ELECTRONICALLY FILED
5/31/2018 5:03 PM
01-CC-2017-004044.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA
ANNE-MARIE ADAMS, CLERK
STATE OF ALABAMA, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. CC-2017-004044
)
SHERRY WELCH LEWIS, )
)
Defendant. )
STATE OF ALABAMA, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. CC-2017-004045
)
JERRY DEWAYNE JONES, )
)
Defendant. )
STATE OF ALABAMA, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. CC-2017-004046
)
TERRY LEE WILLIAMS, )
)
Defendant. )
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“Defendants”). Regardless of how this Court construes the motions, they are due to
be denied because the indictments track the language of the charged statutes and are
facts like the date and location of wrongful conduct in an indictment; the Defendants’
the State’s discovery, which includes specific identification of the State’s trial
exhibits,1 remove any double-jeopardy issues in these cases; and Alabama law does
additional facts in its indictments. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 13.5(c)(1) (limiting motions
individual grand juror, the legal sufficiency of the indictment, or the failure of the
1
The State sent defense counsel a letter on May 25, 2018, which included a spreadsheet identifying
the Bates number(s) of the State’s anticipated trial exhibits. May 25 Letter, attached as Exhibit 2.
While subject to change and supplementation, this removes any doubt that the Defendants cannot
review the discovery in these cases.
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The motions for a more definite statement should also be denied because the
Defendants have not shown “good cause,” as required by Alabama Rule of Criminal
Procedure 13.2(e). As this Response and exhibits demonstrate,2 the law, the
indictments, and the discovery put the Defendants on notice of the crimes with which
INTRODUCTION
This is a case where Defendant Sherry Lewis, a Member and former Chair of
the Board of Directors of the Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham
(BWWB), unlawfully used her position and influence to obtain money, a no-show
job for a family member, and free meals and other improper benefits. Lewis got
those things from two people: Defendant Jerry Jones, a former Vice President of
Arcadis U.S. Inc., and Defendant Terry Williams, an Arcadis subcontractor. Jones
was the manager of the BWWB account with Arcadis and he ostensibly hired
Williams and his company, Global Solutions, LLC, to work on BWWB projects.
Since 2003, Arcadis has been the independent engineering firm for the
BWWB and, in addition to this lucrative contract, Arcadis has obtained many
multimillion-dollar contracts from the BWWB. Through the votes of Lewis (and the
2
All the selected documents are available in the discovery the State has produced or made available
to the defendants. This Response refutes their claims that “the indictment is legally insufficient”
and fails to place the Defendants on notice. It is neither an exhaustive list of the State’s evidence
nor its theories of criminal liability.
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other BWWB members) approving these contracts and payments, Arcadis has made
tens of millions of dollars to advise and work on important, technical issues affecting
the nearly one-million people drinking and using BWWB water. As Arcadis’s
account manager for the BWWB contract, it was Jones’s job to maintain the lucrative
relationship and to protect it from other firms desiring the BWWB’s business. For
his client-management services, Jones earned more than $300,000 per year.
Williams’s company, GSI, derived nearly all of its revenue from Arcadis
subcontracts on BWWB work that Jones steered to him. Lewis cast votes and took
official action to benefit Jones and Williams while she used her public position to
Specifically, Jones and Williams provided Lewis’s son, Joseph Lewis, with a
no-show job with Williams’s company. Despite never accomplishing a single task,
Joseph Lewis received more than $25,000 from GSI. Joseph Lewis gave much of
that money to his mother via regular cash deposits into her bank account, often on
the same day Williams paid him. Lewis then spent that money on the rent for Joseph
Lewis’s apartment and on her own personal expenses. Jones also deposited money
into Lewis’s bank account. In one case, he wrote “loan repay” on the check, even
Additionally, when Lewis traveled for BWWB business, Jones often paid the
bill. On numerous occasions, Jones filed false expense reports and reimbursement
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requests with Arcadis about meals that Jones bought for Lewis or her family. For
her part, Lewis concealed that her sixty-plus votes for Arcadis benefited her
financially and that her refusal to consider other engineering firms for public work
ARGUMENT
This Court should reject each of the four bases the Defendants assert in asking
The indictments in these cases are legally sufficient because they meet the
applicable legal standards. That is, they track the language of the Ethics Act statutes
the Defendants have been charged with violating; there are no missing elements in
the indictments; and the statutes prescribe with definitiveness the elements of the
offenses. The Defendants’ motions do not assert that the indictments fail to do any
of the above three things. This means their motions should be denied on their face
because they do not raise any legally sufficient argument to dismiss the indictments.
