J.

DEL CASTILLO
CASE DIGESTS

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For Remedial Law 1

Submitted to:
Atty. Christian “Kit” Villasis

15 September 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REMEDIAL LAW ...................................................................................................1
POLITICAL LAW...............................................................................................392
CIVIL LAW..........................................................................................................482
LABOR LAW .......................................................................................................692
CRIMINAL LAW ................................................................................................915
COMMERCIAL LAW ......................................................................................1123
TAXATION LAW..............................................................................................1152
LEGAL ETHICS................................................................................................1186

REMEDIAL LAW

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YANG CHI HAO
G.R. NO. 165332, October 2, 2009

DOCTRINE:Only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, may be entertained in a
petition for certiorari; that certiorari will not lie where an appeal may be taken or is lost
through petitioner’s own doing; and that questions of fact are not decided by this Court.

FACTS:
Yang Chi Hao, private respondent herein, filed a Petition for Naturalization before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila which was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines
through the Office of the SolGen. The OSG cross-examined the private respondent and
his witnesses, but did not present any of its own evidence. The trial court issued a
decision denying the Petition for Naturalization which prompted the private respondent to
file a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the trial court.
Thereafter the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the court.
Instead of filing an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals, the OSG filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, claiming that by reversing its original
decision, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
The appellate court dismissed the petition declaring that the present recourse is an
incorrect, improper, or a wrong legal remedy for the simple reason that the order in
question is a final order which disposed of the case. Hence, the proper recourse
therefrom is an ordinary appeal to be filed within fifteen (15) days from the time the OSG
received notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it granted the petition for naturalization of the private
respondent.

HELD:
No.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.
In this case, the OSG simply argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition for
naturalization because it failed to consider material evidence that would warrant the
denial of said petition. If, indeed, there was error, this is simply an error of judgment in
appreciation of facts and the law. Besides, the trial court has the discretion to reverse
itself upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Indeed, Section 3, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court is explicit in that a trial court may amend its judgment or order if it finds that

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the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law. If a mistake was committed
by the trial court, it was in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, the error is one of
judgment, not of jurisdiction; consequently, petitioner's remedy is appeal, not certiorari.
Also, also mandated by Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or
the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Notably, in Keswani v. Republic, we
declared that the remedy from a decision by the trial court admitting an individual as a
Filipino citizen is through an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, a decision granting a petition for naturalization becomes executory only
two years after its promulgation. On this matter, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530 (1950)
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for
Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the
publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the
application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after
the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to
a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
As such, petitioner is not without a remedy to assail the grant of citizenship. In
addition, it may also move to have the naturalization certificate cancelled in the proper
proceedings, if it can be shown that the certificate was obtained fraudulently.

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ARNEL SAGANA vs. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 161952 October 2, 2009

DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service of summons
to be valid, the following must be demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons
within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts were exerted to locate the party;
and (c) that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s
office or regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving
these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return.

FACTS:
Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages alleging that Richard A. Francisco shot
him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh.
The process server Manuel S. Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at
respondent's address at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was
unsuccessful. In his Server's Return, he stated that he tried to personally serve the
summons to respondent at his given address, however, the occupant of that house, who
refused to give his identity, told him that respondent is unknown at said address.
Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted to serve the summons but
these proved to be futile.Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to
respondent's office through registered mail. However, despite three notices, respondent
failed to pick up the summons.
The trial court dismissed the case on account of petitioner's lack of interest to
prosecute. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that after the Server's
Return was filed, he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, and it was confirmed that
respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City and the same
was granted conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days
from receipt of the Order.
Thus, Process Server Jarvis Iconar again tried to serve the summons at the
address of the respondent but no avail. According to Iconar's handwritten notation on the
summons, he was informed by Michael Francisco, respondent's brother, that respondent
no longer lived at said address. However, he left a copy of the summons to Michael
Francisco.
This prompted the petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default
alleging that despite service of summons, respondent still failed to file an Answer. The
trial court issued an Order finding that the summons was validly served to respondent
through his brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner
to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court
documents were furnished to respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St.
Michael Francisco, through his counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying
that he received the summons or that he was authorized to receive summons on behalf of
his brother, respondent Richard Francisco. He alleged that the substituted service did not
comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at
defendant's residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of
the defendant. Michael Francisco also prayed that his name be stricken off the records as

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having received a copy of the summons. The trial court issued an Order denying Michael
Francisco's Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit.
Having failed to file an answer or any responsive pleading, Francisco was declared
in default and Sagana was allowed to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of
Sagana.
Francisco appealed to the CA and prayed that the RTC erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the person, despite the irregularity of the substituted service of summons
by the court Process Server and in awarding of damages to Sagana. CA favored
Francisco hence Sagana filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not summons were properly served to Francisco

HELD:
Yes.
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court, the rules of procedure then
in force at the time summons was served, provided:
Section 8.Substituted service. - If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service of summons to be
valid, the following must be demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c)
that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at
the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or regular
place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return.
In this case, personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court,
although unsuccessfully. In the first attempt, the resident of the house refused to receive
the summons; worse, he would not even give his name. In the second attempt,
respondent's own brother refused to sign for receipt of the summons, and then later
claimed that he never received a copy, despite his participation in the proceedings. The
trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work, but to
no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's
return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case.
Clearly, personal service of summons was made impossible by the acts of the
respondent in refusing to reveal his whereabouts, and by the act of his brother in claiming
that respondent no longer lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., yet failing to disclose his
brother's location. We also note that it was the trial court which directed that the second
service of summons be made within seven days; thus, the reasonable time was
prescribed by the trial court itself.
Undeniably, no Sheriff's Return was prepared by process server Jarvis Iconar; the
only record of the second service of summons was Mr. Iconar's handwritten notation in

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the summons itself. However, the information required by law and prevailing
jurisprudence, that is, that personal service was impossible because of the claim that
respondent no longer lived at the stated address, that efforts were exerted to locate the
respondent through the multiple attempts to serve summons, and that summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion, were already in the records of the
trial court.
Moreover, we find the claim that respondent moved out of their residence in March
1993 without informing his brother or parents his whereabouts, despite regular calls and
letters, simply incredulous. What makes this version of events even more implausible is
respondent's admission that he received a copy of the trial court's Decision of 20
September 1999 that was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita Street. Respondent even filed a
Notice of Appeal coincidentally indicating that his address was No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Baesa, Quezon City. He also received a copy of the appellate court's order for preliminary
conference that was sent to said address. These were never denied by respondent,
despite being given every opportunity to do so.

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METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., vs. LAMB CONSTRUCTION
CONSORTIUM CORPORATION, represented by Victor T. Nubla and Edgardo C.
Santos
G.R. No. 170906 | November 27, 2009

DOCTRINE: A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte,
non-adversarial, and summary in nature because the only issue involved is the
purchaser's right to possession. In fact, Section 7 of Act 3135 (1924) expressly provides
that it is the ministerial duty of the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession in favor of
the purchaser even during the redemption period, unless the case falls under the
exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence. As a rule, mere inadequacy or surplus in
the purchase price does not affect the purchaser's entitlement to a writ of possession. In
case there is a surplus, the mortgagor is entitled to receive the same from the purchaser.
The failure or refusal of the mortgagee-purchaser to return the surplus does not affect the
validity of the sale but gives the mortgagor a cause of action against the
mortgagee-purchaser.

FACTS:
Lamb Construction Consortium Corporation obtained a P5.5 million loan from
petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., subject to 18% interest per annum. To secure
the loan, respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of petitioner involving six
parcels of land. Respondent, however, failed to pay the loan upon maturity hence
petitioner filed a petition for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the said properties. During the
auction sale, petitioner emerged as the highest bidder with the bid amount of
P6,669,765.75 and was accordingly issued a Certificate of Sale.
During the period of redemption, petitioner filed a verified petition for issuance of a
writ of possession. Petitioner alleged that notwithstanding its demands, respondent
refused and failed to turn over actual possession of the foreclosed properties. While the
petition was pending with the trial court, respondent redeemed the one of the parcels of
land mortgaged.
RTC rendered a Decision denying petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of
possession because it failed to deposit the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale.
On appeal, CA ruled that petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession, the issuance of
which is ministerial upon the court. At the same time, it ruled that petitioner is also obliged
to return the excess of the bid price over the outstanding obligation, since the application
of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor's obligation is
an act of payment, not payment by dation. It then found imperative that an assessment of
the total outstanding debt be made in order to resolve whether there was any surplus
proceeds which must be returned to respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can rule upon the surplus or excess of the purchase price
upon issuing a writ of possession

HELD:
No

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In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441 (1997), we withheld the issuance of a writ
of possession because the mortgagee failed to deliver the surplus from the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale which is equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt.
Sulit was considered as an exception to the general rule that it is ministerial upon the
court to issue a writ of possession even during the period of redemption. We explained
that equitable considerations prevailing in said case demand that a writ of possession
should not issue.
In the subsequent case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 538 SCRA
390 (2007) however, we clarified that the exception made in Sulit does not apply when the
period to redeem has already expired or when ownership over the property has already
been consolidated in favor of the mortgagee-purchaser. In other words, even if the
mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the surplus, a writ of possession must still be issued.
In the instant case, the period to redeem has already lapsed. Thus, following the ruling in
Saguan, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner is in order.
The failure of the mortgagee to deliver the surplus proceeds does not affect the
validity of the foreclosure sale. It gives rise to a cause of action for the mortgagee to file an
action to collect the surplus proceeds. Relatedly, we held in Sulit that if the mortgagee is
retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not
affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover
such surplus.
In the instant case, the cadastral court is without jurisdiction to order petitioner to
deliver to respondent the surplus or excess of the purchase price. The only issue in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is the purchaser's entitlement to
possession. No documentary or testimonial evidence is even required for the issuance of
the writ as long as the verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the purchaser to
the relief requested. As held in Saguan, when the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the
surplus, the remedy of a mortgagor "lies in a separate civil action for collection of a sum of
money", thus:
However, petitioners' remedy lies in a separate civil action for collection of a
sum of money. We have previously held that where the mortgagee retains more of
the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the
validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such
surplus. In the same case, both parties can establish their respective rights and
obligations to one another, after a proper liquidation of the expenses of the
foreclosure sale, and other interests and claims chargeable to the purchase price
of the foreclosed property. The court can then determine the proper application of
compensation with respect to respondent's claim on petitioners' remaining
unsecured obligations. In this regard, respondent is not precluded from itself filing
a case to collect on petitioners' remaining debt.
An action to collect the surplus proceeds is improper where there is a pending
action for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings.

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JOVEN YUKI, JR., vs. WELLINGTON CO
G.R. No. 178527 | November 27, 2009

DOCTRINE:It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint and cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant; Principle
holds even if the facts proved during trial do not support the cause of action alleged in the
complaint.

FACTS:
Mr. Joseph Chua was the registered owner of a parcel of land, together with a
commercial building erected thereon. In 1981, he leased a portion of the building to
petitioner Joven Yuki, Jr., who put up a business therein under the name and style
"Supersale Auto Supply." The contract of lease between Mr. Chua and petitioner had a
term of five years but was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, the lease was renewed
through a series of verbal and written agreements, the last of which was a written
Contract of Lease covering the period of January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 at a
monthly rental of P7,000.00.
In November 2003, Mr. Chua informed petitioner that he sold the property to
respondent Wellington Co and instructed petitioner to henceforth pay the rent to the new
owner. After the expiration of the lease contract, petitioner refused to vacate and
surrender the leased premises. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MeTC of Manila.
Petitioner denied having been served with copies of the alleged notice of sale and
notice to vacate. By way of affirmative defenses, he claimed that the complaint should be
dismissed for being premature as there was no allegation therein of prior referral to the
barangay. Petitioner also asserted that since he was not notified by the former owner of
the sale, he was deprived of his preemptive rights. Moreover, respondent has no cause of
action against him because respondent is not the true owner of the property but merely
acts as a representative of persons whom respondent refused to disclose. Further,
petitioner argued that there was an implied renewal of lease considering that a) he did not
receive a notice to vacate, b) the two months deposit and one month advance payment
he gave to Mr. Chua were never returned to him, and c) respondent accepted his
payments for the months of January and February 2004.
Petitioner also asserted that his property rights would be violated if he is evicted
because he has been operating his business in the premises for more than 20 years and
has established goodwill in the area. He thus proposed that he be compensated the
amount of not less than P1 million or be allowed to dispose of his stocks within a
reasonable period of time, before he vacates the premises.
On September 21, 2004, the MeTC-Branch 15 rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondent. In reversing the ruling of the MeTC, the RTC found no proof on record that
petitioner actually received the notice to vacate, thereby making the Complaint fatally
defective. The RTC likewise opined that the resolution of the case hinges on the
existence of implied new lease, a question which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, therefore, beyond the MeTC's jurisdiction. Before the CA, the decision of the RTC
was set aside and reinstated the decision of the MeTC.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of an implied new lease, a matter which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, beyond the MeTC's jurisdiction.

HELD:
No.
The allegation of existence of implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will not divest
the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. It is an elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the
complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
pleadings filed by the defendant. This principle holds even if the facts proved during trial
do not support the cause of action alleged in the complaint. In connection with this, it is
well to note that in unlawful detainer cases the elements to be proved and resolved are
the facts of lease and expiration or violation of its terms.
Here, no interpretative exercise is needed to conclude that respondent has
complied with such requirement. In respondent's Complaint, he specifically alleged that
(1) the former owner, Mr. Chua, and petitioner entered into a contract of lease; (2)
subsequently, respondent purchased the leased premises from Mr. Chua and became
the owner thereof; (3) thereafter, the lease contract between Mr. Chua and petitioner
expired; and (4) petitioner refused to vacate the premises despite the expiration and
non-renewal of the lease.
Besides, we do not agree with the RTC that the MeTC does not have jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of existence of implied new lease in the unlawful detainer case. Tacita
reconduccion refers to the right of the lessee to continue enjoying the material or de facto
possession of the thing leased within a period of time fixed by law. During its existence,
the lessee can prevent the lessor from evicting him from the disputed premises. On the
other hand, it is too well-settled to require a citation that the question to be resolved in
unlawful detainer cases is, who is entitled to de facto possession. Therefore, since tacita
reconduccion is determinative of who between the parties is entitled to de facto
possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction to resolve and pass upon the issue of implied new
lease in unlawful detainer case. In Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the MeTC is clothed with exclusive original jurisdiction over an
unlawful detainer case even if the same would entail compelling the plaintiff therein to
recognize an implied lease agreement.

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POWER SITES AND SIGNS, INC., vs. UNITED NEON
(a Division of Ever Corporation)
G.R. No. 163406 | November 24, 2009

DOCTRINE: Before a court grants injunctive relief, the following must be demonstrated:
that complainant is entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of
complainant's rights, the probability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary
compensation as relief. Otherwise, there is no basis for the issuance of a writ of
injunction.

FACTS:
The petitioner sent a letter-complaint to the Muntinlupa City Engineer and Building
Official requesting to revoke United Neon’s building permit and to issue a Cease and
Desist Order against it. The City Building Official referred the complaint to United Neon to
comment. However, before a resolution could be made by the City Building Official,
Power Sites filed a Petition for Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against United Neon before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City.
After the filing of the parties' respective memoranda, which took the place of
testimonial evidence, the RTC granted petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
United Neon then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals. In brief, United Neon claimed that the grant of preliminary injunction was
unwarranted, particularly because Power Sites only prayed for a prohibitory injunction in
its original petition, but the Order went as far as to grant a mandatory injunction in favor of
Power Sites. United Neon prayed that the Court of Appeals invalidate the RTC's Order
and Writ, issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from further proceeding.
After the parties' exchange of pleadings, the Court of Appeals invalidated the Order of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly invalidated the order of the RTC which granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Power Sites

HELD:
Yes
A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly
entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.
While the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. The
standard is even higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction, which should
only be granted -

x x x in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where
considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor;
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest

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and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing
relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation x x x.
The evidence presented before us in support of a preliminary injunction is weak
and inconclusive, and the alleged right sought to be protected by petitioner is vehemently
disputed. We note that both parties allege that: (1) they began construction of their
respective billboards first; (2) the billboard of the other party blocks the other's exclusive
line of sight; (3) they are entitled to protection under the provisions of the National Building
Code and OAAP Code of Ethics/Guidelines.[30] However, we are not in a position to
resolve these factual matters, which should be resolved by the trial court. The question of
which party began construction first and which party is entitled to the exclusive line of
sight is inextricably linked to whether or not petitioner has the right that deserves
protection through a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the trial court would be in the best
position to determine which billboard was constructed first, their actual location, and
whether or not an existing billboard was obstructed by another.

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Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr., Raymundo Hipolito III, and Edgardo Ridao,
Petitioners, vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), as represented by
its President Ma. Pilar B. Aquino and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION CREDIT
COOPERATIVE, INC., as represented by its President Daniel Borbon, Respondents
G.R. No. 164886 | November 24, 2009

DOCTRINE: Summary judgments are sanctioned by the Rules of Court as a device to
simplify and expedite the resolution of cases when, as shown by pleadings, affidavits,
depositions or admissions on the records, there are no genuine issues which would entail
an expensive, lengthy and protracted trial. However, if there is a genuine issue of material
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, resort to summary judgment would not
be proper. Stated otherwise, if there exists an issue of fact, the motion for summary
judgment should be denied.

FACTS:
Petitioners acted as counsel for the Union in the negotiation of the CBA between the
management of three corporations – SMC, Magnolia Corporation and San Miguel Foods,
Incorporated and the Union. They filed a complaint with Application for Preliminary
Attachment for the collection of unpaid attorney’s fees for the legal services they rendered
for SMCEU-PTGWPO.
On the other hand, the respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment
and Dismiss Complaint. They alleged that the Board Resolution passed was neither valid
nor ratified by the Unions general membership. They also alleged that no demand to pay
attorney’s fees was made to the Union and that petitioners had already been paid for their
services.
The RTC denied the Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment and Dismiss
Complaint. In its Order, the RTC ordered the garnishees - San Miguel Corporation,
Magnolia Corporation, San Miguel Foods, Inc., and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) - to deliver the garnished funds to the Clerk of Court, RTC-Manila. Meanwhile,
San Miguel Corporation Credit Cooperative, Inc. (Credit Cooperative) moved to intervene
in the case claiming that the garnished funds included cooperative dues, the seed capital
of which appears to have come from the union funds. In its Answer in Intervention, the
Credit Cooperative prayed for the lifting of the garnishment of its funds, arguing that said
funds do not belong to or are owned by the Union but actually came from the individual
share capital of its members.
Meanwhile, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by petitioners and
Hipolito, Jr., the latter acting in his capacity as President of the Union and obligating the
Union to pay petitioners' claim for attorney's fees in the reduced amount of P1.5 million.
This Compromise Agreement, although initially approved by the RTC, was later on
invalidated and set aside by the trial court on the ground of irregularities surrounding its
execution. The case was then set for pre-trial conference. Meanwhile, in a local union
election of officers held were Ma. Pilar B. Aquino (Aquino) and Marcial A. Frisnedi
(Frisnedi) were elected as the President and Vice-President, respectively. As newly
elected officers of the Union, they filed a Motion for Substitution/Intervention, which was

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granted in an Order of the RTC. The RTC also allowed the Union, under its new set of
officers, to amend its answer to the complaint.
The RTC ordered the garnished funds of the Union in the amount of P3 million to
be deposited with the Philippine National Bank. The trial court denied the Union's motion
to resume pre-trial and instead.
However, petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. They averred that the
case was ripe for Summary Judgment because there was a judicial admission that legal
services were indeed rendered which resulted to the benefits enjoyed by the workers in
the 1992-1995 CBA.
The Union opposed the motion arguing that it only admitted the allegation in the
complaint insofar as the benefits enjoyed by the workers in the 1992-1995 CBA are
concerned but not the legal services allegedly rendered by petitioners. Further, it alleged
that the amount claimed as attorney's fees was unconscionable. The trial court rendered
its Decision granting the motion for summary judgment. It held that the case was ripe for
summary judgment in view of the Union's admission, through Hipolito, Jr., of its monetary
obligation to petitioners in the amount of P3 million for the legal services they rendered.
The Union appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision
nullifying the RTC's Decision and remanding the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is ripe for summary judgment considering the fact that the
amount for services rendered is not yet determined

HELD:
The determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees would require
presentation of evidence and a full-blown trial. The Rules of Court allows the rendition of a
summary judgment if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on
file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There
can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the
basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance
of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors would indispensably
require nothing less than a full-blown trial where the party can adduce evidence to
establish the right to lawful attorney\'s fees and for the other party to oppose or refute the
same.
The Union considers the attorney's fees in the amount of P3 million as
unreasonable, unconscionable and without basis. In fixing said amount of attorney's fees,
the RTC ratiocinated that the issue of the reasonableness of the amount claimed as
attorney's fees had been heard by the IBP in the disbarment case.
The question of unconscionableness of P3,000,000,00 Attorney's fees of Atty.
Hipolito has been heard and tried by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hence, all
defenses and claims of defendant Union now through the new president Aquino shall be

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dismissed under Section 7, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure necessitating a
Summary judgment, attaching therewith the various transcripts of stenographic notes of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. That there is [sic] no more triable issues otherwise
what was heard by the IBP on unconscionable attorney's fees would be heard again. That
if the defendant Union in 1990 prior to the instant case paid a single lone-lawyer of the
Union of 5% broken down as follows: 4% (2.3 Million as Attorney's fees) and 1%
(670,799.52 as seed capital of the Union's cooperative) as shown in the Court's T.S.N.
dated October 4, 1994; the defendant Union can not now claim the P3 Million Attorney's
fees for three (3) lawyers with a higher and subsequent 1993 CBA benefits as
unconscionable.
We find that the RTC erroneously ruled on this matter. First, it does not appear
from the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Jaime M. Vibar, the IBP
Commissioner who tried the disbarment case, that a pronouncement was made as to how
much Hipolito III (petitioner herein) should receive as attorney's fees. The IBP merely
sustained Hipolito III's entitlement to compensation for acting as union counsel in
collaboration with Loy, Jr. and Ridao (co-petitioners herein) in concluding the 1992-1995
CBA, but refused to fix an amount as the matter was already being heard in court.
Second, the testimony of Abuerne was unsubstantiated by evidence, thereby making her
an incompetent witness to testify on such matters. The records of the Credit Cooperative
were not presented to substantiate Abuerne's statements. The lawyer who was allegedly
paid P2.3 million attorney's fees in 1990 was not also presented to testify. No proof was
proffered to show that Hipolito III was entitled to or actually received the amount. Hence,
the RTC arbitrarily fixed petitioners' attorney's fees at P3 million despite insufficient
factual basis.
When material allegations are disputed, it cannot be asserted that there is no real
issue necessitating a formal trial. We deem it necessary, therefore, that further inquiry
should be made in order for petitioners to prove the extent of the services they rendered,
the time they consumed in the negotiations and such other matters necessary for the
determination of the reasonable value of their services.
Mindful that the instant case has been pending for more than a decade, we
painstakingly reviewed the records. Unfortunately, we find them inadequate and
insufficient to determine the reasonableness of the amount claimed or to fix, for that
matter, a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in order to finally resolve the present
controversy. Thus, in order to adequately afford both parties ample opportunity to present
their evidence in support of their respective claims, a remand is inevitable, but only for the
purpose of determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees on quantum meruit
basis.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

LYNN PAZ T. DELA CRUZ et al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.
G.R. No. 161929, December 8, 2009

DOCTRINE: Under the principle of the law of the case, when a question is passed upon by
an appellate court and the case is subsequently remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question becomes settled upon a subsequent appeal. Whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court.

FACTS:
The instant criminal complaint arose from the construction and/or renovation project
involving several multi-purpose halls located in various barangays in the City of Tarlac.
Upon post audit, the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit issued two Notice of
Disallowances on the ground that what were actually constructed and/or renovated were
barangay chapels in violation of Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
335 of the Local Government Code prohibiting public expenditure for religious purposes.
On February 6, 1998, private complainants Jesus B. David and Ana Alamo Aguas
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman in connection with the approval and
implementation of the aforesaid projects against several local government officials of the
City of Tarlac for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
On December 8, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution which
granted the prosecutions motion and ordered the preventive suspension of the accused
for a period of 90 days. It ruled that the validity of the information has been previously
settled in its April 24, 2003 Resolution. Thus, under Section 13 of RA No. 3019, the
preventive suspension of the accused becomes mandatory. Petitioners thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE:
 Whether the subject criminal case was prematurely instituted considering the pendency
of petitioners appeals before the COA En Banc.
 Whether the Ombudsman may still reconsider his Resolution dated July 13, 1999,
dismissing the complaint, after the same has already become final and executory.
 Whether the subject information is fatally defective.
 Whether, on the basis of the admitted or undisputed facts, there is probable cause to
prosecute petitioners and their co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019

HELD:
The preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA No. 3019 is
mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid.
Section 13 of RA No. 3019 provides:
Section 13.Suspension and loss of benefits - Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be

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convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
Pursuant to this provision, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the
suspension order upon a proper determination of the validity of the information. The court
possesses no discretion to determine whether a preventive suspension is necessary to forestall
the possibility that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or frustrate his
prosecution, or continue committing malfeasance. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both.
The validity of the subject information has been raised and resolved in G.R. No. 158308.
Under the principle of the law of the case, this issue can no longer be re-litigated.
The issues and arguments in the instant petition were already included in the issues and
arguments raised and resolved in G.R. No. 158308. The Court EnBancs June 17, 2003
Resolution should, thus, have put to rest the issue of the validity of the subject information. Yet,
petitioners would have us now revisit the same issue in the instant petition. This cannot be done.
Under the principle of the law of the case, when a question is passed upon by an appellate court
and the case is subsequently remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, the question
becomes settled upon a subsequent appeal. Whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Thus, considering
that the validity of the information has long been settled in G.R. No. 158308, the Sandiganbayan
properly granted the motion to suspend the accused pendente lite.
In conclusion, we note with deep disapproval the failure of petitioners to properly apprise
this Court of the proceedings previously taken in G.R. No. 158308. Petitioners did not act
forthrightly when they omitted in their statement of facts that they had earlier challenged the
validity of the subject information before the Sandiganbayan and this Court, which issue they
now seek to resuscitate in the instant petition. That the accused should be allowed to arduously
and zealously defend his life, liberty and property is not in question. But this is so only within the
permissible limits of the framework of our criminal laws and rules of procedure. Indubitably, the
accused should not give ground for delay in the administration of criminal justice, much less,
hide from this Court the patent unworthiness of his cause.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO ESTRADA

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 17
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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010

DOCTRINE:A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public
trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.

FACTS:
On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against
appellant Edgardo Estrada charging him with two counts of Rape.Appellant was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Sometime in July 1997, she was sleeping side by side with her uncle, herein
appellant, when the latter suddenly placed his knees between her thighs and proceeded
to remove her clothes. Appellant who was already naked went on top of her and inserted
his penis in her vagina. AAA tried to resist but appellant pinned her hands above her
head. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, appellant told her not to report to anyone
what had transpired or she would be killed.
After the rape incident, AAA stayed at her grandfather’s house which was likewise
located in the same barangay where her grandmother’s house was situated. She thought
that she would be safe there. However, she was grievously mistaken. One evening, also
in the month of July 1997, appellant arrived thereat and again raped AAA. While the latter
was sleeping, appellant poked a knife at her and ordered her to remove her clothes. AAA
was cowed into submission and appellant succeeded in sexually assaulting her for the
second time.
On August 16, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of
qualified rape on two counts and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modifications the Decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals opined that mere
allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victims uncle would not suffice to
satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically stated
that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim can convict the accused in crime

HELD:
Yes. Applying the guiding principles that a) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and c) the evidence of
the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense, we affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding herein
appellant guilty of two counts of simple rape.

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Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
deserve great weight and respect. A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness. Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. More so
when, as in this case, the rape victim accuses a close relative of having ravished her. Indeed, if
the victim, who was only twelve years old when she was raped, had the guile to accuse her own
uncle of rape and send him to jail it was only because she was motivated by an honest desire to
have the crime against her punished.
In the instant case, it was clearly established by the prosecution that on two occasions in
July 1997, the victim was sexually abused by appellant through force and intimidation, against
her will and without her consent. The qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim was
likewise proven by the presentation of the latter’s Birth Certificate.
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the
victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the
requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that
appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that
appellant admitted that the victim is his niece.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 19
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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HILARIO ESCOTON
G.R. No. 183577, February 1, 2010

DOCTRINE: In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important
issue. In passing upon this matter, the highest degree of respect must be accorded to the
findings of the trial court. We stress that in rape cases the accused may be convicted
based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

FACTS:
AAA was born on October 29, 1990, as shown by her Certificate of Live Birth and
Baptismal Certificate. The appellant is the uncle of AAA, being the brother of her mother.
On May 12, 2001, at around 7 oclock in the evening, AAA and her brother were asleep in
the house of their maternal grandmother with whom they were residing. The appellant
woke up AAA and told her to follow him to his house which was about 500 meters away.
AAAs brother also woke up and accompanied her. Their grandmother did not give them
permission to leave, but they still proceeded towards their destination.
Upon arrival, the appellant undressed himself and removed the lower garments of
AAA. He made her lie down on the bamboo floor then inserted his penis into her vagina
despite her pleas to discontinue his hideous act. AAA felt pain as the appellant had sex
with her. The appellant raped AAA for five times during the night while her brother lay
silently beside her.
On June 28, 2004, the trial court rendered its Decision.The Court found accused
HILARION ESCOTON, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE
RAPE

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim can convict the accused in the crime
charged

HELD:
Yes. We stress that in rape cases the accused may be convicted based solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In this regard, the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of the victim, having personally heard her and observed
her deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. In the absence of any showing that the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor or circumstances of weight that
would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, the trial courts assessment
of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect.
The testimony of rape victims are given full weight and credence, considering that no
young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public
trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is
highly improbable that a girl of tender years who is not yet exposed to the ways of the world,
would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is false. Considering that
the victim in this case underwent a harrowing experience and exposed herself to the rigors of

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

public trial, it is unlikely that she would concoct false accusations against the appellant, who is
her uncle. Her spontaneous revelation of the assault on her and her unrelenting determination to
have the appellant arrested and prosecuted of rape lend credence to her claim that she was
indeed raped.
An accused can still be convicted of rape on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim.
Here, even if we disregard the medico-legal report, the result would still be the same the
prosecution, through the testimony of AAA, has successfully proved the case of rape against the
appellant.
Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a
credible witness. Between the positive assertions of the victim and the negative averments of the
appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary
weight.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

ARMANDO VIDAR @ Ricky, NORBERTO BUTALON, SONNYMARBELLA @ Spike
and JOHN DOES and PETER DOES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010

DOCTRINE: A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public
trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.

FACTS:
On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against
appellant Edgardo Estrada charging him with two counts of Rape.Appellant was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Sometime in July 1997, she was sleeping side by side with her uncle, herein
appellant, when the latter suddenly placed his knees between her thighs and proceeded
to remove her clothes. Appellant who was already naked went on top of her and inserted
his penis in her vagina. AAA tried to resist but appellant pinned her hands above her
head. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, appellant told her not to report to anyone
what had transpired or she would be killed.
After the rape incident, AAA stayed at her grandfather’s house which was likewise
located in the same barangay where her grandmother’s house was situated. She thought
that she would be safe there. However, she was grievously mistaken. One evening, also
in the month of July 1997, appellant arrived thereat and again raped AAA. While the latter
was sleeping, appellant poked a knife at her and ordered her to remove her clothes. AAA
was cowed into submission and appellant succeeded in sexually assaulting her for the
second time.
On August 16, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of
qualified rape on two counts and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modifications the Decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals opined that mere
allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victims uncle would not suffice to
satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically stated
that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim can convict the accused in crime.

HELD:
Yes. Applying the guiding principles that a) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and c) the evidence of
the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece. the rape victim accuses a close relative of having ravished her. Santos. deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration. who was only twelve years old when she was raped. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. De Mesa. Sy. Inguillo. as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim. Rañigo. Gloria. we affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding herein appellant guilty of two counts of simple rape. Corporal. Page 23 Echiverri. Ramirez. Catindig. Francisco. A witness who testified in a categorical. it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. Lastimosa. De la Cruz.. Alcazaren. deserve great weight and respect. Moreover. Lumberio. the testimony of a rape victim. the victim was sexually abused by appellant through force and intimidation. especially one who is young and immature. the evidence for the defense. Martinez. Corpuz. had the guile to accuse her own uncle of rape and send him to jail it was only because she was motivated by an honest desire to have the crime against her punished. especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. it was clearly established by the prosecution that on two occasions in July 1997. allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Castillo. Factual findings of the trial court. Rodriguez. Valois .e. straightforward. Reyes. Cabañgon. Coronel. Tabugan. against her will and without her consent. spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. Sandoval. Valiente. if the victim. Marquez. In the instant case. More so when. Albano. Indeed. i. Asensi. Espina. Palad. as in this case. we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. However. The qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim was likewise proven by the presentation of the latter’s Birth Certificate. Tecson.

Tabugan. De la Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order denying a Motion to Quash HELD: No. nor did the bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan. Corporal. Marquez. Catindig. Thus. SORIANO vs. Valois . Tecson. Corpuz. such as statment of address of the petitioner and oath of subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the complaint. to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 3(a). Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground: 1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC). No. 83 or RA 337 as amended by PD 1795). Espina. 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DORSI law (Sec. Francisco. an adverse decision is rendered. Palad. 1(b) of Art. Coronel. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Martinez. February 1. for the commission of estafa uner par. Albano. The state prosecutor conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information against Soriano for estafa through falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law. they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. Sy. Page 24 Echiverri. FONACIER G. Santos. Asensi. Sandoval. go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits. and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea. 2010 DOCTRINE: A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. Lastimosa. and 2. Rodriguez. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. BUAN. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. HILARIO P. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Valiente. petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead. FACTS: Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing a loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any loan in the bank. Alcazaren. Lumberio. De Mesa. Inguillo. 162336. Castillo. Gloria. and therefore a person cannot be charged of both offenses.R. for the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP). Reyes. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

unless certain facts or substance have been overlooked. Catindig. Sandoval. Reyes. An entrapment team was thus immediately formed to be conducted in Makati City. Lastimosa. February 5. Coronel. Rañigo. The examination showed that the contents of the plastic sachet weighed 0. Valois .00 buy-bust money. Ramirez. It is well-settled that the trial courts determination on the issue of credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of facts must be given great weight and respect on appeal. if considered. PO1 Inopia. Thereafter. PO1 Inopia lighted his cigarette. FACTS: On January 23. Likewise. an informant went to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Makati Police Station to inform PO1 Alex Inopia that appellant Nieva Alberto y De Nieva was selling shabu. Palad. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Inguillo. Francisco. Martinez. Valiente. The appellant asked PO1 Inopia how much shabu he needed and the latter handed over the P500. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility. Marquez. Castillo. Sy. 179717.25 gram and are positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. NIEVA ALBERTO y DE NIEVA G. having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 2010 DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the trial courts determination on the issue of credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of facts must be given great weight and respect on appeal. the informant approached the appellant and introduced the poseur-buyer. having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the lone witness is credible enough to convict the accused HELD: Yes. The appellant then gave a small plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Upon their arrival thereat. Rodriguez. Santos. unless certain facts or substance have been overlooked. and the consideration were proven. a dangerous drug. 2003. which. The identity of the buyer and the seller. The trial court found that all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were satisfactorily established by the prosecution. which. PO1 Santos responded and together with PO1 Inopia arrested the appellant and retrieved from her the buy-bust money. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Tecson. might affect the result of the case. Corporal. the object. The sachet containing the white crystalline substance was marked with the initials NDA and sent to the crime laboratory for examination. Alcazaren. No. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor were established. Page 25 Echiverri. Espina. De Mesa. might affect the result of the case. Asensi. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. which was the pre-arranged signal for the consummation of the illegal sale.R. De la Cruz. Gloria. Tabugan. Corpuz. Albano. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility. if considered.

De la Cruz. Corporal. Martinez. not counted. De Mesa. Besides. The inconsistencies ascribed to PO1 Inopia involve minor details. Santos. Catindig. Ramirez. Rodriguez. Tabugan. in any way. Thus. Cabañgon. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality. not quantity. Corroborative evidence is vital only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness twisted the truth. On the other hand. Sandoval. Reyes. Valiente. Lastimosa. Marquez. Francisco. Our re-examination of the testimony of PO1 Inopia follows the trial courts conclusion that his testimony was given in a straightforward and simple manner. Palad. Page 26 Echiverri. Castillo. Tecson. it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. and do not negate his positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. appellant is questioning the testimony of PO1 Inopia only on matters pertaining to minor details of the incident that do not. Asensi. Coronel. Gloria. fails to impress. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they were moved by ill will. The argument of the appellant that the prosecutions account of the buy-bust operation is unworthy of belief since no corroborative testimony was presented. Valois . It is to be weighed. Lumberio. Espina. There is no law requiring that in drug cases the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated to be believed. Alcazaren. Inguillo. too trivial to adversely affect his credibility as prosecution witness. Corpuz. affect her conviction. or that his or her observation was inaccurate. Albano. Rañigo. Sy. the testimony of PO1 Inopia on the circumstances that occurred on the date of the entrapment operation against the appellant from the moment he received a confidential tip from his informer until the time the buy-bust team apprehended the appellant deserves to be given weight and significance as it emanated from the mouth of a policeman who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty.

Sometime thereafter the HLURB issued a cease and desist order (CDO) enjoining the collection of amortization payments. Ramirez. They say that the latter was what the HLURB was referring to because it stated that Rita Viola was never impleaded. Tabugan. Arbiter Torres issued an Order denying respondent Viola's motion to quash the writ of execution and directed her to pay the Sps. The complaint stated that on various dates. Gloria.R. On May 26. In connection therewith. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint. 2000. 169706. No. Petitioners contend that the CA erred in ruling that the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived. De la Cruz. Reyes. On December 15. as in the case of Rita Viola. They contend that jurisdiction over the person can be conferred by consent expressly or impliedly given. Tecson. Cabañgon. The said complaint was verified by 34 individuals. Martinez. Albano. Clarification and Computation of Correct Amount of Money Judgment and Allowance of Appeal. the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. Coronel. De Mesa. provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. Francisco. Espina. who referred to themselves as the "Complainants" who "caused the preparation of the foregoing Complaint". 1995. The latter however refused to accept their payments and instead demanded for a lump sum payment of all the accrued amortizations which fell due during the effectivity of the CDO. Palad. Santos. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by highest court of the land.31. Corporal. is not fatal to the case. Alcazaren. Corpuz. Torres issued the Writ of Execution. the Housing Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering complainants to resume payment of their monthly amortization from date hereof pursuant to the agreement. Marquez. SPOUSES WILLIAM GENATO and REBECCA GENATO vs. complainants went to the Sps. WILLIAM GENATO and spouse REBECCA GENATO" was filed with the HLURB. Castillo. versus MR. including the respondent herein. February 5. Sy. complainants executed Contracts to Sell and/or Lease Purchase Agreements with the Sps. the sheriff seized Rita Viola's two delivery trucks and 315 sacks of rice. Page 27 Echiverri. Inguillo. Rañigo. Respondent Viola then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Execution. FACTS: In October 1991. Catindig.133. Genato the amount of ₱739. Sandoval. On March 8. Lumberio. However. Genato pertaining to housing units in Villa Rebecca Homes Subdivision. Thereafter. 2000. This CDO was subsequently lifted. Genato with the intention of resuming their amortization payments. Arbiter Marino Bernardo M. The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3. INC. Rodriguez. Valois . They submit that "jurisdiction of the court over an action" is different from "jurisdiction over the person". 2010 DOCTRINE:It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. Lastimosa. Asensi. a complaint titled "VILLA REBECCA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Valiente. with Prayers for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. RITA VIOLA G.

application or other proceedings. She categorically considered. The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3. Tabugan. Inguillo. they were heard through their counsel whom they themselves chose to prepare the complaint and represent them in the case before the HLURB. No unfairness or surprise to the complainants. Castillo. the complaint should have been amended to reflect in the title the individual complainants. the averments in the body of the complaint. the specification of the individual complainants in the title of the case would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. not the title. Hence. speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. 4. Reyes. Coronel. Corporal. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Cabañgon. However. Viola was a party to the case. It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. Catindig. The error or defect is merely formal and not substantial and an amendment to cure such defect is expressly authorized by Sec. hence. having been set forth in the body of the complaint as a complainant. De la Cruz. Corpuz. To repeat. are controlling. Francisco. the resultant execution was likewise void. the HLURB decision is a nullity as against her and therefore never acquired finality. the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural rules or to correct a technical error. Page 28 Echiverri. most importantly. Only their names were omitted in the title but they were already parties to the case. Espina. Martinez. provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. Lastimosa. Tecson. Genato would result by allowing the amendment. With a void judgment. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint. was one of the persons who caused the preparation of the complaint and who verified the same. Palad. ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the HLURB has not acquired jurisdiction over the person over the person of the respondent Rita Viola. Respondent Viola. although her name did not appear in the title as a party. respondent contends that the HLURB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person since she was not a party to the case. Valois . the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. There being a "defect in the designation of the parties". Marquez. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. this petition. the Court of Appeals has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. Sy. For clarity. Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Hence. Albano. Gloria. De Mesa. Lumberio. On the other hand. Asensi. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Valiente. its correction could be summarily made at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. herself as one of the complainants from the time of the filing of the complaint and up to the time the decision in the HLURB case became final and executory. In the present case. or to the Sps. This is specially true before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in the courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote public interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just. Santos. and held out. including Viola. is not fatal to the case. The allegations in the body of the complaint indicate that she is one of the complainants. Sandoval. HELD: Yes.

reinstating the December 18. Tabugan. it was only when the final and executory judgment of the HLURB was already being executed against Viola that she. Cabañgon. 1999 HLURB Resolution. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Moreover. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party. Corporal. Valiente. representations. Lastimosa. and claimed that she was not a party to the case and that the HLURB did not acquire jurisdiction over her. good faith and justice. Sandoval. fair dealing. Gloria. she cannot now be permitted to impugn her representations to the injury of the petitioners. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment. Sy. has long been final and executory. as discussed above. The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy. Valois . attitude or course of conduct that causes loss or injury to the latter. by his or her deed or conduct. Reyes. Where a party. Ramirez. estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position. void judgments. Corpuz. with jurisdiction over the parties. Inguillo. After petitioners had reasonably relied on the representations of Viola that she was a complainant and entered into the proceedings before the HLURB. and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. De Mesa. and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act. Tecson. The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors. Francisco. None of the exceptions is present in this case. De la Cruz. Palad. Asensi. 1996 Decision. Espina. as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and. Martinez. or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. Hence. Castillo. Catindig. Final and executory judgment may no longer be modified The April 27. Alcazaren. Rañigo. reversed her position. Viola is estopped from taking such inconsistent positions. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Coronel. for the first time. Santos. Marquez. has induced another to act in a particular manner. the same can no longer be modified. Page 29 Echiverri. Albano.

000. Asensi. Gubat filed an Entry and Notice of Charging Lien to impose his attorney’s lien of ₱30. Alcazaren. FACTS: In August 1990. Martinez. He claimed that the plaintiffs and the NPC deliberately did not inform him about the execution of the compromise agreement.000. Inguillo. rendered its Decision on April 24. Marquez. The motion stated that copies were furnished to Atty. totalling ₱96. During the pendency of the appeal. A client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. 2010 DOCTRINE: For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with.000. Mandangan and herein petitioner. Attached to the motion were acknowledgment receipts dated April 2. and Norma Maba. the RTC of Marawi City. Consequently. Coronel. compromise. No.00. Francisco. 1991.00 and appearance fees of ₱2. Page 30 Echiverri. in full satisfaction of their claims against the NPC. De la Cruz. Albano. Corpuz. On the day of the initial hearing on the merits. Norma Maba. Mandangan’s signature which appeared therein. the three complaints were consolidated because the plaintiffs’ causes of action are similar. and that said parties connived with each other in entering into the compromise agreement in order to unjustly deprive him of his attorney’s fees. NPC and its counsel failed to appear. ATTY. knowledge. although it was only Atty. Palad. who received ₱90. for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the litigation and may. especially when the contract is on a contingent fee basis—a lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. Rodriguez. Gloria.00. ₱90. Branch 8. Catindig. During the course of the proceedings. Reyes. 167415. Cabañgon. settle. They all arose from NPC’s refusal to pay the amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements on their respective lands which were destroyed when the NPC constructed the Marawi-Malabang Transmission Line. On August 19. Tecson. plaintiffs Ala Mambuay.00. Espina. at any time before judgment. Ramirez. De Mesa. Lumberio.00 respectively. Tabugan. petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his attorney’s fees. After the cases were remanded to the RTC. February 26. Sandoval. and adjust his cause of action out of court without his attorney’s intervention. Valiente.060. Mandangan. and Acur Macarampat separately filed civil suits for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur in Marawi City. or consent. CV No. 33000. even though he has agreed with his attorney not to do so. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION G. Ala Mambuay.R. NPC appealed to the CA which was docketed as CA-G. Castillo. Valois . if acting in good faith. Atty. Petitioner was the one who signed the complaints on behalf of himself and Atty. 1992 signed by plaintiffs Acur Macarampat. NPC moved to dismiss its appeal alleging that the parties had arrived at a settlement. respondent was declared in default. Sy. Despite the plea of NPC for the lifting of the default order. 1992. Santos. or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. Lastimosa.050. and ₱90.R. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer’s fees. MANGONTAWAR M. the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact. GUBAT vs.00 on each of the three civil cases he handled.000. Rañigo. Corporal.

Santos. NPC likewise claimed that it settled the case in good faith and that plaintiffs were paid in full satisfaction of their claims which included attorney’s fees. Valois . Palad. Rañigo. this petition. Asensi. Tabugan. Corporal. Espina. NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.00. Reyes. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Catindig. Doromal) of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to sign on NPC’s behalf. Martinez. Valiente. He also insisted that NPC’s petition was defective for lack of a board resolution authorizing Special Attorney Comie Doromal (Atty. It prayed that the subject order be set aside insofar as NPC is concerned. Page 31 Echiverri. Tecson. or admissions of the parties. or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. affidavits.00 in each of the above cases. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits. pleadings. Gloria. Corpuz. Marquez. the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. the petitioner’s resort to summary judgment is not proper. De la Cruz. depositions.000. 60722. for a total of ₱96. the pleadings. 2000 Order. for the existence of bad faith is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. Cabañgon. Hence. Thus. NPC opposed the motion for partial summary of judgment. it was a final disposition of the entire case. Lumberio. depositions and admissions show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Sandoval. NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied by the trial court in its June 27. Inguillo. the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact. 2000. when the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment on his fees. A summary judgment is allowed only if. Petitioner alleged that NPC’s remedy should have been an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari because the compromise agreement had settled the civil suits. Rodriguez. Coronel. It alleged that a client may compromise a suit without the intervention of the lawyer and that petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees should be made against the plaintiffs. "Genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived. the court finds that except as to the amount of damages. Sy.000. The purpose of a summary judgment is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear undisputed to the mind of the court. For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with. HELD: No. he is not entitled to an immediate relief as a matter of law. Albano. De Mesa. Francisco. On March 15. after hearing.R. Ramirez. Thus. imputing grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo for granting petitioner’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. He also argued that the issue of bad faith is factual which cannot be a subject of a certiorari petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s result to summary judgment is proper. Petitioner thus prayed that a partial summary judgment be rendered on his attorney’s fess and that NPC be ordered to pay him directly his lawful attorney’s fees of ₱32. SP No. It found that the parties to the compromise agreement connived to petitioner’s prejudice which amounts to a violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Castillo.

Marquez. NPC contested these averments. if acting in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. and it has the effect of res judicata. or consent. the compromise shall be subjected to said fees. But in all cases. Alcazaren. knowledge. Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that the parties intentionally did not inform him of the settlement. Lumberio. It is synonymous with fraud. avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Catindig. a claim for attorney’s fees does not void the compromise agreement and is no obstacle to a court approval. Rañigo. the compromise settlement cannot bind the lawyer as a third party. Corpuz. As certain facts pleaded were being contested by the opposing parties. It is a consensual contract. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer’s fees. it is the client who is bound to pay his lawyer for his legal representation. he was allegedly told that the NPC deceived them into believing that what they received was only a partial payment exclusive of the attorney’s fees. This cannot however affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement. especially when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. He alleged that he never received a copy of NPC’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the CA and that instead. When he confronted his clients. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of Albano. Bad faith has to be established by the claimant with clear and convincing evidence. for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the litigation and may. Palad. Valiente. the terms of the compromise. at any time before judgment. Lastimosa. Tecson. It claimed good faith in the execution of the compromise agreement. it was another lawyer who was furnished and who acknowledged receipt of the motion. De la Cruz. Sy. even though he has agreed with his attorney not to do so. and adjust his cause of action out of court without his attorney’s intervention. Cabañgon. Inguillo. insofar as they prejudice the lawyer. However. Valois . A client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the lawyer. but the terms of the agreement should not deprive the counsel of his compensation for the professional services he had rendered. Coronel. Page 32 Echiverri. Castillo. De Mesa. In this sense. Rodriguez. The above averments clearly pose factual issues which make the rendition of summary judgment not proper. so should not be the payment of a lawyer’s adequate and reasonable compensation for his services should the suit end by reason of the settlement. making both parties accountable to pay the lawyer’s fees. Corporal. in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive another. Gloria. The trial court should have exercised prudence by requiring the presentation of evidence in a formal trial to determine the veracity of the parties’ respective assertions. Ramirez. Tabugan. Reyes. Asensi. settle. will be set aside. compromise. If the client and the adverse party who assented to the compromise are found to have intentionally deprived the lawyer of his fees. and this necessitates an examination of the evidence of all the parties. If so. It stressed that the attorney’s fees were already deemed included in the monetary consideration given to the plaintiffs for the compromise. Contrary to petitioner’s contention. Espina. Francisco. binding upon the signatories/privies. a client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. by making reciprocal concessions. Sandoval. counsel is not without remedy. Martinez. As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties. Hence. Santos. such would not warrant a rendition of summary judgment. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and acted in bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary.

Rodriguez. Francisco. Rañigo. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner. Reyes. Inguillo. Alcazaren. Corporal. Espina. Tecson. Palad. Valiente. De Mesa. Lumberio. Page 33 Echiverri. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Valois . Asensi. Corpuz. Albano. Martinez. Castillo. Sy. Coronel. Santos. Catindig. Gloria. Tabugan. Marquez. Lastimosa. his counsel. Cabañgon. but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.

G.” it was in substance merely a motion. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. before a trial court. Eventually. MBTC filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. Upon default. Page 34 Echiverri. Francisco. 2010 DOCTRINE:As a rule. LUZVIMINDA OCAMPO. THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA) OF ST. Tabugan. by posting the required bond which was subsequently approved. it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. No. (SMCATI). Lumberio. Cabañgon. Ramirez. thusly: (1) the lease to SMCATI by the spouses Ilagans. Exception is where it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. ERNESTO AGANON and RIZALINO MANGLICMOT. MARILOU BARAQUIO. which was granted by the trial court. the spouses Denivin and Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan) applied for and were granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.. JR. Rodriguez. no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to the motion. allegedly a third party occupying the parcels of land.No. Valiente. Santos. ROWENA LAYUG. GREGORIO INALVEZ. The nature of the ex parte petition for issuance of possessory writ under Act. GREGORIO INALVEZ. Martinez. GARY SINLAO. THE METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST CO. Inguillo. Petitioners. and therefore. as lessor. De Mesa. 176518.MARIFE FERNANDEZ. FERNANDO VICTORIO. Coronel. 3135 to be a nonlitigious proceeding and summary in nature. was for a period of one year from the execution of the lease contract in 1998 – therefore.79M secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over 8 parcels of land covered by different Transfer Certificates of Title. Sy. Respondent. Sandoval. Alcazaren. the lease should have expired in 1999. March 2. Catindig. JR. (2) the lease was not registered and annotated at the back of the title. Rañigo. Reyes. Corporal. represented by their Attorney-in-Fact. Even if the application for the writ of possession was denominated as a “petition. the Parents-Teachers Association. not binding on third persons. an extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted with MBTC being the highest bidder and for which a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. teachers and students of SMCATI (Petitioners). 3135 is not strictly speaking a “judicial process” as contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code. vs. Lastimosa. the trial court reversed its earlier Order by ruling that Albano. Gloria. filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order against MBTC and the Provincial Sheriff. Valois . FACTS: Sometime in 2001. MALOU MALVAR.. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac. St. Tecson. the trial court issued a Joint Decision granting MBTC the writ of possession. Asensi. (MBTC) in the amount of P4. De la Cruz. “piercing the veil of corporate entity” is resorted to for the spouses Ilagan should not be allowed to commit fraud under the separate entity/personality of SMCATI. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY. In due course. in a subsequent Order. Inc. During the period of redemption. and (3) the spouses Ilagans are the owners or practically the owners of SMCATI – even if it has a separate personality. Espina. Castillo. Marquez. filed a Motion for Leave to file Petition in Intervention. Corpuz. Palad. Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.. on the ground that SMCATI is not a third party against whom a writ of possession cannot be issued. nevertheless.R. However.

In fact. petitioners’ intervention would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession. Sy. Reyes. spouses Ilagan. De la Cruz. Francisco. a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. Espina. Valiente. Palad. the obligation of the trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are third parties against whom the writ of possession cannot be issued? HELD: No. it would be specious to conclude that the teachers and students hold the subject premises independent of or adverse to SMCATI. Corpuz. Castillo. Marquez. Tecson. whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of possession. petitioners cannot be deemed “third parties” as contemplated in Act No. Thus. As regards the petitioner-students. Martinez. Alcazaren. the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession. Tabugan. Corporal. Page 35 Echiverri. however. However. Valois . Moreover. the foreclosure of the current school premises does not prevent the SMCATU from continuing its operations elsewhere. Albano. the trial court has to issue it as a matter of course. As such. Rañigo. Lumberio. Santos. their interest over the school premises is necessarily inferior to that of the school. Petitioner-teachers’ possession of the said premises was based on the employment contracts they have with SMCATI. Rodriguez. In this case. Asensi. the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Inguillo. Ordinarily. Sandoval. Coronel. Gloria. Besides. As such. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Where such third party exists. their contracts are with the school and do not attach to the school premises. Catindig. petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because they are not claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor. 3135. Ramirez. De Mesa. Petitioner-teachers and students did not claim ownership of the properties. but merely averred actual “physical possession of the subject school premises”. as amended.

