, depending on the individual’s level
of expertise.202 The latter contains “the accumulated experiences of organic life in general, a
million times repeated and condensed into types. In these archetypes, all experience are
represented which have happened on this planet since primeval times. They represent the laws
governing the course of all things we can experience.”203

Jung argues that through its perception of these processes intuition can supply certain data,
which may be of the utmost importance for understanding what is going on in the world. It
can even foresee new possibilities in more or less clear outline, as well as events, which later
actually do happen.204 In building his theory on intuition around archetypes which means
original pattern, idea, or model, he is copying the Forms of Kant, as well as the main tenet of
Platonic doctrine. In accordance with Jung then, and the core argument of the previous
chapter, three levels of intuition are discerned. This is suggested as a main theoretical
contribution of my thesis. The first and second levels correspond to intuitions from the
personal and collective unconscious. The third level corresponds to the fully developed,
mature intuition, the non-dual integral state of mind, elaborated in the previous chapter.
197
Osbeck, 1999, p. 229. See also Teigen, 1999, p. 412-413.
198
Ibid.
199
Westcott, 1968, p. 16.
200
Bastick, 1982, p. 4.
201
Gilovich, et al. 2002, p. 51.
202
Baylor, 2001, p. 243. Fischbein, 1987, p. 54.
203
Jung, 1971, p. 400-401. My italics.
204
Ibid. p. 401.

49
In the third paragraph, my hermeneutic exploration of the historical account is taken one step
further, now focusing on more recent works on intuition. This particular approach is chosen,
much because such an elongated frame of reference aid us in delineation and validation of
reliable dimensions and categories to be applied in the empirical research. A tentative
conclusion is that; timing, possibilities, previous experience, and synthesis are important
aspects of intuition. There is yet a second purpose involved, and that is to make explicit some
of the key contributors, that directly or indirectly have transformed the philosophical concept
of rational intuition, into a psychological one, identified with automatic, biased, and irrational
processing. With Bergson, and definitely with Jung, pivotal aspects of the rational and
intelligible world are defined as unconscious. Thus, we now have the peculiar situation that
our consciousness of the rational and intelligible world gradually is disappearing into the great
black void of the unconscious, which is often linked to the automatic and instinctive. This is
posing difficulties that indeed are reflected in the more recent works on intuition. Here the
immediate and direct access, as well as the integral awareness of Ideas, Forms and Archetypes
is more or less evaporated.

In the fourth and final paragraph, I look closer at dual process theories. In many ways, these
theories reflect the philosophical distinction between the discursive and intuitive mind
elaborated in the previous chapter. According to Stanovich and West system 1 and 2 do not
really, represent different types of rationality. Rather, “they are terms for characterizing
optimization procedures operating at the sub-personal and personal levels, respectively.”205
We may thus go along with March, and suggest that both systems serve the evolution and
fulfillment of an identity, and that both are intrinsically subjective.206 Perhaps neither one,
provide the rationale for a normative theory of rationality. Finally, the age-old question of the
efficacy of intuitive and analytical cognition in expert judgment is addressed at the end of the
paragraph. Here one conclusion is that in direct comparison, intuition apparently performs as
good as analysis.

3.2 Carl Gustav Jung 1875 - 1961

Clearly, Jung has influenced psychology, and he is in many ways an instrumental bridge
between philosophy and psychology. Jung’s diverse and profound knowledge of Continental
philosophy is widely documented.207 He also had an interest in many aspects of Eastern
philosophy and worked with the I Ching. In his exploration of the personal and collective
unconscious, he is echoing the eight and ninth class of consciousness, described in Buddhism.
In addition, his notion of archetype is a blueprint of the main tenet of Platonic doctrine. It
means original pattern, idea or model, which all things of the same type are representations or
copies of.208 And, it is intuition that perceives it. With few exceptions, philosophical
epistemology maintains that the rational and intelligible world is to be found intuitively by
looking first, not out but into the psyche or soul, and then secondarily, to see how it is innate

205
Ibid.
206
March, 1994, p. 61.
207
Jung, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1989.
208
Jung, 1971, p. 413, 437-439. In the previous chapter, the unique world argument served to illustrate how a
Form or Idea relates to the particular. It is portrayed canonically as that of likeness, or more precisely, as the
relation of original to image. It is also reasonably clear that Jung’s 4 functions reflect Platonic epistemology. For
a modern discussion see Gilovich et al. 2002, p. 203.

50
in the world of physical appearances. Jung took on this challenge, and leaves a mark in
history for his effort mapping the psychological reality. With Bergson and definitely with
Jung, the rational and intelligible world is thus become largely unconscious.209 And
eventually the intuitive perception of it is, as we will see in dual process theories, equated
with automatic and biased processing.

Before we inquire into the details of Jung’s theory we should mention that in addition to its
status as an epistemological concept, intuition has status as a behavioral concept. Jung’s
theory of intuition is primarily embedded in a theory of personality, not in a theory of
knowledge and epistemology. We started out with Plato’s cosmological view on intuition,
continued with Kant and Bergson’s more individualized versions, and now we have come to
Jung, who embed it in a theory of personality types. For Jung then, intuition is a cognitive
event which occurs and which must be accounted for. It is one of four psychological
functions, present in all individuals. These four functions attain different degrees of
ascendancy during the life of each individual and, in combination with three levels of
consciousness and two general orienting attitudes, determine largely each individual’s
characteristic behavior. The four functions, which are central in Jungian typology, are
thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition.210 Because I will apply the Myers Briggs Type
Indicator®, an instrument originating in Jung’s theory, some space is devoted to all four
functions. The psychometric properties of the MBTI are discussed in chapter seven.

Feeling
Feeling is, according to Jung, primarily a process that takes place between the ego and a given
content. It is a process that imparts to the content a definite value in the sense of likes and
dislikes acceptance and rejection. Feeling therefore, is an entirely subjective process, which
may be entirely independent of external stimuli, though it allies itself with every sensation.
Hence feeling is a kind of judgment.211 Thus, it is argued that both thinking and feeling are
rational, but incompatible, in the sense that they both involve judgments and cannot operate
at the same time. That is, an object cannot be judged by two standards at once. Valuation by
feeling extend to every content of consciousness, and when the intensity of feeling increases,
it turns into affect. “Feeling is distinguished from affect by the fact that it produces no
perceptible physical innervations, i.e. neither more nor less than an ordinary thinking
process.”212 Jung also emphasizes that he does not see thinking governed by feeling, as
intuitive. Thinking dependent on feeling does not follow its own logical principle but is
subordinated to the principle of feeling. In such thinking, the laws of logic are only ostensibly
present; they are suspended in favor of the aims of concrete feeling.213

The distinction between abstract and concrete feeling is an important one. Abstract thinking
abolishes the differences between things it apprehends. Similarly, “abstract feelings rises
above the differences of the individual contents it evaluates, and produces a ‘mood’ or
feeling-state which embraces the individual valuations and thereby abolishes them.” Jung
argues that in the same way that thinking organizes the contents of consciousness under

209
Ibid. p. 483. “The concept of the unconscious is for me an exclusively psychological concept, and not a
philosophical concept of a metaphysical nature.”
210
Jung, 1968, p. 33. His model is thus a cross, where thinking & feeling and intuition & sensation are
opposites.
211
Jung, 1971, p. 434.
212
Ibid.
213
Ibid. p. 482.

51
concepts, feeling arranges them according to their value. “The more concrete it is, the more
subjective and personal is the value conferred upon them; but the more abstract it is, the more
universal and objective the value will be.”214 Feeling is thus a rational function, since values
in general are assigned according to the laws of reason, just as concepts are. However, strictly
speaking, it is only active, directed feeling which is rational, according to Jung. Passive
undirected feeling resembles feeling-intuition and is irrational. The former would be akin to
loving, while the latter would capture being in love.

Sensation
Sensation mediates the perception of a physical stimulus. It is therefore identical with
perception. It is related not only to external stimuli but to inner ones as well. As with the other
three functions, sensation is either concrete or abstract. Concrete sensation is sense
perception. Jung writes that it is always mixed up with feelings, thoughts and ideas. Abstract
sensation is a differentiated kind of perception, “which detaches itself from all contamination
with the different elements in the perceived object and from all admixtures of thought and
feeling, and thus attains a degree of purity beyond the reach of concrete sensation.”215
Concrete sensation is a reactive phenomenon, while abstract sensation, like every abstraction,
is always associated with the will. That is, with a sense of direction. Since sensation is an
elementary phenomenon, it is given a priori, and unlike thinking and feeling, it is not subject
to rational laws. Jung thus defines it as irrational.

Active Thinking
Thinking is, according to Jung, either active or passive, both of which can be extraverted or
introverted. Active thinking is an act of the will and passive thinking is equated with
intuition.216 Thinking is thus an apperceptive activity.217 In emphasizing orientation of the
thinking activity, Jung is copying Bergson, who argues that our thinking is oriented in two
directions. Each of these, are for Bergson, subdivided into an exteriorised and interiorised
focus.218 Jung echoes this, when defining active and passive thinking as both introverted and
extraverted. The active aspect then, is linked to our ego, while the origins of intuition is
somewhere in the personal and collective unconscious.219 Intuition is thus perception of the

214
Ibid. p. 435.
215
Ibid. p. 462.
216
Jung, 1971, p. 481.
217
Ibid. p. 412. Apperception is by Jung, defined as a psychic process by which a new content is articulated with
similar, already existing contents in such a way that it becomes understood, apprehended, or clear. “We
distinguish active from passive apperception. The first is a process by which the subject, of his own accord and
from his own motives, consciously apprehends a new content with attention and assimilates it to other contents
already constellated. Passive apperception is a process by which new content forces itself upon consciousness
either from without, through the senses, or from within. In the latter case, it is from the unconscious, and it
compels attention and enforces apprehension. In the active aspect the activity lies with the ego, and in the
passive, with the self-enforcing new content.”
218
Bergson, 1949, p. 51. Passive here resembles intellectual sympathy, which is equated with intuition.
219
Jung, 1971, p. 425. “By ego I understand a complex of ideas which constitutes the center of my field of
consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity and identity. Hence I speak of an ego-complex.
The ego-complex is as much content as a condition of consciousness, for a psychic element is conscious to me
only in so far as it is related to my ego-complex. But inasmuch as the ego is only the center of my field of
consciousness, it is not identical with the totality of my psyche, being merely one complex among other
complexes. I therefore distinguish between the ego and the self, since the ego is only the subject of my
consciousness, while the self is the subject of my total psyche, which also includes the unconscious. In this sense
the self would be an ideal entity which embraces the ego.” For a brilliant and thorough discussion of the self, see
Karterud & Monsen, 1997.

52
self. This is in accordance with the philosophical account, where intuition is seen as able to
transcend the ego. In active thinking, the contents of ideation are submitted to a voluntary act
of judgment. In passive or intuitive thinking, conceptual connections establish themselves of
their own accord, and judgments are formed that may contradict our intentions, he writes.

“They are not consonant with my aim and therefore, for me, lack any sense of direction,
although I may afterwards recognize their directedness through an act of active apperception.”
The term thinking is thus confined to the active linking up of ideas by means of a concept, in
other words to an act of judgment. Active thinking thus corresponds to directed thinking and
to intellect. “The capacity for directed thinking I call intellect; the capacity for passive or
undirected thinking I call intellectual intuition.”220 We should here take note of the fact that
Jung defines intuition as an intellectual, thinking activity, which might be unconsciously
directed, resulting in conceptual connections. Many a reader of Jung is not aware of this,
perhaps due to the widespread application of the MBTI where intuition is contrasted with
sensing, and presented as a distinct function separate from thinking.

According to Jung, thinking in general is fed on the one hand from subjective and in the last
resort unconscious sources, and on the other hand from objective data transmitted by sense
perception. Active, extraverted thinking is conditioned in a larger measure by the latter than
by the former. The valid and determining criterion for judgment is thus here supplied by
external, objective conditions. This is so, no matter whether it be represented directly by an
objective, perceptible fact, or by an idea abstracted from objective experience. When we in
chapter five discuss intuition and rationality, the issue of a valid criterion for judgment is of
special importance. It is thus a point we will return to later. Active, extraverted thinking,
therefore, need not necessarily be purely concrete. It can just as well be ideal thinking, if for
instance it can be shown that the ideas it operates with are largely borrowed from outside,
e.g., have been transmitted by tradition and education. Active, extraverted thinking then,
comes into existence only when the objective orientation predominates. Jung also notes that:
“our age, and its most eminent representatives know and acknowledge only the extraverted
type of thinking.”221 We may indicate that this is the situation today as well.

So, what then, are the characteristics of active, introverted thinking? “Thinking that is
directed neither to objective facts nor to general ideas, one might argue, scarcely deserves the
name thinking at all.” However, any thought preoccupied with a concrete object or a general
idea, necessarily, stands in a constant relation to the subject. This relation is a sine qua non,
without which no thinking process whatsoever could take place, Jung argues. “Even though
my thinking process is directed, as far as possible, to objective data, it is still my subjective
process, and it can neither avoid nor dispense with the admixture of subjectivity. We may
struggle towards an objective orientation of thought but it is impossible to cancel out the
parallel subjective process. When the main accent lies on this simultaneous subjective
process, the active thinking is introverted.”222 This thinking is neither determined by objective
data nor directed to them. It is a thinking that starts from the subject and is directed to
subjective ideas or subjective facts. In this line of argument, Jung is in full agreement with
Descartes and Kant. That is, introverted, active thinking resembles a key aspect of the
synthetic a priori.223 Concerning a valid criterion for judgment in this mode of thinking, Jung

220
Ibid. p. 481. My italics.
221
Ibid. p. 342-343.
222
Ibid. p. 344.
223
Ibid. p. 383. Kant argues that our Self-consciousness is a synthesis and a unity in it-self. As such, it is in the
end, the instrument that facilitates and guarantees a synthesis, with any judgment. Due to the fact that the unity

53
leaves us with no specific suggestions, except for a reference to Kant. However, it is
reasonably clear that the ego of the subject serves the purpose here as well.

According to Jung, the essence of active, extraverted thinking is no less fruitful and creative
than the introverted. It merely serves other ends. “The differences are seen quite clearly, when
for instance a subjective conviction is explained analytically in terms of objective data. Each
mode may feel the other trespassing on its own province, thus they are incessantly at war.”
One might think that a clear distinction between objective and subjective data would solve
this tension. However, being one-sided, the two orientations cannot do without each other.
They may benefit from a process of reflective equilibrium.224 This is yet another issue we will
return to later. When objective data predominate over thinking in great extent, thinking is
sterilized, Jung argues. “It is no longer capable of abstracting itself into an independent
concept. It is reduced to a kind of imitative, after-thought, which affirms nothing beyond what
was visibly and immediately present in the objective data in the first place. It leads directly
back to the object, but never beyond it.”

The materialistic mentality is an instructive example, Jung argues. When the point of
departure is a second hand objective idea, the very poverty of this kind of thinking is
compensated by an even more impressive accumulation of facts around the sterile point of
view.225 In deciding then, whether our active thinking is extravert or not, we must ask by what
criterion does it judge? Does it come from outside, or is its origin subjective? A further
criterion is the direction the thinking takes in drawing conclusions. Is it principally directed
outwards or is it not? 226 By and large, active thinking corresponds to the analytical and
conceptual talents of discursive thinking, as described in the preceding chapter.

Intuitive Thinking
Passive, undirected, intuitive thinking is “the function that mediates perceptions in an
unconscious way.”227 Thus, its nature is very difficult to grasp. Right here we find that Jung
differs from the many authors who define intuition as immediate. We have suggested earlier
on that intuition is an immediate and singular perception, which is unique and embedded,
participating of as well as in the duration of life. Jung continues, stating that “everything,
whether outer or inner objects or their relationships, can be the focus of this perception. The
peculiarity of intuition is that it is neither sense perception, nor feeling, nor intellectual
inference, although it may also appear in these forms.”228 Jung is here advocating that
intuition is some kind of non-judgmental, chameleon-like function, so subtle and
encompassing, that it can work its way through any of his other three functions.

How are we to interpret this? This would be a rather strenuous and most difficult undertaking,
if it were not for the Buddhist perspective, already discussed. There it is suggested that the
non-dual, intuitive state of mind is a mixture and a meeting point between the first six classes
of consciousness on the one side, and class eight and nine on the other. It thus represents the
stabilizing and central point of balance, upholding the coherence of its contents, by being the

of our Self-consciousness necessitates such a synthesis, Kant calls it transcendental.

224
Rawls, 1971, p. 20.
225
Jung, 1971, p. 345-346.
226
Ibid. p. 342.
227
Ibid. p. 453.
228
Ibid.

54
center of reference. It is their common ground. “The intuitive mind has thus no body of its
own, nor any marks, by which it can be differentiated.”229 Because the intuitive mind
participates and is integral to all levels of consciousness, it can be an active ingredient in our
body and feelings as well. This might explain what Jung is alluding to here. We may also
indicate that his definition of intuition as a non-judgmental function is reminiscent of the
Buddhist, non-dual state of mind.

In accordance with the philosophers then, he writes that in intuition the content presents itself
whole and complete. However, he also says that we are not able to discover or explain how
this content comes into existence. Like sensation, it is an irrational function of perception. As
with sensation its contents have the character of being given, in contrast to the derived
character of active, directed thinking and feeling contents. “Intuitive knowledge also
possesses an intrinsic certainty and conviction, which enabled Plato, Spinoza and Bergson to
uphold the scientia intuitiva as the highest form of knowledge. Intuition shares this quality
with sensation, whose certainty rests on its physical foundation. The certainty of intuition
rests equally on a definite state of psychic alertness of whose origin the subject is
unconscious.”230 More or less unconscious, we might add.

Turning then to extroverted intuition, we find Jung arguing that it is wholly directed to
external objects, thus it comes very close to sensation. In many ways, this mode resembles
Kant’s empirical intuition. However, this is a rather new twist, as long as most authors align
intuition primarily with contemplation of the psyche. “The intuitive function is represented in
consciousness by an attitude of expectancy, by vision and penetration. But only from the
subsequent result can it be established how much of what was seen was actually in the object,
and how much was read into it.”231 Here we start to recognize main features of what dual
process theories define as system one.

In direct opposition to his main definition, where intuition is considered passive, Jung also
writes that: “intuition, like sensation, is not mere perception or vision, but an active, creative
process that puts into the objects just as much as it takes out. However, the primary function
of intuition is simply to transmit images, or perceptions of relations between things.” These
images have the value of specific insights, which have a decisive influence on action,
whenever intuition is given priority, he argues. “Just as extraverted sensation strives to reach
the highest pitch of actuality, because this alone can give the appearance of a full life, so
intuition tries to apprehend the widest range of potentials and possibilities.” These are
possibilities inherent and innate in the psyche, evolving in and trough the individual intuition.
Thus, only through envisioning possibilities, intuition is fully satisfied, and the capacity to
inspire and to kindle enthusiasm for anything new is unrivalled. It thus seeks to discover what
possibilities the objective situation holds in store, and resembles the hunch, gut feeling, or
good nose for objectively real possibilities.232 Possibilities, is thus one item in my
questionnaire.

Introverted intuition is directed to the inner object, a term that might justly be applied to the
contents of the unconscious. The relation of inner objects to consciousness is entirely
analogous to that of outer objects, though their reality is not physical but psychic, Jung

229
Govinda, 1969, p. 74.
230
Jung, 1971. p. 453.
231
Ibid. p. 366.
232
Ibid. p. 367, 369. In the MBTI intuition is the perception of possibilities, patterns, symbols, and abstractions,
forging ground in new areas. Briggs, 1998, p. 176, 178.

55
argues.233 They appear to intuitive perception as subjective images. These contents per se are
not accessible to experience. “For just as external objects correspond only relatively to our
perception of them, so the phenomenal forms of the inner objects are also relative.” More or
less so, we could add, because the inner objects include the archetypes, Kantian Forms and
Platonic Ideas, which have a rather permanent character. “Although introverted intuition may
be stimulated by external objects it does not concern it-self with external possibilities but with
what the external object has released within the person.” Jung argues that it receives from
sensation only the impetus to its own immediate activity. It peers behind the scenes, quickly
perceiving the inner image that gave rise to this particular form of expression. Every detail of
how it changes, unfolds and fades is explored. “In this way introverted intuition perceives all
the background processes of consciousness with almost the same distinctness as extraverted
sensation registers external objects.”234 Let us pause for a moment. The ego is by Jung,
defined as the center of our consciousness. It is a center embedded, integrated and embraced
by the self, which includes the unconscious. Thus, it appears somewhat limited to anchor
rationality in only the active aspect of thinking, as long as the ego is its sole reference. The
ego is wholly relative to its location in the grander scheme and evolution of the self, thus
leaving us with a notion of rationality that is relative.

Jung argues that introverted intuition apprehends the images arising from the a priori
inherited foundations of the unconscious. These archetypes, whose innermost nature is
inaccessible to experience, are the precipitate of the psychic functioning of the entire
ancestral line. Dual process theories do not assign this talent to intuition. The question that is
imposing itself here is this; what exactly are the structure, coordinates, and content of the
unconscious? We would like to know more about it because it is the domain of the self, where
the ego is embedded. Moreover, familiarity with it could provide us with a profound
understanding of intuition. “It is the accumulated experiences of organic life in general, a
million times repeated, and condensed into types. In these archetypes, therefore, all
experience are represented which have happened on this planet since primeval times. The
more frequent and the more intense they were, the more clearly focused they become in the
archetype. The archetype would thus be, to borrow from Kant, the noumenon of the image
which intuition perceives and, in perceiving, creates.”235

They may be primitive in the sense that they are not clothed with the dress of any particular
time, space or culture, and they are in the same form in children and primitive peoples as they
are in highly civilized adults. Here we may again refer to Kant, who claims that time and
space, contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition. Space and Time are thus ontologically
dependent upon an intuiting act. Apart from our intuiting act then, space and time does not
have any objective existence.236 The personal and collective unconscious of Jung, as well as
the eight and ninth classes of consciousness in Buddhism, are thus given specific and
particular clothing by Kant’s a priori Forms of intuition.237

233
Ibid. p. 398, 453. Jung thus draws a distinction between subjective and objective intuition. “The former is a
perception of unconscious psychic data originating in the subject. The latter is a perception of data dependent on
subliminal perception of the object and on the feelings and thoughts they evoke.” Though, he does not draw the
likely conclusion that they may unite in one singular perception.
234
Ibid. p. 399. My italics.
235
Ibid. p. 400-401. My italics. A particularly good example on this is the work of Schønberger & Govinda,
1992. They make a persuasive correlation between the I Ching and the DNA code.
236
Wong, 1998, p. 50-51. It is in this sense Kant’s theory of space and time is constructive. This is a point we
will return to when intuition and rationality is discussed.
237
Thus timing is used as item in the questionnaire.

56
At the very end of his exposition of intuition, Jung leaves us with this crucial and condensed
insight: “Since the unconscious is not just something, that lies there like a psychic caput
mortuum, but coexists with us and is constantly undergoing transformations which are
inwardly connected with the general run of events, introverted intuition, through its
perception of these processes, can supply certain data which may be of the utmost importance
for understanding what is going on in the world. It can even foresee new possibilities in more
or less clear outline, as well as events, which later actually do happen. Its prophetic foresight
is explained by its relation to the archetypes, which represent the laws governing the course of
all things we can experience.”238

In emphasizing the ability to perceive the laws hidden in the collective unconscious, which
govern all that which takes place in the world of physical appearances to use Plato’s
terminology, Jung articulates a key feature of the developed intuition.239 Moreover:
“Sensation tells us that a thing is. Thinking tells us what that thing is, feeling tells us what it is
worth to us. But there is yet another category, and that is time.”240 In stressing that things have
a past and a future, and that intuition perceives this duration, be it inner, outer, or unified,
Jung aligns with all his predecessors. Timing and perception of cycles are thus included as
items in the questionnaire. Regarding a valid criterion of judgment then, for this mode of
thought, we may suggest the somewhat elusive self.241

Yet another point, of particular relevance to the empirical part of this thesis is Jung’s view
that “people who live exposed to natural conditions use intuition a great deal, and people who
risk something in an unknown field, who are pioneers of some sort, will use intuition.
Inventors and judges will use it. Whenever you have to deal with strange conditions where
you have no established values or established concepts, you will depend upon the faculty of
intuition.”242 Thus, the respondents are asked to describe two strategic decisions. One is to be
characterized by exploration; that is search for new possibilities, experimentation with
completely new alternatives and technology, variation, risk taking, and innovation. The other
is to be characterized by exploitation of old certainties, refinement, improvement and
increased efficiency of existing production, and technology.243 The assumption then, is that
there is more emphasis on intuition in exploration than in exploitation.

The final point then, which we need to address, is Jung’s distinction between concrete and
abstract intuition. Just like active thinking can be represented directly by an objective,
perceptible fact or by an idea abstracted from objective experience, intuition can be concrete
or abstract, according to the degree of participation on the part of sensation. “Concrete
intuition mediates perceptions concerned with the actuality of things, abstract intuition
mediates perceptions of ideational connections. Concrete intuition is a reactive process, since
it responds directly to the given facts. Abstract intuition, like abstract sensation, needs a
certain element of direction, an act of the will, or an aim.”244 This is rather confusing, as long
as Jung also defines intuition as the passive mode of thinking, devoid of direction and will,
and as given, not derived. However, this is not a new controversy. Kant, in making a

238
Jung, 1971, p. 401. My italics.
239
These laws are the main occupation of those who study Geistwissenschaft, or spiritual science, e.g. the
Rosicrucians, and the Theosophical and Anthroposophical Societies.
240
Jung, 1968, p. 13-14. Jung relates intuition to the hunch, and writes: “That is what is called intuition, a sort of
divination, a sort of miraculous faculty. ….. It is a function by which you see round corners”
241
In doing so, we may also refer to the Greeks, who inscribed know your self, at the temple in Delphi.
242
Jung, 1968, p. 13-14. My italics.
243
March, 1994, p. 80, 237.
244
Jung, 1971, p. 453. My italics.

57
distinction between pure and empirical intuition struggles with much the same problem.
Below, three levels of intuition are discerned, which may clarify this issue. Here it suffices to
say that the third level of intuition resembles the synthesis of abstract and concrete, introvert
and extravert, pure and empirical intuition. As such, it is not devoid of direction. On the
contrary, it is integral to the involution and evolution of the psyche and self. In summarizing
Jung’s view then, we have that:

Intuitive Thinking Active Thinking

Non-judgmental Judgmental
Beyond Rationality Rational
Given Derived
Whole & Complete Separated
Self Ego

Three Levels of Intuition

In concluding this section, and in accordance with the main findings of the previous chapter, I
suggest that we delineate three levels of intuition. This may provide us with more nuances, as
requested by Teigen.245 It is also suggested as a main theoretical contribution of this thesis.
We have then first, intuitions from the personal unconscious, or the Buddhist’ eight class of
consciousness. This level relates to all the accumulated personal experience and knowledge.
These intuitions may be more or less pure and mature, depending upon the individual’s way
of living and level of expertise, as Baylor points out.246 Secondly, there are intuitions from the
collective unconscious, that is, the Buddhist’ ninth class of consciousness. This level relates to
all the accumulated collective experience and knowledge. Intuitions from the collective
unconscious are by Jung held to be generally far more important than are intuitions from the
personal unconscious. Here we find the Ideas, Forms and Archetypes, that condition all that
we can experience, to quote Jung. The individual can be more or less in contact with them.

In other words, the awareness and access that the individual has to these repositories will
wary a lot. The introvert tends to have better access. If say, the individual is totally out of
touch with these values and levels of the psyche, these intuitions are not much more than
instinctive impulses, as Bergson and Jung points out. They can work their way through the
individual mind, body and feelings.247 With no awareness of these levels of the psyche and
self, any activity can have a substantial portion of automatic flavor and functioning. This
might include the so-called controlled, analytic activities of system two elaborated in dual
process theories.248 March alludes to the same point when arguing that students of rule
following tend to regard the rational model of choice as simply one version of rule following,
associated with the identity of the decision maker.249

245
Teigen, in Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 698. See also Baylor, 2001, p. 243. See also Teigen, 2001.
246
Baylor, 2001, p. 239. She suggests two types of intuition, immature and mature, which are differentiated by
the level of expertise in a given knowledge domain. We will return to her work.
247
Vaughan, 1979, p. 55.
248
Of the many techniques suggested, facilitating access to these repositories, meditation figures prominently.
The flux of thought is then easier rearranged and synthesized into clearer pictures, new ideas and solutions.
Stress may inhibit intuitive problem solving.
249
March, 1994, p. 59. The rational model of choice is described in the chapter on rationality.

58
The third level is the developed, mature intuition. We may say that it is this level that
corresponds to the proper rational intuition. It is nurtured by, and anchored in, a rich and
profound perception and understanding of the personal and collective unconscious, as well as
of their mutual and integral relationship. It is the ability to see how Ideas, Forms and
Archetypes are reflected and unified with what is going on in the personal ego and the world
of physical appearances.250 A certain amount of inference is required here. Kant thus argues
that the analytic procedure is involved in the complete synthetic method, and Bergson
emphasizes the counter analysis. However, as inferential thought activity is coming to a rest,
the result may eventually be the non-dualistic state of mind as the Buddhist doctrine
proclaims. It is a consciousness being conscious of it-self.

Thus, there is immediate awareness of the meaning being in- and unfolded, clothed as it is in
specific space and time coordinates. The individual mind and being is here a singular
synthesis, as Kant would say, but still not separated. It is unique and embedded. It partakes of
as well as in, much like a wave-crest in a wave or a cell in a body. It is integral experience
and intellectual sympathy, by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide
with what is unique in it.251 The research of Pribram and Penrose on intuition and
consciousness indicates that this state of mind is equal to “a global (essentially quantum)
large-scale coherent ‘hologram’ activity in the brain”252 These three levels then, can
tentatively be anchored in Jung’s notions in the following way:

Personal Unconscious Collective Unconscious

Introverted Intuition Level One Level Two
Extraverted Intuition Level One Little or no Awareness
Integral Intuition Level Three Level Three

When we merge the model developed in Buddhism, with the one suggested by Jung, we can
draw the model below.253 In a preliminary way, it suggests certain dimensions that may serve
as starting point for further discussion and research. It may also facilitate our reading of the
more recent works on intuition. Certain aspects of it, aligns very well with a model developed
by Baylor that will be discussed at the end of the next paragraph.254

250
Wilber, 2000, p. 40. Wilber describes this as holonic consciousness. A holon is a whole that is a part of other
wholes. Bohm does the same when discussing participatory thought. See Bohm, 1996, p. 84, and Moxnes, 1999,
p. 1427, and Wilber, 1979, 2001.
251
Bergson, 1949, p. 23-24. See also The Unique World Argument of Plato, which we did discuss.
252
Penrose, 1994, p. 368. Beck & Eccles, 1992, p. 11357-61 represent the more notable exception from this
view. However, they as well present a quantum mechanical model for the relationship of brain activity to
conscious intentions.
253
Jung, 1968, p. 17.
254
Baylor, 2001, p. 238. See also Cappon, 1994. His work is discussed below.

59
Figure 3.2.1 A Model of Intuition

T h in k in g

S e n s a tio n I n tu itio n
Ego

F e e lin g

Rationality
Jung calls active thinking a rational function, because it arranges the contents of ideation
under concepts, in accordance with a rational norm of which we are conscious. Passive or
intuitive thinking is beyond rationality because it arranges and judges the contents of ideation
by norms of which we are not conscious, and therefore cannot recognize as being in accord
with reason. Only subsequently, we may be able to recognize that the intuitive act of
judgment accorded with reason, although it came about in a way that appears irrational.
However, there are numerous norms of rationality, many of which we are not conscious, and
we can thus not avoid the question; what is the ontological foundation for our normative
theories of rationality? Jung does not address this issue properly and we may arrest him on
this pivotal point because we have discovered fairly strong arguments, indicating that intuition
does assist in the building of such a foundation. Moreover, his conception of intuition seems
to stop short at the second level of intuition. The promise of the third level is consciousness of
the unconscious. It may thus reveal what norm of rationality the individual ego is evolving by.

Jung maintains that thinking and feeling are rational functions in so far they are decisively
influenced by reflection. They function most perfectly when they are in the fullest possible
accord with the laws of reason. The irrational functions, sensation and intuition, are those
whose aim is pure perception.255 Intuition functions most perfectly when it is in the fullest
possible accord with the archetypes “which represent the laws governing the course of all
things we can experience.”256 The puzzling point then, is that it is defined as irrational.
Tentatively, we may indicate that this is because he emphasizes the more common first level
of intuition. In philosophical epistemology, intuition is seen as pure perception as well.
However, contrary to Jung, it is also seen as main distributor of the intelligible world of pure
reason. Thus, it is defined as rational. This may be due to emphasis on the second and third
level of intuition. The immediate and direct nature of intuition is seen as closer to the Ideas,
Forms and Archetypes than the indirect or reflected nature of analytic, discursive thinking,
which is relative to an ego. This is plausible. The fully developed, mature intuition is so to
speak integral to these more permanent laws of the psyche. Jung then, breaks the long
tradition of conceiving intuition as rational. We must therefore take further note of his
definition of rationality.

255
Jung, 1971, p. 459.
256
Ibid. p. 401.

60
Interestingly he defines it as an attitude whose principle is to conform thought, feeling and
action to objective values.257 Objective values are established by the everyday experience of
external facts on the one hand, and of inner, psychological facts on the other. Such
experiences, however, could not represent objective values if they were valued as such by the
subject, for that would already amount to an act of reason, Jung argues. “The rational attitude
which permits us to declare objective values as valid at all is not the work of the individual
subject, but the product of human history.”258 Jung’s view then, is that objective values, and
reason itself, are firmly established complexes of ideas handed down through the ages.
“Countless generations have labored at their organization with the same necessity with which
the living organism reacts to the average, constantly recurring environmental conditions,
confronting them with corresponding functional complexes.”259 In this line of argument,
individual, subjective rationality is not given much guidance. Moreover, this definition of
rationality is more or less identical to the one of archetypes. Archetypes are perceived by
intuition. In a strict sense then, it is not logical of Jung to define intuition as irrational.

This account is contrasted by his definition of irrationality, which is not something contrary to
reason, but something beyond. “The irrational is an existential factor which, though it may be
pushed further and further out of sight by an increasingly elaborate rational explanation,
finally makes the explanation so complicated that it passes our powers of comprehension. The
limits of rational thought being reached long before the whole of the world could be
encompassed by the laws of reason.”260 A completely rational explanation of an object that
actually exists is thus a Utopian ideal according to Jung. Only an object that is posited or
postulated can be completely explained on rational grounds, since it does not contain anything
beyond what has been posited by rational thinking. This is the case with empirical science,
because by deliberately excluding the accidental it does not consider the actual object as a
whole, but only that part of it which has been singled out for rational observation.261 Such an
object is usually devoid of its full context. It therefore tells us only half the story, according to
Jung. This view on rationality is thus consonant with Kant’s notion of the analytic a priori,
and with reasoning system 2, which will be elaborated later on. It also reflects the view of
Bergson, who limits the use of the word intellect to discursive thinking, while intuition is
defined as supra-intellectual.262

It is on this background then we must understand Jung, when he defines thinking and feeling
as directed, rational functions. “When these functions are concerned not with a rational
choice of objects, or with the qualities and interrelations of objects, but with the perception of
accidentals which the actual object never lacks, they at once lose the attribute of directedness
and, with it, something of their rational character.”263 The kind of thinking or feeling that is
directed to the perception of accidentals, is irrational, and is either intuitive or sensational.
They find fulfillment in the absolute perception of the flux of events Jung writes, as if echoing
Heraclitus and Bergson. “Hence, by their very nature, they will react to every possible
occurrence and be attuned to the absolutely contingent, and must therefore lack all direction.

257
Ibid. p. 414. “To have an attitude means to be ready for something definite, even though this something is
unconscious; for having an attitude is synonymous with an a priori orientation to a definite thing, no matter
whether this be represented in consciousness or not.”
258
Ibid. p. 458.
259
Ibid.
260
Ibid. p. 454.
261
Ibid. p. 455.
262
Ibid. p. 108. My italics.
263
Ibid.

61
For this reason I call them irrational functions.”264 Again, Jung is opposing himself. He
defines intuition as the ability to perceive, and even foresee processes and possibilities, thus it
must possess an innate direction. We will return to these issues in the succeeding chapter on
intuition and rationality.

3.3 Recent Works on Intuition

In this paragraph, the historical and chronological account is taken one step further. It may
illustrate why the concept of intuition has become so multi-faceted, ambiguous and
fragmented. This particular approach is chosen, much because such an elongated frame of
reference will aid us in delineation and validation of reliable dimensions and categories to be
applied in the empirical research. The theoretical account on intuition indicates that; timing,
possibilities, previous experience, and synthesis, are important aspects of intuition, and this is
reflected in the questionnaire. A diligent embedding of the contributors in such a historical
frame of reference may also facilitate a structured reading of this concepts elusive evolution.
There is a second purpose involved and that is to make explicit some of the key authorities
that directly or indirectly have moved the philosophical concept of rational intuition into a
psychological one, identified with biased, irrational, and automatic processing. We have
learned that with Bergson, and definitely, with Jung, central aspects of the rational and
intelligible world are defined as unconscious. This is posing difficulties, reflected in the more
recent works on intuition. Here the immediate and direct access and integral awareness of
Ideas, Forms and Archetypes is gradually dissolving.

Many psychologists, and most notably Bastick, have strived to define intuition in terms of its
numerous properties. Altogether, he discusses 20 different properties of intuition.265 My
dissertation is however limited to its main aspect, the cognitive. Necessarily, such a focus
must influence on the succeeding discussion. In scrutinizing the databases then, back to their
origin, we find a relative lack of scientific interest in intuition. If we use the PsychInfo service
of the American Psychological Association, and search articles published in scientific journals
between 1887 and 2003 for the key word intuition there are a mere 2 128 entries, while there
are 239 000 entries for analysis. In the Philosophers Index there are only 78 articles on
intuition from 1940-2001, the major bulk from 1990 and onwards. Hogarth, in his thorough
exposition of intuition, writes that one reason may be that the concept has not been well
defined, another that it covers too many phenomena.266

Before we continue with the more recent views on the issue, we should take note of a couple
of old books on intuition. One written in 1882 has its focus on two schools of mind.267 The
author argues that one school is rooted in knowledge from observation and experience, and
one is rooted in ideas, principles, and truths originating in native power or as seen in the
inward light of the mind. “The first type of intelligence is linked to analysis and deductive
knowing, and the latter to intuition and inductive knowing.” Yet another, thorough inquiry is
pursued by Diblee in 1929. He maintains that sensation is to feeling what intuition is to our

264
Ibid. My italics.
265
Bastick, 1982, p. 6, 25. In 1978, Bastick searched for the word intuition in 5 relevant databases. Of the 2 692
000 articles and reports, only 24 were studies of intuition.
266
Hogarth, 2001, p. 6. See also DiSessa, 1983.
267
McCosh, 1882, p. 3-4.

62
thought. “Sensation has a definite physical basis, and acts mostly in full consciousness.
Intuition grasps the material, the complex abstract propositions extra-consciously and presents
it to thought as a complete whole, or according to some preconceived pattern. It constitutes a
peculiar enlightenment in what each individual knows to be a specially, dark corner for
himself. It is an inward vision whereby knowledge becomes unified.”268 Diblee argues that
intuition as an intellectual function, is not only concerned with original presentations, or
perceptions as Jung would say, but is continually penetrating conscious thought and being
modified by it. “It is the reappearance of changed ideas and images, which affords the
strongest proof of the reality of intuition.”269 This is a connaissance rèflèchie, a return of
knowledge on itself, a synthesis to a second degree, resembling Bergson’s counter analysis.
This activity may be due to reserves of intellectual strength, a certain logical honesty, or it
may be owing to greater independence of instinctive influences, he argues.

Katharine Wild
A book much referred to, is the one written by Wild, in 1938. She reviewed thirty writers on
intuition, including Spinoza, Kant, Bergson, Croce, Jung, and Whitehead. She concluded that,
common to most definitions of intuition is the idea of reaching a conclusion, a synthesis, a
formulation, or a solution to a problem without being aware of the process which this
conclusion or synthesis is reached. Synthesis is thus one item in the questionnaire. “There are
two kinds of such immediate intuition. The first instance is where the objects are universal, or
universally acknowledged when understood, and the second is where the object is enjoyed by
only one particular mind.”270 This may correspond to the collective and personal
unconsciousness, or level one and two intuitions. Cause or responsibility is given as examples
of the first, and the beauty of a particular three blown by a particular wind in a particular light,
is given as example of the second instance.

The first instance can be further subdivided into particular universal intuitions such as Kant’s
categorical imperative, and into what may be called general universal intuitions, such as
Plato’s goodness, Wild argues. Furthermore, “intuition gives us insight into reality as opposed
to, or supplementing appearances, and it differ in degree, rather than kind. The result may be
an infinitely progressing realization of variety in the creative possibilities of the universe. It is
a subconscious, or preconscious working of the normal mind, and it brings with it a certain
degree of compulsion to action. It is largely teleological in its motives and is the minister of
final causes, thus it has in consequence a prophetic aspect. It is an endowment of specially
gifted people and is the crown of reason. Intuition thus introduces novelty into the world.”271
The main function of intuition is therefore recognition of values, and it is intuition, rather than
the discursive intellect, that connects man with a spiritual world, she argues.