inform a defendant of common understanding of the offense charged and with that
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degree of certainty which will enable the court, upon conviction, to pronounce the
proper judgment.” The commentary to Rule 13.2 states that the “rule is designed to
Alabama courts have recognized the effect of Rule 13.2 and have responded
follows the language of the statute violated, provided the statute prescribes with
definitiveness the elements of the offense.” Travis v. State, 776 So. 2d 819, 836
(Ala. Crim. App. 1997), aff’d, 776 So. 2d 874 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis added); Ex
parte Allred, 393 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. 1980). Additionally, “[t]he [State] need
only allege the ‘essential facts necessary to apprise a defendant of the crime
charged’ and not its theory of the case.” Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1026 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993), aff’d, 642 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Schmidt, 947 F.2d 362, 369 (9th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added). This is because
conclusions, than of facts.” Harris v. State, 580 So. 2d 33, 38 (Ala. Crim. App.
1990) (quoting Hochman, 91 So. 2d at 501) (emphasis added). It “is not required
at 502.
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places a defendant on notice of the crime with which he has been charged. An
indictment need not notify a defendant of the evidentiary facts that the State will
produce in discovery, and ultimately, present during its case-in-chief at trial. Given
the simplified standard of pleading, the indictments in these cases are sufficient
because they charge the elements of the statutory offenses in the words of the
statutes. See Ex parte Allred, 393 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. 1980). Specifically, the
indictments track the language of the Ethics Act statutes charged, and they contain
all the elements of those offenses. For example, Defendant Sherry Welch Lewis, a
Member of the Board of Directors of the Water Works Board of the City of
Birmingham was charged with one count of using her official position or office for
The indictment charging Defendant Lewis with violating Section 5(a) reads:
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Plainly, the indictment tracks Section 5(a)’s statutory language and contains
all the elements of the offense. The remaining counts in Lewis’s indictment also
track the relevant statutory language in full, as do the three respective counts in the
not assert that any count of any indictment fails to track the statutory language or
that an element of an offense is missing from the indictment. Thus, the only
remaining issue is whether the statutes charged in the indictments prescribe with
definiteness the elements of the offenses. See Ex parte Allred, 393 So. 2d at 1032;
Copeland v. State, 456 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
On that issue, Alabama courts have held that the Ethics Act statutes provide
definiteness to the elements of the offenses. In Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1026–
28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
which the Defendants are charged with—was so vague and indefinite that the
indictment should be dismissed. The court wrote: “Here, § 36-25-5(a), the statute
under which Hunt was indicted and convicted, provides fair warning of what is
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conduct.” Hunt, 642 So. 2d at 1027 (internal citations omitted). In reaching this
conclusion, the court said, “We reject Hunt’s arguments that, ‘[a]s written, the statute
could be taken to untold limits,’ and the ‘Ethics Act vests almost absolute discretion
in the Attorney General to decide what constitutes using one’s office for direct
The Defendants’ motions have identified no basis in fact or law on which this
Court could depart from Hunt. Just as in Hunt, in giving the words in the Ethics Act
statutes their “natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning,” the
Defendants are on notice of the offenses with which they have been charged. See id.
at 1027–28 (holding that the terms “direct financial gain” and “obtains” were not too
vague, even considering the duty to strictly construe criminal statutes). Because this
is all that Rule 13.2 requires, the indictments in these cases are legally sufficient.
Finally, the Defendants’ reliance on Chambers v. State, 364 So. 2d 416 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978), is misplaced. Like Hunt, Chambers rejected the defendant’s
argument that an indictment’s terms were vague and indefinite. 364 So. 2d at 419.