Corpuz. 99-10-05-0 as amended. 2010 DOCTRINE: A. JR. 8 of Act No. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Sandoval. 2003. Branch 217. On January 20. Tabugan. Corporal. the Motion for Leave to Intervene can no longer be entertained. petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Stay Issuance or Implementation of Writ of Possession. No. Palad. no longer prescribes the requirement of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Lumberio. A. vs. Petitioners failed to pay their outstanding obligation despite demands hence PS Bank instituted on May 8. 3135. to depreciate the value of the property. and MA. which was granted in an Order dated September 21. which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on March 25. 2002. 2005. N-208706 and N-208770. on December 1. Valois . AND AMADA P. issued an Order denying the motion for intervention and to stay the implementation of the writ. 99-10-05-0 (Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages) and in violation of herein petitioners’ right to due process." PS Bank also argued that with the issuance of the trial court’s Order on September 21. Coronel. During the auction sale conducted on February 18. PS Bank opposed the motion citing Manalo v. Tecson.” FACTS: Petitioners obtained a ₱1. Cabañgon.M. or to prevent it from bringing a fair price. 8 of Act No. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 2004. 3135. attaching therein their Petition-in-Intervention pursuant to Sec. CERTEZA. no longer prescribes the requirements of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. with all the buildings and improvements existing thereon.—The use of the word “bids” (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. Martinez.. No. CERTEZA. PS Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. Santos. Sy. as amended. ROSANILA V. Catindig. the RTC of Quezon City.000. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK G. 3135. 99-10-05-0. Marquez. No. Espina. an action for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage pursuant to Act No. Lastimosa.M. 2003 was issued in favor of PS Bank. 2003. No. Asensi.255. Francisco.R. Rodriguez. During the period of redemption.00 loan from respondent Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank). Court of Appeals where we held that "(T)he issuance of an order granting the writ of possession is in essence a rendition of judgment within the purview of Section 2. We further held that “Except for errors or omissions in the notice of sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders. Inguillo. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. Ramirez. SPOUSES NORMAN K. Page 36 Echiverri. Reyes. 2003. 190078. Valiente. 2005. as amended. March 5. Albano. A corresponding Certificate of Sale dated February 20. secured by two parcels of land. The petitioners filed their Reply arguing that the filing of their petition before the court where possession was requested was pursuant to Sec. JR. PS Bank filed an Ex-parte Petition for Writ of Possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Gloria. 2004.M. They sought the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale for allegedly having been conducted in contravention of the procedural requirements prescribed in A. On March 3. VILLAMAYOR and HERMINIO VILLAMAYOR. simple mistakes or omissions are not considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant thereto. Castillo. after the period of redemption for the foreclosed property had already expired.

as amended by the January 30. Coronel. Sy. 2001. Lumberio. Lastimosa.29 Pursuant to A. and (3) payment of filing fees prescribed in the Rules of Court in addition to sheriff’s fees. 2001 and August 7. paragraph 5 of A. Although there is a public interest in the regularity of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. x x x Thus. (2) ceiling on sheriff’s fees. No. Neither Act No.M. this petition. No. 2002 which became effective on April 22. 1594 and its implementing rules with respect to contracts for government infrastructure projects because of the public interest involved. 99-10-05-0 is not found in Act No. Page 37 Echiverri. 5. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Ramirez. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the Order dated May 9. HELD: No. Corporal. De la Cruz. Reyes. Espina. specifically on: (1) period of redemption of properties with respect to the change introduced by Republic Act No. issued Circular No.D. 7-200230dated January 22. No. Catindig. Subsequently. Palad. Velasco. The two-bidder rule is provided under P. The name/s of the bidder/s shall be reported by the sheriff or the notary public who conducted the sale to the Clerk of Court before the issuance of the certificate of sale. Conduct of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale – Albano. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) to Act No.M.. Martinez. Santos. Francisco. in the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 30. 2001. the new requirement will necessitate republication of the notice of auction sale in case only one bidder appears at the scheduled auction sale. 99-10-05-0. it would render naught the binding effect of the publication of the originally scheduled sale. Tecson. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Corpuz. Jr. we further resolved other matters relating to A. 99-10-05-0 now reads: 5. we made the following pronouncements: It is contended that this requirement is now found in Act No.M. 2005. 2001. 3135 nor the previous circulars issued by the Court governing extrajudicial foreclosures provide for a similar requirement. No. the CA correctly ruled that it is no longer required to have at least two bidders in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Asensi. Gloria. Marquez. The reason. 2001 Resolution. Valois . 3135. the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in ruling that there may only be one bidder in a foreclosure sale. Tabugan.M. Hence. Castillo. Valiente. 99-10-05-0. the private interest is predominant. This is not only costly but. on August 7. The requirement for at least two participating bidders provided in the original version of paragraph 5 of A. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there may be only one bidder in a foreclosure sale.31 Section 5(a) of the said circular states: Sec. the then Court Administrator (now Associate Justice of this Court) Presbitero J. Alcazaren. more importantly. Hence. 2002. 3135 and that it is impractical and burdensome. Hence. On the other hand. No. Inguillo. for the requirement that there must be at least two bidders is not as exigent as in the case of contracts for government infrastructure projects. considering that not all auction sales are commercially attractive to prospective bidders. as amended by the Resolutions of January 30. 3135. Sandoval. therefore. The observation is well taken.

Santos. within five (5) days from notice. Lumberio. of the date of the auction (Act 3135. simple mistakes or omissions are not considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant thereto". or to prevent it from bringing a fair price.M. Castillo. an open bidding shall be conducted between the highest bidders. 99-10-05-0. The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. Reyes. Consequently. the extra-judicial foreclosure sale conducted in this case is regular and valid. Gloria. De Mesa. Cabañgon. The property mortgaged shall be awarded to the party submitting the highest bid and in case of a tie. In view of the foregoing. Sandoval. Tecson. Corpuz. Rañigo. no longer prescribes the requirement of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. We further held that "Except for errors or omissions in the notice of sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders. Corporal. Valois . The bidding shall be made through sealed bids which must be submitted to the Sheriff who shall conduct the sale between the hours of 9 a. to depreciate the value of the property. Catindig. A. a.m. Espina. Ramirez. and 4 p. Martinez. Sy. Francisco. Asensi. Payment of the winning bid shall be made either in cash or in managers check. Palad. Valiente.m. Inguillo. as amended. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Albano. Rodriguez. No. the subsequent issuance of the writ of possession is likewise regular and valid. Tabugan. Page 38 Echiverri. Sec. Marquez. Lastimosa. in Philippine currency. Coronel. 4).

Palad. When Paul defaulted in remitting sales proceeds. Lastimosa. Ramirez. April 23. ISSUE: Whether or not the changes made by the court with its decision constitutes an amendment or supplemental pleading. these two issuances must be taken in conjunction with each other. COURT OF APPEALS. The appeal of a final order substantially amending only some matters in a previously rendered Decision is also an appeal of the other intimately interwoven matters passed upon in the original decision. De Mesa. granted the motion of spouses Pelaez. The Regional Trial Court. Valois . Lumberio. The same was dismissed. 2010 DOCTRINE: The appeal of a final order substantially amending only some matters in a previously rendered Decision is also an appeal of the other intimately interwoven matters passed upon in the original decision. Meanwhile. The corporation then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Tabugan. Page 39 Echiverri. HON. Valiente. upon motion of the spouses Pelaez. Coronel. Sandoval. the Corporation instituted the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by the former. De la Cruz. Rañigo. ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION AND FLORANTE DY VS HON. Tecson. the spouses Pelaez filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Execution. As a result. a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the corporation with the Supreme Court. `In the Regional Trial Court. Sy. Corpuz. Castillo. LARON G. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Corporal. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is not severable since the disposition of some inter-related issues in the original Regional Trial Court Decision were materially amended by the latest order. CRISPIN C. thus. Albano. However. the court decided in favor of the Spouses Pelaez. Reyes. Catindig. Francisco. the Regional Trial Court amended its previous decision and changed the overage and moral and exemplary damages amounts to be paid by the corporation. Alcazaren. Gloria. Santos.R. No. Martinez. spouses Pelaez filed a Complaint against the corporation to stop the extrajudicial sale. 167237. Marquez. Espina. FACTS: Spouses Paul Pelaez Jr and Rocelli Pelaez were employees of Associated Ango-American Tobacco Corporation. Cabañgon. Thus. The corporation filed a notice of appeal. HELD: The modification is an amendment. Asensi.

Santos. Alcazaren. two parties intervened in the case namely Alice. Reyes. Despite deficiencies in the petitioner’s appellant brief. The failure of the counsel of spouses Go to serve a copy of the appellant’s brief to two of the adverse parties was a mere oversight constituting excusable neglect. Palad. Rañigo. FACTS: Vicente Chaves filed a complaint against spouses Trinidad and Gonzalo Go for the removal of the clouds on his certificate of title. Valiente. as the petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Corpuz. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Subsequently. wife of Vicente Chaves. Castillo. Catindig. Gloria. Inguillo. Corporal. Ramirez.R. The Court of Appeals granted the motion of Mega and Alice and dismissed the appeal of the spouses Go. as the petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case. Every litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case. The Regional Trial Court decided in favor of Vicente Chaves. De Mesa. Chaves prayed that the SPA and mortgage to the spouses Go be invalidated. Coronel. A deviation from the rigid application of the procedural rules may thus be allowed. Martinez. A Motion to Dismiss was filed by Mega and Alice. alleging that spouses Go failed to furnish them a copy of the brief. Page 40 Echiverri. Albano. TRINIDAD GO VS VICENTE VELEZ CHAVES G. spouses Go appealed to the Court of Appeals. Francisco. April 23. 2010 DOCTRINE: A deviation from the rigid application of the procedural rules may thus be allowed. it is found to be sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same. Cabañgon. Hence. Espina. the dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. Valois . Thereafter. and Mega Integrated Agro-Livestock Farms Inc. which claimed that it purchased Vicente a portion of the property in dispute. rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. Lumberio. No. free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal due to the failure to append a copy of the assailed judgment and late furnishing of copies of the brief to Mega and Alice HELD: Yes. Sy. Asensi. Marquez. Tecson. 182341. Sandoval.

Valois . The defects found in the two notices of appeal are not of such nature that would cause a denial of the right to appeal. the defects are not only excusable but also inconsequential. Ramirez. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. Martinez. an ejectment case was filed by respondents with the Department for Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board for non-payment of rentals. any intention to mislead is simple negated by their ready admission and participation in the proceedings as heirs. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD. respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. especially in agrarian cases. Cabañgon. to visit fraud upon the proceedings. especially in agrarian cases. So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings.R. it did not state ground relied upon for the appeal. April 13. Page 41 Echiverri. Francisco. Inguillo. The petitioners filed two notices of appeal. Valiente. Tabugan. When the heirs of the real parties in interest signed the Notice of Appeal. Moreover. FACTS: Respondents are co-owners of several parcels of land. Corporal. Palad. Thereafter. In answer. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was denied. Sy. De Mesa. and that contained the forged signature of the deceased defendants. Marquez. HELD: No. So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place. Coronel. VS COURT OF APPEALS G. Reyes. Espina. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Thereafter. Alcazaren. Castillo. 2010 DOCTRINE: Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeals should be considered as “mere scraps of paper” for failure to state the grounds relied upon for an appeal. Santos. The motion was granted. the rules should be liberally construed. the rules should be liberally construed. Catindig. the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal on the basis that the Notice of Appeal was not filed beyond the reglementary period. they did not intend. Rodriguez. Albano. and could not have intended. The Regional Adjudicator decided in favor of the respondents and extinguished the tenancy leasehold relationship. Asensi. Lumberio. Gloria. Corpuz. Tecson. Petitioners on the other hand are in actual possession of the said land as tillers thereof. The appellate court found merit in respondent’s petition. No. 165155.

De Mesa. Cabañgon. ANGELITA DE GUZMAN V EMILIO A. Santos. After reinvestigation. Valiente. Ramirez. 2010 DOCTRINE: The transmittal of the funds is considered a clear case of restitution and is a mere mitigating circumstance. Asensi. FACTS: Angelita De Guzman was indicted for malversation of public funds before the Regional Trial Court. Coronel. Corpuz. However the dismissal of the Prosecutor was recommended for disapproval by Graft Investigation Officer II Agbada. Alcazaren. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Albano. It does not obliterate the criminal liability of the accused for the malversation of public funds. Tecson. Sandoval. Martinez. Palad. As an effect. the Deputy Ombudsman favored the disapproval of the recommendation for dismissal. Inguillo. Reyes. Page 42 Echiverri. Gloria. Lumberio. Meanwhile. De la Cruz. It does not obliterate the criminal liability of the accused for the malversation of public funds. the transmittal of the funds is considered a clear case of restitution and is a mere mitigating circumstance. March 26. No. 158104. Castillo. a demand was sent to De Guzman for the transmittal of the amount due to the Municipality of Claveria. Tabugan.R. GONZALEZ III G. Catindig. She requested for a reinvestigation alleging she was not able to participate during the preliminary investigation as she was out of the country. De Guzman complied. The reinvestigation was granted. the case was recommended for dismissal for insufficiency of evidence to establish a probable cause. HELD: Yes. Sy. The Deputy Ombudsman was merely exercising his power and thus it is discretionary upon him whether or not he would rely on the findings of fact of the Prosecutor. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Marquez. Valois . Rodriguez. Moreover. De Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of the case should be continued despite the findings of the reinvestigating prosecutor that there was no sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Espina. Francisco. Corporal.

However. Valiente. The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating prosecutor. any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the discretion of the court. In denying the motion. Coronel. Rañigo. The RTC granted his motion and.R. Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. Tabugan. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. the trial court denied its motion to withdraw the information ruling that since it was already filed in Court. the matter should be left to its discretion. Francisco. Asensi. Castillo. De la Cruz. 163267. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Valois . Judge How we held: It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. Martinez. He posted bail and moved that the proceedings be suspended and that a preliminary investigation be held. the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to indict him and recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable cause and the dismissal of the complaint. Corporal. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case. accordingly. Judge Mogul that once a complaint or information is filed in court. Ramirez. the State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation. HELD: No. In Solar Team Entertainment. Santos. Catindig. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. TEOFILO EVANGELISTA vs. Inc v. any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 for allegedly possessing firearms without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority. Palad. Gloria. Corpuz. Espina. trial ensued wherein the petitioner was found guilty for the violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions both in the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals. Alcazaren. On its resolution. Marquez. Rodriguez. Inguillo. and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo v. petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result of the preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted. Page 43 Echiverri. The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating prosecutor. Consequently. Thereafter. 5 May 2010 DOCTRINE: Once an information is filed in Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the preliminary investigation. Sy. Tecson. Reyes. De Mesa. Lumberio. Albano. Lastimosa.

Valois . Tecson. Ramirez. Reyes. The records substantiate the RTC and CA’s finding that petitioner possessed. Rañigo. Corpuz. Castillo. Corporal. albeit constructively. Asensi. Marquez. Rodriguez. In fine. we find no reason not to uphold petitioner’s conviction. De Mesa. Palad. Lumberio. Espina. Santos. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Page 44 Echiverri. Albano. Gloria. Alcazaren. Catindig. Moreover. Valiente. Inguillo. Sy. the subject firearms and ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines on January 30. Francisco. Cabañgon. Martinez. no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case. Coronel. Tabugan. 1996. Lastimosa.

Palad. deemed to have waived such alleged defect when he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 172708. Sandoval. Albano. Santos. which should be made before arraignment. Marquez. Martinez. Sy. He is. as amended by R. 5 May 2010 DOCTRINE: We have consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue. HELD: No. Valiente. After trial. or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground. Cabañgon. Catindig. Valois . Page 45 Echiverri. Inguillo. which should be made before arraignment. the same was denied by the Court. by the Regional Trial Court. he was found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. We have consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue. Coronel.R. In this case. Tecson. 7659. FACTS: An Information was filed against appellant for allegedly taking several pieces of jewelry and having carnal knowledge with his minor victim. Lastimosa. therefore. JOSEPH AMPER y REPASO G. Castillo. Lumberio. Rodriguez. however. Espina. Asensi. Rañigo. Corporal. De Mesa.A. Reyes. Alcazaren. Francisco. He questioned the legality of his arrest on appeal. Corpuz. appellant only raised for the first time the alleged irregularity of his arrest in his appeal before the CA. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. This is not allowed considering that he was already properly arraigned and even actively participated in the proceedings. or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground. Gloria. Ramirez. De la Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may validly question the legality of his arrest before the Court of Appeals. Tabugan.

De Mesa. the case for ejectment against Marcelina. With respect to the first case against Marcelina. Lumberio. She further alleged that Marcelina took over the cultivation of the 14. Alcazaren. it appears in the PARAD Albano. died in June 1997 and was survived by his wife. DOMINGO CARGANILLO. 170956. Corporal. Since the discussion of this digest focuses on the procedural rule applied. In her Answer. Hence. Reyes. Gloria. Rañigo. the PARAD promulgated a Decision dismissing both cases for lack of merit and evidence. Lastimosa. among others. SERGIO CARGANILLO.R. This petition concerns four cases.000-square meter landholding without her knowledge and consent. Sandoval. On which basis. Valiente. only the third case will be tackled. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal made by the Court of Appeals was proper. the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the DARAB with respect to the issue of non-payment of lease rentals. among others. with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Pedro Solis. Sy. DARAB also dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Decision of the PARAD in toto. Corpuz. Even in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Palad. appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and subsequently further appealed to the Court of Appeals. Tabugan. In this case. In addition. that the petition should state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner. 12 May 2010 DOCTRINE: Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply. DARAB Case 7864 should be dismissed for failure of Felisa to properly indicate the appealing party. FACTS: In DARAB Case 7864. Page 46 Echiverri. Section 4 of the same rule mandates. Marquez. the CA dismissed the petition. among others. Espina. Marcelina specifically denied Felisa’s allegation of arrears in lease rentals from 1995 to 1997. we resolve to dismiss the appeal of Felisa. with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Castillo. that the petition should state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Felisa attested that she is the petitioner in the instant case. and. during the lifetime of Pedro. Felisa indicated in the caption as well as in the parties portion of the petition that she is the landowner. Cabañgon. Tecson. Valois . Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply. among others. the first case against respondent Marcelina. the latter failed to pay lease rentals for three consecutive years from 1995 to 1997. Coronel. HELD: Yes. Felisa represented that the tenant of the landholding. FERRER vs. Francisco. Martinez. involving the petitioner. Catindig. However. Santos. SOLEDAD AGUSTIN and MARCELINA SOLIS G. Asensi. FELISA R. Ramirez. Section 4 of the same rule mandates. On Petition for Review under Rule 43 to the CA. After submission of their respective position papers. jointly heard by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Marcelina.

Inguillo. Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with respect to the first case against Marcelina. Corporal. Valiente. Lumberio. Alcazaren. Palad. Catindig. Castillo.000-square meter agricultural land are Rosa R. Valois . Corpuz. Tabugan. for failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing party with respect to the said case. Gloria. Cabañgon. Sandoval. records that the owners of the subject 14. Thus. the appeal must perforce be dismissed. Elvira A. Procedural lapse aside. Francisco. Pajarito (Pajarito). Rañigo. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Asensi. Albano. Marquez. DARAB Case No. 7864 should still be dismissed for failure of Felisa to establish her principals’ claim. De Mesa. Madolora (Madolora) and Anastacia F. Lagado (Lagado). Page 47 Echiverri. Coronel. Santos. Sy. such failure does not affect the appeal on the other three cases as Felisa is the owner/co-owner of the landholdings subject of said three cases. Reyes. Espina. Ramirez. However. Martinez. Lastimosa. Tecson.

1990. RAMNANI G. 1977 Decision which can no longer be done because 27 years have elapsed from the finality of said Decision. what remains to be done is the issuance of the final certificate of sale which was. Sandoval. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the subject property during which respondent was the highest bidder. Further. excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial court’s October 11. the three-day notice rule does not apply. In affirming the ruling of the trial court. 1978. Catindig. the CA noted that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. On June 6. Valois . JOSE DELOS REYES vs. respondent exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6. Corporal. Petitioner contends that the motion dated February 16. She also points out that said motion is not barred by prescription. De Mesa. He further claims that the subject motion seeks to enforce the trial court’s October 11. Consequently. Castillo. Meanwhile. 2004. Asensi. Sy. Cabañgon. hence. laches or estoppel because the October 11. Thereafter. 1978. Page 48 Echiverri. Although the certificate of sale was annotated on the title only on March 8. Tecson. 2001. 169135. Alcazaren. On March 8.R. No. On February 17. The issuance of the final certificate of sale is a ministerial duty of the sheriff in order to complete the already enforced judgment. 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription. respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and that petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be heard by the trial court. The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case. 1990. Less than a year from the October 11. Lumberio. Marquez. 18 June 2010 DOCTRINE: While. however. Santos. not promptly accomplished at that time due to the demise of the trial court’s sheriff. 1977 Decision was already executed through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6. Reyes. FACTS: On October 11. Tabugan. Francisco. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. a certificate of sale was executed in her favor on even date. De la Cruz. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because petitioner failed to redeem the subject property. 1977. Espina. a writ of possession was issued by the trial court. the taxes due on the sale of the subject property were paid on September 26. Palad. a writ of execution was issued by the same court. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. 1978. Corpuz. Thus. On November 17. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. then Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Martinez. Thereafter. as a general rule. 480537. 2004 filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a notice of hearing. Inguillo. Albano. 1977 Decision. 1978. petitioner did not exercise his right to redeem the subject property within one year from said registration. respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. it agreed with the trial court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by prescription. all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4. Valiente. Gloria. Rañigo. the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. Ramirez. Coronel.

Catindig. and estoppel considering that the levy and sale of the subject property was conducted on 6 June 1978 and the petitioner failed to redeem the same. Hence. Asensi. Lumberio. HELD: No. Gloria. Rañigo. the CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. As to petitioner’s claim that the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of hearing. Valiente. Petitioner cannot. Castillo. Coronel. As already discussed. Ramirez. validly claim that he was denied his day in court. 2004 before the trial court. the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. Corpuz. De Mesa.11 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Alcazaren. While. Lastimosa. Marquez. all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4. therefore. Tabugan. Santos. Palad. Corporal. Inguillo. as a general rule. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Tecson. Francisco. Sandoval. Albano. Sy. Martinez. the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/ Opposition14 on March 1. Cabañgon. Valois . Page 49 Echiverri. Reyes. At any rate. laches. respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Espina. ISSUE: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion.

Concededly. Only the appellant was arrested while the two others remain at-large to date. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Coronel. the appellant alleged that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Valois . Castillo. Ramirez. RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN G. Midway to their destination.250. there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime. However. he was also threatened by the perpetrators should he report the incident to the police which is why he was not able to escape or at least request for assistance from the people around him even after having the chance to do so. tied the hands of the victim and brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death. his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Reyes. Catindig. Negros Occidental. The victim was divested of his wallet containing ₱1. Sy. Santos. Emerging from the sugarcane plantation. Tecson. However. The appellant and his companions boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be passengers. Lastimosa. Corpuz. one of the accused declared a hold-up and at gun point. they boarded the tricycle of the victim. Lumberio. Gloria. Asensi. No. Page 50 Echiverri.00. HELD: No. Tabugan. In this case. Valiente. On appeal. charging the appellant and two others with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Juanito Berallo. They proceeded to Barangay Oringao. to the exclusion of all others. De la Cruz. FACTS: An Information was filed before RTC Cadiz City. The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged. Martinez. According to him. 28 June 2010 DOCTRINE: A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused. De Mesa. Natividad. dragged the driver to the sugarcane fields. On his defense. Sandoval. Rañigo. 185209. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Corporal. appellant denied any participation in the crime. Marquez. the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all requisites for said circumstances were lacking. as the perpetrator. Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt. Inguillo. Palad. Alcazaren. Francisco. which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and Albano. a wrist watch and ring. and killed him. Espina. He claimed that he was just a passenger in the tricycle when two others announced a hold-up. the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant and his companions was to rob the victim. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the accused.R.

There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Santos. unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. Kabankalan City. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance. Valois . (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established. Coronel. Lumberio. to the exclusion of all others. all of them were together in hiding the stolen motorcycle in the house of Natividad Camparicio. the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery with homicide. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus. and that they all acted in concert towards the same end. Valiente. common experience. Sandoval. Reyes. as the perpetrator. Ramirez. Rañigo. De la Cruz." the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same. In this case. Francisco. The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. Marquez. xxx From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence. Martinez. Albano. De Mesa. As a result. Inguillo. Catindig. the accused being together with a group when they rode the tricycle of the victim. and they were together as a group going to Cadiz City from Kabankalan City passing [through] and stopping [at] various cities and municipalities. Page 51 Echiverri. Asensi. Tecson. and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all. concurrence of will. (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused. regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused. Espina. all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. the inescapable and natural conclusion is the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away the motorcycle as the combination of these numerous circumstantial evidence [is] enough to produce the strong moral certainty from an unbiased and [unprejudiced] mind to safely conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired to perpetrate the crime as clearly the series of events indubitably [shows] that there was unity of purpose. they all rode in the same stolen motorcycle going to Barangay Oringao. Castillo. Gloria. Tabugan. all of them were together at the scene of the crime. Sy. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Corporal. Palad.

It enjoined MCTC from proceeding with the case and disturbing the possession of the petitioner over the leased premises during the pendency of this petition until further orders from this Court. 168062. It contends that the petition for certiorari filed by IPI assailing the MCTC's interlocutory order in an ejectment case is clearly and specifically prohibited under Section 13 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as well as the Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus. Valois . Reyes. Espina. petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondent before the MCTC. Cabañgon. that IPI does not have a clear and unmistakable right to the property subject of the case as to be entitled to an injunctive writ. Santos. in the MCTC. Coronel. Page 52 Echiverri. COURT OF APPEALS and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS. vs. Rodriguez. respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to question the jurisdiction of the MCTC over its person. it submits that the said petition should have been dismissed outright by the CA. Inguillo. Corporal. VICTORIAS MILLING CO. among others. It instead immediately filed the present petition for certiorari. Tecson. INC. on the ground that the questioned CA Resolution is patently null and void and due to the urgency of VMC's predicament. 29 June 2010 DOCTRINE: The Rule on Summary Procedure. Tabugan. Palad. VMC no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution. The rules being clear and unambiguous. FACTS: On March 4. De Mesa. Gloria. IPI filed its Answer with express reservation that said Answer should not be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the person of IPI. Lastimosa. Valiente. It then filed an Omnibus Motion for Hearing of Affirmative Defenses raised in the Answer and moved for the suspension of proceedings. permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. G. Corpuz. Catindig. IPI's Human Relations Department Manager. Asensi.. The said preliminary conference was terminated and the parties were directed to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence together with their position papers. Sy. It emphasizes that the grant of the injunctive writ by the CA will serve no other purpose but to cause undue and unnecessary delay to what should be the speedy and summary disposition of the ejectment suit which is repugnant to public policy.R. MCTC issued an Order denying the suspension of the proceedings of the case sought by IPI and set the case for preliminary conference in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. 2004. Alcazaren. Francisco. The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. by way of exception. for non-service of summons on the proper person. De la Cruz. The petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed by the respondent was granted by the Court of Appeals. Castillo. No. Ramirez. It also alleged. IPI moved for the deferment of the preliminary conference while VMC moved for the termination of the same. INC. Sandoval. Martinez. In the meantime. Rañigo. Summons was served to Danilo Maglasang. The parties subsequently submitted the required position papers with the MCTC. Marquez. Lumberio. Albano.

-The following petitions. 8. or pleadings shall not be allowed: 1. Albano. Tabugan. Memoranda. Sandoval. Rañigo. motions. Motion for a new trial. Sy. HELD: Yes. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others. permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. Martinez. Reyes. 4. Prohibited pleadings and motions. Third-party complaints. With more reason. Valois . Motion to declare the defendant in default. Rodriguez. mandamus. Court of Appeals. Tecson. of not immediately dismissing the petition for certiorari before it and of issuing the injunctive writ. 5. De Mesa. 2. 11. Palad. by itself. It must be pointed out that the Rule on Summary Procedure. Espina. 10. 9. Ramirez. Reply. or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Asensi. Petition for relief from judgment. IPI contends that the Rule on Summary Procedure was not intended to undermine the rules of jurisdiction and rules on service of summons. Inguillo. On the other hand. (Emphasis supplied) Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with the service of summons. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings. such ground should not be used to justify the violation of an express prohibition in the rules prohibiting the petition for certiorari. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Marquez. Petition for certiorari. 13. or for reconsideration of a judgment. Page 53 Echiverri. and 12. Motion for a bill of particulars. or for reopening of trial. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Dilatory motions for postponement. provides: Sec. Valiente. on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. Gloria. Interventions. as in Go v. Corpuz. Coronel. Corporal. without a convincing showing of any resulting substantive injustice. 3. Catindig. 7. Castillo. 6. cannot be used to hinder or stop the proceedings before the MCTC in the ejectment suit. It insists that in the present case. or failure to comply with section 12. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals had gravely abused its discretion in ordering the issuance of an injunctive writ on the basis of a clearly prohibited pleading. affidavits or any other paper. Francisco. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. there is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be caused to IPI so as to call for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions for certiorari. there is a procedural void which justified the CA's act of providing an equitable remedy. by way of exception. De la Cruz. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. From this it can be gleaned that allegations on the matter of lack of jurisdiction over the person by reason of improper service of summons. Santos.

They are in fact the exact opposite of those in the present case before the court hearing the original ejectment case. filed its Answer and participated in the proceedings before the MCTC. Court of Appeals12 the Supreme Court categorically upheld that "the purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules." Considering that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA is categorically prohibited. on any of the matters raised by respondent IPI can be threshed out during appeal after the MCTC has finally resolved the ejectment case under summary procedure. It is worth pointing out that in Go v. Espina. Albano. The rules provide respondent IPI with adequate relief. and the subsequent issuance of the writ of injunction enjoining the ejectment suit from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner. Pursuant to this objective. Corpuz. Martinez. Court of Appeals does not support the case of respondent IPI. Rañigo. the purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Tabugan. Santos. Page 54 Echiverri. if any. Ramirez. Sandoval. Palad. IPI has already raised the matter of improper service of summons in its Answer. Valois . Alcazaren. in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. At the proper time. Of primary importance here is that IPI. The MCTC's error/s. The present situation. The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Lumberio. the CA should not have entertained the same but should have dismissed it outright. and the ensuing delay is the antithesis of and is precisely the very circumstance which the Rule on Summary Procedure seeks to prevent.In the present case. Reyes. like a number of other pleadings. Go v. Gloria. Marquez. Asensi. the time and expense involved therein are minimal. Catindig. Lastimosa. to obey the provisions in the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting petitions for certiorari. Corporal. where IPI had filed the prohibited petition for certiorari. Inguillo. Rodriguez. The petition for certiorari questioning the MCTC’s interlocutory order is not needed here. De Mesa. Francisco. the policy of speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. IPI's arguments attempting to show how the Rule on Summary Procedure or lack of rules on certain matters would lead to injustice are hypothetical and need not be addressed in the present case. Court of Appeals. The factual milieu and circumstances of the said case do not fit with the present case. the real defendant in the ejectment case. it is more in accord with justice. Castillo. Not only was there an absence of any "indefinite suspension" of the ejectment suit before the MCTC but likewise there was no "procedural void" that would otherwise cause delay in the summary and expeditious resolution thereof that transpired to warrant applicability of Go v. Valiente. the CA's taking cognizance thereof. As accurately pointed out by petitioner. weighing the consequences of continuing with the proceedings in the MCTC as against the consequences of allowing a petition for certiorari. and the proper administration of justice. De la Cruz. Sy. Cabañgon. and in the meantime no injustice will be caused to it by waiting for the MCTC to completely finish resolving the ejectment suit. The proceedings before the MCTC being summary in nature. IPI has the right to appeal to the RTC. Coronel. Tecson. the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari.

otherwise known as the Revised Revenue Code of Angeles City (RRCAC).861. Ramirez. 1974. Rañigo. Coronel. Francisco. heat and power shall be two percent (2%) of their gross receipts and such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative. On January 1. to impose tax on businesses enjoying franchise. AEC protested the assessment claiming that. Palad. Presidential Decree 551 reduced the franchise tax of electric franchise holders. Sy.R. except where there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. Page 55 Echiverri. Castillo. among others. Marquez. Martinez. The City Treasurer issued a Notice of Assessment to AEC for payment of business tax. FACTS: AEC was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 4079 to construct. 33. As a rule. Santos. and to make a report on the action taken within five days.10. In the petition. (MACCI) of which AEC is a member. 1992. 1994. De Mesa. Inguillo. As a result. Alcazaren. S-93. unjust and confiscatory. and power system for the purpose of generating and distributing electric light. it is exempt from paying local business tax and the assessment and collection of taxes under the RRCAC cannot Albano. Lumberio. the Local Government Code of 1991 was passed into law. in addition to the national franchise tax it pays every quarter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. which referred the same to the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF). Lastimosa. Valois . MACCI elevated the petition to the Department of Finance. Reyes. Pampanga. There being no action taken by the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter. license fee and other charges for the period 1993 to 2004 in the total amount of ₱94. It provided that the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate. No. MACCI alleged that the RRCAC is oppressive. Sandoval. pursuant to RA 4079. ANGELES ELECTRIC CORPORATION and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 57. 166134. Tecson. and that no public hearings were conducted prior to its enactment. conferring upon provinces and cities the power. Asensi. ANGELES CITY G. Espina. among others. a petition seeking the reduction of the tax rates and a review of the provisions of the RRCAC was filed with the Sangguniang Panlungsod by Metro Angeles Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc. AEC has been paying the local franchise tax to the Office of the City Treasurer on a quarterly basis. Corpuz. that it was published only once. instructing the latter to make representations with the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the appropriate amendment of the RRCAC in order to ensure compliance with the provisions of the LGC. Gloria. Cabañgon. Corporal. Valiente. ANGELES CITY vs. In accordance with the LGC. Rodriguez. the issuance of preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with. distribute and sell electric current for light. 29 June 2010 DOCTRINE: Requisites to warrant the issuance of a writ of the preliminary injunction. heat. the BLGF issued a First Indorsement to the City Treasurer of Angeles City. starting July 1995. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City enacted Tax Ordinance No. simultaneously on January 22. heat and power for sale in Angeles City. Catindig. maintain and operate an electric light. On September 11. Tabugan. excessive. Acting on the petition. De la Cruz.194. Thereafter.

AEC likewise points out that following the case of Pantoja v. Finally. Espina. selling and disposing at public auction the properties of AEC. citing Valley Trading Co. where the petition for declaratory relief was pending. these cannot be the subject of an injunctive writ. AEC maintains that it is exempt from paying local business tax. the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Asensi. Ramirez. Sy.. This prompted AEC to file with the RTC. However. seizing. However. v. AEC counters that the issue of whether it is liable to pay the assessed local business tax is a factual issue that should be determined by the RTC and not by the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Lumberio. Castillo. Cabañgon. AEC asserts that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction because it was issued after due notice and hearing. Tabugan. Santos. Valois . garnishing. selling. Tecson. AEC claims that the issuance of the writ of injunction was proper since the tax assessment issued by the City Treasurer is not yet final. Aggrieved. AEC appealed the denial of its protest to the RTC of Angeles City via a Petition for Declaratory Relief. annotating the levy. be made retroactive to 1993 or prior to its effectivity. confiscating.The LGC does not specifically prohibit an injunction enjoining the collection of taxes. Sandoval. Corpuz. In addition. Lastimosa. Martinez. HELD: No. Coronel. Inc. Marquez. Inguillo. petitioner contends that the tax exemption claimed by AEC has no legal basis because RA 4079 has been expressly repealed by the LGC. In any case. Catindig. wherein the lower court’s denial of a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the collection of a local tax was upheld. On the other hand. Branch II. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Angeles City and its City Treasurer from levying. Valiente. proceedings to invalidate a warrant of distraint and levy to restrain the collection of taxes do not violate the prohibition against injunction to restrain the collection of taxes because the proceedings are directed at the right of the City Treasurer to collect the tax by distraint or levy. As to its tax liability. Gloria. it was denied by the City Treasurer for lack of merit. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Petitioner likewise insists that AEC must first pay the tax before it can protest the assessment. Palad. and was necessary to prevent the petition from becoming moot. Alcazaren. Petitioner further reasons that since the levy and auction of the properties of a delinquent taxpayer are proper and lawful acts specifically allowed by the LGC. and disposing the properties of AEC. having been seasonably appealed pursuant to Section 195 of the LGC. After due notice and hearing. Francisco. Page 56 Echiverri. the City Treasurer levied on the real properties of AEC. Court of First Instance of Isabela. Petitioner’s main argument is that the collection of taxes cannot be enjoined by the RTC. Albano. an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Angeles City and its City Treasurer from levying. followed by an Order granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. David. Reyes. Angeles City and its City Treasurer moved for its dissolution but the same was denied. Corporal.

is different in the case of the collection of local taxes as there is no express provision in the LGC prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local governments from collecting taxes. petitioner’s reliance on the above-cited case to support its view that the collection of taxes cannot be enjoined is misplaced. An exception to this rule obtains only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals the collection thereof may jeopardize the interest of the government and/or the taxpayer. Palad. Ramirez. however it may be viewed. it must be emphasized that although there is no express prohibition in the LGC. cited by the petitioner. or (c) That a party. some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding. Lumberio. or is procuring or suffering to be done. Corporal. Thus. or attempting to do. or in the performance of an act or acts. of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Espina. the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax. Santos. Francisco. Cabañgon. Page 57 Echiverri. without unnecessary hindrance or delay. Corpuz. Gloria. Inguillo. No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC Section 3. however. Court of First Instance of Isabela.. the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific provision prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. not because courts are prohibited from granting such injunction. Such statutory lapse or intent. injunctions enjoining the collection of local taxes are frowned upon. Rule 58. and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Courts therefore should exercise extreme caution in issuing such injunctions. In light of the foregoing. we ruled that: Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code. Alcazaren. In line with this principle. Rodriguez. Valiente. The situation. fee or charge imposed by the code. court. may have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and requirements under Rule 58. Martinez. Tecson. Catindig. threatening. Lastimosa. Marquez. Nevertheless. continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant. Sy. in the case of Valley Trading Co. either for a limited period or perpetually. De la Cruz. Coronel. Inc. Castillo. or agency or a person is doing. The lower court’s denial of the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the collection of the local tax was upheld in that case. Reyes. v. Valois . (b) That the commission. Branch II. A principle deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government should be collected promptly. Tabugan. Rañigo. and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of. Asensi. Sandoval. viz: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded. De Mesa. but because the circumstances required for the issuance of writ of injunction were not present. Albano.

Gloria. De Mesa. need not comply with Section 4. this alone justifies the move of the petitioner in seeking the injunctive reliefs sought for. Valois . selling and disposing at public auction the properties of petitioner. merely few weeks after the petition for declaratory relief has been filed. Rule 63 requiring such notice to the Office of the Solicitor General. and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The Court is fully aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement that injunction is not proper to restrain the collection of taxes. Abordo’s testimony reveals and even his Affidavit Exhibit "S" showed that if the auction sale will push thru. Petitioner. De la Cruz. confiscating. Palad. or otherwise exercising other administrative remedies against the petitioner and its properties. Valiente. Martinez. if not lives and properties in Angeles City and surrounding communities. Castillo. Inguillo. Marquez. Two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Coronel. the Court opines that notice is not required to the Solicitor General since what is involved is just a violation of a private right involving the right of ownership and possession of petitioner’s properties. Catindig. Rodriguez. since there is no other plain. Ramirez. Tabugan. Petitioner. The issue here as of the moment is the restraining of the respondent from pursuing its auction sale of the petitioner’s properties. and not the local ordinance concerned. Rañigo. restrained. Corporal. Santos. therefore. annotating the levy. petitioner will not only lose control and operation of its facility. but its employees will also be denied access to equipments vital to petitioner’s operations. Lumberio. Alcazaren. the RTC ratiocinated that: It is very evident on record that petitioner resorted and filed an urgent motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the scheduled auction sale only when a warrant of levy was issued and published in the newspaper setting the auction sale of petitioner’s property by the City Treasurer. but merely mentioned of an injury which is only a scenario based on speculation because of petitioner’s claim that electric power may be disrupted. In issuing the injunction. and since only the petitioner has the capability to operate Petersville sub station. And unless prevented. Francisco. Page 58 Echiverri. The right of ownership and possession of the petitioner over the properties subject of the auction sale is at stake. Cabañgon. garnishing. Lastimosa. Corpuz. there will be a massive power failure or blackout which will adversely affect business and economy. Asensi. Tecson. Respondents assert that not one of the witnesses presented by the petitioner have proven what kind of right has been violated by the respondent. This being the case. seizing. and Albano. in the hearing of the temporary restraining order. speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law except this application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the auction sale and/or to enjoin and/or restrain respondents from levying. thru its witnesses. To the mind of the Court. Petitioner in its petition is questioning the assessment or the ruling of the City Treasurer on the business tax and fees. Engr. it will render this petition moot and academic. presented sufficient and convincing evidence proving irreparable damages and injury which were already elaborated in the temporary restraining order although the same may be realized only if the auction sale will proceed. Reyes. namely: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected. because if the respondent will not be restrained. Espina. Sandoval. Sy.

would be sold at public auction. except where there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. Reyes. Page 59 Echiverri. it will render any judgment in this case ineffectual. enjoined. vs. Pampanga. Guided by the foregoing. Inc. Rodriguez. Gloria. De Mesa. Assn. the writ of injunction was properly issued. Records also show that before issuing the injunction. injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts. mere abuse of discretion is not enough. During the hearing. The purpose of injunction is to prevent injury and damage from being incurred. Dau and Bacolor. Sandoval. and that the acts (conducting an auction sale) against which the injunction is to be directed. Neither was petitioner able to prove that the injunction was issued without any factual or legal justification. Corporal. Catindig. Lastimosa. Marquez. Coronel. it must be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner. Cabañgon. are violative of the said rights of the petitioner. the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with. the Court has no other recourse but to grant the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction considering that if the respondent will not be restrained from doing the acts complained of. 36For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for certiorari. Clark. otherwise. who has the burden to prove grave abuse of discretion. it will preempt the Court from properly adjudicating on the merits the various issues between the parties. CA. Asensi. As a rule. Sy. Francisco. Corpuz. and will render moot and academic the proceedings before this court. Valois . Martinez. Santos. failed to show that the RTC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the injunction. grave and irreparable damage will be suffered not only by the petitioner but all its electric consumers in Angeles. Inguillo. and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. until the merits of the case can be heard" (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Res. Petitioner. Albano. as there exists a right on the part of the petitioner to be protected. Ramirez. Lumberio. the RTC conducted a hearing where both parties were given the opportunity to present their arguments. In assailing the injunction. Valiente. But as we have already said. As we see it then. Alcazaren. AEC was able to show that it had a clear and unmistakable legal right over the properties to be levied and that it would sustain serious damage if these properties. Tabugan. De la Cruz. In other words. Palad. Rañigo. 254 SCRA 220) It appearing that the two essential requisites of an injunction have been satisfied. its right[s] of ownership and possession of the properties subject of the auction sale. we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the writ of injunction. petitioner primarily relied on the prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. Espina. Tecson. by reason of passion or personal hostility. Castillo. "As an extraordinary remedy. there is no such prohibition in the case of local taxes. which are vital to its operations.

Valois . Moreover factual findings of the trial court. In its answer. however. the remaining balance of ₱214. 1998. Francisco. Rañigo. its jurisdiction is limited to errors of law.650. Tabugan. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in admitting the photocopies of the delivery receipts and the testimony of Mr. Corporal. Catindig.40 covered by a total of twelve invoices.704. Partial payments were made by the petitioner. only questions of law may be appealed to the Court by petition for review. that the photocopies of the delivery receipts were not admissible in evidence and that the witness Chua was incompetent to establish the admissibility of secondary evidence. De Mesa.R. Reyes. which is the date of extra-judicial demand. Coronel. trial of the case on the merits was set. Corpuz. particularly when affirmed by the CA. among others. Martinez. only questions of law may be appealed to the court by petition for review. the latter filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with the RTC Antipolo. 167942. Gloria. As a rule. It also found that the outstanding balance of petitioner is ₱241. The Court is not a trier of facts. As a result. statement of accounts and letters as they were never received by petitioner. Tecson. respondent submits that it has duly proven its claim by a preponderance of evidence. On the other hand. it alleged that no demand for payment was made or received by petitioner. petitioner purchased from respondent various reinforcing steel bars worth ₱2. Castillo. Asensi. which is 24% per annum. FACTS: On several occasions. No. petitioner denied that it authorized the purchases/purchase orders from the respondent. Page 60 Echiverri. Petitioner then appealed the case to the CA which found that based on the invoices there is a specific amount of interest agreed upon. De la Cruz. Albano. Espina. The trial court ordered the petitioner to pay respondent its obligation including attorney’s fees and costs of suit.704. Alcazaren. The originals of the invoices were presented during the hearing and the loss of the delivery receipts was properly established by respondent. hence the admission of the secondary evidence was proper.91 which must earn interest from May 12. 29 June 2010 DOCTRINE: As a rule. Palad. it had not received the reinforcing steel bars. Rodriguez. CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION. HELD: No. Inguillo. Santos. Marquez. Ramirez.91 was not paid despite the repeated demands of the respondent. Petitioner argues. Valiente. Cabañgon. After the pre-trial conference was terminated. Sy. Lastimosa. David Chua as admissible in evidence. Lumberio. it had no knowledge as to the truth of the invoices. are generally binding on this Court. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. (CAPASCO) G. Sandoval.916. the amount billed by respondent was bloated and no deduction was made for the corresponding payments made by petitioner and that it had not agreed to pay interest and attorney's fees.

Inguillo. De la Cruz. The notations addressed to him on the purchase orders and his signature on the demand letters further support the finding that he has personal knowledge of the transactions he testified on. As for the delivery receipts.40 were evidenced by the testimony of Chua and the invoices. Lastimosa. Notably the invoices contained a statement to the effect that the reinforcing steel bars were received in good order and condition. Sy. the orders by. Ramirez. Lumberio. In the present case. are not proof and these cannot prevail over evidence to the contrary.211. Tabugan. Sandoval. The total payment in the amount of ₱2. Martinez. Rodriguez. Corporal.650. With regard to the testimony of Chua.409. and pick-ups by. Catindig. Asensi. Marquez. Palad. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Mere allegations of his incompetence to testify on such matters. De Mesa. the fact that he is the head of Marketing and Finance proves that he is competent to testify on the sale of the reinforcing steel bars to petitioner and its unpaid balance. Santos.916. Espina. Some payments made were in fact admitted in the Answer of petitioner. petitioner of reinforcing steel bars having a total value of ₱2. Rañigo. Francisco. Copies of the same are thus admissible. We thus find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the CA. Castillo. Reyes. Valois .49 made by petitioner was also supported by evidence. Albano. Coronel. Page 61 Echiverri. Corpuz. The factual findings of the trial court and the CA were based on a preponderance of evidence which were not refuted with contrary evidence by petitioner. deliveries to. there is sufficient uncontroverted evidence showing loss of the originals despite the diligence exerted to find the same. Valiente. Gloria. Tecson.

Corporal. Alcazaren. was issued an original certificate of title over a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Santos. In their Answer. ASUNCION URIETA VDA. temperate. Gloria. Lastimosa. petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be ordered to vacate subject property. However. When Ignacio died. she emphasizes that respondents never disputed her title. DE AGUILAR. who took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia.R. Inguillo. but which the CA inexplicably ignored. her husband. Corpuz. It upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan since it is a notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed. Reyes. On appeal. Tecson. Furthermore. petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. Marquez. Occidental Mindoro. Sy. represented by ORLANDO U. Valiente. Ignacio allowed petitioner’s sister. And while there are exceptions to the rule on indefeasibility of title. CA reversed the Decision of RTC. Espina. to construct a house on the southern portion of said land and to stay therein temporarily. FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages before the RTC San Jose. Valois . Anastacia Urieta. ALFARO and RAUL ALFARO G. As a result. to vacate the lot. From the Albano. Asensi. respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. mother of respondent Ederlina. as well as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. SPOUSES EDERLINA B. 164402. She alleged that Ignacio. Coronel. In their comment. Castillo. Martinez. Catindig. She executed a sworn statement declaring that she and her husband never sold any portion of the lot and that their signatures appearing on said deed were forged. Tabugan. only questions of law can be raised. they did not heed her demand. petitioner asked the respondents. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Occidental Mindoro. AGUILAR vs. his heirs decided to partition the subject property. Sablayan. Ramirez. Thus. Rodriguez. Factual issues are prohibited. they and their mother have been in possession thereof. De Mesa. The Regional Trial Court ordered the respondents to vacate subject premises and denied their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and laches. and to pay moral. respondents asserted that Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their mother Anastacia the southern portion of the lot as shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan which bears the signatures of petitioner and Ignacio. Prior thereto. Since then. Page 62 Echiverri. Cabañgon. 5 July 2010 DOCTRINE: As a rule. Buenavista. and exemplary damages. She also points to several circumstances which cast doubt on the authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. Rañigo. No. Francisco. only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. Lumberio. Palad.

Corpuz. Francisco. As a rule. Rodriguez. only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. Alcazaren. one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. Coronel. Reyes. Cabañgon. Tecson. Tabugan. Espina. Sy. Albano. like in the present case. is subject to a number of exceptions. Palad. Marquez. Lumberio. Catindig. This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual issues. however. Gloria. Valois . Corporal. arguments advanced by the petitioner. Sandoval. Valiente. Ramirez. Inguillo. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether or not the factual issues raised in the petition may be examined by this Court. This rule. HELD: Yes. Martinez. It is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review. Castillo. Page 63 Echiverri. however. Rañigo. the court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. Santos. Asensi. it is clear that she is asking this Court to examine and weigh again the evidence on record.

Rodriguez. Santos. Cabañgon. dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Marquez. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties during Encarnacion's administration thereof. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. With the latter's death on 1969. Cavite. Ramirez. On appeal. . who. when she subsequently surrendered her earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt. Trial on the merits then ensued. Corpuz. ordering the partition of the disputed lands among the 7 heirs. AMELIA B. The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. could or should have been done earlier. Catindig. disregarding the calim of defendant that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have waived their share. Castillo. or to assert a right within reasonable time. July 5. started withholding the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. LOYOLA. “ FACTS: This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended them by her mother. Valiente. warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo. 168960. Francisco. No. Espina.” “The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right. De Mesa. The RTC ruled in favor of partition. administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter. the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by her co-heirs. Sandoval. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre. Coronel. Corporal. Valois . De la Cruz. G. While conceding their receipt of financial assistance from Encarnacion.R. Tabugan. and denied the motion for reconsideration.Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Candida was the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia. Page 64 Echiverri. Martinez. FRANCO L. Sy. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the trial court was correct in ruling that the defendant failed to prove base on preponderance of evidence the waiver of Candida and the heirs of Conrado (2) Whether or not the CA was correct in saying that the spouse cannot relinquish the hereditary shares of their children Albano. Palad. Lumberio. after some time. Inguillo. The rest were survived and represented by their respective descendants and children For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand. Reyes. HEBRON vs. Gloria." “Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence. Amelia Bautista-Hebron. Rañigo. 1990. Encarnacion. Tecson. Asensi. 2010 DOCTRINE: “Burden of Proof. respondents filed with the RTC of Imus. By the time partition of the said properties was formally demanded on November 4. Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate recompense had been effectively made when they worked without pay at the former's rice mill and household or.

(2) YES. "The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition. Catindig. are compulsory heirs who are entitled to a share in the properties of the deceased. .Burden of Proof. not only the plaintiff. has repeated entries in Amelia's handwriting that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are no longer entitled to shares in the fruits of the properties in litigation because they have sold or given their share in the said properties to Encarnacion. like Candida and her siblings. Gloria. verbal or written. or to assert a right within reasonable time. could or should have been done earlier. Asensi. during the Albano. it is clear that the defendant. Ramirez. These children. Castillo. Marquez. and as such are entitled to their shares in the estate of Remigia and Januario. does not require proof. (Emphasis supplied) From the above provision. Tecson. Santos. Espina. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying. Corporal. Cabañgon. Hence. Coronel. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Section 1. to the petitioner’s mother the undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case.Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. De Mesa.Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence. Petitioner has admitted in her answer that respondents are heirs of Remigia and Januario. there is definite proof of non-recognition by petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrado's entitlement to shares in the subject properties starting only on July 17. Page 65 Echiverri. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case. 980 of the Civil Code states: "The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right. "An admission. Sy. Martinez. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Rañigo. 1986. The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents Remigia and Januario. Corpuz. It is relevant to note however that the entries in the book of accounts started only on July 17. Valois . Before this time. and that the two subject properties were left behind by Remigia and Januario. Art. Children of the deceased. She should have first secured the permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children. not their mother Victorina. Reyes. if she did indeed convey. Francisco. the book of accounts." (3) No. Palad. Valiente. And. Sandoval. In the present case. (3) Whether or not Candida and the heirs of Conrado are barred by estoppel in asserting their claims HELD: (1) YES. it is the defendants who have the duty to establish their defenses. warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it." Hence. 1986. we find no error committed by the CA when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the burden was on petitioner to establish her affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado." The heirs of Conrado are also heirs of Remigia and Januario. Rodriguez. also has a burden of proof. Lumberio. dividing the inheritance in equal shares. being the children of a child of Remigia and Januario. showing the record of receipts of some heirs of their shares. The plaintiffs have the duty to establish their claims. These entries only prove that Amelia no longer recognized the entitlement of Candida and the heirs of Conrado to their respective shares. were the co-owners of the inherited properties.

1990 only 4 years have elapsed. Francisco. From July 17. Catindig. Marquez. Espina. Page 66 Echiverri. Corpuz. Corporal. Rañigo. Ramirez. Martinez. some of whom reside outside the Philippines. Albano. Tecson. On record is the written demand letter for partition of the litigated properties signed by Candida and the heirs of Conrado dated November 4. Sy. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. administration of the properties by Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista and some undetermined number of years after her death. Asensi. Palad. Lumberio. Santos. De Mesa. Even from July 17. to November 4. Valois . We find respondents not guilty of laches. 1993. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have been receiving their shares in the fruits of the subject properties. 1986. the passage of six years before the respondents asked for partition through the court is not unreasonable. Tabugan. Reyes. Gloria. 1993 just six years have passed. Coronel. 1990. 1986 to February 23. The complaint for partition was subsequently filed on February 23. Inguillo. Valiente. Lastimosa. Considering that the parties are closely related to each other and considering also that the parties are many different heirs. Sandoval. Castillo.

Jr. Thus. De Mesa. At any rate. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance which looked like tawas. After laboratory examination. otherwise. the contents of the plastic sachet weighing 0. Clarito. Lastimosa. The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of the crime charged. In this case. Martinez. 2000. Petitioner and his companion. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Catindig. (PO3 Sotomayor). No. were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. Gloria. Barangay Mauway. REBELLION vs. Tecson. On the basis thereof. all members of the Mayor’s Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City. Corporal. Petitioner took out from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated. accused-petitioner questioned the validity of their warrantless arrest.. Castillo. who was later identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito). when they chanced upon two individuals chanting and in the act of exchanging something. the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a Albano. Rañigo. Lumberio. SALVADOR V. Santos. Reyes. he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. Sandoval. July 5. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea.” FACTS: In the afternoon of July 27. he confiscated the plastic sachet.R. Francisco. 2010 DOCTRINE: “It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. On appeal. petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Marquez. Ramirez. The test on the three strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu. Corpuz. The police officers introduced themselves and then inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Espina. Page 67 Echiverri. PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3 Romeo Sotomayor. the objection is deemed waived. together with Michael Fermin and Joseph Apologista. Inguillo. Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. Valiente. Cabañgon. a regulated drug. 175700. petitioner was duly arraigned. Alcazaren. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Tabugan. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not accused-petitioner may question the validity of the warrantless arrest for the first time on appeal (2) Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid HELD: (1) No. We note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. Cruz St. Palad. De la Cruz. Suspecting that the substance was "shabu". on the other hand. were on routine patrol along M. Coronel.03 gram were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Valois . Asensi. Sy. Rodriguez. was further investigated by the City Prosecutor’s Office. entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial.

(2) Yes. At the first opportunity. De la Cruz. At a distance. Tabugan. Lumberio. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu. we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. Asensi. After laboratory examination. The MAC team witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Castillo. Francisco. Valiente. Sy. Albano. the person to be arrested has committed. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7. Rañigo. Inguillo. arrest a person: (a) When. when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may. the results of the attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged. Coronel. petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation. is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. Martinez. Catindig. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. Arrest without warrant. Valois . Santos. the latter presented three strips of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. Corporal. Rodriguez. xxx In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. Lastimosa. Espina. Under these circumstances. Gloria. without a warrant. or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Palad. violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. within the view of the arresting team. the team members introduced themselves. Thus. Marquez. There and then. a regulated drug. Reyes. the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Page 68 Echiverri. Corpuz. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual under Sec 5(a) Rule 113 Sec 5. De Mesa. team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their motorcycles and approached them. Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5(a). Rule 112. his case comes under the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Tecson. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Consequently. Ramirez. in his presence. PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of the plastic sachet which contains white crystalline substance.

as his whereabouts could not be ascertained. Summons for Disini was issued on July 29. Between 1987 up until 2002. the Swiss Federal Court would revoke the freeze order on the Disini Swiss accounts. Disini (Disini). Marquez. 2006. together with an Answer to Amended Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaims. Martinez. Tecson. Francisco. 2002. Greenhills. Finally. This deadline spurred the Republic (through the PCGG) to file an Urgent Manifestation and Motion with the Sandiganbayan on November 30. 2010 DOCTRINE:“The simultaneous availment of judicial remedies from different fora for exactly the same ultimate relief and involving the same issue constitutes forum-shopping. Lumberio. service of summons by publication was resorted to and by August 27. 92 Kennedy St. It is a prohibited malpractice. restitution. otherwise. the summons was unserved on the ground that petitioner did not live at the given address. Valois . Santos.R. Gloria. the Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the pre-trial until the said motion had been resolved. The occupants of said address were the Roman family. 1987. Espina. Palad. which was No. then petitioner Disini’s wife and children filed a petition in a Swiss Federal Court to remove a previously issued freeze order on their Swiss accounts.” FACTS: On July 23. petitioner Disini filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to File and Admit Attached Answer. and damages against petitioner Herminio T. condemned for trifling with the courts and their processes. San Juan. accounting. 2006. Reyes. Alcazaren. reversion. Corporal.” “an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case. the Republic through the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil complaint for reconveyance. De Mesa. Petitioner asked the respondent court to look at his meritorious defenses. with the motion to drop Sison as party-defendant still pending. The records of the Sandiganbayan became silent from the year 2003 to 2006. Catindig. He maintained that he was unaware of the civil case pending against him because he never received summons or other processes from the court. His only fault. Lastimosa. 1987. nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. HERMINIO T. Inguillo. Asensi. Ramirez. Jacob (Jacob). the Swiss Federal Court rendered a partial decision ordering the counsel for the Republic of the Philippines to submit a forfeiture order from a Philippine court with regard to the assets of Liliana and Herminio Disini not later than December 30. Tabugan. SANDIGANBAYAN G. 2006. Page 69 Echiverri. Corpuz. No. it likewise prayed for the setting of the ex parte presentation of evidence at an early date. On December 7. Valiente.. DISINI vs. Per Sheriff’s Return dated September 4. The same was docketed as Civil Case No. multiple attempts to serve summons to Disini were all in vain. Rodriguez. petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his responsive pleading within 60 days from the publication of the summons. was that he was ignorant of the proceedings in the case because of the absence of a proper notice. De la Cruz. Should the resolution of this pending motion be favorable to the Republic. spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos (Marcos spouses) and Rodolfo B. Rañigo. Castillo. Metro Manila. July 5. Coronel. Sandoval. On August 18. Cabañgon. 175730. 2006. The Republic prayed for the resolution of its Urgent Motion to Resolve (its motion to drop Rafael Sison as party-defendant). Sy. 2003. 0013 and assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan (respondent court). On February 17. he averred. 1987. Albano.

Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. Ramirez. Asensi. In regard to the Motion for Leave to Take Deposition (which is the last pleading on record). Palad. the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny petitioner’s Motion to Lift Default Order. Catindig. Gloria. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion in declaring the defendant in default and not lifting its default order against petitioner Disini (2) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex-parte while petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration [of the stay of the default order] had not yet been resolved. Valois . Page 70 Echiverri. 2006. Sandoval. He then invoked the liberality of the courts in lifting default orders to give both parties every opportunity to defend their cases. Valiente. 2007. petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which sought various affirmative reliefs from that court. Reyes. would not be delayed by petitioner’s participation therein. 2006. De Mesa. Coronel. being in their pre-trial stage. petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In his Petition. Espina. Marquez. On December 18. Thus. De la Cruz. By seeking the relief contained in this provision. he has rendered his own arguments moot by his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Santos. Petitioner then filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and an Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion on December 19. petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is Albano. petitioner also prayed that the republic’s ex parte presentation of evidence be held in abeyance until the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. it is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the action. Alcazaren. Aside from asking for reconsideration. The respondent court refused to lift the order of default on the ground that there was no fraud. sans any qualification of the nature of its appearance and without reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. premised on the alleged impropriety in the service of summons. Lumberio. HELD: (1) No. mistake or excusable negligence that would justify such an action. accident. Lastimosa. Castillo. and pointed out that the proceedings. Corpuz. Inguillo. However. On August 7. and (2) after an answer has been served. Tabugan. the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Martinez. petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Cabañgon. the respondent court held that petitioner’s failure to file a responsive pleading within the allotted period resulted in his default. Given the validity of the service of summons. While petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over his person. Tecson. Sy. Francisco. Rañigo. Corporal. Rodriguez.

Santos. De Mesa. Inguillo. Ramirez. "This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result of [petitioner’s] twin devious strategies. Rañigo. Tabugan. Coronel. Lumberio. Sandoval. Valois . (2) Yes. Page 71 Echiverri. Castillo. Albano. In filing a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default with the Sandiganbayan while the instant Petition is pending with this Court. Marquez. or already resolved adversely. by some other court. Sy. Asensi. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case. all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. Martinez. Gloria. There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts. the Court cannot grant the relief he prayed for. Corporal." Because of the forum-shopping committed by petitioner. Francisco. Valiente. De la Cruz. Catindig. Palad. Reyes. Corpuz. Espina. simultaneously or successively. and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in. Tecson. Lastimosa. and shows not only [his] lack of faith in this Court in its evenhanded administration of law but also [his] expression of disrespect if not ridicule for our judicial process and orderly procedure. petitioner has unfairly doubled his chances of securing the lifting of the default order. Cabañgon.

Sy. Thereafter. However. 15-92 but denied that said resolution authorized then Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract. Martinez. Tiwi was able to collect the amount of ₱110.000. and that Tiwi pay ₱500. a trial on the merits must be resorted to in order to afford each party his day in court. Corpuz.R. 2010 DOCTRINE: “A judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer admits all the material averments of the complaint. the subject contract is void. No. 15-92.480. respondent is entitled to 10% of whatever amount that would be collected from the NPC. In particular.985. Further. Petitioners further claim that they are not aware of the cases which respondent allegedly handled on behalf of Tiwi since these cases involved officials of the previous administration. the legal services under the subject contract should have been limited to the execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay as per Resolution No.83 and another ₱35. Mayor Corral exceeded her authority when she bound Tiwi to a gargantuan amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of realty taxes recovered from NPC. Under the Contract of Legal Services. that some of these cases were Albano.00 in attorney’s fees and 10% of the other amounts to be determined during trial plus interest and damages. Lumberio. Betito (respondent) and Atty. unenforceable. that respondent and Atty. Page 72 Echiverri. De Mesa. Santos. Reyes. Palad. July 9. Gloria. But where several issues are properly tendered by the answer. Ramirez. among others. despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi to pass an appropriate ordinance for the payment of his attorney’s fees. Inguillo. Alcazaren. the former refused to pass the ordinance and to pay what is justly owed him. Marquez. respondent claims that he handled numerous cases which resulted to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the realty taxes. Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts. Corporal.” FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. Lastimosa.00 as attorney’s fees. on January 25. Antonio B. Alberto Lawenko (Atty. De la Cruz. Tecson. that the municipal treasurer surrender all the receipts of payments made by the NPC to Tiwi from January 1993 to December 1996 for the examination of the court. representing Tiwi. In their Answer.181. ANTONIO B.594. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and its barangays in the recovery of their rightful share in disputed realty taxes. The present controversy arose when respondent sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services after rendering legal services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. The subject contract provided. Coronel. BETITO G. petitioners admitted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. Tabugan. that the Sangguniang Bayan be ordered to pass the necessary appropriation ordinance. Rañigo. Sandoval. Mayor Corral. unconscionable and unreasonable. In his Complaint for sum of money against Tiwi. As a result of these efforts. Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent Atty. and respondent together with Atty. As a result. For these reasons. Catindig. Rodriguez.000. Francisco. 171873. Lawenko). Cabañgon. MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI vs. Respondent prayed that Tiwi be ordered to pay ₱11. Espina. Valois .000. Asensi. Valiente.00 from the NPC as well as other amounts which will be proven during the trial. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal Services (subject contract). 1993. Castillo.

and that these were personal cases of said officials. the trial court rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of respondent ordering the defendant Municipality of Tiwi to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱14. Pursuant to this memorandum.181.00 is part of the share of Tiwi in the utilization of the national wealth. Petitioners also allege that the contract is grossly disadvantageous to Tiwi and that respondent is guilty of laches because he lodged the present complaint long after the death of Mayor Corral.83 in realty taxes. Rodriguez. Petitioners also raise the defense that the realty taxes were recovered by virtue of the opinion rendered by then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. The trial court held that petitioners’ answer to the complaint failed to tender an issue. the genuineness and due execution of these documents are deemed admitted pursuant to Section 8. hence. Coronel. Valois . Carpio and not through the efforts of respondent. Trial to receive evidence on the remaining amounts due and payable to the plaintiff pursuant to the contract of legal services shall hereafter continue. and that the amount collected from NPC has already been spent by Tiwi. Reyes. Espina. Rañigo. 1996. Asensi. actually handled by the Office of the Solicitor General. Sy. for this purpose. Sandoval. with notice to all the parties. On March 3.985. that Tiwi was paid the amounts of ₱110. It noted that petitioners did not specifically deny under oath the actionable documents in this case.594.83 and ₱35. Lumberio. respondent is entitled to 10% thereof as attorney’s fees under the terms of the subject contract. Ramirez. Tecson. the Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective. 2000. particularly. Palad. Santos. in a Commission on Audit (COA) Memorandum dated January 15. Martinez. the COA ruled that the authority to pass upon the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees claimed by respondent lies with the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi. On November 7. and. Furthermore. Consequently. Further. 15-92. Corporal. shall adopt and approve the necessary appropriation ordinance. the said resolution did not impose as a condition precedent the ratification of the subject contract by the Sangguniang Bayan in order to render it effective. Gloria. Lastly. the defendant Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi. Thus. the same was received by Albay and not Tiwi while the amount of ₱35. Corpuz. the authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract was deemed established. De Mesa.985. Francisco. Province of Albay but extended to representing the interest of Tiwi in other cases as well.18 plus interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until payment is fully delivered to the plaintiff. Tabugan. 2001. thus. the Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. Castillo. It added that the authority given to Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer was not only for the purpose of executing the decision in National Power Corporation v.657.594. Alcazaren. Valiente. Marquez. the trial court ruled that the answer admitted. In addition.00. 27-98 which declared the subject contract invalid. Cabañgon. Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. As to the amount of ₱110. respondent filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and/or partial summary judgment. De la Cruz.480. partial judgment on the pleadings is proper. Inguillo. represented by the co-defendants officials. Page 73 Echiverri. The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court: ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment is proper Albano. through a negative pregnant. Catindig.181. Lastimosa.480.966.

services. The generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners’ answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is. or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action. without basis. the municipal mayor shall: x x x (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs. De la Cruz. De Mesa. respectively. (3) Whether or not the authority given includes the authority to represent the Bayan of Tiwi in all matters HELD: (1) No. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue. Valois . Mayor Corral was authorized to enter into the Contract of Legal Services Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC provides: SECTION 444. However. Gloria. Province of Albay The authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate. and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which. with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution. thus. Corporal. Lumberio. Santos. Rañigo. Marquez. when it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed. contracts. Inguillo. x x x Pursuant to this provision. Castillo. and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. Cabañgon. shall: x x x (vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan. Alcazaren. Albano. the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. Asensi. execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds. Page 74 Echiverri. Reyes. Sy. a review of the records reveals that respondent (as plaintiff) and petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses. Valiente. Francisco. In the instant case. Tecson. Sandoval. Functions and Compensation. Lastimosa. The Chief Executive: Powers. Palad. Catindig. (2) Yes. effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code. of course. Ramirez. judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered. Corpuz. In the instant case. if proven. and in this connection. Coronel. the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. Espina. and obligations. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. That the authorization did not set the terms and conditions of the compensation signifies that the council empowered Mayor Corral to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with the lawyer of her choice subject. and activities of the municipal government. Martinez. projects. Rodriguez. Duties. — x x x (b) For efficient. Tabugan. (2) Whether or not the purported "contract of legal services" exceeded the authority of the late Mayor Corral and should have been ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to be enforceable. Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders several issues.

Catindig. It could not have been the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi to authorize the hiring of a lawyer to perform general legal services because this duty devolves upon the municipal legal officer. The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Council's intention. Sandoval. Province of Albay. Corporal. the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Contract of Legal Services to the contrary notwithstanding. this prior authorization appears to have been given by the council in good faith to the end of expeditiously safeguarding the rights of Tiwi. and there is no allegation to the contrary. Castillo. was granted by the Sangguniang Bayanto Mayor Corral as per Resolution No. Rañigo. 21. 15-92 was limited to the execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay. Rodriguez. Tabugan. public order or public policy. The council sought the services of a lawyer because the dispute was between the municipality (Tiwi) and province (Albay) so much so that it f ell under the exception provided in Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC which permits a local government unit to employ the services of a special legal officer. nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization. there is. as discussed above. Page 75 Echiverri. 15-92. Valiente. Under the particular circumstances of this case. The wording of Resolution No. Valois . without regard to any official acts of the Council prior to Resolution No. to the general limitation that the contract’s stipulations should not be contrary to law. Coronel. Martinez. and. to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to execute a "negotiated contract" with any interested party. (3) No. the basis of respondent’s compensation should be limited to the services he rendered which reasonably contributed to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the subject realty taxes. Prescinding therefrom. As correctly held by the CA. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Sy. Tecson. Reyes. Lumberio. Cabañgon. previously quoted above. Gloria. 15-92 is clear. Alcazaren. We cannot accept respondent’s strained reading of Resolution No. thus. Marquez. to the added restriction that the agreed attorney’s fees must not be unreasonable and unconscionable. Palad. petitioners’ next contention that the subject contract should first be ratified in order to become enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily fail. Francisco. On its face. to allow Tiwi to recover its rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes of NPC. Thus. Its title and whereas clauses. Espina. Province of Albay. Lastimosa. which it expressed in clear language. Corpuz. Ramirez. Inguillo. Santos. morals. This authority. Albano. indicate that the hiring of a lawyer was for the sole purpose of executing the judgment in National Power Corporation v. that is. Asensi. considering that this is a contract of legal services. The scope of the legal services contemplated in Resolution No. 15-92 in that the phrase "to represent the interest of the Municipality of Tiwi and its Barangays" is taken to mean such other matters not related to the execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v. the law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit. good customs.

The RTC dismissed the petition and held that (1) the MTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Reyes.00) exclusive of interest. Santos. Cabañgon. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash Writ/Order of Execution dated August 1. No. On May 2. De la Cruz. Bulacan. 165554. against petitioners Lauro Pasco (Lauro) and Lazaro Pasco (Lazaro). and Albano. Corpuz. 2002. Asensi. Ramirez. petitioners’ resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was improper. 2000 by respondents. or Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 2002 was denied by the MTC. Martinez. damages of whatever kind. represented by Cresencia de Guzman-Principe (Cresencia). the parties jointly filed a Compromise Agreement that was signed by the parties and their respective counsel. and (3) the MTC’s approval of the Compromise Agreement was not done in a capricious. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN G. the parties verbally agreed to settle the case. July 26. Page 76 Echiverri. (2) Cresencia was authorized to institute the action and enter into a Compromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs. Corporal. petitioners filed a verified Motion to Set Aside Decision alleging that the Agreement was written in a language not understood by them. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Petitioners further questioned the MTC’s jurisdiction. the aggrieved party may either enforce it or regard it as rescinded and insist upon the original demand” FACTS: The present petition began with a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages filed on December 13. Valiente. whimsical. Sy. 7691 fixes the MTC’s jurisdiction over cases where "the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200. and the terms and conditions thereof were not fully explained to them. On February 21. it also granted Cresencia’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution. was approved by the MTC in an Order dated April 4. litigation expenses. It is beyond dispute that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Castillo. The writ of execution was subsequently issued on July 3. Tecson. LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO vs. The MTC had jurisdiction over the case. Rodriguez. Said Compromise Agreement. The CA dismissed petitioners’ appeal. 2010 DOCTRINE:“Having refused to abide by a compromise agreement. Coronel. Espina. Tabugan. attorney's fees. 2002. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case (2) Whether or not the petitioner’s Certiorari petition under Rule 65 was proper (3) Whether or not the SPA validly authorized Cresencia to enter into a compromise agreement HELD: (1) Yes. In an Order dated June 28. Francisco. Catindig. or arbitrary manner. the MTC denied the motion. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 2002. 2002. During the pre-trial of the case on February 15. 2002. Rañigo. the heirs of Filomena de Guzman (Filomena).R. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). 129 as amended by Republic Act No. Inguillo. Marquez. Palad. Lastimosa. 2002. Valois . thus. The case was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue. Lumberio. hence they sought recourse before the CA. Sandoval.000. Gloria.

While there may have been other remedies available to assail the decision. (2) Yes. costs. Sandoval. or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. As regards the third issue. Castillo.claimed that the SPA was insufficient. (3) Yes. that petitioners – rather self-servingly . of the Rules of Court: Section 1. Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her. No appeal may be taken from: xxx (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent. Subject of Appeal – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. it is presumed that such action constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal said decision. We recall that petitioners filed a verified Motion to Set Aside Decision on May 2. xxxx In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable.00. From the express language of Rule 41. Corporal. Rodriguez. for when parties enter into a compromise agreement and request a court to render a decision on the basis of their agreement. On the first question. Sy. the CA held that the proper remedy from the MTC’s Order approving the Compromise Agreement was a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38 and not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Espina. Marquez. designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. petitioners were well within their rights to institute a special civil action under Rule 65. Reyes. Santos. Section 1. 2002. Rañigo. mistake or duress. Lumberio. Consequently. This Order of denial was properly the subject of a petition for certiorari. falls squarely within the MTC’s jurisdiction. Cresencia entered into the subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco from Filomena. De Mesa. Corpuz. 2002. Catindig. Page 77 Echiverri. confession or compromise on the ground of fraud. the MTC’s denial of petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside Decision could not have been appealed. Valois .000. Coronel. Valiente. respondents’ initiatory complaint. It was only months later. Alcazaren. Indeed. Ramirez. dated 6 April 1999. in December 2002. Petitioners properly resorted to the special civil action of certiorari. Here. Cresencia was authorized to enter into the Compromise Agreement. we fully concur with the findings of the CA that: x x x It is undisputed that Cresencia’s co-heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney. pursuant to Rule 41. or in the initial Petition before the RTC. Cabañgon. the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. a decision based on a compromise agreement is immediately final and executory and cannot be the subject of appeal. Lastimosa. petitioners maintain that the SPA was fatally defective because Cresencia was not specifically authorized to enter into a compromise agreement. Francisco. Martinez. Gloria. Tabugan. Moreover. Asensi. which was denied by the MTC on June 28. This matter was never even raised as a ground in petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside the compromise. Albano. Inguillo. In so doing. De la Cruz. covering the principal amount of ₱140. we note that petitioners never assailed the validity of the SPA during the pre-trial stage prior to entering the Compromise Agreement. Palad. Tecson." Thus. therefore. or any other ground vitiating consent.

Francisco. Corporal. Receiving. DANES B. Martinez. Page 78 Echiverri. and taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he failed to enroll during the second semester of school year 2000-2001. Despite repeated attempts by the respondent to secure a copy of his ToR. On several occasions. DH-788-02. Rodriguez. since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. and exemplary damages. The respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for actual. is merely a ministerial function [of] the Albano. the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition. 165569. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. is whether admitting the facts alleged. Alcazaren. Valois . Rañigo. 2002. but all of these were futile for he was not even entertained at the Office of the Dean. making it impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations. he was treated like a criminal forcing him to admit the fact that he did not enroll for the last three (3) semesters of his schooling. Bataan. Espina. Reyes. Corpuz." FACTS: This case began with a Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Instead of filing an Answer. Lastimosa. petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release respondent’s ToR because he was not a registered student. [Respondent] did not give the said class cards and instead gave photo copies to the [Petitioner] Dean. July 29. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors. De Mesa. Inguillo. 2010 DOCTRINE: “exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. No. but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. The case was raffled to Branch 5 of the RTC of Dinalupihan. Marquez. Tabugan. They also sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. [respondent] went to see the [petitioners] to get his ToR. De la Cruz. On April 18. respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2. to constitute a cause of action. UST refused to release his records. The Office of the Dean of Nursing of [petitioner] UST became very strict in receiving documents from the [respondent]. Lumberio. SANCHEZ G.R. and docketed as Civil Case No. moral. Asensi. as paragraph 10 of the complaint admitted that: 10. respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrar’s Office. Worst. 2002 with a Bachelor’s Degree of Science in Nursing. and the costs of suit. In his Complaint. attorney’s fees. Tecson. Coronel. as [respondent] believes. Palad. and submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment. They claimed that the respondent’s graduation. Ramirez. [They have] to be scrutinized first before the same are received. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS vs. the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing. Castillo. Cabañgon. attendance in classes. Gloria. Sandoval. we have explained that "[t]he test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition. Santos. Catindig. Valiente. and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. These are the only [bits of] evidence on hand to prove that he was in fact officially enrolled. paid the required fees. and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records (ToR). [Petitioner] Dean tried to persuade the [respondent] to give the original copies of the Class Cards which he has in his possession.” “essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground. Sy.

Tecson. the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. Martinez. Page 79 Echiverri. Corpuz. alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21. De Mesa. Administrative agencies are not courts. In this case. [or] deemed judicial tribunals. Espina. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions. which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. Ramirez. the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the CHED is mandatory – or even possible – in an action such as that brought by the respondent. the rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action. Thus. Santos. Francisco. one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in this case. Thus. Coronel. Alcazaren. Petitioners’ liability – if any – for damages will have to be decided by the courts. As we held in Regino v. The CA affirmed the denial of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Rañigo. Valois . [petitioners] and the documents presented for receiving need not be scrutinized especially so when x x x they are not illegal. exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. Catindig. Specifically. x x x neither [are they] part of the judicial system. petitioners Albano. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided. and the filing of the instant case was premature. In addition. Rodriguez. petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. 2003. so petitioners sought recourse before the CA. Corporal. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology: x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Copies of the class cards are hereto attached as "F" hereof. since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismis on the ground that the issues involved required an examination of the evidence. Palad. Valiente. 2003. Sandoval. After the parties filed their responsive pleadings. Cabañgon. which should be threshed out during trial. Lumberio. Inguillo. petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies. an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. Reyes. as in the present case. Castillo. De la Cruz. and directed the RTC to proceed with trial. Asensi. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated August 1. Gloria. As such. the CHED does not have the power to award damages. petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss. Hence. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should be applied (2) Whether or not respondent violated the rule against forum-shopping (3) Whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action HELD: (1) No. However. Marquez. Sy.

Valois . a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if.000.00 as moral damages. a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Lumberio. ₱50. Gloria. Corpuz. Marquez.000. Here. a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. The Complaint states a cause of action Under Rule 16. Coronel. ₱50. De la Cruz. Santos. respondent has not been able to take the nursing board exams since 2002. Francisco. Cabañgon. Corporal. Tecson. Albano. To clarify the essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground. Lastimosa. and cannot make any disposition of the case – whether favorable or otherwise. (3) No. admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct.  that petitioners’ claim that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue.  that petitioners’ actions violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code. Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court. Page 80 Echiverri. Valiente. hold hearings. Asensi.00 as actual damages. Castillo. and ₱15. weigh evidence. to constitute a cause of action. The Complaint makes the following essential allegations:  that petitioners unjustifiably refused to release respondent’s ToR despite his having obtained a degree from UST." Indeed. Palad. have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to "investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts. Rodriguez. the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial power.000. the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition.  that petitioners should be ordered to release respondent’s ToR and held liable for ₱400.  that as a result of petitioners’ unlawful actions. Inguillo. Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping Forum shopping exists when. Reyes. De Mesa. Sy. Alcazaren. certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. Catindig." Stated otherwise. as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum. we have explained that "[t]he test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition. Espina. Rañigo. Sandoval. (2) No. Section 8 of Republic Act No. and draw conclusions. Ramirez. or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause. Martinez. is whether admitting the facts alleged. Tabugan. 772221 otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994.00 as exemplary damages.000.

979. No. Sonic filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila Petitioner’s original complaint against respondents was filed within 60 days of the loss of its goods." As respondents did not pay petitioner’s claim even long after 90 days from the date of accrual of the right of action. Gloria. Hence. Lumberio. De Mesa. Page 81 Echiverri.’s (Premier’s) vessel. the RTC denied the admission of petitioner’s Amended Complaint. (Sonic) is engaged in the manufacture and sale of galvanized steel sheets or G. Santos. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. G. Lastimosa. a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal. After respondent Seaboard’s Comment and/or Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction but must also show that he has no plain. In March 2003 petitioner loaded 371 crates of G. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. vs. the M/V Premship XIV. sheets. July 29. Tabugan. Coronel.R. respondent Premier procured an insurance policy from respondent Oriental Assurance Corporation (Oriental) to cover the goods of petitioner shipped on board the vessel. damage. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied. to incorporate Sections 243 and 244 of the Insurance Code. It could have filed an Albano. Asensi. FACTS: Petitioner Sonic Steel Industries Inc. petitioner received the assailed September 17. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Inguillo. Marquez. Sandoval. petitioner moved before the RTC to have its Amended Complaint admitted. Francisco. De la Cruz. Prior to departure of the vessel. the Master of the vessel ordered an inspection on the ship. and petitioner’s Reply thereto were filed. Inc.I. Reyes. While on transit. 2004. Palad. it was discovered that the cargo was flooded with seawater. Castillo.Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal or any plain. Despite petitioner Sonic’s demand for indemnification for the total loss of its insured cargo. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Valois . ISSUES: Whether or not the CA was correct in denying petitioner’s petitions. SONIC STEEL INDUSTRIES. INC. in compliance with a stipulation in the bill of lading issued by respondent Premier that "(s)uits based on claims arising from shortage. Martinez. Sy. which provide for the proper interest to be awarded in cases where there is unreasonable refusal to pay valid claims.I. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Corporal. 165976 . for shipment to its clients in Davao City. respondents Seaboard and Oriental refused to settle its claim. COURT OF APPEALS. Corpuz. Rañigo. which denied the petition as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Catindig. HELD: YES. or non delivery of shipment shall be instituted within [60] days of the date of accrual of the right of action. In the course of the inspection.460. 2004 Resolution denying reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition with the CA. Rodriguez. For a writ of certiorari to issue. Valiente. Ramirez. 2010 DOCTRINE:Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal or any plain. sheets valued at ₱19. Tecson. Espina.00 on board respondent Premier Shipping Lines. On September 29.

Reyes. Sandoval. Lumberio. Gloria. Ramirez. Valois . Martinez. Tabugan. Francisco. we find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility". Page 82 Echiverri. In the present case. Catindig. Valiente. The CA’s ruling on such lapses was within the contemplation of the law. "For certiorari to prosper. Corporal. Instead it allowed almost two months to pass and then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. or to act at all in contemplation of law. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Coronel. Asensi. Sy. Rodriguez. Marquez. is available as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. At any rate. Palad. but it did not. Espina. petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA ruled in a capricious and whimsical manner amounting to an arbitrary exercise of power. De Mesa. the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Petitioner admittedly committed lapses. Inguillo. Castillo. De la Cruz. Albano. Santos. Rañigo. The Rules preclude recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal. by way of a petition for review. appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Tecson.

2004 within which to file appellants' brief. Corporal. Valois . Tabugan. 2003. 2004. On October 21. 166236. 2004. Albano. Alcazaren. By that time. Petitioners. the extension to file appellants' brief had already long expired. Lastimosa. thus. 2004. the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). Rodriguez. petitioners themselves again moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3. 2004. this petition for review. However. Sandoval. On July 8. Asensi. the brief8 was filed by the PAO. appealed to the CA. the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal. Santos. petitioners' former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. and c) granting petitioners' motions for extension of time to file their brief for a period totaling 75 days. having been approached by petitioners. 2010 DOCTRINE:Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. De Mesa. Sy. Valiente. 2003. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of default and the subsequent denial of petitioner’s motions for reconsideration where proper. Gloria. b) requiring petitioners to cause the Entry of Appearance of their new counsel. HELD: YES. commencing from December 21. Branch 77. Espina. Hence. Palad. On November 26. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal. FACTS: The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Francisco. 2003. Ramirez. On September 6. 2004 or until October 22. SPOUSES HENRY and LIWANAG ANDRES G. the CA issued a Resolution:5 a) noting the withdrawal of appearance of petitioners' former counsel. Coronel. Page 83 Echiverri. petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or until January 21. Castillo. 1997. On April 14. Inguillo. on August 10. 2003. Rañigo. Cabañgon. San Mateo. 2004. No. on December 8. But before then. 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. Tecson. On March 17.R. petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. On December 19. Then on March 3. 2004. Martinez. 2004 or until April 18. Reyes. 2004. De la Cruz. Marquez. 2003 or until March 5. 2004. Lumberio. entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners. On November 5. Catindig. Corpuz. NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN vs. Rizal. Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6. 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. 2004. The declaration of default and denials of the motions for reconsiderations are proper. the CA issued a Resolution9which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The original 45-day period expired on December 21. July 29. the PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration which requested for a fresh period of 45 days from September 7.

Castillo. on the following grounds: xxxx (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules. has in fact contributed much to the delay. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. But they did neither of these. They could also have requested the said lawyer to file the required appellants' brief before consenting to his withdrawal from the case. have a right to have the case finally settled without delay. but also the respondents. in the present case. Tecson. In the present civil case which involves the failure to file the appellants' brief on time. Marquez. Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the Court excused the late filing of a notice of appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's brief. Asensi. Corporal. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. Albano. Sy. It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him go. Rodriguez. Valois . Court of Appeals where the late filing of the appellant's brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest. Tabugan. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states: Section 1. Catindig. Valiente. Then. Page 84 Echiverri. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements. Palad. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to respondents. the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty. Reyes. The cases cited by petitioners are not in point. Sandoval. Santos. Furthermore. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Gloria. there is no showing of any public interest involved. not poverty. Neither is there a showing that an injustice will result due to the application of technical rules. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. They further cite Development Bank of the Philippines v. Alcazaren. Poverty is not a justification for delaying a case. Inguillo. Francisco. Espina. and hence frustration of justice. not having done so. Coronel. they delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Rañigo. De Mesa. on its own motion or on that of the appellee. Martinez. which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Not only petitioners. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence. are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

Santos. by virtue of a private document denominated "Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan. Medrano filed a Complaint on April 27. It stated that the waiver was done in favor of Medrano in consideration of the expenses that she incurred for Flaviana’s medication. In the same year. Medrano then caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. Francisco. Gloria. Medrano built her concrete bungalow on the land in question without any objection from Hilaria and Elena or from their children. Ramirez. They likewise affirmed in said documents that Medrano had been occupying and possessing the subject property as owner since September 1982. Sy. Jesus Paguyo (Jesus). Lastimosa.k. the case should be tried on the basis of the transferee’s answer and with the participation of the transferee. Valiente. She argued that respondent De Vera had no personality to answer the complaint since he was not authorized by the named defendants to answer in their behalf. Tabugan. Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a similar renunciation. 41860 in the name of Flaviana De Gracia (Flaviana). Thus. De Mesa. 2002. Francisca Alvarado-Diaz (Francisca) and Estrellita Alvarado-Cordero (Estrellita). Coronel. they executed separate Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document and Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano. the other children renounced their hereditary rights in favor of De Vera. Tecson. No. Elena Kongco-Alvarado. He maintained that the "Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan" that was executed by the defendants’ predecessors in favor of Medrano was null and void for want of consideration. Valois . reconveyance. Albano. When Hilaria and Elena died. and Estrellita) had executed a Deed of Renunciation of Rights in his favor on March 23. Pelagia. reformation of instrument. August 9. Emilio a. Hilaria and Elena. Page 85 Echiverri. Lumberio. Corpuz. Marquez. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA MEDRANO vs ESTANISLAO DE VERA G. Rañigo. Catindig. leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo (Hilaria) and Elena Martin-Alvarado (Elena) as her compulsory heirs. To that end. Antonio Alvarado. Cabañgon. 2010 DOCTRINE:In cases where the subject property is transferred by the defendant during the pendency of the litigation. 2001.a. Jesus. De Vera presented himself as the real party-in-interest on the ground that some of the named defendants (Faustina. Espina. Francisca. Veneranda Paguyo-Abrenica. the interest of the transferee pendente lite cannot be considered independent of the interest of his transferors. while some children affirmed the renunciation of their deceased mothers’ rights in the lot in favor of Medrano. Reyes. Rodriguez. Castillo. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Palad. wake and burial. FACTS: This case concerns a 463-square meter parcel of land5 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2001 for quieting of title. 4186011 on May 3.R." waived all their hereditary rights to Flaviana’s land in favor of Francisca Medrano (Medrano). respondent Estanislao D. some of their children affirmed the contents of the private document executed by their deceased mothers. On April 2. Martinez. 165770 . Flaviana died intestate. Alcazaren. hospitalization. If the transferee files an answer while the transferor is declared in default. De Vera (De Vera) filed an Answer with Counterclaim. In September 1982. Inguillo. 2002. Corporal. and/or partition with damages against Pelagia M. Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with Counterclaim of Estanislao D. Faustina Paguyo-Asumio (Faustina). In 1980. De Vera and to Declare Defendants in Default. Asensi. Paguyo-Diaz (Pelagia).

Tabugan. The trial court further explained that when the presence of other parties is required for granting complete relief. De Vera then filed a Petition for Certiorari to the CA ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the trial court was correct in refusing to allow De Vera to participate in the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene. the trial court opined that at the very least he was a necessary party for granting complete relief. Espina. Ramirez. As for the order admitting De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. Tecson. Inguillo. Her cause of action on the basis of acquisitive prescription can be raised solely against the defaulting original defendants. Page 86 Echiverri. Atty. Sandoval. Reyes. Thus. Castillo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow De Vera to participate in the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene. Corpuz. and allowed the latter to be tried separately. on April 2. Palad. Alcazaren. Valiente. (2) Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper HELD: (1) No. Francisco. Medrano’s response to the aforesaid order was two-fold. The trial court’s approach is seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest is not independent of or severable from the interest of the named defendants. The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling. Lumberio. Coronel. the trial court disagreed with Medrano’s argument and admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim." the trial court considered his interest as separate from Medrano’s claims against the named defendants. Because of its ruling that De Vera had an "independent interest. It held that De Vera’s right to participate in the case was independent of the named defendants. She argued that she could present evidence ex parte against the defaulting defendants on the ground that she presented alternative causes of action against them in her complaint. 2003 a Motion to Set Reception of Evidence Before the Branch Clerk of Court. Medrano filed on February 21. the trial court was wrong. De la Cruz. Simplicio M. Valois . Medrano filed on February 13. Sy. She asked the court to order De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could be properly named as a defendant in the case. Rodriguez. Catindig. In an Order. the court declared the named defendants in default for not answering the complaint despite valid service of summons. In the same Order. The trial court opined that De Vera did not need a special power of attorney from the defendants because he did not answer the complaint in their behalf. Rañigo. De Vera did not comply with the court’s order despite service upon his lawyer.19 dated July 30. Thus. Corporal. De Vera is a Albano. U-7316. The trial court misjudged De Vera’s interest in Civil Case No. the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants. De Vera made a voluntary appearance in the case as the transferee of the defendants’ rights to the subject property. While it was unsure whether De Vera was an indispensable party to the case. Santos. Sevilleja. Lastimosa. Marquez. Gloria. 2002. 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated July 30. 2003. Cabañgon. De Mesa. She thus prayed to be allowed to present evidence ex parte with respect to her claim of acquisitive prescription against the defaulting defendants. Asensi. With regard to the order declaring the named defendants in default. it admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim but declared the named defendants in default and allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence by Medrano against the named defendants. 2002. It thus held that the admission of De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim is proper in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. Martinez. it appears that the court a quo treated the named defendants and De Vera as distinct and separate parties.

the action may be continued by or against the original party. Given the circumstance that the final decision in Civil Case No. (Emphasis supplied) The above provision gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the substitution or joinder by the transferee. As transferee pendente lite. Sy. Coronel. De Vera may be allowed to join the original defendants under Rule 3. 19. he is not really denied protection as his interest is one and the same as his transferors. Sandoval. Asensi. In the instant case. Marquez. Corpuz. Rodriguez. or judgments of the trial court. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Catindig. Thus. Martinez. as transferee pendente lite. De Vera’s remedy was to annul the trial Albano. Transfer of interest. There may be no need for the transferee pendente lite to be substituted or joined in the case because. Inguillo. U-7316 prejudices De Vera’s rights despite the fact that he was not recognized as a party thereto and was not allowed to assail any portion thereof. the transferee’s interest is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the participation of his transferors in the case. (2) Yes. Gloria. Valiente. the court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. which has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute. in legal contemplation. It is proper if the court acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain. Santos. the trial court maintained that it had no jurisdiction over De Vera because it did not consider him a party to the case. unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. Corporal. Section 19. in general. Discretion is permitted because. Certiorari petition before the CA was proper Ordinary appeal was not an adequate remedy under the circumstances of the case. We note that under Rule 3. De la Cruz. An appeal would have been an illusory remedy in this situation because his notice of appeal would have certainly been denied on the ground that he is not a party to the case. and to try the case on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and with De Vera’s participation. On the other hand. Tecson. resolutions. this technical flaw may be disregarded for the fact remains that the court had already admitted his answer and such answer was on record when the ex parte presentation of evidence was allowed by the court. However. U-7316). Cabañgon. and De Vera did not file any motion for substitution or joinder. transferee pendente lite of the named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of Rights that was executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil Case No. the substitution or joinder of the transferee is "upon motion". as a non-party to the case. and adequate remedy in law. Ramirez. Page 87 Echiverri. Because De Vera’s answer had already been admitted. De Mesa. certiorari is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Reyes. Castillo. His rights were derived from the named defendants and. he would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. – In case of any transfer of interest. Espina. Section 19: SEC. could not participate therein. Its stance is that De Vera. It was therefore wrong for the trial court to have tried Medrano’s case against the named defendants (by allowing Medrano to present evidence ex parte against them) after it had already admitted De Vera’s answer. speedy. An appeal seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by a court. Palad. Francisco. Tabugan. What the trial court should have done is to treat De Vera (as transferee pendente lite) as having been joined as a party-defendant. much less assail any of the orders. De Vera’s interest cannot be considered and tried separately from the interest of the named defendants. who are already parties to the case. Valois . Lumberio. Rañigo.

De la Cruz. Corpuz. Martinez. Tabugan. Catindig. court proceedings on the ground that it was conducted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Albano. the trial court should hear the case anew with De Vera fully participating therein. With such annulment. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Santos. Corporal. Ramirez. Valiente. Sandoval. Coronel. Tecson. Valois . Marquez. Reyes. Asensi. Inguillo. Page 88 Echiverri. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Palad. Espina. Francisco. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Sy. Gloria. Castillo.

Palad. while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of the tenants of the Murong property. the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. Inc. TCT No. and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent. ORLANDO ESPEJO. Corporal. ISSUE: WON CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts HELD: YES. Reyes. the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents. Coronel. Hovever. Upon their failure to pay the loans. Ramirez. OPHIRRO ESPEJO. Tecson. Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. which is further described as located in Barangay Murong. Castillo. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document. there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. On February 26. Rodriguez. T-62836 dated June 4. Subsequently. T-62836 as its subject. Cabañgon. particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Gloria. Francisco. Corpuz. Tabugan. Valiente. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. Alcazaren. 1997. photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction. The OIC-RARAD agreed to the position of the respondents but the decision of the OIC-RARAD was reveresed by DARAB. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. 2010 DOCTRINE: The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. respondents filed a Complaint before the RARAD for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs. FACTS: The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong. OTHNIEL ESPEJO. On appeal to the CA agreed with the respondents. Lumberio. Marquez. 1985 was issued for the Murong property. Martinez. Valois . No. the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction. the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. Inguillo. which title corresponds to the Murong property. the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents. EMERITA ESPEJO. De Mesa. SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ vs. T-62096). ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ G. Santos. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130. Sy. respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI.R. Lastimosa. Section 3. OSMUNDO ESPEJO. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Catindig. T-62096 as its subject. August 25. De la Cruz. In the instant case. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. ELENITA ESPEJO. T-62096 dated January 14. Sandoval. Espina. 1985 was issued for the Lantap property. Rañigo. On February 10. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. Albano. ELOISA ESPEJO. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document. Page 89 Echiverri. TCT No. RBBI. 168387. Meanwhile. 1985. Asensi. photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule.

Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. The Rules of Court [provide] that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Rodriguez. 2002. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. 2010 DOCTRINE: Section 34. Marquez. the prosecution rested its case after presenting the testimony of AAA without formally offering any documentary exhibit at all. 181829. On the other hand. appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. Francisco. In this case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. the prosecution did not formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence.R. Castillo. Cabañgon. he should only be held liable for simple rape and not qualified rape because the minority of the victim was not duly established. Palad. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Alcazaren. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. De Mesa. Reyes. . After the presentation of AAAs testimony. as in this case. In fact. Rañigo. Sy. although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial. SATURNINO VILLANUEVA G. this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to Albano. the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of AAA. any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected. Espina. HELD: NO. Thus appellant claimed that assuming he was indeed guilty of the crimes charged. Valiente. Martinez. Lumberio. appellant argued that the prosecution failed to formally offer in evidence AAAs birth certificate. Tecson. Section 34. we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial. In Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. respectively. Corpuz. the prosecution rested its case. September 1. AAAs birth and medical certificates were likewise marked as Exhibits A and C. When arraigned on November 14. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that both the medical certificate and AAAs birth certificate. the CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC. thus: The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Catindig. . Inguillo. Ramirez. Consequently. The trial court lent credence to the testimony of AAA and convicting the accused with 3 counts of qualified rape. Parocha is instructive. Page 90 Echiverri. Valois . However. should not have been considered by the trial court and the CA because they were not formally offered in evidence. Gloria. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. It was likewise agreed that AAA was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened. ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of three counts of qualified rape. On appeal.During pre-trial. Sandoval. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Santos. Corporal. Coronel. FACTS: The accused was charged with three counts of qualified rape. Asensi. Lastimosa. No. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Catindig. Valiente. Ramirez. Sandoval. Inguillo. Lumberio. Tabugan. Palad. Coronel. Martinez. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. Marquez. Gloria. Corporal. Corpuz. Rodriguez. its admissibility. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. Lastimosa. Espina. it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Santos. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Castillo. In view of the foregoing. it is excluded and rejected. Cabañgon. Page 91 Echiverri. . we find appellant guilty only of three counts of simple rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua for each count. Francisco. Moreover. Alcazaren. the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered. Tecson. Albano. while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. Sy. otherwise. Asensi. De Mesa. Thus. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. Valois . . Reyes. De la Cruz. we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to prove AAAs minority. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial. In view of the foregoing. and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. Rañigo.

FACTS: This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land. Lumberio. JOSE VALDEZ. Corpuz. hence. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. Albano. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA. Gloria. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable. Ramirez. Lastimosa. 1. However. JR. Rañigo. with an area of 80. Alcazaren. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect. DELFIN LAMSIS. the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam. which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint. After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties. Coronel. Valiente. Valois .736 square meters. Sibonghanoy. Sandoval. Petitioner argued that NCIP has primary jurisdiction over ancestral lands.R. Jurisdiction is vested by law. Page 92 Echiverri. the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy. Francisco. denominated as Lot No. De la Cruz. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E G. Sy. respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. October 20. No. the trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property which was affirmed by the CA. warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Martinez. represented by EUGENE KITMA vs. to do that which. Inguillo. the courts should not interfere when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge.An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Wisely. some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam. Palad. Rodriguez. experience and services of the administrative tribunal. De Mesa. HELD: YES. Marquez.An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. MAYNARD MONDIGUING. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect. Catindig. the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Corporal. the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the petition before the SC by the petitioner. Castillo. ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted. Sibonghanoy. 1. an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. Tabugan. Cabañgon. an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Espina. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. by exercising due diligence. As a rule. The property is located along Km. Asensi. by exercising due diligence. to do that which. 2010 DOCTRINE: As a rule. Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 186. Reyes. Jurisdiction is vested by law. Tecson. Santos. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. 5 Asin Road. could or should have been done earlier. In the seminal case of Tijam v.090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint. 173021.

eight years after the filing of the complaint. Page 93 Echiverri. could or should have been done earlier. Corporal. In their brief.Thus. Francisco. some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam. even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here). all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted by petitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. Santos. Valiente. they proceeded to trial. it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR. Inguillo. Sandoval. Rodriguez. the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot be ignored. the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so. had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA.At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the IPRA.They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration. Marquez. through the CSTFAL. Lastimosa. Sy. except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam. This practice cannot be allowed. Martinez. Instead. Lumberio.When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA.In case at bar. Reyes. after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits. The CA certified the matter to this Court. Catindig. Wisely. Instead. Albano. Castillo. the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Rañigo. Corpuz. what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court. Inexplicably. the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Tecson. Espina. in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. When the case reached the appellate court. they once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the enactment of IPRA. after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records. they only raised as errors the trial courts appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom.When the amended complaint was filed in 1998. Gloria. It was only after receiving the appellate courts adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss. the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal. which then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue. Alcazaren. petitioners still did not question the trial courts jurisdiction. other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Palad. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. Asensi. But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial courts ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction It is only before this Court. they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances. the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. Cabañgon. Coronel. Ramirez. Valois . instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. De Mesa. and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again. In the cross-examination.In Tijam.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process. 168840. On appeal. However. Lastimosa. December 8. 2003 a Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise. On January 20. Tecson. 2010 DOCTRINE: Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. Clearly. Sy. respondent. 2003. Valois . Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. he moved in open court that he be allowed to present evidence in support of said motion. petitioner believed that there was a need to partially modify the conditions of the Amicable Settlement by proportionately reducing the amount covered by the promissory note which he would execute in favor of respondent pursuant to paragraph 1 of the above-quoted Amicable Settlement. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Gloria. Because of this. he has no power to do so because of the TRO issued by the court. Corporal. Coronel. is a corporation engaged in the business of sugar production. the parties were thereafter able to arrive at an Amicable Settlement. it filed before RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Inc. could not be stopped by him because at that time. Page 94 Echiverri. It owns and operates Hacienda San Benito in Moises Padilla. the trial court failed to rule on the same. In said motion. Unfortunately. Because of this. However. 2003 for the trial courts approval and same was eventually approved through a Judgment by Compromise dated April 23. petitioner filed on May 13. ENRIQUE MIGUEL LACSON vs. Tabugan. FACTS: Respondent MJ Lacson Development Company. petitioner alleges that the trial court conducted a hearing on his Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise. Sandoval. Marquez.Just less than a month after said approval. Asensi. There is no denial of due process where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case. Corpuz.R. Santos. Said group allegedly cut the standing crops in the hacienda and such act. 2003. Rodriguez. in effect denying petitioners Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise. HELD: NO. the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) installed a group of farmer-beneficiaries who were not workers or laborers of Hacienda San Benito. in its Memorandum advances a Albano. There is no denial of due process where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case. 2003. Ramirez. Petitioner claims that during the hearing of his Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise. Alcazaren. Reyes. Lumberio. De Mesa. he was given the opportunity to be heard thereon. Accounting and Damages against petitioner Enrique Miguel Lacson.In an Order dated June 30. Martinez. Catindig. The fact is that the trial court heard his motion for partial modification and his failure to present further evidence to support the same cannot be equated with lack of due process. however. The failure of the lower court to rule on his oral motion to present evidence during said hearing is not denial of due process. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Palad. Here. Francisco. Espina. MJ LACSON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY G. Rañigo. the trial court granted respondents Motion for Execution. petitioner alleged that prior to the submission of the Amicable Settlement for approval. Castillo. petitioner argues that he was denied due process. Besides. No. Negros Occidental. Cabañgon. They submitted the above-quoted Amicable Settlement on April 15. We cannot subscribe to petitioners claim that he was denied due process. Valiente. petitioner claimed.

Martinez. Sandoval. Santos. Alcazaren. since as shown by the records. Inguillo. Palad. Francisco. Tabugan. Valois . Catindig. Coronel. Gloria. petitioner was ordered by the trial court to reduce into writing his oral motion but he did not do so. Ramirez. Sy. De la Cruz. Espina. Rañigo. Asensi. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Corpuz. Valiente. Albano. Page 95 Echiverri. Petitioner did not dispute this allegation in his Memorandum despite his having the opportunity to do so. Reyes. Rodriguez. Corporal. De Mesa. Marquez. that is. Tecson. plausible explanation for the trial courts failure to rule on petitioners oral motion to allow him to present evidence. Cabañgon. Castillo. respondent served upon petitioner a copy of its memorandum way ahead of petitioners filing before this Court of his own memorandum.

though. CELINE CONCEPCION LEBRON and CECILE CUNA COLINA G. No. petitioner asked for another extension of five days for the same reason given in its first motion for extension. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period. But this time the Court of Appeals denied the second motion for having been filed beyond the period allowed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Sandoval. Tecson. Valois . BARANGAY DASMARIÑAS thru BARANGAY CAPTAIN MA. Page 96 Echiverri. denied having falsified the subject documents. Subsequently. Lumberio. The Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case because of failure to establish probable cause. Cabañgon.” Albano. dismissed the Petition for Review. Inguillo. Tabugan. Valiente. The Supreme Court gave emphasize in Section 4. Martinez. Respondents on the other hand. Asensi. Coronel. ISSUE: Whether or not the technical rules should be relaxed and not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. Alcazaren. 169942. Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just. De Mesa. which the Court of Appeals granted. PIAMONTE. the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. Castillo.R. Rañigo. this petition. Catindig. it first sought for an extension of time of 15 days. LEGASPIvs. AMADO J. Petitioner thus brought the case before the Department of Justice (DOJ) through a Petition for Review. Marquez. HELD: No. Gloria. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Petitioner argued on the policy of liberal construction embodied in Section 6. Corporal. Sy. Corpuz. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which provides: “…. Espina. Palad. But before petitioner was able to file its petition. DR.. FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents against the respondents alleging that latter falsified and used the Barangay Clearance and Official Receipt purportedly issued in the name of CPC by the Office of the Barangay. 2011 DOCTRINE:Utter disregard of the rules of procedure cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Lastimosa. Francisco. Ramirez. Hence. The DOJ. ENCARNACION R. Petitioner believes that if only the CA examined the records of the case. REGINA PIAMONTE TAMBUNTING. speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. Santos. Reyes. January 24. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. CREATIVE PLAY CORNER SCHOOL. it would find that the substantial merits of the case are enough to override technical deficiencies. after finding that no error which would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution was committed by Prosecutor Ochoa and that the petition was filed late.

Lumberio. Marquez. This Court has previously held that "technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. Besides. Tabugan. Coronel." Petitioner’s low regard of procedural rules only shows that it is undeserving of their relaxation. De la Cruz. Moreover. Inguillo. Francisco. Sandoval. the Court cannot heed the same. Corporal. as pointed out by respondents. Considering that the CA has already sufficiently explained how it was able to arrive at the conclusion that there is no compelling reason for such second extension. the same would have been dismissed for being an improper remedy. petitioner had not only once transgressed procedural rules. Gloria. However. Valiente. even if the Court of Appels ignores the petition’s belated filing. A Rule 43 petition for review is a wrong mode of appeal." The Court has examined the records of this case. they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons. It has been held that "the remedy of a party desiring to elevate to the appellate court an adverse resolution of the Secretary of Justice is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. "It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. Castillo. Martinez. Rodriguez. Page 97 Echiverri." Albano. Alcazaren. Palad. Espina. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Catindig. Reyes. and the Court is convinced that the present case is not attended by such an imperative that justifies relaxation of the rules. the Court deem it unnecessary to repeat the same especially since the Court are in total agreement with the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals. Tecson. As to petitioner’s invocation of liberal application of the rules. Santos. Ramirez. Rañigo. Like all rules. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Asensi. Valois . De Mesa. Sy. Lastimosa. however. it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will.

omission. 2011 DOCTRINE:Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. Tecson. or any act. Sandoval. Martinez. Catindig. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. or put him into contempt. Gloria. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G." Libel stands as an exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right. DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURIvs. this petition.R. JR. Espina. Tabugan. Inguillo. Marquez. "is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights. petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. No. Mayor Escalante of Cadiz City. Lastimosa. condition. Rañigo. Valiente. the message is an insult not only to the person of the mayor but also to the people of Cadiz City. On appeal. Coronel." Respondent. the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the lower court. He further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay. Asensi. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment convicting petitioner of libel. Lumberio. Palad. that "there is nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which ascribe to private respondent any crime. Hence. Corporal. the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion. on the other hand. argued that the words printed on the billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the ludicrous yet they were so deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against private respondent’s honor and reputation. ESCALANTE. 172203.” The accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER. However. Rodriguez. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. Another witness also found the message unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an honorable and dignified resident of Cadiz City. Page 98 Echiverri. Valois . integrity and reputation of private respondent. The OSG. February 14. Alcazaren. filed a complaint for libel against the petitioner for putting up a billboard with the phrase “Cadiz Forever” and a blank phase following the word “Never. Francisco. Reyes. De Mesa. The Supreme Court is precluded from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case. Sy. discredit. Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things happening around Cadiz City. Ramirez. According to her. nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. Castillo. Santos. G. Corpuz. vice or defect.” According to a witness. FACTS: Private complainant. status or circumstance which will either dishonor. Albano. Free expression however. Petitioner avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the character.

in making its findings. only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Were the words imputed not defamatory in character. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts." Albano. Hence. the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion. Valiente. Lumberio. At the outset. Whether or not the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER. h. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record As a general rule. Reyes. the following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory. unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Coronel. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken. Catindig. c. went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. No. unless the case falls under the following exceptions: a. Tabugan. ISSUES: 1. Santos. When the findings of fact are conflicting. e. f. g. a libel charge will not prosper.Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel. Corpuz. Corporal. absurd or impossible. Sandoval. b. Ramirez. Inguillo. Rañigo. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court. To determine "whether a statement is defamatory. the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain. b) it must be malicious. BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" is libelous HELD: 1. For an imputation to be libelous. Tecson. Rodriguez. and. Espina. Palad. De Mesa. i. surmises and conjectures. Although all the elements must concur. d. De la Cruz. Marquez. Gloria. the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. Francisco. When the Court of Appeals. Whether or not the Supreme Court is precluded from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of a case brought before them 2. j. Lastimosa. the Supreme Court is precluded from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. Asensi. Page 99 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them. Sy.” 2. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion. However. Castillo. Martinez. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. Valois . the Court is constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically “When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable.

De la Cruz. As ruled in the case of MVRS Publications. Corpuz. These witnesss would naturally testify in his favor. Inc. the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. Tabugan. Francisco. In addition. or vexatious. Tecson. Marquez. Cabañgon. Islamic Da’ Wah Council of the Phils. do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Tested under these established standards." In criminal prosecutions. at the time the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private respondent as mayor of Cadiz City. omission. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime. Reyes. Castillo. fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. Lumberio. ill-natured." "words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service. status or circumstance tending." In this case. Asensi. these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the project of the city government. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Martinez. to cause his dishonor. contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. whether written or spoken. as observed by the OSG.. Valiente. the Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER. Sy. Rodriguez. directly or indirectly. Valois . and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious. "Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense. integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. Corporal. it is the Supreme Court’s considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondent’s performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence. Palad. BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" imputes derogatory remarks on private respondent’s character. Gloria. Coronel. Sandoval. Albano. Santos. even if real. Inguillo. Page 100 Echiverri. vice or defect or any act. v. reputation and integrity. De Mesa. Espina. Catindig. In its ordinary sense. is not automatically equivalent to defamation. Inc. Alcazaren. BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character. condition.

ELMER SUNBANUN. Asensi. Tecson. Sy. TAN. Lumberio. Santos. The RTC denied the notice of appeal thereafter filed. Marquez. the copies of pleadings and other relevant documents referred to in the petition which would support the allegations therein are not attached. The CA dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed. No. 168240. litigation expenses and costs. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Leyte and that he and his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing the case. Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached. Ycong received the notice of denial with a day left to file her appeal. Sandoval. the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioner. GEORGIE S. Reyes. The signatures may be dispensed with as these parties are not involved in the petition. as equity delights equality FACTS: Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora. Corpuz. Valois . 2004 Decision and copies of the Complaint and Answer is not fatal. and Yiu-Go Employment Agency for breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the respondents made involving the property rented out by petitioner. GO vs. The court in its April 27. Inguillo. Tabugan. For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition. viz: the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing her to represent the two (2) other petitioners. 2004 Order denied said motion. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. 2011 DOCTRINE: When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the administration of justice. Palad. ISSUE: May the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA be relaxed in the interest ofijustice? HELD: The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary.R. Espina. Valiente. counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers. but only those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion. it shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending. Atty. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Coronel. certified true copies of the assailed decision dated January 26. Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26. AURORA B. Page 101 Echiverri. The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral damages. Castillo. 2004 attached to the petition is a mere photocopy of a certified true copy. Martinez. attorney’s fees. February 9. Francisco. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an extension of 15 days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal. Albano. DORIS SUNBANUN and RICHARD SUNBANUN G. the Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks explanation why service of the petition with this Court was not done personally. De Mesa. Catindig. Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal. Corporal. her husband Yiu Wai Sang. Gloria. Atty. Explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was running for the position of town mayor in Calubian.

