CHAPTER III – POWERS & FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES It is not farfetched to assert — as petitioner does 2 that for all
assert — as petitioner does 2 that for all practical purposes, the
13) Makati Stock Exchange vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620
G.R. No. L-23004 June 30, 1965
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and MANILA STOCK
EXCHANGE, respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is a review of the resolution of the Securities and Exchange Commission which would
deny the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., permission to operate a stock exchange unless it
agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock
Exchange.
Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission
has no power to impose it and that, anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust.
Under the law, no stock exchange may do business in the Philippines unless it is previously
registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the information described in
Sec. 17 of the Securities Act (Commonwealth Act 83, as amended).
It is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied with; if
not, it may refuse. And there is now no question that the section has been complied with, or
would be complied with, except that the Makati Stock Exchange, upon challenging this
particular requirement of the Commission (rule against double listing) may be deemed to
have shown inability or refusal to abide by its rules, and thereby to have given ground for
denying registration. [Sec. 17 (a) (1) and (d)].
Such rule provides: "... nor shall a security already listed in any securities exchange be listed
anew in any other securities exchange ... ."
The objection of Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., to this rule is understandable. There is actually
only one securities exchange — The Manila Stock Exchange — that has been operating
alone for the past 25 years; and all — or presumably all — available or worthwhile securities
for trading in the market are now listed there. In effect, the Commission permits the Makati
Stock Exchange, Inc., to deal only with other securities. Which is tantamount to permitting a
store to open provided it sells only those goods not sold in other stores. And if there's only
one existing store, 1 the result is a monopoly.
Commission's order or resolution would make it impossible for the Makati Stock Exchange to
operate. So, its "permission" amounted to a "prohibition."
Apparently, the Commission acted "in the public interest." 3 Hence, it is pertinent to inquire
whether the Commission may "in the public interest" prohibit (or make impossible) the
establishment of another stock exchange (besides the Manila Stock Exchange), on the
ground that the operation of two or more exchanges adversely affects the public interest.
At first glance, the answer should be in the negative, because the law itself contemplated,
and, therefore, tacitly permitted or tolerated at least, the operation of two or more exchanges.
Wherever two or more exchanges exist, the Commission, by order, shall require and
enforce uniformity of trading regulations in and/or between said exchanges.
[Emphasis Ours] (Sec. 28b-13, Securities Act.)
In fact, as admitted by respondents, there were five stock exchanges in Manila, before the
Pacific War (p. 10, brief), when the Securities Act was approved or amended. (Respondent
Commission even admits that dual listing was practiced then.) So if the existence of more
than one exchange were contrary to public interest, it is strange that the Congress having
from time to time enacted legislation amending the Securities Act, 4 has not barred multiplicity
of exchanges.
Forgetting for the moment the monopolistic aspect of the Commission's resolution, let us
examine the authority of the Commission to promulgate and implement the rule in question.
It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted
to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no provision
expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is "necessary for the
execution of the functions vested in it"; but it makes no explanation, perhaps relying on the
reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or more
stock exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides contravening public
interest. (Of this, we shall treat later) .
On the legality of its rule, the Commission's argument is that: (a) it was approved by the
Department Head — before the War; and (b) it is not in conflict with the provisions of the
Securities Act. In our opinion, the approval of the Department, 5 by itself, adds no weight in a
judicial litigation; and the test is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from imposing a
prohibition, but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. No specific portion of the
statute has been cited to uphold this power. It is not found in sec. 28 (of the Securities Act),
which is entitled "Powers (of the Commission) with Respect to Exchanges and Securities." 6
1
According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission
has (Sec. 33) does not imply authority to prohibit." 7
The Manila Stock Exchange, obviously the beneficiary of the disputed rule, contends that the
power may be inferred from the express power of the Commission to suspend trading in a
security, under said sec. 28 which reads partly:
And if in its opinion, the public interest so requires, summarily to suspend trading in
any registered security on any securities exchange ... . (Sec. 28[3], Securities Act.)
However, the Commission has not acted — nor claimed to have acted — in pursuance of
such authority, for the simple reason that suspension under it may only be for ten days.
Indeed, this section, if applicable, precisely argues against the position of the Commission
because the "suspension," if it is, and as applied to Makati Stock Exchange, continues for an
indefinite period, if not forever; whereas this Section 28 authorizes suspension for ten days
only. Besides, the suspension of trading in the security should not be on one exchange only,
but on all exchanges; bearing in mind that suspension should be ordered "for the protection
of investors" (first par., sec. 28) in all exchanges, naturally, and if "the public interest so
requires" [sec. 28(3)].
This brings up the Commission's principal conclusions underlying its determination viz.: (a)
that the establishment of another exchange in the environs of Manila would be inimical to the
public interest; and (b) that double or multiple listing of securities should be prohibited for the
"protection of the investors."
(a) Public Interest — Having already adverted to this aspect of the matter, and the emerging
monopoly of the Manila Stock Exchange, we may, at this juncture, emphasize that by
restricting free competition in the marketing of stocks, and depriving the public of the
advantages thereof the Commission all but permits what the law punishes as monopolies as
"crimes against public interest." 8
"A stock exchange is essentially monopolistic," the Commission states in its resolution (p. 14-
a, Appendix, Brief for Petitioner). This reveals the basic foundation of the Commission's
process of reasoning. And yet, a few pages afterwards, it recalls the benefits to be derived
"from the existence of two or more exchanges," and the desirability of "a healthy and fair
competition in the securities market," even as it expresses the belief that "a fair field of
competition among stock exchanges should be encouraged only to resolve, paradoxically
enough, that Manila Stock Exchange shall, in effect, continue to be the only stock exchange
in Manila or in the Philippines.
"Double listing of a security," explains the Commission, "divides the sellers and the buyers,
thus destroying the essence of a stock exchange as a two-way auction market for the
securities, where all the buyers and sellers in one geographical area converge in one defined
place, and the bidders compete with each other to purchase the security at the lowest
possible price and those seeking to sell it compete with each other to get the highest price
therefor. In this sense, a stock exchange is essentially monopolistic."
Inconclusive premises, for sure. For it is debatable whether the buyer of stock may get the
lowest price where all the sellers assemble in only one place. The price there, in one sale, will
tend to fix the price for the succeeding, sales, and he has no chance to get a lower price
except at another stock exchange. Therefore, the arrangement desired by the Commission
may, at most, be beneficial to sellers of stock — not to buyers — although what applies to
buyers should obtain equally as to sellers (looking for higher prices). Besides, there is the
brokerage fee which must be considered. Not to mention the personality of the broker.
(b) Protection of investors. — At any rate, supposing the arrangement contemplated
is beneficial to investors (as the Commission says), it is to be doubted whether it is
"necessary" for their "protection" within the purview of the Securities Act. As the purpose of
the Act is to give adequate and effective protection to the investing public against fraudulent
representations, or false promises and the imposition of worthless ventures, 9 it is hard to see
how the proposed concentration of the market has a necessary bearing to the prevention of
deceptive devices or unlawful practices. For it is not mere semantics to declare that acts for
the protection of investors are necessarily beneficial to them; but not everything beneficial to
them is necessary for their protection.
And yet, the Commission realizes that if there were two or more exchanges "the same
security may sell for more in one exchange and sell for less in the other. Variance in price of
the same security would be the rule ... ." Needless to add, the brokerage rates will also differ.
This, precisely, strengthens the objection to the Commission's ruling. Such difference in
prices and rates gives the buyer of shares alternative options, with the opportunity to invest at
lower expense; and the seller, to dispose at higher prices. Consequently, for the investors'
benefit (protection is not the word), quality of listing 10 should be permitted, nay, encouraged,
and other exchanges allowed to operate. The circumstance that some people "made a lot of
money due to the difference in prices of securities traded in the stock exchanges of Manila
before the war" as the Commission noted, furnishes no sufficient reason to let one exchange
corner the market. If there was undue manipulation or unfair advantage in exchange trading
the Commission should have other means to correct the specific abuses.
Granted that, as the Commission observes, "what the country needs is not another" market
for securities already listed on the Manila Stock Exchange, but "one that would focus its
attention and energies on the listing of new securities and thus effectively help in raising
capital sorely needed by our ... unlisted industries and enterprises."
Nonetheless, we discover no legal authority for it to shore up (and stifle) free enterprise and
individual liberty along channels leading to that economic desideratum. 11
2
The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally
obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the
existence of two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest — which is doubtful — let
the Congress speak. 12 Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendation of the Commission
will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual
enterprise and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of
exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the
establishment of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening:
(a) the organizers' (Makati's) Constitutional right to equality before the law;
(b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and
(c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the
brokers in his employment. 13
And no extended elucidation is needed to conclude that for a licensing officer to deny license
solely on the basis of what he believes is best for the economy of the country may amount to
regimentation or, in this instance, the exercise of undelegated legislative powers and
discretion.
Thus, it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly
authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground that
a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been issued. (53
C.J.S. p. 636.)
Concerning res judicata. — Calling attention to the Commission's order of May 27, 1963,
which Makati Stock did not appeal, the Manila Stock Exchange pleads the doctrine of res
judicata. 14 (The order now reviewed is dated May 7, 1964.)
It appears that when Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. presented its articles of incorporation to the
Commission, the latter, after making some inquiries, issued on May 27, 1963, an order
reading as follows.
Let the certificate of incorporation of the MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE be issued,
and if the organizers thereof are willing to abide by the foregoing conditions, they
may file the proper application for the registration and licensing of the said Exchange.
In that order, the Commission advanced the opinion that "it would permit the establishment
and operation of the proposed Makati Stock Exchange, provided ... it shall not list for trading
on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange ... ."
Admittedly, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. has not appealed from that order of May 27, 1963.
Now, Manila Stock insists on res judicata.
Why should Makati have appealed? It got the certificate of incorporation which it wanted. The
condition or proviso mentioned would only apply if and when it subsequently filed the
application for registration as stock exchange. It had not yet applied. It was not the time to
question the condition; 15 Makati was still exploring the convenience of soliciting the permit to
operate subject to that condition. And it could have logically thought that, since the condition
did not affect its articles of incorporation, it should not appeal the order (of May 27, 1963)
which after all, granted the certificate of incorporation (corporate existence) it wanted at that
time.
And when the Makati Stock Exchange finally found that it could not successfully operate with
the condition attached, it took the issue by the horns, and expressing its desire for registration
and license, it requested that the condition (against double listing) be dispensed with. The
order of the Commission denying, such request is dated May 7, 1964, and is now under,
review.
Indeed, there can be no valid objection to the discussion of this issue of double listing
now, 16 because even if the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. may be held to have accepted the
permission to operate with the condition against double listing (for having failed to appeal the
order of May 27, 1963), still it was not precluded from afterwards contesting 17 the validity of
such condition or rule:
(1) An agreement (which shall not be construed as a waiver of any constitutional right or any
right to contest the validity of any rule or regulation) to comply and to enforce so far as is
within its powers, compliance by its members, with the provisions of this Act, and any
amendment thereto, and any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder. (See. 17-a-1,
Securities Act [Emphasis Ours].)
Surely, this petition for review has suitably been coursed. And making reasonable allowances
for the presumption of regularity and validity of administrative action, we feel constrained to
reach the conclusion that the respondent Commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule, which, additionally, results in discrimination and violation of
constitutional rights.
ACCORDINGLY, the license of the petition to operate a stock exchange is approved without
such condition. Costs shall be paid by the Manila Stock Exchange. So ordered.
3
14) Taule vs. Santos, 200 SCRA 512
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991
RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga
barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the
Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac,
Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its
officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of
Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government
Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis
A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members,
the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer.
Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
President — Ruperto Taule
Vice-President — Allan Aquino
Secretary — Vicente Avila
Treasurer — Fidel Jacob
Auditor — Leo Sales1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter
to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting the election of
the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in
the manner it was conducted.2
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President
of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the
alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in
the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time
requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.3
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the
officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the
Department of Local Government.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was
denied by respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. 5
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of
respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election
protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether
or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying
the election;
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in the
following levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in cities, katipunang
panlungsod; in provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in regions, katipunang pampook; and on
the national level, katipunan ng mga barangay.6
The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga
barangay at all levels shall be organized:
4
 Sec. 110. Organization. — (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in the
following manner:
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of officers.
The president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned in the next
higher level of organization.
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang pampook,
which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan
and the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the katipunang bayan in each
province shall constitute the katipunang panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod
and the katipunang bayan shall be composed of the punong barangays of cities and
municipalities, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government
Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and
regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial
implementation of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going
programs and projects7 issued Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April
7, 1989,8 to provide the guidelines for the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan
ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels.
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction
upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the
FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that
under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections
which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the
guidelines as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest
upon the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall
exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited
to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the sworn petition
contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A
voter may also contest the election of any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of
the election.11 Only appeals from decisions of inferior courts on election matters as
aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over
popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the
electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people.12 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote.13 Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign,
and the casting and counting of the votes14 which do not characterize the election of officers
in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings
by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after
proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in
dispute15 and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after
the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed.16
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of
the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as
prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The
COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective
barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have
limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is
limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned
to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization.17
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any
protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as
set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of
1987, ** the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government
units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."
5
Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV
of the Administrative Code, to wit:
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives,
policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-
making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law.18
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction
upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto
and consequently declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,
administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing
power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give
validity to their determinations.21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary
implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume
jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An
understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over local governments is therefore
necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of
general supervision22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."23 The
general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local
Government.24
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the
Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority.25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body.26
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President
over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon
the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent
Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in
effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a
purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be
achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the
Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs
of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general
supervision over local governments.27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state
policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress."29 To deny the Secretary of Local
Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan
would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local
governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and
other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring
compliance" by local government units of such issuances.30 To monitor means "to watch,
observe or check.31 This is compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over
local governments which as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to
issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should
be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over
local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG
Circular.32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs
should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by
respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989
as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent
Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC,
the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.33
The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that
"whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared
null and void by the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct and
being invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued
6
on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in
statutory construction that laws, including circulars and regulations 34 cannot be applied
retrospectively.35Moreover, such provision is null and void for having been issued in excess
of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot
confer jurisdiction upon itself.
As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor
has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the
membership of the sangguniang panlalawiganconsists of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan
and the kabataang barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer
of the sangguniang panlalawigan.36
As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest
in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of
the assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable
circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawiganthe official actions of the
sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent
governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the
FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the respondent
Secretary has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now be
resolved in order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement
of an appropriate action by the parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of
DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-
President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule
specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who shall
preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it
must be imperative or mandatory and not merely
permissive,37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been
intended that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in
the elections at the town and city levels38 as well as the regional level..39
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided
over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid
mandatory provision. On this ground, the elections should be nullified.
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of
votes and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This
is consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the
COMELEC to the supervision of the election.40
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There
was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is
dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the
elections in view of the walk out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC
Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of keeping the election free and
honest was therefore compromised.
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is
null and void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging
that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990,
designated Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to
the sangguniang panlalawigan of Catanduanes.41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent
governor swore into said office Augusto Antonio on June 14, 1990. 42
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition43 as required by the
resolution of the Court dated September 13,1990.
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by petitioner
as something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment was merely
temporary "until such time that the provincial FABC president in that province has been
elected, appointed and qualified."44 He stresses that Antonio's appointment was only a
remedial measure designed to cope with the problems brought about by the absence of a
representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang panlalawigan."
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides-
(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-
governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the
katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:
xxx xxx xxx
7
 The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the governor
as chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding officer pro tempore,
the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the appointive members
consisting of the president of the provincial association of barangay councils, and the
president of the provincial federation of the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis
supplied.)
of political interference by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be
allowed. The barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention
if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary dated
August 4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.