Specifically, the court held that the words “willful abuse” and “torture” were not
vague and indefinite, and that the defendant was on notice of the crime with which
he was charged. Id. In so ruling, the court compared the indictment presented in its
case with prior indictments under a previous and no longer operative child-abuse
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statute. It concluded that under the prior statute, a defendant may not have been on
notice of the crime with which he was charged because the old statute used terms
like “unjustifiable pain” and “ordinary and reasonable punishment.” Id. It stated:
“[t]hese are subjective terms and there are no standards whereby one can determine
what constitutes the crime.” Id. In contrast, the court concluded that the indictment
returned under the new statute—which used terms that were definite—placed the
defendant on notice of the crime with which he was charged. Id. at 419–20.
represents yet another case, in a long line of cases, holding that an indictment is
sufficient so long as it tracks the statutory language, identifies all the elements of the
offense, and includes elements that are not vague and indefinite. The Defendants are
simply incorrect to state that Chambers held or even suggested in any way that an
indictment under Alabama’s Ethics Act requires something more. Accordingly, this
Court should deny the Defendants’ motions to dismiss because the indictments are
legally sufficient.
B. Alabama law does not require the State to include evidentiary facts such
as the date, location, or a description of the specific wrongful conduct
in an indictment.
The Defendants are not entitled to evidentiary facts such as the time, location,
or specific conduct involved in the charged offenses because those facts are not
elements of the offenses charged. Under Rule 13.2, an indictment must contain only
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500, 501 (Ala. 1956)). Yet, evidentiary facts are precisely what the Defendants are
Rule 13.2(d) states that “[i]t is not necessary to state the precise time or date
at which or on which the offense is alleged to have been committed or the place
where the offense is alleged to have been committed unless the time or place is a
material element of the offense.” In these cases, neither the time nor the location are
elements of the crimes with which the Defendants have been charged. Accordingly,
this Court should deny the Defendants’ motions that the indictment be dismissed or
amended. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 13.5(c)(1). The State will prove these evidentiary
facts—as it must in every criminal case—at the appropriate time: the State’s case-
in-chief at trial.
indictments and the State’s discovery provide sufficient information to remove any
double-jeopardy issue. For these reasons, this Court should deny the Defendants’
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under the Double Jeopardy Clause: “It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Gholston v. State, 57 So. 3d 178, 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). Alabama courts have held
arising out of the same course of conduct, so long as each charged offense “require[s]
proof of an element not present in the other offense . . . .” Sheffield v. State, 959 So.
In their motions, the Defendants appear to argue that unless additional factual
detail is provided, the Defendants could be tried again for the same crime after being
acquitted. Motions at 6–7. Given the stage of the litigation, this is a premature
challenge as jeopardy has not attached. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 13.5(c)(2) (prohibiting
invalidation of a charge for any defect or imperfection “which does not tend to
prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits”). But even on the
and ordinary language the crimes with which the Defendants have been charged.
That is all Rule 13.2 requires, and the Hunt decision demonstrates that the elements
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of an offense under the Ethics Act are not vague and indefinite. Hunt v. State, 642
So. 2d at 1026–28.
In addition, the discovery produced by the State clarifies and illuminates these
crimes. The Defendants need only review the indictments and the State’s discovery
to determine which crimes jeopardy could attach to. See R.L.G. v. State, 712 So. 2d
348, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (“Cases note that any critical details that are
for a more definite statement . . . and pretrial discovery procedures.”). As the R.L.G.
court recognized, if the Defendants want more facts about the crimes with which
they have been charged, reviewing the State’s discovery is the way to do so. Thus,
This Court should also reject the Defendants’ arguments that the indictments
leave them uncertain whether the crimes with which they have been charged are
based on the same or different set of facts as the crimes with which the other
Defendants have been charged. This is simply not an issue that is cognizable under
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Regardless, the special grand jury’s decision to charge
Defendants Jones and Williams as aiders and abettors on two counts is not otherwise
subject to attack simply because one or more other Defendants were involved in the
alleged criminal activity. See Bridges v. State, 263 So. 2d 705, 707 (Ala. Crim. App.
1972) (holding that Alabama abolished the distinction between aiders and abettors,
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and thus, punishes the latter as principals). Because Alabama law treats accomplices
the same as principals, there is no legal justification that permits the Defendants to
acquire evidentiary facts related to the other Defendants’ indictments. See Smith v.
State, 797 So. 2d 503, 514 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that it was not necessary
that an indictment indicate which defendant committed each separate act during the
accessories is irrelevant).
dismissal of the indictments because the special grand jury issued indictments
premature, and the State removed any such issue because the indictments, combined
with the discovery, identify those offenses to which jeopardy could attach.