Sandoval. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Corporal. Atty. Lumberio. Corpuz. the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v. Inguillo. However. whenever practicable. Lastimosa. Nevertheless. Asensi. Valiente. Martinez. Court of Appeals will be applied to her benefit. personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of service. Catindig. Therefore. Coronel. Should one deviate from the general rule. Ramirez. Marquez. there was no grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition. De Mesa. Francisco. Otherwise. the court has the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Sy. Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers are not fatal. Rañigo. Tecson. Page 102 Echiverri. Santos. Reyes. to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and IBP numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight. Gloria. Albano. Castillo. De la Cruz. The failure of petitioner’s former counsel. in spite of petitioner’s error. Palad. Ycong. Valois . Espina. Tabugan. Rodriguez. it is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served.

Lastimosa. Gloria. which upheld the validity of the direct negotiated contracts. depriving the government of the opportunity of obtaining the most advantageous construction cost. the petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy. Lumberio. During the trial. and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’ demurrer to evidence. the respondents filed their respective motions for leave to file their demurrer to evidence and alleged that the witness had no personal knowledge of the transaction and thus it’s a hearsay and that the prosecution failed to prove that there was an overpricing and (iii) that the ruling of the Court of Appeals in an administrative case (C. Thus this petition. Asensi. Corpuz. FACTS: Respondents were charged for having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SP No. The respondents then filed a MR and was granted and the case was dismissed. Rodriguez. Sandoval. was already the law of the case. It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for review by an appellate court. Santos. BARCENAS G. Valois . thus. The demurrer to evidence was however denied. however. Castillo. Where appeal is available. ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal can be made. Rañigo.A. Catindig. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. 174504 . Tecson. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Ramirez. Reyes. legal counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman. HELD: Procedurally. Valiente. Atty. 3019. The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is. 2011 DOCTRINE: The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. It opined that the prosecution’s evidence substantiated the elements of the crime and that the respondents must present controverting evidence. Consequently. As a consequence. Pagunuran. even in the absence of a public bidding.R. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i)when the prosecution is denied due process of law. No. The SB based its ruling on the ground that that there being want of substantial evidence to support an administrative charge. Espina. instead of presenting their evidence. That the accused being high ranking officials did then and there. an appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double jeopardy. Marquez. there could be no sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that there is probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of R. Inguillo. Cabañgon. March 21. No. Corporal. willfully. Palad. Alcazaren. not absolute. certiorari will not prosper. Sy.A. unlawfully and criminally enter into contracts/transactions for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter Road. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G. Tabugan. De Mesa. HON. Martinez. 62084). Section 1 of Rule 122 allows "any party" to appeal from a judgment or final order. Francisco. the prosecution presented its lone witness.R. Coronel. In the dismissal Albano. without the benefit of public bidding and at the price higher by 60 to 167% than the typical roadway construction cost. unless the right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated. G. De la Cruz. Page 103 Echiverri.

Albano. Rañigo. Martinez. Santos. Reyes. Sandoval. Espina. Gloria. appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy. Francisco. Certiorari. De Mesa. De la Cruz. however. of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence. Corpuz. Valiente. Coronel. Ramirez. Marquez. Tecson. Castillo. Cabañgon. Valois . Catindig. is allowed. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Palad. Sy. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Asensi. Corporal. Page 104 Echiverri.

what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping. Lumberio. CHRISTINE T. De Mesa. Francisco. Corpuz. Valiente. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action. Reyes.e. there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different. ISSUE: Whether or not Goodland committed forum shopping HELD: Yes. Tabugan. and FLORANTE C. i. De la Cruz. and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. Cabañgon. (RMNI). RMNI defaulted in payment of its obligation to AUB. AUB filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to a TRO in the injunction case. Tecson. No. Coronel.00 of Radio Radiomarine Network. March 9.000. the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same — the alleged nullity of the REM.. Asensi. Palad. The mortgaged properties were sold in public auction to AUB as the highest bidder. Page 105 Echiverri. Castillo. GOODLAND COMPANY. DEL MUNDO vs. Martinez. CHAN. Rodriguez. Lastimosa.R. Sy. G. Inc. which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. Rañigo. Santos. FACTS: Goodland Company. inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues Albano. 191388. Inguillo.000. Inc. Corporal. (Goodland) executed Third Party Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land in favor of Asia United Bank. 3135.Goodland filed another complaint against AUB and its officers. Certificate of Sale was issued and was registered with the Registry of Deeds. INC. The identity of the causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action. As previously held by the Court. Sandoval. AUB filed its application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Act No. Espina. They argued that the two cases both rely on the alleged falsification of the real estate mortgage as basis for the reliefs sought. This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping. but with different prayers. Thus. The mortgage secured the obligation amounting to P250. This complaint sought to annul the foreclosure of sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title. Gloria. ASIA UNITED BANK. They brought to the court’s attention Goodland’s forum shopping given pendency of the annulment case. Valois .While the annulment case was pending. Marquez. Ramirez. Catindig. Goodland then filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of the REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of parties’ verbal agreement. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title). 2011 DOCTRINE: There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM. Alcazaren.

Aggrieved. Sandoval. Jacinto J. Martinez. Conception. Coronel. 2007. Palad. Reyes. representing the 20% sales discounts allegedly granted to senior citizens fortheyear 2002. Rule 13 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides that "[a] case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading. However. petitioner filed with the CTA En Banc a Petition for Review. Tabugan. 2007. 2007 and January 17. Valiente. Santos. Corpuz. docketed as CTA En Banc Case No. praying that the case be dismissed without prejudice. Espina. but is discretionary upon the Court. or memorandum that the Court or its Rules require. dismissed the Petition for Review.In response. No.This prompted petitioner to file before us a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Resolutions dated December 4. Francisco.R. On December 4. Cabañgon. 2011 DOCTRINE: When an appeal is withdrawn. petitioner moved for reconsideration but the First Division of the CTA denied the same in a Resolution dated September 12. brief. Valois . Tecson. De Mesa. 181371 March 02.409. and accordingly. However. the amount of tax credit being claimed for 2002 would just be included in its future claims for issuance of a tax credit certificate since the said amount was carried over to its 2003 Income Tax Return. 2007. petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a Petition for Review. De la Cruz. Gloria. 2008 of the CTA En Banc. The OSG does not oppose the Motion to Withdraw. the OSG argues that the withdrawal of the instant case is no longer a matter of right on the part of petitioner. Page 106 Echiverri. FACTS: On April 13. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. 316. instead of filing a reply to the comments. According to petitioner. 2005. citing Section 2. Corporal. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION VS. 2007. On October 19. Lumberio. Sy. Marquez. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. the CTA En Banc resolved to deny due course. Ramirez. Catindig. The OSG insists that such failure renders the instant Petition defective. petitioner filed with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of P32. petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CTA En Banc. The OSG also calls attention to the failure of Mr. Section 1. the person who signed the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping. Asensi. Inguillo. it should be dismissed with prejudice. the assailed decision becomes final and executory. 2007. Rañigo. the First Division of the CTA rendered a Decision denying petitioner's claim for insufficiency of evidence. to exhibit before the notary public a valid Identification Card. Rodriguez. petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw." In the instant case. HELD: YES. Lastimosa. comments were filed by the respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General. Castillo. Alcazaren.170. Albano.On July 23. Thus. On April 14. 2005. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal should be with prejudice against petitioner.On October 3.

we resolved to require petitioner to file a reply. the Court has not yet deemed the case submitted for decision or resolution. Gloria. Alcazaren. Espina. Valois . And since the CTA had already denied petitioner's request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of P32. Tabugan. Ramirez. Rañigo. "an appellant who withdraws his appeal x x x must face the consequence of his withdrawal. Palad. such as the decision of the court a quo becoming final and executory. Catindig. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Lumberio." Albano.409 for insufficiency of evidence. Clearly.170. Marquez. Thus. we resolve to grant petitioner's Motion to Withdraw. we agree with the OSG that the dismissal of the instant case should be with prejudice. Francisco. To reiterate. Santos. By withdrawing the appeal. records show that on August 19. Coronel. De Mesa. Instead of complying. Asensi. Corporal. petitioner opted to file a motion to withdraw. However. Sandoval. Petitioner cannot be allowed to circumvent the denial of its request for a tax credit by abandoning its appeal and filing a new claim. Tecson. it may no longer be included in petitioner's future claims. Corpuz. by requiring petitioner to file its Reply. Castillo. Reyes. Valiente. petitioner is deemed to have accepted the decision of the CTA. De la Cruz. Martinez. 2009. Sy. Rodriguez. Page 107 Echiverri.

R. PIO ROQUE S. Catindig. 2004 which denied respondent Coquia’s petition and sustained the NLRC’s deletion of the award of backwages and moral and exemplary damages. Albano. Alcazaren. FACTS: Respondent Coquia filed a complaintfor illegal suspension. Rañigo. however. illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against petitioner BPI and some of its corporate officers. Sandoval. SP No. Coronel. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the issue of payment of separation pay in favor of respondent considering that another division of the CA first acquired jurisdiction over the said subject matter. Asensi. The parties involved in that case and in the present petition are the same as well as the subject matter and cause of action. March 23. De la Cruz. 167518. It was rendered based on the merits by a court which has jurisdiction thereon. G. 84230. From the said NLRC Resolution. Page 108 Echiverri.R. this Court may not pass upon the same issues which had been finally adjudicated since a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified. Sy. resolved the petitions differently. issues and cause of action. Rodriguez. No. 2011 DOCTRINE: Clearly. As mentioned. Reyes. The CA. the CA. 83883 involving the same parties. 1999. This principle of immutability of final judgment renders it unalterable as nothing further can be done except to execute it. De Mesa. SP No. which revolves around the validity of respondent Coquia’s termination from employment and the propriety of the award of separation pay in his favor. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Corporal. Valois . 83883 has already become final and executory. reversed the assailed decision and declared that there exist sufficient bases for the dismissal. Tecson. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. On July 29. Marquez. petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia filed their separate petitions before the CA. even by the Supreme Court. Francisco. then. SP No. HELD: The issues regarding the validity of respondent Coquia’s dismissal and the correctness of the award of separation pay have been barred by the principle of res judicata by virtue of a final and executory judgment rendered in CA G. In CA-G. Gloria. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionfinding respondent Coquia’s dismissal illegal. Tabugan. Santos. Espina. directly or indirectly.R. Martinez. The CA likewise sustained the award of separation pay as reinstatement was no longer possible due to strained relation between petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia. Jr.R. The NLRC. rendered a Decision dated December 14. through its Special Sixteenth Division. Palad. Cabañgon. the judgment rendered in CA-G. in its Decision dated April 19. Corpuz. Inguillo. 2000. Castillo. Lumberio. COQUIA. Valiente.

No. Marcelo. Santos. Alcazaren. De Mesa.Respondents. ROGELIO GANADOS. Tecson. its Members namely: HERMINIGILDO M. Gloria. Catindig. Petitioners agreement with his family and Jose. petitioner. Page 109 Echiverri. in his official capacity as Mayor and Chair. that Albano. 03-001 Series of 2003 was approved to regulate cockfighting in the municipality. Vice Mayor RAUL BARBARONA. Corpuz. Series of 2003. Valiente. Sandoval. PERFECTO MANTE. Martinez. the Sangguniang Bayan a resolution which opened for public bidding a 25-year franchise of the cockpit operation in Loon. particularly petitioner. Francisco. Petitioner then filed a Complaintwith the RTC against Mayor Lopez. and the franchise awardee. G. Reyes. Corporal. vs. Espina. 03-007. Lastimosa. Marcelo was declared the winner and a franchise for the cockpit operation in Loon was granted in his favor by way of Municipal Ordinance No. Lumberio. The resolution likewise stated that the cockpit in Bgy. and MARCELO EPE. toilets. Rodriguez. for Annulment of both the bidding process and Municipal Ordinance No. STEFAN TITO MIOZA. De la Cruz. Mayor Lopez revoked petitioners temporary license to operate. Lintuan does not clothe him with legal standing to have the bidding proceedings annulled and Marcelo stripped off of the cockpit franchise. JESSE SEVILLA. During the conduct of the public bidding. FORTUNATO GARAY. Loon Cockpit Arena Bidding and Awards Committee. the highest bidder would still be Jose. Rañigo. The fact that he owns the cockpit in Bgy.R. Petitioner. Marquez.. HELD: Under this definition. 03-007.Four qualified parties submitted their cash bids among them is petitioner’s uncle who submitted the bid for and on his behalf. NOEL CASTROJO. 2011 DOCTRINE: There can be no legal duel in court when the one who demands satisfaction from the alleged offender is not even the offended party. Inguillo. and not the petitioner who was not even a participant. not being one of the bidders clearly has no personality to contest the alleged rigged bidding as well as to pray for the annulment of Ordinance No. Coronel. i. HON. Asensi.e. FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution declaring the cockpit owned and operated by petitioner in Bgy. 03-007. Lintuan as unlicensed and that the only licensed cockpit is the one in Cogon Norte. represented by its Presiding Officer. Municipal Ordinance No. BOHOL. Palad. Contrary to petitioners claim that Jose was his representative. 170914 April 13. Series of 2003. Castillo.[31] Never was it shown that he was bidding on behalf of someone else. or eateries and that the place is prone to vehicular accidents for lack of parking space. the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Series of 2003 which granted the franchise to Marcelo. Sy. Series of 2003 and for Damages. records show that Jose acted in his personal capacity when he applied to be one of the bidders of the cockpit franchise. Valois . JASEN MAGARAN. Ramirez. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF LOON. Tabugan. P/INSP. Pursuant thereto. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the standing to challenge the bidding proceedings and the issuance of Ordinance No. 03-007. Lintuan has no benches. the members of the Loon Cockpit Bidding and Awards Committee. CESAR TOMAS LOPEZ. Even assuming that the bidding proceeding was rigged thereby disqualifying Marcelo as a bidder. As a result. CALIFORNIA. Cabañgon.

the latter would bid on behalf of the petitioner. Martinez. Lumberio. Reyes. Jose would be the one accountable to the Sangguniang Bayan with regard to fulfillment of the obligations of said franchise. Rodriguez. Thus. Asensi. Coronel. Alcazaren. Corporal. Palad. Valiente. Page 110 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Francisco. Inguillo. Sy. All told. Marquez. had Jose been the highest bidder. Rañigo. Gloria. Catindig. this Court finds no reason to disturb the judgment of the CA affirming the RTCs dismissal of petitioners action. the court may dismiss the case for lack of cause of action. Albano. Espina. Valois . the franchise would have been awarded in his name and not in favor of petitioner. Castillo. De la Cruz. does not bind the respondents. Corpuz. Ramirez. Tabugan. Tecson. Sandoval. Santos. Cabañgon. De Mesa. Suffice it to state that on the sole basis of the allegations of the complaint.

Sandoval. Martinez. Santos. the decision of the trial court was appealable under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court because it completely disposed of respondent-spouses case against Pag-ibig. Pag-ibig does not explain why it did not resort to an appeal and allowed the trial courts decision to attain finality. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. respondent-spouses filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against Pag-ibig and Sheriff Arimado. Lastimosa. Pag-ibigs petition would still have to be dismissed for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Reyes. Francisco. The complaint alleged that the law on foreclosure authorized Sheriff Arimado to receive. the respondent-spouses payment. on the pretense that he was going to deliver the same to Pag-ibig. Coronel.June 22. especially if the party’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When the case was called for pre-trial conference. The money never reached Pag-ibig and was spent by Sheriff Arimado for his personal use. De la Cruz. ISSUE: Whether certiorari was the proper remedy. 2011 DOCTRINE: A party that loses its right to appeal by its own negligence cannot seek refuge in the remedy of a writ of certiorari.R. Inguillo. Castillo. In fact. Certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. Valiente. Pag-ibig refused to surrender its certificate of title to the respondent-spouses because it had yet to receive the respondent-spouses payment from Sheriff Arimado who failed to remit the same despite repeated demands. Espina. Rañigo. Moreover. respondent-spouses received a Certificate of Sale wherein Sheriff Arimado acknowledged receipt of the purchase price. Corpuz. Tecson. SPOUSES FIDEL and FLORINDA R. Marquez. Considering Pag-ibigs refusal to recognize their payment. Lumberio. In turn. It turned out that Sheriff Arimado withdrew from the clerk of court the money paid by respondent-spouses. It is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party. Sy. FACTS: Respondent-spouses Fidel and Florinda See (respondent-spouses) were the highest bidders in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a propertythat was mortgaged to petitioner Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-ibig Fund (Pag-ibig). Palad. Pag-ibig admitted Albano. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF) vs. Cabañgon. They paid the bid price in cash to respondent Sheriff Manuel L. Asensi. that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Clearly. De Mesa. on behalf of Pag-ibig. ARIMADO G. however. Valois . HELD: No. It is settled. In the case at bar. Despite the expiration of the redemption period. No. Pag-ibig lost its right to appeal and tried to remedy the situation by resorting to certiorari. Ramirez. even assuming arguendo that a Rule 65 certiorari could still be resorted to. Tabugan. Corporal. the decision of the trial court was already at the stage of execution when Pag-ibig belatedly resorted to a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. Page 111 Echiverri. Catindig. Arimado (Sheriff Arimado). Pag-ibig admitted the factual allegations of the complaint but maintained that respondent-spouses had no cause of action against it. 170292. SEE and SHERIFF MANUEL L. Pag-ibig insisted that it has no duty to deliver the certificate of title to respondent-spouses unless Pag-ibig actually receives the bid price. Gloria. the parties submitted their Compromise Agreement for the courts approval.

Martinez. Corporal. and not from receipt of the writ of execution which seeks to enforce the assailed judgment. Lumberio. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Marquez. This submission is beside the point. Reyes. or from notice of the denial of the motion [for reconsideration]. 2002. which writ sought to enforce the Decision assailed in the petition. Francisco. Valiente. Alcazaren. Gloria. Santos. Valois . Sy. However. it thus had until May 21. Pag-ibig stated that its petition for certiorari was filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of the copy of the writ of execution by petitioner [Pag-ibig] on 07 May 2002. Page 112 Echiverri. De Mesa. Asensi. Sandoval. Section 4 is very clear that the reglementary 60-day period is counted from notice of the judgment. Espina. Tecson. Inguillo. Rule 65. The date of Pag-ibigs receipt of the copy of the writ of execution is therefore immaterial for purposes of computing the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. Corpuz. Tabugan. 2002 to file its petition for certiorari. Cabañgon. Albano. Castillo. Palad. 2002. which was the 63rd day from its receipt of the trial courts order and obviously beyond the reglementary 60-day period. order or resolution. Catindig. order or resolution being assailed. Rodriguez. Pag-ibig filed its petition only on May 24. Ramirez. receiving the trial courts Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22. Coronel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules can give a liberal construction upon faithful compliance of petitioner. Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Catindig. The petitioner should also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in any court. Sandoval. Inguillo. Martinez. for good and deserving reasons. Mario. SANTOS vs. not frustrate. the same still substantially complied with the Rules. Valois . Rodriguez. June 22.R. In her letter-reply. Sy. petitioner. Mario notified petitioner that an administrative investigation and requested her to appear and present her defenses on the charges. Lastimosa. the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. During the hearing. among others. have to give way to. No. Gloria. Petitioner received a Letter of Termination from respondents for obtaining or accepting money as a result of an unauthorized arrangement with a waste buyer. Corpuz. and be subordinated by. Tecson. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Corporal. cannot be sacrificed merely in order to achieve that objective. She also insisted that although the Verification and Certification attached to the petition was an abbreviated version. MA. De Mesa. 2011 DOCTRINE:Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote. Reyes. their strict and rigid application may. Coronel. Alcazaren. FACTS: Atty. Lumberio. Asensi. Palad. Allegedly. HELD: Yes. The Labor Arbiter found that her dismissal is valid. the cause of justice. Cabañgon. Marquez. LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED G. Francisco. petitioner denied the accusation and explained that herjob is merely clerical in nature and that she has no authority to hold the release of purchased waste items. directed petitioner to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be imposed on her after having been caught engaging in an unauthorized arrangement with a waste buyer. Valiente. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice. Espina. the CA dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to indicate in the petition the actual addresses of the parties and to state in the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping that there were no other pending cases between the parties at the time of filing. Santos. the just resolution of cases on their merits. LIGAYA B. Rule 46 of the Rules of Court because it indicated that the parties may be served with notices and processes of the Court through their respective counsels whose addresses were specifically mentioned therein. Page 113 Echiverri. 170646. In a Resolution. submitted a Motion for Reinvestigation (which she also filed in the criminal case for extortion). tribunal or Albano. the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal course. represented by three officers of the union of which she was a member. Atty. petitions for certiorari shall contain. however. Rañigo. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration explaining that her petition substantially complied with the provisions of Section 3. an act considered as affecting company interests. personnel manager of respondent Litton Mills. Under Section 3. Ramirez. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable aim. Castillo. De la Cruz. petitioner has been demanding money from a certain Leonardo A. Concepcion (Concepcion) every time he purchases scrap and sludge oil from the company and threatening to withhold the release of the purchased materials by delaying the release of official delivery receipt and gate pass if he would not oblige. Tabugan. thus.

Thus. Reyes. Catindig. It is settled that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. he must state the status of the same. Page 114 Echiverri. Rule 13 which pertinently provides that [i]f any party has appeared by counsel. Because there was substantial and subsequent compliance in this case. De la Cruz. no such other action or claim is pending therein. Tecson. Espina. Alcazaren. he shall promptly inform the court within five days therefrom. Corpuz. To us. Ramirez. quasi-judicial agency and. Sy. Marquez. Valiente. At any rate. Tabugan. Cabañgon. arguing more than revising the mistakes explicitly pointed out. Rodriguez. Palad. The Rule explicitly provides that failure to comply with these requirements shall be sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. to the best of his knowledge. we resolve to apply the liberal construction of the rules if only to secure the greater interest of justice. Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that [t]he petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. Inguillo. Asensi. unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the Court. Hence. she fully complied with the same when she indicated in her Motion for Reconsideration the actual addresses of the parties. Rañigo. The Court has time and again relaxed the rigid application of the rules to offer full opportunity for parties to ventilate their causes and defenses in order to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice. the mention of the parties respective counsels addresses constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3. Santos. the CA should have given due course to the petition. even declared that: Instead of [rectifying] the deficiencies of the petition. Coronel. Moreover. we are at a loss why the CA still proceeded to deny petitioners petition for certiorari and worse. Lumberio. Gloria. Valois . in her motion for reconsideration. Albano. De Mesa. and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending. Lastimosa. Martinez. the petitioner chose to avoid compliance. Castillo. Sandoval. Our observation further finds support in Section 2. petitioner explained that she was of the honest belief that the mention of the counsel’s address was sufficient compliance with the rules. Francisco. service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them. (b) if there is such other pending action or claim. Corporal.

2011 DOCTRINE:Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary judgment. petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property) thereof. When Antonio died in 1918.A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Palad. Martinez. his six children acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document entitled Convenio. Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of possessionagainst petitioners alleging that sometime in 1992. De la Cruz. Summary judgments are proper when. Petitioners cite as their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. Tecson. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Coronel. Castillo. De Mesa. Valois . Francisco. FACTS: President Manuel L. petitioners position could not be sustained. Alcazaren. Corporal. Sandoval. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.. HELD: No. Lumberio. Asensi. Catindig. Santos. Corpuz. Rodriguez. the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that. affidavits and exhibits in support of. a military reservation site. upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant. In 1926. Inguillo. 80 recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military reservation. Cagayan. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment. the trial court rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners claim of possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. They maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest. or against. Antonios children applied for a homestead patent but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. Cabañgon. Sy. as there was no right of [petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government. No. Espina. In the case at bar. Antonio Calubaquib (Antonio). June 22. Page 115 Echiverri. Gloria.al.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay Caggay. as a matter of law. Without any trial. as distinguished from a sham. Lastimosa. which exempts from the military reservation site private rights. The proclamation expressly stated that it was being issued subject to private rights. 80 which declared a 39. Ramirez. The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties pleadings. if any there be. ISSUE: Whether or not the rendering of a summary judgment is proper in this case. The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact.R. Quezon issued Proclamation No. contrived or false claim. ANICETO CALUBAQUIB et. Considering that the remedy of summary Albano. Reyes. the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. if any there be. Rañigo. the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. Tabugan. 170658. Under these circumstances. Petitioners denied the allegation that they entered the subject property through stealth and strategy. Valiente. the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action. 80. have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early 1900s. Marquez. vs. fictitious. Tuguegarao.

Palad. Reyes. Espina.This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. Martinez. Marquez. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an assumption that petitioners defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham. Lumberio. The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense and factual allegations. without first giving them an opportunity to do so. Tecson.g. Alcazaren. the trial court cannot railroad the parties rights over their objections. Catindig. Cabañgon. Corporal. Albano. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Asensi. Ramirez. and that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e. open and continuous possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial court. Valois .. Sandoval. Santos. Coronel. Page 116 Echiverri. Corpuz. The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense. Castillo. Francisco. Rañigo. Valiente. Sy.By proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial. Gloria. judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. Inguillo. No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. Tabugan.

Inguillo. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Umale also challenged ASB Realtys personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed. Amethyst Pearl. in the law. Umale (Umale). HELD: Yes. The intention of the law is to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation by preserving a floundering business as a going concern.R. Valiente. the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Corporal. because the assets of a business are Albano.Upon the contracts expiration. FACTS: Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearls outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty. Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. June 15. ASB Realty commenced an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court for unlawful detainer of the subject premises against petitioner Leonardo S. even constructing commercial establishments thereon. ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. Among the general powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to sue in its own name. unless specifically revoked by another law. Cabañgon. 2011 DOCTRINE:Being placed under corporate rehabilitation and having a receiver appointed to carry out the rehabilitation plan do not ipso facto deprive a corporation and its corporate officers of the power to recover its unlawfully detained property. De la Cruz. Espina. they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. Corporations. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contractwith Umale. Tecson. Page 117 Echiverri. Castillo. Santos. Palad. As a creature of law. No. Coronel. Asensi. Valois . Thus. Umale failed to comply with ASB Realtys demands and continued in possession of the subject premises. Gloria. Martinez. Corpuz. Corporate rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency. Sandoval. Umale continued occupying the premises and paying rentals albeit at an increased monthly rental. This power is granted to a duly-organized corporation. Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended. Francisco. Marquez. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rental to ASB Realty. ASB Realty became the owner of the subject premises. Sy. LEONARDO S. 181126. such as ASB Realty. ASB REALTY CORPORATION G. ISSUE: Whether the corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation. Reyes. are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. UMALE vs. if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. Catindig. expressly or impliedly. He was adamant that his lessor was the original owner. Lumberio. Ramirez. The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers. Tabugan.

Catindig. Alcazaren. Coronel. Albano. Page 118 Echiverri. through its Board of Directors and corporate officers. Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty. De la Cruz. Valois . remains in control of its business and properties. Martinez. Marquez. Lumberio. often more valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated. Gloria. Sandoval. This concept of preserving the corporations business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. Castillo. Corporal. Tecson. Rañigo. Reyes. Espina. Corpuz. Francisco. Ramirez. the rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of the developments in the case. Santos. so that these assets would be managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan. Tabugan. Valiente. Rodriguez. Sy. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Palad. Asensi. Lastimosa. This means that the debtor corporation (the corporation undergoing rehabilitation). the necessity of keeping the receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. De Mesa. subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver. While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover its property and the back rentals from Umale.

petitioners. Tecson. joined by Farmix Fertilizer Corp. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Reyes. FACTS: John Anthony B. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. Page 119 Echiverri. We find that petitioners appeal from the February 2. As stated earlier. Inguillo. petitioner’s certiorari petition. TANKIANSEE AND JUANITA U. except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation. Tan. for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Westmont Investment Corporation. while this case was pending review before the Court of Appeals.e. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention. A petition for certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.. Francisco. Alcazaren.. Ramirez. filed a notice of appeal. Wang Lian Khee and Marianne Malate-Guerrero (UOBP Group). Ong Sea Eng. Sy. the trial court rendered a Decision in the main case (i.While this case was pending resolution before the appellate court or on February 2. On January 31. Valois . Gloria. 2011 DOCTRINE: There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings. 02-103160). Coronel. and Exchange Equity Corporation (Espiritu Group) and Tony Tan Caktiong and William Tan Untiong (Tan Group) filed a Petition for Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management and Controlwith the Regional Trial Court of Manila against United Overseas Bank Limited. Santos. Castillo. From this judgment. 164153. The existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. Civil Case No. Espiritu. the instant petition should be denied because (1) petitioners appeal before the appellate court is the appropriate and adequate remedy. Palad. Cabañgon. subject matter of this case. HELD: Yes. has been superseded by the filing of their subsequent appeal before the Court of Appeals. and (2) the certiorari petition. Valiente. 02-103160). In the same vein. or any plain. With these developments.. Tabugan. United Overseas Bank Philippines. Inc. questioning the three interlocutory orders which denied their resort to discovery procedure. 2003. Lumberio.R. 2004. and Pearlbank Securities. Chua Ten Hui.. Rañigo. Sandoval. Marquez. except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation. constitutes forum shopping. Asensi. Civil Case No. From this judgment. Martinez. the Espiritu and Tan Groups attempted to resort to discovery procedure. Albano. Tan. Catindig. are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. petitioners. filed a notice of appeal. Espina. founded on the same cause. Tankiansee and Juanita U. Samuel Poon Hon Thang. Following suit. Corpuz. Golden Era Holdings. Upon Oral Examination of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. De la Cruz. De Mesa. June 13. Section 1. JOHN ANTHONY ESPIRITU vs. Lastimosa. the trial court rendered a Decision in the main case (i. they filed a Notice to Take Depositions. (intervenors). No. Inc. 2004 Decision of the trial court in the main case is the appropriate and adequate remedy in this case as it challenges the aforesaid interlocutory orders and the decision in the main case. MANUEL N. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation. TAN G. Manta Ray Holdings. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Wee Cho Chaw.. Inc. Corporal. Wee Ee Cheong.e. Manuel N. clearly provides that a petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal. Rodriguez. Sta.

the allegations in the complaint establish a cause of forcible entry. it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from the very beginning. Assuming that these allegations are true. Hence. Sandoval. Thus.But plaintiffs’ patience has come to its limits. Rodriguez. Corporal. Tecson. plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property. Cabañgon. Asensi. Coronel. The Court ruled that taken in its entirety. Rañigo. INC. was attended by strategy and force. Therefore. threat. Francisco. Hence. Consequently. without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs. Tabugan.Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters. defendant took full control and possession of the subject property. absolute and registered owners of a parcel of land. De la Cruz. Ramirez. Martinez. Page 120 Echiverri. one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force. Where the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio. Inguillo. defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs. Catindig. a court should limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint. developed the same and use it for commercial purposes. De Mesa. Castillo. defendant failed and refused. Lastimosa. as alleged inpetitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed. G. Santos. 2011 DOCTRINE:The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the action and of which court has jurisdiction over the action. strategy. Valiente. and as correctly found by the CA. Albano. Palad. HELD: Yes. Espina. defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance. Lumberio. Gloria. Marquez. FACTS: Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City. and to vacate the subject premises. In forcible entry. Alcazaren. who are the owners thereof. since the deprivation of physical possession. The complaints contain that the plaintiffs are the true. sometime in the last quarter of 2002. GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION.After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference. Corollarily. Corpuz. not unlawful detainer. the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession. Valois . No. petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. In their Complaint. Reyes.R.Sometime in 1991.Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land. there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception. or stealth. respondent filed on a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. SPOUSES MANUEL AND FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO vs.June 8. intimidation. the foundation of petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. this Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer. ISSUE: Whether or not in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer. 170575. Sy.

3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. De la Cruz. Page 121 Echiverri. Cebu. Palad. and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. Coronel. Martinez. Santos. however. Cabañgon. Asensi. petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. Self-serving statements. Lastimosa. Valiente. petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. Tecson.Aside from consent.In their Answer. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. The affidavits of petitioners’ neighbors declaring that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties. Rodriguez. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband. Marquez. Sy. 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. In this case. 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. Sandoval. will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner. Salvador alleged that despite several verbal and written demands made by her. HELD: No. the element of consent is lacking. LUCIA RODRIGUEZ ANDPRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ vs. Tabugan. Alcazaren. The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy. Valois .As we have often said. Lumberio. SALVADOR G. mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy.June 8. Serapio. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Francisco. mother and daughter. entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. 171972. TERESITA V. 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. De Mesa. petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. FACTS: Teresita V. petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. Catindig. independent evidence is necessary. to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties. No. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia. Gloria. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land and that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez. 2011 DOCTRINE: Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners-defendants are tenants of the subject land based on factual and legal basis and supported by substantial evidence. respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete. Rañigo. Espina. Castillo. no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Corporal.R. As correctly found by the CA. Ramirez. siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador. Inguillo. Corpuz. Reyes. Albano.

PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS.al. P&G filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Corpuz. (P&G). petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Comment/ Opposition (to P&G's motion for reconsideration). ISSUE: 1. June 6. Corporal. it may no longer be modified in any respect. Tabugan. Inc. OEB M. G. (Promm-Gem) is a legitimate independent contractor. (c) that Promm-Gem is guilty of illegal dismissal. 2010. 2. Inguillo. Palad. INC. No. Gloria. 2010 was proper because it was made after receipt by P&G of a copy of the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. Thereafter. and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Espina. De la Cruz. Motion for Leave to Admit the Attached Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification as well as its Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. Page 122 Echiverri. The Court stressed that the issuance of the Entry of Judgment on July 27. Before any of the parties received the notice of Entry of Judgment. (e) that petitioners are entitled to reinstatement. HELD: 1. Marquez. On October 4. Inc. P&G filed on August 9. 2010 a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification and a Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. Asensi. Whether or not the Entry of Judgment was properly issued. even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. Lastimosa. Francisco. 2011 DOCTRINE: The doctrine of finality of judgment provides that once a judgment has become final and executory. Reyes. Section 1. (b) that Sales and Promotions Services (SAPS) is a labor-only contractor consequently its employees are considered employees of Procter & Gamble Phils. Sy. an Opposition (to petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration). P&G filed a Motion for Leave to Admit the Attached Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification as well as a Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. and Supplemental Opposition. Sandoval. 2010. (d) that SAPS/P&G is likewise guilty of illegal dismissal. be resolved as they were filed before it received notice of the entry of judgment. P&G filed a Manifestation and Motionpraying that its Motion for Leave to File Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. Catindig. On the other hand. Yes. Santos. and (f) that the dismissed employees of SAPS/P&G are entitled to moral damages and attorney’s fees there being bad faith in their dismissal. Tecson. Ramirez. Rañigo. as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. Martinez. FACTS: The Supreme Court rendered a Decisionholding: (a) that Promm-Gem. Cabañgon.. and PROMM-GEM INC.vs. Castillo. Lumberio. Whether or not the P&G can file a second motion for reconsideration.. 160506.R. Rodriguez.. ALIVIADO et. Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides that: Albano. Coronel. Alcazaren. Valois . De Mesa. Valiente. Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. or on November 8.

Palad. Coronel. Alcazaren. First. This is because the issuance of the entry of judgment is reckoned from the time the parties received a copy of the resolution denying the first motion for reconsideration. Page 123 Echiverri. Martinez. by such counsel or his or her representative. Sandoval. and (ii) who received the same. some crafty litigants may resor Albano. Corporal. Asensi. Tabugan. De Mesa. Francisco. Cabañgon. SECTION 1. It is immaterial that the Entry of Judgment was made without the Court having first resolved P&Gs second motion for reconsideration. . Sy. with the information provided by authorized personnel of the said post office serving as the basis for the computation of the fifteen-day period. Besides. Castillo. Lastimosa. to reckon the finality of a judgment from receipt of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration would be absurd. Santos. The filing by P&G of several pleadings after receipt of the resolution denying its first motion for reconsideration does not in any way bar the finality or entry of judgment. Rañigo. Tecson. shall be the reckoning date for counting the fifteen-day period. in case he or she is represented by counsel. Lumberio. Catindig. Second. it shall immediately inquire from the receiving post office on (i) the date when the addressee received the mailed decision or resolution. and (b) if the Judgment Division is unable to retrieve the registry return card within thirty (30) days from mailing. Gloria. Valois . Corpuz. Marquez. the Rules of Court and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second motion for reconsideration. Valiente. Inguillo. Ramirez. Espina. Reyes.A decision or resolution of the Court may be deemed final after the lapse of fifteen days from receipt by the parties of a copy of the same subject to the following: (a) the date of receipt indicated in the registry return card signed by the party or. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Finality of decisions and resolutions.

RTC noted that Abellana did not intend to defraud the Alonto’s. Abellana could not be held civilly liable. Castillo. Lastimosa. ALONTO AND DIAGA ALONTO G. Abellana prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the Alonto’s actually signed. FELIXBERTO ABELLANA vs. or negligently. Alonto signed in Manila but was notarized by Abellana in Cebu without the Alonto’s appearing before the notary. Alcazaren. but the DOA was notarized without the Alonto’s personally appearing before the notary public. Rañigo. Thereafter. Alonto. Coronel.R. For civil liability to arise. that after the latter failed to pay their obligation. SAAPIA B. an information was filed against Abellana for Estafa and falsification of Public Document. 174654 DOCTRINE: It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with respect to the civil liabilities. De la Cruz. Santos. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. Abellana prepared a deed of absolute sale conveying said lots to him. Rodriguez. In either case. Marquez. Espina. Reyes. Abellana caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons. Tabugan. one must by his own act or omission. Subsequently. which Sps. Sy. Corpuz. Valois . FACTS: Abellana extended a loan to Sps. Gloria. Palad. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether or not Abellana could still be held civilly liable despite his acquittal by the trial court and the CA. Page 124 Echiverri. Corporal. Asensi. Sandoval. No. Cabañgon. Tecson. Francisco. HELD: No. The RTC ruled that Abellana is only guilty of falsification of a public document by private individuals and not of estafa through falsification of public document. secured by a deed of real estate mortgage. On appeal to the CA. the CA held that Abellana who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public document (Article 171 (1)) could not be convicted of falsification of public document by a private individual. the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Lumberio. De Mesa. causes damage to another. Ramirez. Martinez. Nevertheless. Inguillo. Catindig. done intentionally. Sometime later. Albano. (Article 171 (2)) The CA opined that the conviction of Abellana for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

the non appearance of the Alonto’s before the notary public for the notarization does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction. Valois . Lumberio. the acts allegedly committed by Abellana did not cause any damage to the Alonto’s. Since the defective notarization does not invalidate the DOA. Corporal. Based on the records of the case. Martinez. Alcazaren. Marquez. Gloria. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Catindig. and thereafter sold the same to third persons. Second. Lastimosa. Coronel. De la Cruz. Valiente. Tecson. Ramirez. Abellana caused the cancellation of Sps. Francisco. Asensi. Page 125 Echiverri. Espina. Corpuz. it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Reyes. Rañigo. Tabugan. Santos. Sy. Sandoval. Hence. First. De Mesa. Palad. Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name. Castillo. For Abellana to be civilly liable to the Alonto’s. the Alonto’s actually signed the DOA. Rodriguez. Albano. the transfer of said properties from the Alonto’s to Abellna remains valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not MeTC acquired jurisdiction over Cheng Lie and Atiko? HELD: MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Atiko. and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration. Marquez. Tecson. Tabugan. Francisco.. to admit answer. Later on. Castillo. No. Catindig. Valois . August 17. ATIKO TRANS. 2011 DOCTRINE(S): Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction. Asensi. Defendant cannot be declared in default unless such declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons. Corporal. Cabañgon. Ramirez. vs. are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The shipment was covered by a bill of lading issued by Cheng Lie Navigation (a Taiwanese corporation) with Oriental Tin Can as the notify party. Prudential filed a motion to declare defendant in default alleging that a copy of the summons was served upon Atiko’s cashier Cristina Figueroa and despite receipt thereof. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Inguillo. The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief. Atiko filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC of Makati. Prudential then filed a complaint for sum of money against Cheng Lie and Atiko (authorized agent of Cheng Lie) before the MeTC of Makati. Lastimosa. RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Atiko failed to file any responsive pleadings. Sy. for additional time to file answer. Martinez. for reconsideration of a default judgment. Rañigo. it was found out that one of the tinplates was damaged. Upon the arrival of the shipment in Manila. Santos. Rodriguez. G. De la Cruz. FACTS: Fourty (40) coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board a ship in Taiwan for shipment to Manila. INC and CHENG LIE NAVIGATION CO. Espina. Atiko and Cheng Lie argued that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person. Valiente. De Mesa. 167545. In its Memorandum. Reyes. INC. Alcazaren. Corpuz. Palad. Coronel. Oriental then filed a claim against Prudential which it paid. Page 126 Echiverri. Sandoval. The issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised. Gloria.R. Lumberio. MeTC ordered Atiko in default and subsequently rendered judgment in favor of Prudential. such as. The cargoes were insured against all risk by Prudential Guarantee. Albano. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE.

Asensi. Albano. When Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal. Ramirez. Martinez. Lumberio. Sandoval. MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cheng Lie. It should be recalled that Atiko was not properly served with summons. Valiente. Moreover. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over Atiko thru its voluntary appearance. However. it follows that the MeTc never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. It has been held in a litany of cases that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised. De Mesa. Reyes. Tecson. Castillo. and service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Sec. no summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner prescribed by the Rules of Court (Sec. Gloria. Motion for Reconsideration. a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying to obtain relief. hence. Santos. Inguillo. Cheng Lie’s filing of numerous pleadings cannot be considered as voluntary appearance. Marquez. it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. Failing to do so. rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. Tabugan. Alcazaren. Page 127 Echiverri. It is true that Atiko is a domestic corporation. Cabañgon. Espina. since there being no proper service of summons to Atiko to speak of. Sy. Rule 14). Palad. Thus. Rodriguez.12. Coronel. Valois . Francisco. since it never sought affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. Memorandum of Appeal. Rañigo. Atiko’s contention is a mere afterthought. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Catindig. that Atiko was not properly served with summons. Cheng Lie cannot be served in default since such declaration must be preceded by a valid service of summons. for the first time. In the present case. and Petition for Review. Corporal. 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. It was only in their Memorandum with the SC where they claimed. Thus. Lastimosa. jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction.

an Alias Writ of Possession was issued but could not be implemented because of the refusal of Basbas. Sayson pursuant to the CFI Decision. Palad. On appeal.R. 2011 DOCTRINE: What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the complaint. the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Corpuz. (4) there was a relocation order. Gloria. vs.. Sandoval. claiming that the land they occupied is not the same land subject of the CFI decision. FACTS: In 1976. Said application was opposed by the State and Eugenio Basbas Sr. In 1989. (2) the said decision became final and executor. Basbas contended that the Order sought to be revived is not the judgment contemplated under Sec. Furthermore. On the other hand. August 24. Lumberio. Tabugan. hence the action for revival of judgment is improper Also they averred that they cannot be made parties to be complaint of revival of judgment as they were not parties to the land registration case (the petitioners here are heirs succeeding the original parties in this case). No. he admitted the following: (1) the land registration case was decided in favor of the Sps. Reyes. EUGENIO BASBAS ET AL. Hence Sayson filed a complaint for revival of judgment. On appeal. The CFI rendered a decision adjudicating to Sps. Sayson subsequently filed an omnibus motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in granting the Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment? Albano. Santos. However it noted that Basbas’ answer admitted almost all of the allegations in Sayson’s complaint. In 1986. Cabañgon. Corporal. Catindig. Martinez. 172660. Valois . Castillo. when the Answer specifically denies the averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses. the CA denied the appeal. A relocation survey was conducted by the order of the RTC of Ormoc city. Hence the RTC committed no reversible error when it granted Sayson’s motion. Alcazaren. De Mesa. De la Cruz. 6. Lastimosa. Valiente. an OCT was issued to the Sps. However the 1989 order was not implemented within the 5 year period from the time it became final. Rodriguez. Sps. In 1989. BEATA SAYSON and ROBERTO SAYSON G. Francisco. Sayson filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in Leyte.. a summary judgment is proper provide that the issue raised is not genuine. (3) OCT was issued in the name of the Sps. Thus order sought to be revived is not binding upon them. Espina. Sayson said agricultural land and approving its registration. When the answer fails to tender any issue a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Sayson. Sayson. Page 128 Echiverri. Tecson. Sy. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the answer of Basbas. RTC ruled in favor of Sayson. Coronel. Rañigo. Ramirez. Asensi. Inguillo. The CA decision became final and executory. accordingly a writ of possession was issued but was never implemented. the RTC ordered Basbas to vacate the subject property.

2) the pleadings of the parties and pertinent portions of the records showing. De Mesa. a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. according to them. Alcazaren. When the Answer fails to tender any issue. Tecson. Martinez. that is. among others. the heirs of such oppositors and the present occupants of the property. when examined. who among the respondents were oppositors to the land registration case. basically boil down to questions relating to the propriety of the action resorted to by respondents. to determine whether same is a judgment or final order contemplated under Section 6. a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. whether they are genuine issues or not. The issues raised are not genuine issues. when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses. A full-blown trial on these issues will only entail waste of time and resources as they are clearly not genuine issues requiring presentation of evidence. Lumberio. Castillo. Cabañgon. and. In sum. Lastimosa. Sandoval. an examination of the issues raised. the CA committed no error in affirming the Order of the RTC granting respondents’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. In this case. we note that while petitioners’ Answer to respondents’ Complaint practically admitted all the material allegations therein. As issues obviously arise from these affirmative defenses. Espina. Corporal. and to the proper parties thereto – the same questions which we have earlier declared as not constituting genuine issues. should first be made. Inguillo. To resolve the issues of whether a revival of judgment is the proper action and whether respondents are the proper parties thereto. however. hence rendition of summary judgment is proper. Petitioners aver that the RTC should not have granted respondents’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment because of the controverted stipulations and the issues enumerated in the Pre-trial Order. Palad. Valois . On the other hand. Albano. HELD: Judgment on the Pleadings is not proper. Judgment on the pleadings is not proper because petitioners’ Answer tendered issues. Reyes. if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Francisco. or in other words raises an issue. before we consider this case appropriate for the rendition of summary judgment. Rañigo. which. Rodriguez. However. require the presentation of evidence. it nevertheless asserts the affirmative defenses that the action for revival of judgment is not the proper action and that petitioners are not the proper parties. Catindig. the RTC merely needed to examine the following: 1) the RTC Order dated September 13. that is. Marquez. Tabugan. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. These stipulations and issues. 1989. Gloria. Ramirez. Asensi. hence. these issues could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings. Corpuz. Sy. What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. which is revival of judgment. Valiente. Plainly. Summary Judgment is proper. Santos. Page 129 Echiverri. Coronel. this Court holds that the instant case is proper for the rendition of a summary judgment. De la Cruz. a judgment on the pleadings is clearly improper in this case.

the Court found that they do not relate to the elements of the offenses committed.R. Reyes. ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses due to several inconsistencies. Palad. (f) testimonies of said officers on the buy bust money was recovered also oppose each other.No. then. Jacuba arrived and together with Bacero arrested Aurelio. Tecson. (c) Bacero vacillated in his declaration that he has personal knowledge regarding petitioner illegal activities (d) the testimonies of Bacero and Jacuba regarding the surveillance on the petitioner contradict each other. Asensi. Petitioner asserts that the credibility of the prosecution witness is adversely affected by several inconsistencies in their testimonies. Harapin and bukas. They tend to focus on minor and insignificant matters. After Aurelio handed the shabu to Bacero. Lastimosa. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to trivial and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Cabañgon. Bacero should have arrested petitioner. Lumberio. Corporal. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Catindig. Alcazaren. Valiente. minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution’s case as they tend to erase any Albano. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. These inconsistencies do not detract from the fact that the prosecution’s key witness who conducted the entrapment. Page 130 Echiverri. Moreover. FACTS: Chief Police Inspector Bien Calag instructed SPO2 Julius Bacero to verify a report of rampant selling of Shabu in Brgy. August 31. Rañigo. upon return of the police officers. Rodriguez. Calag formed a buy-bust team then proceeded to the house of Aurelio. Santos. RADITO AURELIO y REYES vs. Martinez. De Mesa. Coronel. The RTC convicted Aurelio. Sandoval. An informant directed them to the house where the sale of shabu was being conducted. Francisco. 2011 DOCTRINE: Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to trivial and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. 174980. Ramirez. (b) the participation of Bacero in the test-buy with the petitioner is not clear. These inaccuracies consist of the following: (a) the information regarding petitioner’s illegal sale of shabu was not entered in the police blotter. Tabugan. Gloria. Marquez. Bacero and PO1 Ronald Jacuba proceeded to the area to conduct surveillance. Testimonies of witnesses need only to corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. Inguillo. (e) length of time Bacero waited for the petitioner to return with the shabu is incredulous and cannot be ascertained if it was three minutes or three seconds. HELD: After a thorough review of the inconsistencies mentioned by the petitioner. Espina. identified the petitioner as the same person who sold the shabu to him and from whose possession another plastic sachet was recovered. because if it is true that the test-buy yielded positive result. Sy. He only went out to buy cigarettes but suddenly was apprehended by the police officers. Thereafter. Aurelio denied the allegations and argued he was staying at a friend’s house watching TV. De la Cruz. Corpuz. Castillo. Valois . Mandaluyong City.

Tecson. Inguillo. Tabugan. Gloria. Valiente. Valois . Testimonies of witnesses need only to corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. Marquez. Albano. De la Cruz. Page 131 Echiverri. Catindig. Corpuz. Asensi. Sy. Francisco. Lumberio. Martinez. Alcazaren. Coronel. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Palad. Reyes. Corporal. suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed thereby negating any misgiving that the same were perjured. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Santos. Espina. Sandoval. Ramirez. Castillo. De Mesa.

De la Cruz. respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted to obtain the required waivers from petitioners. Respondent asserted that that the CARL covers only agricultural land. Valois . Batangas from the coverage of CARP. AGAPITO ROM et al. ISSUES: Whether or not the parcel of land subject of the application may be exempted from the coverage of CARL. Gloria. respondent filed a petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD of Batangas. Rodriguez. Asensi. Corpuz.R. Reyes. Petitioner’s filed an MR arguing that the certifications (dated 1997 and 1998) on which the application was based was superseded by a Sanguniang Bayan Resolution in 1993. No. are generally accorded not only great respect but even with finality. Espina. INC G. Page 132 Echiverri. 169331. However. MR denied by the PARAD.”Well settled is the rule that findings of fact of xxx quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only great respect Albano. Castillo. Sandoval. The CA denied the petition for being the improper remedy. Lastimosa. CA held that petitioner’s should have filed a Petition for Review under rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Tecson. Corporal. vs. Sy. Further they argued that the application for exemption is already barred by laches or estoppel considering the CLOAs have been issued to petitioners in 1991 and that since then they have been occupying the subject parcels of land in the concept of an owner. FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the DAR seeking for the exemption of a parcel of land located in Nasugbu. Valiente. the parties failed to reach an agreement as regards the amount. September 5. Coronel. 2011 DOCTRINE: Findings of fact of qusi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise to specific matters. Francisco. Palad. PARAD granted the application. Marquez. Inguillo. Ramirez. To comply with the requirement. HELD: The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption clearly show that the parcels of land. hence. ROXAS & COMPANY. who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land. Alcazaren. specifically identified. Catindig. Rañigo. Tabugan. DAR denied the application because the application was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensation as required by its rules. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA arguing that the DAR has no jurisdiction of the application since the application submitted by respondent lacks the necessary proof of payment of disturbance compensation and they further argued that such payment was a condition sine qua non before DAR could take cognizance of the application by respondent. Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL the lands subject of the application were already re-classified as part of the residential cluster by a zoning ordinance which was approved by the HLURB. Martinez. Cabañgon. Lumberio. De Mesa. Santos. were already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL.

6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. Marquez. Reyes. De Mesa. Alcazaren.A. Tecson. Inguillo. petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of appeal. Catindig. Records show that upon being required by PARAD to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation. Espina. Sy. Albano. Cabañgon. Coronel. Lastimosa. Corporal. Gloria. Tabugan. Martinez. De la Cruz. Page 133 Echiverri. Asensi. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence of on record. but even finality. Corpuz. Valois . Lumberio. respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement but failed to agree on the price. Rañigo.” The Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with the requirement of submitting the proof of payment of disturbance compensation. Valiente. Santos. Francisco. Rodriguez. Castillo. Further. Palad. Sec. Thus. Petitioner’s should have assailed before the CA the orders of the DAR through a petition for Review under Rule 43. Ramirez. Sandoval. 61 of R.

Tecson. Rodriguez. Francisco. Valiente. and the terms of payment.E. Castillo. refused to pay and insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead. Respondent. Santos. petitioner gave her second installment to Josephine. Valois . Catindig. Sandoval. Coronel. Marquez. 2011 DOCTRINE: Fresh period rule. Ramirez. The CA pointed out that petitioner failed to overturn the presumption that the demand letter sent by respondent by registered mail was received by her. MIGUEL SAMUEL A. Page 134 Echiverri. Asensi. DURAN G. Gloria. and held that the receipt shows no proof of conformity or acknowledgement on the part of the petitioner. A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the object of the sale. who signed the handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner as proof of payment. Inguillo. FACTS: Respondent offered to sell a laptop for the sum of 15k to petitioner thru the help of a common friend Josephine Dy. 173038. Tabugan. 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court. Later on. Rañigo. Lumberio. Since petitioner was undecided. Albano. Josephine asked if petitioner could instead lend respondent money with the laptop as collateral. Petitioner gave the money under the agreement that the amounts she lent to respondent would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to buy it. ELENA JANE DUARTE vs. Corpuz. On petition for review with the CA. It held that the RTC erred in not giving weight and credence to the demand letter. Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance. petitioner informed respondent that she was willing to buy the laptop on installment. September 14. Sy. Martinez. Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. Cabañgon. the RTC reversed the decision of the MTCC. Petitioner claimed that Josephine offered to sell respondent’s laptop but because petitioner was not interested in buying it. Petitioner proposed that she will pay 5k as initial payment and promised to pay 3k and 7k later on. Corporal. the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTCC. Reyes. Subsequently. the parties are bound by it whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required. Alcazaren.. No. Later on. It found that the receipt and the testimonies of respondent and Dy were sufficient to prove that there was a contract of sale. Espina. On appeal. respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two days. Lastimosa. Litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40.R. ruling retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes. there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. neither was she able to deny the genuineness and due execution of the receipt. 42. De la Cruz. however. Petitioner denied writing the receipt and receiving the demand letter. to which respondent agreed. Once perfected. MTCC ruled in favor of respondent. respondent sent petitioner a demand letter. petitioner informed respondent that she has finally decided not to buy the laptop. De Mesa. 41. petitioner only offered to pay 2k claiming that the laptop was only worth 10k. But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance. Palad. the price.

Sy. Martinez. the SC ruled in Neypes vs CA that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal. Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was promulgated. Lastimosa. Reyes. Page 135 Echiverri. The absence of a written contract of sale does not mean otherwise. the parties are bound by it whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required. De Mesa. Albano. the affidavit of his witness Josephine and the demand letter. In addition. insisting that the laptop was not sold to her but was given as a security for respondent’s debt. Francisco. petitioner’s failure to deny under oath its genuineness and due execution constitutes execution thereof. there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Marquez. Ramirez. Further. the price and the terms of payment. 2004 to file a Petition for Review with the CA. 2004. Respondent argues that his Petition for review was timely filed with the CA because he has 15 days from receipt of the RTC Order within to file the Petition for Review with the CA. which he did by submitting evidence his own affidavit. Gloria. Sandoval. and received a copy of the RTC Order denying his MR on May 27. Such pronouncement retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes. filed a MR on April 12. Asensi. Coronel. Valiente. respondent is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days counted from the date respondent received the RTC Order denying his MR within which to file his Petition for Review. Alcazaren. A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the object of the sale. 2004. Corporal. Espina. The absence of a written contract is not fatal to respondent’s case. Rañigo. 2004 since April 9 and 10 were holidays and April 11. Thus. Catindig. Castillo. Corpuz. Respondent only needed to show by a preponderance of evidence that there was an oral contract of sale. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent’s Petition for Review with the CA was timely filed. Palad. Lumberio. Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale? HELD: Petition for Review was timely filed. To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. and thus. There was a contract of sale. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Valois . Tecson. petitioner’s denial of the receipt of the demand letter cannot overcome the presumption that the said letter was received in the regular course of mail. Santos. respondent argued that the receipt is an actionable document. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Once perfected.. 2004 was a Sunday. Petitioner contends that the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA was beyond the reglementary period. he only had one day left from May 27. Rodriguez. Records show that respondent received a copy of the RTC decision on March 25. Petitioner likewise denies the existence of a contract of sale.