In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr.45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang
panlungsod,46 declared as null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio
Banate Jr. as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing
the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the elegibility and qualification
required by law, not being a barangay captain and for not having been elected president of
the association of barangay councils. The Court held that an unqualified person cannot be
appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer,47 the
appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth sector to
the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the
president of the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337.
The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby
annulled.1âwphi1 A new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be
conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio as
representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared null and
void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise
explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang
panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the
qualifications set by law.48 The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the
requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan.
The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no
authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president
of the federation of barangay councils.

Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but
he was not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was
appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since
Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his
appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such
appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary
was to protect the interest of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have appointed the
incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For even under the guidelines, the term
of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of
their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly
appointed.49 Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the incumbent
has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent
FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner
since he was elected the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of
Antonio, allegedly the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge

8
15) Solid Homes vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72
G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private
respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the
petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab
initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on
June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had
already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and
interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to
deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it
appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing
company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all
the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction,
this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was
denied. The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said
decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree."
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to
deliver to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus
interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00
moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs
of the suit.1
Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also
berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its
dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the
further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration
expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.
In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of
PD No. 957 itself providing that:
SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be
available under existing laws.
and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension
that the court a quowas bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary
opinion of the Secretary of Justice as impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While
we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court on the
dubious conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the jurisdictional issue.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall haveexclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is
vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3
The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on
regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading
in part as follows:
9
 SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or
the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty
thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).
It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been
promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.
This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus,
it has been held that-
The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption
that the special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the
general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the
particular case. 4
xxx xxx xxx
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general
act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be
regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and
where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by
necessary implication. 5
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD
No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting
concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over the complaint
mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or
merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved
party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act
complained of under the Revised Penal Code. 6
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive
power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the respondent to
brush aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice that-
Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have
against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary
consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-performance of contractual
or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in the phrase
"claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted
subparagraph C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims"
is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are
incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases specifically
included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under
the subject provisions.
The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are
recoverable either by agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the
Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages are awarded and (2) where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which
would deny the HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for
damages and for attorney's fees would result in multiplicity of suits in that the
subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the HSRC and who is
thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be
forced to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is
obviously not in the contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.)7
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to
create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
10
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to

enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative
purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing
Authority, 9 the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the
exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to
determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.

It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical
Homes v. National Housing Authority 10 is not in point. We upheld in that case the
constitutionality of the procedure for appeal provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule
there that the National Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are
doing now.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party
raising the issue is barred by estoppel, 12 which does not appear in the case before us. On
the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by
the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the
respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will
entail, to nullify the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE,
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

11
CHAPTER IV – INVESTIGATORY POWERS
16) Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission
on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a
decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising
quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that
relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the
jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and
adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-
matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this
Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted
actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions"
after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting
classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away
from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies,
etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served
with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the
days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the
principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del
Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6
the latter filed separate answers, opted for a
formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings
pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order
dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion
for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by
their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The
case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and
the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was
dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal,
grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra.
The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9
Both petitions in this Court
were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-
members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed
as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his
office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear
12
the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice,
and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12
The Commission thereafter issued an
Order 13reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly,
Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr.
Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any
and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on
the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted
leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November
14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that
the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2)
cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice
to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained
of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative
charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent
Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on
the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18
It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due
process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the
Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the
Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August
6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in
behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass
action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character
of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by
the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected
may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-
judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
13
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23
Upon its constitution, it succeeded
and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules
of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may
be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." 27
The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to
learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence;
a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe
as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2
Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection
of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . .
." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
14
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
SO ORDERED.
actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33
and it
appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil
Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions
of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making
its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort,
frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse
to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in
conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal
thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that
Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil
Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

15
17) Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
G.R. No. L-22754 December 31, 1965
RUBEN A. VILLALUZ, petitioner,
vs.
CALIXTO ZALDIVAR, ET AL., respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with payment
of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.
He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two days
thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; that on May
26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after having been informed of his nomination by
then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January
28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as
Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter
informed the former of the findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross
mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which
are summed up in the letter, as follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to
the government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same,
facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy
unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman Roces
recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio de Leon as well
as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor Vehicles Office by the new
chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having been officially informed of the content of
said letter, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a
copy thereof requiring him to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should be
taken against him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the
letter as required wherein he explained and refuted in detail each and everyone of the
charges contained in the letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the Motor
Vehicles Office, having thereupon created an investigating committee with the only purpose
of investigating the charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to
undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor
Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee submitted its report to the
President of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing
the removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio
was appointed to take his place as acting administrator; and that, after having been officially
notified of his removal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and
when this was denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court.
Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained in the
letter of Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office in general
for the truth is that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross inefficiency and
negligence in the performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office, and as a
result he was required to the same within 72 hours to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him. Respondents also denied that petitioner was investigated
without being accorded due process is required by law for in fact he was given every
reasonable opportunity to present his defense, to secure the attendance of witnesses, and to
produce documents in his behalf in a manner consistent with administrative due process.
Respondent also averred that the President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's claim,
has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who
belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
2260. Respondents finally averred that the letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in
effect a valid administrative complaint because it contained specific charges which constitute
just causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be sworn to for the
Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner, is empowered to commence
administrative proceedings motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of
1941, without need of any previous verified complaint. And as special defense respondents
averred that petitioner is guilty of laches for having allowed almost four years before
instituting the present action.
There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and is such he can only be investigated
and removed from office after due hearing the President of the Philippines under the principle
that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be clearly implied from
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Such is what we ruled in the recent case of Ang-Angco
wherein on this point we said:
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may
extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not
belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero, supra), but
not with regard to those officers or employees who belong, to the classified service
for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the
provision of our Constitution which says that the "Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head of
departments" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,
L-17169, November 30, 1963).
Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may state that the Commissioner of
Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against
petitioner because the authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension,
separation, or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and
employees in the classified service to which classification petitioner does not belong. This is
16
also what we said in the Ang-Angco case when, in interpreting Section 16 (i) of Republic Act
No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the
classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the
investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he is under
the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the reason we have
already stated that he is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under the
jurisdiction of the President. The following rationale supports this view:
Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution
over all officers and employees in the executive departments which is now involved
by respondent as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil Service
Act. This power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific
manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra,
occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter," to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to
remove an officer or employee in the executive department. Apparently, the power
merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over
the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside
the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or
employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or
upon complaint of any person which shall be subscribed under oath by the
complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the
complainant, the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his
discretion, take action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances of
the case, so warrant.1
Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of quo warranto which
seeks petitioners reinstatement to his former position as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles
Office, we are of the opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for having been filed more
than one year after its cause of action had accrued. As this Court has aptly said: "a delay of
slightly over one (1) year was considered sufficient ... to be an action for mandamus, by
reason of laches or abandonment of office. We see no reason to depart from said view in the
present case, petitioner herein having allowed about a year and a half to elapse before
seeking reinstatement." (Jose V. Lacson, et al., L-10177, May 17, 1957).
WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.

