Analysis
June 4, 2009
Summary: Following Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
recent cabinet appointments, Bülent
Arınç will serve as deputy prime min-
ister and Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign
minister. Arınç is widely seen as a
representative of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and has al-
ready put his mark on AKP’s foreign
policy as the foreign affairs advisor
to the Prime Minister. As an extra-
Parliamentary appointment, which
is rare in Turkey, Davutoğlu will have
to bear the political responsibility of
the policies he devises and imple-
ments. His appointment, however,
has raised concerns of pundits about
the future of Turkish foreign policy
and whether it will drift further away
from the West and from the goal of
attainment of EU membership.
This brief discusses a method for
looking at Turkey’s policies and how
the country’s goals may line up
with those of its allies, including
the United States.
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Divining Davutoğlu: Turkey’s Foreign Policy
Under New Leadership
by Soli Ozel*
ISTANBUL — Two of the most impor-
tant choices that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
Turkey’s prime minister, made when he
presented the country with a substan-
tive cabinet reshuffle were Bülent Arınç
as deputy prime minister and Erdoğan’s
long-time advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu as
foreign minister. Known for his un-
shakeable belief in civilian supremacy
and his impeccable credentials against
corruption, Arınç is also seen as a
representative of the hard-line, core
Islamist wing of the Justice and Devel-
opment Party (AKP). On both of these
counts, Arınç so far has proved true
to his reputation. His presence in the
cabinet was arguably a function of these
characteristics. He is meant to protect
the AKP against its rising, less robust
twin—the Felicity Party (SP)—both on
ideological grounds and against corrup-
tion charges. To date, Arınç has proved
to be true to form and behaved as the
conscience and political point man of
the ruling party and the government.
For all his importance in Turkey’s
domestic politics, though, Arınç is not
a well-known figure abroad. This is in
spite of the fact that as speaker of the
Turkish Parliament during the Iraq inva-
sion he had a huge part in the rejection
of the March 1st motion that would have
allowed the deployment of American
troops through Turkey for passage to
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Haberturk. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
Iraq. To the contrary, Davutoğlu has a
high profile in the world of diplomacy
as the architect of AKP’s foreign policy.
As the influential foreign affairs advisor
to Erdoğan, he put his imprint on AKP’s
foreign policy. He has also worked
closely with Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s pres-
ident, and Ali Babacan, Turkey’s former
foreign minister.
By making this exceptional appoint-
ment, (Davutoğlu is not a member of
Parliament and extra-Parliamentary
appointments are rare in Turkey in nor-
mal times) Erdoğan put Davutoğlu in
a position whereby he will have to bear
the political responsibility of the policies
he devises and implements. Upon this
appointment, many pundits raised con-
cerns about the future of Turkish foreign
policy. They wondered whether or not
under Davutoğlu’s stewardship, Turkish
foreign policy would drift further away
from the West, particularly from the goal
of attaining EU membership.
As the author of Strategic Depth (written
from a geostrategic, cultural, and histori-
cal perspective), a highly regarded work
on Turkish foreign policy, Davutoğlu’s
policy preferences in relation to the
Middle East and his conceptualization of
foreign policy earned him the label of a
neo-Ottomanist. Such labeling suggests
a non-Western (and for some, anti-
Analysis
Western) orientation for Turkey that favors engagement with
the Middle East presumably on the sole basis of a shared reli-
gious identity. For those who prefer to malign AKP’s foreign
policy rather than to critically analyze it, this amounts to the
Islamization of Turkish foreign policy and the inevitable “loss”
of Turkey to the West.
I have already made a case in earlier On Turkey pieces that the
strategic choice for Turkey’s orientation is clear. The security
establishment as well as the government clearly chose to stay
in the Atlantic alliance and pursue policies that will reflect
Ankara’s Atlanticist orientation. Turkey will also try to pursue
its own particular interests in the regions surrounding it, and
therefore, will wish to have a degree of autonomy in its policy
choices. Thus, Turkey’s policies in its surrounding regions
ought to be seen in the context of the country’s overall inter-
ests and understood in terms of its goals. A close look at these
goals, as I will try to outline below, also shows that they are
complementary, if not identical, with those of Turkey’s allies,
particularly the United States.
Turkey seeks to be surrounded by regions that are stable. Be-
yond the obvious reason of not wanting to face violent conflicts
on its borders, this desire for stability reflects the primacy of
economic interests in the making of Turkish foreign policy.
Turkey regards the neighboring countries as potential trade
partners and any deepening of economic interdependence
is seen both as beneficial for Turkish businesses as well as
enhancing political stability. To this end, the preference in for-
eign policy choices is for engagement with all plausible actors.