Finally, this Court should reject the Defendants’ assertion that the indictments
are legally insufficient because they do not “apprise” them of the “wrongful
conduct” or provide them with the “level of conduct” of which they have been
accused. Motions at 2. It appears that the Defendants are asking this Court to order
the State to provide them with a “bill of particulars.” They are not entitled to one,
however, because Alabama does not recognize such a thing, and “the practice has
never prevailed in this State.” Jones v. State, 34 So. 236, 238 (Ala. 1903); see also
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Johnson v. State, 335 So. 2d 663, 672 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (“An accused is not
To the extent the Defendants are not requesting a bill of particulars, they still
are not entitled to an advance blueprint of the State’s trial strategy. Rather, Alabama
reviewing the indictments, the law, and the discovery. See R.L.G. v. State, 712 So.
2d 348, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that critical details of a case may be
gathered through a preliminary hearing, a motion for a more definite statement, and
pretrial discovery procedures). For these reasons, this Court should deny the
of conduct concerning the crimes with which they have been charged.
* * *
This Court should deny the Defendants’ motions to dismiss because they have
not provided the Court with a legally sufficient reason to dismiss the indictments.
The indictments track the statutory language, contain all the elements of the offenses,
and those elements are definite; there is no legal basis to require the indictments to
contain evidentiary facts like the time and location of the wrongful conduct; the
indictments, coupled with the State’s discovery, remove any double-jeopardy issue
in these cases; and the Defendants are not entitled to a bill of particulars or to
otherwise be apprised of their level of conduct. Because the Defendants have not
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satisfied the requirements of Rule 13.5(c)(1), they are not entitled to a dismissal of
the indictments.
II. The Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement should be denied.
This Court should deny the Defendants’ motions for more definite statements
because they have not shown good cause under Rule 13.2. As explained above, an
indictment must only contain a statement of legal conclusions, not the evidentiary
facts necessary to obtain a conviction. This theme of limited notice is echoed by the
rule that a motion for more definite statement should only be granted “for good cause
shown,” and that such a motion should “not be routinely made or granted.” Ala. R.
Crim. P. 13, cmt. Courts have held that such a motion is appropriate when an
indictment fails to allege a mental state, A.L.L. v. State, 42 So.3d 146, 147 (Ala.
Harrison v. State, 879 So. 2d 1339, 1339 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). The Defendants’
discovery production, considered along with the indictment, is more than sufficient
to inform the Defendants of the nature of the crimes with which they have been
charged. See R.A.S. v. State, 718 So. 2d 117, 121 (Ala. 1998) (“The Court of
Criminal Appeals correctly noted that any critical details that are available to the
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for a more definite statement as authorized by Rule 13.2(e), Ala. R. Crim. P., or any
The State satisfied its discovery obligations under Rule 16.1, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
copies of all discoverable items in these cases. (“. . . [T]he prosecutor shall . . . permit
tangible objects . . . which are within the possession, custody, and control of the state
. . . and which are material to the preparation of the defendant’s case.”). Production
was made using a word-searchable format that allows the Defendants to be on equal
footing with the State. In addition, the State has provided a preliminary list of its trial
exhibits in a letter that included the Bates number(s) Defendants can utilize as an aid
in the review of the discovery. (May 25 Letter, attached hereto as Exhibit 2).
Accordingly, the Defendants are on notice of the crimes with which they are
charged, and they possess the necessary information to understand the charged
offense and to prepare any defense. In sum, the facts the Defendants seek in their
motions are already in their possession. These charges are illuminated by the
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Alabama’s Ethics Laws. See Ala. Code § 36-25-1(16). For purposes of the Ethics
Laws, Lewis’ son, Joseph Lewis, is a member of her family. See Ala. Code § 36-25-
1(15) (defining “Family Member of the Public Official”). Because Joseph Lewis is
a member of Lewis’s family, his former employer, GSI, and his current employer,
SARCOR, are businesses with which Lewis is associated. See § 36-25-1(2) (defining
The State alleges Defendants Jones and Williams intentionally aided and
abetted Lewis’s use of her public office for personal gain. A person is legally
accountable for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the
intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he aids or abets such other
person in committing the offense. See Ala. Code § 13A-2-23; see also Stokley v.