That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in
administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79 (c) is
given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which
he may "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices," and
under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over the executive
department only refers to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled
or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body or
individual, and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within
the meaning of control over a specific policy of government. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo,
et al., supra)

With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against petitioner
which led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges preferred against him by
Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260,
this much we can say: said proceedings having been commenced against petitioner upon the
authority of the Chief Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may
be commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to
Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is follows:

17
18) Ruiz vs. Drilon, 209 SCRA 695
G.R. No. 101666 June 9, 1992
DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President of Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muñoz,
Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in
his capacity as DECS Secretary; ATTY. RENO CAPINPIN, Director III, DECS, in his
capacity as Chairman, Investigating Committee; DALMACIO CASISON, in his capacity
and as Member, Investigating Committee; EDUARDO PARAY, LUIS CASTRO,
HIPOLITO MALAMUG, NEMESIO TORRES and NOLASCO HIPOLITO, respondents.
No. 103570 June 9, 1992
DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President, Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as DECS
Secretary; MARINA S.J. PANGAN, in her capacity as Asst. Secretary of DECS and DR.
FORTUNATO BATTAD, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:p
I review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition was docketed as G.R. No.
The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to submit a comment to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, (G.R. No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
public respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports ("DECS"), and Resolved to DISPENSE with the comment required of the
public respondents, considering that the pleadings and other papers already filed by the other
parties in this case are adequate to enable the Court to act upon the present petition.
II
On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218
dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon
State University ("CLSU"). 1
In two (2) orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary, acting
by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for reconsideration
therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for being pro forma. Consequently, AO
No. 218 became final and executory. 2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
SP-12656. 3 Petitioner there sought to annul, as products of grave abuse of discretion,
President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr. Fortunato Battad as the
new CLSU President, as well as DECS Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order dated 24
September 1991 directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad. The
Court of Appeals issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 4
Eight days later, on 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the present
petition (G.R. No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose
of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of
the orders of the Executive Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration
therefrom. 5 The Court did not issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 6This petition made no
mention of the petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO filed 8 days earlier with the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-21656).
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September 1991 having gone into
effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January
1992, where for the first time, he disclosed to this Court the other judicial proceedings which
he had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO No. 210. 7
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in
CA-G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for lack of merit and finding the same to be a
case of forum shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision by way of a petition for
103570 and assigned to the Second Division. 9 This case was consolidated with G.R. No.
101666, by this time pending with the Court En Banc, by a resolution dated 2 April 1992.
Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to show
cause why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an apparent case of
forum shopping, considering that the parties involved, issues raised and the reliefs sought
therein are substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165. 10
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992 obviously in
anticipation of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the Court, as well as an undated
compliance filed on 2 March 1992 in response to the same resolution. He denies having
engaged in forum shopping and contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R. No. SP-26156
consists of the illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the President and by the DECS
in implementing AO No. 218, which may render moot the Court's review of the intrinsic merits
of AO No. 218, an entirely different cause of action in itself; and (2) he never attempted to
hide the fact, either before this Court or the Court of Appeals, that he had instituted both
actions "for separate reasons, apart though related from each other," such candor being "an
18
elementary consideration in the determination of the issue whether he committed forum
shopping or not." 11
Deliberating on the present consolidated Petitions, the Court finds the explanations proffered
by petitioner and his counsel as justifications for the procedural maneuvers undertaken in this
case to be completely unsatisfactory and considers the Petitions to be clear cases of
deliberate forum shopping.
The Court views with considerable disfavor the legal maneuvers undertaken by petitioner and
his counsel of record, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra, to defeat his removal from office. It is
evident that petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, had split a single
cause of action consisting of the alleged illegality of his removal from office by the President
through AO No. 218, by seeking judicial review of (1) AO 218 with the Court and at the same
time (2) having the enforcement aspect of the President's action and the filling up of the
resulting vacancy reviewed by the Court of Appeals. It also appears to the Court that
petitioner carried out these acts in order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a limited twenty-day
lifetime) from the Court of Appeals, issued as a matter of course, in order to stop the
execution and implementation of AO No. 218, and afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an
indefinite lifetime from this Court for the same purpose, in case his petition in the main action
of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 would be dismissed on the merits by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666 and CA-G.R. No. SP-
26165 were simultaneously pending action before two (2) different for a petitioner created for
himself a situation where he could hope to get (after the 20-day life of the Court of Appeals
TRO) a judicial order from either forum which could stop the execution of AO No. 218 with
more permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from the Supreme Court or the
grant of his petition for prohibition by the Court of Appeals). Thus the Court of Appeals, aware
of the institution of G.R. No. 101666, 12 committed no reversible error in considering the
action before it as another, independent case and as an instance of forum shopping.
Petitioner sought to maintain the two (2) segments of his single causes of action again by
instituting G.R. No. 103570, in a bid to ensure that the decision on the merits in CA-G.R. No.
SP-26165 will not attain finality and enforceability, even though the matters involved therein
are essentially the incidents of the case already pending review in G.R. No. 101666.
Forum shopping effected by a party litigant through the deliberate splitting of causes of
actions and appeals in the hope that even as one case (in which a particular remedy is
sought) is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open, is a
deplorable practice because it results in the unnecessary clogging of the already heavily
burdened dockets of the courts. 13
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on 11 January 1983,
relative to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129, granting the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now the Court of Appeals) equal original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition, etc., whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provides that if
such a petition is filed before the Court of Appeals and is still pending therein, a similar
petition cannot be filed in the Supreme Court. A violation of this rule has also been
considered a clear case of forum shopping, an act of malpractice proscribed as trifling with
the courts and abusing their processes. The Rule itself provides that a violation thereof
constitutes: (1) cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions; and (2) contempt of court
for which the party or counsel concerned may be held accountable. 14
The pretended candor of petitioner and his counsel here does not persuade. Petitioner never
informed the Court of the existence of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 when he filed his petition in
G.R. No. 101666, the first opportunity available to him to be completely candid with the Court.
It was the private respondents in their comment to the petition filed on 16 November 1991,
who gave the Court first notice of the other proceeding. 15It is obvious that petitioner filed his
subsequent manifestation because he was no longer able to deny the existence of the
proceeding before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's attempt to trifle with the highest court of
the land in this manner renders him liable for forum shopping. 16
III
In addition to the foregoing, the Court deliberated upon the merits of the consolidated
Petitions and considers that petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any
act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in rendering the
assailed administrative orders.
Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented
against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. 17There is no doubt that he
has been accorded his rights.
AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from
office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive
Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting
in wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents;
(b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required
school purposes from a firm owned by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop
harvest sales agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship; and (d)
he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the
provisions of R.A. No. 5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and
furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public service. 19
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 101666, as well as the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 103570, are hereby DISMISSED as clear cases of forum
shopping and for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A,-G.R, No. SP-
26165 dated 29 January 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
19
Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra. is hereby ADMONISHED and WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar acts of forum shopping will be more severely punished. A
copy of this Resolution shall be attached to the personal record of Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra
in the office of the Bar Confidant. Costs against petitioner.

20
19) Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion, 332 SCRA 160
G.R. No. 139465 October 17, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25,
and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the
petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.1
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He
assails the decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of
value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the
filing of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a
denial of fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no
higher objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine
Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of
government and the rights of an individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice
and hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch
necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme
Court has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other
two co-equal branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings."2
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B.
Jimenez, opposing petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with
the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security
Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that
petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August
18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with
its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
First. P.D. No. 10693 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the
time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. - (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received
the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or
set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
21
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the
extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment
thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in
the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a
"court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or
dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or
integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or
substantial justice."4
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light
of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose."5 (emphasis supplied) The preambular
paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz:
"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is
committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it
saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the
interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other
interested countries;
x x x." (emphasis supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to
arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug
trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will
not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the
unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any
signatory state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will
minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite
their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for
his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by
petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner
Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply
rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the
branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the
careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that private respondent’s
demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the
extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:
"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a
criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in
somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him
guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding
government requires his surrender."6 (emphasis supplied)
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution.
Justice is best served when done without delay.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the
parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of
the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The
rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given
them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is accorded great weight.7 The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,8where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-
legislative act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined
to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."
Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition
Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.9 This understanding of the treaty is
shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty.10 This interpretation by the
two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to
assume that both governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines
have expressed the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US
governments. Canadian11 and Hongkong12 authorities, thru appropriate note verbales
communicated to our Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it is
not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition
22
papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a
convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous.
Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the
right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by
likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a
preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.13 His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing
evaluation.14 As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards
that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition
pursuant to a valid treaty."15
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-
blown trial.16 In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an
extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. 17 In terms
of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction18 while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case."19 Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. 20 The United
States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite.21
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action."22 The concept of due
process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same
kind of procedure."23
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice
and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than
life."24 The supposed threat to private respondent’s liberty is perceived to come from several
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest
and temporary detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
"PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the
person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for
provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly
between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of
Justice.
2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time
and location of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or
judgment of conviction against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will
follow.
3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its
application and the reasons for any denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the
expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the
executive authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for
extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to
the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
23
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in
accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or
telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his
behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the
provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the
warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting
state of the result of its request.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in
Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody." (emphasis
supplied)
Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private
respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for
extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition request from the United States and
has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not
requested for private respondent’s provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private
respondent’s liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real.
Nor can the threat to private respondent’s liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069,
which provides:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding
judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve
the ends of justice. . .
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis
supplied)
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of
the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the
extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still
in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for
extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private
respondent’s liberty is merely hypothetical.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration
involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however,
collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the
interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of
interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law."25 The approach
requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation."26 These interests usually consist in the
exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.27
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondent’s claim to due
process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a
bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society
which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight
it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should
give more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite
the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws.
Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters
relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of
powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation
stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and
the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the
interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government."28 Under our constitutional scheme, executive power
is vested in the President of the Philippines.29Executive power includes, among others, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements.30 The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored
devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in
the international arena.31 It is traditionally held that the President has power and even
supremacy over the country’s foreign relations.32 The executive department is aptly accorded
deference on matters of foreign relations considering the President’s most comprehensive
and most confidential information about the international scene of which he is regularly
briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military
24
intelligence data is also unlimited.33 The deference we give to the executive department is
dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of
our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do
it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be
part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational
crimes.
all nations."35 In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity
from these efforts.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the
case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by
the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No.
99-94684.
SO ORDERED.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is
not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the
length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated
otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections
are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an
individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."34 We have explained why an
extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords
an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is
filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his
extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The
extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent
escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the
basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition
proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the
government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not
a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from
the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors
that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's
privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not
deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.

We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice
to resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a rapid
pace, propelled as it is by technological leaps in transportation and communication, we need
to push further back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations and move
closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with