I have also contended that Turkey’s relations with the West
would be dominated by its links to the United States so long as
the sclerosis of the European Union and the comatose nature
of the relations between Turkey and the European Union
continue. Such a situation presents problems for Turkey’s
domestic reform process though, since, in the absence of the
disciplining impact of EU accession, Turkey moves too slowly
on deepening its democratization.
Such was the context in which Davutoğlu was appointed and
the most serious question raised about his term concerned
relations with the European Union. EU relations are not solely
a foreign policy matter for Turkey and reflect the inclinations
and intentions of the government in general, not just the for-
eign minister. However, Davutoğlu’s earlier, dismissive assess-
ment of the accession process, relegating this to just technical
developments in negotiations, led to speculations about the
future of the relations under his stewardship.
2
Davutoğlu responded to the doubts and criticisms with a broad
statement to EU ambassadors on Europe Day in which he
presented his most comprehensive understanding of Turkey-
EU relations to date. He argued that Turkey’s relations with
Europe date back to the 11th century and that relations with the
EU are just the latest episode of a long-standing engagement.
Just as the Ottoman Empire reacted swiftly to epoch-changing
developments in Europe (including the Treaty of Westphalia,
the Vienna Conference, and World War I), and engaged in
transformative political and social reforms, Republican Turkey
is responding to the epochal changes of the post-Cold War
era. As such, Turkey-EU relations are not conjectural and the
goal of integration remains the mainstay of Turkish foreign
policy. In his view, Europe’s vision and Turkey’s vision were
complementary and the synergy that would come out of these
relations would place Europe in an influential position in world
affairs. Such a role for Europe, he added, was something that
the world needed.
In a recent conversation he had with a group of editors and
journalists, the foreign minister reiterated these views and gave
an indication that Turkey was prepared to move forward on
the EU track. Such a determination necessitates the rekindling
of EU enthusiasm in the government, a shift in the nature of
the discourse about the European Union, and a political com-
mitment domestically to respect basic human rights, freedom
of expression, and freedom of the press. In addition to these,
the government will also have to renew its commitment in
economic reforms, even if this means shutting off politically-
rewarding patronage practices.
Currently, the most important ticking bomb in EU-Turkey re-
lations is the Cyprus issue. Although negotiations between the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot presidents on the island continue
unabated, few analysts believe that a final agreement could be
reached before November when the European Commission
will review Turkey’s record concerning the application of the
customs union to Cyprus. Turkey is unwilling to move forward
on its legal commitment to open its ports and airports to Greek
Cypriot vessels because the European Union failed to honor
its promises to Turkish Cypriots on easing the embargoes that
they have been subjected to.
Davutoğlu intimated that Turkey would favor a comprehen-
sive, all party conference. Unless everyone is mobilized for
a comprehensive plan (such as the Annan Plan that Turkish
Cypriots accepted but Greek Cypriots rejected), a solution to
the problem would be impossible to reach.
Analysis
The mood in Turkey is such that no government, no matter
how committed it is to EU accession will move on Cyprus un-
less it gets something in return. Given the rising economic and
strategic importance of the Mediterranean coast for Turkey’s
long-term interests, the fair and balanced resolution of the
Cyprus issue is imperative, and non-resolution has the poten-
tial to jeopardize the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean.
As one of the most seasoned and usually calm practitioners
of Turkish foreign policy, Özdem Sanberk observed that “the
essential elements of a settlement in Turkish eyes (confirmed
in UN negotiations) have always been political equality, i.e.,
equal and not minority status for Turkish Cyprus, expressed
in a two-state federal system… During the last year, the Greek
Cypriots have used language that suggests that they still think
in terms of an essentially unitary Greek state with a Turkish
minority. (In the absence of such a solution) all the prob-
lems Turkey and Greece are now facing in the Aegean will be
transposed to the eastern Mediterranean, e.g., issues such as
territorial waters and seabed rights, where some Greeks appear
to be trying to steal a march on their Turkish neighbors. This
is an avoidable disaster. All of us who want to see the eastern
Mediterranean become a sea of peace need to work together,
but perhaps Britain and America in particular will bear special
responsibility for seeing that what is on offer is a peace deal
that is fair and works.”
We have yet to see whether the Davutoğlu’s commitment to
revitalizing the EU accession process will get full support from
the cabinet. More importantly, we have yet to see whether the
Swedish Presidency will be able to stop the steady deterioration
in EU-Turkey relations. This will of course depend on its ability
to get certain members of the European Union to stop demon-
izing Turkey on all occasions as an excuse for the inadequacy
of their own nations to tackle their own internal problems.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of
International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the
national daily Haberturk and is senior advisor to the chairman of the
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he
is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
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