Mario Bunge
In 1962 Bunge gives yet another systematic review of intuition. He applies a critical view on
this ambiguous Wittgensteinian family concept. In his thorough investigation, he argues that
Kant’s pure intuition, Bergson’s metaphysical intuition, and Husserl’s intuition of essences,
play no role in science. Moreover, he argues that all the intuitions of scientists are normal
modes of perceiving and thinking. In the language by means of which we speak of science,

268
Diblee, 1929, p. 84-99. My italics.
269
Ibid.
270
Wild, 1938, p. 230-233.
271
Ibid. My italics.

63
intuition designates, according to Bunge, first modes of perception. That is, “quick
identification of a thing, event, or sign, clear understanding of the meaning, or mutual
relations of a set of signs, and interpretation ability.”272 The latter is defined as the ease with
which the correct interpretation of artificial signs is accomplished. Secondly, he mentions
imagination. “This is a representation ability, or geometrical, spatial intuition. It is also a skill
in forming metaphors, and in creative inventiveness and inspiration.”

Thirdly, there is intuition as valuation, or sound judgment, phronesis, discernment, or insight.

Finally, he elaborates on intuition as reason, that is, catalytic inference, power of synthesis
and common sense. “Catalytic inference is a quick passage from some propositions to other
propositions perhaps by skipping stages so rapidly that the premises and the intermediary
processes are not noticed. But the premises and the intermediary steps, that have been skipped
or forgotten, are so many that only a trained mind can arrive in this way at likely
conclusions.” Power of synthesis or global vision and synoptic grasp, is defined as “the ability
to combine heterogeneous, or scattered elements into a unified or harmonious whole.”
However, only a highly logical mentality is capable of achieving the synthetic apperception of
a logical relation or set of relations, he says. Such a skill is defined as intellectual intuition.
Common sense is judgment founded upon ordinary knowledge according to Bunge.273 In this
account, we start to see an emphasis on rapid, automatic, effortless inference.

Malcolm Westcott
In 1968, the first attempt to measure individual differences in intuitive thinking in the
laboratory was pursued by Westcott. He states that “a conclusion based on intuition typically
is characterized by less explicit information than is ordinarily required to reach that
conclusion.”274 As this rather simple definition is applied in the popular RAT tests as well, we
should note that it is opposing the one of extraverted intuition given by Jung, as well as the
third level of intuition. We will return to the Remote Associate Test below. We also note that
the main difficulty in measuring intuition, when defined this way, is to create a situation in
which individuals may attempt to reach conclusions, or solve problems in the presence of
varying amounts of information. Furthermore, there must be a way of measuring how much
information a given individual requires, and how much is normally required. Finally, there
must be some conclusion or solution, which is consensually valid, Westcott argues.275 One
example is the clue January. If the subject asks for a second clue, the reply is February. The
subject may now suggest intuitively that the fifth clue should be June. Another popular
approach is to provide a series of pictures that includes more and more details. If the
respondent is able to recognize the pictured object early in the sequence, it may indicate a
well functioning intuition. Interestingly, Bartlett suggested much the same technique as a
possible measure of intelligence. He indicates that: “there may be a direct relation between
capacity to utilize minimal information (in terms of number of items) and high ranking
intelligence.”276

Westcott discovered that subjects do differ in the amount of explicit information they require
before attempting solutions to problems and in the degree of success they have in reaching
accurate solutions. These two characteristics were independent of each other. That is, success

272
Bunge, 1962, p. 67-91. See also Myers, 2002, and Wilder, 1967.
273
Ibid.
274
Westcott, 1968, p. 97-98. My italics.
275
Ibid.
276
Bartlett, 1958, p. 31.

64
was not related to the amount of information. Those individuals who were highly successful
on the basis of less information than is usually required to arrive at an accurate conclusion
were designated as intuitive problem solvers, while those who showed a propensity for acting
on little information with poor results were called wild guessers. Two other categories of
subjects were designated as cautious careful problem solvers and cautious careful failures.
The former group demanded a great deal of information and was successful in using it, while
the latter failed to use it adequately.277

The successful intuitive thinkers tended to have slightly higher mathematical aptitudes than
the other groups. Their verbal aptitudes and their academic grades were not distinctive, but
they tended to be slightly more visible to their instructors, and they were rated slightly higher
in terms of their rapidity and accuracy of conceptualization, according to Westcott. More
interesting were the characteristics of their attitude, which differed significantly from those of
all the other groups. “They tend to be unconventional and comfortable in their
unconventionality. They are confident and self-sufficient, and do not base their identities on
membership in social groups. Their skills and investments in social interaction for its own
sake are relatively low, and when they go along with a group it is not because of any
particular value placed on social conformity.”278 These findings are in accordance with those
of Jung’s typology.

Westcott also states that, “in social situations the successful intuitive thinkers appear to
maintain considerable control of affect, except under special conditions such as ‘necessity’ or
duress. In non-social pursuits, they can become very affectively involved. Their investments
appear to be primarily in abstract issues, either at the academic-intellectual level, or at the
level of human values.” This is in accordance with the philosophical account and Jung’s
abstract intuition. “In their pursuit of these concerns they explore uncertainties and entertain
doubts far more than the other groups do, and they live with these doubts and uncertainties
without fear. Thus, they enjoy taking risks, and are willing to expose themselves to criticism
and challenge. They can accept or reject criticism as necessary, and they are willing to change
in ways that they deem appropriate. There is resistance to control and order imposed from
without, but in contrast, they maintain a high sense of morality, which is generated from
within.” Moreover, they describe themselves as independent, foresighted, confident, and
spontaneous, according to Westcott.279 This is a coherent picture, of an autonomous, self-
determining individual. These findings will be important when we later turn to a specific
discussion of intuition and rationality. In his thorough inquiry, Elster advocates the view that
autonomy is required in order to have substantially rational desires.280

Roni Summers
In Summers’ doctoral work from 1976, A Phenomenological Approach to the Intuitive
Experience, the subjects were students taking the Exploring Intuition workshops for credit at
University of California. Only one quality seemed to be consistently present throughout all
the 56 written responses, this being increased new awareness.281 This was determined
subjectively as well as objectively. Those qualities, which seemed to be present most
frequently, were first a very strong intensity to the experience, which was felt overall or

277
Westcott, 1968, p. 119.
278
Ibid. p. 140.
279
Ibid. p. 137, 143. My italics.
280
Elster, 1983, p. 20.
281
Summers, 1976, p. 172. See also Chinen, 1985, Claxton, 1998, and Raidl, 2001.

65
totally throughout the body. There was also a sense of being guided, directed or guarded. The
source of the intuition was experienced as coming from within, and the experience was
unexpected. The intuition came into awareness spontaneously and instantly, and there was an
increased awareness or new insight about themselves or others. There was also an experience
of clarity about the awareness and less frequently a certainty about it. The intuition seemed
right for the participants, or they sensed something or someone was not right. There was
neither thoughts nor analysis at the time of the experience, or there was an experience of
conflict between the analytical intellect and intuition. Summers thus offers the following
definition: “An intuitive experience is a spontaneous, unexpected, intensely, clear inner
awareness, which occurs without the aid of intellectual reasoning, and is experienced as right
or fitting to the person.”282 Here we recognize the first level of intuition, only.

Frances Vaughan
Vaughan’s book from 1979 offers a typology of ways in which intuition might manifest itself.
She credits the development of this schema to a workshop on professional training in psycho-
synthesis that she had taken with R. Gerard. These levels of awareness include physical,
emotional, mental, and spiritual. Awareness here refers to the levels at which the intuition is
consciously perceived, and this is coherent with the Buddhist doctrine. Mental refers to
images, ideas, and thoughts, or the sixth class of consciousness. The dream is a frequent
vehicle of these kinds of intuition, and they may show up immediately after profound sleep.
Her spiritual intuition resembles certain aspects of integral intuition, and she writes that here
the knower becomes one with the known, and knows from inside, by identification with,
rather than information about, what is known. Interestingly the etymology of intuition or
intueri is to look at or in-to. In her definition she goes along with Jung and says that:
“Intuition allows one to draw on that vast storehouse of unconscious knowledge that includes
not only everything that one has experienced or learned, either consciously or subliminally,
but also the infinite reservoir of the collective and universal consciousness, in which
individual separateness and ego boundaries are transcended.”283 With Vaughan then and even
more so with Bastick, an emphasis on emotional involvement is coming to the fore. Even
though Jung defines feelings as a rational function, this emphasis strengthens the tendency to
see intuition as irrational.

Tony Bastick
In 1982, Bastick wrote the massive 500 pages Intuition, which is a major contribution. The
bibliography contains close to 700 references. His ambition is to define intuition in terms of
its more common properties and to formalize any previously vague terms employed in its
definition. In this, he is fairly successful. He identifies and discusses twenty properties related
to several issues that he finds to be of special relevance.284 First, he discusses intuitive
knowledge and its correctness, indicating that subjective consistency makes intuition seem
correct. This relates to logic of appropriateness, which we will return to later.285 Intuition is

282
Ibid. p. 173-174.
283
Vaughan, 1979, p. 4.
284
Bastick, 1982, p. 25. The twenty properties are; quick, immediate, sudden appearance, emotional
involvement, preconscious process, contrast with abstract reasoning, logic, or analytic thought, influenced by
experience, understanding by feeling – emotive not tactile, associations with creativity, associations with
egocentricity, intuition need not be correct, subjective certainty of correctness, recentring, empathy, kinesthetic
or other, innate, instinctive knowledge or ability, preverbal concept, global knowledge, incomplete knowledge,
hypnogogic reverie, sense of relations, dependent on environment, transfer and transposition.
285
March, 1994, p. 58.

66
seen as a natural function most suitable to the immediate needs of the individual. “As it
satisfies these immediate needs, the intuition may always be considered correct in the
immediate situation.” However, by other later or external criteria the intuition may be
considered inappropriate or wrong, according to Bastick.286 This is not in agreement with
Jung who advocates that extraverted intuition seeks to discover what possibilities the
objective situation holds in store, and resembles the hunch, gut feeling, or good nose for
objectively real possibilities.287 Neither does it resonate with the third level of integral
intuition. The confidence and certainty that attends the intuitive product and guides the
process, is due to a proportionate reduction in the mild anxiety that initiates the process. This
can be measured in GSR, heart rate and respiration, he argues.288 Moreover, he also argues in
accordance with Baylor, that intuition is influenced by experience.

Secondly, he thus elaborates at some length, its dependence on emotional involvement,

claiming that empathy and projection are essential to intuition. “The intuitive process is
dependent upon the interaction of emotional states and cognitive processes. It is evident from
the feeling of satisfaction and reductions in tensions that accompany an insight that emotional
involvement plays a part in intuitive processes. A whole body unifying theory is needed to
describe intuitive processes.”289 The latter conclusion, namely that a unifying theory is
needed, is indeed in accordance with the Buddhist doctrine. Bastick goes on claiming that one
main contrast between intuition and reason is that pure reason is considered to be independent
of feelings, whereas intuition is dependent on our feelings at all stages. That is, “from the
initial perception where feeling impressions of the information are created, through the
intuitive processing where feelings may change, to the final intuition, which has its
accompanying feeling of certainty.”290 Again, this contradicts Jung’s theory, where thinking
governed by feeling, is seen as different from intuition, and where feeling is defined as
rational.291 I prefer not to enter this difficult matter, as it will take us far beyond the scope of
this thesis. It suffices to say that a mature, integral intuition may be aware of any level of
consciousness, including feelings, or the second skandha, to use Buddhist terminology.

Thirdly, Bastick discusses the important phenomenon of preconscious incubation.

Apparently, this is an issue of great relevance. We remember that Buddhist doctrine
emphasizes that “whatever we have done or said or thought or experienced, a trace or residue
of it remains there; nothing is absolutely lost.”292 Moreover, these seeds are active
impressions, left like seeds in the soil, and when conditions are favorable, they sprout and
produce fruits. We thus start to see the origin of new ideas, images, and flashes of insight that
arise out of the mind itself. Bastick then, says that the incubation period is the name given to
the time in which the intuition develops, the time between realizing the problem and arriving
at an intuitive solution.293 We might thus suggest that his view is extended to include the
entire time span of the individual mind and being. Bastick also writes that the word incubation
implies that the intuitive processing is going on out of awareness. More or less so, we could

286
Bastick, 1982, p. 322.
287
Jung, 1971, p. 367, 369.
288
Bastick, 1982, p. 170.
289
Ibid. p. 133. See also Flyvbjerg, 1990, and Forgas, 1995.
290
Ibid. p. 58-59.
291
Jung, 1971, p. 482. “Thinking that is governed by feeling I do not regard as intuitive thinking, but as thinking
dependent on feeling; it does not follow its own logical principle but is subordinated to the principle of feeling.
In such thinking the laws of logic are only ostensibly present; in reality they are suspended in favor of the aims
of feeling.”
292
Sangharakshita, 1998, p. 56. For a more recent contribution see Dorfman, et al. 1996.
293
Bastick, 1982, p. 147.

67
add. An increasing number of people are now focusing in on the possible consequences of all
the violence presented to us through the media channels. They speculate in a relation with the
increase of violent behavior that we see in young children. “As a result of this hidden
processing the intuition comes to light fully formed like the incubation process of an egg
where the chick develops unseen and comes to light fully formed.”294 The incubation period
may range from a short period to many years, and Bastick shows how the length of the
incubation period varies when three emotional processes are combined.

Kaufman & Helstrup as well, claim that intuition is closely related to the phenomenon of
incubation. However, this phenomenon is difficult to investigate scientifically. Intuition is by
them, defined as the situation where we are confronted with a task and have a vague sensing
or gut feeling of the correct answer, but we cannot give a conscious argument. It just feels
correct. Is it then possible to make such a vague, implicit, and unconscious process accessible
to experimental analysis? They refer to Bowers et al, who have tried. What they did was a
Remote Associates Test. In brief, it is a test, where you have e.g. three words, that all may be
related by a single word. Goat, white, moon, can all be related to cheese. The task is
complicated by making dyads of triads, that is, two pairs with three words in each. Only one
of the triads can be solved, and is called coherent. After only a few seconds, the respondents
are interrupted, and asked which pair can be solved. The main finding in such an approach to
intuition, is that it is possible to solve the puzzle, beyond what is to be expected.295 In a
creative way the RAT tests reveals the coherent, synthetic nature of intuition. Bowers thus
defines it as “a preliminary perception of coherence (pattern, meaning, structure) that is at
first not consciously represented, but which nevertheless guides thought and inquiry toward a
hunch or hypothesis about the nature of the coherence in question.”296

The pivotal question then, is this: what exactly is going on in the darkness of the incubation?
Quite a few authors maintain that the subconscious is reasoning in the same way as the
conscious mind.297 One example is Simon’s remark, that intuition and judgment – at least
good judgment – are simply analyses frozen into habit, and into the capacity for rapid
response through recognition.298 He thus alludes to experience as rationale for intuition. This
is the normal view. However, an example given by Baylor, may illustrate the profound
difficulties we face.299 It goes more or less like this: Consider first the experienced, expert
physicist who makes a paradigmatic discovery in her field. On the other hand, there is the
young boy, who is learning geometry and related proofs. He proceeds on his own and
insightfully figures out a famous geometrical problem, even though he is a relative novice.
Mozart is yet another case in point. Six years old, he composed his first symphony. Is it only
experience that facilitates brand new insight? Is it required? Is it beneficial to approach a field
with a naive view? How can both these types of intuition be accounted for? The second level
of intuition relates to all the accumulated collective experience and knowledge. May an
answer be found there?

This matter is not easily settled. Bastick makes the point that intuition cannot be considered a
very fast unconscious inference, because then a long incubation process would not be

294
Ibid.
295
Kaufman & Helstrup, 2000, p. 313-315.
296
Policastro, 1995, p. 106.
297
Simon, 1987, p. 57-64. See also Bastick, 1992, p. 147-148. He refers to e.g. Bartlett, 1968, Cartwright, 1955,
Cobbs, 1952, and Bunge, 1962.
298
Ibid. p. 57-64.
299
Baylor, 2001, p. 238.

68
necessary. This is logical and opposes the view of intuition described in dual process theories.
Why then is it sometimes immediate and fast and at other times very slow indeed? We have
struggled with the acclaimed immediacy of intuition and suggested that it is a result of a
balanced and integral state of mind, which is upholding the coherence of the first six senses
or classes of consciousness on the one side, and class eight and nine on the other. It is thus
their common ground with no body of its own, and it is in this sense it is an immediate and
singular synthesis, as Plato, Kant, Bergson, and others, argue. The length of the incubation
period then, may be dependent upon the balance of our mind as well as the quality and purity
of the seeds stored in the unconscious. In this context, we can fully appreciate the contribution
of Jung. His view is namely that “the unconscious is not just something, that lies there like a
psychic caput mortuum, but coexists with us and is constantly undergoing transformations
which are inwardly connected with the general run of events.”300 That is, events in the
objective world of physical appearances and doxa to use Plato’s terminology.

A Fourth issue, discussed by Bastick is the global knowledge property of intuition, which is
emphasized by Fishbein as well.301 The global aspect is better understood if we think in terms
of the second level of intuition, and its reference to the universal laws of the collective
unconscious. The intuitive process then, according to Bastick, “involves global perception of
all the relevant information which comprises the whole information field for the intuitive
process comprising both external and internal stimuli. Ideas come in a completed form.”302
Here he echoes Jung and his notions of introverted and extraverted intuition. If then, we allow
intuition to comprise both internal and external stimuli it is only a short way to its mature
integral aspect. This aspect is, to my knowledge not properly explored theoretically before.
Thus, this thesis aims at initiating a discussion of the different levels of intuition. Bastick
argues that analytic ideas are constructed by comparing two parts at a time. The global nature
of the information used in the intuitive process is markedly different. “The total information
being used at any time in the intuitive process is defined by its physiognomy, that is its
associated feelings and ideas. Information may be contributed simultaneously through all
modalities, speeding the process. Particularly non-verbal modalities are used, commonly
spatial.”303 Bastick specifies two extreme cases of information content where the intuitive
process is used, namely complex, or very little information. The former is characterized by a
vast amount of duplicated, interrelated information. In the latter case, there is not only little
information but also little time for processing.

A fifth issue that he digs into is the contrast between intuition and analysis. It is one of the
most noticed properties on intuition, he says, citing e.g. Kline, Baer, Poincarè, Berne,
Hutchinson, Koestler, Allport, Clark, Giordana, Skinner, Board, and Bartlett.304 “The analytic
process may be considered as a step-by-step process comparing just two elements at a time.
This contrasts with the intuitive process, which uses feedback feelings for the whole field of
knowledge simultaneously. This intuitive parallel process results in, among other things, a
marked difference in the speed of processing.” Consecutive discrete binary and linear
relations are thus characteristic of analytic thoughts and logical reasoning, according to
Bastick. “Intuitive thought in contrast seems to use the whole field of knowledge. Associated
ideas and feelings affect one another in a non-linear simultaneous feedback process.”305 This

300
Jung, 1971, p. 401. My italics.
301
Fischbein, 1987, p. 53.
302
Bastick, 1982, p. 249. My italics.
303
Ibid.
304
Ibid. p. 51-52.
305
Ibid. p. 52-53. My italics.

69
process is often preconscious. The intuitive type thus prefers complexity and multidimensional
categorizing in contrast to the analytic type who prefers simplicity and symmetry, Bastick
argues. Multidimensional categorizing resembles Kant’s reference to the transcendental.
Whether or not intuitive and analytic thought are two ends of one continuum is yet another
controversial issue. Bastick emphasizes the work of Ausubel, who see them as two distinct
modes. The first model accounts for the fact that linear processing occurs in analytic
processes but not in intuitive. The highly analytic individual moves primarily within the
subordinate concepts (Sub C) and to super-ordinate concepts, with referral back to
subordinate concepts, thus expanding the subordinate concepts. Very little if any exchange is
between super-ordinate concepts.306

Super-ordinate Concepts Super-ordinate Concepts

Sub C Sub C Sub C Sub C Sub C

The next model illustrates that highly intuitive individuals move freely from one super-
ordinate concept to another with frequent referral primarily to, and less frequently from,
subordinate exemplars. In other words, from universals to particulars, that is, from the
intelligible world of pure reason to that which comes about of necessity, to use ancient Greek
terminology. This view is consonant with the one suggested above, namely that Ideas, Forms,
and Archetypes serve as super-ordinate anchors, or epigenetic rules, for the second and third
level of intuition.

Super-ordinate Concepts Super-ordinate Concepts

Sub C Sub C Sub C Sub C Sub C

Efraim Fischbein
Fischbein delineates, in 1987, the following key characteristics of intuitive cognitions: self-
evidence, intrinsic certainty, perseverance, coerciveness, theory status, extrapolative and
implicit, as well as global & synthetic. He uses the word intuition as equivalent to intuitive
knowledge, that is, not as a source, not as a method, but, rather, as a type of cognition. He also
distinguishes between intuition and perception, and argues that intuitions refer to self-evident
statements, which exceed the observable facts.307 He thus differs from Jung, who defines
intuition as the function that mediates perceptions in an unconscious way. Concerning first the
self-evident, self-consistent, self-justifiable, or self-explanatory character of intuition,
Fischbein anchors his argumentation in Descartes and Spinoza. He writes that: “If we affirm
that the whole is bigger than each of its parts, that every number has a successor, or that two
points determine a straight line, we feel that these statements are true by themselves without
306
Ibid. p. 57-59.
307
Fishbein, 1987, p. 14.

70
the need for any justification.”308 In consonance with one of the tests that Westcott used, he
suggests that if one has three numbers 1, 2 and 3 one may find intuitively that the fourth
proportional is 6. Six is to three, as two is to one. “Such a conclusion is self-evident and
therefore certain.”309 Fishbein goes along with Summers and Bastick, and argues that it is the
feeling of certainty, that remains a criterion for intuitive knowledge.

Regarding the perseverance and coerciveness of intuition, Fischbein claims that once
established, intuitions are very robust. “We know that matter is composed of atoms which are
in turn composed of extremely small particles moving at an enormous speed. Nevertheless,
the intuitive representation of matter as being composed of moving particles is practically
impossible.”310 Development of conceptual schemas mapping our intuitions may thus be
instrumental. Research along this line of reason, is done by Clarke and Mackaness.311 The
suggested coercive effect on the individual’s way of reasoning is very interesting. It relates to
time and space as a priori Forms of intuition, as well as to the conditioning effect of Ideas and
Archetypes, which represent “the laws governing the course of all things we can
experience.”312 Intuitions thus impose themselves subjectively on the individual as absolute,
unique representations or interpretations. Generally, other alternatives are excluded as
unacceptable, according to Fischbein. “It is a basic difference between the relativity of a,
somehow, conventional viewpoint – as exposed in a formal-logical dispute – and the apparent
absoluteness of an intuitive acceptance.”313

The theory status and the property of extrapolativeness are also easier understood when seen
against the laws hidden in the collective unconscious. “The theoretical property of intuitions
entails several aspects. An intuition is never confined only to stating the universality of a
property or to the perception of a certain fact. In an intuition one generally grasps the
universality of a principle, of a relation, of a law – of an invariant – through a particular
reality.”314 Right here we can refer to the unique world argument of Plato, and recognize a
similar point of view. An intuition then, is not a pure theory. It is a theory expressed in a
particular representation using a model, according to Fischbein. In ancient Greek words, it is a
copy of an original model, resembling an Idea. This relationship will be further illustrated
when we later on suggest holography as a mechanism of how intuition works. An intuition
then, always exceeds the data on hand. This is exemplified in the Westcott type of test, where
the first clue is January, the second February, and the correct guess then is March. However,
such an extrapolative guess is not sufficient to define an intuition, according to Fischbein. A
feeling of certainty is also a necessary characteristic of an intuition. Otherwise, it is a mere
guess. “It is this particular combination of incompleteness of information and intrinsic
certitude that best characterize an intuition.”315

Fischbein as well, emphasizes that intuition is a global, unitary, synthetic view, as opposed to
analytical thinking which is discursive in its very nature. It is thus reminiscent of the concept
of Gestalt. “One may plausibly connect the role of analogy in structuring an intuitive view
with the fact that the meaning of a Gestalt is determined by its basic internal dependencies
rather than by the discrete elements from which it is composed.” As an example, he uses a
308
Ibid. p. 43.
309
Ibid.
310
Ibid. p. 47.
311
Clarke & Mackaness, 2001.
312
Jung, 1971, p. 401.
313
Fischbein, 1987, p. 50.
314
Ibid. My italics.
315
Ibid. p. 51.

71
black-and-white photograph of a person, and argues that: “we recognize the person
immediately, despite the fact that the absolute values of colors and sizes are different. One
identifies the image by grasping the Gestalt, not by considering the details.”316 Fischbein
stresses another point that resembles Jung’s extraverted intuition, namely that such an
integrative, tacit process is based on both subliminal and marginal clues. The subliminal clues
are totally unobservable, while the marginal ones are observable from the corner of the eye.
Finally, he touches upon the issue of more or less stable intuitions, suggesting that this is due
to their structure. As one example of perfectly structured intuitions, he mentions the aggregate
of space intuitions developed in early childhood. Again, this resonates with Kant’s a priori
Forms of intuition. The challenge then, is to be conscious of the implicit models that our
intuitive reactions are surface expressions of.

Daniel Cappon
The final, thorough account on intuition that I will mention, is the one provided by Cappon, in
1994. As one of few, he focuses on both input and output skills, which to some degree
resembles Jung’s introverted and extraverted intuition. He defines the anatomy of intuition as
“the genetically structured and stored capacity or innate ability for intuitive intelligence. In
entropic terms, its potential (negative energy) is stored in the batteries of the collective
memory vault, and discharged (positive energy) through words, numbers, drawings and
actions.”317 In accordance with Jungian terminology he argues that the individual inherits
various amounts of this potential, builds it up and stores its personally fashioned model,
together with its information fuel, in the personal unconscious memory vault. Cappon is here
in full agreement with our main line of argument, and his view resembles level one and two
intuitions. His operational definition is a result of psychological and literary bibliographic
research, as well as clinical observations of more than three thousand patients. It is divided
into input and output skills, ranging from basic perceptual skills to higher ideational and
symbolic ones.

Looking first at Cappon’s input-skills, they are considered latent, or passive, as Jung would
say. Perceptual closure on insufficient time or definition is exemplified by e.g. the
recognition of an object exposed for 1/25 seconds and recognition of an object through a
whiteout. Perceptual recognition is the skill you need to find things in a crowd. Associative &
dissociative perceptual discrimination is exemplified by e.g. recognition of similar or
dissimilar objects from successive exposures. Cappon as well, emphasize cognitive synthesis
as a key feature, which we all use when we assemble jigsaw puzzles. The ability to know
what one did not know one knew is yet another aspect of intuition, which he defines as
psychoosmosis. “This is elicited for instance when puzzling out a word or symbol from a
foreign language, or naming an object, and its use from the very ancient past.”318 The Remote
Associates Test, that we have discussed earlier on, requires that the subject harness many of
these input-skills. Finally, he mentions spontaneous or passive imagination, instant memory
recall, and the ability to estimate time flow.

The activated, output-skills include active imagination, foresight and hindsight. The alpha and
omega of the extension of foresight is the power to predict. “Foresight is not directly based on
stimulus-response situations like the built-up instincts of animals. Rather it is based on stored
knowledge and an innate, quick, cerebral ‘calculation’ of the chance an event will occur. This,

316
Ibid. p. 53.
317
Cappon, 1994, p. 15. See also Cappon, 1989.
318
Ibid. p. 16.

72
then, is a foremost intuitive key to survival and success.”319 In this quote we recognize Jung
and his view that “its prophetic foresight is explained by its relation to the archetypes, which
represent the laws governing the course of all things we can experience.”320 Cappon also
emphasizes optimal timing intervention, the hunch, choice of optimal method and future
application, as well as assortative & dissortative cognitive synthesis. By the latter is meant
e.g. matching a child’s face to his or her face as an adult, and the ability to tell who did not
belong in a group picture of a family, with one stranger in it.321 It is a kind of perceptual
inference. Finally, he relates intuition to the meaning of things. It provides answers to the
question science never addresses, namely – Why? “Intuition instantly perceives the ‘sacred’
objects of universal inspiration that are meant to lend meaning and sometimes to inspire
awe.”322 Thus, it is teleological ideation, such as understanding the meaning of archetypes,
according to Cappon.

Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky

Before we continue with some of the latest contributions, we can take note of the early work
of Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, which has exercised a profound influence on the research on
judgment and decision making. In their study of statistical intuitions, they use the term
intuitive in three different senses. “First, a judgment is called intuitive if it is reached by an
informal and unstructured mode of reasoning, without the use of analytic methods or
deliberate calculation.”323 This is in flat contradiction to Simon’s view that “intuition and
judgment – at least good judgment – are simply analyses frozen into habit.”324 In suggesting
that intuition is informal and unstructured, they echo Jung and his view of intuition as passive,
undirected thinking. Though, it contrasts the view of Fischbein, who argues that stable
intuitions are well structured. This is also the view of Smit, who argues that insofar as
appearances have this ordered relation to each other, and constitute such grounds of
cognition, they constitute empirical intuitions.325

As an example, Kahenman et al. refer to psychologists, and claim that they often follow an
intuitive procedure in deciding the size of their samples, but adopt analytic procedures to test
the statistical significance of their results. Secondly then, they suggest that: “a formal rule or a
fact of nature is called intuitive if it is compatible with our lay model of the world.” As an
example they state that it is intuitively obvious that the probability of winning a lottery prize
decrease with the number of tickets, but it is counterintuitive that there is a better than even
chance that a group of 23 people will include a pair of individuals with the same birthday.
Finally, “a rule or a procedure is said to be part of our repertoire of intuitions when we apply
the rule or follow the procedure in our normal conduct.”326 It is a common sense, as Bunge
pointed out. Here they use the rules of grammar as example.

In summarizing to date, we may say that what we have seen so far is a wavering disagreement
in the conceptual development of a psychological notion of intuition. However, the tendency
is towards one, which equals intuition with: unconscious, irrational, implicit and tacit
processing. Polanyi’s work is illustrative of this trend. He writes that: “in the structure of tacit
319
Ibid. p. 30. My italics.
320
Jung, 1971, p. 401. My italics.
321
Cappon, 1994, p. 16.
322
Ibid. p. 38.
323
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1985, p. 494.
324
Simon, 1987, p. 63. My italics. See also Simon, 1997 and Henley, 1999.
325
Smit, 2000, p. 265. For a further elaboration of his view, see the paragraph on Kant.
326
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1985, p. 494.

73
knowledge we have found a mechanism which can produce discoveries by steps we cannot
specify. This mechanism may then account for scientific intuition – such intuition is not the
supreme immediate knowledge, called intuition by Leibniz or Spinoza or Husserl, but a work-
a-day skill for scientific guessing with a chance of guessing right.”327 What Polanyi here is
describing, is the first level of intuition, only. However, he does recognize several levels of
intuition. So contrary to the situation in philosophical epistemology, intuition is in
psychology, unconscious, implicit and irrational. Its immediate and direct access to the
intelligible world of pure reason, exemplified by its integral awareness of Ideas, Forms and
Archetypes is now only vaguely present. Its status as rational, intellectual thinking is
evaporated.

Experimental psychology is yet another example of this trend. Osbeck refers to Bouthilet who
attempted to define intuition operationally, as the capacity to make correct guesses without
knowing why. Crutchfield is another case in point. He used the word intuitive to describe
improved performance in solving spatial orientation puzzles with repeated performance,
without awareness of the relevance of previous exposure.328 One of Kant’s a priori Forms is
here still silently with us. Osbeck thus indicates that the phenomenon in question appears to
reflect what was eventually described as implicit learning. That is, learning from experience
without awareness of doing so.329 Her view is corroborated by e.g. Lieberman who writes that
implicit learning suggests a mechanism, whereby sequential associations can be learned
without the learner ever being aware of the learning process or its ultimate product.330

Matthew Lieberman
Lieberman provides a social cognitive neuroscience approach, proposing that implicit learning
processes are the cognitive substrate of social intuition. However, in direct opposition to
Bastick, he distinguishes intuition from insight or the, eureka phenomenon. “Sudden insight
also seems to rely on non-conscious processes, but when awareness is derived in insight, it is
not judgment, as is usually the case in intuition.”331 Here he is opposing Jung as well, but is in
agreement with Fischbein. Insight is rather a process, where one suddenly becomes aware of
the logical relations between a problem and the answer, he argues. “In the case of intuition,
usually there is no insight into the logical relations, but an impetus, judgment, hunch, or
behavioral response. That said, intuition is the subjective experience of a mostly non-
conscious process that is fast, a-logical, and inaccessible to consciousness that, dependent on
exposure to the domain or problem space, is capable of accurately extracting probabilistic
contingencies.”332 His hypothesis then, is supported by two arguments. First, he elaborates on
the conceptual correspondence between implicit learning and social intuition, defined as
nonverbal communication. Secondly, he reviews the relevant neuro-scientific data, and finds
that the caudate and putamen in the basal ganglia are central components of both intuition and
implicit learning. He thus establishes a rigorous empirical link.

327
Polanyi, 1969, p. 143-144. See also Polanyi, 1966, and De Bono, 1971.
328
Crutchfield, 1960, in Osbeck 1999, p. 231.
329
Osbeck, 1999, p. 231. She refers to Reber, 1967. For thorough reviews, see Lamberts & Shanks, 1997, Seger,
1994, Shirley, 1996, and Stadler & Frensch, 1998. See also Damasio, 1994, p. 188.
330
Lieberman, 2000, p. 110. See also Nonaka & Konno, 1998, and Pribram, 1991.
331
Ibid. My italics.
332
Ibid. His research becomes even more interesting when aligned with the work of Bradley and Pribram, who
use quantum holography to explain these implicit learning processes. See Pribram, 1971, 1991, 1998, Bradley,
1998, Gunter, 1987, El sawy, 1985, Glazer, 1987, 1998, and McKenzie, 1991.

74
Karl Pribram & The Organization of Memory
At this point in our inquiry, it may be of relevance to speculate a little bit about the
organization of our memory. Pribram suggests that holographic-like processing operates in
the brain with respect to sensory perception and memory, and he links it to intuition.333 In a
hologram, the whole is enfolded in every single part. This is claimed to be a key property of
intuition.334 A hologram thus has enormous storage capacity. This fact makes it conceivable
that our mind has contained within its repositories all our accumulated personal experience
and knowledge, as well as the entire ancestral memory, as envisioned by e.g. Jung.335 The
access key then, which may not be a mere speculation, is intuition.336 Pribram writes: “It is no
great leap to suggest that a holographic-like organization characterizes the network of cortical
cells. The evidence abounds, and readily accounts for the capability of cortex to construct
perceptual images and for the distributed nature of the brain’s memory mechanism.”337 When
one proceeds from the potential domain of energy and momentum to that of space and time,
one is actualizing or unfolding the potential. When one proceeds in the reverse direction one
enfolds, by virtue of the holographic Gabor function, space and time into the frequency
domain.338 Holography thus preserves space and time as a priori Forms of intuition, as Kant
proposed.

Laszlo and Penrose locate Pribram’s work in a modern context. “A strong early proponent of
global (essentially quantum) large-scale coherent ‘hologram’ activity in the brain was Karl
Pribram.”339 In advocating large scale, quantum coherent action in brain function, Penrose is
embracing the principle of holography. It is of course beyond the scope of this thesis to
discuss the details of quantum mechanics. However, a few remarks on its consequences
should be made.340 The perhaps most astonishing consequence is that “quantum mechanics
unifies the idea of the field and its waves, and the particle, all into one.”341 It thus transcends
dualism. This may be of relevance to our comprehension of integral intuition, which is
claimed to be a unified, non-dual state of mind. Another pivotal consequence is that the
quantum potential does not produce, in general, a vanishing interaction between two particles
as the distance between those particles becomes very large. Thus two distant systems may still
be strongly and directly connected. There is a non-local system involved. This is, of course,
contrary to the implicit requirement of classical physics, where it is always assumed that
where two systems are sufficiently far apart, they will behave independently. This is a
necessary condition if the notion of analysis of a system into separately and independent
existent constituent parts is to be carried out.342 Again, this resonates very well with the long
tradition of philosophers claiming the intuitive state of mind to be global, integral, singular,

333
Pribram, 1971, 1991, 1998. See also Pribram, in Gunter, 1987, p. 171, and Talbot, 1991.
334
In Plato’s exposition of intuition, the relation of whole to part and original to image figures prominently. See
also Morgan, 1984, 1986, who relates holography to social change.
335
This is not in opposition to the multi-layer theory of Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968.
336
Govinda, 1969, p. 74. The intuitive state of mind “represents the stabilizing and central point of balance,
upholding the coherence of its contents, by being the center of reference.” See Weisberg 1980.
337
Pribram, in Gunter, 1987, p. 168, 171. My italics. Pribram as well, links holography to intuition.
338
Ibid. p. 170. See McCraty et al. 2004, p. 29, for hard electrophysiological evidence of this process.
339
Penrose, 1994, p. 368. Laszlo, 2003, p. 83. Beck & Eccles, 1992, p. 11357-61 represent the more notable
exception from this view. However, they as well present a quantum mechanical model for the relationship of
brain activity to conscious intentions. See also Lockwood, 1989.
340
Feynman, 1995, p. 36, 117. The wave-particle duality is at the very heart of quantum physics and the brief
explanation of it is this: “When the frequency is low, the field aspect of the phenomenon is more evident, or
more useful as an approximate description in terms of everyday experiences. But as the frequency increases, the
particle aspects of the phenomenon become evident.”
341
Ibid. p. 36.
342
Hiley, 1991, pp. 15-32.

75
synthetic, etc. In addition, it has implications for dual-process theories, where system two is
seen as context-independent. This may thus be questioned.

Amy Baylor
Turning to New Ideas in Psychology, and to Baylor, we find her proposing two models that in
a neat way synthesize many of the loose threads discovered in this paragraph. In the first
model, intuition (I) is perceived as an overlapping of reasoning, immediacy, and the sensing
of relationships, where the latter are influenced by individual knowledge structures. Certain
aspects of it, is in accordance with the model suggested in the section on Jung. However, in
writing that intuitive thinking is proceeding automatically, immediately interpreting the
present relationship, it is made clear that she stops short at the first level of intuition.343

Figure 3.3.1 Baylor’s Model of Intuition

N O N -M E T A C O G N IT IV E IM M E D IA C Y IN S IG H T
A C T IO N -O R IE N T E D
R E A S O N IN G

I
R E A S O N IN G R E L A T IO N S H IP S

M E T A P H O R A N A L O G Y IN D U C T IO N

The second model is u-shaped, and illustrates a number of important issues. Here expertise
and availability of intuition are linked to immature and mature intuition. The interesting twist
introduced by Baylor is primarily the curve itself. She refers to Choi who found that the mean
reaction times for the second graders were significantly higher than those of the
kindergartners, fourth, and sixth graders, when exposed to a Westcott type of test. That is,
they were asked to identify an increasingly more complete picture as soon as possible. Given
these results, and similar results discovered by Schon, she suggests that children initially have
intuitive understanding, but the analytic approach as thought via school conflicts with the
intuitive thinking process, causing them to make mistakes. A similar point is made by
Ausubel et al.344 Thus the curve bends downwards until they achieve more developed,
schooled understanding. It enables them to answer correctly again, utilizing now what she
calls higher order intuitive connections, given a corresponding increase in expertise. “Once a
person attains more expert knowledge structures s/he develops the ability to figuratively ‘see’
different relationships and thus demonstrate mature intuition.”345 Hypothetically, the intricate
issue of long or short periods of incubation may be partly explained by level of expertise.
Accumulated knowledge and experience is thus one item in the questionnaire. Even though

343
Baylor, 2001, p. 238.
344
Ausubel et al. 1978, p. 104-105. “Intuitive (semiabstract and often sub-verbal) concepts also exist –
particularly in childhood, and afterward in the early unsophisticated stage of acquiring a new discipline.”
345
Baylor, 2001, p. 239-241. “I refer to the intermediate area of the curve as representing analytical/non-
intuitional understanding.” See also Hogarth, 2001, p. 268, and Abernathy, 1995.

76
the model presented by Baylor is limited to the first level of intuition, it might be applied to
the second level as well.

Figure 3.3.2 Baylor’s Model of Intuition

IM M A T U R E M A T U R E
IN T U IT IO N IN T U IT IO N
AVAILABILITY

OF INTUITION

N O V IC E L E V E L O F E X P E R T IS E E X P E R T

In concluding this section, we find that many of the authors emphasize aspects of intuition
that are more thoroughly comprehended when anchored in philosophical epistemology.
Examples include its global and coercive nature, its theory status, and the self-evident,
intrinsic certainty. Thus, recently we have seen two books that offer comprehensive,
interdisciplinary perspectives.346 In ending then, we may say that the psychological notion of
intuition refers mainly to the first level of intuition including the following key characteristics;
perception of the personal unconscious, emotional involvement, preconscious incubation,
uniqueness, absoluteness, subjective consistency, synthesis, unification, non-linearity,
multidimensionality, perseverance, and both very fast and very slow processing. Dual process
theories do not alter this conclusion, but provide valuable nuances.

3.4 Dual Process Theories

Philosophers define intuition as rational and superior to analytical thinking primarily because
it is anchored in Ideas, Forms and Archetypes, which are perceived as a priori laws governing
and conditioning all existence. Psychologists disagree and tend to equate intuition with rapid,
automatic, and often biased processing. That is the case in dual process theories as well. In the
chapter on intuition in philosophy we also reached the tentative conclusion that our mind is
either dualistic in its functioning or it is not.347 In the latter case, it is operating on the
suggested third level of intuition. This distinction is in many ways with us in modern
psychology and it is intrinsic to dual process theories. The key differences in the properties of
these two processes as listed by Stanowich and West are presented in the table below.348

Figure 3.4.1 Dual Process Theories

346
Davis-Floyd & Arvidson, 1997, and Ramsey & DePaul, 1998. Many of the papers in these volumes suggest
that philosophical analysis of intuition may usefully inform cognitive theory.
347
The Neoplatonists defined it as inferential or non-inferential.
348
Stanowich & West, 2000, p. 658-659. See also Gilovich et al., 2002, p. 51, 379, 436.