25
20) Pefianco vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439
[G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000]
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C.
MORAL, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria
for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration
thereof.
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National
Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical
documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library
which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her
possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical
documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose
M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the DECS
Secretary in the administrative case while respondent was represented by her own private
counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent
"guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of
the national library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in
general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.
On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or on 1
October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors found on
the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate
to take under the circumstances."[2] Her petition was, however, denied.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated
September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23 October
1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of
the warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the request for the production of
the Investigation Committee Report was final.[3] As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal
the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she
instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary
Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and
that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received
a copy of the said report.[4]
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action,
but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its assailed Decision of 24
November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Glorias
petition for lack of merit holding that -
FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing
the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity x x x x
SECOND. Even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded,
the petition at hand, nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion to
dismiss is an option available to the respondent judge. Such order is
interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the aggrieved
party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the objection(s) raised
by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in case of
adverse decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January
1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the trial courts
order denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for reconsideration would
practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually decided the case, and that there
is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of the Report of the DECS
Investigation Committee so that the petition for mandamus has no leg to stand on hence
should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action.
26
Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is interlocutory
in nature as it did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner still has a residual
remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive rights have not been violated as she
contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy of mandamus to protect her rights;
and, that petitioner has not shown any law, DECS order or regulation prohibiting the release
of the petitioned documents for reasons of confidentiality or national security.
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily
requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor -
After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or
order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor (underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to
dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise
on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements
prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and
the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without
stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied. We are reproducing
hereunder for reference the assailed Order -
This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Gloria on 14 March
1997 to which petitioner filed their (sic) opposition on April 8, 1997.
Respondent premised his motion on the following grounds: (a) Mandamus
does not lie to compel respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report of
the DECS Investigating Committee because the Petition does not state a
cause of action; (b) The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is legal and
valid, and therefore, the writ of preliminary injunction cannot be granted to
enjoin its execution; while petitioner alleged among others that she has no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts to
be performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. While the
discretion of a Constitutional Commission cannot be controlled by mandamus
x x x x the court can decide whether the duty is discretionary or ministerial x
xxx
Generally, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or
discretion, and finding of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or
official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be
disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there
is capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an
evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or
to act at all in contemplation of law x x x x
WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by herein
respondent is hereby denied for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to file its
(sic) responsive pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
Copy furnished petitioner who is likewise given ten (10) days to submit his
(sic) comment or opposition.
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein
on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e.,
lack of cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The order only confused
petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the proper subject of her
motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein
clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full
understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its
order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher
courts on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was
not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner
strict compliance with the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration,
has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this
rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order
of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the
Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved
party may assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari.[5]
27
On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of
discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie
to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must
be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must
nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not
his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. [6]
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a
clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty
of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not
entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution
dismissing her from the service.[7] By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS
resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now
to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held
in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of
the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and
the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what
action would be appropriate to take under the circumstances,"[9] hardly merits consideration.
It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication
between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally
intended for the perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter, except the DECS
Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2 October 1996 -
Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS
Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x x
[t]he report is an internal communication between the Investigating
Committee and the DECS Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the
latter had already read and used the same in making his own determination
of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision
he may make.
The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part - -
although not controlling - - of the basis for the decision. Only when the party
adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the
Civil Service Commission may all the records of the case, including the
aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the
respondents counsel may be allowed to read and/or be given a copy of the
Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive appellants
Brief Memorandum.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon
which respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the
investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to
pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the
investigation report.
In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is not a
mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity
for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not
entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her
from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to
furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24
November 1997 sustaining the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as well as
its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the court a quo to compel
petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report is DISMISSED
for want of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
28
21) Camara vs. Mun. Court, 387 US 523
Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco
No. 92
Argued February 15, 1967
Decided June 5, 1967
387 U.S. 523
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Syllabus
Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing, after
three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a warrantless
inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential use of which allegedly
violated the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection ordinance
unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections, appellant while awaiting trial,
sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of prohibition, which the court denied. Relying
on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and similar cases, the District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State Supreme Court
denied a petition for hearing.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. Frank v. Maryland,
supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 528-534.
(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States
through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials. P. 387 U. S. 528.
(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of private
property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.
(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment interests are
not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs are
involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of physical conditions not complying
with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal process, as is
refusal to allow an inspection. Pp. 387 U. S. 529-531.
(d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds that they make
minimal demands on occupants;
Page 387 U. S. 524
that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function
under reasonable search warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S. 531-533.
2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code
enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling
violates the code, but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of
conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of
such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced.
Pp. 387 U. S. 534-539.
3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should normally be sought
only after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.
4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the inspectors
obtain a search warrant. P. 387 U. S. 540.
237 Cal.App.2d 128, 46 Cal.Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded.
Page 387 U. S. 525
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, this Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, a state court
conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector to enter and
inspect his premises without a search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, a similar
conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since those closely divided decisions,
more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain and eliminate urban blight have
led to increasing use of such inspection techniques, while numerous decisions of this Court
have more fully defined the Fourth Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23. In view of the growing
nationwide importance of the problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this case and in See
v. City of Seattle, post, p. 387 U. S. 541, to reexamine whether administrative inspection
29
programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those
rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U.S. 808.
Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial
on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a
warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the
criminal court because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its
face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the
Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had
considered by the California courts the federal constitutional questions he now presents to
this Court.
Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition proceeding, we shall set forth
the parties' factual allegations. On November 6, 1963, an inspector
Page 387 U. S. 526
of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health
entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of
the city's Housing Code. [Footnote 1] The building's manager informed the inspector that
appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal
residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the
ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection
of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a
search warrant.
The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again refused
to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear at the district
attorney's office. When appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment
on November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law to permit an
inspection under § 503 of the Housing Code:
"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City departments or
City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon
presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building,
structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal
Code. "
Page 387 U. S. 527
Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search
warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful
inspection in violation of § 507 of the Code. [Footnote 2] Appellant was arrested on
December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied,
appellant filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.
Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that § 503 is contrary to the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling
without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the
Housing Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted
under § 507 for refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by § 503.
Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price,and decisions in other States, [Footnote 3] the
District
Page 387 U. S. 528
Court of Appeal held that § 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it
"is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil, rather than criminal in nature,
inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not
be exercised under unreasonable conditions."
Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless
inspections, must be overruled, we reverse.
I
The Fourth Amendment provides that,
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of
the people which "is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 338 U. S. 27. As
such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,374 U. S. 30.
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which
has for many years divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle,
justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in
certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent
30
Page 387 U. S. 529
is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e.g., Stoner
v. California, 376 U. S. 483; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48; McDonald v. United
States, 335 U. S. 451; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20. As the Court explained
in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 333 U. S. 14:
"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern not only to the
individual, but to a society, which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent."
In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a
suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can arguably be distinguished from this case on
its facts, [Footnote 4] the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an
additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District Court of Appeal so interpreted Frank in
this case, and that ruling is the core of appellant's challenge here. We proceed to a
reexamination of the factors which
Page 387 U. S. 530
persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches.
To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs
"touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection against official intrusion,"
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367, because the inspections are merely to determine whether physical
conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory
ordinances. Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a
search for "evidence of criminal action" which may be used to secure the owner's criminal
conviction, historic interests of "self-protection" jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments [Footnote 5] are said not to be involved, but only the less intense "right to be
secure from intrusion into personal privacy." Id. at 359 U. S. 365.
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less
hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime. For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases
which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment
interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely "peripheral." It is surely anomalous to
say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. [Footnote 6] For instance, even
the most law-abiding citizen
Page 387 U. S. 531
has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home
may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of
official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And even
accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here considering
do, in fact, jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the property owner. Like most regulatory
laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities,
discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a criminal complaint. [Footnote 7] Even in
cities where discovery of a violation produces only an administrative compliance order,
[Footnote 8] refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is verified by a
second inspection, again without a warrant. [Footnote 9] Finally, as this case demonstrates,
refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.
The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other justifications for permitting
administrative health and safety inspections without a warrant. First, it is argued that these
inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant."
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367. The ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with
safeguards, and at any rate the inspector's particular decision to enter must comply with the
constitutional standard of reasonableness even if he may enter without a warrant. [Footnote
10] In addition, the argument
Page 387 U. S. 532
proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in this field. The decision to
inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative or administrative assessment of
broad factors such as the area's age and condition. Unless the magistrate is to review such
policy matters, he must issue a "rubber stamp" warrant which provides no protection at all to
the property owner.
In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant machinery
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when the inspector
demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal
code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting
under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral
magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet
only by refusing entry and risking a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge
the inspector's decision to search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to
take this risk, as appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason for the
31
inspection than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical
effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the
field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to
Page 387 U. S. 533
search. See cases cited p. 387 U. S. 529 supra. We simply cannot say that the protections
provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards
are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be
invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.
The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is that the public
interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the health and safety of entire urban
populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation
standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine
systematized inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying any reasonableness
standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that the public interest
demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But we think this argument
misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage, at least, whether these inspections may
be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. For example, to say that
gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of the police without a warrant is not
necessarily to say that gambling raids may never be made. In assessing whether the public
interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in
question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn
depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384
U. S. 770-771. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection
programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant
requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive.
Page 387 U. S. 534
In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches, when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which
the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v.
Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to
justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Because of the
nature of the municipal programs under consideration, however, these conclusions must be
the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique
character of these inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to reject that
disposition does not justify ignoring the question whether some other accommodation
between public need and individual rights is essential.
II
The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause."
Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases, appellant argues not only that code
enforcement inspection programs must be circumscribed by a warrant procedure, but also
that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that
a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code
being enforced. We disagree.
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained,
"probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the
constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply this standard, it is obviously necessary
first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon
the constitutionally protected
Page 387 U. S. 535
interests of the private citizen. For example, in a criminal investigation, the police may
undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would
hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that these goods
might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with a warrant, is "reasonable"
only when there is "probable cause" to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular
dwelling.
Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at issue here
are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private
property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional
development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. Because fires
and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly conditions adversely affect
the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous courts have upheld the police
power of municipalities to impose and enforce such minimum standards even upon existing
structures. [Footnote 11] In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable -- and
thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection --
the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code
enforcement.
There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through routine periodic
Page 387 U. S. 536
inspections of all structures. [Footnote 12] It is here that the probable cause debate is
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on its
32
appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each
particular building. Appellee contends that, if the probable cause standard urged by appellant
is adopted, the area inspection will be eliminated as a means of seeking compliance with
code standards, and the reasonable goals of code enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.
In meeting this contention, appellant argues, first, that his probable cause standard would not
jeopardize area inspection programs because only a minute portion of the population will
refuse to consent to such inspections, and second, that individual privacy, in any event,
should be given preference to the public interest in conducting such inspections. The first
argument, even if true, is irrelevant to the question whether the area inspection is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The second argument is, in effect, an assertion
that the area inspection is an unreasonable search. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test
for determining reasonableness
Page 387 U. S. 537
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But
we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area
code enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367-371. Second, the public
interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that
any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions --
faulty wiring is an obvious example -- are not observable from outside the building, and
indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime,
they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. Both the majority and
the dissent in Frank emphatically supported this conclusion:
"Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places, either
as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of
indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be
greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of
evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen
this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials, and these inspections are
apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few. Certainly the nature of our society has
not vitiated the need for inspections first thought necessary 158 years ago, nor has
experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in meeting this need by means that
history and dominant public opinion have sanctioned."
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 372.
Page 387 U. S. 538
". . . This is not to suggest that a health official need show the same kind of proof to a
magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the fruits or
instrumentalities of crime. Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts
that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different
from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been
undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities
without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the
public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself
be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable
cause' required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that
is being sought. 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 383 (MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting)."
Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of private property within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant
to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will
vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire
area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the
particular dwelling. It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the
standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a "synthetic search warrant," and
thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359
Page 387 U. S. 539
U.S. at 359 U. S. 373. But we do not agree. The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee
that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest.
But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf.
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186. Such an approach neither endangers
time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the
probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing
public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose
behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of
privacy. See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 273-274 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN).
III
Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say
today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has
traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.
S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S.
380 (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (summary
33
destruction of tubercular cattle). On the other hand, in the case of most routine area
inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular
day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a
practical matter, and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify
the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only
after entry is refused unless

Page 387 U. S. 540

there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any
change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of authorizing
entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.

IV

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing
inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding
immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to
obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained, and thus appellant was
unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the
inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through
the building's manager, but appellee does not contend that such consent was sufficient to
authorize inspection of appellant's premises. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U. S.
483; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451.
Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant
had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that
appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It
appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that, under these circumstances, a
writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.

The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

34
22) Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest
and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza,
Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia
Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay
narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and
ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang
pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya
ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan
ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa
Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako
ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and
PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to
whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE
FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM
RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER
PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO.
1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article
34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code.
35
 This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal
prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.
Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty.
Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a
team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so,
the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of
the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the
residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into
the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance
Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when
required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a
dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her
residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that
said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof.
Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing,
hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated
November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed
under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine
Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five
(5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence
of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the
seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client
were without her consent and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color
of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile
under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were
already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within
twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel
free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our
client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important
matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed
the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against
her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to
be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the
petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the
petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared
that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
36
 But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described
is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been
altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct
preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of
the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been
abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the
basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised
only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present
Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or
was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot
be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of
probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's
adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own
right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent,
Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment
by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to
Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised
recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the
power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in
illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave
the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the
arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-
seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment
and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the
Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister
shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment
activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in
its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is
valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving
foreign affairs. We have held: 11
37
 xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco
vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power
may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action
necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice
Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens
whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest,
"he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick,
38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued
presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu
Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of
NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the
one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article
34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing
laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null
and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in
this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/
recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like
used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM"
newspaper and any and all documents/communications,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and
other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of
the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the
"WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP
665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472
with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the
search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist
Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of
SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
38
 search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes
(the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be
seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter
in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and
the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving
commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy
the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the
voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and
no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,

whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return
all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

