Session 5-7.
Pablo Ocambo vs HRET
Law – Second Placer Cannot Be Declared the Winner
In May 2001, Mario Crespo, also known as Mark Jimenez, was declared as the
elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Pablo Ocampo was the rival
candidate who filed an electoral protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) alleging that Crespo’s win was due to election fraud and vote
buying. In March 2003, Crespo was declared by the HRET as ineligible for office due
to lack of residence in the said district of Manila. Due to such declaration, Ocampo
then requested the HRET to declare him as the winner of the election done in 2001
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6646 which provides that “Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted…” Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo should then
be considered as stray votes. And that being the fact that Ocampo received the second
highest number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of 768 votes), he should be
declared as the winner of the said election. The HRET denied Ocampo’s petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.
HELD: No. Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer
cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates in the event
that the highest earner of votes is disqualified. The fact that the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office. Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a
disqualified candidate to be considered “stray.” Hence, when a candidate has not yet
been disqualified by final judgment during the Election Day and was voted for, the
votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
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disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale
behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona
fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that
the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of government.
- --
Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)
Facts: • Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States
of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines
in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5 • On 3 April 2009
Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states: • On 30
November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9 •
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship,
Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated
03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. • On 30 April 2010, the
COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally
Session 5-7.5
file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. •
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence ex-parte. • Neither motion was acted upon, having been
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. • It was only after his proclamation that Arnado
filed his verified answer, THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION: •
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18The Court ruled that Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. • Petitioner
Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. RULING OF THE COMELEC EN
BANC: ruled in favor of arnado • Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning
the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the parties
before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions
hinge on the result of the first. Issues: 1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case. 2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made. 3.
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whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to
this case. SC: 1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is
proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. 2. The use
of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath
of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. • Between 03
April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions
that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using
his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an
American, • Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization.
This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are
not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to
take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but
also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate
for public office. • By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was
not qualified to run for a local electiv . 3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not
applicable. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates. • Resolving the third issue necessitates
revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle
that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest.
This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test
to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an
Session 5-7.5
ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections. • The
often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
• This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office." • A proper
reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First
Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had
been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held
in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or
not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal
president." • The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as
the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who
receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not
have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain
to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure
to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public
office. • The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
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the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when
the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied) • It is
imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot
by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice
spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1 •
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates. • We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. • Thus,
the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election. • Even when the votes for the ineligible
candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole
and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. • There
is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters
are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and
still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter
that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed
second to ineligible ones. • The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
Session 5-7.5
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second
to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the
vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates. • That the
disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is
of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation. • The disqualifying circumstance surrounding
Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office. •
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado
being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal
effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification
prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the
elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner. •
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections. • Arnado being a non-candidate, the
votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to
regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily
and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
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the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the
law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a
fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the
contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the
prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of profession
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite
uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate
themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of
their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished
- - - --
Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter
of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued
Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative
order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process,
equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent
Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional
Session 5-7.5
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in
question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of
police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In
fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The
letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety
by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing
number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and
highways.
- ------
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by
Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military
service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military
leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the
constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the
citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in
so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five
years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
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Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
Session 5-7.5
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
- ---
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections GR No. 161872April 13, 2004 FACTS When
the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its
due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC
again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other
people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The
COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency.”Pamatong argued that this was against his
right to “equal access to opportunitiesfor public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26
of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution
in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified among all the
presidential candidates” and supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his
alleged capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his government
platform.ISSUES1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to
equal access to opportunities for public service. HELD1. Whether or not
COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with
the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for
public service. – NOThe Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally
considered not-self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the
other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article
2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting
ideals/standards through the policies presented.
Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject
to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without
discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the
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COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of
ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations,
the election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are clearly
unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run.Note:Pamatong
presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The Court
however stated that it is not within their power to make such assessments.
- ---
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's
jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990
stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to
the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights
allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to
engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and
supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing
and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and
power of the CRH?
HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority
and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions
of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of
human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
Session 5-7.5
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative
power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for
it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court
of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is
pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-158
- --
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel,
it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec
3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of
the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the
court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of
police power.
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RULING: “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty
or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should
be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined
to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
— rests on substantial distinctions.
- - - UP BOR vs CA
FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral
program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units
of course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.
After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she
committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation.
Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.
UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval.
Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned
Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of
candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence
Celine graduated.
Session 5-7.5
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent
of the charges against her.