77
Dual-Process Theories
Hammond 1996
Reber 1993
Johnson-Laird 1983
Evans & Over 1996
Sloman 1996
Evans 1984, 1989
Levinson 1995
Epstein 1994, 1996
Pollock 1991
Klein 1998
Shiffrin & Schneider 1977
Posner & Snyder 1975
System 1
Intuitive Cognition
Implicit Cognition
Implicit Inferences
Tacit Thought Processes
Associative System
Heuristic Processing
Interactional Intelligence
Intuitive-Experiential System
Quick & Inflexible Modules
Recognition-Primed Decisions
Automatic Processing
Automatic Activation
System 2
Analytical Cognition
Explicit Cognition
Explicit Inferences
Explicit Thought Processes
Rule-based System
Analytic Processing
Analytic Intelligence
Rational System
Intellection
Rational Choice Strategy
Controlled Processing
Conscious Processing System

System 1 then, is characterized as intuitive, holistic, largely unconscious, and relatively

undemanding of computational capacity. “It conjoins properties of automatic and heuristic
processing as these constructs have been variously discussed in the literature. This system has
as its goal the ability to model other minds in order to read intention and to make rapid
interactional moves based on those modeled intentions.” System 2 is characterized as
analytical, controlled processing. “It encompasses the processes that have been studied by
information processing theorists trying to uncover the computational components underlying
intelligence.”349 As opposed to system 1, it is demanding of cognitive capacity. It is a
relatively slow acquisition by cultural and formal tuition. Stanovich & West argue that system
1, on the other hand, is a relatively fast acquisition by biology, exposure, and personal
experience. A general concern with the intuitive component of system 1 is its rather weak
theoretical platform. This is reflected in Epstein’s work, where face validity of the intuition
scale is the sole means of validation. Hogarth doubts that it captures intuitive processing at a
general level.350

According to Stanowich & West, an important difference between the two systems is that they
tend to lead to different types of task construal. “Construals triggered by System 1 are highly
contextual, personalized and socialized. They are driven by considerations of relevance and
are aimed at inferring intention and meaning, by the use of conversational implication even in
situations that are devoid of conversational features.” The primacy of these mechanisms lead
to what has been termed the fundamental computational bias in human cognition. It is a
tendency toward automatic and radical contextualization of problems, they argue.351

More specifically, this bias includes the tendency to contextualize a problem with as much
prior knowledge as is easily accessible, even though the problem is formal and the only
solution is a content-free rule. It also includes the tendency to see design and pattern in
situations that are random and devoid of pattern and design. Finally, it includes the tendency
toward a narrative mode of thought, and toward enthymematical reasoning.352 This bias then,
is called fundamental, and primary, because System 1 is assumed to permeate all of our
thinking.353 In many ways this view resonates well with Jung and the philosophical account
where Ideas, Forms, and Archetypes are seen as the laws permeating and “governing the

349
Ibid. My italics. They refer to Levinson, 1995. See also Kahneman et al., 1985.
350
Epstein et al., 1996, p. 392. Hogarth, 2001, p. 268.
351
Ibid. p. 659. See also Hogarth, 2001, p. 268.
352
Ibid. Enthymematical reasoning is defined as making assumptions not stated in a problem and then to reason
from those assumptions.
353
Ibid. p. 662.

78
course of all things we can experience.”354 However, System 1 resembles aspects of the first
and second level of intuition, only.

System 2 on the other hand, de-contextualizes and de-personalizes problems. “This system is
more adept at representing in terms of rules and underlying principles. It can deal with
problems without social content and it is neither dominated by the goal of attributing
intentionality, nor by the search for conversational relevance.”355
Stanovich & West argue that System 2 ought to be given priority. This is due to its important
function of abstracting complex situations into canonical representations that are stripped of
context. This is, the same as the analytic a priori of Kant. “It is likely that one computational
task of System 2 is to decouple contextual features automatically supplied by System 1, when
they are potentially interfering.”356 The question we may pose is; how can we separate the
subjective brain from its historical and biological context? Also, is it possible to conceive it as
separate from its unconscious aspect, be it personal or collective? If such a borderline is
illusionary, the distinction between System 1 and 2 may be as well. Much the same concern is
voiced by Bargh & Ferguson when they ask; what controls controlled processes?357 Stanovich
& West recognize this problem and write that the override function of System 2 might only be
needed in a tiny minority of important information processing situations, and that in most
cases the two systems will act in concert. The issue of context is indeed a crucial one. Here it
suffices to say that an object or subject devoid of its context necessarily tells us only half the
story. It thus eludes a proper rational explanation.
In discussing the two types of task construal Stanovich & West focus in on evolutionary and
normative rationality. The biases introduced by System 1 heuristic processing may well be
universal – because the computational biases inherent in this system are ubiquitous and shared
by all humans, they argue. “However, it does not necessarily follow that, errors on tasks from
the heuristics and biases literature will be universal. This is because, for some individuals,
System 2 processes operating in parallel will have the computational power to override the
response primed by System 1.”358 Furthermore, they hypothesize that the features of System 1
are designed to very closely track increases in the reproduction probability of genes. System
2, “while also clearly an evolutionary product, is also primarily a control system focused on
the interests of the whole person. It is the primary maximizer of an individual’s personal
utility. Maximizing the latter will occasionally result in sacrificing genetic fitness.”359 Thus
they argue that because System 2 is more attuned to normative rationality than is System 1, it
will seek to fulfill the individual’s goals in the minority of cases where those goals conflict
with the responses triggered by System 1. This rather cryptic trade-off between personal
utility and genetic fitness is not elaborated by Stanovich & West and several authors oppose
them on this issue.360

Being aware of this intricate issue, they stress that “in the vast majority of mundane situations,
the evolutionary rationality embodied in System 1 processes will also serve the goals of
normative rationality. Our automatic, System 1 processes for accurately navigating around

354
Jung, 1971, p. 401.
355
Stanowich & West, 2000, p. 659. See also March, 1994, p. 57.
356
Ibid. p. 662. They refer to Navon, 1989.
357
Bargh & Ferguson, 2000, p. 938. In yet other words, we may question whether or not analyzing a distorted
dual mind will take us any closer to ‘truth’. See also Sternberg, 1994.
358
Stanowich & West, 2000, p. 660-661.
359
Ibid.
360
Oberauer, 2000, p. 692, Newstead, 2000, p. 690, in Stanowich & West, 2000. S&W refer to Dawkin 1976,
who see evolutionary adaptation as the optimization process of the genes, whereas normative rationality
concerns utility maximization for the so-called vehicle, which houses the genes.

79
objects in the natural world were adaptive in an evolutionary sense, and they likewise serve
our personal goals as we carry out our lives in the modern world.”361 Interestingly, Stanovich
& West argue that one way to view the difference between evolutionary and normative
rationality is that they are not really different types of rationality. Rather, “they are terms for
characterizing optimization procedures operating at the sub-personal and personal levels,
respectively.”362

In applying these notions, we are reminded that Jung anchors his criterion of analytical
judgment in the personal ego. I suggested that a valid criterion for intuitive judgment is to be
found in the self, which includes both the personal and the sub-personal domain. This is also
in accordance with the philosophical account. Thus, we may have come full circle. However,
the appealing promise of the third level of intuition is of a unifying and integral
consciousness. It is the result of a thorough and simultaneous induction and deduction,
perceiving the a priori and the a posteriori, the personal and sub-personal as one. In
summarizing then, I agree with March and suggest that both systems serve the fulfillment of
an identity, and both are therefore intrinsically subjective.363 Perhaps neither one provides the
rationale for a normative theory of rationality. And perhaps normative rationality is
ontologically dependent on intuition, which will be advocated in the next chapter.

Efficacy of Analytical vs. Intuitive Thinking in Expert Judgment

As this thesis focuses on analytical and intuitive thinking in strategic decisions, it is of interest
to look at efficacy. We will return to this issue in the succeeding chapter on intuition in
strategy. Here I limit myself to a discussion of a particularly interesting study undertaken by
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia and Pearson.364 Corresponding to the increased concern with
unconscious or implicit phenomenon within cognitive psychology, experimental interest in
intuitive sources of judgment has increased. Hammond et al. write that intuition is frequently
assumed to be the basis for judgments made rapidly and easily, without awareness of the
inferences supporting them. Eisenhardt & Zbaracki state that: “studying intuition is a way to
create a more realistic view of how strategic decision makers actually think.”365

Performance based on intuitive judgments of the correct solution to a problem, are typically
compared with some established scientific procedure for arriving at a solution. Much of the
research of this nature, particularly in earlier studies, focuses on the shortcomings of intuition
in comparison with analytical processing.366 This is also the case with the well-known study:
Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment, by Dawes, Faust, and Meehl. In considering factors
underlying the greater accuracy of actuarial methods, they emphasize that the mathematical
features of actuarial methods “ensure that variables contribute to conclusions based on their
actual predictive power and relation to the criterion in interest.”367 They also warn that clinical
judgments produce self-fulfilling prophecies. Or as Kahneman and Tversky write: “The

361
Ibid. p. 661.
362
Ibid.
363
March, 1994, p. 61.
364
Hammond, et al. 1997, p. 144-174.
365
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 33. See also Lieberman, 2000, p. 109, Baylor, 2001, p. 237-243, Bargh &
Ferguson, 2000, March, 1994, p. 262, Markley, 1988, p. 85, Schooler, et al., 1999, p. 280, Simon, 1997, p. 129,
Eisenberg, 1984, p. 85, Mintzberg, 1994, p. 303, Hill, 1988, p. 137, Buckingham, 2000, p. 990, Hamm, 1988, p.
78, Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 65, Andersen, 2000.
366
See the work of Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Kahneman, Tversky.
367
Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1985, p. 1671.

80
prevalent tendency to underweight or ignore distributional information is perhaps the major
error of intuitive prediction.”368

In this type of research, the rationality of a person’s intuitive judgment under uncertainty is
usually compared with analytically derived answers produced by a formal model such as
Bayes’s theorem, a multiple regression equation, or other rules from the conventional
probability calculus.369 A key point addressed by Hammond et al., is that such comparisons are
indirect: they compare a person’s intuitive efforts with person-independent operations. That
is, they compare a person’s intuitive processes and judgment with those of an analytically
derived rule or equation put forward as a standard of rationality. Such a comparison cannot
provide a test of whether analytical cognition is inferior or superior to intuitive cognition, and
under what conditions.

Indirect comparisons are undeniably important, but they are necessarily restricted in three
ways, as Hammond et al. argue. “First, because indirect comparisons evaluate intuition with
respect to a standard of rationality, researchers must choose one standard from the many
offered. However, agreement on which standard of rationality is correct, has never been
achieved. The choice of any standard, therefore, is subject to dispute, and any conclusion that
subjects have failed to achieve the standard chosen are sure to be criticized by those who
prefer a different standard.”370 The difficulties in comparing intuitive and analytical
judgments are thus left unresolved. This argument is indeed a pivotal one, and it serves to
legitimate the relevance of both the theoretical and empirical part of my work. It is further
elaborated in the next chapter on intuition and rationality.

Along the same line of reason a second argument is developed. They point to the fact that
indirect comparisons, “cannot fail to show that analytical cognition is equal or superior to
intuitive cognition because analytical models, however chosen, provide a ceiling for
performance.”371 It is thus not surprising, they argue, that studies find that few persons’
intuitive efforts achieve the standard, and none exceed it. Finally, “when indirect comparisons
are made, the analytical models are always provided with all the correct (and only the correct)
substantive information each model requires.”372 They note that in journals, such models are
usually executed without error. “In practice, however, the analytical cognition of persons, in
contrast to analytical computation by formal models, is vulnerable to substantive failures
(insufficient information, incorrect information, incorrect substantive theory) and to
procedural failures (incorrect assignment of numbers to the symbols of the equation,
computational errors, use of an incorrect model, insufficient time).”373 Yet another obstacle is
the conceptual problems, elaborated in this thesis. Despite a long history of dispute then, these
concerns are usually not addressed when the efficacy of intuitive and analytical cognition is
compared. Because the research of Hammond et al. is the first scientific effort to compare
them directly, their results are pioneering.

Indirect comparisons may indeed be valuable, but the restrictions described by Hammond et
al., prevent them from informing us about the relative efficacy of the intuitive and analytical

368
Kahneman, et al. 1985, p. 416.
369
Hammond, et al. 1997, p. 144. They refer to Einhorn, 1981, Jungerman, 1983, Kahneman, Sovic & Tversky,
1985, and Pitz, 1984.
370
Ibid. p. 144, 171.
371
Ibid.
372
Ibid. They refer to Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, and Wright & Murphy, 1984.
373
Ibid.

81
cognition of strategists.374 Direct comparisons on the other hand, will reveal the efficacy of
these modes of cognition in terms of empirical achievement or correctness. Comparisons of
relative efficacy, however, require the presence of an empirical criterion with which
judgments are compared, rather than a standard of rationality. The comparison undertaken in
the empirical part of my thesis is direct, and anchors the relative efficacy, in empirical
decision quality criteria. It is the strategist that can and should define these criteria, which
may differ from case to case. When a set of criteria is available, direct comparisons enable us
to address the age-old question: does a person’s intuitive or analytical cognition produce the
more empirically favorable and accurate answer?

Before we look at their main findings, we should take note of the definitions applied. They
argue that cognitive processes can be arranged on a continuum that runs from intuition to
analysis, and that any point on such a continuum interact in a predictable way with various
task conditions located on a similar continuum.375 Their list of task conditions is included
below, as it is of relevance to the explorative and exploitative decision making contexts
applied in my empirical study. They also say that the task properties induce intuitive or
analytical cognition in order to avoid implying that the relation between task properties and
cognitive properties is inevitable or fully deterministic.

Figure 3.4.2 Task Conditions Inducing Intuitive and Analytical Cognition

Cognitive Processes Intuition Analysis

Cognitive control Low High
Rate of data processing Rapid Slow
Conscious awareness Low High
Organizing principle Weighted average Task specific
Errors Normally distributed Few, but large
Confidence High in answer, low in method Low in answer, high in method

Task Conditions Intuition-inducing state of task Analysis-inducing state of task

characteristics characteristics
Number of cues Large > 5 Small
Measurement of cues Perceptual measurement Objective reliable measure
Distribution of cue values Continuous Discrete
Redundancy among cues High redundancy Low redundancy
Decomposition of task Low High
Degree of certainty in task Low certainty High certainty
Relation between cue and criterion Linear Non-linear
Weighting of cues in environmental model Equal Unequal
Availability of organizing principle Unavailable Available
Display of cues Simultaneous display Sequential display
Time period Brief Long

When direct comparisons were made of the efficacy of 21 expert highway engineers’ use of
intuition and analysis, it was found that not only can intuitive cognition perform as well as
analytical cognition, but it can outperform it as well. Secondly, they found that analytical
cognition is more likely than intuitive cognition to produce extreme errors. This latter result is
in agreement with research done by Peters et al. who found that the analytic approach to
problem solving produces precise answers more often, but the distribution of errors is quite
wide. In contrast to this, intuition is less frequently precise, but more consistently close to the
correct answer.376 Hammond et al. found that the greater the correspondence between task
properties and cognitive properties, the greater the subject’s achievement. “This result

374
Ibid.
375
Ibid. p. 146-149.
376
Peters, 1974, p. 125-131. See also Weigelt, 1988.

82
indicates the task circumstances for which each form of cognition is likely to be most
efficacious and therefore appropriate.”377

Here we should note that a strategic decision making situation is typically characterized by
more intuition-inducing task characteristics. It is a point of some importance for the analysis
of my empirical findings. The latter conclusion of Hammond et al. is the more controversial
because it contradicts the predominating argument that intuition produces biased incorrect
judgments, and thus should be replaced by analytical methods. “In our view, the contradiction
is not an artifact. It occurs for two reasons: (a) the tendency to use multiple definitions of
intuition and (b) the reliance on indirect comparisons, between persons and equations, for
example, rather than on direct comparisons of intuition and analysis within persons.”378 A
suggestion for further research is hence to focus in on conceptual development and direct
comparison, which is the ambition in this thesis.

In concluding this brief discussion of dual-process theories I agree with Bargh & Ferguson
who argue that conscious and non-conscious processes presumably act in concert, and that
both System 1 and 2 are automatic, and determined processes. Furthermore, they emphasize
that previously, automaticity has been taken as evidence that the cognition is environmentally
determined. This is questioned and they recommend that future research should aim at
discovery and delineation of the mechanisms that control controlled processes.379 Throughout
this thesis, I have indicated that the direction to look is towards the personal and collective
unconscious. That is, towards the rational and intelligible world of Ideas, Forms, and
Archetypes, which represent the a priori laws “governing the course of all things we can
experience”, to quote Jung.380 Moreover, the claim is that it is intuition that provides insight
into how this domain is integral to individual consciousness, causing it to work in a more or
less dual and determined manner.

3.5 Conclusion

Philosophers define rational intuition as superior to discursive thinking. In modern

psychology, the situation is more or less reversed. Here the tendency is towards one, which
equals intuition with preconscious incubation, emotional involvement, subjective consistency,
automatic, rapid, biased and effortless processing. It is rather obvious from this psychological
account that the reference to the philosophers’ intelligible world of pure reason has more or
less disappeared in the great black void of the personal unconscious and in the issue of
normative rationality. There is hardly any discussion of the universal Ideas, Forms,
Archetypes and laws that may govern it. In this chapter, I have painstakingly and at great
length aimed at delineation of how this Copernican reversal in our history of epistemology
has taken place. The fragmentation that is sneaking in causes us to wonder how intuition
relates to rationality. This issue is not easily settled but will be further elaborated in the next
chapter. There it is argued that intuition is the ontological foundation for any theory of
normative rationality.

377
Hammond et al. 1997, p. 172.
378
Ibid.
379
Bargh & Ferguson, 2000, p. 939-941.
380
Jung, 1971, p. 400-401. My italics.

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4 INTUITION AND RATIONALITY

4.1 Introduction

How intuition is defined in philosophical and psychological theory is explored in the previous
chapters, thus we have addressed the first research question. A second concern is how
intuition relates to rationality. In recapitulating our main findings, we face the puzzling fact
that philosophers define intuition as rational while psychologists tend not to. Why? In order to
answer this question I do three things. First, I look into the issue of rationality. What is
rationality per se? Apparently, there is no brief or elegant answer. Rather, there is a multitude
of perspectives and this state of affairs is characteristic of the classical theories of normative
rationality as well. Secondly, it is argued with Seung, that intuition is the ontological
foundation for any normative theory of rationality. That is, in his examination of three well-
known forms of rationality; formal and instrumental rationality, and Rawls’s ideal
constructivism, the impossibility of constructing a normative system of rationality without
using some normative intuitions, is demonstrated. Thus, it is argued that our normative view
of rationality may be usefully informed by intuition. Consequently, I then further refine my
sketch of the required theory of intuition. Criteria for rational judgment are also discussed and
a supplementary version of reflective equilibrium, that is intuitive equilibrium, is suggested as
proper frame of reference.

4.2 What is Rationality?

It is, according to Dawes, the potential outcomes, their probabilities, and their values to the
decision maker, at the time the decision is made, that lead us to judge a particular choice to be
wise or foolish.381 But what is rationality per se? This notion as well, is thoroughly elusive.
Numerous entities are rational or irrational: beliefs, preferences, choices or decisions, actions,
behavioral patterns, persons, and even institutions. According to Elster, who distinguishes
more than 20 senses of rationality, the connotations of the term range from the formal notions
of efficiency and consistency to the substantive notions of autonomy or self-determination,
leaving us quite confused.382 March writes that in many of its uses, rational is approximately
equivalent to intelligent or successful, and it describes actions that have desirable
outcomes.383 That is, it serves the best interests of the person making the decision in terms of
his or her current assets, which include “physiological and psychological capacities, as well as
social relationships and feelings.”384 Heterogeneous meanings of rationality are thus
characteristic of the literature, and a brief review does not provide us with a proper
definition.385

Elster elaborates on individual and collective rationality. His thin theory of individual
rationality leaves unexamined the beliefs and the desires that form the reasons for the action,
whose rationality we are assessing, with the exception that they are stipulated not to be
logically inconsistent. Consistency within the desire-, and belief system, and between these
381
Dawes, 1988, p. 7.
382
Elster, 1983, p. 1. See also Elster, in Fløystad, 1982, p. 111-127.
383
March, 1994, p. 1-2. See also Simon, 1997, p. 89, and Parson, 2000, p. 310.
384
Dawes, 1988, p. 8.
385
Ibid., Bazerman, 1998, March, 1994, Elster, 1983, 1986, Plous, 1993, Beach, 1997.

84
systems and the action for which they are reasons, is what rationality in this sense is all
about.386 This thin theory aligns with Føllesdal’s first kind of rationality.387 However, Elster
feels that acting rationally means something more than acting consistently on beliefs, and
desires that are consistent. His suggestion is that we look at: the way in which our beliefs and
desires are shaped. “A belief may be consistent and even true, a desire consistent and even
conformable to morals, and yet we may hesitate to call them rational if they have been shaped
by irrelevant causal factors, by a blind psychic causality operating behind the back of the
person.”388 Rather, they should be well founded and supported by the available evidence, to
quote Føllesdal.389

The difficulty of course, is to delineate the causal origin, and what sort of psychic causal
history our beliefs, desires and values have, as well as what exactly would qualify as the right
sort of history. That is, we would like to extend our perception of the unconscious, this being
a key attribute of intuition. On these crucial issues, he has relatively little to say, but more to
say about the wrong sorts that distort rationality. In brief, they include four drives or cognitive
defects. First, there is adaptive preference formation, which is the often unconscious -
adjustment of wants to possibilities, contrary to the deliberate adaptation favored by character
planners. Secondly, there is preference change by framing, which occurs when the relative
attractiveness of options changes, because the choice situation is reframed in a way that
rationally should make no difference. Thirdly, wishful thinking which is the shaping of beliefs
by wants, and finally, inferential errors or unfounded judgments stemming from defects in the
cognitive apparatus.390

To say that truth is necessary for rational beliefs, and ethical goodness for rational desires, is
to require too much in Elster’s opinion. Rather, he argues in accordance with Føllesdal, that
substantively rational beliefs, or subjective probabilities, are those, which are grounded in the
available evidence. That is, “the positive characterization of rational beliefs can be made in
terms of the notion of judgment, defined as the capacity to synthesize vast and diffuse
information that more or less clearly bears on the problem at hand, in such a way that no
element or set of elements is given undue importance.”391 In its emphasis on a context-rich
synthesis, this definition shares intrinsic similarities with the one of intuition and reasoning
system one. Apparently, it is opposed to the one of the ‘rational’ reasoning system two with
its emphasis on abstraction of complex situations into “canonical representations stripped of
context.”392 However, Elster does not specify what qualifies as evidence, and this is indeed an
intricate issue epistemologically speaking.393 We need only remind ourselves of the Ideas and
inner objects elaborated by Plato Jung.394 Their reality cannot be dismissed. I shall come back
to this later.

386
Elster, 1983, p. 1.
387
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 304-305.
388
Elster, 1983, p. 15.
389
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 304-305.
390
Elster, 1983, p. 25.
391
Ibid. p. 16. My italics.
392
Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 662.
393
Popper, 1989, p. 35, 174-175. On a side note, we may here refer to the accepted Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics, which in brief states that; “objective reality has evaporated.”
394
Jung, 1971, p. 398. “Introverted intuition is directed to the inner object, a term that might justly be applied to
the contents of the unconscious. The relation of inner objects to consciousness is entirely analogous to that of
outer objects, though their reality is not physical but psychic.” The enduring tension between Naturwissenschaft
and Geistwissenschaft may further illustrate this distinction.

85
Føllesdal moves this issue somewhat further along when arguing that our beliefs may go well
beyond the available evidence, as they do in the case of the more theoretical parts of scientific
theories. “But there should be no other competing theories that would be better supported by
the available evidence.” Furthermore: “The specification of the criteria of well-foundedness
would recapitulate epistemology and scientific methodology.”395 To some extent, we have
covered the pivotal issue of epistemology. The philosophical account makes it reasonably
clear that we are justified in claiming intuition to be a relevant component. When Føllesdal
then arrives at the other tricky part, namely specification of the phrase available evidence, he
leaves the reader solely on his own. That is, he does not elaborate the issue.

So where are we then? I have argued that the evidence required for our beliefs, desires, and
values to be well founded necessarily must include knowledge of our own psyche and self.
Unfortunately, the self is more or less unconscious and thus not easily accessible.396
Moreover, this whole business of valid criteria is further complicated by our concern for what
beliefs we should hold, given a certain amount of evidence, and to what extent it is rational to
actively search for additional evidence before we allow our beliefs to settle.397 In the case of
the pure scientist he may very well go on collecting data forever, as truth is the ultimate goal
of his enterprise, causing him to postpone belief formation. The demand for optimal amounts
of evidence leads to an infinite regress and this is the general argument for satisfactory levels
of evidence.

Concerning substantially rational desires or preferences, Elster suggests that autonomy is for
desires what synthetic judgment is for belief. Autonomous desires are desires that have been
deliberately chosen, acquired or modified – either by an act of will or by a process of
character planning. This, he argues, is the ideal of self-determination underlying the Stoic, the
Buddhist and the Spinozistic philosophies. Thus, he as well devotes an entire chapter of his
book The Multiple Self, to Buddhism.398 In recapitulating Buddhist doctrine, we are justified
in stating that the intuitive mind or manas is a key on the path to knowledge of the self and
thus to autonomy.399 Bergson emphasizes a similar point.400 Implicit then, in Elster’s view is
that rationality requires profound self-awareness, and knowing the answer to questions like;
who you are and what the meaning and purpose of your life is. Ideally, we would like to have
awareness of, and consistency between our unconscious values and preferences and those that
we are conscious of. Such self-awareness is rare so we may end up questioning the entire idea
of rationality. In addition, it is indeed impossible to have perfect knowledge about the future
and about consequences following from each alternative thus, it is hard to choose among
alternatives. Moreover, if we did have such enlightened self-awareness would it not be
subjective?

In discussing well founded values, Føllesdal’s makes the important point that when we say a
person is rational we tend to focus almost exclusively on the consistency and well-
foundedness of his or her beliefs and do not take his values or ideals into account, even
though the former may be contingent upon the latter. “This disregard of a person’s values
when we judge his rationality probably reflects the widespread tendency to regard question of
ultimate values as beyond the realm of rational justification.” In yet other words, “It is often

395
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 305. My italics.
396
Elster, 1985, p. 257. As indicated previously, the self may itself ultimately be an illusion.
397
Ibid.
398
Elster, 1983, p. 1, 21. Elster, 1986, p. 28, 233-263.
399
Govinda, 1969, p. 73-75.
400
Bergson, 1949, p. 24-25.

86
claimed that while one may choose means towards an end in a more or less rational way, there
is no notion of rationality that applies to the evaluation of ends, or values.”401

So, what is his solution to this dilemma? The most promising approach to it is according to
Føllesdal, to acquire well-founded values through the method of reflective equilibrium. Thus,
we will take further note of it later. Here it suffices to say that the method of reflective
equilibrium may fall victim to at least two types of critique. The ultimate job of reflective
equilibrium is to say which cognitive states are justified and which are not. It is thoroughly
embedded in the tradition of analytic epistemology. I have voiced the concern that such
epistemology may be ontologically dependent on intuition. In the next paragraph, this
argument is made explicit. Secondly, Stich makes the argument that if primitive tribesmen or
pre-modern scientists or our own descendants think in ways that are quite different from the
ways we think, few of us would be inclined to suggest that all of these are equally good. Some
ways of going about the business of belief revision are better than others. “But just what is it
that makes one system of cognitive processes better than another, and how are we to tell
which system of reasoning is best?” In yet other words, profound cognitive diversity pose
serious challenges to reflective equilibrium.402

Because of these problems and uncertainties, most modern theories of rational choice involve
assumptions. They can be distinguished with respect to four dimensions: knowledge, actors,
preferences, and decision rule.403 We ask; what is assumed with respect to; information
decision makers have about the state of the world and about other actors, preferences by
which consequences are evaluated, number of decision makers, and the decision rule by
which decision makers choose an alternative or utility preference? Similarly, Elster tries very
hard to develop notions of proper judgment and autonomy but concludes that they will have to
be understood as mere residuals after we have eliminated the influence of distorted drives or
cognitive defects.404 Likewise, in discussing rationality of action Føllesdal argues that:
“Rationality always has to do with what the agent ought to choose, given his or her limited
perspectives on the situation, with a limited amount of information, limited imagination and
time for considering different alternatives, and not a question of choosing from within a vast
set of alternatives that lie there ready for one’s inspection.” He thus concludes that rationality
as well-foundedness of belief, values and action is clearly a normative notion not a descriptive
one, and adds, “most of us are not very rational in this sense most of the time.”405 We may
thus feel, rightly, that this is not good enough, being left with a limited, normative definition
of rationality that is a simple negation of a long list of distortions and modifications, which
also fails to be descriptive. A question that perhaps can facilitate further inquiry is thus the
following: What is the ontological foundation of our normative theories of rationality?

In summarizing this paragraph, then, we may admit that we do not have proper conceptual
elegance or agreement on the issue of rationality per se. Rather, there is a multitude of
perspectives, and this is the state of affairs in classical theories of normative rationality as
well. They are discussed in the next paragraph. However, we may indicate that rationality is
related to synthesis and autonomy, and that it is facilitated by intuitive awareness of our
psyche and self.

401
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 306-308. See also, Løwendahl & Wenstøp, 2003, p. 111-112.
402
Stich, In DePaul & Ramsey, 1998, p. 95.
403
March, 1994, p. 7.
404
Elster, 1983, p. 24. See also Diecidue, 2001.
405
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 305-306. Regarding rationality of action, he finds the rational model of choice, described
in the previous chapter to be the best framework currently available.

87
4.3 Intuition as Ontological Foundation for Normative Rationality

Strategic thinking and decision-making are intrinsically related to the issue of rationality. In
the next chapter, it is indicated that human responses often deviate from the performance
deemed normative according to various models of decision-making and rational judgment.
This gap then, between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating
systematic irrationalities in human decision making. However, Stanovich and West who
thoroughly and brilliantly summarize the debate, suggest four alternative explanations that
preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational.406 They posit
that the gap is due to performance errors, computational limitations, the wrong norm being
applied by the experimenter, and different construal of the task by the subject.

In this paragraph, I go along with Stanovich & West and work on their third interpretation,
namely, that the wrong norm is applied. In order to vindicate my position I will argue with
Seung, that intuition is the ontological foundation for any normative theory of rationality.
That is, in his examination of three well-known forms of rationality; formal and instrumental
rationality, and Rawls’s ideal constructivism, the impossibility of constructing a normative
system of rationality without using some normative intuitions, is demonstrated. Thus, I
maintain that our normative view of rationality could be usefully informed by intuition. In
applying this rationale, I then consequently further refine my sketch of the required
supplementary theory of intuition.

By constructivism, we may refer to the thesis; that normative propositions and standards are
constructed by human beings. This thesis is opposed to intuitionism, the thesis that normative
propositions and standards are discovered by intuition.407 Seung argues that though the three
forms of rationality are different from each other, they are motivated by a common concern,
namely normative scepticism, which stems from distrust in the normative ideas delivered by
our intuitive understanding. Let us then start by looking briefly at formal rationality or
constructivism. According to Seung, Kant’s categorical imperative may be considered the
fountainhead of formal rationality. It is a doctrine revived by Hare & Gewirth. “Its method is
to derive normative rules and standards from the principle of rationality without appealing to
substantive ideas, which are given by normative intuition.”408 Seung argues that whether
formal constructivism is implemented in terms of the formal rules of thought or the logical
property of moral language, its ultimate concern is to circumvent normative scepticism by
refusing to rely on normative intuitions. According to Seung, the best example of a purely
formal procedure can be found in R. M. Hare’s work:

“To him all moral judgments are prescriptive. That is not to say they are pure commands, but rather, that they are
supported by reasons. He tries to anchor those reasons in the connection between description and evaluation. ….
Furthermore, to make a moral statement is to make it on principle. Hare maintains that principles are created by
our actions and decisions. And they do not stay the same after being created and adopted. Our decisions and
principles constantly interact with each other. They mutually revise each other. Hare also says that moral
judgments can only be verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision
accepted and made our own. …. He also follows Sartre’s lead in accepting the Kantian requirement of

406
Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 645, 649.
407
Seung, 1993, p. x, 61.
408
Ibid. My italics.

88
universalizability. That is, a prescription is not moral unless it can be universalised, and a moral prescription is
valid only if it can be derived from a principle that can be universally accepted.”409

To some extent we find the same approach in March’s work. He suggests that we treat
decision making as a way of creating preferences and identities, at the same time as
preferences and identities are treated as a basis for decisions and their justification.410 Seung
inquires into how Hare’s prescriptive method controls for the diversity of empirical content
and maintains the universality of its prescriptions but is not convinced that it works.
Essentially there are four elements in Hare’s imaginary test of universalizability and they are
logic, facts, inclinations, and imagination. The universal prescriptivity is derived from the
logical properties of moral language. Facts and inclinations can be empirically ascertained and
from these three factors we can always derive right moral prescriptions as long as we have
sound imagination, Hare maintains.

Seungs critique is focused in the question: How can we tell whether a principle can be
universalised? “To be sure, prescriptivity and universalizability alone cannot make moral
judgments; they have to presuppose empirical content that is, the speaker’s aims and situation.
But empirical content is likely to generate the diversity and multiplicity of prescriptions,
thereby making it impossible for Hare’s method to produce universal prescriptions that can be
accepted by everybody.”411 This is the most critical question for Hare’s theory according to
Seung. His program can thus succeed only if he can find a way to overcome the relativity of
perspectives. Apparently, moral prescriptions made by formal procedures are incurable agent-
relative. Different agents favour different prescriptions. But their differences may be
negotiable. They can perhaps be resolved by agreement.412 This is the hope that has inspired
certain advocates of instrumental rationality.

We may say that instrumental rationality or constructivism began with Hobbes’s theory of
social contract. His conception of instrumental rationality was reaffirmed in Hume’s thesis
that reason can only be the slave of the passions. “To be a slave is to be an instrument.
Reason can perform only the instrumental function of devising a system of rules and
standards for the fulfilment of our passions because it is incapable of having its own norms
and values.”413 This is the heart of instrumental constructivism, according to Seung. David
Gauthier, who stipulates two conditions in his contractual approach, has recently elaborated it.
First, the agents are supposed to be nontuistic. That is, they take no interest in each other, nor
are they affected by mutual feelings of love or hatred. Second, they are equally rational, but
their rationality is restricted to the maximization of individual utilities.

Seung goes on to describe the two types of rational choice recognized by Gauthier, namely
straightforward and constrained maximization. The former is the maximization of individual
utility with no constraints whatsoever. It resembles the principle of rational choice in the
world of perfect competition. In a free market there is no need for constraints. “The
unconstrained operation of free markets produces optimal results for everybody concerned.
But when markets fail, the individually rational choices produce collectively sub-optimal
results. Such a situation is characterized as the Prisoner’s dilemma.”414 A society whose

409
Ibid. p. 72-73.
410
March, 1994, p. 262.
411
Seung, 1993, p. 74.
412
Ibid. p. 96.
413
Ibid. My italics.
414
Ibid.

89
members all seek nothing but individual interests is perhaps destined to collapse into
competitive chaos.

Straightforward maximization thus has to be replaced by constrained maximization. Gauthier

identifies those constraints as morals. By morality he means not any particular moral code or
convention, but any set of impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest. The idea
of fairness or impartiality is here the essence of morality.415 Seung asks: In the world of
subjective values and nontuistic people, what kind of agreement can be accepted as fair and
impartial? Gauthier has tried to answer this question “with his theory of rational bargains.
This is his derivation project, where instrumental rationality is converted into instrumental
justice.”416 How does Gauthier perceive justice then? Justice is a compromise between our
weakness and our strength. If we are strong, we do not need it, and if we are weak we cannot
get it. Justice is a necessary ‘evil’ for those living in the world of equal power, where none of
them has the power to dominate the others. It has only instrumental value. No one wants to
seek it for its own sake.417

Gauthier admits that such a view of justice and morality can subvert moral order as a
cooperative adventure for mutual advantage. He thus tries to find a way “to cope with the
menace of nontuistic people and its instrumental justice, through the astounding claim that it
is not the justice of real people.”418 Instrumental justice is the justice of the economic man. He
is like a pig, in his search for maximization of utility. Opposed to this is the ordinary man who
applies essential justice, which is anchored in critical rationality. Critical rationality is
recognized as reflective, and identified with autonomy. In his critique of Gauthier, Seung
emphasizes that autonomy is defined with the notion ‘critical reflection’ and critical reflection
with autonomy, thus it is circular. Moreover, we can critically reflect upon, and examine our
own preferences only by appealing to objective values. In yet other words, Gauthier begins
with the subjectivity of values and preferences. His acceptance of nontuism as his premise
follows from the subjectivity of values and preferences. However, neither essential justice nor
essential rationality can be constructed from subjective preferences. They presuppose
objective values and standards, which in turn cannot be accounted for without accepting the
intuition of those values and standards.419 Seung thus concludes that in many constructivist
projects substantive intuitive ideas are introduced under the guise of formal requirements.

Turning then to Rawls’s ideal constructivism, we find that in one important respect, it differs
from formal and instrumental rationality. He does not believe that normative rationality or
constructivism can get anywhere by totally rejecting normative intuitions. “Though he does
not derive his two principles of justice directly from intuitive ideas, he acknowledges his use
of intuitions in setting up the constructivist procedure in the original position. He says that the
social ideals of liberty and equality are the ultimate source for the constitutive constraints on
the original position… Unlike formal and instrumental constructivism, ideal constructivism is
meant not to avoid, but only to tame and control our intuitive ideas and normative
scepticism.”420 What intuitive ideas then should be the basis for constructing the principles of
justice, Seung asks. For Rawls, there is no determinate answer, and it is a most difficult
problem for any theory of justice. His foremost methodological problem is thus how to cope

415
Ibid. p. 97.
416
Ibid. p. 118.
417
Ibid. p. 110.
418
Ibid. p. 111.
419
Ibid. p. 118.
420
Ibid. p. ii.

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with the indeterminacy of intuitions. Rawls writes; “No doubt, any conception of justice will
have to rely on intuition to some degree.”421

Having made plausible the argument, that any normative theory of rationality is ontologically
dependent on some normative intuition the question thus arises: What is the nature of
normative intuition? Part of the answer may be found in existing theory, elaborated in
previous chapters. A brief recapitulation would include the theory and methods of Plato, Kant,
Bergson and Jung, as well as the three levels of intuition.

Table 4.3.1 Theory on Intuition – A Tentative Framework

Methods of; Rational Intuition Discursive Thinking

Plato Dialogue Dianoia
Kant Synthetic Analytic
Bergson Metaphysical Science Physical Science

Personal Unconscious Collective Unconscious

Introverted Intuition Level One Level Two
Extraverted Intuition Level One Little or no Awareness
Integral Intuition Level Three Level Three

4.4 Normative Intuition

There are many forms of normative intuitionism. However, we may limit our discussion to the
transcendent and the immanent. They resemble the conceptual distinctions worked out earlier
on and capture the main tradition. That is, transcendent intuition equals Plato’s and Kant’s
rational intuition, and immanent intuition shares many properties with Jung’s view. This
paragraph is thus to be read as an extension of earlier chapters, where three levels of intuition
were discerned. Seung argues that immanent intuition is the intuition of positive or prevailing
normative standards and values in any given society, while transcendent intuition transcends
all particular societies. As such, immanent intuition is both normative and descriptive.

“Immanent intuition is a part of our daily life; every day we recognize the positive norms of our society and
govern our life in accordance with them except for the rare occasions on which their authority appears to be
suspect. These positive norms constitute not only the order of our society, but also the selfhood of its members.
Hence, our intuition of those positive norms belongs to our nature as social beings. Our linguistic and moral
intuitions belong to what is generally known as commonsense intuition, and our common sense should be
regarded as an essential feature of our nature.”422

Loss of confidence in immanent intuition leads to normative subjectivism and skepticism.

Such a loss can take place on an individual or a collective level Seung writes. He makes the
interesting observation that it has induced massive cultural upheaval on two occasions in the
West: in Renaissance Europe and in Sophistic Athens. “On both occasions, distrust of natural
or positive intuition created a normative crisis for the whole culture.”423 Under such
circumstances, there are only two ways to overcome the normative chaos Seung argues. One

421
Ibid. p. 8. My italics.
422
Ibid. p. iii. See also, Gilovich, 2002, p. 13
423
Ibid. p. iv. See also Forrester, 1975 and Kauffman, 1993.

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of them is the positivistic appeal to the power that can sustain a social order and the other is
the idealistic appeal to transcendental norms, which requires transcendental intuition. “In
ancient Athens, Socrates and Plato proposed transcendental intuitionism against the
positivism of Thrasymachus and Callicles. In Renaissance Europe, the positivism of
Machiavelli and his heirs was countered by rational intuitionism.”424 The critical thinkers of
modern Europe distrusted both positivism and idealism according to Seung. “They could not
endorse positivism on normative grounds (Might is right); they could not accept idealism on
epistemic grounds (How can we know there are transcendental ideals?). Since they could
embrace neither, they had to devise their own procedures for constructing normative
standards. Thus began the modern tradition of normative constructivism.”425

In the previous paragraph, it was indicated that ideal constructivism is the only viable form of
constructivism. It does rest on certain normative ideals, thus we cannot avoid questioning
their origin. They can come from only two sources. They must originate either in
transcendental norms or the immanent positive norms and values of our culture.
Transcendental normative idealism is identical to early Platonism. More specifically, it can be
related to mathematical Platonism and intuitionism, in which the heaven contains the
complete edifice of mathematics from arithmetic and geometry to calculus and topology.
Among the many scientists who subscribe to such ontology, Penrose is perhaps the more
acclaimed one. “To me the world of perfect forms is primary (as was Plato’s own belief) – its
existence being almost a logical necessity – and both the other two worlds are its shadows.”426
However, the later Plato emphasized what we may call the bedrock version, where the Ideas,
values and virtues are immanent in that which comes about of Necessity.427 That is, they are
Forms and Archetypes, innate and inherent in any mental and material form, dressed in the
specific clothing of Kant’s Time-Space continuum.428 The challenge posed to the philosopher,
is for her to intuit them.