39
23) Catura vs. CIR, 37 SCRA 303
G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971
PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et
al., respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in this petition for the review of a
resolution of respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Specifically, it is whether respondent
Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor
organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, 1can require a labor
organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts,
vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be delivered and deposited with it at
the hearing to conduct such investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without
the officials of such labor organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before
us, being heard prior to the issuance of such order. The respondent Court, first acting through
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter en banc, upheld its power to do so. The
challenge to such competence sought to be fortified by the allegation of the absence of
procedural due process was rejected. After a careful study of the matter, we cannot say that
thereby respondents Court was in error. We have no reason to reverse.
As set forth in the brief for the petitioners, Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and
Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees
Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered, there was, on December 27,
1966, a complaint against them under Section 17 filed by the prosecution division of the
respondent Court, the principal complainants being now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as
well as other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire membership of such
labor organization. In the complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of
petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were responsible for
"unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various occasions during
the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial
transaction of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial
activities of the union open to inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on
their part to comply. It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor
organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting so that petitioners
could be confronted about the status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President,
cancelled such meeting.lâwphî1.ñèt There was thereafter a general membership resolution
reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the
union," but again there was no response, thus compelling the members to refer the matter to
the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of
accounts to petitioners without any success. After setting forth that complainants had
exhausted all remedies provided in the union's constitution and by-laws, which were all
unavailing, the complaint sought, after due hearing and judgement, to declare present
petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice under the above provision of the
Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease and desist from further committing such unfair labor
practice complained of, and to render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of
the union as well as to make the book of accounts and other records of these financial
activities open to inspection by the members.2
Thereafter, on December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members,
as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents Court, sought an injunction to
prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again elected as President in an
election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged
persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his
refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union. 3
Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which,
instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing "personally
the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to
this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union
funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union
at the hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Said
respondents are hereby required to comply strictly with this Order."4 There was a motion for
reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the
ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their
opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge Ansberto P.
Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on
February 28, 1967. Hence the present petition filed on April 3, 1967.
The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13, 1967 with a
preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners' posting a bond of P2,000.00. Respondents did
not take the trouble of filing an answer within the period expired on June 17, 1967 and
petitioners were required to submit their brief within thirty days under this Court's resolution of
July 14, 1967. Such a brief was duly filed on September 19 of that year. There was no brief
for respondents. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision on October 4, 1968.
In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable legal provisions and after a
careful consideration of the contention that such a power to issue the challenged order
cannot be deemed as possessed by respondent Court which moreover did not accord
petitioners procedural due process, we have reached the conclusion, as set forth at the
opening of this opinion, that petitioners cannot prevail. The order as issued first by Associate
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter by respondent Court en banc must be sustained.
1. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court concerning the
power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with internal labor
40
organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate
alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of the aforecited Section 17 of
the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports
from their officers and representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the
constitution and by-laws of the organization."5 ... "The funds of the organization shall not be
applied for any purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-
laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member." 6 ... "The
books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor
organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof."7
To repeat, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and
Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized disbursement of union funds as
well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and
to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by
the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of
respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate
the alleged violation so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. All that the challenged order
did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the labor organization, to
"deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass
books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the
hearing of the petition before it on January 3, 1967.
member of a labor organization. For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the
petition is, as above noted, beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first
hearing petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued. Moreover, since as was
shown in the very brief of petitioners, there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of
any hearing, even if on the assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such a
requirement, has no cured. So it was held by this Court in a recent decision. Thus: "As far
back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due
process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was
thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be heard on a
motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but
the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.' There is then no occasion
to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was heard on
a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the
Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision, what
'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or
justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount,' the conclusion being that the
hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process."8
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction issued
under the resolution of April 13, 1967 is dissolved and declared to be without any further
force or effect.

On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power
conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be
effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent
Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power
to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into
existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of
the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates
of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative
agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect
the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its
cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed
implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private
rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing
can be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order
herein challenged.

2. Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that there was a
denial of procedural due process. If the books and records sought to be delivered and
deposited in court for examination were the private property of petitioners, perhaps the
allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely lacking in plausibility. Such is
not the case however. The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such
books of accounts and other records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any

41
24) Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 69 SCRA 99
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON
REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of
Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY
SITUATED, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the
Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon
D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00,
let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private
respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents,
representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to
the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings
against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code,1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,
1966.2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft
and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion,
and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public
interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts
Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima
facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of
sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official
or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the
Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer
of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the
Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968
with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or
injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No.
73305 and assailed its legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00,
let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private
respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents,
representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to
the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings
against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for
reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials,
enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the
gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence.7 Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what
42
if anything should be done.8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make
investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a
legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling
for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for
actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the
authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in
judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to
all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h).
It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all
these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the
principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall
and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena
power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would
therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No.
4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued
under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to
require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecumor otherwise shall be
"subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents'
formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before
a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise
of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be
issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however,
that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the
Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent
court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and
qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the
restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable
or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is
shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of
a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order
be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending
charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation
cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed
to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if
not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does
not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may
not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but
can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by
statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is
probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the
demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon
sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in
possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative
investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan,
Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the
respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call
the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same
approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that
could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession.
Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not
facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the
fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with
the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a
basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
unwise. 30Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt
in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
43
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the
President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would
now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4,
as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy,
the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and
effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not
duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is
that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner
Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence
of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set
aside and declared of no force and effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

44
25) Office Court Admin. vs. Canque, 588 SCRA 226
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. P-04-1830
ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. 04-6-151-MCTC]
June 4, 2009
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The instant case stemmed from the Investigation Report of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)-Region VII on the entrapment operation on Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of
Court, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu.
The Investigation Report showed that on June 1, 2004, Marissa Y. Ypanto of Barangay Polo,
Alcantara, Cebu filed a letter-complaint before the NBI alleging that Canque asked from her
the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos in exchange for the release of the formers
common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the dismissal of his criminal cases in court. Patoc
was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9165 before the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves
of the said court.
The NBI operatives conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at about
9:30 A.M. in the sala of Judge Teves. They arrested Canque after she received the amount
of P40,000.00, previously marked with invisible ink and dusted with fluorescent powder, from
Ypanto in the presence of NBI Investigator Jedidah S. Hife. Canque was brought to the
Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI for laboratory examination. Forensic Chemist Rommel
D. Paglinawan, in his Physics Report,[1]found that the right and left hands of Canque were
positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
The NBI report further stated that prior to the entrapment, Patocs mother had already
given the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos to Canque in the presence of
Ypanto for the dismissal of Patocs first case for possession of shabu on November 30, 2003.
The case remains pending to date.
In a letter dated June 3, 2004, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Acting Regional
Director, NBI-Region VII, endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas the case of
Canque for immediate inquest. Thereafter, Informations for direct bribery and violation of Sec.
3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Barili, Cebu and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-1058 and CEB-BRL-1057,
respectively.
In November 2003, Auditors from Region VII, Cebu City, conducted the periodic audit
on the cash and accounts of accountable officers of the provinces of Cebu, Bohol and Negros
Oriental. After the audit of the cash and accounts of Canque, the Auditors found that she had
a cash shortage of P304,985.00. A letter of demand[2] was sent to her to produce the missing
funds and to submit a written explanation within seventy-two (72) hours why the shortage
occurred.
On August 3, 2004, the office of the Cluster Director, Commission on Audit, Quezon
City received the initial report on the result of the examination of the cash and accounts of
Canque.[3] Attached to said report were the chronological statements on the events that
transpired in the course of the audit submitted by Ma. Violeta Lucila T. Luta, State Auditor II,
Team Leader. On August 6, 2004, the Supervising Auditor forwarded to the Office of the
Chief Justice the initial report on the results of the investigation conducted on the cash and
accounts of Canque. The initial report stated that Canque had a shortage in her cash
collection amounting to P304,985.00 and recommended her immediate relief from her
position and any other position involving money or property accountability. [4]
In a Resolution dated June 29, 2004, the Court treated the NBI entrapment on
Canque as an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and directed her to comment
thereon. She was immediately placed under suspension until further orders by the Court. The
case was referred to a Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Comment,[5] Canque claimed that sometime in November 2003, Rebecca
Patoc came to her office to inquire about the bail for her son, Jovencio. When she learned
from the judge that the bail was P200,000.00, but that it could be reduced to P100,000.00 if
there was no objection from the Chief of Police, Rebecca came back two (2) days later with a
Motion for Reduction of Bail. After two weeks, Rebecca came with Ypanto. Canque instructed
them to proceed to a bonding company in Barili. She alleged that at Shamrock Restaurant,
Rebecca gave P20,000.00 as premium payment for the bail bond to a certain Ote Erojo, who
in turn delivered to Rebecca a copy of the Release Order, promising to send her the bond
undertaking by mail. On December 8, 2003, Jovencio and Ypanto brought the surety bond to
Canque at the latters office.
In May 2004, another case for drug pushing was filed against Jovencio. Canque
admits to seeing Ypanto only on two (2) occasions: during the preliminary investigation on
May 24 and on May 31 when Ypanto asked her when the ten-day period for the filing of
Jovencios Counter-Affidavit would expire.
Canque further averred that on June 3, 2004, the last day for the filing of the
Counter-Affidavit, Ypanto came with a woman who introduced herself as Jovencios sister
who had just arrived from Holland. The woman got an envelope from her bag and handed it
to Ypanto. Ypanto tried to give it to Canque, but the latter did not touch it when she saw that it
was not the Counter-Affidavit. The woman allegedly got the envelope from Ypanto and tried
to place it at the back of the palm of Canque where it lightly touched her skin. The woman
then showed her ID and told Canque that she was an NBI agent. Other NBI agents rushed in
and arrested Canque.
In a Resolution dated November 9, 2004, the Court, upon the recommendation of the
OCA, reassigned the case to the Executive Judge, RTC, Cebu City for investigation, report
and recommendation, considering that all the persons concerned were residents
of Cebu City.
Executive Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. conducted a hearing on October 18, 2005,
attended by Canque, NBI agents Gregorio Algoso, Jr., Reynaldo Villordon and Jedidah Hife.
The notice sent to Ypanto was returned with the information that she had died.
The Investigation Report[6] states, viz.:
45
 Jedidah S. Hife, a special investigator of the National Bureau of
Investigation Central Visayas Regional Office, identified her Affidavit, dated
June 3, 2004.
In that Affidavit, Hife declared that on June 3, 2004, at about 9 oclock
in the morning of June 3, 2004, at the office of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, she and other NBI agents
arrested Sylvia Canque in an entrapment operation.
She had been instructed to accompany Marissa Ypanto, pretending
to be her friend, and to give a pre-arranged signal to other NBI agents at the
proper time.
Thus, she and Marissa Ypanto had entered a room inside the
courtroom, and there Marissa introduced her to Sylvia Canque as her friend.
Marissa had brought with her marked money in the amount of P40,000.00,
for which Sylvia had asked from her in exchange for the dismissal of a case
for violation of RA 9165 against Jovencio Patoc, and eventually the release
of the latter.
Sylvia Canque and Marissa went outside. Hife followed and
overheard Sylvia tell Marissa that the money was for the fiscal. Sylvia
showed them a Joint Affidavit executed by PO1 Jeremias Geromo and PO3
Estanislao Avenido, the police officers who had arrested Jovencio.
They returned inside the courtroom. Sylvia Canque asked Marissa
how much money she had. Marissa said that she was carrying P50,000.00,
and gave the envelope to Canque, who wrote P50,000.00 on it. The latter put
the envelope inside her bag, and got it out, and put it in again she seemed
undecided, and then she again asked Marissa how much the envelope
contained. Marissa suggested that she count the money.
While Sylvia was counting the money, Hife gave the pre-arranged
signal. NBI agents Reynaldo Villordon and Michael Angelo Abarico entered
the courtroom followed by other agents, accosted Sylvia Canque and
recovered from her the marked money amounting to P40,000.00. Thereupon,
they put Canque under arrest and informed her of her Constitutional rights.
At the NBI office, laboratory examination found Sylvia Canque
positive for fluorescent powder. She was then booked and fingerprinted.
NBI agents Gregorio Y. Algoso, Jr. and Reynaldo C. Villordon
identified and confirmed the allegations in the Joint Affidavit which they
executed on June 3, 2004.
On June 1, 2004, their office received a letter from a Jonald Ungab,
concerning a certain Marissa Ypanto of Brgy. Polo, Alcantara, Cebu, who
had complained about Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court of the 12 th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-Basian-Alcantara-Alegria, who had asked from
her the amount of P40,000.00 in exchange for the release of her common-
law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the dismissal of the case filed against him,
which was then being heard in the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves.
In accordance with their plan to entrap Sylvia Canque, Jedidah
accompanied Marissa Ypanto, who introduced Jedidah to Sylvia Canque as
a friend. Marked money prepared by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the
NBI, consisting of six five-hundred-peso bills, in the total amount
of P40,000.00, had been given to Ypanto, who was to hand it to Sylvia
Canque. When the transaction was done, and Jedidah had given the pre-
arranged signal indicating that the money had been received by Sylvia
Canque, they immediately went inside the office of Sylvia Canque,
introduced themselves and arrested her. They brought Sylvia Canque to the
NBI office to be examined for the presence of fluorescent powder on her
hands, booked, photographed and fingerprinted.
Villordon added that, being just nearby, he saw Marissa give the
money to Sylvia Canque, who counted it. At this point, Jedidah gave the pre-
arranged signal, and the agents went inside. His co-agent Michael Albarico
announced that they were NBI agents. All of which took Sylvia Canque by
surprise.
Physics Report No. 04-P-3306, dated June 3, 2004, of the Forensic
Chemistry Section of the National Bureau of Investigation states that the
examination conducted on June 3, 2004, at 12:30 p.m. revealed that the left
and right hands of Sylvia Canque bore the presence of yellow fluorescent
powder.
For her part, Sylvia Canque identified and confirmed the allegations
she made in her Comment, dated July 21, 2004, adding nothing to the same.
Still and all, Canque insisted that it was Jedidah who put the
envelope on her forearm, and that she did not count the money inside it. In
fact, it was NBI Director Esmeralda who counted the money in his office.
Until then the envelope was unopened. She denied having
written P50,000.00 on the envelope.
Findings
Canque admitted that an entrapment operation was conducted on
her. Laboratory tests found her hands positive for the presence of fluorescent
powder. But Canque denied touching the money herself, claiming that it was
Jedidah Hife who put the envelope on the back of her palm. But if the
envelope were (sic) just put on her forearm, and what was dusted with
46
 fluorescent powder was the money, which was inside the envelope, why
were Canques hands found positive for the presence of the powder?
The undersigned gives credence to the testimony of the NBI agents,
which was coherent, and given in a forthright manner. No ulterior motive to
lie could be ascribed to the agents. Thus, the undersigned finds the facts to
be as narrated by the agents.[7]
The Investigating Judge found respondent Canque guilty of grave misconduct and
recommended the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of all her benefits and disqualification
from re-employment in the government service.
In a Resolution dated February 7, 2006, the Court referred the Investigation Report to
the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Report dated June 13, 2006, the OCA recommended that the Investigation
Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and the complaint be investigated anew
upon finding that Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel
during the investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right to due process; and
for the Audit Report of Shortage in the amount of P304,985.00 and other actuations and
deficiencies of respondent Canque to be set in the next En Banc Agenda.
On September 5, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a
Comment, within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice, on the Audit Report of the
COA finding a shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00. Respondent failed
to comment. Thus, in an En Banc Resolution dated December 4, 2007, the Court considered
respondent to have waived her right to file Comment and referred, for the second time, the
matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a Memorandum dated July 23, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator found
Canque liable for gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave misconduct and
recommended her dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any government office
or instrumentality, including government-owned and controlled corporations. It further
recommended that she be ordered to restitute the amount of P304,985.00 representing the
shortage in the collection of court funds.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule
of action more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or
employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice. [8] It
manifests itself in corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rules.[9] It is considered as a grave offense under the Civil Service Law[10] with the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in
government service.
In the case at bar, respondent violated Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel which states that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or
benefit on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift shall influence their official
actions. This is sufficiently established by the evidence on record. First, respondent was
caught red-handed, in a legitimate entrapment operation, demanding and receiving money
from complainant Ypanto in connection with the immediate release of the latters common-law
husband Jovencio from police custody; and the dismissal of the criminal charges against him
which were pending before the MCTC, Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu her official
station. While respondent was in the act of counting the marked money, she was validly
placed under arrest and apprised of her constitutional rights. Second, her hands were found
to have smudges of the yellow fluorescent powder used to mark the bills when her hands
were subjected to ultraviolet light examination. These results of the entrapment operation
clearly establish the guilt of respondent who has merely denied, without support, the
allegations against her.
This is not all.
Respondent likewise failed to observe the standard of behavior required of clerks of
court as the chief administrative officers of their respective courts as shown by the initial audit
report of the COA finding her remiss in the performance of her administrative duties as clerk
of court. These infractions consist of her failure to update the court cashbook, as well as her
failure to explain the missing collection records[11] for the Fiduciary Fund (FF) and the
shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00. These acts of respondent are in
violation of her duties and responsibilities as clerk of court in the collection and custody of
legal funds and fees. Clerks of court are responsible for court records and physical facilities
of their respective courts and are accountable for the courts money and property deposits
under Section B, Chapter 1 of the 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court and the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court, viz.:
The Clerk of Court has general administrative supervision over all the
personnel of the Court. As regards the Courts funds and revenues, records,
properties and premises, said officer is the custodian. Thus, the Clerk of
Court is generally also the treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant
manager thereof.
Thus, as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, clerks
of court are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of the same.
The cited acts of respondent clearly show her failure to discharge her functions as
clerk of court constituting gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Each offense is punishable with dismissal even for the first time of commission under Section
22 (a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
47
 We have held time and again that the Court will not hesitate to impose the stiffest
penalty on those who atrociously display serious lack of integrity, uprightness and honesty
demanded of an employee in the judiciary. Neither shall we tolerate or condone any conduct
that would violate the norms of public accountability and diminish, or even tend to diminish,
the faith of the people in the justice system,[12] as in the case at bar.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court
Administrator in its first Report dated June 13, 2006 recommending that the Investigation
Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and that the complaint be investigated
anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel during
the investigation an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due process. The
essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. [13] A formal or
trial-type hearing is not required.