R. After trial. Reyes. Valiente. Page 136 Echiverri. constitutes direct contempt. Corporal. The MR filed by petitioner contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record. Espina. Inguillo. Petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the “basketball goal” which was permanently attached to the 2nd floor of Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s only right of way. 2011 DOCTRINE: A pleading containing derogatory. which is considered as a grave offense. Alcazaren. FERDINAND A. Castillo. Cabañgon. FACTS: The case stemmed from a civil complaint filed by petitioner against Benjamin Mina in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance. Sandoval. Lumberio. Petitioner on his part filed an ex parte motion to post bond and quast warrant of arrest. Marquez. De la Cruz. Tecson. Petitioner argued that it’s impossible for Judge Gingoyon to picture such detailed description when it is only petitioner who presented its evidence ex parte while the defendant Mina was declared in default. offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or the judge in which the proceedings are pending is equivalent to “misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same” within the meaning of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and therefore. Petitioner then filed an MR and accused Judge Gingoyon to be communicating with Mina off-record as it pictured a detailed description of the alley in its decision. 170404. offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. constitutes direct contempt. JUDGE HENRICK F. Palad. Sy. Ramirez. Rañigo. Coronel. Asensi. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. Mina was declared in default hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte. therefore. Santos. ISSUE: Whether the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court HELD: A pleading containing derogatory. Martinez. Corpuz. Valois . No. CRUZ vs. Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner and further narrated a detailed description of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. Rodriguez. Gloria. Petitioner then filed with the SC a Petition for Certiorari. Tabugan. Catindig. De Mesa. Lastimosa. MUPAS G. Judge Gingoyon in his decision declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi. when Albano. GINGOYON and JUDGE JESUS B. Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court ordered the arrest of petitioner. In fact. September 28. Francisco.

Gloria. Tecson. asked to adduce proof of the allegation. Cabañgon. Asensi. Rañigo. Inguillo. Santos. Sy. Albano. Ramirez. Palad. Sandoval. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Valiente. De la Cruz.” The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with Mina off the record. Marquez. but repeatedly argued that is is his “fair observation or conclusion. Reyes. Francisco. Corpuz. Corporal. Page 137 Echiverri. Alcazaren. petitioner was not able to give any. Castillo. Lumberio. brings the court into disrepute and exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office. Martinez. Lastimosa. without factual basis. Valois . Tabugan. Catindig. Espina. Coronel.

2011 DOCTRINE:Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extra-judicial confession or admission made during such investigation. 176229. October 19. Inguillo. she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. six informations were filed. shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. Valiente. Coronel. the 13 tourists were brought to the NBI for further questioning. 1991. she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered. On September 7. Corporal. 1991. The forensic chemist’s findings revealed that the representative samples were positive for methampethamine hydrochloride and its total weight was 31. FACTS: On September 6. Ho Wai Pang vs. Page 138 Echiverri. De Mesa. all in all. Becoming suspicious. On September 19. The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused. No. it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. Tabugan. as amended. she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Sy. 2006. NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro. When the second bag was examined. Cinco thus. 1995. Espina. Gloria. Ramirez. At the ICU. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding all the accused guilty of violating Section 15. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Asensi. De la Cruz. who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of RTC. Thus. the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. at around 11:30 in the evening. Alcazaren. Palad. she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing. Lumberio.On April 6. Castillo. after conducting the Mandelline Re-Agent test. Catindig. immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Article III of R. 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused. Valois . 91-1592 was filed and all the other Informations were withdrawn. Santos. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. Reyes. At the arrival area. On June 16. The admissibility of other evidence.R. Instead of chocolates what she saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Tecson. found that the white crystalline substance is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.A. Rañigo. Corpuz. Marquez. provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules. Sandoval. a single Amended Information under Criminal Case No. Cinco (Cinco). Lastimosa. Thereupon.126 kilograms. 1991. People of the Philippines G. From the first travelling bag. No. Francisco. is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. 6425. Albano. Martinez. United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. While conceding that petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation was indeed violated.

Ramirez. Tabugan. Corporal. Catindig. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Reyes. Gloria. The Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the so called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extra-judicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. Inguillo. Palad. HELD: NO. Sy. Santos. Corpuz. Castillo. Valiente. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Espina. Coronel. Martinez. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation render inadmissible evidence other than extra-judicial confession or admission made during such investigation. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Francisco. are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Sandoval. Page 139 Echiverri. Tecson. Alcazaren. Valois . Rañigo. Albano. Asensi. The admissibility of other evidence provided they are relevant to the issue and not otherwise excluded by law or rules.

Alleging that they were dismissed without cause and due process. Lumberio. As enshrined in our bill of rights. Corpuz. Espina. DE GUIA ENTERPRISES. On February 8. Thus.It likewise failed to timely submit its position paper. Inguillo. Francisco. On December 27. 2011 DOCTRINE:A worker cannot be deprived of his job. respondent failed to appear despite due notice. RAUL DOMDOM and OSCAR ANDRIN vs. Immediately. that in both instances. Santos. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisiondismissing petitioners complaint for lack of merit. No. (respondent). Tecson. petitioner Rayala. Marquez. Corporal. the petitioner’s appeal should have been given due course. on the last hearing held on January 14. Lastimosa. liberty or property without due process of law. petitioners failed to affix their individual signatures on top of their typewritten names in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition. December 5. With respect to their petition for certiorari with the CA. GERONIMO LIMPANTE. G. During the hearings set before the Labor Arbiter. It held that petitioners were validly terminated from employment for violation of company rules and regulations as well as for gross and habitual neglect of duties as supported by petitioners employment records submitted by respondent. Sandoval. petitioners were not represented by a lawyer. Gloria. without satisfying the requirement of due process. Alcazaren. On this basis and on the conclusion that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal on technical grounds. no person shall be deprived of life. 2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of backwages and damages against respondent before the NLRC. De Mesa. They had no counsel on record and had been filing and signing all pleadings only through their representative. JR. Castillo. Rayala. the case was submitted for decision. Asensi. Valois . Domdom and Andrin (petitioners) were bus drivers and conductors of respondent De Guia Enterprises. Albano.R. Palad. PABLO POLSOTIN. 2002. Reyes. Catindig. respondent filed its position paper without furnishing petitioners a copy of the same. 2002. Martinez. Page 140 Echiverri. Tabugan. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether or not in spite of technicalities. Petitioners appeal before the NLRC was dismissed purely on technical grounds as it did not contain the required certification of non-forum shopping and proof of service upon the respondent. Limpante. however. Sy. the CA denied due course to the petition and dismissed the same. The Labor Arbiter added that the procedural requirements for dismissing petitioners were likewise satisfied. De la Cruz. INC. Note. Inc. petitioners filed on July 17. a property right. FACTS: Petitioners Polsotin. Cabañgon. petitioners rectified these lapses by filing their motion for reconsideration indicating therein that there was no intention on their part to commit forum shopping and that the registry receipt showing proof of service upon respondent was attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC. Rodriguez. ARWIN RAYALA. 2002. 172624. Rañigo. Ramirez. Coronel.

Castillo. Tecson. civil or criminal. Sandoval. Lumberio. petitioners case concerns their job. objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. It is worthy to mention at this point that the right to counsel. De Mesa. Indeed. Lastimosa. Gloria. labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily. Coronel. Espina. Palad. The Court has often set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities to serve the broader interest of substantial justice. the CA could have been more prudent by giving petitioners time to engage the services of a lawyer or at least by reminding them of the importance of retaining one. Catindig. Marquez. being intertwined with the right to due process. considered as a property right. Martinez. Alcazaren. Corporal. Valois . Aware that petitioners are not represented by counsel. in every proceeding before it. Valiente. Sy. Besides. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Page 141 Echiverri. De la Cruz. is guaranteed by the Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is administrative. Corpuz. HELD: YES. Santos. Rañigo. Inguillo. It bears stressing that the dismissal of an employees appeal on purely technical ground is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to labor. Asensi. of which they could not be deprived of without due process Albano. the fundamental and essential requirements of due process should not to be ignored but must at all times be respected. Francisco. However. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Reyes.

. premium pay for holidays. Catindig. the rest of the aforementioned workers also filed similar complaints. Geronimo also entered his appearance for Fairland and again requested for an extension of time to file position paper. On February 5. Corporal. Aurora Aguinaldo. Corpuz. Sandoval. The Position Paper for Fairland was verified by Debbie while the one for Susan/Weesan was verified by Susan. are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings. the workers submitted their Rejoinder. Debbie Manduabas (Debbie). Reyes. Reyes (Labor Arbiter Reyes) on April 3. No. they filed on February 18. jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired not only by service of summons but also by voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. 2003. Geronimo (Atty. vs. Alcazaren. helpers. Geronimo filed two separate position papers one for Fairland[15] and another for Susan/Weesan. Rodriguez. To these pleadings. Ramirez. Lastimosa. It may be made not only by actual physical appearance but likewise by the submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal.On the other hand. the workers filed a Reply. Eventually all the cases were consolidated as they involved the same causes of action. Santos.m. Gloria. SY. Espina. INC. On said date and time. Cabañgon..R. the complaining workers (the workers) are sewers. Geronimo then filed a Consolidated Reply verified both by Susan and Debbie. Albano. 2003 an Amended Complaint. De la Cruz. et al. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO. Francisco. 2003. to include the charge of illegal dismissal and impleaded Fairland and its manager. As the workers were not anymore allowed to work on that same day. 182915. Weesan filed before the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a report on its temporary closure for a period of not less than six months. On December 23. substantial compliance with the same being considered adequate. Page 142 Echiverri. Atty. Asensi. 2003. A Notice of Hearing was thereafter sent to Weesan requesting it to appear before Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. another pleading entitled Amended Complaints and Position Paper for Complainants. On the next hearing on April 28. Rañigo. Vivencia Penullar. Coronel. Martinez. such procedural modes. overtime pay. December 20. Appearance by a legal advocate is such voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction.On November 25. On May 16. Atty. G. at 10:00 a.[17]Atty. Valiente. Lumberio. workers Marialy O. modes of service of summons are strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant. a guard and a secretary who were hired by Weesan. Inguillo. FACTS: Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business. In January 2003. 2002. Moreover. Valois . Antonio A. 2011 DOCTRINE:Although as a rule. De Mesa. Marquez. and on March 13. 2003. Palad. Geronimo) appeared as counsel for Weesan and requested for an extension of time to file his clients position paper. Sy. trimmers. Castillo. Sy. Atty. Tecson. MARIALY O. as additional respondents. Tabugan. 13th month pay and other monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan. while Susan de Leon (Susan) is the owner/proprietress of Weesan Garments (Weesan). 2003. however. 2003. Gemma dela Pea and Efremia Matias filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages. Gina Aniano.

Ramirez. Santos. Castillo. On May 9. Corpuz. Gloria. HELD: YES. Valiente. Thus. Alcazaren. It may be made not only by actual physical appearance but likewise by the submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal. 2008. De la Cruz. Valois . Hence. Fairland. Said decision was set aside by the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the labor tribunal validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Jurisdiction over the person of Fairland and Debbie was acquired through their voluntary appearance. De Mesa. Francisco. the case now was transferred to CAs Special Ninth Division that granted the MR. Corporal. 182915. Sy. Since a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was granted. Melina O. It held that the labor tribunals did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Fairland. Lastimosa. Coronel. the workers filed a Petition for Review on Certiorati docketed as G. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Sandoval. Rodriguez. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Asensi. Catindig. Tabugan. Rañigo. a Petition for Certiorari was filed but CAs first division denied the same. the CA now reversed the First Division’s ruling.R. No. Espina. Albano. but denied by the NLRC. Reyes. for the second time now through Atty.Appearance by a legal advocate is such voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction. Inguillo. Tecson. Page 143 Echiverri. Marquez. Aggrieved. Tecson filed MR assailing jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and NLRC. Martinez. claiming that it was never summoned to appear. Palad.

IRENEO LEE GAKO JR. Coronel. ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Sorensens petition for certiorari. Sandoval. 1994. Rañigo. De Mesa. Corporal. Lumberio. Sorensen thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. HELD: NO. the CA outrightly dismissed Sorensens petition for her failure to state that the allegations in her petition are true and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on authentic records. Lopez and Susan Honoridez are the registered owners parcel of land known as Lot 5 located in Cebu City. HON.A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. the use of the phrase personal knowledge or authentic Albano.A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief. Asensi. De la Cruz. particularly the Deed of Absolute Sale. In a Resolution promulgated on April 24. 165338. A pleading may be verified by stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their petition and that the same are true and correct based either on their personal knowledge or authentic records. MAHINAY vs. Marquez. November 28. outweigh the owners evidence consisting of private documents which was affirmed by the CA. It is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are true and correct. It reads:SEC. Page 144 Echiverri. Castillo. Corpuz. the use of the phrase personal knowledge or authentic records is not without any legal signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose any of these phrases fancifully. shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Martinez. verified or accompanied by affidavit. are not speculative or merely imagined. Josefina H. It is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are true and correct. No. and have been made in good faith.R. On July 25. or lacks a proper verification. Espina. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Lastimosa. Reyes. Regional Trial Court. Sanchez. information and belief. Gloria. MAKILITO B. Verification. or based both on their personal knowledge and authentic records. Valiente. Mahinay filed a complaint for specific performance against the owners and one Felimon Suarez to compel them to convey Lot 5 to him. Tecson. Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any legal importance. It held that the notarized documents Mahinay presented. The RTC rendered a Decision debunking the owners theory of equitable mortgage. While the rule gives the pleaders several ways of verifying their pleading.The rule requiring certain pleadings to be verified is embodied in Section 4. Presiding Judge. Branch 5. Palad. pleadings need not be under oath. Catindig. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Except when otherwise specifically required bylaw or rule. Tabugan. FACTS: Constantina H. Rodriguez. and not a sale. Sy. In traversing Mahinays allegations. the owners asserted that they did not violate Mahinays preferential right to buy as the transaction between them and Suarez was actually an equitable mortgage. Santos. Francisco. and have been made in good faith. Alcazaren. 2011 DOCTRINE: Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any legal importance. Valois . While the rule gives the pleaders several ways of verifying their pleading. SORENSEN G. 4. however. Cebu City and JOCELYN B. Ramirez. are not speculative or merely imagined. 2007. A pleading may be verified by stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their petition and that the same are true and correct based either on their personal knowledge or authentic records. or based both on their personal knowledge and authentic records. or upon knowledge.

based on his personal knowledge. Sorensen also attached copies of the August 12. it was necessary for Sorensen to state in the verification that the allegations in her petition are true and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on the information she gathered from authentic records. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Valois . To illustrate. Tecson. De Mesa. Albano. the truthfulness of the statement in his petition before the CA that at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand. De la Cruz. Reyes. Rodriguez. 153762 and other material portions of the records of Civil Case No. Eung Won Choi teaches us when to properly use authentic records in verifying a pleading:[A]uthentic records as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court a quo. No. Hence. Sy. Corporal. petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity. this Court pronounced for the guidance of the bench and the bar that non-compliance x x x or a defect [in the verification] does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Sorensen questioned the September 1. Corpuz. In her CA petition. Rañigo. The CA is. Palad. Page 145 Echiverri. Asensi. therefore. Cabañgon. Martinez. 2006 Orders of Judge Gako which respectively granted Mahinays Reiteratory Motion and denied her Motion for Reconsideration. Tabugan. Sandoval. In Altres v. Alcazaren. Santos. 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R. Nonetheless. and to support the allegations in her petition. Hun Hyung Park v.Pitted against this test. CEB-16335. 2006 and September 18. the Rules and jurisprudence on the matter have it that the court may allow such deficiency to be remedied. we sustain the CA for not taking a liberal stance in resolving Sorensens petition for certiorari as the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her substantive rights. Lumberio. Ramirez. Catindig. Hence. Castillo. Marquez. Coronel. correct in its observation that Sorensens verification is insufficient. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the needs of justice may be served thereby. Quite obviously. Empleo. and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. petitioner himself could not have affirmed. Sorensen had no participation in the preparation and execution of these documents although they constitute the main bulk of her evidence. Espina. records is not without any legal signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose any of these phrases fancifully. Valiente. because he (petitioner) was not present during the conference. Gloria. In addition to said Orders and Motions. Francisco.

Martinez. Performs related duties as may be assigned. Inguillo.. 6. Valiente. as amended. De la Cruz. hence a claimant only needs to show reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) on January 21. Corporal. Espina. 1976 as a Bank Examiner. De Mesa. Believing that his working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease. he was promoted as Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III. and analyzes various periodic and special reports required of rural banks to ascertain. among others. Palad. 2006. verifies. Catindig. GSIS filed a Motion for Reconsideration Albano. 2006. Asensi. 5. Rodriguez. the test of proof is probability. the CA reversed the ruling of the ECC. The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the appealed decision ratiocinating that there is no substantial evidence to prove that the illness was directly caused by the employees duties. The GSIS. both locally and abroad. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. Heads a team of examiners in the conduct of regular/special examination of rural banks. Marquez. 3. Sandoval. Subsequently. 626. Coronel. 2. Evaluates. Besitan sought reconsideration in a letter dated June 6. had to undergo a kidney transplant at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI). MANUEL P. Confers with Head/Top Management of rural banks under examination. because his ailment was aggravated by the nature of his work. as well as prepares appropriate recommendations on requests/complaints received from the public. No. 2011 DOCTRINE:In compensation proceedings. Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No.455. Submits report of examination/memoranda to MB and other reports related to examination. Rañigo. Santos. Besitan was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus. Castillo. Corpuz. The CA ruled that Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. Sy. and prepares reports corresponding thereto. Ramirez. His duties and responsibilities are as follows: 1.40. compliance with pertinent laws and regulations. Valois . etc. charged with the management and administration of the trust fund of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) for government officials and employees. Tabugan. Gloria. Lumberio. and prepares memoranda/reports on various requests such as the establishment of branches/banking offices and investments in allied undertakings/subsidiaries/affiliates. however. processes. November 23. 186. BESITAN G. Tecson. for which he incurred medical expenses amounting to P817. Monitors. On appeal. Page 146 Echiverri. not absolute certainty. but the GSIS denied the same in a letter dated June 20. Francisco. In October 2005. 178901. denied the claim in a letter dated May 2.R. Reyes. 4. as amended. Cabañgon. 2006. 626. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. FACTS: Petitioner GSIS is a social insurance institution created under Commonwealth Act (CA) No.

No. thus. is not necessary to prove a claim. Gloria. Tecson. Corporal. there must be a reasonable proof that the employees working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease. any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social legislations. Lumberio. Page 147 Echiverri. 2017. Corpuz. direct and clear evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under P. Catindig. Moreover. Valois . however. 626. Under the increased risk theory. Santos.D. Castillo. Probability. De Mesa. Strict rules of evidence do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Espina. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection. Martinez. Albano. Lastimosa. 626. Francisco. Tabugan. Asensi. Cabañgon. or that there is a connection between his work and the cause of the disease. Sy. Alcazaren. which was denied by the CA in a resolution dated July 17. is the yardstick in compensation proceedings. is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease. Coronel. Inguillo. and not certainty. like PD No. Valiente. Hence. this petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45of the Rules of Court was filed. Reyes. Ramirez. Marquez. were enacted. HELD: YES. De la Cruz. as amended. Rañigo. Palad. Sandoval. Rodriguez. not direct causal relation.

Corporal. Castillo. and refuting the technical evaluation reports of Engr. Sy. De Mesa. Asensi. to the Office of the President and to the Court of Appeals. Despite successive and consistent dismissal of appeals to the Secretary of the DPWH. FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito. San Andres Bukid. 2011 DOCTRINE:Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect. Cinco. the Committee was constrained to schedule an ocular inspection of the subject buildings on October 7. Valiente. by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano (Edeltrudis)entered into an agreementwith Francisco Villena(now deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street. all residing in the property. Carlota Balde Cinco (respondents) filed with the OBO a verified requestfor structural inspection of an old structure located at 2176 Nakar Street. In his memorandum Engr. Catindig. Alcazaren. Gloria. Rico) conducted an initial inspection. filed a counter manifestation questioning respondents personality to file the petition for condemnation.On September 20. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis. Rodriguez. Manila. Victoria Villena. Palad. petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena. San Andres Bukid. and LIZA HIPOLITO G. Valois . Cabañgon. Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Whereupon. Inguillo. Jr. wife and heir of Francisco Villena and owner of one of the two buildings. Tabugan. Acting on the request. Espina. if not finality. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners) allege that on June 15. SPS. Cinco (Atty. On June 17.R. 2002. 2002. 1989. Marquez. No. 174143. Corpuz. Rañigo. three hearings were subsequently held from August 12. Martinez. A demolition order was issued and the petitioners and tenants were furnished a copy hereof. petitioners now Albano. electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still safe for continued occupancy. Lastimosa. Unwilling to concede. Said Resolution was based on Ocular Inspection revealing that the subject structures incurred an extensive degree of deterioration by 60%-80%. Sandoval. Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. architectural presentability. Rico (Engr. Francisco. Pursuant to the agreement. were informed that respondent Atty. Rico and respondents commissioned engineer. Tecson. herein respondents Atty. Lumberio. De la Cruz. the petitioners remained undaunted. JR. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and disposition. Cinco) acquired the subject property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976. Page 148 Echiverri. With prior notices to the parties and the tenants. 2002 to September 20. The Office of the Building Official declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous and recommended their demolition. Ramirez. Coronel. In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement. 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal issue of the structural stability. Teresita Cinco and Dr. November 28. RICARDO HIPOLITO. Carlos D. Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house thereon. Reyes. Santos. 2002.

Reyes. Francisco. Tabugan. if not finality.It is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence. The CA did not err in affirming the Resolution of the Administrative Authorities sustaining the recommendations of the Office of the Building of Manila. Lastimosa. has cited exceptions to the general rule that it is not a trier of facts. None of the said exceptions is present in this case. Valois . Similarly. Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect. Gloria. by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction. This Court. Lumberio. Martinez. HELD: NO. Inguillo. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Resolution of the Administrative Authorities sustaining the recommendations of the Office of the Building of Manila. come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Coronel. Catindig. Asensi. Valiente. Palad. Santos. Tecson. Alcazaren. Castillo. Corpuz. this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling reasons to do so. Corporal. Sy. Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. in numerous occasions. Page 149 Echiverri. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Espina. Marquez. Ramirez. Albano. even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. Rañigo. Cabañgon. De Mesa.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for non-payment of the required docket and other lawful fees. this appeal. SAMUEL JULIAN. 2011 DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be disregarded without the most compelling of reasons. Hence. offered DBP to buy the subject property. Corpuz. the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Payment of full docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is mandatory. Section 4 of which provides: Section 4. No. one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules.Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Rañigo. 174193. Inguillo. Palad.DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE CITY SHERIFF G. Valiente. Rodriguez." The applicable rule for appeals from judgments issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. FACTS: This case was stemmed when Thelma.R.Within the period for taking an appeal. The Rules also provide that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. HELD: Yes. Asensi. De Mesa. Corporal. Tabugan. and executed a Real Estate Mortage in favor of the respondent. but failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees. Francisco. Sy. DBP filed Unlawful Detainer case for their refusal to vacate the premises. Petitioner then filed for Cancellation of Respondent’s Title to the property. Tecson. However. the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. Espina. Cabañgon. petitioners’ sibling. since they failed to pay resulting to rescission. Santos. Marquez. ROBERTO DELA CRUZ vs. It is well-established that "the right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Sandoval. Lastimosa. December 7." "Thus. Albano. The actual occupants of the property. Gloria. However. Subsequently. Alcazaren. RTC dismissed the case for the failure of the parties to comply with court’s order. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in strictly applying the rules on the payment of docket fees. Martinez. . De la Cruz. Then petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. Reyes. so the property was sold to the respondent through public auction since there was failure to pay the loan. Page 150 Echiverri. Thelma died. and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. mother of herein petitioner Samuel Julian. obtained a housing loan from respondent DBP. Catindig. Lumberio. Ramirez. Castillo. Coronel. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. Valois . represented by his Attorney-in-Fact.

Rodriguez. Rañigo. Martinez. Valois . Gloria. Admittedly. Catindig. Lastimosa. The Court sees no justifiable reason to allow this Court to relax the strict application of the Rules. In the instant case. Lumberio. Castillo.It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction over the case. failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances. no payment was made by petitioner at all.The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons. resolution or order final and executory. Albano. Tecson. Ramirez. Valiente. Alcazaren. Asensi. Sandoval. Sy. Santos. Corpuz. Marquez. Clearly. De Mesa. Page 151 Echiverri. this rule is not without recognized qualifications. Coronel. Espina. Reyes. Corporal. Cabañgon. The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases that the payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. The Court has declared that in appealed cases. Tabugan. Inguillo. Francisco. Palad. the case applies to a situation where payment of the docket fees was made albeit incomplete. De la Cruz. Non-observance would be tantamount to no appeal being filed thereby rendering the challenged decision.

2012 DOCTRINE: It is settled that a mere assumption cannot be made the basis of a decision in a case or in granting relief. Francisco. They also entrusted to the couple the collection of rents from tenants. Ifugao to compel the petitioners William and Mary Guidangen to execute a registrable document of a conveyance of a two-storey house located at the Philippine National Police (PNP) barracks in Lagawe. In reply. Gloria. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Valiente. No. In their Answer. Marquez. February 15. She also denied having sought permission from the petitioners to collect the rentals from tenants for minor repair works. Catindig. Alcazaren. In 1983. Palad. Cabañgon. Wooden G. Ramirez. petitioners presented the tax declaration and clearance for payment of taxes of the old house in their name. A judgment must always be based on the court's factual findings. bought the said house from the petitioners for the sum of P60. Sy. She denied that Nestor lived with petitioners or that she and her husband asked petitioners to allow them to stay in the old house. Ifugao. Martinez. They alleged that they built the old house and lived there until 1988 after which they transferred to their new house. Lumberio. was allegedly taken by petitioner Mary Guidangen (Mary) along with some other documents when she processed the claims and benefits due from the PNP of Nestor who died in 1997.00 as evidenced by a private document. 174445. Sandoval. Asensi. Respondent alleged that sometime in 1994 to 1995. Corporal.000. their nephew Nestor.R. Castillo. Lastimosa. Corpuz. Spouses William Guidangen and Mary Guidangen vs. lived with them in the old house as well as in their new house until 1995 after the couple got married. In support of their claim of ownership.petitioners denied having sold the old house to Nestor and respondent or having executed a private document relative to its sale. Santos. who was still single then. Albano. FACTS: Devota Wooden (respondent) filed a complaint with the RTC of Lagawe. This private document. a member of the PNP. Valois . Devota B. Rodriguez. Coronel. Rañigo. Reyes. Tecson. respondent maintained that petitioners sold the old house to her and Nestor. Page 152 Echiverri. Espina. she and her husband. however. Nestor Wooden. De Mesa.

On appeal. Santos. Valois ." Petitioners moved for reconsiderationbut their motion was denied by the CA for lack of merit. thereby proving that the same already belongs to the Wooden spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not the findings by the Honorable Court of Appeals are manifestly mistaken. Marquez. after which they left and moved to their newly-built house. Asensi. Espina. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Reyes. Mary testified that she and her husband constructed the old house in the latter part of 1981. De la Cruz. Sy. The RTC ruled that respondent was not able to prove the sale of the old house with preponderant evidence which would justify the court to compel petitioners to execute the documents of sale/ conveyance. who testified that they paid their rentals to the respondent. Inguillo. they allowed the Wooden spouses to occupy the second floor thereof for free. Page 153 Echiverri. Telan recounted that he initially paid rentals to Mary but was later advised by her to make the payments to respondent because she has already sold the house to the Wooden spouses. Alcazaren. PO3 Oscar Mamaclay and Policeman Jay Telan. Rañigo. Coronel. Instead. They occupied the same in 1982 until 1988. Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1996 while the latter was hospitalized. Francisco. Ramirez. On the other hand. Cabañgon. Corpuz. De Mesa. The old house was leased to tenants and in the latter part of 1995. Valiente. Rodriguez. Castillo. Gloria. they pointed out that what they undertook in the old house were not minor repairs but a major renovation. Palad. Tabugan. Catindig. Corporal. the CA reversed the RTC through its decision and held that respondent "was able to present other cogently strong proofs in amplification of her evidence which were entirely ignored by the court a quo to the effect that the subject house was sold by appellees to them. Lumberio. without evidentiary basis and contradictory to the findings of the Trial Court? Albano. To further bolster her claim that the old house was already sold to them. Martinez. It dismissed the complaint. Respondent presented as witnesses the former tenants in the ground floor of the old house. The old house was declared therein as part of Nestor’s assets. Tecson. respondent averred that Mary even prepared Nestor’s Statement of Assets.

Espina. Marquez. Tabugan. Sy. Court of Appeals)" No clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the CA to justify the reversal of the trial court’s findings. De la Cruz. Gloria. Inguillo. De Mesa. Ramirez. Martinez. Lumberio. Corpuz. Catindig. Coronel. Castillo. Lastimosa. They are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses. Cabañgon. Reyes. Page 154 Echiverri. Tecson. Rañigo. Asensi. in this case. Valois . Palad. Rodriguez. not only by the nature of their testimonies. (Borillo v. between the factual findings of the trial court and those of the CA. The reason for this is that trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters than appellate courts. Thus. Corporal. Francisco. Santos. Albano. Valiente. those of the trial court must prevail over those of the latter. Sandoval. HELD: Yes. Alcazaren. but also by their demeanor on the stand. "It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court’s findings of facts with the highest respect and not to disturb the same on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons to do so.

He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. De la Cruz. married Evelyn who is a Filipina. 175303. Santos. until the matter is finally and completely disposed of. No. Pacific Ace Finance LTD. Lastimosa. Inguillo. Corpuz.R. subject only to the appellate authority. Page 155 Echiverri. After sometime. Tabugan. Valiente. Corporal. Francisco. including the Paranaque townhouse unit. Evelyn voluntary agreed which led the court to issue an order. Alcazaren. Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage against Evelyn and PAFIN before the RTC of Paranaque. Rodriguez. Asensi. Marquez. with its proceeds to be divided between the parties. Reyes. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage. Eiji* Yanagisawa G. The Paranaque RTC dismissed and explained that Eiji. Sandoval. or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him. Rañigo. its authority continues. and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. Eiji filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of bigamy. April 11. During its pendency. Ramirez. De Mesa. Martinez. she executed a real estate mortgaged in favor of PAFIN over the subject town house. Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against them. Lumberio. (PAFIN). The order indicated that the properties registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of. At the time of this mortgage. a Japanese national. Espina. Cabañgon. To secure theloan. 2012 DOCTRINE: When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. filed a Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application of Writ of Preliminary Injuction. Sy. Tecson. cannot possibly own the mortgaged property without ownership. Albano. the appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA. Palad. Castillo. During their marriage. vs. alienated or encumbered in any manner during the pendency of the petition. Catindig. Valois . as a foreign national. and had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties. Coronel. Evelyn purchased a townhouse under her name. This was annotated on the title of the subject townhouse. FACTS: Eiji. Gloria. Evelyn obtained a loan from Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.

Castillo. Palad. Valois . Coronel. Lastimosa. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA decision. Reyes. The CA annulled and set aside the Paranaque RTC’s decision to dismiss Eiji’s complaint. cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases. Cabañgon. It also annulled the real estate mortgage executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN. having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.” The matter is further explained thus: Albano. Tabugan. Gloria. By insisting on ruling on the same issue. Lumberio. Francisco. Santos. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Alcazaren. PAFIN insists that the CA sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an alien can have an interest in real property located in the Philippines. Evelyn and PAFIN filed separate motions for reconsideration which were both denied for lack of merit. PAFIN filed this petition for review. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC. Espina. much less with their orders or judgments. and is pending appeal before the CA. Sy. ISSUE: Whether or not the Paranaque RTC can rule on the same issue that was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA? HELD: No. Asensi. Rodriguez. Valiente. Marquez. Catindig. Page 156 Echiverri. Cojuangco v. Tecson. Inguillo. Martinez. Villegas states: “The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city. Corporal. which allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property. should not. Sandoval. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the Paranaque RTC. The appellate court determined that the Paranaque RTC’s decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Rañigo. Ramirez. the Paranaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. Corpuz. the RTC of Paranaque violated the doctrine of non-interference. Eiji appealed to the CA.

Marquez. to criminal prosecutions. Palad. and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy. It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. Lastimosa. its authority continues. it is. Valiente. it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. Santos. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws. Espina. Cabañgon. De Mesa. and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. Coronel. Castillo. until the matter is finally and completely disposed of. Corporal. also. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Rañigo. but is enforced to prevent unseemly. Tabugan. Catindig. subject only to the appellate authority. Gloria. De la Cruz." In addition. Lumberio. Sandoval. Corpuz. Asensi. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases. Rodriguez. Valois . axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts. Tecson. Page 157 Echiverri. Inguillo. and to courts-martial. and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. Francisco. expensive. Martinez. Reyes. it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively. Sy. Albano.

Transfer Certificate of Title. they have been paying the taxes for the said property.00 to the bank in order to prevent the foreclose of the subject property. refused to accept the same demanding instead Php 50. Just like any other rule (procedural rules) are required to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. Tax Declaration and other relevant documents. including a receipt containing the loan. and that since then. Sy. De la Cruz. De Mesa.00 loan. Valois . she borrowed from her first cousin. the RTC rendered a Decision in favour of respondent-spouses. After paying the bank. Jr. contending that there was a valid sales as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute sale signed by petitioner on July 15. Mineo and Trinidad Dabon before the RTC of Mandaue City.R NO. Asensi. Petitioner further claimed that sometime in 1982. Castillo. Marquez. Petitioner. Branch 56. Corporal. Albano. Lumberio.000. De Mendez filed a Complaint for Nullity of Deed of Sale. Valiente. 174937. Whether petitioner’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15. that she never sold the subject property to respondent-spouses. and that her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15. 2012 DOCTRINE: While the court has the power to relax procedure rules for persuasive and weighty reasons. 1982 before Notary Public Bienvenido N. covered by TCT No. Later. containing an area of 174 square meters. 2006 of the Court of Appeals. she mortgaged her property to Banco Cebuano to secure a Php 20. Respondent-spouses filed their Answer.000. 1982 was forged. and Reconveyance of property with damages. When her property was about to be foreclosed by the bank. DE MENDEZ vs. 9408. On the Appeal. Tecson. Gloria. Mineo’s sister went to petitioner’s house and asked her to sign some papers.00. Coronel. Cabañgon. Martinez. June 13. 1982 was forged. Rodriguez. G. against respondent Sps. Mandaue City. Tabugan. JOVINA DABON VDA. Page 158 Echiverri. Francisco. Sandoval. 2. Whether or not the petitioner has failed the correct remedy of Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court in assailing the Decision dated September 12. 1995 petitioner Jovina Dabon Vda. docketed as Civil Case No. Trial on the merits ensued on July 31. due to financial difficulties and illness of her youngest son. alleged that she is the registered owner of a paraphernal property situated in Barangay Ibabao. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MINEO and TRINIDAD B. MAN-2445. DABON. the CA agreed with the RTC that there was no forgery. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Catindig. Gloria Singson. Santos. in her complaint. but it also ruled that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due execution of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.000. they paid the amount of Php 20. Palad. 2002. Alcazaren. ISSUE: 1. They narrated that after petitioner signed the Deed of Absolute Sale. Inguillo. Espina. Ramirez. respondent Mineo. It ruled that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed since an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribed in 10 years and the court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was duly executed. Mabanto. this does not mean that [they] are too belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Corpuz. FACTS: On June 19. Reyes.

Palad. direct evidence such as the testimony of the notary public. is a question of fact not allowed in both instances. the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a judgment. Francisco. Martinez. Alcazaren. Gloria. at best. outweighs the testimony of the expert witness. availed of the wrong remedy. HELD: 1. final order. Corpuz. Tabugan. Coronel. Petitioner. Whether we treat the petition as an appeal or as a special civil action for certiorari the petition must be dismissed as the core issue of whether petitioner’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15. Albano. Tecson. De la Cruz. which. Inguillo. Sy. final order or resolution appealed from records show that petitioner filed her petition 33 days after receipt of the Resolution dated September 12. Rañigo. Page 159 Echiverri. More credence was also given by the RTC and the CA to the testimony of the notary public who personally saw petitioner sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. No doubt. 1982 was forged. Cabañgon. or resolution of the CA is to file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review in certiorari under rule 45 within15 days from notice of the judgment. 2. Asensi. Under the Rules of Court. Castillo. Espina. Valois . A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of hand-writing of experts. Rodriguez. in filing a petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Ramirez. Valiente. Lastimosa. Catindig. Sandoval. Santos. Marquez. De Mesa. Lumberio. is considered indirect or circumstantial evidence. Corporal. 2006. Reyes.

2001. Susan noticed her husband slumped in his seat with his head resting on the steering wheel. Corpuz. at that time. De la Cruz. FACTS: On August 27. Sy. and proceeded to the police station and reported the incident. Valiente. while he was traversing Balagtas Blvd. The appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. she discovered that Arnel was hit in his head which caused his death. Julius Panganiban who was at his house preparing dinner when he heard a loud noise. in a waiting shed approximately 20 meters away from where the incident happened saw it. 182920. Lastimosa. Page 160 Echiverri. While they were already cruising along Schetelig Avenue in San Pablo City. Thereafter. He escaped from them by climbing a high concrete fence at Tirones Compund at Barangay III-C. Coronel. Seconds after.R. Valois . the latter should be convicted. 2001. HELD: It was held that the crime committed is murder. Santos.. Corporal. Asensi. Susan heard a gunshot. Seated beside him was his wofe. Victor Andaya who was. that is: whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convict accused/appellant for murder. 2012 DOCTRINE: Direct evidence is not the only matrix by which the guilt of the accused may be determined. When he went out to investigate. NO. Catindig. Appellant then ran towards a vacant lot. he saw a motorcycle crashed into his gate and a revolver lying near it. around 8:00 pm. Gloria. he sought his cousin. a red motorcycle overtook their jeep. Susan Alcos. somebody hit him at the back with a piece of wood. De Mesa. However. At about 2:00 pm of August 28. Tecson. Palad. 2001. Jr. Cabañgon. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. ISSUE: With the categorical denial by the appellant. Lumberio. MICHAEL BIGLETE Y CAMACHO G. 2001 at around 7:00 pm. Marquez. Alcazaren. Castillo. Francisco. somebody got it from him. Appellant admitted that he owned the subject motorcycle. his motorcycle was stolen by three men who mauled him. Angel route. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Sandoval. June 18. the principal issue therefore is factual. The RTC rendered its judgment finding appellant guilty as charged. Rodelo Biglete. Some 500 meters from Schetelig Avenue. Resort to circumstantial evidence may be made in the absence of direct evidence. Ramirez. Martinez. Section 4. However. Julius reported the matter to the police authorities and at the same time surrendered possession of the motorcycle and revolver. the motorcycle driver was nowhere to be found. Tabugan. As long as the prosecution establishes the appellant’s participation through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the imputed crime. Reyes. he claimed that on August 27. The passenger jeepney they were riding turned turtle. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court Albano. Later. Inguillo. When he fell down from the motorcycle. Rañigo. appellant went to the police station and reported to SPO2 Joselito Mendoza Calabia that on August 27. The driver of the motorcycle was holding a gun. After a while. Arnel Alcos was driving his passenger jeepney plying the San Pablo City-Sto. Rodriguez. Espina.

Sy. Valiente. Reyes. and 3) accused was the owner of the motorcycle. Tecson. Corporal. Rañigo. 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Page 161 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Coronel. Palad. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Catindig. Marquez. accused/appellant was seen by Susan Alcos and Victor Andaya as the only one holding a gun on board the motorcycle which overtook the jeepney driven by Arnel Alcos. Sandoval. Albano. Francisco. Lumberio. Valois . Martinez. Inguillo. Santos. Espina. instruct us when circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction. Corpuz. Lastimosa.when there is more than one circumstance. Gloria. Asensi. The combination of the following events leads to no other conclusion that the appellant/accused was the author of the crime. Alcazaren. De Mesa. De la Cruz. 2) right after the shooting. viz: 1) . Ramirez. thus: 1) Arnel Alcos was shot while he was driving a jeepney. 2) when the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. Castillo.

Corpuz. Santos. support or acquiescence of. Marquez. invited Enrique Lapore (Bong) and Benhur Pardico (Ben) to their office because they received a report from a certain Mrs. FACTS: Versions of Petitioners: On March 31. Lumberio. At the security office. Thereafter. They were unlawfully arrested. Reyes. Lolita and Bong left the security office. Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Tecson. at around 8:30 pm.” Later on Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore. Emphasis. petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising). Espina. considering that the complainant was not interested in the investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office. Asensi. Rañigo. Ben begged for mercy. that as proof that they released Albano. Ben. Rodriguez. Navia then took hold of his gun. Corporal. he ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Page 162 Echiverri. PADRICO G. a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision. but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from NAvia hitting him in different parts of his body. 184467. Palad. June 19. 2008. Bong and Ben were not merely invited. According to Egdardo Navia (Navia). Alcazaren. Subsequently petitioners received an invitation from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed and without any injury. or with the authorization. Navia lividly grumbled “Ikaw naman?. Castillo. Tabugan. De la Cruz. for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. Upon Navia’s instructions.” and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him. “Wala kang nakita at wala kang nadinig. Coronel. allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. Bong signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. NO. shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. Catindig. also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Martinez. who both work as security guards at the Asian Land Security. Gloria. De Mesa. 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband. Lolita. that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision. (the government) or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge (the same or) give information on the fate or whereabouts of (said missing) persons.R. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his whereabouts. Cabañgon. Supervisor of the security guards. Francisco. RUBEN DIO and ANDREW BUISING vs. The suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer the house of Lolita (Bong’s mother). Valiente. Lastimosa. Sy. papatayin ko na si Ben. VIRGINIA PARDICO. Version of the Respondent: According to the respondents. Sandoval. His mother. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by. 2012 DOCTRINE: For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases. Valois . Ramirez. EDGARDO NAVIA. Inguillo. looked at Bong and said.

Martinez. Albano. Francisco. Rañigo. Castillo. De Mesa. Tecson. Tabugan. HELD: It does not. Valois . however. Ben. Still. government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here. Sy. is a private entity. her son Bong unharmed but Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to the barangay. Lumberio. Ramirez. quoted as follows: (g) “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the arrest. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police. the Asian Land. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage. petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Barangay Lugam. or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. military or governmental operation. courts should read AM No. Under Section 1 of AM No. detention. Inguillo. they left Ben behind. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity. Coronel. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life. define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Virginia went to the Asian Land Security Office to visit her husband. Ben pleaded not to leave him. Virginia reported the matter to the police. Palad. as Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearance. ISSUE: Whether Ben’s disappearance as alleged in Virginia’s petition and prove during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo. A writ of amparo was accordingly issued on the petitioners. Marquez. Asensi. Section 1 of AM No. or abduction of persons by. Virginia filed a petition for writ of amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Catindig. Espina. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. said rule does not. Corpuz. falls within the ambit of AM No. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. or of a private individual or entity. 9851. Since she could not find her husband. liberty. Sandoval. and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee. Page 163 Echiverri. 9851. Petition. with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Cabañgon. a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom. a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. (emphasis ours) While Section 1 provides AM No. The following morning. Santos. since they were afraid of Navia. When Bong had to leave. Malolos City and their principal. but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. However. Gloria. Valiente. Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook again without reading what she signed. To fall within the ambit of AM No. Reyes. support or acquiescence of. 07-9-12 provides: Section 1. Corporal. 07-9-12-SC. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws. 07-9-12-Sc in relation to RA No. Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband. Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house. or with the authorization. The courts in probing enforced disappearance cases.

2006 Decision. It ruled that while Emilia did issue the check to value. Ramirez. Single Proprietorship Business Outfit Owned by Evelyn S. MTCC granted the demurrer to evidence. Catindig. Tecson.R. 68-309-B-98 and 68-310-B-98 against Emilia for violations of BP 22. 1996. MINDANAO WINES AND LIQUOR GALLERIA. Corpuz. the MTCC acquitted Emilia of the criminal charges. 1996 and October 20. Sy. Page 164 Echiverri. However. De la Cruz. Mindanao Wines filed before Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City Criminal Case Nos. Palad. the CA ruled that the dismissal of the criminal cases against Emilia was expressly based on reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of Emilia’s BP 22 cases likewise includes the dismissal of their civil aspect. hence she is not free from civil liability because the same is not extinguished by acquittal based on said ground. Corporal. demanded from H and E Commercial the payment of the value through two separate letters both dated November 8. Undettered. e. The CA further declared that even granting that her acquittal was for insufficiency of evidence. Reyes. When the demands went unheeded. After the prosecution rested its case. 2012 DOCTRINE: Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability. for which the latter issued four Philippine National Bank (PNB) postdated checks worth Php 25. Emilia filed with the CA a Petition for Review still insisting that the MTCC’s dismissal was based on insufficiency of evidence and that the same pertains to both the criminal and civil aspect of BP 22. Coronel. particularly PNB Check Nos. Hence. Mindanao Wines. Asensi. Santos. Lastimosa. Hence. Tabugan. the prosecution nevertheless miserably failed to prove one essential element that consummates the crime of BP 22. Cabañgon. Albano. Lumberio. thru its proprietress Evelyn Valdevieso. In its December 10. De Mesa. bounced for the reasons ACCOUNT CLOSED and DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. In its June 30. NO. Alcazaren. it dismissed the appeal. EMILIA LIM vs. On appeal with the RTC. the MTCC considered the same as an acknowledgement on her part of her obligation with Mindanao Wines. 175851. Sandoval. Martinez. the MTCC still found her civilly liable because when she redeemed one of the checks during the pendency of the criminal case. When two of these checks. Valdevieso G. Valois . Emilia’s indebtedness was nonetheless proven by preponderance of evidence. respectively. Francisco. 1999 order. Valiente. Gloria. FACTS: Respondent Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H and E Commercial owned by Emilia Lim.000. the quantum of evidence required to prove the same. this petition for review on certoriari. the same is still akin to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. Rodriguez. Rañigo. 1996. Thus. July 4. Emilia filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming insufficiency of evidence. Castillo. Emilia prays for the reversal and setting side of the said rulings of the CA. Marquez. the fact of dishonor of the two subject checks. no bank representatives testified about presentment and dishonor. It noted that other than the checks. Espina. Inguillo. the RTC clarified that the MTCC dismissed the criminal case based on reasonable doubt and not on insufficiency of evidence. And while the prosecution failed to prove criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt. 951453 and 951454 dated October 10. i.00 each.

While Emilia is acquitted of violation of BP 22. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Gloria. A check. HELD: Emilia’s allegations that she was denied due process and that Mindanao Wines is not the real party in interest do not merit our attention as these were never raised for resolution before the courts below. Tecson. Santos. Inguillo. Lumberio. Notwithstanding her acquittal. They were raised only for the first time in this petition for review on certoriari. De la Cruz. Palad. Lastimosa. Valiente. Albano. De Mesa. Sandoval. Ramirez. Page 165 Echiverri. Espina. Valois . Francisco. Reyes. Martinez. Coronel. Tabugan. it is well to remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. Marquez. Castillo. Asensi. Emilia is civilly liable. could prove a loan transaction. she would nevertheless pay the debt she owes. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where xxx the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. Corpuz. Sy. Rodriguez. Corporal. Catindig. Moreover. Cabañgon. the entries of which are in writing. These new issues are mere afterthoughts.

The heirs filed their comment thereto. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION G. OCHOA and JOMAR B. With respect to moral damages. Marquez. Francisco. Php 300. Sandoval. 2. 2012 G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. Lumberio. Catindig. Palad.000. Santos.00 Hence. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K OCHOA NAMELY: RUBY B. Valiente. OCHOA and JOMAR B. Whether G & S exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Asensi.00 as attorney’s fees and. Whether or not the USAID Certification is a public or private document. Rañigo. that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees and. was able to overcome the presumption of fault imputed to it.00 as exemplary damages On appeal. and. ISSUES: 1. even if it did not particularly state under which exception to such rule its case falls. 3.00 as civil indemnity. 4. Cost of litigation The RTC also ordered G & S to pay the heirs the following: 1.000.00 as moral damages.000. Php 50.000. Php 100. July 16. the CA found the same excessive disproportionate to the award of Php 50. Reyes. OCHOA vs. the same was reduced to Php 200. G & S argued that the USAID Certification used as basis in computing the award for loss of income is inadmissible in evidence because it was not properly authenticated and identified in Court by the signatory thereof. The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage and ordered it to pay the heirs the following amounts: 1. is self-serving. unreliable and biased. Thus. Php 50. Rodriguez.96 be deleted and that moral damages reduced to Php 200. the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 170071.00 exemplary damages. Castillo. Page 166 Echiverri.R NO. The parties’ respect appeals from the CA Decision became the subject of this Court’s (SC) March 9.96 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K OCHOA namely: RUBY B.537.244. De Mesa. Tabugan. the CA affirmed the RTC Decision but with the modifications that the awards of loss of income in the amount of Php 6. Corporal. 2011 Decision which denied G & S petition and partly granted that of the heirs. Tecson.000. Php 6. OCHOA G. that while settled in the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. hence. Lastimosa. Espina. and that the same was not supported by competent evidence such as income tax returns or receipt.537. Cabañgon. Corpuz. Pasig City. as well as moral damages on the reduced amount of Php 100. 2. OCHOA MICAELA B. De la Cruz. Sy.R NO.000.000. Albano. Alcazaren. Ramirez. this G & S Motion for Reconsideration. the deletion ordered on the ground that the income certificate issued by Jose Marcial’s employer. Coronel. Valois . 170125 DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that this requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents and does not apply to public documents proof of their due execution or genuineness. Branch 164 on account of Jose Marcial’s death while on board a taxi cab owned and operated by G & S. Inguillo. Gloria.00. 2. The Court affirmed the assailed CA Decision with the modification that for loss of earning capacity of the deceased. FACTS: These petitions stemmed from a complaint for damages filed by the heirs against G & S with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). OCHOA MICAELA B.244.000. Martinez.

official bodies and tribunals. De la Cruz. Asensi. second. Whether there is a compelling reason to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts. Hence. Marquez. The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority. Cabañgon. (the driver of the ill-fated Avis taxicab). 2. Reyes. Martinez. Palad. The reasons advanced by G & S in support of this argument are mere rehash if not a repetition of those raised in its petition which have already been considered and passed upon in their March 9. Sandoval. Lastimosa. x x x x x x In view of these. Coronel. Corpuz. Albano. the court held that in the presentation of public documents as evidence. The conclusion therefore that G & S failed to overcome the presumption that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured stands. HELD: 1. Rodriguez. documents are either public or private. section 19. Moreover. Tabugan. Hence. we note that although G & S enumerated in its consolidated Memorandum the exceptions to the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law. Inguillo. Rañigo. its due execution and authenticity must first be proved. and public officers. Public documents are: a. Ramirez. it is solely by way exception. and. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. do not require reconsideration. Section 19. as a public document issued in the performance of a duty by public officer. it is clear that the USAID Certification is a public document pursuant to paragraph (a). The USAID Certification could very well be used as basis for the award of loss of income to the heirs. Gloria. 2011 Decision. (Emphasis supplied). hence. court may take judicial notice. Before a private document offered as authentic be received in evidence. Tecson. 3. And. whether of the Philippines. Alcazaren. the subject USAID Certification is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. upon review of the records of the case. Page 167 Echiverri. such exception apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious cases. G & S insisted that it exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family when it hired and continued to employ Bibiano Padilla Jr. in a case. we are convinced that it does not fall under any way. Sy. When we give due course to such situations. namely: said documents have been executed in the proper registry and are presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by clear and convincing proof. Francisco. Hence. or of a foreign country. Catindig. Santos. As we have consistently held. De Mesa. Lumberio. Valois . It must be remembered that this requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents. It is not a function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. Rule 132 of the Rule of Court clarifies documents as either public or private. 3. because public documents are authenticated by the official signature and seals which they bear and of which seals. due execution and authenticity thereof are already presumed. The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. Espina. Castillo. these being admissible without further proof of their rule. “this court is not a trier of facts. Corporal. we cannot proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the findings and conclusions of the CA with respect thereto x x x (Emphasis supplied). it nevertheless did not point out under what exception its case falls. the authenticity and due execution of said Certification are already presumed. Valiente.” Hence. If therefore becomes necessary to first as certain whether the subject USAID Certification is a private document before this Court can rule upon the corrections of its admission and consequent use as basis for the award of loss of income in these case. viz: Section 19: Classes of Documents – for the purpose of their presentation in evidence.

For this reason. Asensi. De Mesa.a. Catindig. while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa? FACTS: Lim file a civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case she filed against Charlie Co. the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. its proceedings are suspended until the Albano. On the other hand. Page 168 Echiverri. 175256 & 179160 / August 23. Valiente. Valois . LILYLIM vs. Tabugan. treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation.200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the subject of the sale. It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but. Santos. Cabañgon. nevertheless. its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. Corporal. Lim’s cause of action for the case of specific performance is based on contract. She claims that the cause of action for the damages is based on the crime of estafa. Inguillo. Corpuz. G. Martinez. Lastimosa. civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.200 bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him. Co violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Rodriguez. Ramirez. ISSUE: Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa? HELD: Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other. the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. Co received payment for the 37. at the time that they entered into the contract. The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense. and (2) independent civil liability. Marquez. that is. KOU CO PING a. The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. Alcazaren. Sandoval. The answer is in the affirmative. Castillo. Lumberio. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37. Espina. Tecson. as Co Violated Lim’s right to be protected against forum shopping. that is. De la Cruz. 2012 DOCTRINE: Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific performance and damages. Gloria. Coronel. CHARLIE CO. Rañigo. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53). that he could not deliver what he promised. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew. Francisco. Palad. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto. fraud and physical injuries”). No. Sy.k. Reyes. hence.R.

Martinez. Santos. Corporal. De Mesa. Corpuz. Tecson. Alcazaren. Catindig. Sandoval. Valois . Cabañgon. litis pendentia. Inguillo. Marquez. Asensi. Lumberio. Ramirez. Espina. Coronel. Albano. Castillo. Rodriguez. Gloria. De la Cruz. or res judicata. jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively. Valiente. Palad. Reyes. Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities. Page 169 Echiverri. Sy. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Francisco. Rañigo. final outcome of the criminal action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. without offending the rules on forum shopping.

Tecson. The parties did not file any objection to the above Order and proceeded to submit the names of their respective nominees for commissioner. for a total of P1. This value roughly translates to P75 per square meter. Alcazaren. Page 170 Echiverri.. Reyes. the commissioners denied VCP’s request for an additional four months to submit its independent valuation of the property. The trial court explained that just compensation. Rodriguez. consisting of the property’s actual occupants. Asensi. the reckoning period should have been the time of filing of the complaint in 1987 because it took place before the taking of the property in 2002. a certification from the Office of the City Assessor. Espina. sustained the municipality’s right to expropriate the said property and to a writ of possession. De la Cruz. respondents G. VCP’s choice for commissioner. (SHHAI). who are also the intended beneficiaries of the action. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque. in line with the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor’s classification of the site as an area of priority development.350. Catindig.R. did not contribute to the commission’s work due to his frequent absences. as Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides. Lastimosa. intervened in the case. due to time constraints. The trial court appointed three commissioners to assist in ascertaining the just compensation.00. which the trial court denied in its Order dated August 15. commissioners Bienvenido Reyes and Jose Marleo Del Rosario informed the trial court that VCP did not participate in the meetings despite notification and that. Coronel. The commissioners also informed the court that Cenon Astudillo. Sandoval. The municipality intended to develop the property for its landless residents. Tabugan. Corporal.372. Applying this rule to the facts of the case. Branch 274. VCP received its copy of the said Order on August 24. No. VCP moved for a reconsideration. Corpuz. Inguillo. Sy. or to a mistaken mode of procedure. at the time it was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation was filed. Rañigo. Judge Fortunito L. The report violated this rule by using data from 1996 onwards.C PONCE COMPANY INC. Valiente. V. 2005.” FACTS: Respondent Municipality (now City) of Parañaque (municipality) filed a complaint7 against petitioner VCP for the expropriation of its property. 116554. Madrona (Judge Madrona) rendered his Decision rejecting the report. Albano. Marquez. Cabañgon. Santos. whichever came first. Francisco.00. Municipality of Parañaque and Sampaguita Hills Homeowners Association. It determined that there exists. Castillo. Valois .27 must reflect the value and character of the property sought to be expropriated. petitioner vs. Lumberio. INC. on record. De Mesa. which is located in the municipality’s Barrio San Dionisio and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.400. 2005.. The trial court then made an independent finding based on the evidence already on hand. that the property’s market value for the years 1985 to 1993 (which includes the year the complaint was filed) was P1. Martinez.366. Palad. Respondent Sampaguita Hills Homeowners Association. Inc. Ramirez. 178731 / November 12. Gloria. 2012 DOCTRINE: "It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party when the loss or the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence.