We started out looking briefly into Platonic epistemology, which is echoed by many of the
main contributors to European philosophy. Here Socratic dialogue figures prominently. Thus,
if we leave out Kant and Bergson’s method of intuition and scrutinize dialogue, we must
admit that what Socrates is seeking is a conceptual definition that spells out the essential
property or eidos of all instances of certain values and virtues like courage, temperance,
wisdom or the good. However, in the Meno we are made aware of a paradox, namely that we
cannot seek to define something unless we already have some idea of it. In order then, to
clarify a main point we should carefully examine how normative intuition is discovered, not
constructed. Consider first the fact that in the early dialogues, we find three examples and
definitions of courage and seven of temperance but unfortunately, none of them qualifies as
an eidetic or essential definition. Wittgenstein’s critique is thus that these examples share no
eidos but only a family resemblance. How does Plato address this intricate subject? Seung
suggests that his account on intuition evolves and matures with his later work, most notably in
the Republic and Timaeus, and that eventually it differs somewhat from the approach of
Socrates.

424
Ibid. See also Levinas, 1973.
425
Ibid.
426
Penrose, 1994, p. 417. The other two worlds are here the material and mental. See also, Popper, 1989, p. 189,
206, Bohm, 1981, p. 53, Fischbein 1994, Parson 1995, 2000, and Cheyne, 1997.
427
Cornford, 1937. See also Feferman, 2000, and Thompson, 1998.
428
Kemp Smith, 1999, p. 447. “For Plato Ideas are the archetypes of the things themselves, and not, like the
categories, merely keys to possible experiences.” See also Majer, 1995 and McDowell, 1998.

92
Let us see how this goes about. First, in Meno, he tries to account for intuitive knowledge
through his doctrine of recollection. By interrogating a slave boy, Socrates elicits some basic
propositions about squares and their diagonals. Since the boy had never been taught geometry
in this life, Socrates argues that he must have known it in his previous life. Thus, he is now
only recollecting what he has known all along. This argument is vindicated by Jung, who in
numerous cases discovered ancient mythological themes in the dreams and paintings of
people who had no education, nor acquaintance with such symbolism.429 Baylor and Ausubel
argue along the same line of reason.430 However, the question of how this knowledge arrived
there in the first place is still with us. Seung makes the insightful argument that the theory of
recollection and innate ideas cannot deliver what Plato wants for his theory of Forms, namely
their independent and a priori existence. “Although the doctrine of innatism assures that
innate ideas are independent of sense perception, it cannot guarantee that those ideas are
objectively real. … The doctrine of innatism would make the existence of Platonic Forms
dependent on the empirical existence of human minds. The realism of Platonic Forms would
be replaced by the subjective idealism of human minds.”431 This critique, it seems, may be
less severe if our mind is also a non-local, spiritual matter, capable of transcending ego
boundaries.

Plato’s next step is introduced in the Republic. Here he engages his interlocutors in the
definition of justice, and discredits the proposed definitions one after another. The inquiry
then takes an unexpected turn. It moves on to the issue of how to construct an ideal state. That
is, he starts not with the single individual, but with the whole republic. In the ideal state all
participants benefit reciprocally by division of labor based on natural aptitudes and virtues,
by cooperation, and by exchange of goods and services. In such a context, justice arises. “You
remember how, when we first began to establish our commonwealth and several times since,
we have laid down, as a universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one function
in the community for which his nature best suited him. Well, I believe that that principle, or
some form of it, is justice.”432

This view of justice is not presented as a result of a laborious attempt at conceptual definition.
Rather, it is a synoptic view. What is good for the individual also facilitates and is facilitated
by the state of affairs in the whole republic. The additional subtle and pivotal point is thus
that: “All this time [justice] has been under our very noses from the start, and we never saw it.
We have been as absurd as a person who hunts for something he has all the time got in his
hand.”433 That is, in dialoguing they exercise a philosophic virtue, which is good, because
they are to be philosophers. In yet other words, in discovering and pursuing what they as
individual souls, can be good at, they are acting rational and just.434

The final step in Plato’s stroll along the unpaved road of intuition is to be found in the
Timaeus. The unique world argument, which I did discuss, illustrates the synoptic view of
normative intuition even more explicitly. The roaring ambition is here to construct a model
not of an ideal state but of an ideal world. We note that the reasoning is identical. To
recapitulate; “What was the living creature in whose likeness he framed the world? We must
429
Jung, 1968, p. 42-45. “Our mind has its history, just as our body has its history… A study of the structure of
the unconscious collective mind would reveal the same discoveries as you make in comparative anatomy….
Though a child is not born conscious, his mind is not a tabula rasa.”
430
Baylor, 2001, p. 238. Ausubel et al. 1978, p. 104-105. The reader may refer to chapter three.
431
Seung, 1993, p. 188. My italics.
432
Cornford, 1955, 427C-434D, p. 124.
433
Ibid.
434
Ibid. 502C-509C, p. 207.

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not suppose that it was any creature that ranks only as a species, for no copy of that which is
incomplete can ever be good. Let us rather say that the world is like, above all things, to that
Living Creature of which all other living creatures, severally and in their families, are parts.
For that embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living creatures, just as this
world contains ourselves and all other creatures that have been formed as things visible.”435
Again, it so to speak dawns upon us, that we are one humankind one world, not two. In
addition, such a non-dual, synoptic view is not at all alien to diversity and proper
individualization. On the contrary, its objectivity is embedded in subjectivity and this is
required in order to uncover the hidden Ideas and mechanisms instrumental to our individual
growth and fulfillment.

The recent work of Damasio et al. Unity of Knowledge may be seen as a step in the same
direction. They write that the key to bridge building is the discovery of epigenetic rules, that
is hereditary regularities in mental development.436 What are the epigenetic rules if not the
Ideas, Forms and Archetypes of the collective unconsciousness? The heuristics made explicit
and conscious. After all, humans share 99 percent of the same gene pool. Velmans work on
consciousness and reflexive monism should also be mentioned. Drawing on recent scientific
discoveries, he provides an understanding of how consciousness relates to the brain that is
neither dualist nor reductionist. The precise manner in which entities, events and processes are
translated into experiences depends according to him on the location in time and space of the
observer and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive affective, social, cultural and historical
influences, which enter into the construction of a given experience. In this sense, each
conscious construction is private, subjective and unique. “In this vision, there is one universe
(the thing itself) with relatively differentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like
ourselves, each with a unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so
far as we are parts of the larger universe that in turn experience the larger universe, we
participate in a reflexive process whereby the universe experiences itself.”437 In summarizing
then, on normative intuition, we may refer to the rather lengthy discussions provided earlier
on which culminated in discernment of three levels of intuition. Thus, here it suffices to quote
Bergson who defined it as integral experience.438

Reflections on Intuitive Equilibrium

Before we draw to an end we may reflect a little more on criteria for rational judgment and for
assessing cognitive processes. Throughout this chapter, we have seen that a central issue is the
rationality of ideas and values and their role as formal requirements in normative theories of
rational justification. Føllesdal makes the important point that when we say a person is
rational we tend to focus almost exclusively on the rationality of his or her beliefs and do not
take his values or ideals into account. “This disregard of a person’s values when we judge his
rationality probably reflects the widespread tendency to regard question of ultimate values as
beyond the realm of rational justification.” In yet other words; “It is often claimed that while
one may choose means towards an end in a more or less rational way, there is no notion of
rationality that applies to the evaluation of ends, or values.”439 This then is the focus of the
current section, and I suggest we coin the notion intuitive equilibrium, which may buy us
some new land. Let us start by listening to Føllesdal’s solution to the dilemma. The most

435
Cornford, 1937, 30C-31B, p. 39-40. My italics.
436
E. Wilson, in Damasio et al., 2001, p. 12. See also Wilson, 1998, and Damasio, 1994.
437
Velmans, 2000, p. 233, 235. See also Laszlo, 1995, p. 130, and 2003, p. 83-133.
438
Bergson, 1949, p. 62.
439
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 306-308.

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promising approach to it is according to him the method of reflective equilibrium. It is the end
stage in Rawls ideal constructivism, which ultimately has to rely on intuition to some degree,
according to him-self.440 It is hard to find anyone who expresses the notion of reflective
equilibrium more eloquently than Goodman does:

“How do we justify a deduction? Plainly by showing that it conforms with the general rules of deductive
inference. An argument that so conforms is justified or valid, even if its conclusion happens to be false. An
argument that violates a rule is fallacious even if its conclusion happens to be true. …. Analogously, the basic
task in justifying an inductive inference is to show that it conforms to the general rules of induction. …. Yet of
course, the rules themselves must ultimately be justified. …. But how is the validity of the rules to be
determined? … Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive
practice. Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular deductive inferences we actually make and
sanction. If a rule yields unacceptable inferences, we drop it as invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives
from judgments rejecting or accepting particular deductive inferences. A rule is amended if it yields an inference
we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of
justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the
agreement thus achieved lies the only justification needed for either. All this applies equally well to
induction.”441

As indicated earlier on there are some problems with this approach and thus with Føllesdal’s
definition of rationality. The ultimate job of reflective equilibrium is to say which cognitive
states are justified and which are not. It is thoroughly embedded in the tradition of analytic
epistemology. I have voiced the concern that such epistemology may be ontologically
dependent on intuition. It is thus legitimate and necessary to inquire into the nature of
intuition and how to justify it. Is it possible then, that reflective equilibrium as a criterion for
assessing rational cognitive processes could be refined so that it better captures intuition?
When we look closer at the passage above there are thus two points that demand a bit of
interpretation.442

First, Goodman claims to be explaining what justifies deductive and inductive inferences. In
using the term inference, he is implicitly referring to analytical cognitive processes and not
intuitive ones. If we accept the claim that there are cognitive diversity in the world we can
ask; What is it that makes one system of cognitive process better than another and how are we
to tell which system of reasoning is best? After all inferential and non-inferential thinking,
that is nous and noesis, has been with us all the way from the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition to
our present dual-process theories. Consciously or not, Goodman sidesteps this thorny issue.
For a start, I thus suggest that intuitive equilibrium can complete the picture somewhat. In
intuitive equilibrium the deduction of rational, transcendental intuition, and the induction of
empirical, immanent intuition is akin to reflexive monism, and it may move us towards a
integral, synoptic, non-dual state of mind. The distinction between rational and empirical
intuition was elaborated in the section on Kant.

A second point that needs some elaboration is why a particular set of inferential rules is
justified if it passes the reflective equilibrium test. This critical question applies equally well
to non-inferential rules. One sort of answer is that if a set of rules passes the test this counts as
good evidence.443 Right here we are reminded that neither Føllesdal nor Elster provide a
profound account on what exactly qualifies as evidence. This is indeed the crux of the matter.
I have argued with Jung that; “our age, and its most eminent representatives know and

440
Rawls, in Seung, 1993, p. 8.
441
Goodman, 1965, p. 66-67.
442
Stich, in DePaul, 1998, p. 98.
443
Ibid.

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acknowledge only the extraverted type of thinking.”444 It is conditioned primarily by objective
data transmitted by sense perception. In intuitive equilibrium good evidence is not limited to
the outer objects but embraces the inner objects, a term that might justly be applied to the
contents of the unconscious and the psyche. According to Jung, the relation of inner objects to
consciousness is entirely analogous to that of outer objects though their reality is not physical
but psychic.445

In the recent work of Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman they allude to the same rationale: “The
material essence of some aspects of contagion has a basis in fact; the spiritual essence does
not, according to current doctrine, but we must be humble about things like this. ‘Action at a
distance,’ a hallmark of magical thinking in the past, is a scientifically accepted aspect of
modern physics, and “mind over matter,” another such hallmark, is now recognized in areas
such as psychoneuroimmuniology.”446 In concluding this paragraph then, we can refer to
etymology, which teaches us that the root of the word rationality is the Latin word ratio,
which essentially is the relative value, relationship or proportion between two or more things.
If the rules pass an intuitive equilibrium test, we may thus say that it counts as good evidence
because the reality taken into consideration is integral. In other words, the end result may be a
tighter consistency between Plato’s episteme and doxa, Kant’s a priori and a posteriori, and
Bergson’s physics and metaphysics.

4.5 Conclusion

How does intuition relate to rationality? In order to answer this research question I did three
things. First, the issue of rationality was addressed. Apparently, there are heterogeneous
meanings of rationality and this is the state of affairs in classical theories of normative
rationality as well. However, we may indicate that rationality is related to synthesis and
autonomy and that it is facilitated by intuition of our psyche and self. Secondly, it was argued
that intuition is the ontological foundation for any normative theory of rationality. That is, in
examination of three well-known forms of rationality; formal and instrumental rationality, and
Rawls’s ideal constructivism, the impossibility of constructing a normative system of
rationality without using some normative intuitions was demonstrated. Thus, consequently I
tried to complete my sketch of the required, supplementary theory of intuition. In concluding
this chapter then, we may quote Seung, who expresses a main point:

“Without Platonic Forms, we would be prisoners of our positive norms and share with the denizens of the
Platonic Cave a fate of benighted existence. The syndrome of the Platonic Cave need not be limited to the tribal
consciousness of a primitive society; it is equally present in the positivistic consciousness of our scientific world.
For the positivistic consciousness is governed as much as the tribal consciousness by its own provincial norms
and standards. Positivism has its own cave, the cave of an exclusively materialistic universe, and this cave is so
deep and dark that it allows no view of any other dimension of reality.”447

444
Jung, 1971, p. 342-343.
445
Ibid. p. 398, 453.
446
Gilovich, et al. 2002, p. 216.
447
Seung, 1993, p. 210.

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5 INTUITION IN STRATEGY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter starts with a definition of strategy. Apparently, strategy is a unified perception
revealing a unique and consistent set of activities, propelling the company into what it is to
be. It is context-rich in the sense that it is anchored in both internal and external analysis.
When key aspects of strategy are compared with the ones that define intuition, we discover
intrinsic similarities. In the second paragraph strategic decision-making and bounded
rationality are discussed. March’s work on logic of consequence and appropriateness
resembles aspects of the distinction between analytical and intuitive cognition as well as the
one between system one and two, elaborated in dual process theories. In addition, a
descriptive line of argument is presented, which is not controversial namely that strategic
decision makers do rely on oversimplified rules-of-thumb and a mixture of analysis and
intuition. Eisenhardt & Zbaracki’s view thus captures a key point; “studying intuition is a way
to create a more realistic view of how strategic decision makers actually think.”448 With few
exceptions, the literature thus emphasizes awareness of search heuristics and biases as the
proper way to rational decisions.

Having established the relevance of my inquiry, the third paragraph focus in on strategic
thinking. While the notion of strategic thinking has been increasingly used in the literature
over the past two decades, it has up to the 1990’s been applied mainly in generic terms, and
thus without a specific meaning.449 Only recently has management research come to identify a
more fine-grade understanding of the notion. Mintzberg’s work is illustrative of a growing
line of research efforts where the term is not merely a catchall for all sorts of notions about
strategic management.450 Rather, he approaches strategic thinking as a particular way of
thinking with specific characteristics. He claims that strategic planning is an analytical
process with the aim to program already identified strategies. The result is a plan. Strategic
thinking on the other hand is a process of synthesis, based on intuition, where the outcome is
an integrated perspective of the enterprise. A vision of the whole as Porter put it.451 This
duality then, of strategic thinking as both analytic and intuitive, is made explicit by De Wit &
Meyer.452 In their comprehensive coverage of the strategy field they ask; what is the
fundamental nature of strategic thought processes? They emphasize analytical and intuitive
cognition, this distinction being the main one throughout my thesis. Thus right here it may
prove its worth. Certain implications are discussed.

5.2 Strategy Defined

448
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 33.
449
Porter, 1980, 1985. The Generic strategies of Porter can never delineate what is unique to the individual firm.
450
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 273-274, 291. See also Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, Porter, 1998, Fredrickson 1986, and
McGinnis 1987.
451
Porter, 1998, p. 68. See also Porter, 1990, 1994, 1998.
452
De Wit & Meyer, 1998, p. 70-75.

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Before we turn to strategic thinking and decision-making we ought to define strategy. There
are a number of connotations attached to this concept as well. However, in this case the
history is much briefer.453 If we try to delineate main dimensions of this concept, we may start
with the definition given by Andrews. He states that: “The essence of the definition of
strategy is pattern. … It is the unity, coherence, and internal consistency of a company’s
strategic decisions that position the company in its environment and give the firm its identity,
its power to mobilize its strengths, and its likelihood of success in the marketplace.”454 It thus
defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the kind of economic and human
organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the economic and non-economic
contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, employees, customers and communities.455
For Mintzberg the situation is similar. “Strategy is a pattern, that is, consistency in behavior
over time.”456 Quinn adds that: “A strategy is the pattern or plan that integrates an
organization’s major goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. A well-
formulated strategy helps to marshal and allocate an organization’s resources into a unique
and viable posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated
changes in the environment and contingent moves by intelligent opponents.”457

Porter stresses that operational effectiveness is not strategy. “While operational effectiveness
is about achieving excellence in individual activities, or functions, strategy is about combining
activities. Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set
of activities.”458 Another essential part of strategy is thus choosing what not to do. Porter’s
view then, is that strategy is about creating fit among a company’s activities. The success of a
strategy depends on doing many things well – not just a few – and integrating among them. It
is a vision of the whole.459 A quick glance at some recent contributions confirms the classical
definitions. In De Wit & Myers work, it is suggested that strategy is: “A coherent, unifying,
and integrative pattern of decisions.”460 They add that this definition has historical validity
because strategy is a matter of record – it emerges from what the firm actually does.

In these definitions we find part of the rationale applied by Mintzberg, when he argues that
strategic planning is an analytical process with the aim to program already identified
strategies. The result is a plan. Strategic thinking on the other hand is a process of synthesis
based on intuition, where the outcome is an integrated perspective of the enterprise.461 In
agreement with Mintzberg, Hamel & Prahalad focus in on how to think. They write that the
challenge is to develop great foresight into entirely new competitive space. And, “foresight is
not the product of perspicuity, but of unconventional, out-of-the-box thinking. It is a view of
strategy that recognizes the need for more than an incremental, annual planning rain
dance.”462 In other words, they as well highlight the role of intuition. We may thus say that
definitions of strategy emphasize a coherent, unified perception that reveal a unique and
consistent set of activities, propelling the company into what it is to be. It is context-rich in

453
Rumelt et al., 1995, p. 11. In reviewing the history of strategic management, they find that a holistic view has
always been valued.
454
Andrews, 1987, p. 14-15. My italics. See also Andrews, 1965.
455
Ibid. p. 13.
456
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 23.
457
Quinn, et al. 1998, p. 5. My italics. See also Quinn, 1980, 1988, and Chakravarthy, 1992.
458
Porter, 1998, p. 55, 60.
459
Ibid. p. 59, 64, 68.
460
De Wit & Myer, 1998, p. 29. My italics. See also Grant, 1998.
461
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 108.
462
Hamel & Prahalad, 1996, p. xi, xviii.

98
the sense that it is anchored in both internal and external analysis. When these key aspects of
strategy and strategic thinking are compared with the ones that define intuition and analysis
we find that:

Strategic Thinking Intuition Analysis

Synthesis Synthesis Analysis
Integration Integration Separation
Unification Unification Fragmentation
Pattern Pattern Pieces
Whole precedes the part Whole precedes the part Parts precedes the whole

5.3 Strategic Decision Making

The Rational Decision-Making Model

Our context calls for a brief look at strategic decision-making. Concerning first the implicit
cognitive limitations of the so-called rational decision-making model, several empirical
studies have been conducted.463 Cyert and March’s work demonstrated that goals can be
inconsistent across people and time, that search routines are often local, and that standard
operating procedures guide much of organizational behaviour.464 Similarly, Simon argued
convincingly that decision-makers are not infallible rational-analytic machines. According to
him actual behaviour falls short of objective rationality in at least three ways:

“Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each
choice. In fact, knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary. Since these consequences lie in the future,
imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them. But values can be only
imperfectly anticipated. Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviours. In actual
behaviour, only a very few of all these possible alternatives ever come to mind.”465

The work of Eisenhardt and Zbaracki is along the same line of reason. They refer to Allison
who challenged the rational model as a descriptive theory, by arguing that actions made
yesterday best predict actions that are made today.466 They also discuss The Cuban Missile
Crises and the related decision making process. Here few alternative courses of action were
considered simultaneously. Instead, participants raised objections to a current alternative. In
order to avoid high risk, the decision makers often selected alternatives that even they did not
expect to succeed. Instead of the rational process of goal definition, followed by alternative
generation and choice, the observation was made, that goals and choices were discovered
nearly simultaneously through social processes. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki conclude their
investigation by stating that; “these and other studies indicate the limitations of each step of
the rational model. Goals are unclear and shift over time. People often search for information
and alternatives haphazardly and opportunistically. Analysis of alternatives may be limited
and decisions often reflect the use of standard operating procedures rather than systematic
analysis.”467

463
Eisenhardt, & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 18. The authors refer to Cyert and March, 1963, Carter, 1971, Anderson,
1983, and Pinfield, 1986.
464
Cyert and March, 1963. See also Cyert & Simon, 1983.
465
Simon, 1997, p. 93-94. See also Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997.
466
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 18-20.
467
Ibid. p. 20. They refer to Anderson, 1983, p. 201-222. See also Nutt, 1993, 1998 and Hogarth, 1987.

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After observing strategic decision-making processes in ten large corporations, Quinn
described them as characterized by fragmentation, constant evolution, and intuition as well as
analysis. According to him, effective top managers blend formal-analytical techniques with
more behavioural oriented elements of strategic decision-making and produce “cohesive step-
by-step movement towards ends, which initially are broadly conceived, but which are then
constantly refined and reshaped as new information appears.”468 Thus, bounded rationality
and search heuristics surfaced as interesting fields of study. Fifteen years after the publication
of Simons’ work, Kahneman and Tversky continued what March and Simon had begun. They
provided critical information about specific systematic biases that influence judgment.
Concerning the role of intuition they write:

“Any significant activity of forecasting involves a large component of judgement, intuition, and educated
guesswork. Intuitions play an important part, even where the forecasts are obtained by a mathematical model or
simulation. Intuitive judgments enter in the choice of the variables that are considered in such models, the impact
factors that are assigned to them, and the initial values that are assumed to hold. The critical role of intuition in
all varieties of forecasting calls for an analysis of the factors that limit the accuracy of expert judgements, and for
the development of procedures designed to improve the quality of these judgments.”469

Hence, for Kahnemann and Tversky the problem is not whether to accept intuitive predictions
at face value or reject them, but rather how they can be de-biased and improved. They would
like them more explicit. They also state that most predictions and forecasts contain an
irreducible intuitive component.470 In this latter view, Seung agrees. He argues in favor of
intuitionism as ontological foundation for any constructivism, as elaborated in the chapter on
intuition and rationality. In its most basic form then, the rational model of choice follows the
everyday assumption that human behavior has some purpose. In research on decision-making,
this translates into a common model of rational action, sometimes referred to as the synoptic
or comprehensive model of decision.471 Usually, these six steps characterize it:472

1 Define the problem. Managers often err by defining the problem in terms of a proposed solution, missing the
big problem, or diagnosing the problems in terms of its symptoms.
2 Identify the criteria. Most decisions require the decision maker to accomplish more than one objective. In
buying a car, we may want to maximize fuel economy, minimize costs, maximize comfort, and so on.
3 Weight the criteria. Rational decision makers will know the relative value that they put on each of the criteria
that were identified.
4 Generate alternatives. An inappropriate amount of search time is often spent seeking and identifying possible
alternative courses of action. An optimal search continues only until the cost of search outweighs the value of the
added information.
5 Rate each alternative on each criterion. How will each of the alternative solutions score on each of the defined
criteria?
6 Compute the optimal decision. For each alternative, compute the sum of weighted ratings.

According to the second step in this model, actors enter decision situations with known
objectives. These objectives determine the value of the possible consequences of an action.
The original debate thus involved the heroic nature of cognitive assumptions. Eventually the
validity of the classic economic actor was challenged. Simon, for instance, rejected the
Hobbesian notion of consistent, value-maximizing calculation in human behavior. “We will
use the term decision premises to refer to the facts and values that enter into this decision-

468
Quinn, 1980.
469
Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 1985, p. 414.
470
Ibid. p. 421.
471
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 18.
472
Bazerman, 1998, p. 3-4.

100
fabricating process, a process that involves fact-finding, design, analysis, reasoning,
negotiating, all seasoned with large quantities of ‘intuition’ and even guessing.”473 Later
variations accepted the rational model, but rearranged the pieces to allow for repetition and
variety.474 One example is Mintzberg et al. who generated a model of the structure of
apparently unstructured strategic decisions. Three basic phases, the identification,
development and selection phase, represent the core of the model.475 Here the phases have no
sequential relationship as in the classical rational model of choice.

Eisenhardt and Zbaracki refer to the Bradford group, which examined 150 widely varying
strategic decision processes in the UK. They found that the linearity of the decision process is
highly variable. The amount of cycling and the shape of the process correlated with how
complex and political the decision was. “Decision processes thus seems to vary depending
upon decision characteristics as executives apparently bypass or revisit different aspects of the
choice over time.”476 Incarnations that are more recent have transformed the rational vs.
boundedly rational dichotomy into a continuum, probing whether and when decision-making
is rational.477 According to Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, the normative question of where the
optimal point on the continuum is to be found has challenged a number of researchers. They
indicate that the most prevalent argument is that more complex or turbulent environments
require less rationality.478 In my research, quite a few respondents said that in exploration of
brand new terrain they put more emphasis on analysis than usual due to higher risk. However,
the general reply was the opposite because; “there were hardly any data to analyze.”
The same authors thus argue that the original debate, which shaped this view, whether
decision makers are rational or boundedly rational, is no longer very controversial. Empirical
research reveals cognitive limits to the so-called rational model. “Decision makers sacrifice
instead of optimize, rarely engage in comprehensive search, and discover their goals in the
process of searching.”479 The empirical research referred to, suggests that many decisions do
follow the basic phases of problem identification, development and selection, but that they
cycle through the various stages, frequently repeating, often going deeper, and always
following different paths in fits and starts. Furthermore, the complexity of the problem and
the conflict among decision-makers often influence the shape of the decision path. Moreover,
it appears that there is no single theory of bounded rationality, but rather many variations,
they argue.480 In summarizing, we might say that research demonstrates that human responses
deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision-
making and rational judgment.

Logic of Consequence & Appropriateness

March stresses a crucial point, when he says that theories of bounded rationality and heuristics
tend to take preferences and identities as given. This is oversimplification and is thus
questioned by March.481 He suggests that we instead should treat decision making as a way of

473
Simon, 1997, p. 24-25. See also Zey, 1992, 1998, and Whitecotton, 1998.
474
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 18. The authors here refer to Mintzberg et al., 1976, Nutt, 1984, and
Hickson et al., 1986.
475
Mintzberg, et al., 1976, p. 246-275. See also Langley et al. 1995, p. 268 and Greenhalgh, 2002.
476
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 21. See also Eneroth, 1990, Fletcher, 1990 and Goldberg, 1983.
477
Ibid. They refer to Fredrickson, 1984, Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984, Dean & Sharfman, 1992.
478
Ibid. The authors also refer to Dess, 1987, Priem, 1990, Miller, 1987, Fredrickson & Iaquinto.
479
Ibid. p. 22.
480
Ibid.
481
March, 1994, p. 262. He thus calls for a technology of foolishness. It is discussed below.

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creating preferences and identities, at the same time as preferences and identities are treated
as a basis for decisions and their justification. Of special relevance are his two decision-
making logics. Logic of consequence emphasizes given preferences and expected
consequences, while logic of appropriateness focus on rules that are appropriate to the
situation and the identity of the decision maker or organization.482 In logic of appropriateness
decision makers are supposed to ask what kind of situation is this, how is it to be interpreted
and recognized, what kind of person am I and what does a person such as I do in a situation
such as this? We may perhaps say that logic of consequence stresses explicit thought
processes while logic of appropriateness is more aligned with implicit thought processes.
Thus, the former relates to reasoning system 2 and the latter to system 1 as described by
Stanovich and West.483 My empirical study addresses the question; what sort of decision-
making logic is applied by strategists in exploration of completely new situations contrasted
with the more familiar situations?

Rules and identities are so obvious, that they are more likely regarded as context for behavior,
than interesting phenomena in their own right. Not only do decision makers take them for
granted, so also do observers. They are largely implicit. March thus concludes that within an
ideology of choice any detectable willfulness is exalted, no matter how circumscribed by
rules. “The stories told in history and journalism tend to glorify strategies of rational
maneuver within the rules. They tend to ignore the rich processes by which identities and
rules are created, maintained, interpreted, changed, and ignored.”484 In contrast to this view,
students of rule following tend to regard the `rational` model of choice as simply one version
of rule following, associated with the specific identity of some decision makers. Within such
conceptions it is identities and rule following that is fundamental, and ‘rationality’, or
controlled, explicit thought processes, which is derivative, March argues. “Among the many
aspects of meaning that are shaped within decision making processes, few are more important
than the understanding individuals have of their preferences and their identities.”485 Thus the
Myers Briggs Type Indicator® will be applied in the empirical study. It indicates individual
traits and preferences.

In order then, to use decision making as a conscious basis for constructing the self, March
suggests that decision-makers have to combine logic of consequence and appropriateness with
a technology of foolishness. He argues that a technology of foolishness will make the greatest
sense in situations where there has been an over-learning of the virtues of rationality. As one
of five elements in this technology, March suggests that we treat intuition as real. “It is not
clear what intuition is. …. Perhaps it is some inexplicable way of consulting memories or
ideas that are inaccessible to standard theories of thought. Whatever intuition is, a belief in
intuition strengthens the case for actions that are otherwise indefensible.”486

Secondly, he suggests that we treat the self as a hypothesis. This because conventional
thinking about decision-making allows doubts about everything except the one thing about
which there is often the greatest doubt – the self. Moreover, we should treat memory as an
enemy, treat experience as a theory, and treat hypocrisy as a transition. Learning is based on a
series of conclusions about history that people have invented to understand experience.
Interpretations of history, and thus experience, can be changed retrospectively. In yet other

482
My data indicate that top managers rely more heavily on logic of appropriateness.
483
Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 645.
484
March, 1994, p. 59. See also Thommessen & Wetlesen, 1996, p. 218-219.
485
Ibid. p. 261, 59.
486
Ibid. p. 262. See also Cohen, 1972, Birgerstam, 2002, Bougon, 1992, and Bowers, 1995.

102
words, we need to learn how to unlearn.487 By changing the interpretation of history now,
decision makers can revise what they learned earlier and reconstruct self-conceptions.
Memories accumulate experience and permit learning. However, the ability to forget may also
facilitate such reconstruction and in this way, our decision engineering work is improved.

March makes yet another point that should be mentioned briefly. He argues that adaptive
processes, by refining exploitation more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become
effective in the short run but self-destructive in the long run.488 In rational models of choice,
the balance between exploration and exploitation is discussed classically in terms of a theory
of rational search. That is, an optimal search continues only until the cost of search outweighs
the value of the added information. Similarly, in organizational learning, the problem of
balancing exploration and exploitation is exhibited in distinctions between refinement of an
existing technology and invention of a new one.489 Thus, intuition may play a pivotal role in
that it perceives and foresees new possibilities.490 It is therefore of interest to investigate
whether or not intuition is more emphasized in exploration of new ideas and technology, than
in exploitation of familiar terrain, as hypothesized by Miller & Ireland.491 Exploration is
typically characterized by: search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility,
discovery, and innovation. Exploitation, on the other hand captures refinement, choice,
production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution.492 In the former situation,
strategists will often have limited previous experience and knowledge, while in the latter the
opposite is the case.

Research on Intuition in Management

In reviewing the literature on intuition in management we do not find much empirical
research done. The only international survey is by Parikh, Alden and Lank. They present a
somewhat limited conceptual framework, but conduct a comprehensive global survey of more
than 1300 practicing managers in nine countries.493 Norway was not included. One critical
finding is that intuition is perceived as playing a major role in the professional lives of the
responding managers, with 56 percent using both intuition and logic/reasoning in almost equal
measure, and a further 7,5 per cent stating that they use more of intuition. Furthermore, almost
80 per cent believe that intuition has relevance in corporate strategy and planning.494

These findings correspond with those of Eisenhardt who concludes that decision-makers are
rational in some ways but not in others. She claims that such behaviour is the most
effective.495 Woolhouse & Bayne, Fredrickson, Langley et al., Agor, Bennet & Anthony,
Cosier, Brockmann & Simmonds, Khatri & Ng, Isenberg, Stauffer, and Hayashi, are other
authors who advocate that the executive’s approach is simultaneously rational and intuitive.496

487
Hedberg, 1981. Janis, 1972.
488
March, 1991, p. 71. See also March, 1978, and the work of Argyris, 1974, 1978, 1985.
489
Ibid. p. 72.
490
Jung, 1971, p. 401.
491
Miller & Ireland, 2000, p. 19. See also Miller & Burke, 1999.
492
March, 1991, p. 71. See also March, 1994, p. 237. And March, 1978, 1988.
493
Parikh, et. al., 1994, p. 25-41. My sample is restricted to top managers.
494
Ibid. p. 81. See also Johnson, 1987, Rowan, 1986, Schon, 1983, and Senge, 1989.
495
Eisenhardt, 1989. See also Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 22, and Johannessen, 1999.
496
Fredrickson, 1985, p. 821, Langley, 1995, p. 267, Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000, p. 157, Agor, 1986, p. 49,
1984, 1989, Stauffer, 1999, p. Cosier, 1982, p. 275, Isenberg, 1984, p. 81, Khatri & Ng, 2000, p. 57, Brockmann,
& Simmonds, 1997, p. 454, Bennet & Anthony, 2001, p. 185, Hayashi, 2001, p. 59.

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Papadakis and Barwise, in a study of 151 firms on timing and intuition in strategic decision
making, found that in addition to organizational centralization, the CEO’s cognitive ability,
use of intuition and tolerance for risk, were associated positively with speedy SDM. They also
looked into the capability of firms to use a wide range of decision models simultaneously. The
research indicated that those who could do this had better performance.497

If we look at little closer at the research of Parikh et al. we find that they asked the
respondents to describe intuition. 23 percent described it as a decision/perception without
recourse to logical or rational methods. 17 percent described it as inherent perception,
inexplicable comprehension, a feeling that comes from within. 17 percent described it as
integration of previous experience, processing of accumulated information. 12 percent
described it as gut feeling, 9 percent as a decision/solution to a problem, without complete
data or facts, and another 7 percent as a sixth sense. 7 percent described it as a spontaneous
perception or vision, 6 percent as insight, 6 percent, as a subconscious process, and another 6
percent described it as instinct.498

In a recent study, Burke and Miller interviewed 60 experienced professionals holding

significant positions in major organizations across various industries in the U.S.499 Their
findings revealed that 56 percent understood intuitive decisions to be based on previous
experiences, together with emotional inputs. When asked whether they always, often,
sometimes, seldom, or rarely used intuition in the workplace, 47 percent answered often.
Participants reported employing intuition when decisions needed to be made quickly or
unexpectedly because potential costs were associated with delays. Other participants
responded that they used intuition when uncertainty pervaded such novel situations as a first-
time restructuring or reorganization and in some financial issues, such as formulating budgets,
estimating prices, and selecting investments.500 We may thus indicate that in most cases,
managers define intuition along the lines we have suggested for the first level of intuition,
which relates primarily to the personal unconscious.

The aim of Clarke & Mackaness is to develop and test propositions about the structure and
content of management intuition from the literature, using qualitative in-depth case studies to
construct cognitive maps of their decision schemas. They cite different authors who have
proposed that managers use intuition when faced with insufficient facts and complex
alternatives, and to simplify a given decision situation. However, their study suggests that
senior managers do not appear to use more complex and more coherent decision schemas than
less senior executives. Rather, there is some suggestion that it is the content, not the structure
of their cognitive maps that are different. Senior managers seem to opt to use simpler
cognitive explanations, putting greater reliance on key constructs and a higher proportion of
non-factual information. Analogues, or comparable exemplars, play an important part in this
process. “Intuition seems, therefore, to come more into play as a means of going beyond the
rational data and information, by using experience to cut through to the essence of a situation,
helping make sense of it, and as a test of its validity.”501 They thus indicate that when viewed
in this way, we begin to see how cognitive and intuitive constructs might interplay within the
decision schema of an individual manager, and why quantitative analysis may not be integral
to the decision-making in the way that one might presuppose.

497
Papadakis & Barwise, 1998, p. 96, and 1997, p. 269-270. See also Bakken & Gilljam, 2003.
498
Parikh, 1994, p. 165. See also Pattakos, 1996, and Pehrson, 1997.
499
Burke & Miller, 1999, p. 91. See also Ohmae, 1982, Bennet, 1997, Ims, 1987 and Keen, 1996.
500
Ibid. p. 92-94.
501
Clarke & Mackaness, 2001, p. 166. See also the work of Neisser, 1976, p. 108.

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The rationale for studying intuition in strategy is thus its salience not only for the field of
strategy, but for the field of decision making as well. The proposed contribution of my
research is thus to demonstrate that by better understanding intuition and its application, more
rational, effective, and efficient strategic thinking and decision-making could result.

5.4 Strategic Thinking

Metaphors of strategy as learning and evolutionary adaptation implicitly suggest that

successful firms are simply those that adapt quickly to changing environmental demands. That
is, one is much more likely to hear senior managers call for quicker response time than for
higher-quality strategic thinking and decision-making. However, we may have reached the
limits of incremental improvements. Getting a product to market a few weeks earlier,
responding to customer inquiries a little bit faster, squeezing another penny out of cost,
ratcheting quality up one more notch, capturing another point of market share, tweaking the
organizational one additional time, these are the obsessions of managers today, according to
Porter, Hamel and Prahalad.502 If there is little to gain from further increase in operational
efficiency, how then should we proceed further? We might need to explore and cultivate the
potential of those resources and activities that are time-bound to a lesser extent. The mind
appears to be the single most important asset in this respect. Thus, in this thesis, it is argued
that strategic thinking and decision-making might benefit from exploration and proper use of
intuition.503

High-level managers in large companies first articulated the need for explicit strategic
thinking. For example, Alfred Sloan, the chief executive of General Motors from 1923 to
1946, devised a successful strategy based on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of his
company’s critical competitor, the Ford Motor Company, and wrote it up after he retired. In
the 1930s, Chester Barnard, a senior executive with New Jersey Bell, argued that; “The action
which is the essence of organization, or the coordination of action which is the function of the
executive, relates to the synthesis of physical, biological, and social factors.”504 World War II
supplied a vital stimulus to strategic thinking in business as well as military domains, because
it sharpened the problem of allocating scarce resources across the entire economy.505

However, while the notion of strategic thinking has been increasingly used in the literature
over the past two decades, it has up to the 1990’s been applied mainly in generic terms, and
thus without a specific meaning.506 Only recently has management research come to identify
more a more fine-grade understanding of the notion. Mintzberg’s work is illustrative of a
growing line of research efforts where the term is not merely a catchall for all sorts of notions
about strategic management.507 Rather, he approaches strategic thinking as a particular way of

502
Hamel & Prahalad, 1996, p. x. Porter, 1998, p. 43, 59. See also Stacey, 1992 and Stalk, 1990.
503
A point made by several authors; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, p. 6, Mintzberg, 1994, p. 329, Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki, 1992, p. 18, Kreiner, 1999, Watson, 2002 and Lai, 1999.
504
Barnard, 1938, p. 290. “Through a period of years, as a matter of interest, I have endeavored, without any
success, to find out what the intellectual processes were and what we can possibly mean by intuition. My initial
interest in the subject was quite practical. Without casting any aspersions, it was an interest in discovering why it
is that people who had scientific training so frequently had no sense.”
505
Ghemawat, 1999, p. 3. See also Novicevic, et al., 2002, p. 992-1001, and Chandler, 1962.
506
Porter, 1980, 1985. Generic strategies can never delineate what is unique to the individual firm.
507
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 323. See also Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, Porter, 1998, Fredrickson 1986, and McGinnis

105
thinking with specific characteristics. He claims that strategic planning is an analytical
process with the aim to program already identified strategies. The result is a plan. Strategic
thinking on the other hand is a process of synthesis, based on intuition, where the outcome is
an integrated perspective of the enterprise. A vision of the whole as Porter put it.508

Liedtka as well, defines strategic thinking as a particular way of thinking.509 She includes five
specific elements; it incorporates a whole system perspective, is intent-focused, involves
thinking in time, and space we might add, is hypothesis-driven, and is intelligently
opportunistic. Having these competencies is what characterizes the individual strategic
thinker. Masifern and Vila emphasize that strategic thinking, as structure of meaning, is
presented as both the medium of social cognitive action and its product. They suggest that it is
more a state of mind, than just another planning process. “We conceive of strategic thinking
as a set of ideas, principles, policies, concrete rules, and operational approaches which shape
the way managers think about their role and guide their daily actions.”510 They argue that this
set of ideas and rules is more malleable than corporate ideology or organizational identity,
which have a more permanent character. In this account, we recognize many of the
connotations attached to intuition.