In the case at bar, despite respondents protestations, the records readily show that
she was afforded the opportunity to present her side as she was directed to file her comment
on the complaint. She was notified of the hearing and was in fact present during the entire
proceedings. As to the issue on the legality of her arrest, respondent has failed to submit
evidence in support of her bare claims.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court, 12th MCTC,
Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT,
GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and GROSS DISHONESTY. She is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions. She is further ordered
to RETURN to the Court the amount of P304,985.00 to cover the shortage in the collection of
court funds. In case of her failure to restitute the said amount, in full or in part, the Employees
Leave Division of the Office of Administrative ServicesOCA is directed to compute the
balance of respondents accrued leave credits and forward such computation to the Finance
Division of the Fiscal Management OfficeOCA for the determination of its monetary value.
The said amount plus other benefits that respondent may be entitled to shall be applied to the
above shortage incurred.
SO ORDERED.

48
26) Carmelo vs. Ramos, 116 Phil. 1152
G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962
IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of
Manila, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to
investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License
Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division
of this Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said
committee.
It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on June 3, 8,
9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an administrative case against
Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to
appear.
Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative
proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare
Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show
a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no
law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand
that witnesses testify under oath. It also held that to compel Ramos to testify would be to
violate his right against self-incrimination.
It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos
admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him by the
owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact
had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City
Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The
trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case
against certain employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give
testimony that could be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of
Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court.
The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which
petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their
punishment in case of refusal.
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior
courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or
bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly
defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza; People v. Dizon, 49 O. G. No. 2, 541.)
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. — When authority to take testimony or
evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person,
committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right
to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the
production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of
a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who,
without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of
the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising
the power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce
documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to
discipline as in case of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or
body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first instance
having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take
testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile
witnesses. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.)
Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner's committee have from which the power
to cite witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section 580?
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee
about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate
anomalies involving certain city employees.
Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to investigate city officials
and employees appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested in him to
suspend and remove such officials of employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be
justly and fairly exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held so in the case
49
of Pagkanlungan v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p. 4332. But We do not agree with the
petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the
power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the
compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in denying this power to an investigating body in the
Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra: "Were do not think
the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the powers to administer oaths, to take
testimony, and to issue subpoenas."

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code
are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the
government.

Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation committee to
issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses undoubtedly exists since
only complimentary to the power of the mayor to investigate, suspend and remove city
officers and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the statute grants a right, it
also confers by implication every particular power necessary for the exercise thereof." There
is no merit in the argument. In the first place, the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of
power to a body. Here, We have seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's
committee may only be traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his
power to suspend or remove certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of power to
investigate to petitioner's committee.

In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the
appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor can not
delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner. (Francia v. Pecson, et
al., supra.)

Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule invoked by the
petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and property of persons are sought to be
brought within the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because
necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to
be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of Armando Ramos is involved in the claim of the
committee to the right to cite witnesses.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear
before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion makes it
unnecessary for Us to pass upon the other error assigned by petitioner as having been
allegedly committed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

50
27) Masangcay vs. Comelec, 6 SCRA 27
G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the
Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial
numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities
of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its
resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution date March 5,
1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the presence of the division superintendent of
schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid
resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64
of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by
the Commission in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of
the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to appear and
show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the
aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by both the prosecution and
the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding
Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to
suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of
two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other
respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality
of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well
as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that
the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish
for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of
powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government. In
other words, it is contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt
charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to
impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. There is merit in
the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary
penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to stress in
the case of Guevara v. The Commission on Elections 1 that under the law and the
constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and administer all
laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy
that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision law come
under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty
which inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of
the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view
that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to
punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly
gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not
exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to
punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in
nature. As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates courts,
and, consequently, in the administration of justice (Slade Perkins v. Director of
Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In
Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.).
Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective
the power to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been
held invalid (Langenberg v. Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v.
Hacney, 58 SW., 810).1awphîl.nèt
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose
violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the
exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to
be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one
designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of election supplies in that
province, was charged with having opened three boxes containing official ballots for
distribution among several municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission
which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division
superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and
distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions.
And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was
sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in
punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.
51
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the question of
constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised
Election Code which confers upon the Commission on Elections the power to punish for
contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay is

concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, insofar
as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