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw
private respondent's doctorate degree.
The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate
Degree recommended by the University Council.
She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which
request was denied by President
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had
unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her
right to substantive due process.
RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard
several times.
Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that
private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his
position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which
she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the
Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the
U.P. authorities explaining her position.
8/20
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an
audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is
noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases
are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
- - - In RE Laureta and Maravilla
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M.
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First
Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court
rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when
Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-
partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court
en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating
that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman
of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14
May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz
with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made
true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber
1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the
press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint
Issue: Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty.
Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended
from the practice of law until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of
the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement
of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a
Session 5-7.5
republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government
are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one
can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
- - -INS v Chadha
Facts of the case - In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress
authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of
the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa
deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge
suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or
recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States
House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.
Question Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto
of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine?
The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the
Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of
bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even
though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the
"explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.
- - - Arnault v. Balagtas
Facts: Arnault continuously withheld information. This time about an affidavit
supposedly giving details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave
the name Jesse Santos as the person he gave the amount to.
Issue: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness?
Decision: Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the contempt is related to the
exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of legislative process,
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the legislative authority is supreme. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power or necessary to effectuate said power.
- --
Facts: During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act
No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor
General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of
such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
US vs. Tang Ho
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to
Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said
Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was
an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Discussions: By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional
limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the
Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands.
As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in
violation of the organic law.
Session 5-7.5
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly
be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves
the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of
the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect
in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings: Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that
proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature
left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was
not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined
conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or
quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether
or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,”
or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it
specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a
crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and
the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
- - -Conference vs. POEA
10/20
FACTS: he Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1994 amending and increasing the
compensation and other benefits under Part. II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. POEA
also issued Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994 informing all Filipino
seafarers, manning agencies, shipowners, managers and principals hiring Filipino
seafarers of the said adjustments.
ISSUE(S): hether or not the assailed issuances violated the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
RULING: O. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based
and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work
environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social,
civic, and spiritual activities.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
- - - Macias vs COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners are 4 members of the House of Representatives from Negros
Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan & the provincial Governor of Negros
Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement
RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged
that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less
representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void
because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members
of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the
population
Session 5-7.5
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.
Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they
1. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and
allege to be constitutional
2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3 day requirement.
3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3 year requirement.
4. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR is valid.
HELD: The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved
provinces have the personality to sue. The passage of the act did not conform to the
printed-form and the 3 day requirement, and that there is no certificate of urgency
from the President was received by the HO. The requirement that the apportionment
must be done within 3 year following the last census is complied with. The
apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it is not based on the
number of inhabitants a province has. Some provinces were given more
representation despite the inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court held that RA
3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.
- --
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts: Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization
composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the
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elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was
a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the
Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
“detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec
failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be
detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally
vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor
by any international laws to which we adhere.
Walden Bello vs Comelec FACTS:
Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List(AGPP) filed with the Commission on Elections its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in theMay 10, 2010elections. Subsequently,
onMarch 23, 2010, AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the
Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
Session 5-7.5
OnMarch 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807which prescribed the
rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for
purposes of theMay 10, 2010elections.
OnMarch 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna
Party-List, represented by TeodoroCasi, (collectively referred to ascertiorari
petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against Arroyo,
pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List System Act).
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization
factually and truly represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the nominee
must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, citing in this regard the case ofAng Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. On this basis, thecertioraripetitioners
concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents tricycle
drivers and security guards because he is not only a member of the First Family, but
is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman
of the Houses Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House,
namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics and Privileges,
Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works and Highways, Transportation
and Ways and Means.
On April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales
(mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter requesting for
a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP, in compliance with Section
6 of Resolution No. 8807.On the same day, the COMELEC Law Department replied
that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary evidence
required by Resolution No. 8807.
Themandamuspetitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to act,
consistently with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification
of the nominees of AGPP for their failure to comply with the requirements of Section
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6 of Resolution No. 8807. Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list
group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the
sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent. It
likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list groups
and nominees to make the required documentary submissions.
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo. It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941
merely requires the nominee to be "abona fidemember [of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
elections." The COMELEC En Banc refused to reconsider.
Themandamuspetitioners filed with the Supreme Court their Petition
forMandamusand Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction,docketed asG.R. No. 191998.They sought to compel
the COMELEC to disqualifymotu propriothe AGPP nominees for their failure to
comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, and to enjoin the COMELEC from
giving due course to the AGPPs participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On July 23 and 29, 2010, thecertioraripetitioners elevated their case to the Supreme
Courtviatwo (2) separate petitions forcertiorari, docketed asG.R. Nos. 192769
and192832, to annul the COMELEC Second Divisions May 7, 2010 joint resolution
and the COMELECen bancs July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed
their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPPs nominee.