Other authors are focusing on the consequences of strategic thinking rather than on the
characteristics of a strategic thinker. Takur & Calingo is one example, and they suggest that
strategic thinking is the conceptual glue that holds the organization together. “Strategic
thinking can be imagined as the strand of rope on a string of pearls. The strand holds all the
beads without being visible itself.”511 This approach does have some similarities to the one
presented by I. Nonaka and N. Konno. They introduce the concept of ba, or shared space.512
As opposed to information, which is tangible and resides in media and networks, knowledge
is intangible and embedded in shared spaces, it is argued. Despite this, I have limited my
research to include only the individual strategic thinker. They ground the concept in an
existentialist framework, where the key platform of knowledge creation is the `phenomenal`
place. Such a place can emerge in individuals, working groups, project teams, informal
circles, temporary meetings, e-mail groups, etc. A ba thus unifies the physical space, the
virtual space, and the mental spaces, a pivotal point being its non-local features. A ba may
thus resemble aspects of the quantum holonomic model of intuition mentioned in the previous
chapter.

Shimuzi refers to Japanese executives and defines insight as ‘intuitive sensibility’ an ability to
grasp instantly an understanding of the whole structure of new information. That is, a sixth
sense or kan which, in contrast to the sequential steps of logical thinking, entails the fitting
together of memory fragments that had until then been mere accumulation of various
connected information.513 Eisenhardt & Zbaracki elaborate on strategic thinking and explicitly
state that; “studying intuition is a way to create a more realistic view of how strategic decision
makers actually think.”514 They also write that executives who attend to real-time information
are actually developing their intuition. Aided by intuition they can react quickly and
accurately to changing stimuli. Their conclusion is that future research could profitably

1987.
508
Porter, 1998, p. 68. See also Porter, 1990, and 1994.
509
Liedtka, 1988.
510
Masifern & Vila, 1998, p. 20.
511
Takur & Calingo, 1992, p. 48. In Masifern & Vila, 1998, p. 20.
512
Nonaka & Konno, 1998, p. 40-41. See also Nonaka & Konno, 1995, and Hutchins, 1991.
513
In Langley et al., 1995, p. 268. See also Hellgren, 1993.
514
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992, p. 33.

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examine how intuition develops, how intuition can be separated from superstitious learning,
and how intuition reinforces and relates to insight and heuristics. A question that has been
among the most important themes of strategy research over the last ten years is according to
them: What is it that characterizes decision-makers? Still, there is little knowledge about the
specific link between top management and strategic decisions.515 The empirical part of my
research addresses this issue.

In his work The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Mintzberg discusses the fundamental
fallacies of strategic planning.516 In familiarizing with them, we may improve our
understanding of strategic thinking. He describes three basic fallacies of the planning process,
namely that discontinuities can be predicted, that strategists can be detached from the
operations of the organization, and that the process of strategy-making itself can be
formalized. Concerning first the fallacy of predetermination, it is argued that planning
assumes predetermination in a number of respects. The prediction of the environment through
forecasting, or the predict-and-prepare approach is given as example. “Almost everything
written about planning stresses the importance of accurate forecasting.”517 He goes on,
referring to a number of authors, all of whom support his thesis; that forecasting is notoriously
inaccurate.518

One more argument is given. Because planning, in the absence of ability to control the
environment must rely on forecasting, and because forecasting amounts to extrapolation of
known states, or existing trends, planning and analysis typically work best under conditions of
relative stability. Strategy itself is associated with this same condition of stability. Thus,
strategy and planning may sometimes fit naturally together. However, while strategy may be
associated with conditions of stability, strategy making is generally associated with times of
change. Here we are reminded of Bergson’s argument; that in applying fixed concepts,
analytical thinking is bound to misunderstand motion and change. Mintzberg elaborates on
this point, by emphasizing that strategies do not exist as tangible entities, and that they are
abstract concepts in the minds of people. “The best of them seem to be gestalt in nature, and
tightly integrated.”519 Serious change in strategy thus generally means shift in gestalt. The
core of his argument is therefore that major changes in strategy, both within the mind and
outside, is associated with discontinuity, the very thing that planning and analysis is least able
to handle.

Secondly, the fallacy of detachment is investigated. Mintzberg vividly describes a situation of

calculated chaos, which managers tend to work in. They do so not because they are
disorganized, or do not know how to make use of their secretaries to screen interruptions, or
fail to recognize the importance of reflective planning. They do so, for quite the opposite
reason, it is claimed. They know that only by interacting with the dynamic context, they are
able to develop proper strategies. “If they cannot, the problem is not an absence of formal
planning, but of managerial ability, or of detachment of managers from context.”520 The key
assumption that thinking can be separated from action and context is thus dismissed because
“thinking must certainly precede action, but it must also follow action, close behind, or else

515
Papadakis and Barwise, 1998, p. 275.
516
Mintzberg, 1994.
517
Ibid. p. 228.
518
Ibid. p. 229-230. Makridakis, Wheelwright, and McGee, 1983, Makridakis, and Wheelwright, 1989, Hogarth,
1981, Pant and Starbuck, 1990.
519
Ibid. p. 240. Fischbein, 1987, p. 53, argues that intuition is reminiscent of the concept of Gestalt.
520
Ibid. p. 244.

107
run the risk of impeding it!”521 Formal planning poses the danger of distancing that
connection and therefore discouraging action. Eisenhardt supports this view and argues that
successful strategy emerges by building collective intuition through frequent meetings and
real-time metrics that enhance a managements team’s ability to see threats and opportunities
sooner and more accurately.522

These arguments may be of some relevance to dual-process theories, where system two is
seen as rational and context-independent. Mintzberg also writes that managers and planners
detached from the operating details cannot be properly informed by so-called hard data only.
This point is made by Malan & Kriger as well, who stress the importance of “detecting
nuances and fine-grade variation within the organization.”523 Detachment is possible only if
the information needed can be provided conveniently. The messy world of random noise,
gossip, tacit inference, impression, and fact must then be reduced to firm data, hardened and
aggregated so that they can be supplied regularly in digestible form. This is of course most
difficult. Mintzberg argues that hard information is often limited in scope, lacking richness
and often failing to encompass important non-economic and non-quantitative factors. Much
hard information is also unreliable, to aggregated, and arrives too late for effective use in
strategy making, he says.

Closer to the core of planning’s grand fallacy Mintzberg finds the fallacy, that the strategy
formation process can be formalized, or in yet other words, that exploration and innovation
can be institutionalized.524 The prime assumption behind this is that systems can detect
discontinuities, comprehend stakeholders, provide creativity, and program intuition. “We
believe there is something fundamentally wrong with formalization applied to processes like
strategy making, which constitutes the grand fallacy. It has to do with reductionism, or the
analytical nature of planning.”525 More specifically, he argues that formalization is achieved
through decomposition, in which a process is reduced to a procedure, a series of steps, each of
which is specified. Breaking the whole down into parts is essentially analytical. The word
analysis itself comes from a Greek root meaning to subdivide. “The formal system could
certainly process more information this way. They could consolidate it, aggregate it, and
move it about. But they could never internalize it, comprehend it, and synthesize it. Analysis
was never up to the job set for it.”526 That is why, he asserts, the strategy formation process
has failed so often and so dramatically.

The grand fallacy then, as perceived by Mintzberg, is that because analysis is not synthesis,
strategic planning is not strategy formation. “Analysis may precede and support synthesis, by
defining the parts that can be combined into wholes. Analysis may follow and elaborate
synthesis, by decomposing and formalizing its consequences. But analysis cannot substitute
for synthesis. No amount of elaboration will ever enable formal procedures to forecast
discontinuities, to inform managers who are detached from their operations, to create novel

521
Ibid. p. 293.
522
Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 72.
523
Malan & Kriger, 1998. See also Weick, 1995.
524
A similar point is made by De Wit & Meyer, 1998, p. 7.
525
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 294, 298. Business Week, 1983:56. He refers to Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990,
McKenney and Keen, 1974, Roger Sperry, 1974.
526
Ibid. p. 299. My italics. Here he refers to i.e. the conspicuous failure of massive urban renewal, the non-
democratic non-planning of the French government, the dramatic rejection of planning at General Electric, and
the PPBS burlesque.

108
strategies.”527 He thus concludes that strategy cannot be planned because planning is about
analysis and strategy is about intuitive synthesis.

In expressing these arguments, which are somewhat new and controversial in the management
literature, we become curious to learn how Mintzberg defines intuition. Perhaps this is the
weaker part of his work. The reason should be obvious; it is indeed a most difficult subject.
He indicates that intuition exists as a distinct process of thought, different from rational
analysis, by referring i.e. to Ornstein and the work on brain hemispheres.528 Here the left
hemisphere is the base for linear, sequential, explicit, analytic thinking, and the right
hemisphere is specialized for simultaneous, holistic, relational, synthetic, implicit, intuitive
thinking. Mintzberg’s main point is thus that while these two hemisphere activities might
productively combine, they do not blend into one, nor can they easily substitute for each
other. In flat contradiction to this view is Simon’s remark that intuition and judgment – at
least good judgment – are simply analyses frozen into habit, and into the capacity for rapid
response through recognition.529

Simon’s famous example of chess grandmasters is interesting in many ways. It shows that
these players can look at the twentieth position in a grand-masters chess match for five
seconds and then reproduce it almost perfectly. Experts and novices cannot do that, and no
one can do it for pieces randomly placed on the board. The conclusion being that it is the
familiarity and experience with these patterns that enables the grandmasters to know what
constitute good and bad moves from such patterns.530 Simon thus argues that the essence of
intuition lies in the organization of knowledge for quick identification, that is, arranged in
terms of recognizable chunks, and not in its rendering for inspired design. More specifically,
he writes that; “these processes can be explained without postulating mechanisms at
subconscious levels that are different from those that are partly verbalized. Much of the
iceberg is, indeed, below the surface and inaccessible to verbalization, but its concealed bulk
is made of the same ice as the part we can see …. . The secret of problem solving is that there
is no secret. It is accomplished through complex structures of familiar simple elements.”531

This duality then, of strategic thinking as both analytic and intuitive, is made explicit by De
Wit & Meyer. In their comprehensive coverage of the strategy field they ask; what is the
fundamental nature of strategic thought processes? “A whole spectrum of views exists,
without any coherent clusters or schools of thought identifiable.”532 However, they focus in on
what they call the generative and the rational thinking perspective. This distinction reflects the
one elaborated throughout my thesis, thus right here it may prove its worth.

Rational Thinking Generative Thinking

Cognitive Style Analytical Intuitive
Emphasis on Logic over creativity Creativity over logic
Direction of Reasoning Vertical Lateral
Nature of Reasoning Computational Imaginative
Value Placed on Consistency & Rigor Unorthodoxy & Vision
Assumption About Reality Objective, Partially Knowable Subjective, Partially Creatable

527
Ibid. p. 321.
528
Ibid. p. 306. R. Ornstein, 1972. Damasio, 1994, elaborates on this issue.
529
Simon, 1987, p. 63. See also Frantz, 2003, p. 265-275.
530
Dawes, 1988, p. 6.
531
Simon, 1977, p. 69.
532
De Wit & Meyer, 1998, p. 70-75.

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Decisions Based on Calculation Judgment
Metaphor Strategy as Science Strategy as Art
Reasoning Follows Formal, fixed rules Informal, variable rules
Reasoning Hindered by Incomplete information Adherence to Current Ideas

Concerning the role of intuition they write that in general it can be understood as the opposite
of formal analysis. “Intuition is informal and synthetic. Informal means that it is largely
unconscious and based on assumptions, variables and causal relationships not explicitly
identifiable by those doing the thinking. Synthetic means that the thinker does not aim at
unravelling phenomena into their constituent parts, but rather maintains a more holistic view
of reality.”533 Interestingly, they point out that intuition is not necessarily irrational. “If
intuition is viewed as a set of unconscious and un-codified decision rules largely derived from
experience, intuitive judgments can be quite logical.”534 To support this view, they refer to
Simon. They also claim that unconscious does not mean illogical and thus that most
proponents of the rational perspective do not dismiss intuition out of hand. This is so, even
though intuitive judgments are difficult to verify and infamously unreliable.535

Implications
Apparently, intuition is recognized as a mode of cognition that is of special relevance in
strategic thinking and decision-making. Thus, we may wonder what possible implications
there are, and how we best can benefit from intuition. Let us start by considering the cost,
speed, and accuracy of using analysis versus intuition. Analysis would seem to be slower and
costlier. This because a team often has to be assembled, and it has to study all kinds of data
before it can draw a conclusion. For better or for worse, the decisions aided by intuition are
available immediately. However, that considers only the operating cost. The investment cost
of intuition, as emphasized by Mintzberg, is far higher.536 Earlier on, it was indicated that this
is due to the assumption that one cannot be intuitive, unless one has intimate knowledge of the
subject in question.537 Intimate knowledge of the subject in question, necessarily, takes years
to develop. Analysis on the other hand, is rather easy to undertake, clever analysts can with
little effort, get their hands on good, hard data.

Analysis, when done correctly, with the right kind of data, gives answers that are accurate
and correct. Intuition, when applied to problems with which it can deal, tends to be only
approximately correct, according to the study conducted by Hammond et al. and Peters et
al.538 In other words, the analytic approach to problem solving produces the precise answer
more often, but its distribution of errors is quite wide. In contrast to this, intuition is less
frequently precise, but more consistently close to the correct answer. Part of the reason, may
be that to intuition, a bizarre answer is out of context and thus reconsidered. Peters et al. thus
described analysis as equivalent to the switching of trains on a track, involving a set of
discrete and well-defined choices. Correct decisions all along the way will lead to the right
destination, while one simple error, anywhere can take the train to a completely different
place. Analysis may be sub-optimal, in trading off breadth for depth, and because it does not

533
Ibid. p. 72.
534
Ibid.
535
Ibid. Here they refer to Hogarth, 1980, and Schwenk, 1984.
536
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 325.
537
Baylor, 2001.
538
Hammond et al. 1997, p. 172. Peters et al., 1974, in Mintzberg, 1994, p. 327.

110
seem to encourage creativity. It is often a convergent process, in search of a solution, and
often a deductive one, oriented more to decomposition than to design. It often suffers from
premature closure, and leads to marginal rather than radical innovation. Intuition on the other
hand, can lead either to dramatic forms of innovation, or none at all, Mintzberg argues.539
Strategic decision-making usually includes high risk. Portfolio theory thus teaches us that we
are better off being equipped with several modes of thinking. However, it requires
investments.

Finally, it may be suggested that to benefit the most from intuition, a shift from purely
external or objective reality approach, to internal locus of control is required. In doing so, the
responsibility, in success as well as in failure, is to be anchored within the organization. An
example may clarify what is meant here. If the organization is in a strategic group where
competition is fierce and rude, where customers are disloyal and profit is meager, the question
to be raised is why your organization faces these problems. In scrutinizing the ethical standard
and the application of power, it is likely that we will find some answers within the
organization. What we want to have is a unification of the external and internal analysis, an
integral SWOT analysis.540

Concerning more specific guidelines on how to apply intuition in strategic thinking, the
following procedure may prove useful. Its backbone is developed by Kahneman et al.541 Step
one is the selection of a reference class, so that the case can be anchored meaningfully. A
good thing would be to know i.e. class average and variability, thus the second step is
assessment of the distribution for the reference class. Step three is the intuitive estimation.
The expert usually has a considerable amount of knowledge and experience relevant to the
particular case. On this basis, an intuitive estimate should be made. In this stage, we may
benefit considerably from different techniques that foster and facilitate intuition. Worth
mentioning is i.e. dialogue, meditation, and neuro-linguistic programming. Then the intuitive
estimate may be corrected. It can be done, by adjusting it towards the average of the reference
class, using the correlation coefficient.542 In step five the expert is supposed to evaluate
whether or not the information available permits accurate prediction. This can be most
difficult. One way to approach it is to reflect upon own skills, compared with those of others,
who also work with predictions. To these five steps, we might add March’s technology of
foolishness, which we did discuss.543

To conclude this paragraph we may say that even though intuition is recognized as pivotal in
both strategic thinking and decision making, theory is so to speak non-existent. Another point
I have alluded to is thus that; in extensive application of analysis we are running into March’s
exploitation trap. That is, if analysis is the only mode of cognition explored theoretically and
empirically, it may in the longer run, prove dysfunctional to the field of strategy. The current
work aims at bridging the gap.

539
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 325-329.
540
Andrews, 1987, p. 35-51. SWOT = Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats.
541
Kahneman et al. 1985, p. 417-421.
542
Ibid. p. 420. “If the intuitive estimate was non-regressive, then under fairly general conditions the distance
between the intuitive estimate and the average of the class should be reduced by a factor of p, where p is the
correlation coefficient.”
543
March, 1994, p. 262.

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5.5 Conclusion

This chapter first introduced a definition of strategy. Apparently, strategy is a unified

perception revealing a unique and consistent set of activities, propelling the company into
what it is to be. It is context-rich in the sense that it is anchored in both internal and external
analysis. When these key aspects of strategy are compared with the ones that define intuition,
we discovered intrinsic similarities. In the second paragraph strategic decision-making and
bounded rationality were discussed. March’s work on logic of consequence and
appropriateness resembles the distinction between analytical and intuitive cognition as well as
dual process theories. A descriptive line of argument was presented, which is not
controversial namely that strategic decision makers do rely on oversimplified rules-of-thumb
and a mixture of analysis and intuition. The rationale for studying intuition in strategy is thus
its salience not only for the field of strategy, but for the field of decision making as well.

Having established the relevance of my inquiry the third paragraph focused in on strategic
thinking. Mintzberg’s work is illustrative of a growing line of research efforts where the term
is not merely a catchall for all sorts of notions about strategic management.544 Rather, he
approaches strategic thinking as a particular way of thinking with specific characteristics. He
claims that strategic planning is an analytical process with the aim to program already
identified strategies. The result is a plan. Strategic thinking on the other hand is a process of
synthesis, based on intuition, where the outcome is an integrated perspective of the enterprise.
A vision of the whole as Porter put it.545 This duality then, of strategic thinking as both
analytic and intuitive, is made explicit by De Wit & Meyer. In their comprehensive coverage
of the strategy field they ask; what is the fundamental nature of strategic thought processes?
They emphasize analytical and intuitive cognition, without providing any theory on intuition.
This distinction is the main one throughout my thesis and right here it may prove its worth.

With this chapter, I draw to an end on the first research question and objective. How intuition
is defined in philosophical, psychological and management theory is elaborated. In strategic
thinking and decision-making, intuition is recognized as a cognitive style of utmost
importance but theory is so to speak, non-existent. Thus, conceptual clarification was
required. The proposed contribution of this research is that by better understanding intuition
and it’s application, more rational, effective, and efficient strategic thinking and decision-
making could result. Being equipped with the theoretical and historical inquiry the next
objective and question of concern is how top managers define intuition, its pro’s & con’s and
what emphasis they put on analysis versus intuition. This is the focus of the succeeding
empirical study.

544
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 273-274, 291. See also Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, Porter, 1998, Fredrickson 1986, and
McGinnis 1987.
545
Porter, 1998, p. 68.

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6 RESEARCH METHOD

6.1 Research Problem, Objectives and Questions

The research problem was elaborated in the previous chapter. In brief, the problem is that
even though intuition is recognized as imperative in strategic thinking management literature
is surprisingly silent on the issue. Theory construction is thus the primary research objective
and I come at it from two angles. One is a rather thorough cross-disciplinary theoretical
inquiry aiming at clarification of the concept intuition and the other is an exploratory
empirical study. Concepts are the most critical element in any theorizing because they guide
what is captured.546 As the literature on the issue is rather scarce and fragmented, an historical
and hermeneutic approach appeared sensible. The issue of concern was how intuition is
defined in philosophical, psychological and management theory. What is intuition? It is a
question intriguing philosophers and psychologists alike, from the very origin of their
traditions. Usually intuitive thinking is contrasted with discursive or analytical thinking, and
this was my take on it as well. The ambition was not to uncover and discuss the numerous
weaknesses of intuition. That is already properly done by a number of excellent researchers.
Rather, the intent was to explore the notion and in this way, I hoped to delineate main aspects
and valid dimensions, which could facilitate the empirical research.

The other strand of work is the exploratory empirical study. It is three-fold. First, I did
interview 105 Norwegian top managers from the private sector about how they perceive
intuition and its role in strategic thinking. Interpreting their replies, applying the
philosophical, psychological and management theory lenses may facilitate further refinement
of the concept. Secondly they completed the Myers Briggs Type Indictor®, which indicate
whether or not they have a personality preference for intuition in perception and judgment.
Finally I tested certain tentative and preliminary aspects of the concept, considered relevant in
this managerial context. I did this by personal interviewing, in which the same 105
respondents were asked to both score and rank the items of an intuition and analysis scale, in
two different self-chosen decisions. That is, they were asked to evaluate their emphasis on
intuition and analysis and the corresponding decision quality. Given the research problem the
empirical study may thus also contribute to our knowledge of how top managers think about
their intuitive and analytical thinking in strategic decision-making, this being the secondary
research objective.

The four research questions are then:

1 How is intuition conceived in philosophical, psychological and management theory, and

how is it related to normative rationality?

2 How are intuition and its role in strategic thinking perceived by Norwegian top managers?

3 Do Norwegian top managers have a personality preference for intuition as indicated by

Myers Briggs Type Indicator®?

4 Is intuition more or less emphasized than analysis, in strategic thinking and decisions?

546
Ghauri et al. 1995, p. 17. See also Burns, 2000, Elster, 1989, Troye, 1994.

113
6.2 Research Model, Variables and Questionnaire Items

Many variables might influence the thinking and decision making of top managers. For
instance, the decision making process may involve many people.547 However, I have
sidestepped this issue and focus in on the individual strategic thinker as unit of analysis. The
theoretical review has indicated that decision situations, personality and experience may be
relevant variables in explaining emphasis on intuition and analysis. The tentative research
model with main variables to be explored is illustrated and discussed below.

Figure 6.2.1 Research Model & Variables

Exploration & Exploitation Personality & Experience

Emphasis on Intuition & Analysis

The Strategic Decision Making Context

Before we turn to a presentation of the suggested independent and dependent variables a few
words about the research context is required. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the
very nature of strategic thinking might explain why top managers are inclined to emphasize
intuition. Apparently, strategic thinking is a unified perception of a unique and consistent set
of internal and external activities, well aligned with intuition. In Mintzberg’s elaboration of
strategic thinking it is concluded that strategy cannot be planned because planning is about
analysis and strategy is about intuitive synthesis. Exploring the concept of intuition in only
this particular research context is therefore a very limited and biased approach. Testing of the
tentative constructs measuring intuition, in a different context could of course give other
results. It is thus a suggestion for further research.

In the previous chapter, I also argued with March that in rational models of strategic thinking
and choice the balance between exploration of new terrain and technology and exploitation of
familiar situations is discussed classically in terms of a theory of rational search. That is, an
optimal search continues only until the cost of search outweighs the value of the added
information. Similarly, in organizational learning, the problem of balancing exploration and
exploitation is exhibited in distinctions between refinement of an existing technology and
invention of a new one.548 There are numerous modes of strategic thinking and decision
making. However, in my research some of the variation is covered by having the respondents
evaluate their emphasis on intuition and analysis in both exploration and exploitation that is,
in new and old decision situations. Miller & Ireland’s hypothesis that intuition is more
prevalent in exploration is thus investigated.549 More specifically then, we have a situation
variable, defined by exploration and exploitation.

547
Nonaka & Konno, 1998. They introduce the concept ba or shared space.
548
March, 1991.
549
Miller & Ireland, 2000, p. 19. See also Sharfman, 1998.

114
Variables
In this research decision situation, personality and experience are considered independent
variables while emphasis on analysis and intuition are dependent ones. Causal relations in the
true sense of the word are very hard to detect. This is especially so as long as my dependent
variables and belonging theory are still not properly validated.550 To a large degree, the
current work is thus exploratory, taking place in the context of discovery. The focus is
primarily on the role and emphasis on intuition and analysis in strategic thinking and decision
making.

Personality
Philosophy, psychology and more lately management disciplines, all give attention to
consciousness, cognition and intuition. These issues are to some extent discussed and
anchored in personality type and trait theory. The work of for example Jung and Westcott
indicates that intuitive types share distinct personality characteristics.551 Several instruments
have been developed that seek to reveal our traits and preferences in perception, judgment and
decision making. The assumption that there is an intimate, causal relation between personality
and decision making behavior is indeed a controversial one.552 One serious problem is
whether the traits, as measured by personality tests, are consistent across contexts. If the traits
are not consistent across contexts, we may not predict behavior. This and other related issues
are discussed in the next chapter. A major challenge in my research was to find a valid and
reliable instrument that can delineate to what extent individuals prefer intuition and analysis
in their perception and judgment. It could not be too time-consuming as the respondents were
to fill it out during the personal interview. The table below lists some of the reviewed
instruments measuring cognition and problem solving strategies.553

Table 6.2.2 Instruments Measuring Cognition and Problem Solving Strategies

Instrument Measure
Kolb’s Competency Circle, 1976 Learning Styles
Kirton’s Adaptor and Innovator, 1987 Problem Solving Strategies
Bass’s Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire, 1989 Transactional & Transformational Leadership
Kaufmann’s Assimilator-Explorer Styles, 1991 Problem Solving Strategies
Martinsen’s Managerial Behavior, 1999 Managerial Behavior
Myers Briggs Type Indicator, 1985 Psychological Types

Kolb’s instrument is primarily developed for identifying individual learning styles and is
anchored in the work of Dewey, Piaget and Lewin.554 Here it is suggested that a learning
process goes through four stages; concrete experience, reflective observations, abstract
conceptualization and active experimentation. Kolb thus suggests that we can identify four
types of learning styles: accommodators, divergers, assimilators, and convergers. In statistical

550
Thus, I do not introduce control variables. They are more useful when an explicit causal link is hypothesized.
551
Wetcott, 1968, p. 140, Jung, 1971.
552
Bass & Stogdill, 1990, p. 87, 563-658. “It is reasonable to conclude that personality traits differentiate
leaders from followers, successful from unsuccessful leaders, and high-level from low-level leaders.” “Though,
above and beyond personal attributes of consequence, the situation can make a difference.” See also Terkelsen,
1999, p. 67 and March, 1994, p. 59.
553
Kvålshaugen, 2001, p. 53. See also Kolb, 1984.
554
Ibid. p. 55. Kvålshaugen refers to Dewey, 1958, Piaget, 1969, and Lewin, 1951. See also Dewey, 1947.

115
analysis the circle, scales generated by this instrument are somewhat difficult to handle and
there is no clear link to intuition. Kirton’s instrument is useful for measuring mental processes
related to creativity, problem solving and decision making.555 The adaptor is characterized by
precision, efficiency, prudence, discipline, conformity, and a methodical approach. The
innovator is characterized by being undisciplined, with emphasis on thinking, and
approaching tasks from unsuspected angles. The instrument is in many ways comparable with
Kaufman and Martinsen’s instruments. Here the assimilator corresponds to the adaptor and
the explorer to the innovator. The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire is based on Burn’s
distinction between transactional and transformational leadership and is further developed by
Bass. A transactional leader is recognized as operating within the existing system or culture,
prefers risk avoidance and pays attention to time constraints and efficiency. A
transformational leader on the other hand seeks new ways of working, seeks opportunities in
the face of risk, prefers effective answers to efficient ones and is less likely to support status
quo.556 Regarding the more well known tests like: Costa & McCrae’s NEO-PI, Cattell’s 16PF,
Eysenck’s EPQ and Wiggins’ circumplex model, they do not address intuition as a specific
trait or function, and they are in general time-consuming, including as many as 181 items in
NEO-PI.557

The MBTI surfaced as the more promising instrument in this context. It is an instrument,
which seeks “to make the theory of psychological types described by Jung understandable and
usable in people’s lives.”558 As Jung is one of a few psychologists who have provided a theory
on intuition, MBTI serves my main purpose well. For Jung intuition is a cognitive event
which occurs and which must be accounted for. It is one of four psychological functions,
present in all individuals. These four functions attain different degrees of ascendancy during
the life of each individual, and in combination with three levels of consciousness and two
general orienting attitudes, determine to a great extent each individual’s characteristic
behavior. The four mental functions, which are the basis of MBTI and Jungian typology, are
thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition.559 I have covered these functions in the section on
Jung. Discussion of the MBTI and its psychometrical properties are postponed to the next
chapter.560

Experience Levels
The theoretical inquiry provided arguments for why experience is supposed to be another
relevant independent variable. It is reflected in for example Jung’s definition of intuition as a
function that mediates perceptions of personal and collective unconscious experience. The
work of Simon, Baylor, and Cappon are other examples.561 Experience is accounted for in two
ways in the empirical study. First, the top managers are asked to evaluate their emphasis on
intuition in an exploratory strategic decision situation in which they had no previous
experience, and in an exploitative situation familiar to them. Secondly, a number of questions
reveal their professional experience in the industry, in the company, in other industries, and

555
Ibid. p. 56. She refers to Kirton, 1989.
556
Ibid.
557
Cloninger, 1996, p. 87-104.
558
Briggs, 1998, p. xvii. Briggs & McCaulley, 1985, 1995, Epstein, 1979, Bayne, 1995, Cloninger, 1996, p.
101.
559
Jung, 1968, p. 33. His model is thus a cross, where thinking & feeling and intuition & sensation are
opposites.
560
Cohen, 1996, p. 658-659.
561
Jung, 1971, p. 453, Baylor, 2001, p. 238, Simon, 1987, p. 63, Cappon, 1994, p. 15.

116
with strategy. The experience measures will be correlated with the scores and ranks of
intuition and analysis.

Certain demographical classes may also turn out to be relevant. Questions on level and type
of education, gender, work position, industry type, and number of employees are included.
Some statistics from my sample are presented in the tables below.

Table 6.2.3 Demographical Classes; Education, Gender, Number of Industries & Firms, Work Positions
Education Business Engineering Others Total
Undergraduate Level 35 22 17 74
Graduate Level 12 2 14 28
Doctoral Level 3 0 0 3

N Females Males Industries Firms Average Number of Employees

105 13 92 22 34 3325

CEO Finance Marketing Strategy HR IT Production Others

28 8 11 3 8 2 19 26

Analysis & Intuition

Emphasis on analysis and intuition in strategic thinking and decision making are the primary
dependent variables. They are measured by self-report measures. The construct validity is
especially difficult with intuition. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish a valid scale
on intuition. It might be impossible due to its subtle and elusive character. However, the
laborious theoretical inquiry may provide us with conceptual clarification, facilitating
construction of my questionnaire, which is presented on the next page. The tables below
summarize key findings. This is not an exhaustive nor a complete list, but indeed a tentative
one. In addition, quite a few relevant aspects of intuition are kept off the list, as they have no
obvious opposing analytical aspect. They include Plato’s Ideas, Kant’s Forms time and space,
Bergson’s duration, Jung’s archetypes, as well as vision, foresight, hindsight, insight,
meaning, possibilities, self-evidence, intrinsic certainty and novelty.562 See previous chapters
for detailed argumentation and rationale.

Table 6.2.4 The Concepts Intuition and Analysis in Philosophy and Psychology

Intuition Analysis In Philosophy

Non-inferential Inferential Greek
Grasps all at once * Grasps objects piecemeal Greek * Items in cursive are emphasized in my questionnaire
Infallible Fallible Greek
Balanced Unbalanced Buddhism
Non-discriminating Discriminating Buddhism
Coherent Incoherent Buddhism, Baumann, 2002, Bastick, 1982, Kaufman, 2000
Non-dual Dual Buddhism
Multi-dimensional Three-dimensional Buddhism, Bastick, 1982
Representation in it Representation under it Kant, 1724
Immediate Mediate Kant, 1724, Baylor, 2001
Direct Indirect Kant, 1724, Davis-Floyd & Arvidson, 1997
Given Derived Kant, 1724, Jung 1971
Non-discursive Discursive Kant, 1724, Greek
Singular General Kant, 1724
Whole precedes the part Parts precedes the whole Kant, 1724
Multiplicity in unity Unity in multiplicity Kant, 1724
Metaphysical Science Physical Science Bergson, 1949

562
Cappon, 1994, p. 16, Fischbein, 1987, p. 14. See Hodkinson, 2003, for a discussion of the validity issue.

117
Spirit Matter Bergson, 1949
Qualitative Quantitative Bergson, 1949
Synthesis Analysis Bergson, Diblee, Wild, Bunge, Fischbein, Cappon, Mintzberg, Arvidson
Complete Incomplete Bergson, 1949, Diblee, 1929, Bastick, 1982
Absolute Relative Bergson, 1949
Simple Complex Bergson, 1949
Original Copy Bergson, 1949, Diblee, 1929
Real Symbolic Bergson, 1949, Wild, 1938
Unification Fragmentation Bergson, 1949, Diblee, 1929, Fischbein, 1987
Integrates Separates Bergson, 1949, Buddhism, Fischbein, 1987, Arvidson, 1997
Dynamic Static Bergson, 1949, Cappon, 1994

Intuition Analysis In Psychology & Management

Non-judgmental Judgmental Jung, 1971
Beyond Rationality Rational Jung, 1971, Bergson, 1949
Whole Separated Jung, 1971, Diblee, 1929, Bastick, 1982, Fischbein, 1987, Arvidson, 1997
Self/Soul Ego/Personality Jung, 1971
Tacit Explicit Polanyi, 1969, Fischbein, 1987, Evans & Over 1996
Implicit Explicit Reber 1993, Johnson-Laird 1983, Fischbein, 1987, Osbeck, 1999
Associative System Rule-based System Sloman 1996
Heuristic Processing Analytic Processing Evans 1984, 1989
Interactional Intelligence Analytic Intelligence Levinson 1995
Experiential System Rational System Epstein 1994, 1996
Quick & Inflexible Intellection Pollock 1991
Recognition-Primed Rational Choice Strategy Klein 1998
Automatic Processing Controlled Processing Shiffrin & Schneider 1977, Kahneman, Gilovich, Griffin, 2002

The Questionnaire Items

When choosing which items from the list to apply in this particular managerial context, pilot
testing was instrumental. Moreover, Epstein’s work and Parikh’s research on 1300 managers’
definition on intuition proved useful, and experts were consulted for further validation.563 As a
rule, I picked aspects of intuition and analysis that the authorities above agree are central. The
suggested second and third levels of intuition are assumed to be of little or no familiarity to
top managers, thus the items chosen do primarily reflect the first level. The items in cursive
were emphasized and built in to the eleven questions of the interview-guide presented below.
The first four address analysis and the remaining seven, intuition. During the interview, they
are mixed according to a fixed pattern. The respondents describe two strategic decisions, one
characterized by exploration and one by exploitation, and then they reply to the eleven
questions in both decisions. In each question, the respondents are asked: to score their
emphasis on a Likert scale from one to seven. Finally, they rank the items in accordance with
their emphasis. The entire interview guide is included in the appendix.

Table 6.2.5 The 11 Interview Questions on Analysis & Intuition

1 A controlled study and break down of explicit data, using quantitative models. Kahnemann, Shiffrin & Schneider
2 Evaluation of alternatives, in terms of their consequences for preferences. March
3 Dividing the whole situation into sub-areas, dissecting & scrutinizing them. Bergson, Fischbein
4 Analysis of facts, figures, reports, data and evidence. Evans, Levinson
5 Correct timing (knowing when to take the right step in the marketplace). Kant, Bergson, Cappon
6 Perception of cycles (foreseeing emerging trends, patterns and recurring events). Jung, Bergson Cappon, Mintzberg
7 Perception of the larger picture (a holistic view and apprehension of the situation). Cappon, Bastick, Fischbein
8 Synthesis (The ability to perceive many factors and variables as a coherent whole). Bergson, Mintzberg, Bunge, Wild
9 Gut feeling rooted in the sum of implicit and unconscious knowledge, insight and previous exp. Epstein, Bastick, Vaughan, Jung
10 Perception of possibilities (the innate idea). Jung
11 Intuition

563
Epstein, et al., 1996, p. 394, Parikh, et al., 1994, p. 165. Former CEO Per Grøholt and Professor Jon
Wetlesen at UIO were consulted.

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6.3 The Sample

Probability and non-probability sampling represent two distinct approaches to sampling.

“Although researchers can make accurate estimates of the population’s parameters only with
probability samples, social scientists do use non-probability samples. They employ this option
for reasons of convenience and economy, which under certain circumstances (e.g.,
exploratory research), may outweigh the advantages of using probability sampling.”564 In my
exploratory research, I have relied on aspects of several non-probability sampling techniques,
including, quota, convenience, and purposive sampling. The chief aim of a quota sample is to
select a sample with characteristics proportional to those of the population. For instance, I
assumed that in the population of Norwegian top managers from the private sector, there are
approximately ten percent women, and this was taken into consideration. Access to top
managers time are strenuous work and often won by indirect routes. Usually I had to send a
written request to the person in charge of human resource management or to the CEO’s
secretary. From the initial request 2-3 months often passed before the interview took place,
and a full year went by upon completing the interviewing. In a few companies, this process
was facilitated by personal acquaintances. Consequently, elements of convenience influenced
on the sampling.

In purposive sampling units are selected subjectively, utilizing own judgment, in an attempt to
obtain a sample that appears to be representative of the population. More specifically, I used
statistics from Dun & Bradstreet revealing the distribution of different industry sectors with
regard to number of firms, employees, sales, and financial structure.565 These data guided the
sampling and are presented in an appendix. A chief concern when choosing which companies
to contact was to secure a proper variety and ratio of industries and firms. Thus, I have all the
main sectors represented except agriculture, and I tried to include individual companies
representative of the industry, and in this way aligning the sample with the population.
Secondly, gender and occupation types for the respondents were taken into consideration. Not
all the respondents were CEO’s. Some were in charge of finances, some of marketing, some
of human resource, etc. It was more difficult to take into consideration differences in age,
experience, and geographical location of the companies. Elements of subjective judgment thus
characterize the sample, which includes 34 companies and 22 industries. A detailed
presentation of the sample is included in an appendix.

Since some of the 105 top managers come from the same companies and industries there is a
potential problem that they cannot be regarded as independent observation units.566 We may
assume that company and industry differences explain variation in their thinking. To check
for that, I have performed a Kruskal-Wallis test on each of the questions asked to see if there
are significant differences between the industries, and again between the companies. If not, it
is reasonable to assume that there are no disturbing company and industry effects. The
Kruskal Wallis test is a non-parametric equivalent to a one-way analysis of variance. It is
better suited for small group sizes, like I have. It assumes that the underlying variable has a
continuous distribution and requires only an ordinal level of measurement. The test indicates
with two exceptions no significant industry or company effects. In addition, as the sample
increased I discovered only minor changes. However, as the p-values for question 4, analysis,

564
Nachmias, 1996, p. 184.
565
The data are from 2001 and are provided by colleague Eskil Goldeng at BI.
566
Yet another concern is that many respondents are from the same company. However, with two exceptions
they did not describe the same decision.

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are all in the range of 0,04 to 0,120 we may indicate that here the replies are influenced by
both industry and company characteristics.

Table 6.3.1 Kruskal Wallis Test with p-values for the 11 Questions on Analysis and Intuition
Analysis Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Company Effects in Exploration (A) 0,26 0,27 0,20 0,07
Company Effects in Exploitation (B) 0,28 0.23 0,70 0,12
Industry Effects in Exploration (A) 0,11 0,36 0,19 0,12
Industry Effects in Exploitation (B) 0,17 0,32 0,82 0,04

Intuition Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11

Comp. Eff. A 0,59 0,28 0,21 0,23 0,09 0,29 0,04
Comp. Eff. B 0,48 0,35 0,53 0,90 0,84 0,36 0,25
Indust. Eff. A 0,31 0,28 0,61 0,36 0,33 0,24 0,16
Indust. Eff. B 0,25 0,17 0,59 0,90 0,78 0,41 0,26

6.4 Data Collection Procedure

Given the research objectives and variables, the next step was to construct a design enabling
me to answer the four research questions within the given constraints of time and budget.
Ghauri et al. suggest that we distinguish between three main classes of design in business
studies: the exploratory, the descriptive and the causal. In the former, the understanding of the
problem is unstructured, while in the latter two it is structured.567 I have argued that intuition
is not yet well understood, hence an inductive and exploratory design seems sensible. Proper
deductive work is premature. A distinction is also often made between two strategies: theory
before research or research before theory.568 In my case, the theoretical inquiry might be seen
as both a separate contribution, and as a prerequisite for the empirical study. Obviously more
theory could be reviewed and more data could be collected. However, the design chosen also
intends to combine theory and empirical data into a coherent effort at developing conceptual
clarification. I look for their mutual resonance.

Concerning the data collection four general approaches was considered: survey research,
qualitative research, observational methods, and secondary data analysis. Each of these has
subgroups and certain unique advantages but also some inherent limitations. For example, if I
was to observe behavior directly, the reason behind might be hidden, which is easier
elucidated in an interview. However, the verbal reports given to me by the top-managers may
not resonate perfectly with their actual strategic thinking. In contrast to large impersonal
surveys, qualitative research attempts to understand behavior and institutions by getting to
know the persons involved and their thinking, values, rituals, symbols, beliefs, and emotions.
It is normally carried out in natural settings, in order to learn firsthand about the issue
investigated.569 As my respondents described two strategic decisions made by themselves, a
qualitative element is introduced. More specifically then, I conducted personal interviews with
105 top managers. The research objective, questions, and constraints are such that this
approach appears to be the more feasible one. Observational methods are presumably not

567
Ghauri, et al. 1995, p. 27. See also Elfring, 1996.
568
Ibid. p. 16.
569
Nachmias, 1996, p. 281. See also Strauss, 1987, and Yin, 1994.

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suitable means for delineating how strategic thinking evolves. Strategic thinking is often an
intuitive, introvert, and time consuming process, not easily conveyable, to observation nor to
secondary data analysis.