52
28) Bedol vs. Comelec, 606 SCRA 554
G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009
LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case entitled "In the Matter of the
Charge of Contempt of the Commission Against Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol." The first
Resolution1 dated August 7, 2007, held petitioner guilty of contempt of the COMELEC and
meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment and a fine of ₱1,000.00. The
second Resolution2 dated August 31, 2007, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts as stated by the COMELEC follow:
On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held under the auspices of this
Commission.
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao, the
respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC’s
performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the
twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and gargantuan
duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election
Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial
certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections
Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain ‘observations’ on the
provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in
abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of
elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to
appear despite prior knowledge.
On June 4, 2007, Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of the Records and
Statistics Division of the COMELEC issued a certification that as of even date, the
canvassing documents for all municipalities of the province of Maguindanao in connection
with the May 14, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Provincial Election Supervisor of
said province nor the respective Board of Canvassers.
The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory powers to
determine existing controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao, headed by
Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on
the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from the city and municipalities in
Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] appeared before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding
activity and responded to the queries from the chair. It was during this hearing that
respondent [petitioner] Bedol explained that, while in his custody and possession, the election
paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the
elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and
no written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.1avvphi1
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled
investigative proceedings set for June 14, 2007 as the Task Force wanted to delve deeper
into the alleged loss by propounding additional questions to Atty. Bedol during the next
scheduled proceedings, such as why he still had in his possession said documents which
should have already been turned over to the Commission, why he did not report to the
COMELEC or to the police authorities the purported theft, and other pertinent questions.
However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol failed to appear, giving the
impression that respondent [petitioner] Bedol does not give importance to this whole exercise
and ignores the negative impact his attitude has on this Commission.
Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a written explanation of his
absences which he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007, but was only received by this
Commission belatedly on July 03, 2007.
On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national newspapers, in an exclusive interview
with the ‘Inquirer’ and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to his side, and in
clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that ‘those that are saying
that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day. They
should file a case now and I will answer their accusations.’(Words in brackets ours)
53
On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao head, Commissioner
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order3 against petitioner
citing various violations of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, viz:
You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this Commission for having committed during
the period between May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007, acts in violation of specific paragraphs
of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows:
1. (a) Your (PES Bedol’s) failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he (sic) is (sic) the
Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007; (b) your failure to attend the reset
schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when you
attended the previously scheduled but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on May
25, 2007; (c) your failure to attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force
Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to him in open session in the hearing
held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to you of a subpoena which you duly
signed on the same date; and your failure/refusal to submit your written explanation
of your said absences which you undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 – all of these
failures on your part are violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. Your unlawful assumption of custody in your office in Maguinadanao of the
municipal certificates of canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents
of all the municipalities of Maguinadanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which
should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office in
Intramuros, Manila, and your admission that said accountable documents were lost
from your said custody – these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d),
section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
3. Your pronouncements in the media flaunting [disrespect to] the authority of the
COMELEC over you, challenging the institution to file a case against you in court as it
is only in court that you are ready to face your accuser are violations of paragraphs
(a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
4. Your regaling the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers
and radios) with your boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side
arms, displaying in public for all to see in your front-page colored portrait in a national
broadsheet and during a television interview a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at your
waist in a ‘combative mode (sic)’ – these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and
(d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. (Words in brackets ours)
Through the foregoing June 27, 2007 Order, petitioner was directed to appear before the
COMELEC En Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning to personally explain why
he should not be held in contempt for the above-mentioned offenses.
On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the
basis of an Order of Arrest4 issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner
repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force
Maguindanao.
During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing
the warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Upon
petitioner’s motion, he was granted a period of ten (10) days within which to file the
necessary pleading adducing his arguments and supporting authorities. The continuation of
the hearing was set on July 17, 2007.
On July 17, 2007, which was beyond the ten-day period he requested, petitioner submitted
an Explanation Ad Cautelam with Urgent Manifestation, containing the following averments:
1. Respondent [petitioner] urgently manifests that he is making a special appearance
as he assails the jurisdiction of the Honorable Commission and its capacity to
prosecute the present case in an impartial and fair manner.
2. Respondent [petitioner] questions the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him.
He can not be validly arrested or re-arrested as a witness who is being compelled to
testify in a hearing before the Honorable Commission.
3. Respondent [petitioner] has not committed any contemptuous acts against the
Commission. He has not committed those acts charged against him by the
Commission motu proprio. (Words in brackets ours.)
During the hearing on July 17, 2007, petitioner reiterated his objection to the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the absence of a complaint lodged with the
COMELEC by any private party. Petitioner’s objection was treated as a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, which was denied forthwith by the COMELEC. Petitioner was then
required to present evidence which he refused to do. Various exhibits were then marked and
presented to the COMELEC. However, the latter allowed petitioner to file a Memorandum
within a period of ten (10) days and gave him the opportunity to attach thereto his
documentary and other evidence.
On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his Memorandum 5 maintaining his objection
to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on ground that the
COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators,
was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner argued that
the COMELEC, in that capacity, could not punish him for contempt.
On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed Resolution, the
dispositive part of which reads:
54
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, respondent Atty. Lintang Bedol is hereby found
guilty of Contempt of the Commission for the following acts and omissions:
1. (a) The failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor
on May 22, 2007 (b) failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing on May
30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when Respondent Bedol attended the
previously scheduled but again reset canvassing on May 25, 2007 (c) failure to
attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007,
despite notice to Respondent in open session in the hearing held on June 11, 2007,
and personal service to him of the subpoena which he duly signed on the same date;
the failure/refusal to submit written explanation of respondent’s absences which he
undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 --- all of these failures are violations of
paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The unlawful assumption of custody in the Respondent’s office in Maguindanao of
the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election
documents of all the municipalities of Maguindanao used in the last elections of
2007, but which should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its
main office in Intramuros, Manila, and Respondent’s plain admission that said
accountable documents were lost from his said custody --- these constitute violations
of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.lavvphil
3. The respondent’s pronouncements in media flaunting disrespect to the authority of
the COMELEC over him, challenging the institution to file a case against him in court
as it is supposedly only in court that Respondent Bedol was ready to face his accuser
are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
4. Regaling the public through the media (interviews in national television channels,
newspapers and radios) with boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and
side arms, displaying in public, for all to see in his front-page colored portrait in a
national broadsheet and during a television interview, a shiny pistol tucked in a
holster at your waist in a ‘combative mode’ (sic) --- these are clear violations of
paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
All the foregoing constitute an exhibition of contumacious acts showing disrespect for the
institution, of which respondent is even a ranking official, which is clearly contemptuous of
this Commission, for which Respondent Lintang Bedol is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00).
The Legal Department of the Comelec is hereby directed to investigate and determine
whether or not any election offense or crime under the Revised Penal Code has been
committed by respondent Lintang Bedol and to initiate the filing of the necessary charge/s
therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC
in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari raising the following
issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO
INITIATE OR PROSECUTE THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSSION HAS ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ASSUMING
IT HAS JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
We dismiss the petition.
The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in
initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its
quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while exercising
its quasi-judicial functions.
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit
provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
55
The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to give effect to the COMELEC’s
constitutional mandate as enunciated in Loong v. Commission on Elections, 6 which held:
xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision
is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this
Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the
conduct of our elections.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code.7
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,8 described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of
specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial
power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. [Emphasis ours.]
The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud and
irregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province of Maguindanao and the non-
transmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said province.
Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe into the veracity of the
alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election
offense had possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a purely
ministerial or administrative function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial
power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the
attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue
and support their respective positions.
The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution
hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the
hearings or proceedings. As enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno9 –
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse
to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend,
would render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to
its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case,
the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to
appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election
documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend
the Task Force hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that
time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the
powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-
judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted
to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.10 When the results of the
elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various
candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the
COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the
issue of whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not.
When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the
bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.
56
In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista,11 the Court held:
xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in
a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the
exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with
that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt
charges against petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
pertinently provides:
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.
xxx
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therin. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or
ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt thereof. [Emphasis ours.]
The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELEC’s Rules of
Procedure, Section 2 of which states:
Rule 29 – Contempt
Sec. 1. xxx
Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. – After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission or
Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of
the Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order granted by it;
(c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the
Commission or any of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this
Rules;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.
SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. – If adjudged guilty, the accused may be punished by a
fine not exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment for not more than six (6)
months, or both, at the discretion of the Commission or Division.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad
enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu
proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus
Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.
Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC,
viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated
motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein,
and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in
the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceedings
which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt Charge and Show
Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed by a private party.
We turn now to petitioner’s claim that the COMELEC pre-judged the case against him, and
that its findings were not supported by evidence. His claim deserves scant consideration.
The fact that the indirect contempt charges against petitioner were initiated motu proprio by
the COMELEC did not by itself prove that it had already prejudged the case against him. As
borne out by the records, the COMELEC gave petitioner several opportunities to explain his
side and to present evidence to defend himself. All of petitioner’s belatedly filed pleadings
were admitted and taken into consideration before the COMELEC issued the assailed
Resolution finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.
57
 The COMELEC complied with the aforementioned Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
and with the requirements set by Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, when it
issued the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order against petitioner directing him to
appear before it and explain why he should not be held in contempt.
Petitioner claims that the challenged Resolution finding him guilty of indirect contempt was
based merely on hearsay, surmises, speculations and conjectures, and not on competent
and substantial evidence. He contends that there is no convincing evidence that he
deliberately refused to heed the summonses of the COMELEC or that he was sufficiently
notified of the investigative hearings. He further argues that the loss of the election
documents should not even be automatically ascribed to him.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds. First, he repeatedly failed to
attend, despite notice of the scheduled12 canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass,
the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his explanation for such
absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of
Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official responsibility to be
present during the scheduled hearing to shed light on the allegedly stolen election documents
but he failed to do so without offering any valid justification for his non-appearance.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were lost
while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of
paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election documents were
lost while in his custody. Petitioner himself admitted during the hearing held on June 11, 2007
that the documents were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007. Apart from the said loss of the
vital election documents, his liability stemmed from the fact that he illegally retained custody
and possession of said documents more than two weeks after the elections. The COMELEC
viewed such act as a contemptuous interference with its normal functions.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC through
the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by
flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of
a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a)
and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a firearm tucked
to his side and his supposed exclusive interview. He claims that said newspaper clippings are
mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary value.
True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay, when
such articles are offered to prove their contents without any other competent and credible
evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al., 13 the Court held that
not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the hearsay rule
have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of "relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity."14 When certain facts are within judicial notice of the Court,
newspaper accounts "only buttressed these facts as facts."15
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity
thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible
as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.16
Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately defied or
challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the
challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007, it was not the mere content of the articles that was
in issue, but petitioner’s conduct when he allowed himself to be interviewed in the manner
and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on a pending controversy
which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he
denied neither the said interview nor his picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm
holstered at his side but simply relied on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper
clippings. It should be stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent. He was
under the administrative supervision of the COMELEC 17 and it was incumbent upon him to
demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his duties as dictated by law.
His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as well as his reliance on technicalities
to justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of fraud or anomalies and newspaper
publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order amounted to an
implied admission of the charges leveled against him.
All told, petitioner brought this predicament upon himself when he opted to dispense with the
presentation of his evidence during the scheduled hearings and to explain his non-
appearance at the hearings of Task Force Maguindanao and the loss of the certificates of
canvass and other election documents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
58
29) Gaoiran vs. Alcala, 444 SCRA 428
[G.R. No. 150178. November 26, 2004]
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, Retired Chairman,
Commission on Higher Education, ESTER ALBANO GARCIA, now Chairman,
Commission on Higher Education, FELIPE S. AMMUGAUAN, SR., Vocation
School Superintendent I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, EDMOND M.
CASTILLEJO, Administrative Officer I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, and
DIOSDADO TELAN, Instructor I & Head Teacher III, OIC Designate, Angadanan
Agro-Industrial College, Angadanan, Isabela, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Florian R. Gaoiran, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477. In the assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the
Decision dated February 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan, Isabela,
Branch 20, nullifying the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then
Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), dismissing petitioner Gaoiran
from the service for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED against petitioner
Gaoiran, Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College (AAIC),[2] a state-supervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. In his letter-complaint,
respondent Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of the same school, charged
the petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his duties therein. The incident
allegedly took place on August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside the school premises. Appended
to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal complaint filed by respondent Castillejo
against the petitioner and the sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for
assault to a person in authority was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-
San Guillermo and docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-42.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Thereafter,
Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs
Service, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling incident to determine the
existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner.
During the fact-finding investigation, respondent Castillejo averred that at 2:30 p.m. on
August 15, 1997, while he was performing his usual duties as Administrative Officer II, the
petitioner suddenly barged into his (Castillejos) office and, then and there, assaulted and
boxed him. The petitioner delivered blows on respondent Castillejos head, left eye, left
eyebrow and lower lip. Not content with the injuries he inflicted on respondent Castillejo, the
petitioner tried to throw him down the stairs but was prevented by the timely intervention of
Mr. Ismael Bautista, Accountant I of the same school. Bautista and other employees of the
AAIC corroborated respondent Castillejos statements. Moreover, the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Belinda L. Miguel showed that on August 15, 1997, she treated respondent
Castillejo for the wounds he sustained on his left eye, left eyebrow and lower lip.
For his part, the petitioner averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August 15, 1997, he was
about to leave the school premises. Suddenly, respondent Castillejo shouted to the security
guard to punch out the petitioners attendance card. This irked the petitioner because there
were students and other teachers in the vicinity. The petitioner confronted respondent
Castillejo and asked the latter why he had to embarrass him (petitioner) in front of the
students. Respondent Castillejo just turned his back and proceeded to his office. The
petitioner followed him and later saw that respondent Castillejo was already holding a
wrench. Inside respondent Castillejos office, the petitioner made a side step and just then,
respondent Castillejo slipped and fell flat on the floor. The petitioner noticed that respondent
Castillejos left eyebrow was bleeding and he was putting up a struggle (nagpupumiglas), so
the petitioner held his feet. While going down the stairs, the petitioner met Bautista and Henry
Rupac, Watchman I of the school.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima
facie case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive
Suspension dated July 27, 1998 stating in part:
WHEREFORE, you are hereby directed to answer in writing and under oath the above
charges against you within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, submitting therewith sworn
statements of your witnesses and other pertinent documents, if any. In your answer, you are
directed to state whether or not you elect a formal hearing of the charges against you or you
waive your rights to such hearing. You are, likewise, advised of your right to counsel.
Considering the gravity of the instant charge against you, pursuant to the provisions of P.D.
807, as amended, you are hereby PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED FOR NINETY (90) DAYS
WITHOUT PAY effective upon receipt thereof.[3]
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges
against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the said preventive suspension order.
However, considering that the petitioner had already served the suspension, the case was
dismissed for being moot and academic.
59
 The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive suspension
order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was not informed
nor apprised of the complaint against him before, during and after the preliminary fact-finding
investigation.
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs
Service of the CHED, issued the Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the
administrative complaint against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo was not under oath.
However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED, apparently
unaware of the existence of Director Mayos resolution, issued another Resolution dated June
3, 1999, finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom. The dispositive portion of respondent
Alcalas resolution states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, respondent FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN is hereby
meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE for unlawfully attacking a person in
authority while in the active performance of his duties and responsibilities and, then and
there, inflicted physical injuries on his person. This is without prejudice to the complainants
right to institute the proper criminal and civil actions against the respondent relative thereto.
The Vocational Schools Superintendent of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, Angadanan,
Isabela, is hereby directed to effectively implement this Order and to submit a report thereon
within three (3) days upon implementation.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner received a copy of the above resolution on July 12, 1999, which was
served on him by respondent Felipe P. Ammugauan, Sr., School Superintendent I of AAIC.
The petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged that respondent Alcala committed grave
abuse of discretion when, in the Resolution dated June 3, 1999, he dismissed the petitioner
from the service despite the fact that the administrative complaint against him had already
been dismissed per the Resolution of February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs
Service.
In its Decision dated February 15, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner as it declared the June 3, 1999 Resolution of respondent Alcala null and void. The
RTC found that after the formal charge was filed against the petitioner and he chose not to
file an answer thereto, a formal investigation was still required to be conducted under the Civil
Service Rules. When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service, in his February 20, 1999
Resolution, dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner on the ground that
the letter-complaint was not under oath, the formal investigation had not, as yet, been
terminated. Such dismissal, according to the RTC, put an end to the litigation. Thus,
respondent Alcala acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his June 3, 1999
Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the service, for the reason that the administrative
complaint against him had already been dismissed.
On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA), in the assailed Decision of
September 10, 2001, reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA declared as
valid respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the service.
On the other hand, it declared as without legal effect Director Mayos February 20, 1999
Resolution, dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner.
In so ruling, the CA noted an apparent irregularity in Director Mayos February 20, 1999
Resolution. The CA pointed out that while the said resolution was ostensibly dated February
20, 1999, a copy thereof was mailed to respondent Castillejo only on July 6, 1999 and
received by the latter only on July 14, 1999. The petitioner, for his part, received a copy
thereof only on July 1, 1999. Prior to these dates, the existence of the said resolution had not
been established; hence, the date of its actual issuance remained doubtful. The CA ruled that
between the two conflicting resolutions, Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution and
respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution, the latter was entitled to the presumption of
regularity. Moreover, respondent Alcala, as then Chairman of the CHED, had the authority to
reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates, including that of Director
Mayo.
The CA further ratiocinated that, even granting that the February 20, 1999 Resolution
was regularly issued, Director Mayo nonetheless overstepped his authority because Atty.
Dasig, then OIC of the Legal Affairs Service, had filed the formal charge and order of
preventive suspension against the petitioner as early as July 27, 1998. The CA also held that,
contrary to Director Mayos ruling, the fact that the letter-complaint was not under oath was
not fatal. Even an anonymous complaint may be acted upon by the authority concerned
provided that the same is verifiable, since under Section 48[5] of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292,[6] administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government
or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors.
The CA, likewise, opined that in administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not, at all times, necessary. In this case, the petitioner was not denied procedural
due process as he was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side. On the
other hand, the CA declared that respondent Ester Albano Garcia, who replaced respondent
Alcala as Chairman of the CHED, was denied procedural due process by the RTC when it
rendered its decision without awaiting her answer to the petition. The dispositive portion of
the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of then Chairman of CHED, Angel C.
Alcala is hereby declared valid while the Resolution dated February 20, 1999 of Director Joel
Voltaire Mayo is hereby declared to be without legal effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
60
 Aggrieved, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW FOR NOT UPHOLDING THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW
ESPECIALLY RULE XIV, SECTION 2 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK 5
OF EXECUTIVE [ORDER] NO. 292 AND OTHER PERTINENT CIVIL SERVICE LAWS,
SECTION 2, SECTION 4 AND PARAGRAPH D OF SECTION 4;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT A VOID COMPLAINT IS DEEMED INEXISTENT;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN NOT ORDERING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES PROFFERED
AGAINST THE PETITIONER THERE BEING NO FORMAL INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED
BY THE COMMISSION;
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTER ALBANO GARCIA WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW KNOWING THAT THE LATTER, BEING A NOMINAL PARTY, THE
LOWER COURT MAY DISPENSE WITH HER ANSWER TO THE PETITION;
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE FORMAL CHARGE AND ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS
LEGAL.[8]
As the petitioner himself submits, the foregoing issues are interrelated; hence, they shall
be resolved jointly.
The petitioner vigorously contends that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo
should be deemed inexistent as it was not made under oath. Consequently, the formal
charge and order of preventive suspension filed against him, which stemmed from the said
letter-complaint, was, likewise, null and void. The petitioner cites Section 2, [9] Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, which requires that an administrative
complaint against a civil service official or employee be in writing and under oath. Moreover,
the letter-complaint did not allegedly comply with Section 4(d) [10] of Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Resolution No. 94-0521,[11] also known as the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the
Conduct of Administrative Investigation, and the law then in force at the time, because it did
not contain a certification of non-forum shopping.
Since respondent Castillejos letter-complaint failed to comply with the formal
requirements of the law, the petitioner maintains that Director Mayo rightfully dismissed the
same and that respondent Alcala abused his discretion when he dismissed the petitioner
from the service.
The Court is not persuaded.
The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative complaints against civil
service officials or employees are provided in Book V of E.O. No. 292. Sections 46(c) and
48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A thereof read:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service
official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing and subscribed
and sworn to by the complainant.
...
Sec. 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. (1)
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by
the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary
evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the
respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of
the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall
be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the
charges in writing under oath together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in
which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall
dismiss the case.
On the other hand, Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292, cited by the petitioner, reads:
Sec. 2. Any person may file an administrative complaint with the Commission or any of its
proper office. Said complaint shall be in writing and under oath, otherwise, the same shall not
be given due course.
Further, Section 4(d) of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, likewise, invoked by the petitioner,
states:
Sec. 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a civil servant shall be
given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.
61
The complaint should be written in a clear manner, simple and concise language and in a
systematic manner as to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare his defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following:
...
(d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against the same party
involving the same acts or omissions and issues has been filed before another agency or
administrative tribunal.
In the absence of any one of the above-mentioned requirements, the complaints shall be
dismissed.
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not
concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he filed
against the petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents
could very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this
Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only
unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for
violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct.[12] Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a
government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative
powers.[13] After all, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied.[14]
In any case, contrary to the petitioners assertion, the letter-complaint of respondent
Castillejo is not a complaint within the purview of the provisions mentioned above. In the fairly
recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court held that the
complaint under E.O. No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases both refer to the actual
charge to which the person complained of is required to answer and indicate whether or not
he elects a formal investigation should his answer be deemed not satisfactory.
In this case, respondent Castillejos letter-complaint contained the following averments:
The undersigned wish to file his complaint against Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran, Head Teacher III of
Angadanan Agro-Industrial College for mauling him last August 15, 1997 at around 2:30 in
the afternoon for the accused to be disciplined. The case is now filed in the Court of Justice
docketed under Criminal Case No. 97-42 for Assault to Person in Authority.
I am Mr. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College, Angadanan, Isabela, furnishing you a copy of my complaint filed in court, all under
oath, for you to determine the gravity of the case administratively. Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran is
now intimidating two of the witnesses against him thats why may I request for an immediate
investigation of the case, by the commission, for him to be suspended or probably removed
from the service to avoid him from threatening the witnesses.
Your preferential attention and favorable action in this request are earnestly requested and
will be highly appreciated.[16]
Acting thereon, the CHED referred the matter to its Office of Legal Affairs Service and
Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the incident.
The said letter-complaint did not, by itself, commence the administrative proceedings against
the petitioner, requiring an answer from him, but, as already mentioned, merely triggered a
fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioners contention that respondent
Castillejos letter-complaint was inexistent and could not be acted upon by the CHED for to do
so, would result in an absurd and restrictive interpretation of E.O. No. 292 and effectively
deprive the Government of its disciplining power over people who hold a public trust. [17]
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty.
Dasig against the petitioner charging him with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and directing him to submit his answer in writing and under
oath that constituted the complaint.[18] Notably, Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge and
order of preventive suspension for the Commission in her capacity as then OIC of the CHEDs
Legal Affairs Service. As the complaint against the petitioner was initiated by the appropriate
disciplining authority, under Sections 46(c)[19] and 48(1),[20] Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of
E.O. No. 292, the same need not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the
same contain a verification of non-forum shopping.
Section 47(2), Chapter 7 of E.O. No. 292 provides, in part, that the Secretaries and
heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Since it was the CHED,[21] as the disciplining authority,
through Atty. Dasig, which filed the formal charge or complaint against the petitioner,
jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case.
Anent the issue on which of the two conflicting resolutions is valid, the Court agrees with
the CA that respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner from the
service prevails over that of Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution dismissing the
administrative complaint.
First, the basis for the dismissal of the administrative complaint stated in Director Mayos
resolution, i.e., that the letter-complaint was not verified, is, as earlier discussed, patently
erroneous. Second, it was issued by Director Mayo in excess of his authority. It is borne by
the records that Atty. Dasig already filed the formal charge against the petitioner after a fact-
finding investigation had been conducted on the mauling incident and a prima facie case had
been established against him. The formal charge was filed as early as July 27, 1998 and, on
September 21, 1998, Atty. Dasig submitted her memorandum to respondent Alcala
recommending the petitioners dismissal. It was, thus, highly irregular for Director Mayo to
62
dismiss the administrative complaint against the petitioner long after the formal charge had
already been filed against him and the matter was already for respondent Alcalas resolution.
Third, respondent Alcala, by reason of his position as then Chairman of the CHED, had the
authority to reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates. His June 3, 1999
Resolution dismissing the petitioner from the service, in effect, reversed and set aside the
Resolution dated February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo, his subordinate.
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service on first offense is punishable by
suspension for six months and one day to one year.
In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible error in upholding respondent
Alcalas Resolution of June 3, 1999 finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom.