In the interim, AGPP obtained in theMay 10, 2010elections the required percentage
of votes sufficient to secure a single seat.This entitled Arroyo, as AGPPs first
nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. OnJuly 21, 2010, the COMELEC,
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-
elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
I. Whetheror not mandamuslies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPPs
nomineesmotu proprioor to cancel AGPPs registration;
Session 5-7.5
II. Whether or not the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to AGPPs
participation in the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPPs votes, and
proclaiming it a winner; and
III. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyos
qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a
member of the House of Representatives.
HELD: The petitions are dismissed.
REMEDIAL LAW; MANDAMUS
First Issue: For a writ of mandamus to issue (inG.R. No. 191998), Petitioners must
comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law." However, they failed to do so.Under Section 2, in
relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any
interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a
party-list nominee. Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any interested party
may file a verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list
organization. These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy" that themandamuspetitioners should have taken. In filing the present
petition, themandamuspetitioners also violated the rule on the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides
that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
the courts.
REMEDIAL LAW; MOOTNESS
Second Issue: The court finds that the second issue has been mooted by the
supervening participation, election and proclamation of AGPP after it secured the
required percentage of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections.The prohibition issue has
been rendered moot since there is nothing now to prohibit in light of the supervening
events.A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon (in this case, the prevention of the
specified acts) can no longer be done.
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POLITICAL LAW; HRET
Third Issue: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass
upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption
of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. In the present
case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first nominee, has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives.The court takes judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions
forquo warrantoagainst Arroyo, now pending before the HRET.The court holds that
the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has
the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives.
- --
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum vs COMELEC
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for
not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back
to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
Session 5-7.5
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
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5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined
political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
Session 5-7.5
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will
of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people,
in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for
the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack
“well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in
a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of
Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation
groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
- - -Aquino vs COMELEC
Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of
Makati stating that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy
was opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing
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in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed
petition for Aquino’s disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election.
Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour
of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to
qualify he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice. Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home” where he eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the
Constitution speaks of residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is
not an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon.
SESSION 7
Santiago vs Guingona
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in
receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Session 5-7.5
Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners,
it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec.
16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.”
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The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.
- - - Avelino vs. Cuenco
Department – Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the
senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He
requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators,
Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all
dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions
being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they
even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp
then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered
and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged
his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his
followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record —
it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made
it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions
of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,
Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President
of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
Session 5-7.5
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the
case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in
the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al)
may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be
different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen.
Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session
(presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum
constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the
minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session
that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a
majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
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majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all”
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of
“the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve
did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would
be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the
case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it
be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when
Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee
senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the
number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed
is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12
senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case
in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice
agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the
ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional
requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the
evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as
Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against
Session 5-7.5
senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent
efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC
believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice
and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally
elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the
members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact
that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided
for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited
to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of
death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes
which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive
process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the
session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made
for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words
“of all the members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI
of the original Constitution which required “concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the National Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3)
Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United
States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the
Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12
constituted a majority.
- - -De Venecia vs SB
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Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was
filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S.
Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded
not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.”
In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus,
on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear
before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can
only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116
adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de
Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P.
Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose
Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief,
Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a
precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from
the mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August
1995), the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of
different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.
Session 5-7.5
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of
separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of
RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and
from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to
the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or
expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its
members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline,
maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.
The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
- - -Bondoc vs Pineda
Removal of a Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th
District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
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(LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in
that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was
subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was
a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for
Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed
in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s
expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the
HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP
representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for
Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by
HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such
action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
because Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the
doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said
act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching
upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here
is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is the act of
HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the
tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already
voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc
won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal
Session 5-7.5
has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has
already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to
change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his
removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause
for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right
to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from
the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the
Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
Codilla vs De Venecia
Facts: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the
4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a
disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of
petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s
proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty
of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was
proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however
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reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and
void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution
publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues: Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
HELD: The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against
petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently
found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore,
respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not
represent the electorate’s choice.
Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner
before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said
that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued
to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail
since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.
The facts had been settled by the COMELECen banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its
(Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is
ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition
regardless of personal judgment or opinion.