Mail questionnaires, telephone interviews, and personal interviews are the three main methods
of gathering data with surveys.570 There are a number of reasons why I preferred the personal
interview, including a very high response rate (100%), more, fuller, and recorded
information, as well as flexibility in the questioning process, all improving the validity of the
research. It also facilitated MBTI replies and ranking of the eleven questionnaire items. Due
to the flexibility, the interviews could range from highly structured to non-structured allowing
me to gather both quantitative and qualitative data, required in triangulation. Additionally, it
allowed me to determine who answered the questions, where the interview was conducted and
in which order the questions were answered. Disadvantages included higher cost, as it is
indeed time consuming to personally interview 105 top managers. Even though the interview
guide was applied rigidly and without exceptions, non-verbal cues may have influenced on
the answering of the respondents. Thus, one more interviewer could have been instrumental.
Finally, lack of anonymity is sometimes an issue causing the respondents to withhold
information. However, in this study I could promise individual anonymity.571

In the construction of my questionnaire the content, structure, format, and sequence of the
questions were taken into consideration. The questionnaire should translate the research
objective into questions providing proper data, and seven versions of it were made before the
interviewing could start. Double-barreled, threatening, and leading questions were avoided.
The structure of questions, are either closed- or open-ended. For the most part my respondents
replied to closed-ended questions with a belonging Likert scale or set of answering
alternatives. However, a few open-ended questions allowed for free and thorough elaboration
of the answer. The sequence of the questions may affect the type of response given. Ideally,
the MBTI should have been distributed either well in advance of the interview or at a later
point in time. At the outset, I did try to accomplish this, but experienced that it did not work.
After nearly two months, the human resource manager who was my contact in the first
company resigned in having his colleagues fill it out and return it. Thus, I ended up having the
respondents filling it out at the end of the interview, a task they completed in approximately
10-15 minutes. Possibly, their previous reflections during the interview, on own thought
processes and perceptions facilitated more self-aware and precise replies.

Yet another concern, regarding the sequence of the questions, is that the question about how
they define intuition and its role in strategic thinking is located after the eleven questions
inquiring into their emphasis on intuition and analysis. Thus, their definitions may be
influenced by the previous questions. The main reason why I did this is that their memory of
the two actual decisions then is properly activated, anchoring their definitions and replies in
their real-life strategic decision, thus utilizing a main strength of the personal interview. When
we in the next chapter look at their answers we see that, with few exceptions, the words they
use in defining intuition, are not synonymous with those applied in the questionnaire. This
concern may thus not be critical. And the alternative, of having the opposite sequence
introduces similar problems.

A related issue was whether fixed, predefined cases should be used in the interview.
Predefined cases were perceived as especially relevant in the beginning of the project, when
570
Ibid. p. 204.
571
Ibid. p. 226, 239, 244-245.

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the intention was to include only one or two industries in the sample. In this way, much
variation could be eliminated. However, the research objective and questions are such that a
design where the respondents can elaborate on their own real-life decisions was favored.
Also, the theoretical review indicated that it is personality, experience, and strategic thinking
per se, not company or industry effects that may explain emphasis on intuition and analysis, if
a casual explanation was to be pursued. At this point I may again repeat that the nature of my
inquiry is such that up-front I resigned from making such claims.

6.5 Validity Issues

Having described the details of the research method, the final issue is its validity and
reliability. Certain statistical tests are instrumental in this respect and they are performed in
chapter eight. Four criteria of validity are especially relevant in the current research, namely
construct, content, internal- and external validity. The historical inquiry of intuition provides a
preliminary and tentative rationale for the construct validity of the seven items in the
suggested scale. I will return to reliability and the construct validity in chapter eight. There are
two common varieties of content validity. The face validity rests on my subjective assessment
of the instrument’s appropriateness. In applying the interview-guide more than 100 times a
feeling for its appropriateness developed. In addition, I still have long conversations with
several experts on the issue.572 The other element in content validity is sampling validity. It
necessitates familiarity with all the items of the content population. In yet other words: Are
my seven tentative items on intuition representative of intuition per se? This question is not
an easy one to answer, but again the cross-disciplinary theoretical inquiry is purposive.

The validity of the study is also dependent on the level of measurement and possible
measurement errors. In order to attain an interval level the respondents would have to specify
exactly how much more or less emphasis they did put on for example timing versus gut
feeling, in a decision taking place perhaps one year ago. Such preciseness would be rather
illusionary, thus an ordinal level is applied. Concerning the risk of measurement errors three
types were taken into considerations. First, the scores and ranks obtained may have been
influenced by the ability of the respondent to comprehend the meaning of the question. One
respondent, who had previous experience with questionnaire work, indicated that this was
difficult. On the other hand, quite a few respondents commented that all the items were highly
relevant. In order to avoid these possible problems the instrument was pilot-tested on eight
subjects. And in asking the questions, I carefully applied only the exact wording. Moreover,
one thing is what they say they emphasized in their thinking, what they actually did when
making their decisions may be a different story. Self-report measures are often dubious due to
memory problems and a misconceived self-perception.

Secondly, there may be errors resulting from differences in temporary conditions, such as
health or mood affecting the responses to my questions. On rare occasions, I felt that the
respondent became irritated due to the fairly long interview. This problem disappeared as the
time spent sunk from one hour to approximately 50 minutes, an effect of me being acquainted
with the questionnaire and the interview situation. Thirdly, differences in the time and setting
in which the interviewing took place may have contributed to measurement errors. However,

572
Professor Jon Wetlesen at UIO and former CEO Per Grøholt were consulted.

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all interviewing were done at the office of the respondents and I tried to play my role in a
similar way each time.573

Comparison allows us to demonstrate correlation. In the classic experimental design, we

compare a group that is exposed to the independent variable with one that is not. In many
types of design however, the comparison is made within the same group, before and after the
independent variable is introduced. The former approach reveals more information. For
example, we would like to know if an experimental group and a control group of top
managers differ in their emphasis on analysis and intuition with increasing experience,
different strategic situations and MBTI profiles. This requires some form of control or
manipulation of the independent variables: situation, personality and experience. In my
setting, this was difficult, but it is a suggestion for further research.

In order then to establish proper internal validity I would have liked to ensure that changes in
the independent variables did in fact cause the dependent variables to change. In this I have
failed, but my focus has not been on possible causal relations between the variables, but
primarily on the emphasis and role of analysis and intuition in strategic thinking. A related
issue is that practical concerns sometimes prevent a random selection of respondents and
hence that possible biases are introduced. If so, it will be difficult to separate selection effects
from the effects of the independent variable. This problem is of special concern in cases
where the individuals themselves decide whether to participate.574 With two exceptions, all the
top managers I contacted volunteered to participate in the interview, thus the non-response
error is minimal. We may thus say that one of the pitfalls that jeopardize internal validity is
avoided.

The fourth criterion, external validity, concerns the extent to which my research findings can
be generalized to larger populations and applied to different social settings and times. To
ensure the external validity of my study, the characteristics of the top managers should reflect
the characteristics of the population. Although randomization contributes to the internal
validity of a study, it does not necessarily ensure that the sample is representative of the
population of interest. “Results that prove to be internally valid might be specific to the group
selected for the particular study. This possibility becomes likely in situations where it is
difficult to recruit cases to the study.”575 Again, the minimal non-response error may be
important. However, my non-probability sampling lack the control we like to see in order to
secure a representative sample. In order to counterbalance this problem The Myers Briggs
Type Indicator® was applied, which might improve the external validity somewhat. It is an
issue we will return to in the next chapter. In summarizing then on the validity issue it can be
indicated that the internal validity is rather weak, while the construct, content and external
validity is somewhat better off. As we now turn to the analysis of the findings, different
statistical tests will shed more light on the validity and reliability issues.

573
Nachmias, 1996, p. 165.
574
Ibid. p. 107.
575
Ibid. p. 113.

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7 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY & FINDINGS PART I

7.1 Introduction

The preceding and more laborious theoretical part of this inquiry addressed the primary
research objective and the first out of four research questions: How is intuition conceived in
philosophical, psychological and management theory and how does it relate to rationality?
Having explored the concept theoretically I now turn to the empirical counterpart, which has
three main elements, addressing the remaining three research questions. First, the 105 top
managers were interviewed about; how they perceive intuition and its role in strategic
thinking, this being my second research question. It is elaborated in the succeeding sections
7.2 and 7.3. Interpreting their replies may also facilitate further refinement of the concept.
Next, they completed the Myers Briggs Type Indicator®, which indicate whether they have: a
personality preference for intuition in perception and judgment. This third research question
is discussed in section 7.4 and answered in the affirmative. Finally, they did score and rank
the items of my tentative intuition and analysis scales in two different self-chosen strategic
decisions. That is, they were asked to evaluate; their emphasis on intuition and analysis and
the corresponding decision quality, thus answering the fourth research question. Chapter eight
is devoted to this latter question. The exploratory empirical study thus serves two purposes.
First, it may be a contribution to our knowledge of how Norwegian top managers think they
perceive and judge in strategic decision making. Secondly, it is a test of certain aspects of
intuition.

7.2 Intuition Defined by Norwegian Top Managers

In chapter five I reviewed the literature on intuition in strategy and did not find much
empirical research done. The only international survey is by Parikh, Alden and Lank. They
presented a somewhat limited conceptual framework, but conducted a comprehensive global
survey of more than 1300 practicing managers in nine countries.576 Norway, however, was not
included. Their study differs from this one also in the sense that they addressed both managers
and top managers. In asking their respondents to describe intuition, 23 percent defined it as a
decision or perception without recourse to logical or rational methods. 17 percent described it
as inherent perception, inexplicable comprehension, a feeling that comes from within. 17
percent described it as integration of previous experience, processing of accumulated
information. 12 percent described it as gut feeling, 9 percent as a decision/solution to a
problem, without complete data or facts, and another 7 percent as a sixth sense. 7 percent
described it as a spontaneous perception or vision, 6 percent as insight, 6 percent, as a
subconscious process, and another 6 percent described it as instinct.577

In Burke and Miller’s study, 60 experienced professionals holding significant positions in

major organizations across various industries in the U.S were interviewed.578 Their findings

576
Parikh, et. al., 1994, p. 25-41. My sample is restricted to top managers.
577
Ibid. p. 165.
578
Burke & Miller, 1999, p. 91.

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revealed that 56 percent understood intuitive decisions to be based on previous experiences,
together with emotional inputs. These replies are consistent with those presented below and
those of the pilot-test. We may thus indicate that in most cases, managers define intuition
along the lines I have suggested for the first level of intuition, which relates primarily to the
personal unconscious experience.

The second research question of the current research then asks: how do Norwegian top
managers perceive intuition? All of them replied to this open-ended question. Having
recorded and typed their full answers, I color-coded and content-analyzed the sentences and in
this way, aspects of intuition were differentiated. Some respondents focused in on only one
aspect, for instance gut feeling, while others emphasized several aspects. Thus, the columns to
the right include the number and percentage of respondents mentioning the particular aspect.
Turning to the specific findings we may start by presenting them in this table:

Table 7.2.1 Research Question Two: How is Intuition Defined by Norwegian Top Managers?

Intuition Defined by 105 Norwegian Top Managers % Nr.

Gut Feeling 69 72
Experience Based 57 60
The Larger Picture 47 49
Sense of Right or Wrong 30 31
Unconscious, Tacit 24 25
Foreseeing Direction 17 18
Sudden, Immediate New Idea/Insight 12 13
What you Believe in 7 8

Gut Feeling
A large number of respondents referred directly to gut feeling. When asked whether the
feeling was located in the head or the stomach, quite a few responded, both. We may include
a few quotations on each of the aspects, to illustrate the main tendency in the replies: “Not so
far away from gut feeling, and connected to your character. A kind of feeling for a possibility,
for a successful result.” “Something that is not quantifiable. It cannot be defined or measured.
No basis in theory.” “Gut feeling. Located in the head, linked with logic, but touches the
stomach.” “Some of the brain cells strikes in your gut.” “A kind of sensitivity, emotional
content.” “Gut feeling together with facts equals intuition.” “Gut feeling that develops over
time when you learn to know the industry. Some have more than others due to their ability to
be interested in not only themselves.” The more thorough replies include this one: “Gut
feeling, telling you whether or not the required psychological process in the organization will
gain enough momentum. This you can’t calculate or analyse.”

Experience Based
The reference to experience is widespread among the respondents: “Sum of own experience
put in a system you are not necessarily conscious of.” “A total conception of the situation,
with regard to my experience.” “Experience is the base of intuition. It is to look forward with
support in what you have experienced.” “The ‘computer’ moves in and checks with the
intuition. Intuition is connected with what life has taught you.” “Feeling that develops over
time when you learn to know the industry. Based on experience, try and fail.” “Combination
of experience and feeling.” “A mixture of analytical data and accumulated experience.” “The

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more experienced you are as leader the more you learn to listen to your gut, and act in
accordance with it.” “It is not only something that falls down into your head but also a result
of experience and insight anchored in an internal database in the back of your head.” “Can be
trained through broad experience.” “Impossible to have intuition on something you have not
been acquainted with previously. Much experience from similar situations facilitates intuition.
It is in your backbone.”

The Larger Picture

In defining intuition, 47 percent of the respondents used the larger picture or equivalents as
metaphor: “Palette mixed with many ingredients. Many antennas, and sensing in many
directions, internal and external.” “Sum of own experience put in a system you are not
necessarily aware of. The larger picture.” “The clear picture you see when you wake up early
after a good night sleep.” “A total conception of the situation in relation to my experience.”
“System-thinking, holistic thinking.” “Intuition is shaped as a mosaic throughout life.”
“Grasps wholeness and interrelationships.” “Sum of trends, knowledge and experience, you
see as relevant to the case.” “Unconscious work that gather and unifies all relevant aspects of
previous experience.” “Intuition sees the complexity in a situation.” “Something more than
just gut feeling. Gathering of signals you receive from different levels and perspectives, and a
kind of systematisation of them.” “Intuition tells you how you are part of something larger
than yourself. Kennedy and the man on the moon mission was intuitively embraced and
supported by the people.”

Sense of Right or Wrong, Unconscious

Approximately 25-30 percent of the respondents reflected upon the unconscious aspect of
intuition and how it gives a sense of right or wrong. For instance: “The feeling that something
is correct without knowing why.” “The first idea that pops up almost always reveals itself as
true.” “A brief moment of insight.” “Wake up early after a good night sleep with the answer, a
result of an unconscious analysis.” “True knowledge from a source beyond my reason.” “The
brain works unconsciously at putting together all your experience into go or not go, right and
wrong. It is difficult to document it, explain or verbalize it because the references are tacit and
unclear. It may oppose facts and figures.” “Psychological hunch and understanding without
knowing the entire equation consciously.” “Inner conviction for right and wrong.
Counterbalances the facts.” “I have to forget that I am a civil engineer and that 2+2 = 4. I
have to dare to mean something without knowing why.” “A thought in the head, that you are
unable to explain rationally. It can oppose the acclaimed rationale. A feeling of direction that
a decision is moving, by looking at the non-quantifiable and non-tangible.” “Good intuition is
embedded in a big database of hidden, unconscious knowledge and experience.”

Foreseeing Direction
More than 16 percent of the respondents did mention that intuition foresees direction. “You
see a direction that you can not argue logically or thoroughly for there and then.” “Ability to
see what comes out of the situation we are in now. It is to look forward with support in what
you have experienced.” “A feeling that something is going to happen, the likely outcome.”
“Ability to think in several steps ahead, like chess.” “Opinion about what you can do in order
to have something done in the future.” “An elevated feeling about what emerges as right.”
“Our business is not created by the past. Intuition sees the future, and indicates where to go.”
“An idea about how the world develops in the future. Ability to see trends, cycles and the

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larger patterns.” “You see the tail….” “Your industry experience, detailed knowledge, depth
of knowledge, management operating systems, adds up to intuition, which is the ability to
foresee the future, direction, change, developmental patterns, wholeness.”
“Visualization of how things will develop.”

Sudden, Immediate, New Idea or Insight

Twelve percent referred to the sudden, immediate nature of intuition. “Sudden reflection on
what is wrong or correct.” “Something that comes as a clear thought. Does not stay for long.”
“First impression.” “Something sudden to it.”
“The first idea that pops up almost always reveals itself as true.” “An impulse.”
“Sudden, first impression. The ability to immediately grasp wholeness and interrelatedness.”
“Influenced by experience you have gathered from familiar terrain, and comes as first hunch
in new terrain.” “Sleep on it and then the answer is there.” “Sudden thought or attitude.”
“Power that strikes you in the head enabling you to bring the idea forward.” Quite a few
respondents also mentioned that intuition might be linked to what you believe in.

Comments
If we are to comment upon these replies, we may start by saying that they are rather hazy.
When I did ask the respondents for elaboration they tended to stop short with two or three
sentences. Apparently the folk conception of intuition: as new ideas, sudden insight, and gut
feeling rooted in previous experience dominates. However, we should take note of the fact
that these top managers agree when defining intuition. By and large they all stick to the same
key words in their replies, which are congruent with the theory reviewed. If we apply the
philosophical, psychological and management theory lenses on this account, we can ask
certain critical questions. Regarding first the reference to gut feeling. As the respondents
locate this feeling in both the head and the gut, we are left confused. The philosophers and
psychologists tend to concentrate their exposition of intuition on the cognitive aspects.
Bastick is a notable exception. In recapitulating, he argues that: “The intuitive process is
dependent upon the interaction of emotional states and cognitive processes. It is evident from
the feeling of satisfaction and reductions in tensions that accompany an insight that emotional
involvement plays a part in intuitive processes. A whole body unifying theory is needed to
describe intuitive processes.”579 Obviously, in this current research I have not been able to
discuss this issue properly. Future research may thus benefit from addressing how the
cognitive components of intuition interact with emotional states.

Turning to the next issue, namely that intuition is based in unconscious experience more has
been said in previous chapters. A core question concerns the type of experience they refer to.
My impression is that it is primarily their personal experience they refer to and that it is often
unconscious. I have argued in accordance with Jung that this is the first level of intuition. The
second level of intuition accesses and comprises the collective unconscious memory vault.
When fully integrated in the conscious mind both individual and collective heuristics may be
illuminated. Indeed, this is a long way to go and I do question whether there is any substantial
awareness of these levels of the psyche among the respondents. However, it is interesting that
many of the respondents take into consideration the psychology of the decision, when they
rely on intuition. In addition, the many references to its sudden and immediate nature are well
worth mentioning. The short or long incubation delivers the new idea or insight when needed

579
Ibid. p. 133. See Bolte et al. 2003, for a recent contribution.

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or after a good night sleep. Why and how certain new ideas are elicited from the a priori
constraints of the human psyche is a thrilling mystery to most of us. The theoretical review
indicates that meditation and a non-judgmental attitude may be facilitating techniques. Their
reference to foresight will be discussed in the next section.

The larger picture or equivalents, was often used as a metaphor for intuition. How many
pieces that make up these so-called larger pictures in the mind of the strategist is difficult to
estimate. The related and troublesome question is how these mental pictures relate to genuine
intuition and analytical inference. In the section on Kant, this intricate issue was discussed in
detail. The sense of right and wrong, success and failure is yet another aspect of their
description of the subtle workings of intuition. In the chapter on intuition and rationality, the
discussion revolved around Føllesdal’s view: that when we say a person is rational we tend to
focus almost exclusively on the rationality of his or her beliefs and do not consider his values.
Rawls admits that it is not possible to develop a theory of values without relying on intuition,
and I rehearsed the argument that intuition is the ontological foundation for any theory of
normative rationality. Thus, we may not dismiss the view held by these Norwegian top
managers, that intuition provides a genuine reference to intrinsic values of right and wrong.
My conclusion then is that these top managers are experts in both the extraverted and the
introverted aspects of the first level of intuition only.

7.3 The Role of Intuition in Strategic Thinking

One critical finding in the aforementioned research of Parikh et al. is that intuition is
perceived as playing a major role in the professional lives of the responding managers, with
56 percent using both intuition and logic/reasoning in almost equal measure, and a further 7,5
per cent stating that they use more of intuition. Furthermore, almost 80 per cent of the 1300
respondents believe that intuition has relevance in corporate strategy and planning.580 The
same indication is revealed in Burke and Miller’s study.581 When asked whether they always,
often, sometimes, seldom, or rarely used intuition in the workplace, 47 percent answered
often. Participants reported employing intuition when decisions needed to be made quickly or
unexpectedly because potential costs were associated with delays. Other participants
responded that they used intuition when uncertainty pervaded such novel situations as a first-
time restructuring or reorganization and in some financial issues, such as formulating budgets,
estimating prices, and selecting investments.582 Turning to the latter part of my second
research question it addresses; how top managers perceive the role of intuition in strategic
thinking and decision making. With few exceptions, all the 105 respondents replied to this
open-ended question. Having recorded and typed their full answers, I color-coded and
content-analyzed the sentences, and in this way, the main issues could be differentiated. Four
issues discussed by most of the respondents came to the fore: they linked intuition to
foresight, synthesis, new ideas, and as complimentary to analysis.

580
Ibid. p. 81.
581
Burke & Miller, 1999, p. 91.
582
Ibid. p. 92-94.

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Foresight
The more common introductory reply to the question about the role of intuition in strategic
decision making is exemplified by a few quotations: “required, imperative, pivotal, a must,
decisive, essential, extremely useful.” When it comes to arguments for its salience, four main
lines of reason came to the fore. The first issue I will mention is its link to foresight. One CEO
in a company with 800 employees stated that: “The future is created by those who have vision
and power to make it through, who have ideas, simplicity, clarity. You do not analyze
yourself to the future.” Another CEO, in an equally large company put it slightly different:
“Useful in the sense that we speak of a future which is not properly defined. Intuition gives us
that foresight.” Yet another respondent replied that: “Intuition is the feeling you very early
have of direction. The analysis tends to take you towards familiar solutions, while intuition
provides new directions and solutions.” In addition, “Intuition is to try to look forward
supported by your experience.” Many of the respondents referred to this issue and we include
a few more remarks: “You are supposed to have an opinion about the future.” “We make a
choice for our customers in the sense that we decide what we are to provide.” “Important
because our industry is not created by the past. Intuition foresees the future, and indicates
where to go. We can never calculate how a decision will turn out.” “Very useful because
strategy is about vision, and belief in right direction, which we can never know for sure.”
“Sense about what you can do in order to have something successfully done in the future.”

Synthesis
A second issue emphasized by most respondents is synthesis, or the ability to combine and
integrate pieces and variables into a larger and clearer picture or pattern: “You are supposed
to see how many insecure variables are linked in a complex way.” “Intuition gives the sum
total of elements.” “It is an invisible umbrella over the analysis.” “In many ways it gives the
combinations, revealing the wholeness crucial in SDM.” “Ability to see trends, cycles and
new connections.” “Intuition is a mixture of analytical data and accumulated experience.”
“Depth and details in knowledge, together with decision support systems, gives in sum
intuition. It perceives direction, the future, change, wholeness, and development trends in the
industry” “It perceives the interplay and friction with environment and opposing forces.”
“Intuition facilitates concentration on what you know is doable.” “It brings in the whole
group.” “Strategy is about seeing relation and connection between different elements that can
influence on the company. Thus recognition of a pattern in previous experience is important.”
“Useful in the sense that it is quick to see positive connections and solutions. It is anchored in
the totality of your understanding for what you are doing.” The more philosophical replies
include these ones: “It relates to level of development, and more specifically the blend of head
and heart. Women are better at this.” “After all, our existence is cyclic. We are born, unfold,
grow old and die. We make the same inherited mistakes.”

New Ideas
A third issue highlighted by a large number of the respondents is how intuition provides new
ideas. For example: “Pivotal for genuinely new ideas.” “Linked to your personality and thus
to your genuine contribution.” “The advantage with intuition is that it provides new ideas. But
you must dare to be wrong.” “Ensures novel, innovative thinking.” “Need it to push new
things through.” “Very important in the sense that it brings up the strategic alternatives you
have to look closer at.” “Intuition builds on long experience. It comes immediately, while gut
feeling comes after some work with the issue.” “Sometimes it is an impulse, sometimes it
takes a bit of time.” “It is with an intuition it starts, that is, whether or not it is a sensible

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project. It gives new solutions and direction.” “Experience is more important in familiar
situations.” “Balance between my own hypothesis and those of other people is required for
intuition to work properly. Thus it is critical to include the latter.” Two more thorough replies
emphasize the wider context: “The intuitive solution may come after a good night sleep. If
you dare listen to it, and more people see it, then we start talking about what initially may be a
vague idea. My MBA has nothing to do with it.” “Intuition is related to intent, vision, goals. It
separates greatness from ordinary performance, in that you are able to create and stretch
commitment for something beyond yourself, which Kennedy did with his first man on the
moon vision. A vision the people understood intuitively and embraced.”

Intuition versus Analysis

Having noted the different lines of reason given by top managers when arguing why intuition
is imperative, pivotal, decisive, etc. we can turn to the final issue, namely its relationship with
analysis. As already indicated, a number of respondents emphasized the mutual reinforcement
of analysis and intuition: “There is no divergence between intuition and analysis.” “If
intuition tells you that something is wrong you will seek help and continue the analysis.”
“They Complement each other. Upfront you must have proper analysis, which gives a good
gut feeling, and vice versa.” “Intuition is required because you don’t start a large analytical
exercise unless you build on an intuition.” “We are overwhelmed by information and analysis.
Intuition filters, and tells us what it is interesting to spend more time on. Intuition is not static
as the analysis is.” “It is very important because you must always have a qualitative
evaluation in addition to the quantitative. If the analysis supports my intuition then the choice
is easy. If not I choose by intuition.” “We have a tendency to think that analysis and logic
dominate much more than it actually does. Feelings and irrational factors are much more
important than we like to believe. The consequences are not necessarily detrimental.” “Many
strategic decisions are irrational. You can have as much analysis as you like, but other
stakeholders may have other agendas, moving the issue in other directions.” “The younger
you are the more important is the analysis. With experience and more developed intuition you
see the picture more clearly. I have learned from my previous mistakes.”

Apparently, this issue was of particular relevance to the respondents, thus we might include a
few more remarks: “In early phases there is often not enough data for an analysis.” “Believe
most strategic decisions are intuitive.” “Intuition facilitates visualization of how things will
proceed and this increases the chance for success.” “Intuition gives the advantage of taking
action early. The analysis is introduced later and provides secondary support and
documentation required when selling the decision.” “Intuition is fast, not precise nor re-
testable. However, it is essential, especially in complex decisions. With analysis you stop
short in old, fixed patterns.” “It is important to have an analytical personality, but not more so
than still trusting the feeling you have for direction. Analysis takes you primarily into familiar
solutions while intuition gives you new solutions and directions.” “Hindsight teaches you that
analysis is self-fulfilling as it is undertaken only when things have gone to hell. When you
listen to your intuition things usually goes well.” “A bit dependent on the choices you make.
In areas where experience counts a lot and in human resource management it is important. In
quantifiable things it is not so important.” “The analysis must support the rationale of the
choice, but intuition must examine the analysis, that is, the way the numbers are put together.
If you know your field intuition will secure the quality of the analysis.” “To make strategic
decisions only with analytical exercises is wild. Intuition corrects the analysis.”

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“Intuition gives additional decision support beyond the rational.” “It is a must, and very
individual. Regardless of how much analytical work you do upfront, you add something of
your own.” “There is much uncertainty with the analysis. Thus intuition is important because
it provides answers to what is right and wrong.” “You will never be able to calculate your
way to a strategy. The analysis is used as support.” “Intuition is embedded in the wider
context of the support system, thus it is more precise and better able to correct our direction.”
“Numbers and analysis are easy to get hold of. However, there are more to this game than
numbers on costs. Utility, service, etc, and their consequences are indeed difficult to
quantify.” “No problem analysing yourself away from everything. Without intuition we do
not get ahead in matters of strategic choice and processes.” “Intuition usefully
counterbalances the concrete and mathematical.” A more thorough reply is this one: “A good
leader must make many decisions applying intuition. Confusion in the organization may
result, because the reasoning behind the choice is unclear. Intuition secures that you are not
solely an instrument of the board, which is obliged to empirical confirmation and a
bureaucratic mind set.” The more critical replies included these ones: “Clearly less important
than analysis.” “Intuition is not to have overriding influence.”

Comments
If we apply the philosophical, psychological and management theory lenses on the replies
given, we can make the following remarks. Regarding first the reference to foresight and new
ideas. The more critical reader of these self-reports would perhaps think along two
dimensions. He or she may argue with e.g. Simon, that this is not intuition but rapid analytical
inference taking place at a subconscious level. Secondly, there are those who advocate the
heuristic and biases tradition, and system 1 & 2 processing. In recapitulating dual process
theories, we may stop with Bargh & Ferguson and ponder upon their question; what controls
controlled processes?583 Moreover, where does new ideas and heuristics originate?

We may not find the answer with Jung, but he did equip us with a theory on intuition: “Since
the unconscious is not just something, that lies there like a psychic caput mortuum, but
coexists with us and is constantly undergoing transformations which are inwardly connected
with the general run of events, introverted intuition, through its perception of these processes,
can supply certain data which may be of the utmost importance for understanding what is
going on in the world. It can even foresee new possibilities in more or less clear outline, as
well as events, which later actually do happen. Its prophetic foresight is explained by its
relation to the archetypes, which represent the laws governing the course of all things we can
experience.”584 In the chapter on intuition in philosophy a rationale was presented, making
Jung’s theory a plausible one.

Turning to the latter issue of analysis and intuitive synthesis, we have again the problem of
discriminating between them. Mintzberg, in full agreement with the top managers, quite
clearly states that: “Analysis may precede and support synthesis, by defining the parts that can
be combined into wholes. Analysis may follow and elaborate synthesis, by decomposing and
formalizing its consequences. But analysis cannot substitute for synthesis. No amount of
elaboration will ever enable formal procedures to forecast discontinuities, to inform managers
who are detached from their operations, to create novel strategies.”585 He thus concludes that

583
Bargh & Ferguson, 2000, p. 938.
584
Jung, 1971, p. 401. My italics.
585
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 321. See also Mintzberg, 1978, 1982.

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strategy cannot be planned because planning is about analysis and strategy is about intuitive
synthesis.

Bergson is one author that tries to make such a line of reasoning more logically stringent by
arguing that the fixed concepts of the analytical intellect may be extracted by our thought
from mobile reality, but there are no means of reconstructing the mobility of the real with
fixed concepts. The discursive, analytical intellect is therefore bound to misunderstand the
fact of motion and change.586 As the distinction between analysis and intuitive synthesis has
been the main one throughout the thesis, it will not be further discussed here. The conclusion
to the second research question then, is that top managers define intuition in accordance with
the theory reviewed.

7.4 MBTI® Personality Profiles of Top Managers

Having discussed the second research question; how this sample of top managers define
intuition and how they perceive its role in strategic thinking and decision making, we now
turn to the third question: Do Norwegian top managers have a personality preference for
intuition as indicated by the Myers Briggs Type Indicator®? Philosophy, psychology, and
more lately management disciplines, all give attention to consciousness, cognition and
intuition. These issues are to some extent discussed and anchored in type and trait theory. The
work of e.g. Jung and Westcott indicate that intuitive types share distinct personality
characteristics.587 Several instruments are developed that seek to reveal our traits and
preferences in perception, judgment and decision making. However, the assumption that there
is an intimate, causal relation between personality and decision making behavior is indeed a
controversial one.588 Therefore, before we apply MBTI scores as `independent variable` we
need to familiarize with some of the main objections.

One serious problem is whether the traits as measured by personality tests, are consistent
across contexts. If the traits are not consistent across contexts, we may not predict behavior.
Even more intricate and challenging is the probability that a top manager who is intuitive by
Myers Briggs standards, will differ in emphasis on intuition and analysis within SDM
contexts. We may hypothesize that he will use intuition in an explorative decision making
mode but not so, when in an exploitative decision making mode. Thus, I control for this by
having the respondents describe their thinking in both exploration and exploitation. The
discussion about cross-situational consistency in behavior has been intense and according to
Cloninger, neither side is the clear victor. Depending upon how the study is conducted either
factor can be stronger.589 It is important to recognize that the cross-situational
consistency/inconsistency controversy refers mainly to different contexts. We may argue that
SDM situations have enough common elements to say that they are similar situations. They

586
Bergson, 1949, p. 30.
587
Wetcott, 1968, p. 140, Jung, 1971.
588
Bass & Stogdill, 1990, p. 87, 563-658. “It is reasonable to conclude that personality traits differentiate
leaders from followers, successful from unsuccessful leaders, and high-level from low-level leaders.” “Though,
above and beyond personal attributes of consequence, the situation can make a difference.” See also Terkelsen,
1999, p. 67, March, 1994, p. 59, and Pervin, 1990.
589
Cloninger, 1996, p. 78-83. He refers to Mischel, 1984, Peake, 1982, Conley, 1984, Funder, 1983, Cook,
1986.

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are work issues, not private, and they are all strategic. However, this does not resolve the
main problem.

Yet another aspect of this problem is the age-old debate: whether genes and inborn traits are
more or less influential than environment. Moreover, is the influence different in children,
adults, and professionals? A new twist in this discussion is coined moderator variables. The
moderator variables attempt to explain why people are sometimes consistent across situations,
sometimes not. Bem & Allen rejected that all traits are equally relevant for describing
everyone’s personality. Rather, they seek to determine which traits are relevant to each
person.590 There are different ways to determine which traits are relevant to each individual,
but the important point here is the claim that personality scores do predict behavior when the
trait is relevant to the individual. There is little doubt that intuitive and analytical thinking are
relevant traits and skills for top managers. Another key element is global versus specific traits.
Global traits are phrased in quite general terms and are presumed to apply to behavior in
many situations. Specific traits describe behavior in particular situations. The MBTI indicates
global traits, or more precisely, psychological functions.

A final issue we can mention is the interaction between traits and situations. We may predict
behavior from the joint effect of personality and situations. From this perspective, we do not
seek to identify personality differences that have persuasive effects regardless of situation.
Instead it is recognized that a given personality trait may have one impact on behavior in one
type of situation and another impact in another.591 Consider the fact that situational effects are
sometimes overwhelming: When a building catches fire, its occupants try to escape,
regardless of the personality differences among them. Situations that have such powerful
impacts on behavior are called strong situations. When situational pressures are weak,
however, personality differences presumably do influence behavior. That is, personality traits
predict behavior best when situations are weak. From the perspective of a top manager, SDM
situations are probably weak situations. Whether or not there is an intimate, causal relation
between personality and decision making behavior then, will not be settled here. Given these
difficulties we will interpret the findings presented below cautiously and conservatively.

Validity & Reliability of the MBTI

Before we turn to the findings a few words on reliability and validity are required. Gardner &
Martinko include a detailed examination of the psychometric properties of MBTI. Concerning
the available evidence for reliability, they write that, “the estimated reliabilities of type
categories appear to be satisfactory in most cases. The split-half reliabilities of continuous
scores for numerous samples repeatedly exceed .75 for each scale. Test-retest reliabilities for
continuous scores usually exceed .70 and often surpass .80.”592 Constructs tapped by self-
report measures such as the MBTI, cannot easily be verified by other means. However,
extensive validity evidence is supplied by type distribution tables, which reveal differing type
proportions across occupations that are consistent with type theory.593 Nordvik claims that;
“because the personality concepts refer to behavioral modes that are congruent with one’s

590
Bem & Allen, 1974, p. 506-520. See also Cloninger, 1996, p. 80. He refers to Stringfield, 1980, Zuckerman,
1989, Koestner, 1988, Reise & Waller, 1993, Baumeister, 1991, Tice, 1988.
591
Cloninger, 1996, p. 81. He refers to Magnuson, 1990, Romer et al., 1986, Caprara, 1987.
592
Gardner & Martinko, 1996, p. 50.
593
Ibid. p. 51. See also Cohen, 1996, p. 658-659. He refers to Davey, 1993, LaCorte & Risucci, 1993,
Lowenthal, 1994.

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personal assets, MBTI scores of various occupational groups have been used to validate the
test (e.g. Myers & McCaulley, 1985, Nordvik, 1994, Thorne & Gough, 1991).”594 Because the
Norwegian translation of the MBTI will be applied, it is important to look at his validity study
of the Norwegian translation. Here it is found that all of the MBTI continuous dimensions
were significantly related to occupational grouping. The relationship was strongest for sensing
– intuition and weakest for extroversion- introversion.595

Cohen, in his thorough discussion of psychological testing and assessment point to the fact
that the MBTI leaves no middle ground with regard to the scoring of the four functions, nor
any room for situation-specific circumstances to alter the classification. One’s type is thinking
or feeling, sensing or intuition. “This type of scoring has been criticized for both the
systematic loss of information it may entail and its over-sensitivity to responses to single
items.”596 That is, a test-taker may be classified as a thinking type if the thinking score is
slightly higher than the feeling score, whereas a different response to just one item could
produce the opposite classification. Because so many subjects cluster around the point used to
divide the distribution, an unstable situation is created with regard to the type. Moreover,
cluster analysis does not support 16 distinct types, Cohen argues.

The dimensions however have been found to be more reliable than the type designations.597
Thus, for the most part I leave the type designations aside and focus in on dimension scores.
A second concern is the bipolarity of the dimensions. Cohen argues that if the dimensions
were in fact bipolar, negative correlations between characteristics assumed to be on opposite
ends of the dimensions would be expected. He refers to two studies where this is not the
case.598 The construct validity of the MBTI dimensions may thus be questioned. Yet another
concern is that many of the MBTI validity studies are conducted with small samples of
people. For that reason the reported differences may not be reliable. Finally, factor-analytic
studies do not support a four-factor structure of the MBTI: as many as six factors may be
identified.599 In the MBTI manual, they refer to several studies opposing the arguments of
Cohen.600

Research on MBTI and Management Behavior

A thorough review of the research on the relationships between psychological types, as

measured by the MBTI, and managerial attributes, behaviors and effectiveness, is provided by
Gardner & Martinko. Their review reveals that intuitive types are predominant among top
managers, while sensing types are most common in samples of middle and lower level
managers. They refer to Roach who contrasted sub-samples of supervisors, managers and
executives with his total sample, and found that the proportion of intuitive types rose with
movement up the hierarchy. Among executives the scoring was 67 percent intuition and 33
percent sensing, this being similar to my sample with 73 and 27 percent respectively. They

594
Nordvik, 1996, p. 263.
595
Nordvik, 1994, p. 32. See also Nordvik, 1994 B.
596
Cohen, et al. 1996, p. 658-659.
597
Ibid. He refers to Girelli & Stake, 1993, and Pittenger, 1993.
598
Ibid.
599
Ibid.
600
Briggs et al. 1998, p. 172, 173, 196-219. They refer to Harvey, 1995, Thompson, 1986, 1989, Tzeng, 1984,
Tischler, 1994, Johnson, 1990, Sipps, 1985, Comrey, 1983, Jøreskog, 1981.

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also refer to Van Velsor, who reports that intuitive types are over-represented in a sample of 1
981 top and middle managers.

In considering the potential reasons for the prevalence of intuitive types, among higher-level
managers, they point to their conceptual skills, such as strategic and holistic thinking.601 An
issue here is the divergence of opinion regarding the existence of individual differences in the
use of intuition, ranging from intuition being the preserve of a creative elite, to intuition as a
basic cognitive process that is equally accessible to all. Woolhouse and Bayne thus studied the
relationships between the sensing-intuition scale of the MBTI, and strategy and performance
on an implicit learning task. The results indicated clear differences. Intuitive types were more
likely to report a strategy of using intuition and sensing types were more likely to use explicit
knowledge. In addition, intuitive types were more accurate than sensing types in their
intuition.602

The Consulting Psychologists Press in their extensive evaluation of MBTI applications also
notes that there is an increasing selection for intuition (N) as one moves up the ranks, and for
thinking (T) and extraversion (E), at the executive level.603 The MBTI research literature has a
number of sources of occupational data, and the data bank contains many hundred thousand
records.604 One conclusion is: “Expect samples of managers at all levels to have more
judgment (J) than perception (P). Most samples of management have substantial numbers of
the tough-minded TJ types with operational and production managers more likely to report
STJ, and long-range planning managers NTJ.”605 For instance, in a sample of 1 394 federal
executives, 41 percent were NT’s, and in a sample of 136 high level corporate executives 39
percent were NT’s.606 In my sample, it is 46 percent.

A word of explanation is required here. The four mental functions, which are the basis of
MBTI and Jungian typology, are thinking (T), feeling (F), sensing (S) and intuition (N). The
former two are modes of judgment (J) and the latter two are modes of perception (P). I have
covered these functions in the section on Jung, and elaborated on why he contrasts intuition
with sensing, not with thinking. When the introvert (I) and extrovert (E) preferences are
included we are left with altogether 16 different personality types, each one described by four
letters. For example: ENTJ indicates that the person is extrovert (E) and prefers intuition (N)
to sensing and thinking (T) to feeling. Moreover, (J) indicates that he or she put more
emphasis on judgment than perception, thus we have the ENTJ type.

Turning to my sample of 105 top managers, we find that there are 89 extroverts and only 16
introverts. There are 77 intuitive and 28 sensing types. The thinking types amount to 75,
leaving us with 30 feeling types. Finally, there are 76 who have a preference for judgment and
29 that have a preference for perception. When occupational trends of the 16 types are
analyzed, 4 of them are more likely to be in the management disciplines. They are ENTJ,
ESTJ, ENTP, and ISTJ.607 When we look at a sample from 1984, of 7 463 middle and high-

601
Gardner & Martinko, 1996, p. 64. They refer to Roach 1986, and Van Velsor, 1988.
602
Woolhouse, & Bayne, 2000, p. 157.
603
Hammer, 1996, p. 71. See also Hammer, 1992.
604
Briggs et al., 1998, p. 295. The most comprehensive list of occupational data sorted by type are published in
Appendix D of the 1985 MBTI Manual and in the Career report Manual, Hammer & Macdaid, 1992, and in The
Atlas of Type Tables, Macdaid, 1986.
605
Macdaid, 1986, section III, p. 3.
606
Ibid.
607
Briggs, et al. 1998, p. 294.

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level managers these four types accounts for 47 percent.608 In a more recent multicultural
sample of 43 586 managers these four types account for an average of 58 percent.609 In my
sample of top managers, these types account for 61 percent. The table below summarizes the
main findings with regard to type distribution and we may conclude that it aligns with the
tendency in larger samples.