State, 254 Ala. 534, 49 So. 2d 284 (1951) (“All persons concerned in commission
living in Madison, Alabama. Lewis supported her son financially by signing the
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omitted from public filing3]. The defense does not deny that Lewis asked Defendant
Jones to help find her son a job. At the time, Jones was the account manager for
whether to pay Arcadis for work Jones oversaw. Not long after Lewis asked Jones
for help, Defendant Williams hired her son to build a website for GSI in April 2012.
and received nearly all of its revenue from Arcadis, for BWWB work that Jones
directed to Williams.
After paying Joseph Lewis for more than a year despite his performing no
work, Williams emailed him in June 2013, saying, “Joe, please send me your ideas
on the website. I’d like to get something up by early July.” Three days later, Joseph
responded, “Ok.” Three weeks later, Joseph sent another email to Williams stating,
“I’m still working the ideas for your website…. Will have something to you soon.”
and 8). Even after this exchange, Joseph Lewis never followed through on the
website. Despite this, Joseph Lewis continued to receive paychecks from GSI until
3
Due to privacy concerns and logistical considerations because of their size, large exhibits or
exhibits containing financial records have been omitted from the public filing of this response.
Upon request of the Court, the State will produce such records for in camera inspection.
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filing]. In fact, Williams paid another designer to build a GSI website in December
paid Joseph Lewis forty paychecks totaling approximately $26,000 over 20 months
investigators with the Attorney General’s Office asked Williams whether Lewis
knew her son was getting paid despite not doing any work. He replied, “How could
While he was being paid by GSI, between May 2012 and October 2013,
Joseph Lewis regularly deposited cash into his mother’s Regions checking account.
[omitted from public filing]. In total, Joseph Lewis made twenty-seven deposits into
Defendant Lewis’s bank account between May 2012 and October 2013. He made
thirteen of those deposits on the same day GSI paid him. He made another 12
deposits within a week of being paid by GSI. (Id.) All together, Joseph Lewis
deposited at least $12,540 into Defendant Lewis’s bank account between May 2012
and October 2013. (Id.) In return, Lewis used some of the money her son received
from GSI to pay the rent on Joseph Lewis’s apartment. (Id.) In fact, Lewis paid
$10,650 in rent to Summer Tree Apartments for Joseph Lewis over two years. (Id.)
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Not only did Jones funnel money to Lewis through her son and GSI, he also
deposited money directly into Lewis’s Regions bank account. The State produced a
Regions security video made in April 2016 (and a still image taken from that video),
showing Jones withdrawing $1,400 in cash from his own bank account at the
hereto as Exhibits 10, 11, and 12) [Exhibits 11 and 12 omitted from public filing].
Approximately one minute later, Jones deposited $1,400 into Lewis’s account. (Id.)
Less than one month later, Jones stopped at the Regions Bank Alabaster branch,
withdrew $1,000 from his own bank account, and two minutes later deposited $600
into Lewis’s account. Even though Lewis never loaned Jones money, Jones wrote
The State’s discovery permits Defendants to understand why Lewis has been
charged with using her office for personal gain for herself, her son Joseph Lewis,
and a business with which she was associated, GSI. This discovery further permits
indictments.
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which she or a family member had a financial gain or interest. Jones and Williams
are charged as aiders and abettors to Lewis’s votes. As explained above in count one,
Joseph Lewis was paid as an employee of Arcadis subcontractor, GSI, between April
2012 and December 2013. In March 2014—three months after GSI quit paying
Despite never disclosing that her son worked for Arcadis subcontractors,
between 2012 and 2016, Defendant Lewis was present and voted for Arcadis (f/k/a
Malcom Pirnie) to receive money on at least 65 occasions. The State produced all of
the BWWB meeting minutes4 from that time to the Defendants in discovery
from public filing]. An example of such a document, the minutes from the October
to 84377). While Lewis received ethics training as a public official and filed
4
Due to the size of the documents, the minutes from every meeting between 2012 and 2016 have
been omitted from the public filing. Upon request of the Court, the State will produce such records
for in camera inspection. They are also available from the BWWB as a public record.
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attached hereto as Exhibits 15, 16, and 17), she never recused or otherwise refrained
from voting to pay Arcadis. The State’s discovery shows that some of the money
Lewis voted to pay Arcadis, GSI, and SARCOR was given to her son, who later
deposited a portion of the money into her personal bank account. Thus, Defendants
received a thing for the purpose of corruptly influencing her official action. Ala.