VCP argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to impose legal interests on the just compensation from the time of taking until VCP is fully paid. Corpuz. Francisco. A court with appellate jurisdiction can review both the facts and the law. De Mesa. Appeal is a speedy remedy. or a motion for new trial. VCP filed its Petition for Certiorari on November 7. as an adverse party can file its appeal from a final decision or order immediately after receiving it. finds no merit in its contention. VCP’s empty protestations. There is no reason. if warranted. however. petitioner resorted to certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal. Coronel. Rodriguez. and it even waited until the 58th day of its receipt of the CA Decision before taking action. VCP’s continued negligence. Tabugan. is correct. Valois . to file a motion for reconsideration. and its resort to the wrong remedy. Clearly. Based on Rule 52 of the Rules of Court and Rule 7 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA). placed all perceived errors in the decisions below beyond the CA’s and this Court’s grasp. Catindig. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to be applied in the case. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Page 171 Echiverri. Rañigo. Espina. Castillo. Failure to file the necessary Albano. and VCP cannot explain. Assuming arguendo that the commissioners committed an error. Santos. who is alleging that an appeal will not promptly relieve it of the injurious effects of the judgment. Martinez. 2007. Reyes. 2007. it filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time (MOTEX) to File Petition for Certiorari. VCP received the CA Decision on April 10. In sum. why an appeal would not be speedy and adequate to address its assigned errors. De la Cruz. Corporal. A party. Ramirez. therefore. fail to impress. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. 2005 or 58 days since VCP received the Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration. On October 21. including questions of jurisdiction. Sandoval. It justified its resort to the extraordinary remedy on the ground that “there is no appeal or plain. failure to file Motion for Reconsideration on time renders the Decision final. speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law that is available to the petitioner. VCP maintained that the appraisal. the trial court should have recommitted the valuation to a new set of commissioners. should establish facts to show how the appeal is not speedy or adequate. The Court. Asensi. Period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration not extendible. Sy.00 per square meter is unrealistic and is unsupported by the evidence. or until April 25. The CA did not err in dismissing the same. It prayed for the annulment of the trial court’s Decision. Valiente. VCP cannot complain of delay because it was guilty of delay itself. which is based on the property’s value at the time of its taking in 2002. It can set aside an erroneous decision and even nullify the same. VCP attempts to extricate itself from the effects of its negligence by alleging that an appeal would not have been speedy and adequate for its purpose. instead of substituting its own judgment. Inguillo. Tecson.” It assailed the trial court’s rejection of the appraisal report as a grave abuse of discretion. VCP had 15 days from its receipt of the Decision. Palad. 2005. Cabañgon. Marquez. which the CA granted. Gloria. Lumberio. VCP insisted that the trial court’s own valuation of P75. Lastly. an appeal.

Coronel. Rañigo. The CA was correct in denying petitioner’s MOTEX because the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not extendible.64 The CA was correct in denying the Motion for Reconsideration that VCP had belatedly filed on May 25. Francisco. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Palad. Castillo. Albano. Corporal. Marquez. Tecson. Reyes. Inc. Instead of filing a Motion for Reconsideration on April 25. The Court has pronounced strict adherence to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises. the Decision of the CA dated March 23. and the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). Catindig. Santos. pleading within the reglementary period would render the CA Decision final and executory. Corpuz. 2007 became final and executory by operation of law. 2007. Thus. Lumberio. 2007. Tabugan. VCP’s MOTEX did not toll the reglementary period.” Since the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not extendible. Valois . Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. De Mesa. Sy. Gloria. Ramirez. the Regional Trial Courts. there being no Motion for Reconsideration as of April 25. Inguillo. Valiente. v. Alcazaren. Espina. Page 172 Echiverri. Martinez. 2007 as its lateness had rendered it moot. VCP filed a MOTEX on the ground that its lawyer had withdrawn from the case and it was still in the process of retaining a new counsel. Asensi. Judge Japson that “no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts.

thrice moved for extensions of time within which to file the same. Catindig. the spouses Magtoto exercised acts of dominion over the said properties. despite the lapse of more than three months from receipt of notice of denial of their Motion to Dismiss. Valiente.497. the balance of P9. Martinez. The motion to declare petitioners in default was heard by the RTC on March 18.The RTC thus deemed the motion submitted for resolution. Leonila argued that after the denial of their Motion to Dismiss.750.000. however. Out of the total purchase price of P11. Rañigo. the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Cabañgon. the RTC declared the spouses Magtoto in default on March 23. Espina. the Complaint. However. Lumberio.Eventually. The spouses Magtoto were served with summons requiring them to file an Answer within 15 days from notice. 2003. Rodriguez. From then on. the spouses Magtoto instead filed a Motion to Dismiss.Leonila delivered the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) of the properties to spouses Magtoto. Pampanga to petitioner Ruben C.Leonila’s presentation of evidence ex parte and formal offer of evidence followed. On June 25. 2004 or almost three months after they were declared in default. Francisco.00. Corpuz. 1999. Leonila filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to Render Judgment Based on the Complaint. 2004. Santos. Ruben was present. 2003 within which to file their Answer. The court a quo noted that despite the spouses Magtoto’s counsel’s withdrawal of appearance as early as September 25. Gloria. Castillo.750. Ramirez. The trial court properly declared them in default. the spouses Magtoto. Lastimosa. Sandoval. We thus sustain the appellate court’s ruling dismissing petitioners’ appeal for lack of merit. Magtoto (Ruben) for P11. the spouses Magtoto were only able to pay the amount of P2. most of the checks that Ruben issued were dishonored. Citing Section 4. Reyes.In an Orderdated July 25. On August 4. Sy. Corporal.In an Orderdated September 11. Coronel. CA. she sold her three parcels of land situated in Mabalacat. Inguillo. Marquez. 2004. De Mesa.As payment therefor.750.After the parties executed the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale. 2003. the RTC granted the spouses Magtoto a final extension until August 2.00. 2012 DOCTRINE: Petitioners’ failure to timely file their Answer was unreasonable and unjustified. Meanwhile. Tabugan. enjoyed the use thereof. spouses Magtoto should have filed their Answer within the reglementary period. and Leonila dela Cruz GR No. 2004. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. they have not yet engaged the services of another counsel. FACTS: Leonila filed before the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages and prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the spouses Magtoto. Hence.The said spouses. Palad. Alcazaren. through their new counsel.00 remained unpaid. Ruben issued several postdated checks.455. Asensi. filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Albano.00. the spouses Magtoto still failed to file their Answer. Alleging that on January 11. RUBEN MAGTOTO vs. 175792 / November 21.952. During said hearing. Page 173 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Leonila also cautioned the spouses Magtoto that their counsel’s withdrawal of appearance does not justify their failure to file an Answer. and transferred their titles in the name of Ruben. On January 23. Despite Leonila’s repeated demands.952. 2003. Valois . 2003 or two days after the last day for filing the Answer. Tecson.

Palad. Sandoval. 2006. For their final request for extension. The RTC thus properly declared them in default. Canlas’s motion for withdrawal of appearance and for its advice for them to retain a new counsel. it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Castillo.after the period to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired. After the denial of their Motion to Dismiss on September 11. At the outset. Valiente. Rañigo. Marquez. Even if the petition is to be treated as filed under Rule 45. De la Cruz. Atty. De Mesa. however. Thereafter. Tabugan. Martinez. Catindig.The RTC. Asensi. The records show that after receipt of the summons. 2003.They therefore had 15 days or until November 14. The belated filing of the Answer is solely attributable to the spouses Magtoto. This delay is unreasonable as well as unjustified. Records show that petitioners received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on October 30. on August 4. The RTC correctly declared the spouses Magtoto in default. However. albeit not in favor of the said spouses. Hence. the RTC gave the spouses Magtoto until August 2. Corporal. 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. Canlas. 2003 within which to file their Answer. no Answer was filed. 2006. Cabañgon. The RTC granted these requests. the spouses Magtoto thrice requested for extensions of time to file their Answer. the RTC acted on the motion and resolved the same. Tecson. Gloria. the same must still be denied for late filing and there being no reversible error on the part of the CA. they filed their Answer on June 25. 2003. denied the said motion. Lumberio. Valois . Reyes.and their Answer. Instead. Lastimosa. Default and to Admit Attached Answer. the spouses Magtoto aver that it took them a while to secure the services of a new counsel because they were waiting for the RTC to rule on Atty. As such. Rodriguez. or two days after the deadline for filing their Answer. Despite its belated filing. this petition should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. But still. Francisco. petitioners’ former counsel. Santos. Espina. Ramirez. Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Instead. this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal which is not allowed. they filed their Petition for Certiorari on December 29. Alcazaren. Page 174 Echiverri. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were correctly declared in default? HELD: YES. the spouses Magtoto filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Inguillo. filed a motion to withdraw his appearance since he could no longer effectively defend spouses Magtoto because he had lost communication with them. Sy. In an attempt to pass the blame on the RTC for their failure to timely file an Answer. Coronel. petitioners should have filed their Answer within the balance of the period prescribed in Rule 11. 2004 or nine months after the denial of their Motion to Dismiss or three months after they were declared in default. They miserably failed to be vigilant in protecting and defending their cause. Corpuz. Albano.

Asensi. when Antonio landed a job as seaman. Since respondents’ complaint for support is anchored on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Gloria. Rañigo. shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations were untrue. ANTONIO PERLA vs. Reyes. Antonio’s counterclaim was denied due to the absence of bad faith or ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and Randy. Sandoval. he categorically declared Antonio as his father. his filiation must be established Albano.a good reason to disregard his denials. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. Santos. Cabañgon. Antonio. ISSUE: Whether or not the order for Support was proper? HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. the lower courts should have first made a determination of the same. Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages by way of counterclaim from respondents. Francisco. Sy. The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. Coronel. 2012 DOCTRINE: An order for support must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio. Randy (collectively respondents). Martinez. Espina. 1983. Tecson. Rodriguez. Valiente. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy testified. filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio. Ramirez. they are proofs that Antonio is the known. As a result of said cohabitation. Castillo. Valois . as there was nothing to suggest that the RTC erred in such respects. Hence. Corpuz. Palad. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA G. Page 175 Echiverri. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. According to the appellate court. The CA also affirmed the trial court’s findings on the credibility of the witnesses and its appreciation of facts. No. It highlighted Antonio’s vacillation in his testimony regarding the number of times he had sex with Mirasol and concluded that the same is a clear badge of his lack of candor . he averred that she never became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. for Randy to be entitled for support. he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. The CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. In his Answer with Counterclaim. And since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son. Randy was born on November 11. Inguillo. 172471 / November 12. The RTC opined that Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of exposing herself to humiliation. Catindig. Tabugan. However. Marquez.R. Corporal. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol. imputed and identified father of Randy. FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son. Lumberio. De Mesa. Respondents’ Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. who is now married and has a family of his own. Lastimosa. denied having fathered Randy.

for its part. with sufficient certainty. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature. baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. cited the applicable provision on illegitimate filiation. Although the appellate court. Catindig. Castillo. Sy. Martinez. And “while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document. it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Palad. A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is bereft of any discussion regarding Randy’s filiation. we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. It is settled that “[a] certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Besides. Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. Lumberio. it merely declared the certified true copies of Randy’s birth certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing more. “Time and again. the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. Reyes. Tabugan. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon. Valiente. However. Albano. De Mesa. Just like in a birth certificate. Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate. Asensi. Ramirez. Sandoval. Espina. Francisco. Thus. Gloria. Most important. said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. Rodriguez. Corpuz. respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Santos. Page 176 Echiverri. the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation.” We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Inguillo. this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. Corporal. An order for support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. Tecson. Valois . Cabañgon. Marquez. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Coronel. it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.

built a hut. A real party-in-interest is one who has a legal right. Reyes. Rañigo. December 3. contending that "Daniel T. Page 177 Echiverri. Carmen based her right of possession through her tax declarations. threat. No. Lumberio. FACTS: Plaintiff Valeriana Villondo (Valeriana) claimed that respondent Carmen Quijano (Carmen) and her farm laborers. an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. 146099. and MARCELINO EBENA G. vendor. it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. Villondo. HELD: Yes. fenced off the area. Corpuz. the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession. Valiente. strategy. harvested the root crops. thus preventing Valeriana and her family from entering the premises where they have always resided and depriving them of their harvest alleging that they were the owners of the said land. or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold Albano. Sy. respondents Adriano Alcantara and Marcelino Ebena. CARMEN QUIJANO. Valeriana based her and her family’s right of possession on Certificate of Stewardship No. De la Cruz.R. Valois . and in case of controverted right. Rodriguez. Who may institute proceedings. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Marquez. Hence. On the other hand. x x x Section 1. Catindig. by substantive law. and when. VALERIANA VILLONDO vs. 2012 DOCTRINE:In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer. Inguillo. 146099 in the name of Daniel T. 173606. Castillo. intruded into her land with the help of three policemen and other barangay officials. Espina. De Mesa. Lastimosa. or a lessor. vendee. Alcazaren. Tecson. which she claimed to have been awarded to her now-deceased husband whose actual name is Daniel P. Coronel. Gloria. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be the plaintiff in an action for forcible entry. ‘Interest’ within the meaning of the rules means material interest. or a mere incidental interest. viz: Section 1. respondents questioned Valeriana’s legal personality to sue. Tabugan. Sandoval. and posted a "NO TRESPASSING" sign. They claimed that "Daniel T. ISSUE: Whether Valeriana is a real party-in-interest in the forcible entry case she filed. is the real party-in-interest and thus should be the plaintiff in the suit and not Valeriana. corn. They destroyed the plants therein. Santos. Villondo. and banana. With this. the court a quo should have dismissed the complaint since it does not state a cause of action. Villondo" is actually Valeriana’s son Romualdo Villondo (Romualdo). ADRIANO ALCANTARA. . or stealth.x x x a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force. possesses the right sought to be enforced."13 the named tiller in the Certificate of Stewardship No. Asensi. Corporal. x x x The action must be brought by the person who. a construction worker who had never even cultivated the subject land. Palad. It is obviously just the person who has first acquired possession [who] should remain in possession pending this decision. Villondo. Francisco. intimidation. Martinez.

Marquez. the provision clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the property against the alleged usurper. vendor. Santos. or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor. or other person. Asensi. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession. vendee. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Espina. Catindig. possession. for the restitution of such possession. De Mesa. This matter already delves into the character of her possession. Rañigo. Ramirez. Corporal. Coronel.) Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship. Valiente. The court highlighted the principle behind ejectment proceedings: Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand. We emphasize that in ejectment suits. Cabañgon. The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case. together with damages and costs. Valois . Sy. Gloria. Alcazaren. violence or terror. express or implied. Sandoval. She has a right or interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed and thus. Inguillo. may. (Emphasis supplied. she can file the action for forcible entry. or any person or persons claiming under them. Lumberio. Francisco. at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Tecson. Rodriguez. Reyes. Palad. De la Cruz. Page 178 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject property. Martinez. it does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable. Castillo. by virtue of any contract. Albano. Corpuz. Tabugan.

MARCELINA DIONA vs. Tecson. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. 173559. BALANGUE. BALANGUE. Valois . "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC’s Decision. Lastimosa. Francisco. Martinez. They prayed that the RTC’s Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted. Rodriguez. Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. SONNY A. has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial. Resultantly. De la Cruz. 2001 ballooned from ₱124. and ESTEBAN A.R. Asensi. 2000 Decision. Palad. Ramirez. Corporal. however. Coronel. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and serious error of law when it granted respondents’ petition for annulment of judgment as a substitute or alternative remedy of a lost appeal. Thus. FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas. The court ruled that it be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. When the debt became due. respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. Page 179 Echiverri. Subsequently. petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Espina. REYNALDO A. Valiente. Inguillo. ROMEO A. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party. without fault on his part. the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum). BALANGUE. Litigation must end and terminate sometime Albano. Sandoval. represented by her Attorney-in-Fact. Cabañgon. BALANGUE. No. Santos. Tabugan. De Mesa. Rañigo. appeal. Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. January 7. V-12296. JR. petitioner filed a Motion for Execution. Alcazaren. Corpuz.00. 1991 to May 22.400.000. an exception to the final judgment rule. Catindig. Sy. claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Castillo. Lumberio. HELD: No. Reyes. According to the other respondents. respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. they had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. Before it could be resolved. But RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17.00 to ₱652. G. petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint praying that he be paid. their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2. The court granted the relief sought by the petitioner. Gloria. Surprisingly. LETICIA DIONA. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47. grounds therefor. Marquez. 2013 DOCTRINE: The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given not supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party’s right to due process nor may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.

Ramirez. Coronel. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Catindig. Teston. Espina. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings. Valiente.36 this Court expounded that: Due process considerations justify this requirement. We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and. Sy. Reyes. Sandoval. Rañigo. Page 180 Echiverri. Gloria. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. In Arcelona v. Inguillo." While under Section 2. Palad. Santos. Alcazaren. Tecson. Lumberio. upon mere inspection thereof. Asensi. Corpuz. and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final. Castillo. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Francisco. Rodriguez. hence. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Cabañgon. Court of Appeals. De Mesa. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. Martinez. De la Cruz. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. Albano. absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. and somewhere. Marquez. Valois . the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if. Corporal. Tabugan. Lastimosa.

FACTS: Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho (Ho) before the (MeTC) of Quezon City. 172590 . Thus.R. Marquez. Palad. Lastimosa. Page 181 Echiverri. Alcazaren. January 7. he was able to secure a judgment from the court in favor of Anderson. Albano. Ramirez. Ho denied that his occupation of the property is through Anderson’s mere tolerance. petition. Hence. Asensi. She alleged that through her mere tolerance. pro hac vice. Lumberio. Inguillo. ISSUE: Whether or not Anderson’s prayer of relaxation of the rules on certification against forum shopping should be granted and therefore giving her sufficient cause of action for ejectment and damages against Ho. which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. For all these. Santos. Tabugan. No. There being no allegation that the said property already has a buyer. the certification against forum shopping attached thereto was signed by him on Anderson’s behalf without any accompanying authority to do so. which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Martinez. MeTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. 2013 DOCTRINE: The rules on forum shopping. Cabañgon. Anderson is authorizing him “to make use of the property as his residence free of charge provided he vacates [it] if there is a buyer for the lot” and “that the balance of Ho’s compensation shall consist of 10% of the proceeds of the sale of any or all of her properties In view of this. Because of this. Although after many extensions granted for the filing of the petition for review by anderson’s counsel because anderson was in the USA. ENRIQUE HO G. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Anderson did not pay Ho a single centavo and instead executed a written document which states that as partial payment for Ho’s services. The CA. Valois . Sy. Anderson prayed that the MeTC order Ho to vacate the propety and pay her damages. Rañigo. He claimed that he managed her affairs in the Philippines and administered her properties. Francisco. MARY LOUISE R. should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. she could not eject Ho therefrom. As she was already in need of the said property. It gave much weight to the written document executed by Anderson wherein she gave her consent for Ho to occupy the property provided that the latter shall vacate the same if there is already a buyer for the lot. Reyes. ANDERSON vs. he is entitled to the continued possession thereof until such time that the property is sold and he is paid. Coronel. Catindig. Tecson. resolves to dismiss. when the petition was already filed. Anderson served upon Ho a Demand Letter to Vacate but Ho refused. Gloria. Corpuz. Valiente. Corporal. dismissal of the complaint. Rodriguez. Ho averred that he possesses the property not through mere tolerance but as part of his compensation for services rendered to Anderson. Castillo. Ho is in possession of her parcel of land. When Anderson sought his assistance in ejecting her relatives from the and in demolishing the Church built thereon. De Mesa. Espina. The RTC is inclined to consider the dismissal of the complaint. on the other hand. Hence.

Tecson. Lastimosa. Asensi. Non-compliance therewith or a defect therein is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof. Valiente. Corpuz. Catindig. time and again. Santos. Coronel. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Lumberio. Valois . The certificate of non-forum shopping has. compliance of which is necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. Ramirez. Gloria. necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. SC denied petition. Francisco. Inguillo. De Mesa. Sandoval. Corporal. Marquez. Sy. Cabañgon. Albano. Martinez. Ejectment case against Ho shall not prosper for lack of cause of action and for failure of the Petitioner to abide by the rules as to the certification against forum shopping. No justifiable reason exists in this case as to relax the rule on certification against forum shopping. Rañigo. Page 182 Echiverri. Reyes. Thus. Castillo. Rodriguez. Espina. HELD: No. been declared as basic. Tabugan. Palad.

Catindig. 2006. Lumberio. Gloria. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PSCD) G. PCSD argued that it did not perform a quasi-judicial function. De Mesa. or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Corporal. they maintain. DONALD BUNDAC. They alleged that these provisions prohibit small-scale nickel mining for profit in the proposed site. Asensi. They prayed for the nullification of the said SEP Clearance for violating various provisions of RA 7611 and PCSD Resolution No. Martinez. sought the recall of the said clearance in their letter to PCSD Chairman. through its Executive Director. Lastimosa. and BILLY BUNGAR vs. board. SALVACION VILLANUEVA. Francisco. No. Ramirez. Inguillo. FACTS: The controversy in the instant case arose when PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corporation (PLMDC) for its proposed small-scale nickel mining project to be conducted in a controlled use area in Barangay Calategas in the Municipality of Narra. Coronel. Abraham Kahlil Mitra. ISSUE: Whether or notRTC has certiorari jurisdiction over PCSD because the latter is a quasi-judicial body functioning only within the RTC’s territorial jurisdiction HELD: NO. Espina. Romeo B. Valois .R. Rodriguez. who are farmers and residents of Barangay Calategas. but actually a core zone. Page 183 Echiverri. board. Cabañgon. The PCSD. The following requisites must concur for a Petition for Certiorari to prosper. Santos. Tecson. Dorado. or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. denied their request for lack of basis. On August 7. The petitioners. Rañigo. Alcazaren. petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against PCSD and PLMDC with the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. Tabugan. Reyes. Sandoval. PLMDC and PCSD sought the dismissal of the Petition on various grounds. namely: (a) The writ is directed against a tribunal. Palad. Castillo. TEOFILO TREDEZ. which. Valiente. Corpuz. Marquez. 05-250. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2013 DOCTRINE: The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that the Court issues only under closely defined grounds and procedures that litigants and their lawyers must scrupulously observe. Sy. is not even a controlled use zone. including the impropriety of the remedy of certiorari. Province of Palawan. and Albano. (b) Such tribunal. DANNY CABIGUEN. 178347 February 25. De la Cruz. GREGORIO DELGADO.

Santos. Asensi. Lastimosa. Martinez. Sy. (c) There is no appeal or any plain. Coronel. Albano. speedy. De la Cruz. Reyes. Corpuz. Marquez. which created the PCSD. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Palad. RA 7611. Valois . Catindig. Corporal. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body. Rañigo. Lumberio. Valiente. Castillo. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. This procedure includes reviewing the sufficiency and accuracy of the documents submitted by the project proponent and conducting public hearings or consultations with the affected community. the parties submit that the public respondent PCSD is exercising a quasi-judicial function in its issuance of the SEP clearance based on the procedure it follows under its own AO 6 or Guidelines in the Implementation of SEP Clearance System. The Court disagrees with the parties’ reasoning and holds that PCSD did not perform a quasi-judicial function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari. Ramirez. Tabugan. In the case at bar. Espina. does not confer quasi-judicial powers on the said body. Page 184 Echiverri. Gloria. Cabañgon. Tecson. Sandoval. Francisco. De Mesa. Inguillo.

its findings of facts. Reyes. Petitioners right to appeal has prescribed. and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record. Albano. As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTCs September 8. with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P. No.R. however. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Espina. EFREN ALMUETE v. Rañigo. Branch 27. otherwise.1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal. Corporal. Asensi. Francisco. ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it acquitted petitioner Almuete in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court HELD: YES. Almuete (petitioner). Sy. Valois . 705. Page 185 Echiverri. The petitioner and co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari on Court of Appeals which granted the petition in favor of Almuete. found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled and finding accused guilty. Alcazaren. Tabugan. this Court reversed petitioners acquittal by the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion. In People v. This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error. we rule in the negative. Marquez. Ramirez. Valiente. Sandoval. otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. Court of Appeals. 277.D. De la Cruz. FACTS: Efren D. docketed as Criminal Case No." Thus. De Mesa. Martinez. Palad. Castillo. 2013 DOCTRINE: Section 6. Tecson. in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal. CA also denied their reconsideration. Rodriguez. 1998 Decision. Inguillo. Corpuz.) No. Lastimosa.) No." as amended by Executive Order (E. On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment. The People of the Philippines elevate the case to Supreme Court which reinstated RTC’s decision. petitioners counsel informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. and acquitted respondent Almuete of the crime charged. Aggrieved. Coronel. Gloria. petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. The RTC. Catindig. 2672.O. the decision becomes final. the accused moved for reconsideration and repromulgation but was denied. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction. Lumberio. Santos. 179611 : March 12. Cabañgon. Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya.

the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion. The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself. Reyes. Alcazaren. it is non-existent. Consequently. the decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. in the certiorari proceedings. Espina. Gloria. Valiente. Marquez. Thus. In this case. Albano. Sy. Cabañgon. Lumberio. force or efficacy for any purpose. Castillo. which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error. nor can any right be based on it. De Mesa. In contemplation of law. Asensi. and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application. Francisco. Coronel. Lastimosa. Martinez. Corporal. Inguillo. Santos. Valois . A void judgment has no legal and binding effect. the said Decision is no longer open to an appeal. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ramirez. Palad. Catindig. It cannot impair or create rights. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Corpuz. respondent Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate courts decision Clearly. Tabugan. Consequently. Sandoval. 1998 Decision has long prescribed. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only. the judgment rendered is void. petitioners right to appeal the RTCs September 8. Page 186 Echiverri. the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Tecson. De la Cruz.

R. Gloria.000. P25. The case was docketed as DARAB Case No.000. 27. Espina. and respondent Porferio Soliman (Porferio) was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof. HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO v. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. However. Marquez. 2013 DOCTRINE: The signature of only one of the petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially complied with rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Lazaro Gallardo (Lazaro). The CA held that the certification against forum shopping must be executed and signed by all of the petitioners. did not sign. Tecson. Tarlac City. Catindig. (TCT) 976035 (the land). PORFERIO SOLIMAN G. Ramirez. Lumberio. NO. Castillo. P15.00 moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners Mario Lazaro P. The land was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. and no special power of attorney to sign in their favor accompanied the Petition. Rodriguez. ejectment. dispossession. Palad. 898-T 95. Santos. Gallardo and Lazaro P.178952 : April 10.3699-hectare parcel of land in Balingcanaway. Page 187 Echiverri. PARAD directed Porferio. DARAB also upheld the ruling with modifications. De Mesa. Corporal. Asensi. Sandoval. Tarlac. Diwa ng Tarlak. The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. Alcazaren. Tarlac. Reyes. Francisco. and costs. Inguillo. the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its Albano. 1995. Corpuz. Sy.00 attorney's fees. Cabañgon. ISSUE: Whether or not the signing of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping by only 4 of the 6 petitioners is insufficient to meet the requirements of the rule HELD: YES. or else it is insufficient. and cancellation of Deed of Transfer and Emancipation Patent against respondent Porferio before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Vivian and Antonio to pay petitioners a total of about 478. Valois . Lastimosa. Lazaro and Prosperidad are the registered owners of a 4. Rañigo.24 cavans of palay. Gallardo. De la Cruz. Coronel. petitioners filed a Complaint for collection of land amortizations. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. Jr. The Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners' Petition for Review on the ground that the verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six petitioners. Tabugan. On June 2. Martinez. Valiente.

Palad. Valiente. Santos. requirements completely disregarded. Tabugan. Sy. The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification. Cabañgon. Martinez. Thus. Lumberio. Corpuz. under justifiable circumstances. we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal. Albano. Castillo. the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. Francisco. Inguillo. it was held that the signature of only one of the petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially complied with rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense. Furthermore. De Mesa. the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Corporal. it is not jurisdictional. not a jurisdictional. Reyes. Catindig. Thus. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Page 188 Echiverri. Espina. because the lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Tecson. De la Cruz. Coronel. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association. Asensi. Valois . Gloria. Marquez. Heirs of Cavile. Rañigo. requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct.

Coronel. Asensi. It is a mere statutory privilege. Court of Appeals dismissed outright the petition holding that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and payment of fees with the RTC. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL G. Lastimosa. the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. It is a mere statutory privilege. Valiente. Petitioner's case is not unique. v. 2013 DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. De Mesa. Valois . Lumberio. However. Espina. Rodriguez. Francisco. BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES. It filed with RTC Manila a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and paid the docket and other legal fees thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not Boardwalk properly filed its appeal HELD: NO. petitioner committed multiple violations of the Rules which should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. It should have done so with the CA as required by the Rules. Corpuz. Sandoval. MeTC rendered decision favoring Boardwalk. As will be shown below. Boardwalk filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Inguillo.R. Boardwalk also filed its Notice of Appeal with RTC. in this case. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. this Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the Rules. Sy. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. and there is no compelling reason to accord it the privilege it now seeks. Castillo. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional Albano. Marquez. and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law FACTS: The case stemmed on Boardwalk filing a Complaint for Replevin against Villareal. x x x an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. De la Cruz. and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Corporal. RTC granted the appeal filed by Villareal. Palad. Catindig. Tecson. INC. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. Alcazaren. 181182 : April 10. Martinez. Santos. records show that petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing rules. Gloria. Rañigo. Tabugan. Page 189 Echiverri." This being so. No. petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the reglementary period and paying the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. Ramirez. However. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets. Reyes. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. Concededly. Petitioner must comply with the following requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Cabañgon.

The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad. Marquez. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. Coronel. Court of Appeals dismissed the case for improper remedy. Valiente. Benguet. Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad. Castillo. After trial. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC exercised its Albano. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an improper appeal: SECTION 2. Corpuz. In the mistaken choice of their remedy. Sy. issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT. Tabugan. AND ELIZABETH MONZON. Valois . Martinez. DARMA MASLAG v. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Ramirez. 2013 DOCTRINE: It is incumbent upon x x x appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. Section 2. 174908. Corporal. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. No. De Mesa. William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad.Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. De la Cruz. Lumberio. Tecson. Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. Sandoval. Asensi. an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. June 17. they can blame no one but themselves FACTS: In 1998. Similarly. There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. Benguet. Palad. Santos. Rañigo. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the appeal filed by the Petitoner HELD: YES. Rodriguez. Espina. Gloria. REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET G. Cabañgon. Francisco. Catindig. WILLIAM GESTON. Inguillo. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered it in its appellate jurisdiction. Benguet which reversed the ruling of MTC. petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon). Reyes. Page 190 Echiverri.R. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed.

Rañigo. Corpuz. Thus. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Lastimosa. and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Alcazaren. Simply put. De la Cruz. let alone the parties. This is but logical. Castillo. Sy. Asensi. hence. It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within the courts. Martinez. The MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Page 191 Echiverri. appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. Sandoval. Reyes." Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case. Gloria. Espina. to themselves determine or coveniently set aside. the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed. we look at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. It is done by filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Valois . Tabugan. Ramirez. Valiente. but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with. Tecson. Palad. De Mesa. Corporal. Francisco. Albano. Inguillo. or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short. Catindig. Santos. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Marquez. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance of the case and review the court a quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves the merits of the appeal. Coronel.

respondent filed and affidavit of third party claim. Sandoval. Valiente. Palad. Reyes." Facts: O’Pallick (respondent) was the assignee of Poblete and Villanueva in a Contract to Sell for the purchase of the Makati Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati (unit) between the latter and Primetown Property Group. When the auction sale was completed.R. HELD: No. petitioner was declared the highest bidder and was issued a certificate of sale. O'PALLICK G. Meanwhile. RAAGAS. to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of Aguilar. Francisco. But. MICHAEL J. TERESA C. Gloria. Rodriguez. Castillo. as a result. As a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit. several properties of PPGI including the unit were levied. Albano. Corpuz. Coronel. VILLAMOR VILLEGAS. CESAR D. as well as to recover the unit. Martinez. and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MAKATIvs. Aguilar (petitioner) was able to obtain a final and executory decision in her favor against PPGI before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). and. Tabugan. Espina. "The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. 182280. Page 192 Echiverri. No. more than the fact that O’Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case. After respondent paid the full purchase price of the unit. AGUILAR. 2013 Doctrine: "The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. (PPGI). Lumberio. Sy. Catindig. Rañigo. he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. De la Cruz. he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action. Tecson. Corporal. Inc. Inguillo. Santos. respondent is not bound by the decision of the HLURB. Ramirez. A Notice of sale was posted by the sheriff which was also published. he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. Valois . he had the right to be heard on his claim. July 29. Lastimosa. as in this case." Thus. Asensi. Marquez. Because he was not impleaded in said case. PPGI issued a deed of sale in his favor but said deed of sale was not registered or annotated in the title. Respondent filed a case for quieting of title and to set aside the levy on execution of the subject unit. we agree with the CA’s pronouncement that since respondent was not impleaded in the HLURB case. But before the scheduled auction sale. De Mesa. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Issue: Whether or not respondent is bound by the decision of the HLURB and the subsequent auction sale.

The RTC. Ramirez. Marquez. Corporal. the Court resolves to deny the motion. Lastimosa. In a joint resolution. Castillo. JOSE vs. there was grave abuse of discretion. in itsdenial of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. or how the DOJ findings impacted on its ruling. the city prosecutor found probable cause to indict respondent for estafa and. And instead of confronting the reasons stated in the motion for the withdrawal of the Information. July 17. Rodriguez.R. Albano. as a result. There was never any discussion as to how it reached such conclusion. HELD: Yes. PURITA SUAREZ G. Page 193 Echiverri." without further elaborating on the bases of its conclusion. Pursuant to the DOJ’s directive. Reyes. Valiente. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information". SO ORDERED. 176111. Valois . the RTC digressed and focused solely on what constitutes estafa involving bouncing checks. Likewise. Respondent filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to which the latter resolved to reverse the findings of the city prosecutor finding that there was in fact. Catindig." Facts: Jose (petitioner) filed two complaints against Suarez (respondent) for estafa. Palad. and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. Corpuz. Santos.” A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent but the same was likewise denied. and finding it to be unmeritorious. the RTC merely stated that the 5% interest is a matter of defense. and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion. the city prosecutor moved for the withdrawal of the information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). CAROLINA B. it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion. however. no probable cause to indict respondent for estafa. Sandoval. Gloria. Tabugan." The RTC simply declared that it was denying the motion for being "unmeritorious. Inguillo. No. Alcazaren. 2013 Doctrine: When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information". Espina. the corresponding information was filed against her. Lumberio. Martinez. Moreover. Rañigo. Francisco. there is nary any reference made to the findings of the DOJ. Issue: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information without making an independent evaluation of the merits of the case as to whether there was probable cause or not. denied the motion and ruled in this wise: “Acting on the Motion to Resolve "Motion to Withdraw Information" dated July 13. Coronel. Tecson. Asensi. De Mesa. Sy. 2005.

Valois . 179638. Martinez. July 8. Page 194 Echiverri. Santos. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. namely: CIRILA (deceased). NUMERIANO. Coronel. Rodriguez. however. Issues: Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time. (petitioners) against the heirs of Pedro Miranda." instead. MIRANDA. LOLITA. Lumberio. In the second case. HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA. the date of filing is the date of receipt. Ramirez. RUFINA. Corpuz. Petitioners did not file an appeal and the same became final and executory. Tecson. the RTC denied the Motion. pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. Alcazaren. 2013 Doctrines:While filing a pleading by private courier is not prohibited by the Rules. the Regional Trial Court ruled. the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier. Gloria. a party aggrieved by a decision Albano. that some of the petitioners were to vacate the premises of a certain property and pay the respondent monthly rentals. Lastimosa. Reyes. Asensi. As such. or reverse the original judgment. vs. TERESITA. a petition for revival of judgement cannot modify." instead. Valiente. 2006 the RTC rendered its decision granting the Petition." An action for revival of a judgment cannot modify. Francisco. De la Cruz. all surnamed MIRANDA. alter or reverse the original judgment. No. which is already final and executory." Under Section 3. ERLINDA. among others. Rañigo. In the first case. Though not prohibited by the Rules. "the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. PABLO R. Petitioners. SR.It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. Tabugan. respondent filed an Ex-parte motion praying that the RTC issue a Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property but since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced. Cabañgon. Marquez. Inguillo. we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. among whom Pablo Miranda (respondent) was a part of. Palad. "the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. Facts: In a case filed by the Heirs of Numeriano Miranda Sr.. Sandoval.. the petitioners filed a notice of appeal via LBC. In this case."Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Whether or not an appeal on the Petition for revival of Judgment can modify. FELIMON. alter. DANILO. Castillo.R. JR. More than 5 years later. Espina. ELIZABETH and ANALIZA. the date of mailing is the date of receipt. No. Sy. G. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Corporal. Catindig. On July 13. HELD: Yes. De Mesa. ALEJANDRO. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment. a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. 2006. It is established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court. the appeal was filed out of time. "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court. alter or reverse the original judgment. On June 20. CORNELIO. Respondent.

Page 195 Echiverri. Sy. Espina. Corporal. Castillo. Cabañgon. Albano. Alcazaren. Santos. Tabugan. De Mesa. Valiente. Palad. Marquez. Martinez. may no longer be reversed. Rañigo. Sandoval. The original judgment. De la Cruz. Gloria. Valois . or modified. altered. Tecson. Coronel. Ramirez. Rodriguez. which is already final and executory. Francisco. Lumberio. Catindig. Corpuz. of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision. Asensi. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Reyes. but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned.

2013 Doctrine: "Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness. Sandoval. Catindig. the RTC did no err in convicting the accused based on Valenciano’s testimony alone. Valenciano was merely about three arms-length away from the accused when he saw the incident. who was a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Alcazaren. Cabañgon. the fact that Valenciano was just a few meters away from the victim and that the crime was committed in broad daylight bolster Valenciano’s identification of appellant as the assailant. Santos. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Lumberio. immediately after the stabbing incident. July 01. Accused was apprehended only after more than 5 years of hiding and was subsequently arraigned and entered the plea of not guilty. Castillo. Coronel.R. Corporal. he saw accused position himself behind the deceased and subsequently proceeded to stab the latter at the back. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. to chase the accused but the latter eluded arrest. During the trial. Finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. 180281. Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting the accused by relying only on the testimony of Valenciano. Page 196 Echiverri. Valiente. preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. can prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed the decision assailing the credibility of Valenciano and contending that the RTC erred in relying on the latter’s testimony which was incredible and insufficient to prove his guilt.’" Albano. Valois . as long as it is credible and positive. De la Cruz. JOEMARIE JALBONIAN alias "Budo" G.] identified himself as Joemarie Jalbonian y Mellendez. Francisco. Tecson. Palad. Lastimosa. spontaneous. Marquez." Facts: Jalbonian (Accused) was charged of the crime of murder for causing the death of Fortunato Quintanilla through stabbing with a bladed weapon. Also. Tabugan. HELD: No. In a simple. and straightforward manner. Valenciano ordered Julio Gaston. Further. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused for the crime of murder. According to his testimony.] and when asked[. Rañigo. The witness pointed to the person who stood up[. the lone witness of the prosecution was Barangay Chairman Oscar Valenciano (Valenciano) who testified that at around noon of the day of the crime. Likewise untenable is appellant’s contention that Valenciano’s testimony cannot be relied upon since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Asensi. "For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence. We are convinced that it was appellant who killed the victim. Reyes. No. Corpuz. Ramirez. Espina. Gloria. Sy. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary ‘only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. Valenciano clearly narrated the details of the stabbing incident and positively identified appellant as the assailant. Martinez.

Sy. Tecson. which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Espina. The sale was also registered with the register of deeds and a new title was issued in favor of petitioner. August 5. Marquez. HELD: Yes. which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules. Francisco. No. Ramirez. Whether or not the applicable law in this case is Article 1544 of the Civil Code which gives the petitioners the better right to the lot. JUANITO F. SABITSANA vs. SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. Inguillo.230. represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. Palad. Act 3344 is the law that is applicable over unregistered sale of real estate not Art. Act No. ROSARIO M. Cabañgon. Lumberio. 2013 Doctrines:An action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs. Petitioner opposed the application for registration through a letter addressed to the DENR claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito Muertegui (respondent) over an unregistered parcel of land. while Albano. Rañigo. Valiente. Alcazaren. 1981. JR. Page 197 Echiverri. 1544 of the Civil Code. G. his heirs applied for registration and coverage under the Public Land Act. JR. Sandoval. Asensi. Reyes. Rodriguez. 1991. and MA.00. MUERTEGUI. No. Lastimosa. The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2. De la Cruz.R. Martinez. 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale. Respondents then filed a case for quieting of title with preliminary injunction against petitioner and his wife before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Garcia sold the same parcel of land to the family lawyer of the Muertegui. it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs. On the question of jurisdiction. regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. MUERTEGUI. respondent filed the case to obtain a declaration of his rights. Catindig. Corporal. Tabugan. The respondent’s father and brother took actual possession over the lot and started planting coconut and ipil-ipil trees. Atty. Coronel. De Mesa. in order to preventa cloud from being cast upon his application for a title. Facts: On September 2. the applicable law is not Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. In this sense. Castillo. Thus. They also paid real property taxes over the said parcel of land. the action is one for declaratory relief. It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. it is the RTC who has jurisdiction over the case.as amended. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. Clemencio Sabastina (petitioiners) through a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. Valois . Santos. Corpuz. Issues: Whether or not it was the RTC who had jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the land was merely P 1. Gloria. 181359. 3344. He further asked that the application be held in abeyance until the issue of ownership is resolved. an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. What applies in this case is Act No. When the father of respondent passed away. On October 17. SABITSANA.

or the requirement of a public document under the Civil Code. Corporal. having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Francisco. or ten years thereafter. the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17. Rodriguez. Palad. Albano.And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia. for his ownership thereof had ceased. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners. Registration does not vest title. 1991. Martinez. Cabañgon. Asensi. the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. De Mesa. Catindig. The mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the land. Sandoval. and not for validity or enforceability. Espina. Tabugan. Tecson. Rañigo. Corpuz. since the sale between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Inguillo. while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void. Gloria. The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything. it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights.is only for convenience. Page 198 Echiverri. Valois . Nemo dat quod non habet. Marquez. Lastimosa. Valiente. which is null and void. Lumberio. Coronel. Ramirez. the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners. because when it was made. Castillo. Thus. Notarization. Santos. Alcazaren. Sy. De la Cruz. Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot. Reyes.

a bank teller."such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity. Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross and habitual negligence of duty. August 7. Asensi. Rañigo. 641. respondent was administratively charged with neglect of duty and was subsequently found by respondent’s Administrative Adjudication Panel guilty of gross neglect of duty resulting in her forced resignation with benefits. Rodriguez. Without filing a motion for reconsideration. PNB’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC before filing its Petition for Certiorari before the CA is a fatal infirmity. Cabañgon. inadvertently misposted the amount of US$ 5. (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable. a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless. Facts: Mary Sheila Arcobillas (respondent).R. Lumberio. Corporal. (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court. Catindig. (d) where. 179648. HELD: No. Alcazaren. Tecson. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Santos. 2013 Doctrines:The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. 517.00 thereby causing damage to her employer Philippine National Bank (petitioner) the amount of P214. Francisco. Coronel. acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act.517. as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction. Ramirez. De Mesa. Valiente. Sy. not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally. No. it is a well-established rule that "a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari x x x. Inguillo. under the circumstances." It "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care. Palad. the CA cannot give due course to the petition for certiorari without the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the lower tribunal/quasi-judicial body. Reyes. Marquez. with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Lastimosa. Issues: Whether or not the CA can give due course to the petition for certiorari even without the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the lower tribunal/quasi-judicial body.23. Tabugan. Gloria. Valois . (e) where petitioner was deprived of due Albano. Espina. Sandoval. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. Respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA) who found that there was no sufficient evidence to hold respondent of gross and habitual negligence of duty. Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) who subsequently affirmed the decision of the LA. or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).00 to the account of Avelina Nomad-Spoor instead of the amount of P5. Gross neglect of duty "denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. MARY SHEILA ARCOBILLAS G. Of course. Castillo. After investigation. the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration. Page 199 Echiverri. Martinez. De la Cruz. Corpuz.

Sandoval. in a criminal case. Valois . Catindig. Page 200 Echiverri. No. Espina."As aptly held by the labor tribunals. not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally. Asensi. Reyes. Gloria. Corpuz. (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object. Rodriguez. De Mesa. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. Tabugan. (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. as satisfactorily explained by Arcobillas." Here." It "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care. Lastimosa. Martinez. Valiente. Neither did it present any plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Coronel. Rather.e. the misposting was not deliberately done as to constitute as gross negligence. PNB did not at all allege to which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls. Castillo. and. Santos. with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. (f) where. was the effect of her heavy workload that day and the headache she was experiencing. Marquez. Cabañgon. To warrant removal from service. Albano. Palad. relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relied by the trial court is improbable. Lumberio. Francisco.. Sy. (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process. Corporal. Inguillo. process and there is extreme urgency for relief. it was a case of simple neglect brought about by carelessness which. the negligence should be gross and habitual.Although it was her second time to commit misposting (i. the first misposting was in 1995 while the second misposting was committed in 1998). Tecson. Arcobillas’s act cannot be considered as gross as to warrant her termination from employment. Rañigo. Gross neglect of duty "denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. respondent is not guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty. It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act. Ramirez.

Marquez. Corporal. Valois . petitioner filed a petition to nullify the foreclosure proceedings on the ground that the same is void for lack of notice and publication of the sale. Albano. Castillo. VENZON vs. Catindig. As such. Gloria. Sandoval.00.000. Francisco. 18 years after the foreclosure sale.00 publication was not necessary. August 28.. Cabañgon. Ramirez. According to petitioner. Lumberio. disposing of the issue of publication and notice of the foreclosure sale – which is the very core of petitioner’s cause of action in Civil Case No. does not exceed ₱10.000. and not Rule 65. Lastimosa. Espina. Coronel. Page 201 Echiverri. Reyes. including interests due and unpaid. as petitioner’s outstanding obligation did not exceed ₱10. Asensi. Rodriguez. 2013 Doctrine: Facts: Virginia Venzon (petitioner) obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Buenavista (respondent) which was secured by a real estate mortgage. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s petition for certiorari is the proper remedy given the factual circumstance. The Court finds no error in the CA’s treatment of the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled against petitioner stating among others that under the Rural Bank Act as amended. 178031. Sy.R. represented by LOURDESITA E. No. Corpuz. Alcazaren. Santos. De Mesa. Rañigo. when she offered to pay the balance of the loan. This constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. Palad. Subsequently.000. Inguillo. petitioner should have availed of the remedy under Rule 41. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. the foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks and executions of judgments thereon involving real properties levied upon by a sheriff shall be exempt from publication where the total amount of the loan. PARAJES G. INC. Tabugan. respondent shoved her out of the premises of the bank resulting in the former’s failure to pay the balance of the loan. Tecson. 5535 – and declaring the same to be unnecessary pursuant to the Rural Banks Act. and thus leaving petitioner without basis to maintain her case. HELD: No. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) who dismissed the same stating that the petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy. VIRGINIA M. De la Cruz. respondent foreclosed the mortgage and the property was sold to the latter as the highest bidder.00. Since petitioner’s outstanding obligation amounted to just over ₱6. the petition for certiorari is an improper remedy. 2006 Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final order. Martinez. The trial court’s July 13. RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA (AGUSAN DEL NORTE). Valiente.

This was followed by an Order granting respondents’ Motion to Admit and admitting respondents’ Amended Complaint where they withdrew their ancillary prayer for injunctive relief. Tecson. Thereafter. Reyes. Palad. 2013 Doctrine:A Petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the intrinsic correctness of the public respondent’s ruling. among others. The CA ultimately resolved the petition in favor of the respondents. Corpuz. HELD: No. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. Subsequently. Sy. RTC Branch 71 granted petitioners’ Motion for Special Order of Demolition. RTC Branch 268 denied the prayer for TRO. Issue: Whether or not a petition for certiorari may lie against the CA for issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction considering that petitioner was the buyer of the subject land in a foreclosure sale and therefore has the right to possess the same. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.THE COURT OF APPEALS. they filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC). Asensi. Castillo. Cabañgon. They further allege that their possession became in the concept of an owner when the Reyeses sold parts of the land to them. Meanwhile. It is settled that as long as a court or quasi-judicial body acts within its jurisdiction. petitioners filed a verified petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 71. Gloria.R. Albano. The respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari. SUSANA AHORRO. Finally they claim that the mortgage was fictitious since during the time of the execution of the same. SPOUSES CARMELITO AND ANTONIA ALDOVER vs. thus. Marquez. Francisco. Sandoval. Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners stating. Rañigo. the Reyeses were no longer the owners of the property. Prohibition. et al. G. Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners before the Court of Appeals (CA). Lastimosa. Tabugan. September 23. Espina. Lumberio. Page 202 Echiverri. Despite the Reyeses’ opposition to the petition. hence. Coronel. Facts: The Reyeses were the registered owners of a parcel of land. No. a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner. in said complaint that the respondents have been residing in the subject land since the 1960’s by virtue of a lease with the Reyeses. the mortgage and the foreclosure were void. Corporal. 1999. the Reyeses obtained a loan from Antonia Aldover (petitioners) secured by a real estate mortgage on the parcel of land. The sheriff. De Mesa. Santos. however. On August 12. De la Cruz. any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are not reviewable in a special civil action of certiorari. Ramirez. 167174. failed to do the same as there were several persons who occupy portions of the land claiming to be the owners thereof (private respondents). Private respondents filed a Complaint for Declaration of Documents and Title. The Reyeses failed to pay their loan and the petitioners caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the lot where the latter emerged as the winning bidder. RTC Branch 71 issued the Writ of Possession and ordered its sheriff to place the petitioner in possession of the land. Valois . Catindig. Inguillo. Valiente. Martinez.

Page 203 Echiverri. that is a right in esse. De Mesa. Catindig. the CA cannot be said to have acted apriciously. Thus. title. Corporal. Asensi.” Considering the foregoing and the fact that respondents properly alleged that they were the owners of the subject property. Rañigo. Ramirez. Espina. Marquez. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. speedy. Francisco. misappreciated the facts.33 of Rule 39 provides thus: “xxx Upon the expiration of the right of redemption. Valiente. Alcazaren. A Petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the intrinsic correctness of the public respondent’s ruling. Cabañgon. Inguillo. the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights. Sec. Palad. Reyes. and. Valois . (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right. In the instant case even though petitioners were indeed the purchasers of the subject land in the foreclosure sale. arbitrarily or despotically in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. or misapplied the law is beyond our power of review in this Petition for Certiorari for it cannot be used for any purpose except to limit the action of the respondent court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Castillo. Sandoval. and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. De la Cruz. Tabugan. Tecson. Coronel. Albano. whether the CA committed errors in proceedings. Lastimosa. (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants. interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. It is settled that as long as a court or quasi-judicial body acts within its jurisdiction. Gloria. the following must be present (1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Corpuz. Rodriguez. whimsically. Sy. It should also be noted that to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are not reviewable in a special civil action of certiorari. Lumberio. (4) there is no other ordinary. Martinez. Santos.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be disturbed. Catindig. Issue: Whether or not the SC can disturb the decision of a lower court with regard to a demurrer to evidence through a petition for certiorari. Cabañgon. Tecson. (ISI). De la Cruz. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Jr. (2) the contracts with PNB contained provisions that are beneficial. GREGORIO SINGIAN. Palad. in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer. Sandoval. the latter filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC). Alcazaren. Reyes. Valiente. to the government. the Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe. "A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action. and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON GOOD GOVERNMENT G. Marquez. Valois . the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime. Rañigo. and not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous. Sy. to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law. the SC cannot disturb the decision of a lower court with regard to a demurrer to evidence through a petition for certiorari. JR. (Petitioner). Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied. that is. Page 204 Echiverri. Asensi. De Mesa. and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. whether true or not. Facts: Gregorio Singian. Lastimosa. Castillo. Inguillo. Coronel. SANDIGANBAYAN (3RD DIVISION). 2013 Doctrine:The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court." "The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. the appellate courts will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. No. and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. Gloria. Corporal. Lumberio. (3)the loans could not be characterized as behest loans because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization. is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. petitioner. To be considered sufficient therefore. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.195011-19." "Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character. September 30. Espina. HELD. Martinez.R. Santos. unless accused has Albano. weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. is one of the many accused in a case for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 (The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act) due to the purported granting of behest loans by the government’s Philippine National Bank (PNB) to ISI. After the prosecution rested its case. vs. petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any participation. Inc. and (4) assuming the loans are behest loans. the prosecution called to the stand 9 witnesses as well as presented 8 documentary evidence. with prior leave. to make out a case or sustain the issue. filed a Demurrer to Evidence anchored on the following grounds: 1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official. During the trial for the case of petitioner. Tabugan. Ramirez. Nos. The court. Francisco.

Palad. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice. Reyes. Tecson. Rodriguez. We agree with the PCGG’s observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its conclusion after a careful and deliberate examination and assessment of all the evidence submitted. Coronel." In this case. Tabugan. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. Page 205 Echiverri. established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused. Rañigo. De Mesa. Catindig. De la Cruz. much more. Marquez.It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did the respondent court lay down its find Albano. petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan abused. Ramirez. Valois . Cabañgon. its discretion in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. Francisco. Corpuz. gravely abused. Martinez. Lumberio. Santos. there by amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Sandoval. Castillo. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Espina. Sy. Inguillo. Corporal. Valiente. Gloria. Asensi.

Petitioner-spouses. Alcazaren.784. To secure the obligation under the Promissory Note.R. Rañigo. sent them a demand letter. No. Nissan Gallery Ortigas. Tecson. 184565. the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff. Martinez. Asensi. who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Rodriguez. Castillo. thru counsel.744. FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Manolito and Lourdes de Leon executed a Promissory Note binding themselves to pay Nissan Gallery Ortigas the amount of P458. Cabañgon. Afterwhich. November 20.00 in 36 monthly installments of P12." In civil cases. Catindig. Citytrust was then merged with and absorbed by respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Lumberio. ISSUE: Who has the burden of proving that the mortgaged vehicle was stolen and that Citytrust received notice and proof of loss of the mortgaged vehicle. in turn. MANOLITO DE LEON and LOURDES E. CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order and reinstated the MeTC Decision. Page 206 Echiverri. averred that the case should be dismissed for failure of respondent BPI to prosecute the case pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court because the mortgaged vehicle was stolen while the insurance policy was still in force. with notice to petitioner-spouses. who is required Albano. Ramirez. the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant. Corporal. with a late payment charge of five percent (5%) per month. De la Cruz. DE LEON vs. MeTC ruled in favor of BPI and declared petitioner-spouses liable to pay their remaining obligation for failure to notify Citytrust or BPI of the alleged theft of the mortgaged vehicle and to submit proof thereof. Petitioner-spouses offered as evidence the Alarm Sheet issued by the PNP. the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Reynaldo Llanos and the testimonies of Ultu and petitioner Manolito. Santos. Marquez. BPI filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila a Complaint for Replevin and Damage against petitioner-spouses. Tabugan. Corpuz.00. 2013 DOCTRINE:The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. executed a Deed of Assignment of its rights and interests under the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citytrust Banking Corporation. the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff. Sandoval. Section 1. who. Gloria. Sy. HELD: The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Reyes. They averred that BPI should have collected the insurance proceeds and applied the same to the remaining obligation. Once the plaintiff has established his case. Lastimosa. In civil cases. BPI. Valiente. in their Answer. When petitioner-spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. Coronel. RTC reversed the MeTC Decision. Valois . De Mesa. Espina. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS G. Palad. On the same day. Inguillo. Francisco. has the burden to establish his defense. they constituted a Chattel Mortgage over a 1995 Nissan Sentra 1300.