Table 7.4.1 Distribution of the 16 MBTI Types in my Sample of 105 Top Managers

ISTJ N = 5 4.7 % ISFJ N=1 1% INFJ N=1 1% INTJ N = 6 5.7 %

ISTP N=1 1% ISFP N=0 0% INFP N=1 1% INTP N=1 1%
ESTP N=2 1.9 % ESFP N=0 0% ENFP N = 16 15 % ENTP N = 8 7.6 %
ESTJ N = 18 17 % ESFJ N=1 1% ENFJ N = 10 9.5 % ENTJ N = 34 32 %

Are Norwegian Top Managers Intuitive by the MBTI Standard?

The dimensions have been found to be more reliable than the 16 type designations, thus they
will be used to address my third research question: Do Norwegian top Managers have a
personality preference for intuition as indicated by MBTI? In this sample, we see a strong
emphasis on extroversion, intuition, thinking, and judgment. There are altogether 30 points on
each of the four dimensions and intuition receives 19.2 sensing the remaining 10.8. Thinking
gets 18.6 and feeling 11.4. The research question may therefore be answered in the
affirmative. When these dimensions are correlated, we find a significant negative correlation
between intuition and thinking and between intuition and judgment, which is of relevance for
the issue of discriminant validity. There is no significant correlation with introversion or
extroversion.

Table 7.4.2 MBTI Dimension Scores. N=105

Extrovert Introvert Sensing Intuition Thinking Feeling Judgment Perception
Average 21.6 8.4 10.8 19.2 18.6 11.4 18.6 11.4
Std. dev. 5.7 5.7 7.3 7.2 6.6 6.6 6.8 6.8

Table 7.4.3 Correlations of MBTI Dimensions Scores. N=105

Extrovert Introvert Sensing Intuition Thinking Feeling Judgment Perception

Extrovert 1 -1 -.12 .12 -.13 .13 .00 .00
Introvert -1 1 .15 -.15 .15 -.15 .00 .00
Sensing -.12 .15 1 -1 .44** -.45** .47** -.47**
Intuition .12 -.15 -1 1 -.43** .43** -.49** .48**
Thinking -.13 .15 .44** -.43** 1 -1 .50** -.49**
Feeling .14 -.15 -.45** .43** -1 1 -.50** .49**
Judgment .00 .00 .47** -.49** .50** -.50** 1 -1
Perception .00 .00 -.47** .49** -.50** .50** -1 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

With any personality inventory, there are validity and reliability issues that might concern us,
and this debate will not be settled here. I may repeat the two main reasons for applying the

608
Macdaid, 1986, section III.
609
Briggs, et al. 1998, p. 383.

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MBTI. First, it serves a validity purpose. It allows us to compare this sample to the trend in
much larger samples. It is also yet another measure of preference for intuition and analysis.
Together with my eleven questions and interview-data, it indicates how top managers
perceive and judge along the analytical and intuitive dimensions thus addressing the second
research objective. Secondly, these measures are correlated, in order to find out what type of
correlation there is between the MBTI personality measures and the emphasis on intuition and
analysis in strategic decision making, as revealed by my questionnaire.610 The results are
presented in the table below.

When we look at the correlations between the MBTI intuition measures and the scores for my
seven intuition items there is hardly any correlation. This may be expected. If these top
managers do belong to an intuitive group, as postulated, we could have a case of low
correlations due to homogeneity of scores. However, we would expect negative correlations
with the analysis scores, which is not the case. When we look at the MBTI thinking measures
and the scores for my intuition and analysis items the picture is slightly different. Here we do
find certain significant positive correlations with the analysis items and a negative one with
the single item intuition. Though this is the case only in decision situations characterized by
exploration of new terrain and technology.

Table 7.4.4 Correlation of MBTI Dimensions Scores with my 11 Intuition and Analysis Scores. In each column,
the figures to the left refers to exploration while the figures to the right refers to exploitation.
The 11 Items MBTI Intuition MBTI Thinking
Controlled Study .01/.00 .24*/.14
Evaluation of alternatives .02/-.07 .15/.11
Dividing the situation -.04/-.02 .18/.26**
Analysis .08/.01 .02/.00
Timing -.04/-.13 .12/.16
Cycles .06/.02 .01/.02
Big Picture .07/-.01 -.13/-.05
Synthesis -.03/-.10 -.02/.15
Gut Feeling -.01/-.06 -.14/-.09
Possibilities .04/-.15 -.08/.20*
Intuition .04/.00 -.21*/-.11
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

There are a number of possible and speculative explanations of these results. The more likely
one perhaps being the one mentioned above, namely that the correlations are low due to
homogeneity of scores thus indicating that personality does play a role.611 Another angle to
these findings is to say that personality may not have explanatory power at all, in this
context.612 Along the same line of reasoning, we may suggest that Jung, Westcott, and those
who advocate intuitive personality typology, are wrong on this issue. In addition, the
measures of intuition may not be instrumental. Those of the MBTI, and those applied in the
current research can all be questioned.

610
In doing so I am aware, that statistical analysis cannot be used to establish the time sequence of the variables.
It must be inferred from theoretical considerations. That is, I cannot use these correlations to prove that
personality precedes preferred mode of strategic thinking.
611
Rather high standard deviations, in particular for the MBTI measures, may point in other directions.
612
Hammer, 1996, p. 55-74. See this section for an excellent discussion.

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The attentive reader has noted that with Jung and MBTI, intuition is contrasted with sensing
while I stick to the main tradition and contrast it with analysis.613 The rationale of these
different approaches is elaborated in the theoretical part, particularly in the section on Kant
and Jung.614 The more important point I believe is whether the MBTI and my measures of
intuition reflect the same underlying process. Obviously there is an overlap, insofar the MBTI
items include; insight, vision, imaginative, future, patterns, possibilities, original, unknown,
change, idea, opportunities, inspiration, inventing and design. Given these results then, the
tentative conclusion is that it is still an open question whether or not personality influences on
emphasis on intuition and analysis in strategic thinking and decision making.

7.5 Conclusion

The preceding and more laborious theoretical part of this inquiry addressed the first research
question: How is intuition conceived in philosophical, psychological and management theory?
Having explored the concept theoretically, this chapter focused in on the empirical
counterpart, which has three main elements. First, the 105 top managers were interviewed
about how they perceive intuition and its role in strategic thinking, this being also my second
research question. In defining intuition, they emphasized gut feeling, unconscious experience,
the larger picture, a sense of right and wrong, and sudden new insight. When discussing the
role of intuition four main issues came to the fore namely: foresight, synthesis, new ideas, and
how it is complimentary to analysis. The replies were interpreted by both myself and
colleague Per Grøholt. Apparently, they are congruent with the theory reviewed.

Secondly, they completed the Myers Briggs Type Indicator®, which indicate whether they
have a personality preference for intuition in perception and judgment. This research question
is answered affirmatively. In the third latter part of the empirical study, the respondents
scored and ranked the items of my intuition and analysis scales in two self-chosen strategic
decisions. That is, they were asked to evaluate their emphasis on intuition and analysis and the
ensuing decision quality. The findings and corresponding statistics are discussed in the next
chapter. Colleague Espen Røysamb verified them.

613
However, I do not contrast them on the same dimension.
614
An intuition in the form of a mental picture is a perception and a cognitive event that may be contrasted with
both analytical inference and sensing.

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8 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY & FINDINGS PART II

8.1 Introduction

Even though intuition is recognized as imperative in strategic thinking, management literature

is surprisingly silent on the issue. The research problem is thus focused in the question: What
is intuition? Theory construction is the primary research objective and I come at this objective
from two angles. One is a rather thorough historical, cross-disciplinary theoretical inquiry of
intuition aiming at conceptual clarification. The other is this exploratory empirical study.
Concepts are the most critical element in any theorizing because they guide what is captured.
Having discussed how top managers conceive of intuition and its role in strategic thinking I
now turn to a test of certain aspects of the concept, considered relevant in this particular
managerial context. This was done by structured personal interviews in which the 105
respondents were asked to both score and rank the items of tentative intuition and analysis
scales, in two different self-chosen decisions. That is, they were asked to evaluate their
emphasis on intuition and analysis and the ensuing decision quality. The results indicate that
there is more emphasis on intuition than analysis, particularly in exploration of new terrain
and technology. The empirical study may thus also contribute to our knowledge of how
Norwegian top managers think about their intuitive and analytical thinking in strategic
decision-making, this being the second research objective.

8.2 Intuition Versus Analysis in Strategic Decisions

Having discussed research question one, two and three we now turn to the fourth and final
one: Is intuition more or less emphasized than analysis in strategic thinking and decision
making? Theory, interview data and the MBTI measures have indicated that both intuitive and
analytical thinking are prominent personality preferences for top managers. Now we focus in
on their thinking about their actual strategic thinking in order to reveal more information. The
opening question in the interview is; “would you please elaborate on two recent strategic
decision making-situations that you have thorough experience with, and in-depth knowledge
of. One should be characterized by exploration (A), that is search for new possibilities,
experimentation with completely new alternatives & technology, variation, risk taking,
innovation. In short you are to have no previous experience with such a situation. The other
situation is to be characterized by exploitation (B) of old certainties, refinement, improvement
& increased efficiency of existing production & technology that you are familiar with.”
Then the respondents are asked to reply to the eleven interview questions in both decisions by
scoring their emphasis on a Likert scale. It is ranging from one to seven where one is not
emphasized, two little emphasized, three somewhat emphasized, four emphasized, five quite
emphasized, six considerably emphasized and seven is heavily emphasized. The opening
phrase in each of the eleven questions posed is; to what degree did you emphasize……?

Table 8.2.1 The 11 Interview Questions on Analysis & Intuition

1 A controlled study and break down of explicit data, using quantitative models.
2 Evaluation of alternatives in terms of their consequences for preferences.

139
3 Dividing the whole situation into sub-areas, dissecting & scrutinizing them.
4 Analysis of facts, figures, reports, data & evidence.
5 Correct timing (knowing when to take the right step in the marketplace).
6 Perception of cycles (foreseeing emerging trends, patterns and recurring events).
7 Perception of the larger picture (a holistic view and apprehension of the situation).
8 Synthesis (the ability to perceive many factors and variables as a coherent whole).
9 Gut feeling rooted in the sum of implicit & unconscious knowledge, insight and previous exp.
10 Perception of possibilities (the innate idea).
11 Intuition

The first four questions address analytical thinking and the remaining seven, intuition. During
the interview, they are mixed according to a fixed pattern. The rationale behind each question
is elaborated in the previous chapters and summarized in the chapter on methodology and the
section on research variables. The complete interview-guide is included in the appendix.
Turning first then to emphasis on intuition, we can illustrate the replies in the following way:
(The seven point Likert scale is on the y-axis.)

Figure 8.2.2 Emphasis on Aspects of Intuition in Strategic Decision Making. Average Scores.

1
Timing Cycles & Patterns The Larger Picture Synthesis Gut Feeling Possibilities Intuition

Exploration Exploitation
When contrasted with aspects of the more analytical approach we find that apparently the
respondents think they did put less emphasis on those. The average scores for the single item
intuition, seen to the right in the diagram above, are 5.30 and 5.37 in exploration and
exploitation respectively. The same figures for the single item analysis, seen to the right in the
diagram below, are 4.52 and 4.64.615 As these scores relates to the specific decisions chosen
by the respondents, a control question about emphasis on intuition and analysis in their
normal work with strategic decisions was included. It reveals an average on 5.40 for intuition
and 5.13 for analysis. Which scores are the more representative of their actual behavior, is
hard to tell.

Figure 8.2.3 Emphasis on Aspects of Analysis in Strategic Decision Making. Average Scores.

615
Corresponding standard deviations are 1.43 and 1.54 for intuition, 1.68 and 1.66 for analysis.

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 7

1
Controlled Study Evaluation of Alternatives Dividing the Situation Analysis

Exploration Exploitation

Is Intuition More or Less Emphasized than Analysis in Strategic Thinking?

In order to answer this fourth research question I will apply a rank sum test.616 A t-test on
pair-wise differences between analysis and intuition indexes would be invalid as the average
scores for analysis and intuition are not on the same scale. After completing the scoring, the
respondents were given eleven cards with the eleven items written on. Then they ranked them
according to emphasis, in both decisions. The starting point for the rank sum test is the null
hypothesis of no difference in emphasis on intuition and analysis, with the alternative that
intuition is more emphasized. Then the ranks of the four analysis items can be interpreted as
random draws from the eleven ranks. This gives 330 different combinations, each with a
belonging rank sum. The distribution of the rank sums under H0 is illustrated in the diagram
and table below. It will be used to test whether a particular top manager is significantly
analytic or not. A low rank sum signifies high emphasis on analysis. The rank sum values
range from 10 to 38, which is seen on the x-axis (1+2+3+4=10 and 8+9+10+11=38). How
many rank sums that have a particular value is seen on the y-axis.

Figure 8.2.4 Rank Sum Distribution for Analysis under the Null Hypothesis

30

25

20

15

10

0
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

616
This test is developed by Prof. F. Wenstøp at Norwegian School of Management BI.

141
A rank sum of 14 or less indicates a significant emphasis on analysis at the 0.05 level. In the
table below, we see that in exploration (A) there are 1.9 percent of the top managers that think
they have such a strong emphasis on analysis. In exploitation (B), the figure is also 1.9. At the
opposite end of the table, we see that a rank sum of 34 or higher indicates a significant
emphasis on intuition at the 0.05 level. In exploration, there are 100-76.2 = 23.8 percent of
the top managers that think they have such a strong emphasis on intuition. In exploitation, the
figure is 100-87.6 = 12.4 percent. In order to determine whether intuition in general is more
emphasized, we are to ask if the majority have a rank sum equal to or above 25. If so we may
conclude that there in this sample is more emphasis on intuition. We see that there are 30.5
and 33.3 percent respectively that have a rank sum below 25. The remaining majority of 69.5
and 66.7 are evidence in favor of the assumption that intuition is more emphasized than
analysis regardless of decision situation.

Table 8.2.5 Rank-Sum Distributions for H0, Exploration (A) & Exploitation (B)
Rank Sums H0 H0617 P-values A Cumul. % A B Cumul. % B
10 1 0.32 0.003 0 0.0 0 0.0
11 1 0.32 0.003 0 0.0 0 0.0
12 2 0.64 0.006 0 0.0 0 0.0
13 3 0.95 0.009 1 1.0 2 1.9
14 5 1.59 0.015 1 1.9 0 1.9
15 6 1.91 0.018 1 2.9 1 2.9
16 9 2.86 0.027 3 5.7 0 2.9
17 11 3.5 0.033 2 7.6 1 3.8
18 14 4.45 0.042 4 11.4 2 5.7
19 16 5.09 0.048 1 12.4 2 7.6
20 19 6.05 0.058 4 16.2 4 11.4
21 20 6.36 0.061 6 21.9 5 16.2
22 23 7.32 0.070 2 23.8 7 22.9
23 23 7.32 0.070 6 29.5 6 28.6
24 24 7.64 0.073 1 30.5 5 33.3
25 23 7.32 0.070 1 31.4 9 41.9
26 23 7.32 0.070 2 33.3 6 47.6
27 20 6.36 0.061 3 36.2 8 55.2
28 19 6.05 0.058 9 44.8 5 60.0
29 16 5.09 0.048 10 54.3 5 64.8
30 14 4.45 0.042 5 59.0 5 69.5
31 11 3.5 0.033 6 64.8 4 73.3
32 9 2.86 0.027 5 69.5 3 76.2
33 6 1.91 0.018 3 72.4 4 80.0
34 5 1.59 0.015 4 76.2 8 87.6
35 3 0.95 0.009 7 82.9 3 90.5
36 2 0.64 0.006 8 90.5 2 92.4
37 1 0.32 0.003 3 93.3 4 96.2
38 1 0.32 0.003 7 100.0 4 100.0
330 105 1.0 105 100.0 105 100.0

To make further conclusions we can perform a Chi-square test. Under the null hypothesis, we
expect the distribution of the rank-sums to follow the random pattern in figure 8.2.4. Under
the alternative, it will be located more to the right. Given the problem of many cells with
expected frequencies less than five, we have to merge cells in order to apply the Chi-square
test. This is especially so with the cells pertaining to rank sums 10-17. These first eight cells
are therefore summarized and reduced to two cells, leaving us with 23 cells. They define the
x-axis in the figures below. That is, in cell 1 and 2 rank sums 10-17 are now merged, while
cell 3-23 still equals rank sum 18-38. Thus, there is a bulge on the left side of H0. How many

617
In order to compare the distribution under H0 with those in A and B, the former need to be adjusted. This is
done by multiplying each figure with 105 and dividing it with 330.

142
of the rank sums in A and B that have a particular value, is seen on the y-axis. The results
from the table above can then be illustrated graphically:

Figure 8.2.6 Rank Sum Distributions under H0 and in Exploration (A)

12

10

A
6
H0

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Figure 8.2.7 Rank Sum Distributions under H0 and in Exploitation (B)

10
9
8
7
6
B
5
H0
4
3
2
1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

In figure 8.2.6, we see that there is no good overlap between the distribution in H0 and the
one in exploration (A). In figure 8.2.7 there is a much tighter fit. Turning to the Chi-square
test then it asses’ the goodness-of-fit and reveals a significant difference between H0 and A at
the 0.05 level, but not so between H0 and B.618 We should also take note of the fact that the
difference between the distribution in A and B is not significant in strict terms. This is of
relevance to the question addressed in the next section, about the role of experience. The Chi-
square test thus leaves us with the conclusion that apparently Norwegian top managers think
they rely more on intuition than analysis in exploration of new terrain and technology. The
data are not supportive of the same conclusion in decisions characterized by exploitation of
familiar terrain and technology.
618
Hair, et al. 1998, p. 280, Wenstøp, 2003, p. 264, Kristianslund, 1985, p. 186.

143
Figure 8.2.8 Chi-square Test Assessing the Goodness of Fit of Rank Sum Distributions under
H0, Exploration (A) and Exploitation (B).
Distribution Alpha d. f. Chi² Critical value Sig. prob.
H0 versus A 0.05 22 45.30 33.92 0.005
H0 versus B 0.05 22 21.66 33.92 0.599
A versus B 0.05 22 30.55 33.92 0.105

8.3 Intuition and Experience

In the theoretical inquiry, I argued that experience might be a relevant independent variable. It
is reflected in for example Jung’s definition of intuition as a function that mediates
perceptions of personal and collective unconscious experience. The work of Simon and
Baylor are other examples.619 The top managers interviewed also share this view. Given this
particular research context and my tentative items on intuition we may thus address the
question: Is emphasis on intuition positively correlated with experience? In the empirical
study, experience is accounted for in two ways. First, the top managers are asked to evaluate
their emphasis on intuition in an explorative decision situation in which they had no previous
experience and in a situation familiar to them. Whether their emphasis differs across these two
different strategic environments will be indicated by a t-test. Secondly, a number of questions
reveal their professional experience. Their answers to these latter questions will be correlated
with their scoring of emphasis on intuition.

The paired sample t-test then, assesses the statistical significance of the difference between the
mean scores of the intuition and analysis items in exploration and exploitation respectively.620
It computes the difference between the two scores for each of the eleven items and tests
whether the averages differs from zero. If we specify a 99 percent confidence interval, the t-
values reveal that three of the four analysis item scores and three of the seven intuition item
scores do not differ significantly in exploration and exploitation. If we specify a 95 percent
confidence interval all but one intuition item score differ significantly in the two situations.
However, it is only timing and possibilities that are more emphasized in situations where the
top managers have no previous experience to rely on, while the other intuition items are more
emphasized in familiar terrain. Together with the Chi-square test, these findings thus indicate
that decision makers actually think they treat both kinds of decisions very much alike and that
experience does not exert a significant influence in explaining different emphasis on intuition
across the two situations.

Table 8.3.1 Paired sample t-test with 99 percent confidence interval of the difference between the means of the
11 items in exploration and exploitation, 104 degrees of freedom.

The 11 Items Mean Difference Lower Upper t-values

1 Controlled Study 0 -0.54 0.54 0
2 Evaluation of Alt. -0.34 -0.90 0.22 -1.61
3 Dividing the Situation -0.09 -0.57 0.38 -0.52

619
Jung, 1971, p. 453, Baylor, 2001, p. 238, Simon, 1987.
620
Hair, et al. 1998, p. 331. The items that differ significantly are bold-typed.

144
4 Analysis -0.11 -0.68 0.45 -0.53
5 Timing 0.36 -0.23 0.95 1.60
6 Cycles 0.06 -0.44 0.57 0.34
7 Larger Picture -0.11 -0.51 0.28 -0.75
8 Synthesis -0.04 -0.41 0.31 -0.34
9 Gut Feeling -0.14 -0.58 0.29 -0.86
10 Possibilities 0.36 0.02 0.70 2.81
11 Intuition -0.06 -0.48 0.35 -0.41

The theoretical inquiry revealed that the nature of intuition might be such that it is particularly
well suited in exploration of brand new technology and terrain. That is, several authors and
top managers link it to foresight and ability to perceive new ideas and possibilities.621 Thus it
may not surprise us that it is the items timing and possibilities that are significantly more
emphasized in exploration of new terrain. Given this result, and the fact that these two items
are the more troublesome ones in the factor analysis, it might be worthwhile pursuing further
research focusing on these two items.

Turning then to the second issue, of how personal and professional experience relate to
emphasis on intuition we may start by presenting the descriptive statistics:

Table 8.3.2 Years of Experience in Industry, Company, Strategy and in Other Industries

Industry Company Strategy Other Industries Age

Average 16.17 10.84 10.30 1.69 46.87
Stand. Dev. 8.71 8.21 7.56 1.54 7.87
High 50 50 50 7 76
Low 1 0 1 0 31

When their different types of individual experience and age are correlated with their emphasis
on analysis and intuition we find no persuading tendency in the statistics. The exception is
age, which is positively and significantly correlated with many of the intuition items but not
so with the analysis items. Of interest is also the significant negative correlation between three
of the experience measures and the item evaluation of alternatives. In order to double check
the relevance of experience and personality as independent variables I performed different
types of regression analysis with the intuition and analysis indexes as dependent variables.
Without exceptions the R² values revealed no significant results. If we are to say anything
about these findings then, it is that apparently there is a stronger positive correlation between
experience and intuition than what is the case with experience and analysis. This conclusion is
the same regardless of decision situation. Altogether there are only 9 out of 40 correlations
that are positive for analysis, while there are 61 of 70 for intuition, many of which are
significant at the 0.10 level. The figures to the left in the table refer to decision A that is
exploration, while those to the right refer to exploitation.

Table 8.3.3 Emphasis on Analysis & Intuition Correlated with Age and Experience in Industry, Company,
Strategy, and Other Industries. The Exploration Measures are to the Left and the Exploitation Measures are to
the Right.

621
Jung, 1971, Bergson, 1949, Cappon, 1994, Vaughan, 1979, Miller & Ireland, 2000.

145
The 11 Items Industry Company Strategy Other Industries Age
Contr. Study -.09/-.05 -.15/.02 -.16/-.03 -.10/-.04 -.07/.08
Evaluation Alt. -.10/-.16 -.24**/-.03 -.21*/-.15 -.15/-.03 -.18*/-.05
Dividing the Sit. -.09/-.14 -.17/-.14 -.09/-.16 .01/.11 -.10/-.07
Analysis -.09/-.04 -.08/.05 -.07/.08 -.08/.12 .07/.14
Timing .07/.00 -.11/.01 .00/-.01 .07/.14 .06/.10
Cycles -.03/.07 -.07/.10 -.02/.21* .20*/.14 .07/.21*
Larger Picture .10/-.04 .00/-.06 .06/.01 .11/.12 .15/.12
Synthesis .13/.09 .03/.00 .13/.08 .10/.25** .09/.23**
Gut Feeling .21*/.12 .18/.11 .18/.09 -.01/.09 .20*/.17
Possibilities .07/.05 .05/-.01 .07/.13 .09/.15 .22*/.21*
Intuition .15/.12 .15/.18* .18/.16 .12/.11 .22*/.11
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

8.4 Intuition & Decision Quality

Before we turn to a discussion of the validity and reliability of the study, I should also report
on how the top managers perceived the quality of their decisions, as well as say a few words
about how the remaining demographical variables relate to emphasis on intuition and analysis.
I asked four questions relevant to decision quality. First the respondents were asked to judge
the quality of their strategic thinking in the two decisions made, as compared with their
thinking in other strategic decisions they have made. Secondly they judged the quality of the
decision itself with regard to the outcome of the decision. Given the fact that these decisions
are strategic and thus often long-term this latter question was sometimes difficult for them to
answer, as the end-result was not yet in place. When asked what criteria they adhered to, the
more common reply was financial gain. Finally they were also asked: To what degree would
you say efficiency and a feeling of certainty characterized your strategic decision making?

When the scores on these four questions are correlated with the eleven intuition and analysis
items we get the results presented in the table below. The exploration measures are to the left
and the exploitation measures are to the right. By and large there are no significant correlation
with the analysis items, except for two, but more so with the intuition measures. There are a
huge variety of questions that could reveal decision quality, giving other results. Also, self-
report measures are dubious, thus these results are to be interpreted with much caution.
However, tentatively we may indicate that emphasis on intuition facilitates good strategic
decisions.

Table 8.4.1 Emphasis on Analysis & Intuition, Correlated with Thinking and Decision Quality. The Exploration
Measures are to the Left and the Exploitation Measures are to the Right.

The 11 Items Quality of Thinking Quality of Decision Efficiency Certainty

Contr. Study .24*/-.03 .15/-.09 .06/-.11 .17/-.02
Evaluation Alt. .10/-.10 .10/-.06 -.00/-.14 .07/-.07
Div. the Sit. .14/-.05 .28**/-.03 .03/-.05 .06/-.02
Analysis .08/.10 .01/-.04 .08/.07 .12/.07
Timing .25*/.14 .21*/.15 .39**/.13 .14/.12
Cycles .21*/.16 .07/.06 .33**/.19 .06/.06
Larger Picture .23*/.33** .35**/.10 .18/.21* .13/.26**
Synthesis .25*/.21* .22*/.18 .22*/.04 .24*/.04
Gut Feeling .27**/.06 .26*/.06 .28**/.04 .30**/.17

146
Possibilities .19/.44** .10/.48** .18/.35** .22*/.39**
Intuition .21*/.21* .21*/.19 .19/.28** .20*/.13
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Demographical Findings
The remaining demographical classes include gender and educational background. Female
intuition is an issue that could be of interest to discuss, but there are to few women (13) in the
sample to address this issue properly. However, if we do correlate gender with the intuition
and analysis measures we do not find any significant correlations. As the major bulk of
respondents are educated in business (50 persons) or engineering (24 persons), I did primarily
look at these two categories. There are but a few noteworthy correlations with the measures of
intuition and analysis. The item gut feeling is negatively correlated with business education (-
.34) and positively with engineering background (+.28), both significant at the 0.01 level.
Thus, apparently, those educated in engineering do rely more on their gut feeling than do
those educated in business. There are also negative correlations, significant at the 0.05 level,
between business education and the items intuition and the larger picture.

8.5 Validity and Reliability of the Study

Validity
In the chapter on methodology, the internal, external, construct and content validity of the
study were discussed. In this section it is of interest to further investigate how well the eleven
items measure the constructs analysis and intuition. They may not be instrumental in
revealing these different cognitive activities. Whether or not there are two factors, as the
theoretical review and the interview data have indicated, remains a hypothesis. Thus, we turn
to the factor analysis. It may tell us if we are correct in assuming two different factors. “The
general purpose of factor analytic techniques is to find a way to condense or summarize the
information contained in a number of original variables into a smaller set of new, composite
dimensions or factors with a minimum loss of information – that is, to search for and define
the fundamental constructs or dimensions assumed to underlie the original variables.”622
According to Hair we generally would not factor analyze a sample of fewer than 50
observations, and preferably, the sample size should be 100 or larger. Hair suggests that as a
rule the minimum is to have at least five times as many observations as there are variables to
be analyzed and the more acceptable size would have a ten-to-one-ratio.623 In my case, there
are 105 observations and 11 variables.

Common factor analysis and principal component analysis are the two basic models to obtain
factor solutions. Which one to apply, is determined by the objectives of the analysis and the
amount of prior knowledge about the variance in the variables.624 Common, specific, and
error variance are taken into consideration. Common variance is defined as the variance in a
variable, shared with all other variables in the analysis. Specific variance is variance

622
Hair, et al. 1998, p. 95.
623
Ibid. p. 98.
624
Ibid. p. 102.

147
associated with only a specific variable. Error variance is due to unreliability in the data-
gathering process, measurement error, or a random component in the measured phenomenon.
Hair argues that the principal component model is appropriate when the primary concern is
about the minimum number of factors needed to account for the maximum portion of the
variance represented in the original set of variables, and when prior knowledge suggests that
specific and error variance represent a relatively small proportion of the total variance. “In
contrast, when the primary objective is to identify the latent dimensions or constructs
represented in the original variables, and the researcher has little knowledge about the amount
of specific and error variance and therefore wishes to eliminate this variance, the common
factor model is most appropriate.”625

According to Hair, this latter model suffers from several problems contributing to the
widespread use of the former e.g. factor indeterminacy, which means that for any individual
respondent, several different factor scores can be calculated. There is no single unique
solution. “Although there remains considerable debate over which factor model is the more
appropriate, empirical research has demonstrated similar results in many instances.”626 Given
these problems, my research objectives, and the error variance in my data, the principal
component model is selected.

Choosing the number of factors to be interpreted is something like focusing a microscope.

Hair argues that too high or too low an adjustment will obscure a structure that is obvious
when the adjustment is just right.627 I will take both the latent root, percent of variance, scree
test and a priori criteria into consideration. The rationale for the latent root or eigenvalue
criterion is that any individual factor should account for the variance of at least a single
variable. Each variable contributes a value of 1 to the total eigenvalue. “Thus, only the factors
having latent roots or eigenvalues greater than 1 are considered significant.” However, “using
the eigenvalue for establishing a cutoff is most reliable when the number of variables is
between 20 and 50. If the number of variables is less than 20, there is a tendency for this
method to extract a conservative number of factors.”628

In the table below we see that there are four factors that have an eigenvalue greater than 1,
although two of them barely exceeds this limit. The percentage of variance criterion then, is
an approach based on achieving a specified cumulative percentage of total variance extracted
by successive factors. Hair writes that the purpose is to ensure practical significance for the
derived factors by ensuring that they explain at least a specified amount of variance. In the
social sciences, it is not uncommon to consider satisfactory, a solution that accounts for 60
percent of the total variance, and in some cases even less.629 I have included only the first six
factors and we see that the first four factors add up to 65 and 60 percent in exploration and
exploitation respectively.

Table 8.5.1 Eigenvalues & Percent of Total Variance

Eigenvalues Percent of Variance

Factor Exploration Exploitation Exploration Exploitation
1 2.7 2.5 24.6 22.7

625
Ibid.
626
Ibid. p. 103.
627
Ibid.
628
Ibid. The latter five eigenvalues range from .72 to .20.
629
Ibid. p. 104. The latter five components range from 6.5 to 1.9 percent of variance.

148
 2 2.3 1.9 20.8 17.2
3 1.1 1.1 10.5 10.4
4 1.0 1.1 9.2 10.1
5 .96 .98 8.8 8.9
6 .73 .79 6.6 7.2

The eigenvalue and the percent of variance criteria may thus persuade us that
there are at least three factors. In addition, the statistical software-packages
SPSS and LISREL usually suggests three or four factors with these data.
However, the scree test may not be supportive of such a conclusion. The scree
test is used to identify the optimum number of factors that can be extracted
before the amount of specific variance begins to dominate the common variance
structure. Although all factors contain at least some specific variance, the
proportion of specific variance is substantially higher in later than in earlier
factors. According to Hair, the point at which the curve first begins to straighten
out is thus considered to indicate the maximum number of factors to extract. If
we look at the scree plot, we find this point to indicate two factors.630

Scree Plot
3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0
Eigenvalue

.5

0.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Component Number

The rather lengthy theoretical inquiry into the history of the concepts intuition and analysis, is
yet another argument to be considered. The long tradition of philosophers and psychologist
has normally contrasted these two cognitive activities, and the items applied are derived from
their work. A priori we might thus assume that there are two factors, and then apply factor
analysis to test this assumption. When instructing the computer to extract two factors only, we
get the results presented in the table below.

Table 8.5.2 SPSS Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin, Kaiser Normalization.
The 11 Items Exploration Exploitation
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
Gut Feeling .78 -.24 .68 -.39
Intuition .77 -.27 .76 -.33
Larger Picture .63 .06 .52 .08

630
Ibid. The scree plot for exploitation does not differ much.

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Timing .60 .35 .12 .40
Synthesis .59 .18 .48 .31
Cycles .54 .21 .31 .27
Possibilities .27 -.15 .66 .02
Controlled Study -.12 .80 -.27 .75
Analysis -.04 .72 -.06 .70
Dividing the Situation .10 .65 .06 .63
Evaluation of Alternatives .05 .61 -.03 .46

Before we interpret this factor matrix and loadings, we need to mention the issue of rotation.
Un-rotated factor solutions extract factors in the order of their importance. The first factor
tends to be a general factor with almost every variable loading significantly, and it accounts
for the largest amount of variance. The second and subsequent factors are then based on the
residual amount of variance. Each accounts for successively smaller portions of variance. Hair
writes that; “the ultimate effect of rotating the factor matrix is to redistribute the variance
from earlier factors to the later ones to achieve a simpler, theoretically more meaningful factor
pattern.”631 In yet other words, the objective of all methods of rotation is to facilitate
interpretation.

According to Hair, there is no compelling analytical reason to favor one rotational method
over another. In brief, the choice may be made with regard to the particular needs of the
research problem. “If the goal of the research is to reduce the number of original variables,
regardless of how meaningful the resulting factors may be the appropriate solution would be
an orthogonal one. Also, if the researcher wants to reduce a larger number of variables to a
smaller set of uncorrelated variables for subsequent use in regression in other prediction
techniques, an orthogonal solution is the best.” Oblique rotations are similar to orthogonal
rotations, except that the former allow correlated factors instead of maintaining independence
between the factors. Hair thus argues that if the ultimate goal of the factor analysis is to obtain
several theoretically meaningful constructs, as it is in my case, an oblique rotation is
appropriate. “This conclusion is reached because, realistically, very few factors are
uncorrelated, as in orthogonal rotation.”632

Turning to criteria for significance of factor loadings, both practical and statistical
significance are to be considered. Because factor loading is the correlation of the variable and
the factor, the squared loading is the amount of the variable’s total variance accounted for by
the factor. A .30 loading translates to approximately 10 percent explanation of the variance
and is by Hair considered to meet the minimal level of practical significance. A .50 loading
translates to approximately 25 percent explanation of the variance accounted for by the factor
and is considered practically significant.633 In the table above, we see that in exploration all
but one loading meets the .50 criteria. The item possibilities load with .27 and is thus in the
range of .30. In exploitation the item possibilities loads with .66.

The more troublesome item in exploitation is timing which loads with only .12. Moreover, it
loads high on the other factor in both situations. Timing and possibilities might thus be
candidates for deletion. Statistical significance then, is a different story. With an objective of
obtaining a power level of 80 percent, a .05 significance level and my sample size of 105 the
631
Ibid. p. 107.
632
Ibid. p. 110, 113. As I have used an oblique rotation, two factor matrices of loading are provided by the
SPSS. I apply the more common factor pattern matrix, which has loadings that represent the unique contribution
of each variable to the factor. The other is the factor structure matrix. It contains both unique variance between
variables and factors, and the correlation among factors.
633
Ibid. p. 111.

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loadings ought to be between .50 and .55 according to Hair.634 In the former situation of
exploration, it is still one item only that does not meet this requirement. However, in the latter
situation there are altogether four items that face difficulties. Two of these are close by
though.

Apparently, a proper discussion of this factor analysis could include three or more factors.
However, the more critical validity issue in this study, in my opinion, is perhaps not these
factor loadings, but how well the top managers evaluate their own thinking. Asking them to
discriminate between analytical inference and intuition in decisions taken place some time
ago is indeed a dubious matter. There is but one solution to this challenge and it is to start
exploring it. This study is one attempt. The conclusion to this factor analysis then is that there
are not one but rather two major factors, covering intuition and analysis respectively, as
unrelated concepts.

Reliability
Reliability is of central concern to social scientists because the measuring instruments they
employ are rarely completely valid. Nachmias says that in many cases, evidence of validity is
almost entirely lacking and instead the measuring instrument is evaluated with regard to other
characteristics. Reliability is frequently used and is an assessment of the degree of consistency
between multiple measurements of a variable. One type of reliability refers to the extent to
which a measuring instrument contains variable errors. That is “errors that appear
inconsistently from observation to observation during any one measurement attempt or that
vary each time a given unit is measured by the same instrument.”635 It differs from validity in
that it does not relate to what should be measured, but instead to how it is measured. The Test-
Retest method is one common way of estimating reliability.

Here the instrument is administered to the same group of respondents twice, and the
correlation between the two sets of scores is computed. The objective is to ensure that
responses are not too varied across time periods so that a measurement taken at any point in
time is reliable. There are at least two limitations of this approach. One is that the respondents
may be influenced by their own replies on the first occasion. The other is that there may have
been changes in the variable measured, in the time elapsed since the first testing. Another
method, without the aforementioned limitations, is the Parallel-Forms Technique. It is
characterized by two parallel versions of the instrument. A critical question with this method,
that must be addressed, is whether the instruments are in fact parallel.

My approach is slightly different. During the interview, the respondents were asked to both
score and rank the same eleven items in the two self-chosen decisions. I will use the
correlation between these individual scores and ranks to assess the reliability of my
instrument. Calculations reveal that the median of the correlations is -0.58 and -0.54 in
decision A and B respectively. In the diagram below the individual consistency for situation B
is pictured. Situation B refers to exploitation of familiar terrain and technology. In situation A,
or exploration, the consistency is just a little stronger. The critical correlation value at the 0.05
level, with nine degrees of freedom, is approximately -0.53. The lower horizontal line in the
diagram pictures this level. There are altogether 55 out of 105 respondents with a correlation
between -0.53 and -1, indicating a fairly good individual consistency. Here I should mention
634
Ibid. p. 112. See also Coven, 1991.
635
Nachmias, 1996, p. 170.

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the possible difficulties faced by the respondents in discriminating between the eleven items
when ranking them. My impression was that by and large the top managers faced no problems
in distinguishing the analysis items from the intuition items, but more so in discriminating
between the items gut feeling and intuition.

Figure 8.5.3 Correlation Between Individual Scores and Ranks in Exploitation (B). The Correlations Below the
–0.53 Line are Significant at the 0.025 Level.

Individual consistency

0.5
correlation

corr.
0 l.c.l

103
13

19

25

31

37

43

49

55

61

67

73

79

85

91

97
1

u.c.l.
-0.5

-1
Respondent

Internal Consistency
Another commonly used measure of reliability is internal consistency, which applies to the
consistency among all the variables in a summated scale. “The rationale for internal
consistency is that the individual items or indicators of the scale should all be measuring the
same construct and thus be highly inter-correlated.”636 Because no single item is a perfect
measure of intuition, we must rely on a series of diagnostic measures to assess internal
consistency. First, there are several measures relating to each separate item, including the
item-to-total correlation (the correlation of the item to the summated scale score) and the
inter-item correlation (the correlation among items). According to Hair, rules of thumb
suggest that the item-to-total correlations exceed .50 and that the inter-item correlations
exceed .30.637

The second type of diagnostic measure is the reliability coefficient, assessing the consistency
of the entire scale, with Chronbach’s alpha being the most widely used measure. Hair states
that “the generally agreed upon lower limit for Cronbach’s alpha is .70, although it may
decrease to .60 in exploratory research.”638 Given the complexity of intuition, we may not like
to see a too high alpha value, since we are then likely to have missed important aspects of
intuition. The alpha values for the scales on intuition and analysis as well as inter-item and
item to total correlations are presented in the tables below. Again, all the figures to the left
refer to exploration or decision A and the figures to the right refer to exploitation, that is
decision B.

Table 8.5.4 Chronbach’s Alpha for Scale on Analysis

636
Hair, et al. 1998, p. 118.
637
Ibid.
638
Ibid.

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The 4 Analysis Items Item-to-Total Correlation Alpha if Item Deleted
1 Controlled Study .58/.56 .55/.46
2 Evaluation of Alternatives .43/.30 .65/.65
3 Dividing the Situation .41/.38 .66/.60
4 Analysis .46/.47 .63/.54
Alpha for Scale: .69/.64

Table 8.5.5 Chronbach’s Alpha for Scale on Intuition

The 7 Intuition Items Item-to-Total Correlation Alpha if Item Deleted
5 Timing .47/.08 .68/.59
6 Cycles .41/.21 .70/.53
7 The Larger Picture .44/.27 .69/.51
8 Synthesis .43/.26 .69/.51
9 Gut Feeling .54/.36 .66/.47
10 Possibilities .17/.41 .73/46
11 Intuition .54/.40 .66/.45
Alpha for Scale: .72/.56

Table 8.5.6 Inter-Item Correlations for Analysis and Intuition

Inter-Item Correlation Mean Minimum Maximum
Analysis .36/.31 .23/.16 .56/.49
Intuition .26/.16 .02/-.10 .75/.79

The alpha measures for the scale on analysis are .69 and .64 in the two different decision
contexts. Apparently this is close to being satisfactory. However, we may argue that the items
on analysis are not of an exploratory kind, thus we should apply the limit of .70 fairly strictly.
The alpha measures for the scale on intuition differ substantially with .72 and .56 respectively.
If they are perceived together, we might suggest that this scale passes the limit of .60 often
applied in exploratory research. Turning to the inter-item correlations for analysis we find
them barely exceeding .30. Even though exploratory research may allow for a slight decrease
in this limit of .30 the inter-item correlations for intuition are not fully satisfactory. Moreover,
I sidestep the entire issue of weighting of the items, which could influence on the reliability
measures. And of course, another research context and time may very well give different
results. Having said this we may indicate that the single items on intuition and analysis have
fairly good reliability while the reliability of the scales pass, but can be questioned.