Code § 36-25-7(b). Jones and Williams are charged with intentionally offering or
giving Lewis a thing for the purpose of corruptly influencing her official action. Ala.
Code § 36-25-7(a). The Alabama Ethics Act defines “corruptly” as “to act
end or result.” Ala. Code § 36-25-7(e). These charges are further illuminated by the
well as whether to authorize approval for Arcadis to perform additional work outside
attached hereto as Exhibit 18). Because of Lewis’s votes and other official action as
a public official, Arcadis earned tens of millions of dollars from the BWWB.
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accounting of the times Lewis voted to pay Arcadis and the amount of money
Arcadis received from Lewis’s votes is available in the State’s discovery, in addition
On more than one occasion, Jones falsified expense reports to hide his
methods of corrupt influence. For example, on Valentine’s Day 2013, Lewis and
Jones scheduled a one-night layover together in Las Vegas before they would join
Phoenix. Jones hid this secret getaway and justified his expenses by telling Arcadis
that he got stranded in Las Vegas because his plane was delayed. In truth, Lewis and
Jones had already booked one-way plane tickets from Birmingham to Las Vegas
According to Jones’s expense reports, he stayed in the Embassy Suites, and he and
Lewis shared a $357 dinner at Michael Mina, a restaurant inside the Bellagio Hotel.
submitting that his “flight [was] delayed en route to Phoenix” Arcadis paid for Jones
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AL000001881, attached hereto as Exhibits 24 and 25). This dinner cost $553.25
(Id.), and occurred the night before the BWWB—with Lewis’s yes vote—approved
hereto as Exhibits 27 and 28). Jones’s expense reports show that he requested
reimbursement from Arcadis for dinners he labeled as BWWB events, including one
at Capital Grille on June 19, 2016, which the FBI surveilled. (Id.) On his expense
report to Arcadis, Jones lists himself and Lewis as eating dinner at Capital Grille,
when in fact Jones was not there. Instead, Arcadis, by virtue of Jones’s actions,
picked up the tab for Lewis, her son, and two other individuals not associated with
At the time, Lewis paid $699.79 for the dinner with her own credit card, which
AL000002666, attached hereto as Exhibit 31). On June 25, Jones wrote a check to
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Joseph Lewis for $600, notating “Dinner in Chicago” on the memo line.
On June 30, 2016, Joseph Lewis cashed the $600 check from Jones and deposited
$700 into his mother’s bank account, which fully reimbursed his mother for the
dinner that Jones did not attend. (AG_REGIONS_SL_0001 to 2277) [omitted from
public filing].
During the same Chicago trip, Jones lied on additional expense reports. On
June 20, 2016, the night after the dinner at Capital Grille, Jones expensed $381.07
for a dinner at a Chicago restaurant called Rosebud. This time, Jones did not identify
Lewis as joining him for dinner even though FBI surveillance showed otherwise.
Exhibits 33, 34, and 35). On June 22, Jones did the same thing at Wollensky’s Grill
for a dinner that cost $464.89 and included Lewis, though she was not listed as an
hereto as Exhibits 36, 37, and 38). All told, Lewis obtained a job for her son that she
never disclosed, received cash deposits from her son and Jones, and enjoyed dinners
paid for with falsified expense reports. These actions were for the purpose of
corruptly influencing Lewis, and they violated the Ethics Act. By offering and
providing these things, Defendants Jones and Williams also violated the Ethics Act.
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* * *
In sum, this Court should deny the Defendants’ motions for a more definite
statement because the indictments, read together with the discovery, place the
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully asks this Court to deny the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The indictments are legally sufficient and place the
Defendants on notice of the crimes with which they have been charged. Additionally,
the State asks this Court to deny their alternative motions for more a definite
Steve Marshall
Attorney General
s/ Peggy Rossmanith
Peggy Rossmanith
Assistant Attorney General
James R. Houts
Deputy Attorney General
Kyle Beckman
Assistant Attorney General
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STATE OF ALABAMA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
501 Washington Avenue
Montgomery, AL 36130
(334) 242-7300
srossmanith@ago.state.al.us
jhouts@ago.state.al.us
kbeckman@ago.state.al.us
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on May 31, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing using the
AlaFile system, which will send notification of such filing to all parties of record in
the case.
s/ Peggy Rossmanith
Assistant Attorney General
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