Santos. Marquez. Tecson. Rodriguez. which was insured. Asensi. Corporal. Martinez. to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Sy. Coronel. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Valois . Once the plaintiff has established his case. Francisco. Rañigo. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Valiente. Castillo. In this case. who. on the other hand. had to prove their defense that the obligation was extinguished by the loss of the mortgaged vehicle. Gloria. Lumberio. Petitioner-spouses. Reyes. De Mesa. Page 207 Echiverri. Corpuz. BPI had to prove that petitioner-spouses failed to pay their obligations under the Promissory Note. Palad. Albano. the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant. Catindig. has the burden to establish his defense. in turn. Inguillo. Espina. Ramirez.

all in the Province of Batangas. Rodriguez. the properties would be advertised and sold at public auction. San Juan. Espina. It invoked the final Decision in Civil Case No. Martinez. Rañigo. 180200. Nasugbu. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. DIGITEL was granted a legislative franchise to install. 2000. Upon seeking the renewal of its Mayor's Permit to operate and provide telecommunications service in Balayan. 3514. When petitioner failed to pay. Cabañgon. 7678. Santos. Jr. CANTOS G. Marquez. Lastimosa. Inguillo. Sto. The RTC ruled that since respondent was not a party in Civil Case No. Valiente. Corpuz. No. Catindig. CA noted that the dismissal of the case for indirect contempt by the RTC amounted to an acquittal from which an appeal is not allowed. Sy. It held that the issuance of the writ prayed for had already become moot and academic since the public auction sale sought to be enjoined was already consummated. Lumberio. Palad. petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Hence. Batangas issued a Cease and Desist Order enjoining petitioner from further operating its business. Sandoval. Asensi. Ramirez. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES. The ruling became final and executory as shown in an Entry of Judgment dated February 2. Martinez. De Mesa.R. It held that the enjoinment of petitioner's business operation is not one of the remedies available to enforce collection of real property taxes under existing laws. Batangas. Reyes. Albano. Corporal. November 25. 4051). respondent. that its business operation would be restrained should it fail to pay the assessed real property taxes. Balayan. Coronel. petitioner was informed by Mayor Benjamin E. Batangas. 3514. 2013 DOCTRINE:DIsmissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an acquittal. operate and maintain telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines. in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas. RTC rendered its Decision 25 dated July 7. Tomas. Petitioner wrote respondent to request the lifting of the Warrants of Levy and to refrain from proceeding with the public sale of its property located in Balayan. Cuenca. and Lemery. De la Cruz. JESSIE E. issued seven Warrants of Levy certifying that several real properties of petitioner situated in the Municipalities of Ibaan. he had no duty to render obedience to the Decision therein. 2003 dismissing petitioner's Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition against respondent (Civil Case No. INC. Page 208 Echiverri. But since the warrants remained uplifted. The RTC also ruled that petitioner is only liable to pay real property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise. FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. Batangas. 3514 decreeing petitioner's exemption from the payment of real property tax which it claimed to be binding upon respondent. Francisco. vs. In June 2002. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared that the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order was without legal basis. the Chief of the Permit and License Division of Balayan. Castillo. Tabugan. Gloria. which effectively bars a second prosecution. Valois . Alcazaren. RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Tecson. Petitioner thus promptly filed a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order before the RTC of Balayan. are delinquent in the payment of real property taxes.

Corpuz. Ramirez. Palad. Coronel." In this case. the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an acquittal. De Mesa. Tecson. Lastimosa. in some manner. De la Cruz. but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's order. Rañigo. Thus. Sy. Catindig. Martinez. Albano. Gloria. Marquez. and dignity. Santos. Asensi. Valois . which effectively bars a second prosecution. Rodriguez. Francisco. Valiente. Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in criminal cases. Castillo. Reyes. It is a defiance of the authority. However. Page 209 Echiverri. Lumberio. or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Sandoval. a charge for contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal action. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cantos is guilty of indirect contempt? HELD: No. Respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. This Court has held that an alleged contemner should be accorded the same rights as that of an accused. the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioner's real properties. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform. Corporal. Espina. were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. justice. Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt. to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt is not a criminal offense. Inguillo. justice. Tabugan. In fact.

Banco De Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank released a loan in the amount of P8. 183918. Before the expiration of the redemption period. Franco Lim to mortgage his share in the property by executing an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney. Gloria. Inguillo. petitioner sent respondent a letter signifying his Albano. Corporal. Santos. However. In this case. Lumberio. CA reversed the RTC Decision. no other evidence was submitted by petitioner to prove his allegation of forgery.5 million by virtue of the said Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney. No. like all other allegations. petitioner and Franco executed in favor of respondent a Real Estate Mortgage over the same property. Asensi. HELD: No. Francisco. which he claims was also forged by his brother. On 1992. respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Valiente. Catindig. Rodriguez. Although handwriting experts are often offered as witnesses. Martinez. Corpuz. when the loan was not paid. Page 210 Echiverri. INC. Reyes. Valois . Rañigo. FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Lim authorizes his brother. they are not indispensable because judges must exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or genuineness of the signatures in question. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged. Lastimosa. Inc. Palad. But except for this. Tabugan. FRANCISCO LIM vs. What petitioner submitted was another mortgage contract executed in favor of Planters Development Bank. now known as the BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK. On this 2 nd loan. Sandoval. 2014 DOCTRINE: The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case. It ruled that petitioner's mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document. petitioner's subsequent actions belie his allegation of forgery. Moreover. the alleged forged signature was not compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted. Alcazaren. Sy. On 1996. the loan was fully paid by Franco. Allegations of forgery. It should not be presumed but must be established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the genuine signatures. which was entered in the Register of Deeds of San Juan. G. Espina. Coronel. Metro Manila. Tecson. On 1989. and convincing evidence by the party alleging it.R. To secure the loan. Ramirez. Franco. EQUITABLE PCI BANK. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was able to prove that his signature was forged. petitioner. Cabañgon. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Castillo. Marquez. must be proved by clear. positive. His allegation that he was in the US at the time of the execution of the mortgage contract is also not sufficient proof that his signature was forged. Petitioner failed to prove that his signature was forged. petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged. and their mother Victoria Yao Lim obtained from respondent Equitable PCI Bank a loan in the amount of P30 million in favor of Sun Paper Products. January 15.

Gloria. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Martinez. He even visited the bank to discuss the matter. Castillo. Asensi. Espina. Coronel. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Palad. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Sy. which appears to be an afterthought and a last-ditch effort to recover the said property. Clearly. Albano. Tecson. Santos. Lumberio. Rañigo. Reyes. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Corporal. Valiente. intention to reacquire the said property. Valois . Inguillo. Marquez. Corpuz. Catindig. his acts contradict his claim of forgery. Page 211 Echiverri. Francisco.

191189 January 29. Coronel." The evidence does not support Manlar’s view that both Deyto and Ang contracted with Manlar for the delivery of rice on credit. and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. Castillo. all of the checks were dishonored. the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. which went unheeded.k. that Ang could not be located. In civil cases.D. Valois . who was previously recovered from a kidnapping perpetrated by no less than Ang’s best friend. Evidence showed that Deyto was an old lady who owned properties in Isabela and Manila. the petition. Marquez. and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. LOURDES L. Respondent Jennelita Deyto Ang or Janet Ang is Deyto’s daughter and. rather. Grains Center" and JENNELITA DEYTO ANG. Ang appeared to have abandoned her own family and could no longer be located. The transaction was covered by nine postdated checks issued by Ang from her personal bank/checking account with Chinabank. Ramirez. Page 212 Echiverri. She is a reputable businessperson in Isabel and that Ang originally worked for JD Grains Center. Palad. vs. Reyes. It appears that during the time demand was being made upon Deyto. Martinez. ISSUE: w/n Deyto is solidarily liable with Ang who was alleged to be the only person who transacted with Manlar. Espina. Respondent Lourdes L. Lastimosa. Inc.00. is engaged in the business of rice milling and selling of grains. Corporal. Upon presentment.220. she informed Manlar. "JANET ANG. which connotes "that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. Lumberio. "Janet Commercial Store". It is a basic rule in evidence that he who alleges must prove his case or claim by the degree of evidence required. Rodriguez. It does not mean absolute truth. MANLAR RICE MILL." G. Sy. it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side. Tabugan. rather. it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side.a. De Mesa. Asensi. De la Cruz. No. It does not mean absolute truth. Valiente. Cabañgon. What this Court sees is an attempt to implicate Deyto in a transaction between Manlar and Ang so that the Albano. Corpuz. Sandoval. Ang entered into a rice supply contract with Manlar. a. Tecson. prior to her alleged absconding. Gloria. INC. HELD: No.The Court ruled in favor of Manlar prompting Deyto’s appeal to CA which reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Deyto." FACTS: Petitioner Manlar Rice Mill. with the former purchasing rice from the latter amounting to ₱3. operated her own rice trading business through her own store.843. The preponderance of evidence indicates that it was Ang alone who entered into the rice supply agreement with Manlar. Catindig. Manlar filed a Complaint for sum of money against Deyto and Ang before the RTC. but was removed in 1997 for failure to remit collections. Santos. through its Sales Manager Pablo Pua. Francisco.R. Rañigo. Ang and Deyto were no longer on good terms as a result of Ang’s activities. DEYTO. Inguillo. Hence. Manlar made oral and written demands upon both Deyto and Ang. Deyto took custody of one of Ang’s children. Alcazaren. Deyto does business under the trade name "JD Grains Center" and is engaged in the business of milling and selling of grains. doing business under the trade name "J. 2014 DOCTRINE:In civil cases. which connotes "that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.

Alcazaren. Lumberio. Sy. and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party thereto. but not Deyto. Gloria. Santos. Reyes. Coronel. Cabañgon. Palad. De Mesa. Albano. Page 213 Echiverri. Ramirez. Castillo. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Espina. who the Court finds to be not a party to the rice supply contract. Corporal. Inguillo. Marquez. a contract affects only the parties to it. Corpuz. Valois . former may recover its losses. Martinez. Valiente. Lastimosa. their assigns and heirs. However. it cannot favor or prejudice a third person. Tecson. This conclusion is consistent with what the totality of the evidence show. since it could no longer recover them from Ang as a result of her absconding. as a general rule. Thus. Manlar may sue Ang. contracts take effect only between the parties. Asensi. Catindig. Tabugan. Rodriguez." Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code. "It is a basic principle in law that contracts can bind only the parties who had entered into it. Francisco. Rañigo.

Palad. Lastimosa. likewise. Sandoval. Catindig. Reyes. petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum7 to require Metrobank’s officers8 to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31. it filed a timely Opposition thereto. Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court. as will be shown below. as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter land in Meycauayan. certificate of sale and other documents. 22. The situation is different here. ISSUES: (1) w/n the notice and hearing (secs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. De la Cruz. rule 15. 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief. rules of court (2) w/n the bank officers can be summoned without the written interrogatories. This is not without significant consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party. Marquez. Gloria. in fact." The provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. auction sale. The trial court issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum. Francisco. Inguillo. 185145 February 5. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.R. spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia. with damages. filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage. Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. Albano. and EMMANUEL L. Valois . the motion under consideration is a mere scrap of paper by reason of its failure to comply with the requirements for a valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. or to give a deposition pending appeal. Cabañgon. Asensi. Rule 25 of the Rules of Court provides that "a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court. Corpuz. Sy. Province of Bulacan G. After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial. the case of Adorio cannot apply squarely to this case. In Adorio. De Mesa. Ramirez. against respondents Metrobank and Emmanuel L. HELD: (1)Yes. Contrary to petitioners’ submission. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed petitioners’ appeal. Clerk of Court. Rodriguez. The court stated that as pointed out by the defendant bank in its opposition. ORTEGA. rules of court) are required for a mere motion for subpoena of respondent bank’s officers when such requirements apply only to deposition under sec. Ortega. FACTS: Petitioners. and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank. Martinez. foreclosure. 2014 DOCTRINE:Section 6. (2) No. Valiente. Rañigo. Santos. Bulacan. the defendant bank and its officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories are first served upon them. Castillo. rule 25. 6. SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA vs. Alcazaren. the request for subpoena duces tecum was sought against bank officials who were not parties to the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. as officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling party’s main witnesses. Moreover. Lumberio. Coronel. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition. Espina. Tecson. 4 and 5. Tabugan. Corporal. No. as provided in Sections 1 and 6. Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum. they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. Page 214 Echiverri.

Sy. De la Cruz. it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. Espina. a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court. This is embodied in Section 6. which provides – Sec. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Santos. since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony. Albano. unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. De Mesa. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. Castillo. the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed. Lastimosa. Asensi. Corpuz. Sandoval. Reyes. in civil cases. and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. 6. Valiente. Besides. Lumberio. Marquez. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories. Francisco. Inguillo. Page 215 Echiverri. One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant. Rañigo. Palad. Valois . Gloria. Martinez. or to give a deposition pending appeal. Coronel. Rule 25 of the Rules. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Tecson. As a rule. Catindig. compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Alcazaren. Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice. Corporal.

Tabugan. petitioner’s suspension from office was mandatory. Valois . HELD: No. Ramirez. Valiente. there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the assailed May 23. Lumberio. Page 216 Echiverri. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra. Hence. Sy. Coronel.one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded. Petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled hearing of her own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. The Ombudsman (Prosecution) also filed a Motion to Reset the Scheduled Trial and was set for hearing. ISSUE: w/n petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration without conducting a hearing thereon. Petitioner’s cause of action lies in the argument that her Motion for Reconsideration. Sandoval. Rodriguez. three days before the hearing for the latter motion. 173523 February 19. which was earlier set for a hearing was reset to another schedule. It should be said that petitioner was accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings. Thereafter even before the hearing. Palad. Francisco. Consequently. at all times and in all instances. 2006 Resolution by the Sandiganbayan. Rañigo. Petitioner thereafter filed her Motion for Reconsideration and set the date of hearing. A formal trial-type hearing is not. The contention that petitioner was deprived of her day in court is plainly specious. 2014 DOCTRINE:Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. yet he failed to do so. essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. before the said date could arrive. Nonetheless. thus depriving her of the opportunity to be heard. Martinez. Espina. Cabañgon. yet he failed to do so. The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13. is grossly erroneous. Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Lastimosa. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court . however. A reading and understanding of the Sandiganbayan’s Order on the motion indicates that what it referred to were the two hearing dates covering the continuation of the trial proper – the ongoing presentation of the prosecution’s evidence – and not the single hearing date for the determination of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Tecson. De Mesa. Inguillo. Catindig. RA 3019 arguing that under Section 13 of RA 3019. Petitioner opposed the motion but Sandiganbayan still ordered the preventive suspension. Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Albano. Castillo. No. and is the accused for several violations of RA 3019 which cases are pending before the Sandiganbayan. Asensi.R. Alcazaren. This premise. it simply does not follow. De la Cruz. he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Palawan. Marquez. However. LUCENA D. there is no denial of due process. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN G. he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Corpuz. DEMAALA vs. Gloria. Santos. Reyes. Corporal. the petition. Ombudsman sought to reset the scheduled hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to a later date. FACTS: Petitioner Lucena D. Sandiganbayan issued the assailedResolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Palad. FACTS: Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises. 2014 DOCTRINE:While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders. claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. the same became final and executory. "he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the parties’ dispute. Inc. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. Page 217 Echiverri. 2-90. M/GEN. the company union. Reyes.. De Mesa. represented by JOSE JESSIE OLIVAR G. Another Motion for Reconsideratio was filed but CA likewise dismissed it. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration while respondents filed a Partial Appeal. Lastimosa. HELD: Yes. Catindig. petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules. The CA added that since the assailed Decision was not timely appealed within the reglementary 15-day period under Rule 43. Valiente. Petitioner then filed before the CA an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. available. SIGAYA vs. So the case reached the DOLE Secretary who ordered reinstatement. Espina. Tecson. filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE. Sandoval." The very nature of certiorari – which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain. "The authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. Rodriguez. Asensi. Consequently. Lumberio. 180962 February 26. retrenched 21 of its employees. Martinez. Valois . De la Cruz. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO). Corporal. Gloria. Inguillo. which properly covers decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators. the petition is dismissible pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. PIDLTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES. No. Rañigo. Corpuz. The Secretary of Labor held that the complainant’s and the respondent’s respective pleadings need not be acted upon for lack of legal basis. ISSUE: w/nthe petitioner availed of the correct remedy in filing a petition for certiorari under rule 65 instead of under rule 43 of the rules of court. herein private respondent Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU). Ramirez. in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator. Marquez. Santos. For this reason. represented by its Vice-President for Administration. Tabugan. speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law – requires that the office Albano. It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy. NEMESIO M. Sy.R. Castillo.. Parties were not able to settle. There is no distinction: when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry indispensable to national interest. a local land transportation company engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight. the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. Coronel. Francisco. INC. and sought injunctive relief. The CA held that. when it should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof.

Corpuz. Valois . before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of. De Mesa. Rañigo. Espina. this opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for reconsideration has been filed. Sandoval. Such petition may be filed within a reasonable time from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. Reyes. Martinez. the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake complained of. De la Cruz. Valiente. Asensi. Francisco. Marquez. Ramirez. Palad. The only way by which a labor case may reach the Supreme Court is through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Santos. Catindig. Castillo. Coronel. Quite evidently. Rodriguez. Sy. Tecson. Inguillo. Alcazaren. Lumberio. issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct itself. Albano. Corporal. Gloria." Clearly. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Page 218 Echiverri. Lastimosa.

No. Valiente. it appears that the building was demolished. In addition. it was merely a purchaser or transferee of the property. Baric was a lessee therein. An appellee who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. Tabugan. Sy. Corpuz. demanded the return of the leased property through a written notice. Sandoval. Palad. under the lease contract the right to at least four months advance notice.Surely. 193684 March 5. this may not be allowed. Cabañgon. Respondent Danilo G. He did not question the CA ruling in an appropriate Petition before this Court. De Mesa. Castillo. Inguillo. Since the restoration of the possession was already impracticable. An appellee who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court. Page 219 Echiverri. Tecson. Inc. Baric filed a case for forcible entry with prayer for injunctive relief against Palado and herein petitioner One Network Rural Bank. However. De la Cruz. Espina. INC. Baric filed an Amended Complaint and alleged that he had been occupying the leased space since 1994. because as the registered owner of the subject property. CA reversed the decision holding that Palado was guilty of forcible entry. Palado may transfer his title at any time and the lease merely follows the property as a lien or encumbrance. Palado in December 2000. operating a barber shop on one of the commercial spaces. that in 2000. BARIC G. Rañigo. Any invasion or violation of Baric's rights as lessee was Albano. Santos. Martinez. which prompted the Barangay Chairman to issue a Certificate to Bar Action. FACTS: Jaime Palado was the registered owner of real property with a building containing commercial spaces for lease.Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. Upon appeal. Ramirez. Baric took the matter to the office of the Barangay Lupon. Marquez. Francisco. Baric failed to attend. Lastimosa. Asensi. Hence. Rodriguez. ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK. After the sale a new title was issued in the bank’s name.R. 2014 DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that a party who has not appealed from a decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. Gloria. "It is well-settled that a party who has not appealed from a decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. DANILO G. the latter was granted. In the meantime. located in Barangay Piapi. With regard to Baric's argument that he should be reinstated to the premises and awarded damages. MTC and RTC both ruled in favor of Palado and the bank." (2) No. Davao City. Valois . Coronel. Lumberio. he renovated the leased space with Palado’s consent and knowledge. Network Bank did not violate any of Baric's rights. Alcazaren. nominal damages were awarded. It then constructed a new building on the lot. vs. it is not prohibited from acquiring the property even while the forcible entry case was pending. and the bank merely stepped into the shoes of the former owner. Corporal. While Palado’s notice to vacate required Baric to vacate the premises within 40 days. Catindig. Reyes. the petition. Network Bank’s purchase of the property was subject to all liens and encumbrances found thereon. ISSUES: (1) w/n Baric can be reinstated to the premises (2) w/n the bank may be held liable for nominal damages HELD: (1) No. on the scheduled dates of conciliation.

De Mesa. Rañigo. Valois . Valiente. Marquez. Lumberio. Corporal. Page 220 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Gloria. Santos. Sy. On the contrary. it appears that Barie was ousted through Palado's acts even before Network Bank acquired the subject property or came into the picture. which does not appear to be so from the evidence on record. Alcazaren. Tecson. Asensi. committed solely by Palado. De la Cruz. Francisco. Cabañgon. Coronel. Palad. Thus. Albano. Martinez. Rodriguez. Castillo. Sandoval. Ramirez. Tabugan. Inguillo. Reyes. Espina. and Network Bank may not be implicated or found guilty unless it actually took part in the commission of illegal acts. Corpuz. Catindig. it was error to hold the bank liable for nominal damages.

together with the laboratory request. Espina. Sy. Moreover. De Mesa. Tabugan. when confronted during trial. the burden of proof rests on the appellant. the same were brought to the police station where Espejo marked them with his initials. Sandoval. Tecson. Cabañgon. Reyes. Valois . the totality of the prosecution’s evidence shows the integrity of the drugs seized to be intact. a dangerous drug. identified the three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance as the very same items confiscated from the appellant. De la Cruz. Police Inspector Melanie Joy Ordoño conducted an examination on the specimens submitted with the corresponding markings and concluded that the three heat sealed transparent plastic sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. ISSUE: w/n the chain of custody was properly established HELD: Yes. Rañigo. Under the situation. Castillo. 2014 DOCTRINE: In prosecutions involving narcotics. Lumberio.R. appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. Catindig. the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith. Page 221 Echiverri. 191360 March 10. Corpuz. The identity of the drugs was proven and the chain of its custody and possession has been duly accounted for and not broken. Martinez. this conclusion is bolstered by the defense’s admission of the existence and due execution of the request for laboratory examination. and. Gloria. This can be gleaned from the testimonies of Espejo and Arce who narrated that from the moment the items were seized from appellant. were immediately delivered by Espejo himself to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Incidentally. No. FACTS: Both the RTC and CA found that accused Sherwin Bis feloniously distributed and sold 3 heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu to PO2 Manuel Espejo who was a poseur-buyer. Palad. properly inventoried. The latter used marked money. Ramirez. Valiente. ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with" and in such case. ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with and in such case. Asensi. In the present case. integrity and evidentiary value of the items subject matter of this case. Alcazaren. Marquez. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Here. Espejo. Inguillo. the Chemistry Report and the specimens submitted. this Court finds no circumstance whatsoever that would hint any doubt as to the identity. a piece of One thousand peso bill. the burden of proof rests on the appellant. Albano. Francisco. Coronel. The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith. SHERWIN BIS y AVELLANEDA G. Rodriguez. "Besides. Santos. Corporal. Lastimosa.

No. While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere Albano. It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect petitioners’ cause in any manner.456. As conceded by them and as held by the CA. Petitioners argued that the Acknowledgment — respondent’s Exhibit “A” which was presented in court — was not an original copy and thus inadmissible. which remained unpaid despite written demand. does not materially affect the outcome of the case. the alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials were not covered by delivery receipts. Petitioners moved to reconsider the trial court’s order but was denied. Though respondent now claims that she had lost the original. proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC). Palad. Santos. Espina. On November 21. Corporal. and respondent’s testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated. Rañigo. De Mesa.R. Francisco. 2005. Castillo. petitioners filed a Demurrer toEvidence. Inguillo. it evidently appears that there is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and identified in court. spouses Fernando and Ma. Alcazaren. ISSUE: WON the photocopy presented and offered in evidence is inadmissible and could not be the basis for arriving at a finding of liability on their part. Petitioners went up to the CA on certiorari. both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated. Corpuz. Asensi. there is no harm if in a case. This would explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession. represented by her Attorney-in-Fact DELFIN CHUA G. 183034. Valois . Reyes. Tabugan. On January 17. the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the record. and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing. Tecson. Page 222 Echiverri. which they nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the case. 2006. Pre-trial was conducted. ELENA SANTOS vs. Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the second time. it is with the court as an exhibit. respondent presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. Ramirez. Martinez.00. petitioners’ receipt of the written demand was not proved. HELD: No. FACTS: Lolita Alcazar. identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. Lumberio. the original exists and was made part of the records of the case when respondent’s evidence was first taken. pursuant to the best evidence rule. Valiente. Lastimosa. Sy. instituted through her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaintfor sum of money against the petitioners. Coronel. petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondent’s failure to present the original. Besides. Rodriguez. 2014 DOCTRINE: While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Gloria. The trial court issued an Orderdenying petitioners’ demurrer for lack of merit.which respondent opposed. Elena Santos. Sandoval. Marquez. On November 8. to collect the value of paint and construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1. she made a formal offer of her evidence and rested her case. Petitioner’s motion to reset the hearing was likewise denied. 2005. March 12. LOLITA ALCAZAR.000. SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. Catindig.

Sandoval. Sy. Corpuz. Lastimosa. Gloria. Castillo. Rodriguez.there is no harm if in a case. Lumberio. both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated. are waived by him. or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out x x x. Valiente. Martinez. such as a seal. Francisco. De Mesa. Espina. or that it was unauthorized x x x. Asensi. an acknowledgment. Hence. The effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. Catindig. that the document was delivered. identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. Marquez. De la Cruz. Reyes. photocopy. Tecson. Inguillo. Valois . or revenue stamp. Cabañgon. are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution. such defenses as that the signature is a forgery x x x. Page 223 Echiverri. Alcazaren. Palad. Ramirez. and that any formal requisites required by law. More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. or that it was never delivered x x x. Rañigo. which it lacks. Tabugan. Corporal. that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it. Coronel.” Albano. “By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority. Santos.

the spouses Dela Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession. Tecson. They alleged that Teodora T. CAPCO and MARTYC. Rañigo. SPOUSES RUFINO R. Teodora. No. 2003. Hence. CAPCO G. Sandoval. as these proceedings are summary in nature. Rodriguez. The CA found in favor of the spouses Capco. The said property was eventually registered in her name. Here. Intending to construct a house thereon and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs business. Subsequently. Castillo. the matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation wherein several meetings were held but to no avail.R. the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-in-interest. Page 224 Echiverri. the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. and 4. De Mesa. the subject property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz. DOCTRINE: To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land. acquired ownership over a piece of land by virtue of a Decision rendered by the RTC of Pasig in Land Registration Case. As the spouses Capco refused. The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through conveyance and they extended Albano. Sy. A complaint.The MeTC rejected the spouses Capco’s claimed right to possess the subject property. FACTS: On October 6. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation thereof. thereafter. out of neighborliness and blood relationship. Undeterred. Ramirez. eventually. possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. Asensi. Gloria. Valois . is the registered owner of the property per TCT No. Tabugan. the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof. Lastimosa. 176055. the spouses Capco filed a Petition for Review with the CA. to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the jurisdiction of the MeTC. March 17. Valiente. it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy. Corporal. Teodora. Espina. Catindig. Lumberio. The spouses Capco appealed to the RTC but the latter did not find merit in the spouses Capco’s appeal. must allege that: 1. It concluded that since the spouses Capco’s possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance of the spouses Dela Cruz. SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ and AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ vs. the latter have the better right to possess and thus may recover the same upon demand. ISSUE: WON the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the Spouses Dela Cruz’ complaint even when there was a failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property. initially. Concio (Teodora). Alcazaren. Coronel. Cabañgon. this petition. Martinez. HELD: Yes. Santos. Corpuz. De la Cruz. 2014. Francisco. Palad. 3. mother of petitioner Amelia Concio-Dela Cruz (Amelia). 31873 and that she tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the lot. 2. Inguillo. Reyes. Marquez. the spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaintfor Unlawful Detainer against the spouses Capco before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pateros.

Tabugan. the Complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it. Coronel. Santos. Francisco. 2003. Catindig.The Complaint was filed on October 6. Gloria. Sandoval. is dated September 1. Espina. Tecson. Sy. Corpuz. per the attached copy to the Complaint. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Marquez. Castillo. Alcazaren. they sent the latter a formal demand letter which. Asensi. Valiente. The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail. Rañigo. De la Cruz. hence. Page 225 Echiverri. Ramirez. Valois . Martinez. De Mesa. Reyes. Lumberio. Albano. 2003 or within one year from the time the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly. Lastimosa. the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. Palad. Corporal. Cabañgon.

2006 Order —which declared that Civil Case No. and BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK. Inguillo. and Ramo handed to petitioner a copy of the tax declaration covering the property.R. Gloria. YOLANDA S. 5703-R for failure to prosecute. Cabañgon. Sy. 2003 deed of sale) was executed between the parties. Alcazaren. 2014. Francisco. FACTS: Civil Case No. 2008. Asensi. which indicated that it was subject to several liens and encumbrances. that Ramo assured petitioner that the subject property was free from liens and encumbrances. petitioner paid P850. Page 226 Echiverri. against respondent Catalina Ramo (Ramo). On February 2. petitioner and Ramo entered into an agreement for the purchase by petitioner of a 240-square meter portion of Ramo’s 637-square meter unregistered lot located at Brgy. Coronel. petitioner’s new counsel filed a Notice of Appearance with Manifestation and Motioninforming the court of Ramo’s June 29. is definitely a harsh action. that a “Deed of Sale with Mortgage to Secure Payment of Price” (October 29. 5703-R On January 6. Palad.000.00 advance she made. which is not even required by any rule. 2009. Espina. Vilma Macedonio (petitioner) filed a civil case for rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. MARQUEZ. CATALINA RAMO. De la Cruz. petitioner’s refusal of the offer. 2004 as stipulated in the October 29. On December 2. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. The parties were unable to submit a compromise agreement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Santos. 193516. that petitioner failed to clear the property of the ARGEM mortgage. On February 11. VILMA MACEDONIO vs. The complaintalleged that on October 29.700. Tecson. seeking an investigation into Ramo’s acquisition of the subject property. Ramirez. that Ramo assured petitioner that she would clear the property of liens and encumbrances before petitioner pays the balance of the price on January 3. SPOUSES JOEFFRY and ELIZA BALANAG. namely a) levy made in relation to a case before Branch 60 of the Baguio RTC and b) mortgage to ARGEM. Rodriguez. as petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to reset. Baguio City (the subject property). Valiente. and praying that the case be set for pretrial since all efforts to settle the issues between the parties failed. 2004. 2003. Sto.00 as earnest money. who was given until the end of this month of August. Reyes. Martinez. Castillo. petitioner filed a written Protestwith the office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR Cordillera Administrative Region.with damages. Corporal. No. 5703-R was already terminated — became final and executory on November 17.000. Rañigo. 2010. SPOUSES ROEL and OPHELIA PEDRO. 2006. Ramo opposed the motion. G. and claiming that Ramo’s sales patent was issued despite her having Albano. 2009 letter and offer. Tabugan. INC. March 24.00 sale price. 2006 in order to substantiate her Motion for Reconsideration. The September 4. Valois . a lending institution. 2003 deed of sale. Lumberio. petitioner filed a Motionpraying that the trial court issue an order directing theparties to comply with their oral agreement for Ramo to return petitioner’s money — or the P850. Lastimosa. Marquez. certifying that the October 23. that of the agreed P1. Sandoval. Corpuz. and the “dismissal of an action for failure to submit a compromise agreement. 2006 hearing did not push through. De Mesa. DOCTRINE: Dismissing the action without allowing the parties to present evidence and after ordering them to compromise is tantamount to deprivation of due process. In October 2009. Catindig. an Entry of Judgmentwas issued by the trial court. Rosario Valley.000.

Thus. Tecson. De Mesa. 7150-R with prejudice and held that held that petitioner filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action. petitioner filed another civil case against respondents for specific performance. Page 227 Echiverri. Sy. HELD: No. Besides. keeping in mind. For the same reasons. the trial court stood its ground. as the Court does. Alcazaren. Gloria. It is understandable why the trial court in Civil Case No. Reyes. 2010. although with different prayers for relief. In a July 29. their application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote substantial justice. Lastimosa. 5703-R and the pending DENR Protest. Asensi. as the Court has held countless times. Tabugan. Apparently. Lumberio. Marquez.the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition. she went on to subdivide and transfer or sell the property to other individuals. this injustice has been lost on the trial court. Ramirez. even as Ramo made a judicial admission of her liability to petitioner — that is. no action has been taken on the protest. the Court finds that the dismissal of Civil Case No. in favor of deciding the case on the basis of merit. committed multiple violations of the law. The circumstances require that substance must prevail over form. Coronel. ISSUE: WON Civil Case No. Valiente. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 2009 letter which she and her counsel signed — she refuses to pay petitioner what she owes. Santos. Civil Case No. this Court is inclined to forego petitioner’s failure to abide by the requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding certifications against forum shopping. 2010 Order. Indeed. Corporal. 7150-R. petitioner instituted this direct recourse. Espina. Albano. 2009 — and an extrajudicial admission thereafter — via her June 29. Sandoval. De la Cruz.” The Court took into consideration the evidence and Ramo’s admissions that while she refuses to honor her obligations under the sale or at least return petitioner’s money. 2013 Resolution. Civil Case No. 7150-R was unwarranted. annulment of documents and titles. Catindig. but in an August 16. 5703-R) and a pending Protest with the DENR. petitioner filed her comment and opposition. Petitioner moved to reconsider. seeing. in open court on June 22. Rodriguez. It is true that while it was incumbent for petitioner to have informed the trial court of Civil Case No. 7150-R is not barred. Public policy dictates that court cases should as much as possible be resolved on the merits and not on technicalities. Palad. with damages. Cabañgon. 5703-R was not decided on the merits and no trial was conducted. Inguillo. It appears that to this date. claiming that in filing the case. 7150-R On April 21. Corpuz. “the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility. that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. that a rigid interpretation of the 1997 Rules would result in substantial injustice to petitioner. Ramo filed her answer with motion to dismiss the case. Martinez. To this. Castillo. petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping since there had already been a prior terminated case (Civil Case No. arguing that since Civil Case No. Rañigo. Francisco. 5703-R should not have precipitately dismissed the case: petitioner sought a refund of her payments but evidently. Ramo was not willing to pay her. 5703-R bars the filing of the second case — or Civil Case No. which is absolutely unfair if not perverse. Valois .

Sandoval. Lumberio. Marquez. Francisco. Castillo. Coronel. Page 228 Echiverri. Palad. Valiente. Reyes. having decided the way it did by disregarding the basic facts and adhering to technicalities. Corpuz. Espina. Rañigo. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Asensi. De la Cruz. Gloria. Ramirez. Sy. Martinez. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Tecson. Catindig. Rodriguez. Albano. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Valois . Santos. Corporal.

R..500. Rañigo. On April 10. Suspecting fraud. Sy. on the other hand. PATIÑO. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC. Asensi. 196142. The notices revealed its initial findings — that the given address and telephone number of Alavera Optical were fictitious. 2014. 2006. VENUS B. INC. insisting that there was just cause to dismiss the petitioners for serious misconduct. DOLENDO. De la Cruz.500. Marquez. Page 229 Echiverri. Castillo. Prudential Plans Employees Union-FFW (PPEU-FFW). recognized exceptions to this rule such as when there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and that of the Court of Appeals FACTS: Individual petitioners were regular employees of respondent Prudentialife Plans. that the eyeglasses were grossly overpriced. Article X of the parties’ CBA.. There are. Sandoval. LEAH J. PRUDENTIALIFE PLANS. Petitioners and the other availing employees submitted their respective written explanations. CEFERINO A. INC. and ROSEMARIE DE LEMOS G. Prudentialife issued individual Notices of Termination to petitioners and other employees. that the official receipts and prescriptions issued by Alavera Optical appear to have been forged. EMPLOYEES UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (PPEU-FFW) vs. JR. Palad. March 26. ATTY. Gloria. money claims and damages against respondents. DOCTRINE: It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals (CA) via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Tabugan. Prudentialife began an investigation into the matter. De Mesa. ALBA. Espina. DAWN KAREN S. No. SY and PRUDENTIAL PLANS. Inguillo.500. Inc. but was denied. On May 5. and it sent individual written Notices to Explainto petitioners and other employees who availed of the benefit. DITAS M. Petitioners moved to reconsider. In a December 8. Lumberio. Francisco. Rodriguez. or that their eyeglasses were worth less than P2.00. Coronel. 2008 Decision. Corporal. Cabañgon. the instant Petition. Respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC. Santos. Martinez. Corpuz. Respondents went up to the CA via an original Petition for Certiorari. Prudentialife concluded that petitioners and other employees knowingly availed of the optical benefit allowance to obtain a refund of the maximum P2. Prudentialife employees were granted an optical benefit allowance of P2. is a local chapter of the Federation of Free Workers and is the authorized bargaining agent of Prudentialife’s rank-and-file employees. Catindig. 2006. EVANGELISTA. and that Prudentialife was being required to pay for the eyeglasses even though they have not been released as yet. Valiente. Thus.00 to subsidize prescription eyeglasses for those who have developed vision problems in the course of employment. The individual petitioners are members of PPEU-FFW. finding that there was a concerted and premeditated scheme to defraud Prudentialife.00 benefit even though they did not have vision problems. however. petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioners urge a judicious review of the case given the conflicting decisions of the labor tribunals and the appellate court. Valois . CASTILLO. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Tecson. Reyes. and it is unfair for the Albano. They add that it was improper for the CA to adjudge them guilty of wrongdoing based on the written admissions of their co-employees and not on evidence pointing to their wrongdoing. The Labor Arbiter held that there was ground to dismiss petitioners. Alcazaren. Under Section 4. the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. and/or JOSE ALBERTO T.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Asensi. Rodriguez. Catindig. Inguillo. Lastimosa. recognized exceptions to this rule such as when there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA. Sandoval. When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA. however. Tecson. Tabugan.” Albano. Valiente. Castillo. “It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Corpuz. Ramirez. CA to sweepingly rule that the acts of some employees were attributable to all who availed of the optical benefit allowance. HELD: Yes. De la Cruz. Rañigo. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently. Gloria. Espina. Palad. ISSUE: WON Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Francisco. In the exercise of its power of review. Lumberio. There are. it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Page 230 Echiverri. De Mesa. Marquez. Corporal. Cabañgon. Valois . there is a need to refer to the record. Reyes. Santos. Sy. Martinez. Coronel. Alcazaren.

He also invites the Court’s attention to the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the color of the bag. Santos. FACTS: In an Informationdated April 19. 2014 DOCTRINE: It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. ISSUE: WON the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are sufficient to diminish their credibility. Palad. Francisco. appellant interposed the present appeal. Appellant and Danglay pleaded not guilty to the charge upon their separate arraignment. Page 231 Echiverri. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Rañigo. accused-appellant. While PO3 Fines mentioned a red colored bag. the inconsistencies alluded to by the appellant refer merely to minor details and collateral matters that do not in any way affect the material points of the crime charged. Lastimosa. the CA gave credence to the police officers’ narration of the incident as prosecution witnesses. Aggrieved. plaintiff-appellee. MANUEL APLAT y SUBLINO and JACKSON DANGLAY y BOTIL. appellant and Danglay were charged with Violation of Section 5. 191727. Marquez. more or less. finds that the CA correctly agreed with the appellee that the perceived inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are insufficient to diminish their credibility. Castro. Article II of RA 9165. vs. their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Tabugan. accused. knowing fully well that said drug is a dangerous drug and that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so. March 31. De la Cruz. unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in a newspaper weighing 950 grams. Coronel.“[i]nconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration. in the City of Baguio. Inguillo. conspiring. SPO4 Sison and PO3 Sagmayao stated that Danglay was carrying a blue colored sando bag. Lumberio. G. and that of SPO4 Sison. who stated that it was Danglay who was carrying the bag.00 to PO3 PHILIP R. Appellant further challenges the legality of the buy-bust operation by adverting to the alleged inconsistency between the testimony of PO3 Fines.R. Espina. appellant and Danglay separately appealed to the CAwherein they questioned the chain of custody of the subject drugs and the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against them. Undeterred. for [P]1. HELD: No. Martinez. the above-named accused. RTC found appellant and Danglay guilty as charged. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. a bona fide member of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Baguio City Police Office. did then and there willfully. As held in People v. Tecson. who claims that he did not notice who was carrying the plastic bag containing the alleged dangerous drug or where it came from. Reyes. confederating and mutually aiding one another. De Mesa. Catindig. FINES. 2006. Cabañgon. Philippines. No. Sy. who acted as poseur-buyer. Gloria. That on or about the 12th day of April 2006. Corporal.The Court.500. Valiente.” “It is Albano. Indeed. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Corpuz. however. Valois . Like the RTC. Ramirez. MANUEL APLAT y SUBLINO. in violation of the aforementioned provision of law. Castillo. Asensi. Sandoval.

Rodriguez. Lumberio. Inguillo. Ramirez. Asensi.” Albano. perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. Palad. Marquez. Castillo. Tecson. Tabugan. Alcazaren. Sy. Corpuz. Page 232 Echiverri. De Mesa. Santos. Catindig. Rañigo. Martinez. Coronel. Francisco. Valiente. Corporal. Gloria. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Reyes. Espina. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Valois .

1999. Asensi. To the RTC. Barangay Bambad. the CA affirmed with modification theDecision of the RTC. appellant. ISSUE: WON the testimonies of Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. Tabugan. Espina.After pre-trial was terminated. Valiente. that on or about 11:30 o’clock in the evening of April 25. FACTS: On June 2. appellant now appeals to this Court asserting that the lower courts erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the defense he interposed. DOCTRINE: It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the witnesses. Having witnessed the shooting incident. Sandoval. 2000. Corporal. did then and there. Inguillo. Gloria. Catindig. De la Cruz. The RTC relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution particularly. However. Corpuz. Rañigo. Castillo. Municipality of Isulan. the said accused.On appeal.”The Court. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility. Page 233 Echiverri. which directly caused her death. Imelda. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Valois . SAN GASPAR. with intent to kill. Ramirez. like alibi. April 2.On the other hand. without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses. armed with a [. and especially when the findings of the Albano. Francisco. Moreover. Sy. De Mesa. ROY SAN GASPAR G. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 180496. Province of Sultan Kudarat. “in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo. both of them positively identified appellant as the person who shot their mother. Coronel. 2014.12] Gauge Homemade Shotgun. [unlawfully] and feloniously. Upon being arraigned on July 12. Lastimosa. thereby inflicting gunshot wound upon the latter. The RTC in its Decisionon January 29. is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses. Palad. Joramel and Cherme. Rodriguez. trial on the merits ensued. pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 2000. Martinez. 2003 convicted appellant of the crime of Parricide. their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. Philippines. Lumberio. finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. such positive identification. therefore. assault and shot IMELDA E. was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. Not satisfied.R. Alcazaren. Tecson. attack. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material details. Santos. Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who shot and killed Imelda. his legitimate wife. [willfully]. “It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect since trial courts have first-hand account on the witnesses’ manner of testifying and demeanor during trial. Reyes. HELD: No. appellant was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC in an Information. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the witnesses. Marquez. with the assistance of counsel. appellant only offered his bare denial of the offense. “[t]he Court had consistently stressed that denial.”Furthermore. at Purok Ma-oy. No. Cabañgon.

Francisco. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Castillo.” Albano. judge have been adopted and affirmed by the CA. Valiente. Coronel. Martinez. Palad. Alcazaren. Catindig. Corporal. Santos. Inguillo. Sandoval. Page 234 Echiverri. Cabañgon. the factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. Tecson. Gloria. Ramirez. Espina. Asensi. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Reyes. Valois . Corpuz. Lumberio. Sy. Marquez. Rañigo.

In this case. the appellate court found Relecita to have “positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. the above-named accused did then and there willfully. Corporal. The Court is not persuaded. Castillo. HELD: No. the failure of Relecita to warn the victim of the appellant’s impending attack should not be taken against her. appellant appealed before the Court of Appeals. Francisco. Lastimosa. without any justifiable cause. Sy.The trial court rendered itsJudgmentfinding appellant guilty as charged. No. with intent to kill. thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. 2014. FRANCISCO ABAIGAR. Province of Samar. Cabañgon. 199442. assault and use personal violence upon the person of JOSEPH GABUYA by shooting him with the use of a homemade shotgun locally known as “Bardog. Ramirez.R. Corpuz. appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. vs. Albano. Philippines. DOCTRINE: It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province and expertise of the trial court. Tecson.”Similarly. the appellate court affirmed in full the Judgment of the trial court. Appellant claims that Relecita could have forewarned the victim of his presence if indeed Relecita saw him in the vicinity. ISSUE: WON Relecita has ill motive to testify against appellant. Rañigo. During his arraignment. and that it was improbable that Relecita could see him considering the poor lighting condition of the place. the accusatory portion of which reads. Inguillo. It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province and expertise of the trial court.”Also. Neither should it be taken as a blemish to her credibility. Palad. at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening. De la Cruz. Reyes. In a Decision. plaintiff-appellee. Catindig. FACTS: An Informationwas filed charging appellant Francisco Abaigar with the crime of murder. Martinez. Santos. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.” which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose. unlawfully and feloniously. Asensi. Page 235 Echiverri. Espina. attack. Coronel. hitting the victim’s left side of the face and behind the head. accused-appellant. Sandoval. Aggrieved. The court below categorically found that Relecita had no ill motive to testify against appellant. she “has no reason to impute on him the heinous crime of murder had she not witnessed the actual killing of the victim. we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court. that on or about the 11th day of July 2001. and by means of treachery and evident premeditation. Rodriguez. Gloria. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Hence. Marquez. Appellant basically argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in lending credence to the testimony of eyewitness Relecita. at Barangay Rosalim. April 7. Municipality of San Jorge. Valois . De Mesa. Lumberio. Alcazaren. G. Valiente. Tabugan. this appeal.

De Mesa. Valois . 2007 Order andexplaining that no motion for reconsideration was filed since they never received a copy of the RTC’s January 5. 2007. filed with the RTC of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Quieting of Title. declared that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. GAMALIER. ACOSTA. Inguillo.On January 5. Corpuz. the CA issued a Resolutiondismissing the Petition for being insufficient in form and substance. 2007 Order. BIHAG. VERONICA B. Petitioners alleged that sometime in the 1960’s. the RTC issued an Orderdenying the Notice of Appeal. Damages. 181949. BIHAG JR. Asensi. Francisco. DANILO B.They confronted respondents to return the documents but to no avail. within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). it is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding. ISSUE: Albano. namely: ALEJANDRA BIHAG. Corporal. Catindig. respondent Primitiva approached her brother. vs. Francisco. petitioners found out that the mortgage had long been cancelled. and Writ of Injunction and TRO against respondents spouses Bathan and their daughter. BIHAG. denying their Notice of Appeal. petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsiderationattaching a copy of the RTC’s August 24. Lumberio. Ramirez. 2007. Rodriguez. which were submitted to the bank in support of the loan application. Page 236 Echiverri. MIÑOZA. to the Rural Bank of Mandaue City so that she could get a loan. April 23. Palad..which petitioners did not oppose. 1976. Santos. BIHAG.petitioners. she instead asked him to mortgage his unregistered land in Casili. NICOMEDES B. Valiente. Aggrieved. The petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunctionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 2006. DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court. respondents.She promised that she would pay the obligation to the bank and that she would return to him the documents. Tabugan. The RTC issued an Ordergranting the Motion and issued a Writ of Execution. TIMOTEO B. Alcazaren. Castillo.R. namely: PRIMITIVA B. JOSEPHINE B. in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. Also. Unfazed. Martinez. Gloria. SUSANA B. BIHAG. Rañigo. G. Reyes. Sy. respondents filed a Motion for the Issuanceof a Writ of Execution. Cabañgon. No. Tecson. HEIRS OF FRANCISCO BIHAG. MIÑOZA. Mandaue City. Marquez. When Francisco died on December 13.But since he did not have money at that time. HEIRS OF NICASIO BATHAN. Thereafter. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. Sandoval. Duminina Bathan Gamalier. The RTC issued a Decisionin favor of respondents.Francisco agreed on the condition that respondent Primitiva would pay the real property tax of the subject land while it was mortgaged. FACTS: On April 23. BATHAN and DUMININA B. EDILBERTO B. ARDITA. Coronel. FE B. Lastimosa. 1992. On October 26. PAULINO B. petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2. Espina. petitioners heirs of Francisco Bihag (Francisco). to borrow money. and MA. 2014. De la Cruz.Petitioners later discovered that respondents took possession of the land and were hauling materials and limestones from it to the prejudice of petitioners.

Martinez. In Neypes. received a copy of the assailed January 5. As such. they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10. the decision or order may no longer be amended or modified. Rodriguez. Marquez. Francisco. no even by an appellate court. the RTC’s January 5. Santos.” Albano. within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC. Espina. It is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding. Corpuz. Rañigo. 2007. or on or before February 6. we are nevertheless constrained to deny the instant Petition as the January 5. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. At this time. De la Cruz. Coronel. declared that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 2007 Order.In this case. Page 237 Echiverri. denying petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was timely filed as they had a fresh 15-day period from the time they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration within which to file their Notice of Appeal. through their counsel. WON the Notice of Appeal by the petitioners was erroneously denied by the RTC. when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made.Once it becomes final and executory. 2007 Order denying the Notice to Appeal had long become final and executory. Sandoval. Lumberio. Palad. De Mesa. Gloria. But while we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was erroneously denied by the RTC.In light of the foregoing jurisprudence. under Registry Receipt No. Petitioners’ mere denial of the receipt of the assailed Order cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster as we have consistently declared that “[t]he best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster. Valiente. the Supreme Court. Instead. who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how. on January 22. in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. Tabugan. Inguillo. Castillo. 2007. HELD: Yes. 2007 Order. has attained finality. Valois . as evidenced by the Certification of the assistant postmaster. Reyes. Asensi. petitioners. E-0280. Alcazaren. 2007. Ramirez. but they did not. Catindig. petitioners should have filed their motion for reconsideration within 15 days. Tecson. Sy. Corporal.

Hence. Inguillo. the victim was last seen in the presence of the appellant. No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ramirez. Coronel. Catindig. Asensi. threat and intimidation. Municipality of Pilar. Marquez. De Mesa. Edwin Jr. and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. committed the crime. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance. Rodriguez. Page 238 Echiverri. In its Decision. this appeal. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. Santos. Sy. Province of Sorsogon. Sandoval. Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City rendered its Decisionfinding appellant guilty as charged based on circumstantial evidence. Valois . Corpuz. and after the sexual assault said accused strangled “AAA. Castillo. with lewd design. to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs. to have seen him chasing “AAA” from a distance of 50 to 60 meters or even identify him as the perpetrator of the crime. did then and there. saw appellant chasing the victim. (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. When arraigned on June 6. (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. Tabugan. Nestor also saw appellant dragging the motionless body of “AAA. it is beyond doubt that all the circumstances taken together point to the singular conclusion that appellant. Tecson. and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Gloria. at Sitio Okdo.Appellant claims that the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. plaintiff-appellee. 2007. Francisco. JR. The crime is aggravated by the minority of the victim being twelve years old (12) at the time of the incident. the appellate court affirmed in full the trial court’s Decision. Palad. Lastimosa. Philippines. that on or about the 22nd day of April. Reyes. HELD: No. G.”In this case. to the exclusion of all others.” resulting in the immediate death of said victim. Martinez. y GECITA. appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Espina. Corporal. “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance.R. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. the above-named accused. by means of force. 2014. FACTS: Appellant Wilfredo Solano. Jr. accused-appellant. June 2. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. wilfully. De la Cruz.”a 12-year old girl. WILFREDO SOLANO. and by employing personal violence upon “AAA. Rañigo. Valiente. vs. Lumberio. 199871.” The body of the victim was eventually found buried in the mud near the place where she was last Albano. y Gecita was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an Information that reads as follows. 2007 at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning. He insists that it was highly improbable for prosecution witness Edwin Jr. Barangay Palanas. unlawfully and feloniously. Appellant also assails the testimony of Nestor that he saw appellant dragging the victim’s body towards the swamp considering the lack of explanation why he was in the vicinity or how he reached the place. ISSUE: WON the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient. have sexual intercourse with her against her will and without her consent.

Appellant admitted holding a grudge against the family of “AAA” because he believes that a relative of “AAA” had raped his [appellant’s] sister. Cabañgon. Valois . Sandoval. Palad. Lumberio. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Asensi. Coronel. The autopsy report showed that “AAA” was raped and strangled.. Gloria. Valiente. Martinez. Sy. Tabugan. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Corporal. Tecson. De la Cruz. Likewise. Edwin Sr. Castillo. Albano. Rañigo. Espina. and Nestor whom he even considered as friends. Santos. Marquez. appellant could not ascribe any ill motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Edwin Jr. Reyes. De Mesa. seen with the appellant. Page 239 Echiverri. Catindig. Lastimosa. Francisco. Ramirez.

Valiente. it nonetheless appears that the Petition has been overtaken by events. 2004. Jacinto and F. Lumberio. Palad. there are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment. Jacinto Group. JACINTO (formerly President of F. and against petitioner Joselito Ma. Entry of judgment was issued by the NLRC on November 23. Castillo. hence.”And “when a judgment has been satisfied.. However. among others. 2005. JR. P. it passes beyond review. a Writ of Executionwas issued in the labor case. Asensi. Corporal. 2011 Manifestation. the labor case is now deemed ended. De Mesa. P. Francisco. a Decisionwas rendered in favor of respondent Eduardo Gumaru. Albano. he may execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf. Petitioner went up to the CA on certiorari but was denied. and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge. Jr. ISSUE: WON the petitioner may execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf. Inc. Jacinto Group. Cabañgon. Gloria. It is true. 2004 Decision became final and executory. the appeal was not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or surety bond. in which case. 191906. and that the execution process covered by the Second Alias Writ of Execution be invalidated but was denied. JOSELITO MA. Petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy on Executionpraying. it passes beyond review. Alcazaren.” With the above development in the case. HELD: Yes. Espina.Thus. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Tecson. the case is deemed terminated once and for all. while the Court takes the petitioner’s side with regard to the procedural issue dealing with verification and the certification against forum shopping.On February 6. Valois . Ramirez. as petitioner asserts. filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition. In a May 24. this was the finding of the NLRC in its Resolution dated September 30. 2005. vs. Santos. G. Jacinto Group. the instant Petition is rendered moot and academic. June 2. respondent. DOCTRINE: When a judgment has been satisfied. 2006. However. Catindig.”and “there are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment. “Indeed. “It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied. No. Reyes. a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Corpuz. that the scheduled June 27. The petitioner does not dispute this claim.respondent informed this Court that the judgment award has been satisfied in full.). EDGARDOGUMARU. A Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued and returned when the first one expired. satisfaction being the last act and the end of the proceedings. Martinez. Inguillo. 2008 auction sale be restrained. The satisfaction of the judgment in full has placed the case beyond the Court’s review. petitioner. Marquez.R.” FACTS: On December 6. Petitioner and F. the December 6. Inc. 2014. Inc. Rañigo. Sy. Coronel. Tabugan. Page 240 Echiverri.

respondent. G. At that point. Palad. Fahad Abdulaziz Mohammed Al-Mijary (Fahad) for a basic monthly salary of US$200. June 2. DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter.00. Nahas filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich was denied. Ramirez. Corpuz. at the outset. Upon arriving in Fahad’s home. unless patently erroneous. Olarte finally saw an opportunity to escape from the abusive hands of her employer. Gloria. the recourse to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. Olarte served Fahad’s family diligently. Alcazaren. The NLRC. However.she was to serve her employer. De la Cruz. Lumberio. Olarte filed a Complaintfor illegal dismissal. Fajad’s information sheet. ISSUE: WON the issue of Nahas’ act for and in behalf of PETRA and/or Royal Dream in deploying Olarte abroad is a question of fact. Inguillo. Sandoval. Olarte was surprised that there were four children with one suffering from serious disability. Lastimosa. Nahas now comes to this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. It must be stressed. 2014. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. HELD: Yes. Tabugan. vs. however. Asensi. Because of her condition. Martinez. Marquez. JUANITA L. Corporal. She was later diagnosed to be suffering from ostro-arthritis. Reyes. her salaries were not paid. But her pleas fell on deaf ears. Valiente. Olarte requested Fahad to just allow her go home to the Philippines. OLARTE. and also rejected their claim against liability after giving weight to the fact that Nahas admitted to have interviewed Olarte but failed to substantiate the claim that the latter withdrew her application. attorney’s fees and refund of placement fees against her foreign employer Fahad and Nahas/PETRA/Royal Dream. Saudi Arabia for a contract term of two years. petitioner. Nahas appealed to the NLRC. Sy. that the resolution of the issue of whether Nahas acted for and in behalf of PETRA and/or Royal Dream in deploying Olarte abroad is a question of fact. Cabañgon. “Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. In the succeeding months. Page 241 Echiverri. De Mesa. when affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). are binding on the Supreme Court (SC). NAHAS.R. Hence. Coronel. was not persuaded and affirmed the decision of the LA. Francisco. which was also denied. Santos. Rañigo. Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on Albano. damages. Valois . 2005. This notwithstanding. doing business under the name and style — PERSONNEL EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNICAL RECRUITMENT AGENCY. The Labor Arbiter ruled that PETRA/Royal Dream/Nahas failed to discharge the burden of proving that Olarte’s termination and repatriation were for just cause. Rodriguez. Several months later. Fahad was already frequently maltreating her since she could no longer accomplish all the household chores due to her illness. CONSOLACION M. Catindig. Espina. provides that there are two adults and three children living in his household and that no disabled or sick person is to be put under Olarte’s care. FACTS: Olarte was deployed as a domestic helper to Hail. MA. 169247.The Motion for Reconsiderationthereto having been denied in the CA Resolutiondated July 8. No. Castillo. Olarte started feeling intense pain in her legs. Tecson. on the other hand. Per her employment contract.