8.6 Conclusion
In this chapter the latter part of the empirical study was presented. The respondents were
asked to both score and rank the items of my tentative intuition and analysis scales in two
different self-chosen strategic decisions. That is, they were asked to evaluate their emphasis
on intuition and analysis. A rank-sum test and a Chi-square test indicated that Norwegian top
managers think they rely more on intuition than analysis, particularly in exploration of new
terrain and technology.

Theory and pilot interviewing provided reasoning for why experience might be a relevant
independent variable. The top managers were thus asked to evaluate their emphasis on
intuition in an explorative decision situation in which they had no previous experience, and in
a situation familiar to them. Whether their emphasis differs across these two different
strategic contexts was indicated by a t-test. It revealed that the decision makers think they
treat both kinds of decisions very much alike and thus that experience does not exert a

153
significant influence. This conclusion is supported, though not firmly, when their age and
different types of individual experience in company, industry, and with strategy, is correlated
with their emphasis on analysis and intuition. With the exception of age there is no strong,
persuading tendency in the statistics.

Having replied to how they think, the top managers also evaluated the quality of their decision
making. They were asked to judge the efficiency and quality of their strategic thinking in the
two decisions made, in comparison with their thinking in other strategic decisions they have
made. They also judged the quality of the decision itself with regard to the outcome of the
decision. By and large I found no significant correlation with the analysis items except for
two, but more so with the intuition measures. There are of course a huge variety of questions
that could reveal decision quality, giving other results. Moreover, self-report measures are
often incorrect thus these results are to be interpreted with much caution. However, we may
indicate that emphasis on intuition facilitates good strategic decisions.

Concerning construct validity, factor analysis showed that among my eleven items, there are
not one but rather two major factors, covering intuition and analysis respectively, as unrelated
concepts.639 Thus the more critical validity issue in this study is perhaps not the factor
loadings, but how well the top managers evaluate their own thinking. Asking them to
discriminate between analytical inference and intuition in decisions taken place some time
ago is indeed dubious matter.

9 CONCLUSION

9.1 Theoretical Implications of the Study

Two research objectives have guided this research. Reading strategic management literature, I
noted that intuition is recognized, as imperative in strategic thinking and that the literature
does not provide adequate theory on the issue. This called for a thorough theoretical inquiry
into the concept of intuition. It serves also as a separate contribution. Conceptual clarification
was thus the foremost research objective. Being equipped with the historical, cross-
disciplinary review, I then undertook the second objective: to contribute to our knowledge of
how top managers perceive their intuitive and analytical thinking when performing strategic
decision-making. In conducting the theoretical inquiry, and addressing the first research
question: how is intuition conceived in philosophical, psychological and management theory,
three levels of intuition were discerned.

There are first intuitions stemming from the personal unconscious. This level relates to the
accumulated personal experience and knowledge. These intuitions can be more or less biased
and mature, depending upon the individual’s way of living and level of expertise.640 Second,

639
Hair et al. 1998, p. 119. Given the rather vague concept of intuition proper discriminant and nomological
validity is difficult to establish at this point. Discriminant validity ensures that my scale is sufficiently different
from other similar concepts to be distinct, while nomological validity determines if the scale demonstrates the
relationship shown to exist based on theory and or prior research.
640
Baylor, 2001, p. 239-241. Hogarth, 2001, p. 41.

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there are intuitions from the collective unconscious. This level relates to the accumulated
collective experience and knowledge. Here we also find the Ideas, Forms and Archetypes, that
hypothetically condition all our experiences in everyday life.641 An introvert person tends to
have better access to this level than the extrovert. Both kinds of intuitions can work their way
through the individual mind, body and feelings, giving insight, new ideas, foresight and a
sense of right and wrong.642 With no awareness of these levels of the psyche, any activity
might have a substantial portion of automatic flavour and functioning. This may include the
explicit, controlled, analytic activities of system two elaborated in dual process theories.

The third level is the developed, mature intuition. This is the level that corresponds to the so-
called rational intuition heralded by certain philosophers. It is nurtured by and anchored in a
rich and profound understanding and perception of the personal and collective unconscious, as
well as of their mutual and integral relationship. It is the ability to perceive how Ideas, Forms
and Archetypes are reflected and unified with what is going on in the individual and the world
of physical appearances. A certain amount of analytical inference is required here. Kant thus
argues that the analytic procedure is involved in the complete synthetic method, and Bergson
emphasizes the counter analysis. However, as inferential thought activity comes to a rest the
result may eventually be the non-dualistic state of mind as Buddhist practice proclaims. It is a
consciousness which is conscious of it-self. The research of Penrose and Pribram on intuition
and consciousness indicate that this state of mind is equal to “a global (essentially quantum)
large-scale coherent ‘hologram’ activity in the brain”643

The second research question asked was: How are intuition and its role in strategic thinking
perceived by Norwegian top managers? When the theoretical account and the three levels of
intuition are used to interpret the replies given, certain remarks can be made. To me their
conceptions of intuition came about as rather hazy. When I asked the respondents for
elaboration, they tended to stop short with two or three sentences. Apparently the ‘folk
conception’ of intuition: as the larger picture, sudden insight, and gut feeling, rooted in
previous unconscious experience, dominates also here. However, we should take note of the
fact that these top managers agree in their conceptions. For the most part, they all used the
same key words in their replies. A core question is what type of experience they anchor their
intuitions in. The overall sense from the interviews in hindsight is that they refer primarily to
their personal unconscious experience. The conclusion then is that these top managers
conceive intuition in accordance with the suggested first level of intuition, only.

In delineating the role intuition plays in strategic thinking, more nuances came to the fore.
Here they emphasize new ideas, foresight, and how intuitive synthesis and analysis represent
distinct, complementary skills. A short or long incubation period delivers the new idea or
insight when needed, or perhaps after a good night’s sleep. Why and how certain brand new
ideas are elicited from the a priori constraints of the human psyche is a thrilling mystery to
most of us. How intuitive synthesis and analysis complement each other is likewise an
intricate matter, as we have seen. The notion of foresight is yet another difficult one. Whether
genuine foresight is a result of rapid, unconscious analytical inference as Simon claims, or an
aspect of Jung’s introvert intuition, will not be settled here. The important point, however, is
that these top managers do describe intuition in terms congruent with the theory reviewed.

641
Jung, 1971, p. 401.
642
Vaughan, 1979, p. 55.
643
Penrose, 1994, p. 368. Pribram, 1971, 1991, 1998, and in Gunter, 1987, p. 171.

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That is, primarily with psychological theory.644 This adds to the problem faced by
philosophers, of scarce empirical support for their theories.

Quite late in the research it became clear to me that in the history of epistemology there is a
divergence in opinion with regard to the concept of intuition. Along some fairly general lines
I suggested a controversy between philosophy and psychology. More specifically, I referred
to psychological theory where intuition is conceived as a rather biased, automatic,
unconscious, rapid and effortless cognitive process.645 This is opposite to the view held by
philosophers, where intuition is considered supreme rational intelligence, and to quote Plato;
“the apprehension of it is rather to be thought of as a revelation which can only follow upon a
long intellectual training.”646 Here I will not repeat the many arguments, but only reflect a
little more upon the main theoretical argument of this current work, namely that a
Copernican reversal has taken place in the history of thought.

The brief reflection may start with Plato’s distinction between the intelligible world and the
world of physical appearances. His notion of discursive or analytical thinking, dianoia, is
attached to the former. For Kant, the situation is similar. He draws a distinction between the a
priori and the a posteriori. His notion of analytical thinking, verstand, is also related to the
intelligible world, or the a priori. The new and confusing element introduced by the later
Bergson, is that his notion of analytical thinking, made equivalent to intellect, is fallen from
the a priori, intelligible world, down to an occupation in the Platonic cave, where its primary
interest now is the world of physical appearances. With Bergson, we therefore have the
contradictory situation, that the intellect no longer occupies a place in the intelligible world.
Its character and memory is from then on, gradually becoming devoid of soul. Rational
intuition is left alone with the intelligible, metaphysical, spiritual agenda, and the intellect is
solely in charge of the more solid affairs. With Jung and onwards this tendency to equate
intuition with the elusive aspects of the subjective psyche, and the analytical intellect with
objectivity and empiricism, is more or less firmly established in folk conceptions. The trend
continues today, where analytical thinking is regarded by many as rational and intuition as
irrational, automatic and biased.

If we ask why this reversal has taken place we are left without any easy answers. However, we
may speculate. Here, I am inclined to go along with Osbeck, who writes that the avoidance of
epistemological perspectives on intuition might reflect psychology’s development into an
empirical science.647 The intriguing example is that in psychological literature there is hardly
any reference to the soul, even though the meaning of psyche is soul.648 Westcott indicates
that with the advent of positivism, and the rise of analytical philosophy, views of reality
became suspect if not properly supported by demonstrative reasoning and empirical
observation. The opposition between intuitionism and empiricism has persisted in psychology
to the present day, just as it has in philosophy.649 Thus, the syndrome of the Platonic Cave
need not be limited to the tribal consciousness of a primitive society. According to Seung it is
equally present in the positivistic consciousness of our scientific world. “For the positivistic
consciousness is governed as much as the tribal consciousness by its own provincial norms

644
There are no references to Ideas, Forms or Archetypes. The replies are more in tune with the work of
Polanyi, 1966, Bastick, 1982, Epstein, 1996, Stanowich & West, 2000, Gilovich, et al. 2002.
645
Gilovich, Griffin, Kahneman, 2002, p. 51. Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 658.
646
Cornford, 1955, p. 206.
647
Osbeck, 1999, p. 229.
648
Teigen, 1999, p. 412. See also Berger & Luckman, 1967, on social construction of reality.
649
Westcott, 1968, p. 16.

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and standards. Positivism has its own cave, the cave of an exclusively materialistic universe,
and this cave is so deep and dark that it allows no view of any other dimension of reality.”650

Given this main theoretical argument of a Copernican reversal in our history of epistemology,
it became pivotal to further investigate how intuition relates to rationality. I started out
asking; what is rationality per se? There is no brief or elegant answer. Rather, there is a
multitude of perspectives and this state of affairs is characteristic of the classical theories of
normative rationality. I then argued that intuition is the ontological foundation for any
normative theory of rationality. That is, in examination of three well-known forms of
rationality; formal and instrumental rationality, and Rawls’s ideal constructivism, the
impossibility of constructing a normative system of rationality without using some normative
intuitions, was demonstrated. Thus I further refined my sketch of the required theory of
intuition, including a discussion of criteria for rational judgment. Intuitive equilibrium was
suggested as a complementary version of reflective equilibrium, providing a proper frame of
reference. One conclusion then is that philosophers emphasize vertical rationality, that is,
consistency between a priori and a posteriori, episteme and doxa, while psychologists are less
inclined to do so. The proposed contribution of this research is thus to demonstrate that by
better understanding intuition and its application, more effective strategic thinking and
decision-making could result.

The weaker part of the theoretical inquiry may be its fairly brief discussion of the literature on
heuristics and biases. This is partly due to the fact that I come from the philosophical
tradition, but also because it is a rather long undertaking to cover the history of intuition
across three theoretical disciplines within the given limitations of this thesis work. In future
research it would be of interest to work on a possible reconciliation, where heuristics and
biases might turn out to be consonant with the suggested level one and two of intuition. More
specifically such a discussion could elaborate on the notions evolutionary and normative
rationality. Stanovich & West might have a good point when they argue that one way to view
the difference between evolutionary and normative rationality is that they are not really
different types of rationality. Rather, “they are terms for characterizing optimisation
procedures operating at the sub-personal and personal levels, respectively.”651 The appealing
promise of the suggested third level of intuition is a conscious awareness of how these levels
are integral to each other.

The theoretical inquiry revealed one more key point. Given the argument that intuition is the
ontological foundation for any normative theory of rationality it is even more significant that
the philosophers provide distinct and different methodologies for intuition and analysis. In
other words, if science is concerned with the question how do we know, and characterized by
its methodology, new progress may be achieved by better integrating the methods of intuition
in our scientific effort.652 There is little doubt that the analytic and the synthetic methods
delineated by Kant, in important respects, are copies of Plato’s two clear-cut methods of
dianoia and dialogue. So also with Bergson, who elaborates on the methods of metaphysical
and physical science. When examined I found the same innate rationale in all these methods,
even though they span more than two thousand years. These findings may thus inspire further
research in the philosophy of science and scientific methodology.

650
Seung, 1993, p. 210. See Davis-Floyd & Arvidson, p. 22.
651
Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 661.
652
Nachmias, 1996, p. 3.

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9.2 Implications for Strategic Thinking

Strategic thinking is often defined as a coherent, unified perception that reveals a unique and
consistent set of patterns and activities, propelling the company into what it is to be.653
According to Eisenhardt, Hamel & Prahalad, de Wit & Myer, and Mintzberg, it is also a
process of foresight and synthesis based on intuition, where the outcome is an integrated
perspective of the enterprise.654 This is a vision of the whole as Porter put it.655 Even though
intuition is recognized as crucial, studies on the role of intuition in strategy are rare.656 More
critically it is, that the management literature does not address this issue properly. Having
laboured through the theoretical inquiry, the next step was thus an exploratory empirical
study, of how top managers perceive their intuitive and analytical thinking in strategic
decision-making. I applied certain aspects of the concept, considered relevant in this
managerial context and asked: Is intuition more or less emphasized than analysis, in strategic
thinking and decisions?

The more noteworthy result of the empirical study is that these top managers think they rely
more extensively on intuition than analysis. This is especially so in decisions characterized by
exploration of new terrain and technology. In taking a step back, and asking why they do, their
own replies might be informative. Arguments for the salience of intuition in strategy,
emphasized by most of the respondents, centered around four themes; namely its link to
synthesis, foresight, new ideas, and a sense of right and wrong. A few quotations illustrate
part of their rationale: “Intuition is useful in the sense that we speak in strategy of a future
which is not properly defined. You do not analyze yourself to the future. Intuition gives us
that foresight.” “Intuition is an invisible umbrella over the analysis. It gives the combinations
and synthesis, revealing the wholeness necessary in strategic decision making.” “Intuition
ensures novel, innovative thinking.” “Gut feeling, telling you whether or not the required
psychological process in the organization will gain enough momentum. This you can’t
calculate or analyse.”

Synthesis
Mintzberg, in full agreement with the top managers, states that: “Analysis may precede and
support synthesis, by defining the parts that can be combined into wholes. Analysis may
follow and elaborate synthesis, by decomposing and formalizing its consequences. But
analysis cannot substitute for synthesis. No amount of elaboration will ever enable formal
procedures to forecast discontinuities, to inform managers who are detached from their
operations, to create novel strategies.”657 He thus concludes that strategy cannot be planned
because planning is about analysis and strategy is about intuitive synthesis. The distinction
between analysis and intuitive synthesis has been the main one throughout this inquiry. Thus
right here it may prove its worth, by informing the field of strategy about how these distinct
cognitive efforts can complement each other in a more conscious, rational, and effective way.

653
Andrews, 1987, p. 14-15. See chapter 4.2 for elaboration.
654
Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 66, 1992, p. 33, Hamel & Prahalad, 1996, p. 25, Mintzberg, 1994, p. 329.
655
Porter, 1998, p. 68. See also de Wit & Myer, 1998, p. 72.
656
The few there are indicate that intuition plays an important role. See Parikh, et al., 1994, p. 81, and Burke &
Miller, 1999, p. 91.
657
Mintzberg, 1994, p. 321. See also Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 66.

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Foresight
Hamel & Prahalad who for a long time have researched and worked with numerous
outstanding top management teams around the world, argue convincingly for a new view of
strategy. “It is a view of strategy that recognizes it is not enough to optimally position a
company within existing markets; the challenge is to pierce the fog of uncertainty and develop
great foresight into the whereabouts of tomorrow’s markets.”658 If we are to believe there
exists a genuine skill called foresight, the question about how it works arises. I have advocated
the view that the philosophical account on intuition corroborates Jung’s theory on intuition.
He argues that intuition foresees new possibilities because it is connected with a priori layers
of the psyche, extending beyond the personal aspect of it.659 Top management may thus
benefit from harnessing, and better integrating these layers and epigenetic rules, in their
thinking.660 In this way the emergent strategy is more easily conveyed.

New Ideas
Innovation, first mover advantage, and creation of new competitive space, are all important in
strategy. But where do new ideas originate from, if not from intuition? It is the reappearance
of changed ideas and images, which affords the strongest proof of the reality of intuition,
Diblee writes.661 This is a connaissance rèflèchie, a return of knowledge on itself, a synthesis
to a second degree, resembling Bergson’s counter analysis. How to foster and to facilitate this
mosaic activity is more difficult to explain. However, many of those who have tried,
emphasize the orientation and state of mind. Thus, today it is more common for top managers
to spend time in meditation.

Values
A sense of right and wrong was perceived as another particularly important aspect of
intuition. Access to core values is indeed instrumental in defining the uniqueness of a
company, and what it is to pursue in order to enhance strategic work. According to Føllesdal,
we unfortunately tend to focus solely on beliefs, not on values, when we say an agent is
rational.662 Rawls admits that it is not possible to develop a theory of values without relying
on intuition, and I rehearsed the argument that intuition is the ontological foundation for any
theory of normative rationality. Thus we cannot easily dismiss the view held by these
Norwegian top managers, that intuition provides a reference to intrinsic values of right and
wrong.

The theoretical inquiry indicated that experience might be a relevant independent variable in
explaining emphasis on intuition in strategic thinking and decision making. In the empirical
study, experience was accounted for in two ways. First, the top managers were asked to
evaluate their emphasis on intuition in an explorative decision situation in which they had no
previous experience, and then in a situation familiar to them. Whether their emphasis differs
across these two distinct strategic contexts was statistically tested. The tests indicated that

658
Hamel & Prahalad, 1996, p. 25.
659
Jung, 1971, p. 401. See also McCraty, 2004.
660
E. Wilson, in Damasio et al., 2001, p. 12. See also Wilson, 1998.
661
Diblee, 1929, p. 84-99.
662
Føllesdal, 1982, p. 306-308.

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decision makers think they treat both kinds of decisions very much alike, and thus that
experience does not significantly explain different emphasis on intuition, across the two
situations. Secondly, this conclusion did not change much when their age and different types
of individual experience in company, industry, and with strategy, were taken into account.
With the notable exception of age, there were no persuading correlations with the intuition
measures. However, in retrospect I have the concern that the two situations did not serve to
discriminate properly with regard to experience. Aspects of the respondents’ unconscious and
domain specific experience, may have been applied in both decisions.

Personality is a many-faceted construct. In this study the Myers Briggs Type Indicator® was
applied. The results indicate that the top managers have a strong preference for intuition
versus sensing. Although many of the MBTI® questions are work related, neither this variable
can here be used to ‘explain’ emphasis on intuition, in significant terms.

9.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

In retrospect, many ways of improvement can be suggested. Pilot testing and the research of
Epstein, Burke & Miller, and Parikh et al. provided part of the rationale behind my explicit
focus on the first level of intuition in the empirical study.663 It is also consonant with the
replies given by the respondents. However, the conceptual development suggests three levels
of intuition, while the two instruments do not test for multiple levels. Bluntly speaking there
is thus a mismatch between the theory and the applied instruments. Therefore, if we are
correct in assuming the existence of multiple levels and meanings of intuition, there is a need
for more fine-grade instruments as well as other research contexts. Exploring the concept of
intuition in only the managerial setting is indeed a limited and biased approach. With a
different sample, we may see other results. As intuition is claimed to be perception of the
psyche or soul, a comparison group of individuals devoted to the ‘spiritual path’ could prove
instrumental.664 Leaving these difficulties aside, the more troublesome validity issue in this
study is perhaps not the narrowness of the instruments, but rather how well the top managers
evaluate their own thinking. Asking them to discriminate between analytical inference and
intuition, in decisions that took place some time ago may be a dubious matter. However, I
assume this would be equally difficult for other professional groups. There is but one solution
to this challenge and it is to start exploring it. This study has been one attempt.

A second concern is that it is still an open question as to what determines emphasis on

intuition. Thus, we are left in a sort of vacuum. Given the hypothesis that there exist two
distinct cognitive talents, we are also curious to know how intuition works, and what causes it
to work in a more or less skilled manner. Apparently, experience and personality are not the
sole explanatory means in this respect. To some extent, I have thus failed to develop and
present theory and models that explains the findings in a fully satisfactory way. Although the
main research objective was firmly restricted to a clarification of the concept intuition and its
role in strategy, such theory would be much appreciated. In some places, the theoretical
account indicates that a promising avenue of research may be found within, developmental

663
Burke & Miller, 1999, Parikh et al. 1994, Epstein, 1996. See also section 4.3, 4.4 and 6.2.
664
Laughlin, in Davis-Floyd, 1997, p. 19, writes that: “Among the Tibetan lamas I worked with, I found that
many of the meditative techniques they use are intended to evoke and mature intuitive realizations about the
properties of consciousness.”

160
psychology.665 There is for instance in Greek philosophy the implicit understanding that areté
or moral virtues are intrinsic to a mature intuitive state of mind. Likewise, Westcott who is
credited with clinical studies on intuition argues that the intuitive type is an autonomous
individual. Autonomy is by Elster recognized as a precondition for rational behavior.666

Developmental Psychology
In order to facilitate further research, and in order to make up for a possible bias in my
selection of psychologists, a short note on developmental psychology can thus be made.
Loevinger, in her classical work on Ego Development writes that: “Before psychology became
separated from philosophy our topic was harbored chiefly within ethics, where it appeared as
moral development. There were two great schools of ethical thought in the nineteenth century,
the intuitionists and the utilitarians.”667 Loevingers’ central claim is that many diverse aspects
of thought, interpersonal relations, impulse control, and character grow at once, in some more
or less coherent way.

Kohlberg elaborates this view, and similar to the Greeks, he explicitly links moral stages and
cognitive development. A precondition for his higher levels of psychological development is
proper acquaintance with the universal principles of ethics.668 Loevinger also writes that stage
and type theories of character development have a long lineage, going back at least as far as
Plato’s Republic, which I did discuss. For a long while they fell into disrepute among
psychologists, in part because, so many people seemed to lie between stages. However,
recently there have again been a number of such development theories proposed, partly
because the strictly behaviorist psychometric alternatives have failed to capture something of
the dynamics of character development, she says.669 Clearly, the two instruments applied in
the current research, are open to this critique.

An examination of these development theories is therefore useful, and indicates directions for
further research. In Piaget’s scheme of things, the central importance of consciousness
development is highlighted. He elaborates the role of possibility and necessity in cognitive
development, and stresses the importance of equilibrium in cognitive systems. “Like
organisms, the cognitive systems are actually both open in the sense that they undergo
exchanges with the milieu and closed insofar as they undergo ‘cycles’.”670 He refers to
Prigogine’s work, on stationary but dynamic states, to exemplify his understanding. The
reader should here refer back to my discussion of reflective and intuitive equilibrium in
section 4.4. The importance of cognition is underscored by the fact that, when specific
developmental lines are studied – such as moral development and self development, it has
often been found that cognitive development is necessary for these other developments.671
However, Piaget and Kohlberg, do not move beyond the individual ego and logical-
mathematical competence.672 With Miller and Cook-Greuter, who have refined and extended
Loevinger’s research, the situation is different. They present theories of human development

665
This is the case in Greek and Buddhist philosophy. See also Westcott, 1968, and Bastick, 1982.
666
Westcott, 1968, p. 137, 143. Elster, 1983, p. 20. See also Diblee, 1929, p. 84-99.
667
Loevinger, 1976, p. 262. See also Karterud & Monsen, 1997, p. 113, 123.
668
Kohlberg, 1976, and 1981.
669
Loevinger, 1998, p. 49. See also the same author, 1987, p. 239-242.
670
Piaget, 1977, p. 4. See Piaget, 1987, p. 32, on geometric intuition. See Prigogine, 1977, 1984, 1997.
671
Wilber, 2000, p. 20-21. See also Karterud & Monsen, 1997, p. 113, 123.
672
Piaget, 1977, p. 170-177. True formal thought is defined as construction of all possible combinations of
relations, systematic isolation of variables, and deductive hypothesis-testing.

161
that offer a comprehensive view of our potential as participants in an integrated, unified field
of transpersonal consciousness, resembling the previously discussed second level of
intuition.673

Kegan, a student of Kohlberg, also has worked on these transpersonal stages of human
development. His research on the evolving self is deeply inspired by Piaget and Erikson.674
Kegan proposes an interesting postmodern, fifth order of consciousness, characterized by
trans-ideological, trans-system, and trans-complex properties. In addition, this elevated order
of psychological development is characterized by inter-individuation and interpenetration of
selves.675 However, he doubts that the majority are ready for the fifth order of consciousness.
“Those who understandably champion its merits, and who disdain the limits of modernism,
might consider that before people can question the assumptions of wholeness, completeness,
and the priority of the self, they must first construct a whole, complete, and prior self.”676
Kegan’s optimistic endnote though, is that we will see more adults working on a qualitatively
different order of consciousness than did adults one hundred years ago because we live twenty
or more years longer than we used to.

A critical question here is whether the transpersonal stages themselves, can be conceived as
higher levels of cognitive development. That issue is hotly debated and will not be settled in
the near future. However, we may take note of the long list of modern Western pioneers who
have studied these higher realms. It includes among others; Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,
Schopenhauer, Bergson, Nietsche, Heidegger, Jung, Jaspers, Husserl, Fechner, James,
Emerson, Steiner, Solovyov, Royce, Besant, Myers, Berdyaev, Huxley, Fromm, Habermas,
Assagioli, Jaspers, Baldwin, and Maslow.677 When the classical psychological development
theories are outlined, and compared with a wide range of acknowledged philosophical
development theories, the former are found to cluster around a fairly narrow band. The
interesting point, however, is that in these contributions Wilber discovers and describes a
shared basic structure in psychological development.678

He argues that for the last three thousand years or so, perennial philosophers have been in
nearly unanimous agreement as to the basic developmental levels. Typically, they relate to
matter, body, mind, soul and spirit.679 In Wilber’s view, each of these basic levels transcends
and includes its predecessors, ending with the non-dual state of mind, that is, the previously
suggested third level of intuition. Some of its key features are discussed and researched in this
current work. “These basic levels are holons of consciousness. A holon is a whole that is part
of other wholes. For example, a whole atom is part of a whole molecule, a whole molecule is
part of a whole cell, a whole cell is part of a whole organism, and so on.”680 Wilber’s view is
consonant with the work of Laszlo, Beck & Cowan, Greek philosophy and basic Buddhist
teachings.681 The question, then, which might facilitate further research, is this: According to

673
Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994, p. xi.
674
Kegan, 1982, preface. See also Karterud & Monsen, 1997.
675
Kegan, 1994. For an overview of his developmental stages, see p. 315.
676
Ibid. p. 351.
677
Wilber, 2000, p. 24, 44, 78, 82. As for the cognitive line itself, it has been carried forward by Commons,
Richards, Fischer, Pascual-Leone, Sternberg, Koplowitz, Powell, Benack, Arlin, Sinnott.
678
Ibid. p. 197-217. Wilber discusses and pictures the work of classical contributors such as Piaget, Erikson,
Kohlberg, Loevinger, Baldwin, and Fischer, as well as numerous others along relevant dimensions of
psychological development.
679
Ibid. p. 6.
680
Ibid. p. 7.
681
Laszlo, 2003, p. 83, 121, 133. Beck & Cowan, 1996, p. 286. They apply and elaborate the notion holon and

162
what principles, are these hypothesized higher levels of intuition and cognitive development
transmitted?

Intuition and Holographic Models

In order to build on, and possibly explain some of the key findings of the current research I
will conclude by suggesting a tentative model of how intuition may work, that future research
might investigate. At the outskirts of developmental psychology and research on cognition
and consciousness, we find the subjects of holistic realism, reflexive monism, and the
principle of holography, discussed earlier on.682 Gabor won the Nobel Prize for his discovery
of the mathematics of holography.683 In our context, then, it is of special relevance to note that
the cells in the visual cortex apparently respond as if they were performing according to the
principle of holography. Pribram equates intuition with these principles and writes: “It is no
great leap to suggest that a holographic-like organization characterizes the network of cortical
cells. The evidence abounds, and readily accounts for the capability of cortex to construct
perceptual images and for the distributed nature of the brain’s memory mechanism.”684
Penrose locates Pribram’s work in a modern context. “A strong early proponent of global
(essentially quantum) large-scale coherent ‘hologram’ activity in the brain was Karl
Pribram.”685 In advocating large scale, quantum coherent action in brain function, Penrose is
embracing the principle of quantum holography in his search for the missing science of
consciousness.686 Bradley, drawing on Piaget and Gabor’s work, provides an excellent
discussion, of how non-deterministic quantum holographic processes may operate in both
individual and social information processing.687

In proceeding from the potential domain of energy and momentum to that of space and time,
one is actualizing or unfolding the potential stored in the implicate order. When one proceeds
in the reverse direction one enfolds, by virtue of the holographic Gabor function, space and
time into the frequency domain, Pribram writes.688 Holography thus preserves space and time
as a priori Forms of intuition, as Kant proposed. In addition, it is a peculiar fact that any
illuminated slice of the photographic film used in a holographic image, still contains the
whole object. The whole is enfolded in every single part, this also being a key property of
intuition. The holographic model thus potentially elucidates our reading of Plato’s exposition
of intuition, where the harmonic and intrinsic relation of original to image figures
prominently.689 The more difficult notions addressed were the immediacy and singularity of
an intuition. How can non-inferential knowledge arise? Kant tries to convey that an intuition
is a representation or mental picture of the undivided whole, which is immediately present in

MEMES in their spiral dynamics.

682
Velmans, 2000, p. 233, Resnik & Orlandi, 2003, p. 305, Laszlo, 2003, p. 83-133.
683
Gabor, 1946, p. 431-437. See also Gabor, 1948, p. 777-778.
684
Pribram, in Gunter, 1987, p. 168, 171. See also Pribram, 1971, 1991, 1998, and Talbot, 1991.
685
Penrose, 1994, p. 348, 368.
686
Feynman, 1995, p. 36, 117. Non-locality and wave-particle duality are at the very heart of quantum physics.
“When the frequency is low, the field aspect of the phenomenon is more evident. As the frequency increases, the
particle aspects of the phenomenon become evident. Quantum mechanics unifies the idea of the field and its
waves, and the particle, all into one.” It thus transcends dualism.
687
Bradley, 1998, p. 471-504.
688
Pribram, in Gunter, 1987, p. 170. Bohm, 1981, p. 144, 150.
689
Cornford, 1955, p. 217-218. “Will you also take the proportion in which the visible world has been divided
as corresponding to degrees of reality and truth, so that the likeness shall stand to the original in the same ratio as
the sphere of appearances and belief to the sphere of knowledge.”

163
every part of the whole. As such, these immediate and singular representations, precedes any
part, with representations in it, not under it. Again, this resonates well with holography.

A fourth point is the subtle non-local and non-dual aspects of intuition. If our intuitive
perception is embedded in and intrinsic to a global field, just like a particle of light is to its
field, or a cell to its body, holography has the potential to explain how this works. Researchers
at the HeartMath Research Center have recently designed experiments where they discovered
the surprising EEG and ECG results that both the brain and the heart receive intuitive
information before exposure to stimuli, demonstrating foresight at the neural level. They also
discuss a holographic explanation.690 The ancient doctrine of ‘as above so below’ may thus be
transformed and interpreted as a holographic relationship between a priori and a posteriori,
episteme and doxa.691

Finally, the huge storage capacity of a hologram makes it more plausible that our mind has
access to all our accumulated personal experience and knowledge, as well as the entire
ancestral memory, as envisioned for example by Jung. Under this explanation intuition is a
perception, distinct from judgment, which is also in agreement with Jung. This was not taken
into full account in the design of my research instrument. However, a picture tells more than
thousand words, ‘for those who have eyes to see’, the saying goes. Holography transmits the
picture of the whole, due to its application of coherent laser light. The access key then, to
these deeper layers of the psyche, is perhaps the coherent or mature intuitive state of mind.692
Reflective and intuitive equilibrium may thus be a prerequisite, in order to avoid automatic,
biased application of intuitive or analytical heuristics.

In summarizing, the suggestion from the preceding lines of investigation is that further
research on intuition may benefit from at least two other sources of knowledge. First,
developmental psychology appears to provide us with perspectives that might explain why
certain types of cognitive development accentuate. Specifically, research can be designed in
such a way that a reliable and valid personal development test is included, serving as means
for measuring key developmental variables. The Washington University Sentence Completion
Test may be one research option.693 Secondly, holography and related issues may usefully
inform theory and research on intuition. Specifically, EEG and ECG measures in tandem with
multiple measures of intuitive perception could be instrumental. At Princeton University,
there is the Engineering Anomalies Research Laboratory (PEAR), directed by Bob Jahn and
Brenda Dunne.694 They work creatively and in an interdisciplinary way on human
consciousness and intuition. It is a likely future source for new ideas and inspiration on
intuition research.

The more challenging part is to develop a test that can discriminate between the suggested
first, second and third levels of intuition respectively. Admittedly, in this I have not conducted
any empirical tests. Clearly, the two decision situations applied in the current research are in
this sense, not exhaustive. However, in section 3.4 I discussed the particularly promising
research of Hammond et al. where they focus in on how expert highway engineers apply

690
McCraty, Atkinson & Bradley, 2004, p. 2. EEG = electroencephalogram, ECG = electrocardiogram.
691
Penrose, 1994, p. 368. Laszlo, 2003. See also Henden, 1998, p. 41-57.
692
Govinda, 1969, p. 74. The intuitive state of mind “represents the stabilizing and central point of balance,
upholding the coherence of its contents, by being the center of reference.”
693
Loevinger, 1998, p. 103.
694
Davis-Floyd & Arvidson, 1997, p. 121. Jahn & Dunne, 1987.

164
intuition and analysis in their visual fieldwork.695 In the final analysis, it may not be easy to
design research and instruments to measure the suggested second and third level, although a
stratified sample might here be useful. In other words, we may as Bergson did, call for a
blend of paradigms, not only in theory, but also through simultaneous application of intuitive
and analytical methods, discussed in this research.

I end with a poem by the eminent mathematician and geometer R. Buckminster Fuller on
intuition, which capture something of the further depth of this construct.

Intuition

Key to humanity’s scientific discoveries,

Technical inventions,
Design conceptioning
And production realizations
Has been a phenomenon
Transcendental to humanity’s
Self-disciplined,
Objective concentrations of thought
And deliberate acts -
A phenomenon transcendental to humanity’s
Consciously disciplined inventive capabilities.

That key is the first and utterly unpremeditated event

In all discovery, invention and art.
It is humanity’s intuitive awareness
Of having come unwittingly upon
An heretofore unknown truth,
A lucidly conceptual,
Sublimely harmonic,
Regenerative relationship
Of a priori universe -
An eternal principle -
And then moments later
A second intuitive awareness
Regarding what the conceiving individual human
Must do at once,
To capture the awareness of
And secure the usefulness of
That eternally reliable generalized principle
For all humanity,
For now and henceforth.696

695
Hammond et al. p. 172.
696
Buckminster Fuller, 1973, p. 55-56. See also the same author, 1975.

165
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Appendix A Interview-guide
The opening question in the interview is:

Would you please elaborate on two recent SDM-situations that you have thorough experience
with, and in-depth knowledge of. One should be characterized by exploration, that is search
for new possibilities, experimentation with completely new alternatives & technology,
variation, risk taking, innovation. In short you are to have no previous experience with such
a situation. The other situation is to be characterized by exploitation of old certainties,
refinement, improvement & increased efficiency of existing production & technology that you
are familiar with. Can you please focus in on how you arrived at your specific choice of
strategy, that is, on your perception and judgment?

The respondent is encouraged to describe in detail, the context, the development and
maturation of the decision, as well as any detail that may throw light on how and why he/she
perceived, judged, and decided the way he did. If he hit the wall, when struggling with the
decision, it is of interest to understand what kept him from proceeding, what enabled him to
cross the hurdle, that is, the emphasis and importance of intuition and analysis.

1 Not emphasized 2 Little emphasized 3 Somewhat emphasized 4 Emphasized

5 Quite emphasized 6 Considerably emphasized 7 Heavily emphasiszed

A The described explorative SDM situation in brief (A);

B The described exploitative SDM situation in brief (B);

To what degree did you emphasize; (In the interviewing the sequencing of the items are mixed
according to a fixed pattern; A-K)

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Analytical Thinking

1 A controlled study and break down of explicit data, using i.e. quantitative models? H
A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

2 Evaluation of alternatives, in terms of their consequences for preferences? J

A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

3 Dividing the whole situation into sub-areas, dissecting & scrutinizing them? E
A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

4 Analysis of facts, figures, reports, data & evidence? C

A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

Intuitive Thinking

5 Correct timing? (Knowing when to take the right step or action in e.g. the marketplace.) A
A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

6 Perception of cycles? (Foreseing emerging trends, patterns and recurring events.) F

A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

7 Perception of the larger picture? (A holistic view and apprehension of the sit.) B
A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

8 Synthesis? (The ability to perceive many factors and variables as a coherent whole.) D
A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

9 Gut feeling rooted in the sum total of your previous experience? I

A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

10 Perception of possibilities, and the innate idea? G

A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

11 Intuition? K
A Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
B Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

12 How would you define intuition?

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B

13 What are the pros and cons of intuition and analysis in strategic thinking and decision-
making?

Analysis:

Intuition:

14 The respondent is asked to rank the items, using cards on the table

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
A
B

15 What is your normal emphasis on analytical and intuitive thinking in SDM?

Analysis: Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized
Intuition: Not emphasized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heavily emphasized

The Quality of the Thinking and Decision Making

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16 To what degree would you say it was good strategic thinking?
A Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree
B Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree

17 To what degree would you say the decision itself turned out to be a good one?
A Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree
B Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree

Please list the criteria you have in mind.

18 To what degree would you say your thinking and decision making was efficient?
A Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree
B Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree

19 To what degree would you say you were certain when making the decision?
A Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree
B Little degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High degree

20 Which of the logics was more emphasized?

Logic of appropriateness, that is, the decision was seen as appropriate to, and matched the
situation in which you were. Or Logic of consequence, that is, the decision was a result of
evaluation of alternatives, in terms of their consequences for preferences.

A Logic of appropriateness % …………. Logic of consequence % ………………

B Logic of appropriateness % …………. Logic of consequence % ………………

Demographical Data
21 How many years of experience do you have in this industry? …. 22 Industry type?
23 How many years of experience do you have in this company? ……….
24 How many of these years have you worked with strategy? …… 25 Your age …..
26 How many other industries have you experience from (more than one year)? …....
27 How many employees are you all together? ……… 28 Sex ……..
29 What is your highest level of education: Undergrad. ..… Grad. ..…. Ph.d. …...
30 What subjects: Business/Economics …… Engineering ……… other(s) ……
31 Current position and responsibility: …………………………………..…………..

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Appendix B Sample Presentation

Company Industry Employees Respondents

Aker Offshore Offshore 2600 11
Widerøe Flyselskap Aviation 1250 10
BBS Banking/IT 800 10
BI Private University 800 8
Volvo Trucks & Machines 130 6
Telenor Telecom 20000 5
Aas Bryggeri Brewery 130 5
Norgesgruppen Retail 12000 4
Leif Høegh Shipping 2000 4
Teknologisk Institutt Consulting 240 4
Andersen Consulting Consulting 70 3
Nordea Banking 38000 3
Radisson SAS Hotel/Travel 230 3
Byggmakker Carpenter 80 3
COOP Retail 1600 3
Posten Norge Postal Services 25000 2
TV2 TV/Media 500 2
Herstad Eiendom Lawyer 3 2
Ovtun Eiendom Real Estate 8 2
Wilhelmsen Shipping 12000 1
Norsk Stål Steel Production 300 1
Veritas Certification 4500 1
Meditalklinikken Health Services 3 1
BNP Banking 90 1
Jan Lorentzen Investment 1 1
Lunde Arkitekter Architect 7 1
Brøvigs Rederi Offshore 50 1
Hewlett Packard IT 500 1
Antares Gruppen IT 45 1
Ergogroup IT 2300 1
Norrøna Sport Retail 35 1
Statoil Oil 15000 1
A. F. Klaveness & CO. Shipping 10 1
Torvald Klaveness Group Shipping 1140 1
34 Companies 22 Industries N = 105

Data from Dun & Bradstreet: 2001

Sectors Nr. of Firms Sales in kr. Wages in kr. Equity in kr. Tot. Capital kr. Employees
Agriculture & Fishing 2 413 26 569 630 4 490 645 13 312 984 43 770 590 11 521
Oil and mining 853 351 341 245 20 679 928 127 279 263 474 589 813 30 180
Industry 11 767 533 129 849 89 286 615 199 890 397 519 183 636 187 036
Electricity, Gas & Water 497 39 463 016 3 698 710 82 373 800 173 209 702 8 619
Construction 10 562 125 267 876 35 815 468 17 942 529 75 741 852 68 116
Wholesale & Retail 33 095 703 239 916 75 421 671 90 923 792 320 279 834 190 825
Accomod. & Restaurant 4 441 31 019 450 11 128 012 3 938 314 20 881 521 35 740
Transport 7 814 256 068 124 38 540 470 155 956 939 506 375 982 82 787
Real Estate & Business 55 536 525 714 228 96 378 018 814 835 540 3 054 492 719 228 532
Others 7 971 60 491 906 17 190 090 20 886 922 58 100 475 49 485
Total 134 951 2 652 311 214 392 631 935 1 527 341 417 5 246 631 611 892 852

189