Finally, the petitioner insists that no formal investigation was conducted after the formal WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
charge had been filed against him in violation of Section 22 of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 September 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477 is AFFIRMED in toto.
which reads: SO ORDERED.

Section 22. Conduct of Formal Investigation. A formal investigation shall be held after the
respondent has filed his answer or after the period for filing an answer has expired. It shall be
completed within thirty (30) days from the date of the service of the formal charge, unless the
period is extended by the Commission in meritorious cases.

Although the respondent did not elect a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be
conducted if upon evaluation of the complaint, the answer, and the documents in support
thereof, the merits of the case cannot be judiciously resolved without conducting such formal
investigation.

The petitioners allegation is, however, belied by respondent Alcalas statement in his
resolution, to wit:

Nevertheless, during the formal investigation of the case, respondent [referring to the
petitioner] failed to submit his written counter-affidavit/answer to the charges filed against him
by the complainant so he was declared in default. This notwithstanding, the oral testimony
given during the fact-finding investigation was considered in his (respondents) favor to enable
this office to determine the veracity of the allegations imputed against the respondent.

After weighing all the evidences [sic] submitted and the testimonies given by the witnesses
for both complainant and the respondent, this office finds substantial evidence to hold the
respondent administratively liable for violation of subparagraphs (2) and (27) of Section 46(b),
Chapter 7, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987.[22]

Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that he was denied procedural due
process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. [23] The
petitioner was undoubtedly afforded the opportunity to present his side as he was directed to
file his written answer to the formal charge against him. He opted not to do so. He cannot
now feign denial of due process.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292, grave misconduct on first offense is punishable by dismissal. On the other hand,

63
30) Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 60 Phil. 635
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-
entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in
his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de
duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual
ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en
sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan,
dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con
sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que
se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro
forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo
5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a
que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que
tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud
del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court
of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2
and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source
of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made
applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor
legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the
motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that
it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We
shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before
doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of
this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several
observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
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emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of
Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole
transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn
to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part
of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law,
is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate
the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-
laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the
Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to
reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a
minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by
the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and
compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the
Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act
No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially
regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct.
773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs.
McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
65
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650,
81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides
that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187,
57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74
Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement
to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public
official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation,
and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the
said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case
there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except
as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon
which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached
to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents
that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents
attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We
have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large,
after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under
which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new
trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive
all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to

66