Sy. unless patently erroneous. acting for and in behalf of PETRA and Royal Dream. are binding on the Supreme Court. The Court is. Valiente. the NLRC. Martinez. Page 242 Echiverri. Marquez. Rodriguez. particularly in this case where there is no showing that it was arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. Tecson. Lumberio. Santos. when affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. Gloria. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Rañigo. Castillo. interviewed Olarte. caused her to sign an employment contract. Coronel. De la Cruz. Alcazaren.”In this case. Ramirez. Espina. Sandoval. Reyes. Albano. Corporal. certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Corpuz. the Labor Arbiter. Tabugan. Valois . Lastimosa. not dutybound to inquire into the accuracy of this factual finding. De Mesa. Francisco.”Also “settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Asensi. and facilitated and made possible her deployment abroad. therefore. Catindig. and the CA are one in their factual conclusion that Nahas. Palad.

Corpuz.k. Gloria. Alcazaren. confederating and mutually helping one another. Truly. JOSE ESPINELI a. The trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder. “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt. Inguillo. circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than one circumstance. Tabugan. entered a plea of not guilty. Petitioner was arrested and when arraigned with the assistance of counsel. Valois .” FACTS: On June 24. Valiente. and is now undergoing trial before Branch 90. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. all circumstances emanating from or included in the sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and probative value.”The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely Albano. Martinez. Santos. Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength. an Informationcharging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Lumberio. Philippines. Pursuant. Reyes. of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. the abovenamed accused. 1997. Petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysayof Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. attack. did then and there. Page 243 Echiverri. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich the CA denied in its Resolutiondated September 14. He avers that the said sworn statement should not have been given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. Tecson. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Palad. Rodriguez. 2007. then armed with firearms. Rañigo. said Sotero Paredes having been earlier charged with the same offense. Francisco. Province of Cavite. Corporal. ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven. June 9.a. Asensi. ISSUE: WON the circumstantial evidence failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. however. De la Cruz. and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. that on or about the 15th day of December. Ramirez. to the Court’s pronouncement in People v. thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds on his head and different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death. Hence. DOCTRINE: Under Section 4. Sy. with intent to kill.R. unlawfully and feloniously. De Mesa.the case was ordered transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition through a Resolutiondated March 22. Sandoval. Dissatisfied. Coronel. The CA affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. Castillo. whose real names. 2014. to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie. Cabañgon. willfully. No. 179535. HELD: No. conspiring. Thus.the accusatory portion of which reads as follows. identities and whereabouts are still unknown. this Petition. together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and three (3) other unidentified persons. Marquez. Espina. 2006. assault and shoot one Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms. 1996 in the Municipality of Imus. Catindig. Lastimosa. DANILO ESPINELI vs. Mateo.

Lastimosa. Santos. Coronel.In this case. Sy. Gloria. to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person. Ramirez.”All the circumstances must be consistent with one another. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence “which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Tecson. is the guilty person. Page 244 Echiverri. Palad. Castillo. Catindig. ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven. Reyes. Marquez. Sandoval. Corporal. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Valois . Valiente. Inguillo. Francisco. Espina. Thus. Tabugan. De Mesa. Albano. to the exclusion of all others. Cabañgon. Asensi. Alcazaren. Corpuz. the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner. Lumberio. consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Rodriguez. on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Martinez.”Under Section 4. and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than one circumstance.

Inguillo. however. Virgilio Gracela.00 for legal research fund. an educational institution in Bulan. the CA further required petitioners to remit within ten days from notice the amount of ₱30. the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. They asserted that they did not heed SLI’s demand to vacate as they believed that they have the right to stay on the said property. petitioners failed to comply with the CA’s directive. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE. De la Cruz. In view of this. Tabugan. with a view to substantial justice. Lumberio. filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against petitioners Alonzo Gipa. They relied on their occupation thereof and that of their predecessors-in-interest which. considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and prudently. Reyes. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appealwhich was granted by the RTC. Subsequently. Marquez. Juanito Ludovice. A party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. Rosemarie Alvarez and Rosita Montalban. Sandoval. which apparently was not included in the ₱3. Ramirez. Demar Bitangcor. Valois . Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. dates back to as early as 1950. Rodriguez. Tecson. Cabañgon. represented by RUBEN ASUNCION G. the said court dismissed the appeal. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. according to them. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection. Valiente.177425 June 18. never capriciously. Arturo Rogacion. Page 245 Echiverri. Gloria. Hence. Coronel. Francisco. Espina. and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court. Finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the property. Corporal. Santos. FACTS: Southern Luzon Institute (SLI). Corpuz. dismissed the appeal since it was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid.Petitioners promptly filed a Motion for Reconsiderationto which they attached a Certificationfrom the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of ₱3. Imelda Marollano. Asensi. GIPA vs. In both original and appellate cases. Alcazaren. the RTC rendered a decision in its favor.R. Virgilio Gojit. SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a parcel of land occupied by the petitioners and refused to vacate the same despite demand. Martinez. De Mesa. No. 2014 DOCTRINE:A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees does not apply where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees. Lastimosa. Castillo. Despite the lapse of nine months from their counsel’s receipt of the said resolution. Palad. The CA contends that: Albano. the CA granted the said motion and consequently reinstated the appeal. Sy.00 appeal fee previously paid by them.000. The CA. Felipe Montalban and four others namely. Catindig. however. Rañigo.000. Sorsogon.

Martinez. the Court’s explanation anent the requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful fees under the above-quoted provision was iterated. Corpuz. Lumberio. De la Cruz.00 payable to the Clerk of Court of the CA. the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners for failure to remit the amount needed HELD: No. Francisco. The CA properly dismissed the case. Reyes. Santos. Tabugan. Espina. Rañigo. Castillo. on its own motion or on that of the appellee.Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Marquez. they attached to the said motion a postal money order in the sum of ₱30. Relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case. De Mesa. as provided for under Section 1(c)[. 4. Asensi.R. Gloria. Sandoval. As compliance. Valois . on the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx c. 2011). Section 4.] Rule 50 of the same Rule. Page 246 Echiverri.Grounds for dismissal of appeal. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. Corporal. We quote: SECTION 1.00. No. In Gonzales v. Rodriguez.000. Alcazaren.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount of ₱30. Inguillo. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. x x x Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration invoking the principle of liberality in the application of technical rules considering that they have paid the substantial amount of ₱3. Coronel. Pe (G. Tecson. 167398. Catindig. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals. August 8. Ramirez. viz: Albano. – Within the period for taking an appeal. Sy. Jurisprudence is replete that the nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal. the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. Cabañgon. Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and jurisdictional. Lastimosa. Palad. Valiente.

Reyes. It may be recalled that while petitioners paid a substantial part of the docket fees. Santos. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right. Ramirez. Gloria. Magdaluyo. Martinez. Alcazaren. The Court is not persuaded. Corpuz. Here. considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and prudently. Asensi. De Mesa. the CA could have dismissed the appeal outright. Nevertheless. as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling. The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA at the outset. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. Cabañgon. even if it was already beyond the reglementary period. under Section 1 (c). Sandoval. Palad. a case cited by petitioners. the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Francisco. on its own motion or on that of the appellee. on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. Lastimosa. Espina. Valiente. Based on the premise that the questioned Decision of the RTC has already become final and executory due to non-perfection. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. but a mere statutory privilege. to complete their payment of the appeal fee within 10 days from notice. Without such payment. that "[a] party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. Catindig. the appeal is not perfected. Rule 50.00 was lacking and considering that the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the docket fees are paid. Page 247 Echiverri. In Far Corporation v. petitioners concede that payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but a jurisdictional requirement. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. it still required petitioners. the Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory. Lumberio. And within this period. De la Cruz. the CA acted conformably with the pronouncement made in Camposagrado. Rañigo. they still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short of ₱30. Castillo. Rodriguez. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. an appeal may be dismissed by the CA. the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. Further.00. as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection. But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of ₱30. Valois . Sy. with a view to substantial justice. Coronel. never capriciously. Corporal. they want this Court to relax the application of the rule on the payment of the appeal fee in the name of substantial justice and equity. Clearly. Tabugan. Inguillo. In both original and appellate cases. Marquez. Tecson." Albano.

help but conclude that there is really no plausible reason behind the said omission. The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there. Lastimosa. the pronouncement made in Sun Insurance Office. at the start. Castillo. a departure from the rule on the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted. In fact. Rañigo. have not attempted to tender one in this Petition and instead continue to capitalize on substantial justice. v. Reyes. therefore. Rodriguez. Albano. Surprisingly. The Court cannot. Corpuz. fair play and equity to secure a reversal of the dismissal of their appeal. Sy.00 when required by the CA and only did so after the lapse of more than nine months when their appeal was already dismissed. as cited in Gutierrez.00-deficiency. failed to pay the correct docket fees or why they failed to comply with the CA’s directive for them to remit the ₱30. Martinez. De la Cruz.. Ltd. Sandoval. Nevertheless. Unlike in this case. Inguillo. up to now. Coronel." As may be recalled. petitioners in this case did not immediately remit the deficient amount of ₱30.00. Gloria. Alcazaren. and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court. apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would be on its way. Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. i. Valois . Neither do the cases cited by petitioners help because they are not in point.00 deficiency but just dismissed the appeal outright. a justifiable reason for the insufficient payment was tendered by petitioners in the said case. Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. The same thing goes true with Gutierrez. the CA in Camposagrado no longer required the petitioners therein to complete the payment of the appeal fee by remitting the ₱5. What is worse is that even if the CA already took note of the lack of such explanation in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Tabugan. Asuncion. it was constrained to finally dismiss the appeal for non-perfection. Espina. But as no payment was remitted. Lumberio." Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. they did not offer any plausible explanation either as to why they. Hence.e. It was reiterated therein that the rule that "a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees does not apply where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees. Asensi. Ramirez. Moreover. Francisco. Palad. arguing that the meager amount of the deficiency involved justifies relaxation of the rules. they focused on begging the CA for leniency. Corporal. petitioners. Valiente. De Mesa. Santos. petitioners were again heard of when they filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a postal money order of ₱30. Cabañgon. even militates against petitioners. Instead. that they relied on the assessment made by the collection officer of the court and honestly believed that the amount collected from them was that which is mandated by the Rules. Catindig. Marquez.00 deficiency. Although they were given only 10 days to remit the ₱30. Page 248 Echiverri. the said court allowed an even longer period of nine months to lapse. Tecson.

Meanwhile. Meanwhile. Lastimosa. Tiburcia and Fermina. together with Cristina M. NOVIDA G. Tecson. Modesto A. Cabañgon. liquidation and damages with injunctive relief against petitioners before the Regional Office of the DARAB Urdaneta. This Court is not a trier off acts. the DAR Secretary issued another order stating that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case. Esteban. Belarmino and Marcelo O. and that there is another case between the parties – for cancellation of anomalously prepared/generated Emancipation Patents – pending in the Office of the DAR Secretary. The Office of the DAR Region I ruled in favor of the petitioners. the DAR Secretary issued an order affirming the order of the DAR Region I Director in the petition for reinvestigation and cancellation of EPs filed by petitioners against the respondents. Gloria. Sy. Jr. Benjamin G. Castillo. Mamerto B. Orlanda. a petition for review under Rule 45 covers questions of law only.. Belarmino. Asensi. and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. on respondents’ motion for reconsideration. Warlito B. Libed. Novida. Reyes.177374 July 2. Rodrigo Libed. Victoria. Corporal. it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. No. Valiente. Rodriguez. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. accounting. Martinez. that they were issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to the same. JOSE vs. Petitioners Mariano. Delfin. Corpuz. which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as the subject property was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession. Petitioners went up to Albano. Alcazaren. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently. that they are actually in possession of the same. The appeal was premised on the arguments that the DARAB Urdaneta erred in taking cognizance of the case. were each granted – as farmer-beneficiaries – Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Certificates of Title(covering one hectare each) over a parcel of land in Pangasinan which was placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Rodolfo Palaylay. Rañigo.but the DARAB Quezon City denied the same. Leonardo L. as well as Josefina and Anecita – all surnamed Jose – filed with the Office of Department of Agrarian Reform a Petition for Reinvestigation and Cancellation of Anomalously Prepared and Generated Emancipation Patents against the respondents." FACTS: Respondents Ernesto M. De la Cruz. 2014 DOCTRINE: A review under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Bernardo B. Valois . Santos. In the exercise of its power of review. Marquez. Belarmino. Moreover. they appealed to DARAB Quezon City. Inguillo. DARAB Quezon City affirmed the DARAB Urdaneta decision. Alex M. Pangasinan.R. Palad. Acosta. Mejia. De Mesa. The DARAB held in favor of the respondents. However. Camilo. Ramirez. Sandoval. Coronel. Lumberio. claiming that they are the bona fide and actual tenant-tillers of the subject property. and that the EPs issued to respondents were anomalous. Page 249 Echiverri. Francisco. Tabugan. Catindig. Espina. failing to obtain a reconsideration of the DARAB Urdaneta’s decision.

respondents were illegally dispossessed of their landholdings through force and intimidation by the petitioners after Felicisimo returned from abroad. Valiente. Santos. “The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. are afforded great weight by the courts. Corpuz. Respondents point out that a review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is discretionary and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. Asensi.as well as the very admissions of the petitioners themselves . and became a naturalized American citizen. Catindig. Espina. It must be said as well that "factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise. Gloria.A. Moreover. Lumberio. Tecson. Palad. who took over the land and tilled the same until 1987. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently. In the exercise of its power of review. This Court is not a trier off acts. and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented. Lastimosa. Tabugan. ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail a decision of a quasi-judicial body HELD: No. De la Cruz. Inguillo." This Court finds that no special and important reasons exist to warrant a thorough review of the assailed CA Decision. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. the Court is satisfied with and can simply rely on the findings of the DARAB Urdaneta. Rañigo. Alcazaren. the CA via Petition for Reviewinsisting that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. a review of the instant petition under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.S. Martinez." Albano. that Felicisimo migrated to the U. but even finality. should not be disturbed. that in 1991. Reyes. and that as between petitioners and respondents. and the CA . Castillo. that such special and important circumstances that should warrant review do not obtain in petitioners’ case. The CA affirmed the DARAB decision.to the effect that respondents fulfilled all the requirements under the agrarian laws in order to become entitled to their EPs. Coronel. Page 250 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Sandoval. they are conclusive. the latter are legally entitled to the subject property. Quite the contrary. Corporal. Ramirez. DARAB Quezon City. Valois . De Mesa. These identical findings are not only entitled to great respect. that F elicisimo voluntarily surrendered and abandoned the subject property in favor of his creditors. Marquez. Sy. and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure. Francisco. a petition for review under Rule 45 covers questions of law only. For petitioners to question these identical findings is to raise a question of fact. As correctly pointed out by the respondents. Cabañgon. it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.

Cipriano Rey R. Asensi. Reyes. Tecson. Carandang. antennas. Corpuz. Respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration on October 18. The Manila RTC issued two search warrantsdirected at the officeof EMS.Respondents posted bail the following day. Francisco. Likened to a jumper. Valiente.assailing the validity of the Search Warrants on the ground that the searches conducted were not in accordance with the established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines. Espina. PLDT vs. FACTS: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Inguillo. the RTC denied the application for subpoena duces tecum. After confirming that some PLDT subscribers wereindeed operating ISR businesses in Makati City. De la Cruz. Ocampo. cables. ISR is a method of routing and completing an international long distance call using lines. Castillo. Respondets filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Suppress or Exclude or Return Inadmissible Evidence Unlawfully Obtained. Corporal. Coronel. and Jose R. documents. Respondents applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against certain persons allegedly in possession of documents relating to PAMTEL. No. through its Quality Control Investigation Division (QCID). 2002. Palad. the unauthorized routing of international long distance calls by-passes petitioner’s International Gateway Facilities (IGF) with the use of ISR access numbers. Martinez. Sy. the Manila RTC. NBI agents conducted simultaneous raids during which electronic gadgets. Lastimosa. Catindig. The CA rendered a Decisiondismissing the Petition. a foreign telecommunicationscompany with tie-ups to INFILNET and EMS. Lumberio. Cabañgon. depriving petitioner of substantial revenues. Page 251 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Sandoval. Makati RTC denied the Motion ruling that it is the issuing court. 2002. making international long distance calls appear as local calls. 2014 DOCTRINE: The 60-day limitation (Rule 65) may be relaxed only for the most persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases. which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality. Rañigo. and some personal belongings of the employees of INFILNET and EMS were seized. and/or airwave or frequency that directly connect to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country of destination of the call. conducted an investigation on the alleged illegal International Simple Resale (ISR) activities in Makati City. which has the jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Search Warrants. Eric F. Valois .R. Hipolito. An Information for the crime of simple theft was filed before the RTC of Makati City against respondents Millard R. Merjilla. OCAMPO G.prompting them to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari.assorted office supplies.On the same day. several pieces of computer equipment. both located in Makati City. petitioner requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apprehend the said subscribers. Alcazaren. in this case. under the business names INFILNET and Emergency Monitoring System(EMS). Santos. and thereby. Respondents sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated October 10. De Mesa. Gloria. Marquez. 163999 July 9. Ramirez.Finding the documents irrelevant and immaterial to the resolution of the case. Tabugan. Respondents moved for reconsideration but the same was unavailing. Albano.

respondents’ replywas unresponsive. They have not offered any plausible justification for their non-compliance.Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment. Ramirez. more than60-days had lapsed from the time respondents were notified of the denialof their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11. When petitioner brought up the issue. respondents kept silent about it in their Petition for Certiorari. on the other hand. was filed prior to the filing of the Petition for Certiorari. Francisco. Corporal. Valois . Corpuz. Rañigo. ISSUE: Whether or not the 60-day period required for filing of a special civil action should be complied with HELD: Yes. or resolution. De Mesa. Inguillo. Sandoval. they did not even confirm or deny the alleged lapse of the 60-day period. denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress. the 60-day limitation may be relaxed "for the most persuasive of reasons. Coronel. Valiente. Infact." which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality. Martinez. 2002 is not fatal as the rule is subject to exceptions.As to the alleged non-compliance with the 60-day period. Castillo. respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration on October 18. show that it was only on January 20. But like all rules. order. which denied their application for subpoenaduces tecum. Lumberio. 2002. respondents no longer filed a motion for reconsideration as they already moved inopen court for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress butthe RTC flatly denied the same.” In this case. there was no intention on the part of respondents to delay the resolution of the Motion. 2002. 2002 within which to file a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Page 252 Echiverri.In this case. Tabugan. order. Albano. or from the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment. De la Cruz. Gloria. which it considers to be meritorious. Cabañgon. Records. Sy. Tecson. 2002. Reyes. insist that their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 29. Asensi.Second. Catindig. or resolution being assailed.The CA rendered a Decisionfinding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the assailed Orders. strict compliance of this rule is mandatory and imperative. Santos.Accordingly. Marquez. Palad. Espina. Thus. Respondents. respondents failed to observe procedural rules. however.In reversing the denial of the Motion toSuppress. Alcazaren. Instead of admitting that more than 60 days had lapsed. Section 4. Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorariassailing the Orders of the RTC Makati. First. 2003 that respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari. Rodriguez. they had until December 17. however. The Petition for Certiorari should have been filed within 60 days from notice of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order. Lastimosa. The 60-day period. positing that in filing the Petition for Certiorari. which would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay. respondents brush aside the issue arguing that technical rules cannot prevent the CA fromgiving due course to a Petition for Certiorari. no motion for reconsideration of the RTC Makati order dated November 29. the CA explained thatcontrary to the findings of the RTC. In fact. Petitioner assails the propriety of the CA’s reversal of the Orders of the RTC.

however. Rodriguez. Valois . Gloria. Sandoval. modified. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Thus. Leniency is given only to those deserving of it. Marquez. Rañigo. the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in reversing the Order dated November 29. which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality. respondents are not entitled to any because they intentionally omitted to indicate in their Petition for Certiorarithe date they were notified of the Order dated October 10.This respondents failed todo. Albano. Coronel. Such allegation. they alleged that their counselverbally moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress. Page 253 Echiverri. Sy. Corpuz. Asensi. we must emphasize thatwhile litigation isnot a game of technicalities. Castillo. Inguillo.is not supported by the evidence as the Order dated November 29.In closing. or reversed. who had every right to believe that the order had attained finality and may no longer be altered. as aptly pointed out by petitioner. none of which is present in this case.Besides. Besides. he appeared only after the hearings were over. 2002.Such is not the situation in this case. this does not mean that procedural rules may be ignored at will or that their non-observance may be dismissed simply because it may prejudice a party’s substantial rights. Lumberio. In this case.In the absence of a motion for reconsideration. Francisco. Santos. in the absence of a motion for reconsideration. their adamant refusal to admit the obvious truth as well as their deliberate attempt to hide this procedural lapse cannot be ignored. except only for the most compelling or persuasive reasons. the Petition for Certiorari should have been dismissed. Martinez. Lastimosa. which could only be done by filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order. Valiente. Cabañgon. Palad. procedural rules must be followed to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. 2002 made no mention of such fact. which the RTC flatly denied in open court. relaxing the rule would not only be unfair and unjust but would also be prejudicial to petitioner. Espina. the lower court should first be informed of its supposed error and be allowed to correct or rectify the same through a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Catindig. Ramirez. as stated in the Order. As an excuse. Tecson. De Mesa. 2002 prior to filing the Petition for Certiorari. 2002 in order to mislead the CA.Again. As we have said. Corporal.Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari. Reyes.Mere invocations of substantial justice and liberality are not enough for the court tosuspend procedural rules.It is also unlikely for respondents’ counsel to have moved for a reconsideration of the said Order considering that. Tabugan. the 60-day limitation may be relaxed only for the most persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases.Respondents admit that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 29.Although this rule is subject to certain exceptions.

with the intention to sell. Asensi. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich the RTC denied. HON. Observing that the motion was anchored on petitioners’ alleged illegal arrest. it held that any objection to an arrest must be made before an accused enters his plea on arraignment. Valois . 8293. Coronel. a party seeking the writ whether for certiorari. Francisco. Lastimosa. 173861 July 14. Gloria. nor any plain. prohibition or mandamus. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. No. Corporal. it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. Palad. Ramirez. De la Cruz. CANDELARIA and BASIT vs. They contended that the evidence the prosecution intended to present were obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus they filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtto nullify and set aside two Orders of the RTC. De Mesa. Castillo. Page 254 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Having failed to move for the quashal of the information before the arraignment. Espina. It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65. FIDER-REYES G.R. Moreover. Sandoval. The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. They were charged with violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. Reyes. Lumberio. Inguillo. must be able to show that his or her resort to such extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain. 2014 DOCTRINE: A Petition for Certiorari is dismissible for failure to allege that there is no appeal. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as to justify resort to certiorari. This is considering that at the time the alleged counterfeit productswere seized. an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Tabugan. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Catindig. Marquez. Martinez. Valiente. Rañigo. “[H]e must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate x x x.petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on inadmissibility of evidence. RTC issued an order denying the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence. Corpuz. MARIA AMIFAITH S. Santos.” As held in Visca v. otherwise known as the IntellectualProperty Code of the Philippines. FACTS: During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit werefor delivering. they were neither committing nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure following their unlawful arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in the given case HELD: No. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources: Albano. five cases of counterfeit FundadorBrandy. Tecson. Sy.

or that excuse petitioner for not having availed himself of such remedy. Francisco. settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. nor any plain. In Triplex Enterprises. Tecson. Inc. Palad. x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with certainty in his verified petition facts showing that “there is no appeal. A petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Gloria. the mistake is an error in judgment which is beyond the ambit of certiorari. PNB-Republic Bank. Valiente. De Mesa. Corporal. Asensi. Coronel. Reyes. petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.17cralawlawlibrary Pursuant to the foregoing. The rationale of this rule is that. “Being a special civil action. Otherwise. Sy. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. Corpuz. Espina. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as to justify resort to certiorari. speedy and adequate remedy precludes the granting of the writ. v. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Rodriguez. any mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal. an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Ramirez. Santos. nor any plain. every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment. the petitioner must allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing.” “Where the existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Valois . Rañigo. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment. Castillo. Martinez. not of jurisdiction. the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismissible for failure to allege that there is no appeal. Cabañgon.19cralawlawlibrary Albano. Assuming the assailed October 12. Tabugan. Marquez. When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant. Moreover.the Court held that: The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. when a court exercises its jurisdiction. it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. Catindig. Hence. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 2005 Order (The Order denying the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence) to be erroneous. Page 255 Echiverri.” because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari.

the Court held: Albano. or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Cabañgon. petitioners miserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its discretion. Valois . No grave abuse of discretion. citing People v. Melicor. Cuaresma. Corpuz. In any case. Corporal. Francisco. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. not certiorari. Castillo. Coronel. Reyes. City of Manilathat: Indeed. Ramirez. Rejoinder. Santos. Sandoval. It was held in Rayos v. This is against the well-settled principle dictating that a petition for certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders of the RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not directly with the Supreme Court. it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the person of the petitioners. Alcazaren. Lumberio. Tecson. Asensi. Here. as the same would only be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. In fact. Martinez. Reply. as well as the Joint affidavit submitted by the arresting officers. De Mesa. any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by appeal. Inguillo. Only after a careful analysis of the submissions of the parties did the RTC render its judgment. Marquez. Lastimosa. Espina. In particular. Catindig. Page 256 Echiverri. It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC. As such. we note that the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is when is the proper time to file a motion to suppress/exclude evidence. our perusal of the records shows that the RTC did not abuse. Gloria. to wit: Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence. and Sur-Rejoinder.They even conceded that this is a pure question of law. such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. the Petition must still be dismissed for their failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Valiente. In this case. much more. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its assessment that the evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible. quo warranto. Rodriguez. this Court. “Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Opposition (to the Motion to Suppress Evidence). Palad. Assuming that the RTC’s determination is erroneous. Petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. However. Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorari is proper. mandamus. The RTC thoroughly considered the pleadings submitted by the parties. De la Cruz. prohibition. Sy. Rañigo. gravely abuse its discretion. the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari. petitioners made a direct recourse to this Court. the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari. habeas corpus and injunction. was done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Tabugan.

Tecson. however. Rodriguez. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. Cabañgon. Corpuz. Gloria. Francisco. Marquez. Asensi. Reyes. Palad. Sy. Espina. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. and those against the latter. Ramirez. unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. Page 257 Echiverri. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. Valois . De Mesa. to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute. De la Cruz. are not obtaining in this case. Valiente. Tabugan. and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. Santos. Inguillo. Corporal. Albano. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Castillo. Clearly. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. Coronel. a direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction may only be allowed if there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition which. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals. clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Lumberio. Sandoval. Rañigo. This is [an] established policy. with the Court of Appeals. however. Martinez. Catindig.

G. Cabañgon. Coronel. They alleged that respondent’s demand letters violate and defy the CA’sResolutions which enjoined respondent’s appointment as administrator pursuant to the Omnibus Order. Valiente. and Ligaya S. Ricardo Jr. vs.’s appointment as the new administrator. Lumberio. Espina. Silverio. demanded in the first letter that Ricardo Sr. SR. Alcazaren. be declared in indirect contempt of court and punished accordingly. Castillo. JR. July 18. and Nelia Silverio-Dee (Nelia). Francisco. Palad. represented by her Legal Guardian Nestor Dela Merced II. Rañigo. Inguillo. Rodriguez.). Gloria. shares of stock in Pilipinas Development Corporation (PDC) and a residential house in Urdaneta Village (house at Urdaneta Village). Tabugan. 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business. 2014 DOCTRINE: The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a pending case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. the respondent to the charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone. Heir-Movant. Ligaya. Silverio. Heir-Administrator Designate. 1. Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA with an application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction questioning the trial court’s Omnibus Order. Silverio. Edmundo S. Sr.’s second wife. SILVERIO. (Ricardo Jr. Lorna Cillan-Silverio (Lorna) is Ricardo Sr. Jr. cease and desist from 1) exercising the rights of a stockholder in PDC. which includes. A hearing is required in order to resolve a charge of indirect contempt. 186589. Edmundo. Ricardo Jr. In the second letter. Ricardo C. Heir-Intervenor. Catindig. seeking among others a reversal of the CA’s Resolution and the issuance of injunctive relief. Silverio. Respondent contended therein that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order and in granting injunctive relief against him. Silverio. Corporal. De la Cruz. Page 258 Echiverri. Reyes. He wrote and sent two letters. Lastimosa.R. Ramirez. and 3) transacting with third persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records.) is the surviving spouse of the decedent Beatriz S. The CA issued the assailed Decision. Silverio. filed with this Court an “Appeal under Rule 45 and/or Certiorari under Sec. No. De Mesa. Rule 65” with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. which held thus – Albano. among others. Corpuz. versus Ricardo S.. Asensi. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate the house at Urdaneta Village. particularly Ricardo Jr.. SILVERIO. Santos. (Ricardo Sr. Ricardo Jr. Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Indirect Contemptseeking that herein respondent Ricardo Jr. with whom he has children: herein respondent Ricardo Jr. Tecson. Sandoval. Sy. Sr. FACTS: The RTC Makati issued an Omnibus Order on the case. Martinez.” Petitioner Ricardo C. The subject matter of case is the decedent’s intestate estate (the estate). Silverio. Petitioner. one each to petitioners. Marquez. “In re: Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz S.The CA granted Nelia’s petition. Valois .

Rañigo. Ramirez. Sandoval. Inguillo. ISSUES: Whether or not the CA is correct in suspending the application for a Petition for Certiorari of the petitioner pending the appeal of the respondent Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the indirect contempt proceedings filed before the appellate court HELD: No. Petitioners are thus correct in arguing that the pendency of Ricardo. Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this clear: The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings. Castillo. Petitioners filed a Petiton for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court praying that the assailed Decision be set aside and that the Court declare respondent guilty of indirect contempt. Corporal. Reyes. The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal. The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a pending case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. this Court finds it inappropriate to make a ruling on whether or not the Respondent has committed certain acts violative of Revised Rule 71 of the Rules.Accordingly. After a careful evaluation of the evidentiary records. Cabañgon. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. Coronel. Francisco. Alcazaren. Martinez. De Mesa. Espina. in the absence of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued in the former case. Marquez. in the light of the foregoing development. Sy. Ricardo Jr. Palad. Valois . Rule 65. absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Corpuz. Asensi. submits that the mere act of writing and sending the letters to petitioners does not make him liable for indirect contempt of court.’s appeal with the CA did not interrupt the course of Nelia’s Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge. Page 259 Echiverri. Catindig. Valiente. Santos. Jr. as they do not deal directly or indirectly with any of the enjoined acts enumerated in the Omnibus Order. Lastimosa. Lumberio. This is because "an original action for certiorari is an independent action and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained of. Rodriguez. this Court is compelled to restrain itself from resolving the issuesin the instant petition. Tabugan." The CA therefore committed error in dismissing petitioners' indirect Albano. De la Cruz. and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. Gloria. or upon its expiration. Tecson.

A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy of the motion/petition. Finally. While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Asensi. Albano. the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Marquez. Sections 3 and 4. Lumberio. conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Second. Sy. Inguillo. Tecson. Third. The Supreme Court cannot. specifically outline the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. at this point. Santos. It need not wait for this Court to resolve the same before the petitioners' contempt charge may be heard. To be sure. In contempt proceedings. This is due process. De la Cruz. The law requires that there be a charge in writing. contempt petition. Palad. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. Castillo. Coronel. Alcazaren. which must be observed at all times. on the ground of pendency of the respondent’s appeal. Sandoval. since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge. Francisco. Tabugan. The respondent in an indirect contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone. a hearing is required in resolving a charge for indirect contempt. the Court does not issue summons on the respondent. Page 260 Echiverri. there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's answer. the court must set the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must make his appearance to answer the charge. Reyes. No. Valiente. Ramirez. First. there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. Espina. the prescribed procedure must be followed. only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly. Aside from the fact that the CA is the court against which the alleged contempt was committed. grant petitioners' plea to resolve the merits of their petition for indirect contempt. Corporal. Valois . Catindig. Gloria. Unlike in civil actions. Cabañgon. duly filed in court. Lastimosa. it is the CA that should properly try the same. De Mesa. Corpuz. Martinez.

De Mesa. Corpuz. Rule VIII of Department Order No. In rejecting Namboku’s contention that Section 17. NAMBOKU PEAK. It argued Albano. mainly airline companies. The Med-Arbiter issued an Orderholding that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are regular employees of Namboku. De la Cruz.169745. Tecson. Coronel. Namboku imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary ofLabor in (i) not resolving the issue of appropriateness and (ii) rejecting its appeal based on an invalid provision of Department Order 40-03. The Secretary of Labor filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA issued its Decisiongranting Namboku’s Petition and reversing the resolution of the Secretary of Labor. It contended that Section 17. INC. 40-03 prohibiting the filing of an appeal from an order granting the conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment is unconstitutional because it runs counter to Article 259of the Labor Code. Sy. The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order. Namboku filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari. Sandoval. Gloria. represented by the DOLE vs. and that Namboku is an unorganized establishment. Namboku received a summons setting the pre-election conference and stating that the Order granting the conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment is not appealable. Lumberio. The Philippine Aircraft Loaders and Cargo Employees AssociationSolidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (PALCEA-SUPER) filed a Petitionfor direct certification election before the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of Namboku assigned at the Cargo and Loading Station of the Philippine Airlines (PAL) in Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Rodriguez. Santos. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ramirez. Catindig. Valois . Tabugan. FACTS: Namboku is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower services to variousclients. Reyes. Hence. Namboku appealedthe Med-Arbiter’s Order to the Secretary of the Labor. Espina. Palad. Rañigo. Corporal. Namboku filed a Manifestation and Motion. No. Inguillo. Cabañgon.Rule VIII of Department Order No. In the meantime.seeking to suspend the conduct of certification election pending resolution of its appeal. Namboku opposed the Petitionon the ground of inappropriateness. Page 261 Echiverri. G. It claimed that the members of the PALCEA-SUPER are project employees.This prompted Namboku to file a Motion to Expungeon the ground that the Secretary of Labor is a mere nominalparty who has no legal standing to participate or prosecute the case. Castillo. Asensi. they cannot represent its regular rank-and-file employees. maintaining that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are mere project employees.R. Francisco. Alcazaren. the Secretary of Labor ratiocinated that unless said Department Order is declared by a competent court as unconstitutional. Martinez. Lastimosa. her office would treat the same as valid. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.as well as a Supplemental Motion and Manifestation. 40-03 is unconstitutional. Valiente. Marquez. July 18. 2014 DOCTRINE: A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

Valiente. The Sec. Castillo. Valois . Sandoval. Page 262 Echiverri. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to bebenefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. the real parties-in-interest in these cases would have been PALCEA-SUPER and PJWU-SUPER. Corporal. Rodriguez. Francisco. Under Section 1.As thus defined. Martinez. Asensi. that she is merely a nominal party to the case and has no personal interest therein. Ramirez. The Secretary of Labor isnot the real party-in-interest vested with personality to file the present petitions. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Coronel. Marquez. of Labor was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party because one of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. Tecson. Lumberio. Albano. Lastimosa. Sy. Gloria. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Catindig. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. De la Cruz. Reyes. Corpuz. The CA issued a Resolutiondenying the Secretary of Labor’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground. Tabugan. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Palad. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has legal standing to file a Motion for Reconsideration against reversal of its order by the CA HELD: No. But that does not make her a real party-in-interest or vests her withauthority to appeal the Decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling. among others. Santos. Espina. only real parties-in-interest who participated in the litigation of the case before the CA canavail of an appeal by certiorari. that the Secretary of Labor should have refrained from filing the said Motion for Reconsideration and should havemaintained the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Inguillo.

Corpuz.00 10 June 97 18. however. Batangas I promise to pay the following rentals in arrears: 10 April 97 8. Espina. & Mrs. Inguillo.00 P70.000. Reyes. Ma. They leased a 6. representing advance rental for the month of August 1997. Judicial admissions.000-square meter portion of the above-mentioned property to Waterfields.000.00 check replacement 8. Corporal. Gloria. – An admission. Marquez. G.R. Asensi. Catindig. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Tecson. Tabugan. From hereon. Sandoval. verbal or written. (30-day) representing advance rental. Albano. Alejandro Manzanilla Sto. notwithstanding the terms of the lease contract. Batangas. Sy. 1997.00 10 May 97 18. Hence. In addition to the aforementioned. Palad. Page 263 Echiverri. Francisco.00 10 July 97 18. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case. Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental. SEC. Beginning April 1997. Tomas. De Mesa. Coronel.000. Ma sent the spouses Manzanilla a letter dated July 7. Valois . Castillo. Rañigo.000. 4.00 by way of check payment dated July 15.000. WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORP. Valiente. I will give a check for the amount of P18. De la Cruz. I shall pay rentals (eve) on or before the 10th day of each month. Rodriguez. 1997 which reads as follows: Spouses Mr. Lumberio. Santos. July 18. No. an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it.000.177484. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Tomas. Rule 129. FACTS: The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay San Miguel. does not require proof. Martinez. Sto. and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. SPOUSES MANZANILLA and VELASCO vs. as represented by its President Aliza R. 2014 DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of estoppel.000. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

It argued that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against it. Marquez. (Signed) ALIZA MA President Waterfields Industries Corporation 7/9/97 Quezon City The spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against Waterfields. Gloria. 1997. the rental deposit should have been applied as payment for monthly rentals pursuant to the original Contract of Lease. The lease contract dated 5/24/94 shall be amended according to the above provision. if any. Ramirez. Before the RTC. Waterfields claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit. It argued that the said letter is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds since the same was merely in the handwriting of Ma. Lastimosa. 2000 that in its Answer. 1997 letter which states that “the deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities. Section 4 of the Contract of Lease which provides that the rental deposit shall answer for any unpaid rentals. if any. the MTC declared that Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to non-payment of rentals. On the other hand. In particular. Waterfields questioned the MTC’s ruling that Ma’s letter of July 9. Valiente. Palad. Albano. It noted in its Decision dated July 14. Waterfields also asserted that the precipitate filing of the Complaint against it is tainted with bad faith and intended to cause it grave injustice considering that it already spent an enormous amount in developing the property. Waterfields admitted paragraph 5 of the Complaint which states that the Contract of Lease was amended on June 6. Reyes. Asensi. Francisco. damages. Coronel. 1994 and July 9. Castillo. Consequently. Hence. penalties and unpaid utility charges was superseded by the portion in Ma’s July 9. Cabañgon. Santos. 1997 effectively amended the Contract of Lease. Sy. however. the MTC found no merit in Waterfield’s claim that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was applying the rental deposit to its payment of the same. Rodriguez. and other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease. Sandoval. Inguillo. Martinez. Valois . The RTC. Page 264 Echiverri. Hence. Corpuz. Espina. Catindig. unsubscribed by both parties. De la Cruz. was unimpressed. and unacknowledged before a notary public. Tecson. The MTC found Ma’s letter to have amended the Contract of Lease. Rañigo. Corporal. De Mesa. Lumberio. and other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease”. The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities. Tabugan. Alcazaren.

this Petition for Certiorari. That. Tabugan. Judicial admissions. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. the MTC and the RTC had uniformly ruled that the said letter operates as an amendment to the original contract. Hence. Coronel. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. Asensi. 1997. effectivity and enforceability of Ma’s July 9. Valiente. verbal or written. Tecson. Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial admission that the Contract of Lease was amended on July 9. “A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings. Sy. the said Contract of Lease was amended on 06 June 1994 and on 09 July 1997 x x x. Espina. Whereas. – An admission. Rañigo. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. 4. Alcazaren. the doctrine of estoppel likewise bars it from falsifying Ma’s July 9. paragraph 2 of Waterfields’ Answer reads: 2. Francisco. (b) during trial. and 6 of the Complaint are admitted. De Mesa. Section 4. ISSUES: Whether or not the CA is correct in reversing the RTC’s decision HELD: No. Castillo. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case. 1997 letter in this litigation. Sandoval. Santos. Martinez. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Paragraphs 4.” Here. does not require proof. Page 265 Echiverri. subsequently. 5. Marquez. 1997. Palad. Valois . The spouses Manzanilla contend that there can be no issue as to the due execution. Lumberio. Catindig. Reyes. either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations. Corporal. Gloria. Lastimosa. paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges 5. Inguillo. or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 1997 letter since aside from the fact that Waterfields itself admitted in its Answer that the Contract of Lease was amended on July 9. Albano. Ramirez.

by his own declaration. Castillo. be permitted to falsify it. De Mesa. intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing [to be] true. Tecson.” Moreover. Marquez. act. Asensi. Francisco. or omission. Espina. Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material allegation that the Contract of Lease was amended on July 9. Page 266 Echiverri. Ramirez. “It is well. Cabañgon. an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it. Palad. in any litigation arising out of such declaration. Rañigo. Coronel. Corporal. and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case). Lastimosa. he cannot. In the law of evidence. Corpuz. De la Cruz. any effort on the part of Waterfields to impugn the July 9. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. Catindig. Martinez. act. Clearly. “[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel. Reyes.settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party itself and binds the person who makes the same. or omission. Santos.” In view of these. Albano. no amount of rationalization can offset it. and to act upon such belief. Rodriguez. 1997. Inguillo. Sandoval. Sy. Gloria. Alcazaren. Valois . 1997 letter is futile. Lumberio. Valiente. and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Tabugan. whenever a party has.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and of the NLRC HELD: No. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Demetrio L. Anaclito A. Lumberio. De la Cruz. issues of fact relating to the dismissal of their employeesand the computation of monetary claims. which have been passed upon by the Labor Arbiter. Gina Benitez. Asensi. De Mesa. Ferdinand M. Marquez. Evageline B. the NLRC. single proprietorships owned by petitionersRose Hana Angeles and Zenaida Angeles. Ruben N. Coronel. Alcazaren. and in the absence of substantial showing that suchfindings were madefrom an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented. Gloria. however. No. and the CA. Brian Ogario. it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Palad. Jr. Sy. Valiente. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. Reynante. July 21. Marlon A. Martinez. Balata. Ompoy. Roaquin. respectively. This Court is not a trier offacts. Bucad.Ensuingly. LAS MARIAS GRILL AND RESTAURANT vs. against petitioners Las Marias Grill and Restaurant and Café Teria Bar and Restaurant.R. Tabugan. is that this Court is not a trier of facts. Aggrieved. it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Evelyn A. Bumacod. Rodriguez. They were surprised to discover that their former counsel did not file any pleading in their behalf to refute respondents’ accusations. What must be realized. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently. Corporal. They bewailed thatthey were underpaid workers.Bastan. Norberto Ballasteros. Factual findingsof administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise. Wilma Caingles. and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure. and Maribel Roaquin. 2014 DOCTRINE: In the exercise of its power of review. Joel Ducusin. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA viaRule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Page 267 Echiverri. Santos. Bernadine B. BUCAD G. petitioners seasonably appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") flatly denying the charges against them. Tecson. They would have this Court resolve issues which require a reevaluation of the evidence. Inguillo. Ramirez. Jovy R. Valois . Bastan. Sandoval. Herminio Agsaoay. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently."26 This principle applies with greater force in labor cases. Francisco. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ruling that petitioners are guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioners offered not a tinge of explanation as they failed to submit their Position Paper. they are conclusive. The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. 196249. Cabañgon.. are affordedgreat weight by the courts. Albano. Charleston A. In the exercise of its power of review. Corpuz. Laroza. Ma. Castillo. Rañigo. Catindig. Lastimosa. should not be disturbed FACTS: Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and Money Claims filed by respondents. Espina. Reyes. Berdin.

and in the absence of substantial showing that suchfindings were madefrom an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented. and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure. "Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency ofthe evidence uponwhich the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.especially if they coincide withthose of the LaborArbiter and are supported by substantial evidence. Corporal. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Palad. De la Cruz. Castillo. should not be disturbed. Asensi. Sy. where this Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded great respect and even finality. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. they are conclusive. Page 268 Echiverri. Corpuz. Reyes. Espina. Gloria. Francisco. Valiente." Albano. Lumberio. Rañigo. Tecson. "factual findingsof administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise. Catindig. Moreover. De Mesa. Coronel. Martinez. Inguillo. Marquez. Cabañgon. Sandoval."Factual issues are beyond the scope of this Court’s authority to review on certiorari. are affordedgreat weight by the courts. Tabugan. Santos. Valois .

On May 11. Corpuz. respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s wife. De Mesa. 2004. July 30. Reyes. SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND SAME ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW? Albano. denominated as Lots 2 and 3. Rodriguez. 2014 DOCTRINE: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Forum-Shopping FACTS: Proclamation No. Province of Rizal and Pasay City. reversed the decision. Inguillo. Valiente. Santos. that the parties’ true agreement was that petitioners would act as caretakers of respondent’s Lot 3. Catindig. Gloria. Francisco. Sampaguita Extension. HAS FIRST ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME PARTIES. Makati City. Well-established is the rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision or order is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Leonila dela Cruz with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. Lumberio. Sy. TABINO G. Mauricio established residence within the lot. ISSUE/S: 1) CAN THE COURT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE ON REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT HAVING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST EXHAUSTED? 2) HAS RESPONDENT VIOLATEDTHE RULE AGAINST FORUM. Petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical sergeant in the military – and his brother. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition to any bona fide occupants/residents of different Barangays. Coronel. Petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3. Valois . respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of ₱800. The ejectment case in MeTC favored the Petitioners. Block 255. Proc. Tecson. Rañigo. IN EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. Castillo. and for this. Espina. However. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO vs.R. Sandoval. Quezon City. SPOUSES MAURICIO M. Palad. Asensi.00. while respondent continued to reside in Novaliches.LAZARO M. RTC affirmed the lower court’s decision.SHOPPING IN FILING EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST PETITIONERS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE MISCELLANEOUS SALES APPLICATION CASES BEFORE THE DENR WHICH ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Tabino – a colonel in the military – occupied a 353-square meter lot in Pembo. Cabañgon. The ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent is the true and sole owner of the 353-square meter lot. Ramirez. Martinez. Group 10. Pembo. Pateros and Parañaque. 196219. Taguig. Page 269 Echiverri. Alcazaren. The lot was later subdivided into two portions. Corporal. No. 518 since he was already awarded a home lot in Fort Bonifacio. Marquez. Lastimosa. CA. It ruled that the Plaintiff’s contention that defendants’ stay on the premises is by mere tolerance is devoid of merit. Zone 12. respondent Lazaro M. 518 was issued. Petitioners countered in their Answer that respondent had no right to eject them. Makati City. establishing the military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig. The DENR held that respondent (plaintiff) is not qualified to acquire Lot 2 under Proc.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of Our judicial system. Sandoval. Palad. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Encarnacion. petitioners in the instant Petition pray for the reinstatement of the MeTC Decision. if not finality. Castillo. Echoing the explanation of the private respondent DENR. other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence. Lumberio. imposition or mistake. Santos. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Alcazaren. to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. so long as there is some evidence upon which the findings in question could be made. citing the case of Ortua vs. Reyes. Page 270 Echiverri. Asensi. Rañigo. Ramirez. Moreover. the findings of facts of the Director of Land (now the Regional Director) is conclusive in the absence of any showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud. As such. Corporal. these issues are being raised for the first time at this stage of the proceedings. Catindig. Espina. Inguillo. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Martinez. Gloria. We agree with the respondents and dismiss the petition for petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies. De Mesa. Corpuz. which enjoins the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. Valois . Cabañgon. Tabugan. Tecson. Besides. Lastimosa. Valiente. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. Sy. Rodriguez. regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence. they cannot be allowed to simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings or actions taken by the lower courts. On this point. it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord great respect. De la Cruz. Strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case. Albano. Marquez. Coronel. Francisco. Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers. HELD: Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum-shopping.

this Court is not a trier of facts. Espina. Ramirez. 2002. Meyr Enterprises Corporation (plaintiff-appellant. Castillo. Sy. Rañigo. This being the case. the instant Petition must fail because a question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. In CA. if it is not so. An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only Albano. it concluded that Meyr is not assailing the dismissal of its complaint but only the award of moral damages. Santos. He alleged that sometime in July 2002. Plaintiff-appellant prays actual damages. T-1198. Corporal. which it based on malicious prosecution. the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. Reyes. He added that plaintiff-appellant has no personality to sue as the area in controversy is a foreshore land. The trees in the land were allegedly in danger of being uprooted and the sand of disappearing further. No. 2014 DOCTRINE:A question of fact cannot be raised in petitions for review on certiorari.887-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. Gloria. Cabañgon. Asensi. Corpuz. only questions of law shall be raised. Palad. However. then there is no ground to hold it liable for malicious prosecution. Francisco. in such appeals by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Catindig. Valiente. but it affirmed the decision of the RTC. The resolution of the case hinges on the question of whether petitioner is guilty of malice and bad faith in instituting Civil Case. Camiguin pursuant to a resolutionof the Sangguniang Bayan. Marquez. Meyr claims to be the registered owner of a 4. Inguillo. September 3. 197336. moral damages. Lastimosa. HUMILIATE AND ANNOY RESPONDENT WHICH AMOUNTED TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION HELD: The Court denies the Petition. It requires that the reviewing court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is substantial enough to show such bad faith. Lumberio. Coronel. attorney’s fees. Martinez. Page 271 Echiverri. it is not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. ISSUE/S: 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER FILED SUBJECT COMPLAINT WITH THE INTENTION TO VEX. Cordero averred that the construction of the dike began December 2001 through the authority of the Local Government of Guinsiliban. defendant constructed a dike in front of his land. MEYR ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs.) filed a Complaint7 for Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Rolando Cordero (defendant-appellee). When supported by substantial evidence. and litigation cost by the trial court. and exemplary damages. RTC dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff based on defendant-appellee’s affirmative defenses. ROLANDO CORDERO G. Tecson.R. De Mesa. Plaintiff’s file an MR but was also denied. Valois . owned by the State and under no circumstances will plaintiff suffer any damage or injury there from. FACTS: On August 22. Tabugan. The existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. The flow of the waves of the sea causing damages to his land. Sandoval. De la Cruz.

Santos. questions of law. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. However.Of course this is subject to exceptions. Rodriguez. Asensi. Inguillo. Rañigo. Page 272 Echiverri. Corporal. Gloria. Catindig. Lastimosa. are binding upon this Court. Martinez. Palad. particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Tecson. Valiente. Castillo. Espina. Corpuz. Marquez. Valois . Cabañgon. Albano. Lumberio. Tabugan. Ramirez. Sandoval. Francisco. these exceptions do not obtain in the instant case. Coronel. Sy. De Mesa. It will suffice for this Court to rely on the judgment of the trial and appellate court prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court. Reyes.

Alcazaren. ruled the value of the subject lot at ₱1. Page 273 Echiverri. Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. Corpuz. RTC. No. Rodriguez. Sy. LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR G. NPC filed an appeal to CA which was denied. Orense.500. RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. ISSUE/S: 1) WHETHER OR NOT CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT REMANDING THE COURT FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY INACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4. Palad. Reyes. 83. HELD: The Court grants the Petition. did not set an amount. Martinez. Santos. Esteban D. Lumberio. The court representative. Valois . However. Catindig. Valiente. 2014 DOCTRINE:Determination of just compensation under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Espina. IR-224. that the value of the lot at the time of NPC’s taking thereof or filing of Civil Case No. IR-2678. September 8. IR-2678 be remanded to the trial court for determination of just compensation applying Section 4. Inguillo.000. the trial court issued another Order5 dismissing Civil Case No. Asensi. Corporal. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should have been observed in fixing the amount of just compensation for the subject lot.After almost three (3) years since the said order was issued. commissioner for NPC. Wenifredo Pornillo. IR-2678 in 1995. docketed as Civil Case No. for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil Case No. FACTS: Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. Coronel. Sandoval. Atty. Gloria.00 per square meter. Case is dismissed without prejudice. NPC thus prays that Civil Case No. De la Cruz. IR-2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Colarina. the Committee has not met nor deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not exerted efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a time. Tabugan. seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar’s 1. and not residential. Lastimosa.00 per square meter valuation. lands within the area. Tecson. Francisco.R. although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing market prices of agricultural. Marquez. Ramirez. IR-2243 with the RTC.00 to ₱1.100.00 per square meter. recommended a valuation within the range of ₱1. De Mesa. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. Rañigo. NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line denominated as Tower No. Albano. In Republic v.020-square meter lot which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line. Castillo.000. Court of Appeals. NPC insists that Section 4. Respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. proposed a ₱1. Lorenzo C. The RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. 197329. Accordingly. IR-2243 in 1990 should have been the basis for computing just compensation and not the prevailing market value at the time of the filing or pendency of Civil Case No. Cabañgon. to wit .

However. Valois . The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. Lastimosa.. including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. and hence. Coronel. and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. Catindig. Palad. Francisco. Rañigo. the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession. the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable. Corpuz. Cabañgon. we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation. Sandoval. the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i. the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements. Martinez. De Mesa. In National Power Corporation v. waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. Castillo. If no such complaint is filed. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Gloria. Sy. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the order of expropriation. Santos. Alcazaren. Page 274 Echiverri. Corporal. Asensi. we held in Republic v. The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Albano. Espina. if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings.e. Valiente. Ramirez. Marquez. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. not of the filing of the complaint. Reyes.’ However. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Tabugan. Tecson. Court of Appeals.

Sy. According to Pag-IBIG.000. Cabañgon. Pag-IBIG is withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure. Castillo. FACTS: Flordelis B. Alcazaren. Marquez. Catindig. however. ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN RULING THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27. Inguillo. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid of Leoncio Lim in the amount of P500. Lastimosa. Decoroso D. Samar on the alleged anomalous auction sale conducted by Sheriff IV Lorenzo De Guzman. Asensi. RTC ruled that The public auction sale are in order. FR.R. PASCUAL D. Sandoval. 2005. Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that a civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. 178911 September 17. Section 5. Monsanto and Pascual moved to intervene in the case. Santos.00 was grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that the outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor. JR. he is already entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession. 2004. MONSANTO. Executive Judge Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter considering that Eduardo is his relative. Valiente. Menzon. IN ITS ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AND ITS ISSUANCE DOES NOT NEED A MOTION FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF SALE WHICH REQUIRES A HEARING. Palad. Espina. Corpuz. Lumberio. Corporal. De Mesa. Monsanto of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan. Leoncio opposed Pag-IBIG’s manifestation. Coronel. every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. Leoncio filed with Branch 27 a Manifestation with Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming that the reglementary period had elapsed without Eduardo redeeming the subject property. AND REV. Tabugan. Moreover. Albano. Martinez. Valois . On July 15.. Both claimed that they are co-owners and actual possessors of the subject property. MONSANTO. Pag-IBIG informed the trial court that the loan of Eduardo had been restructured and that Eduardo had commenced paying monthly amortizations. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. vs. De la Cruz. 2014 DOCTRINE: Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Regional Director of the Home Development Mutual Fund requested the intervention of Executive Judge Sinforiano A. No. was more than the bid amount. Rañigo. DECOROSO D. Usman of Branch 28. And that it is no longer interested in pursuing an administrative action against De Guzman. EDUARDO D. MONSANTO. as such. SR. HELD: The Petition is dismissed. Tecson. Eduardo Monsanto. instead he re-assigned the same to Judge Sibanah E. the sale proceeded as originally scheduled on January 15. Page 275 Echiverri. Reyes. that as a result of the restructuring.Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. LEONCIO LIM AND LORENZO DE GUZMAN G. There is no showing that he has abused his authority during the conduct of the public auction. Ramirez. 2004. Francisco. Rodriguez. to its surprise. Gloria. De Guzman previously acceded to its request to move the date of the auction sale to January 20.

Tecson.” To stress. Corporal. the parties were not properly identified. Tabugan. said letter could not in any way be considered as a pleading. In this case. Second. only the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested. Lastimosa. records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. Valiente. It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. Catindig. Martinez. Rule 3 and Section 1. Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines pleadings as “written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Espina. the parties to the case were not identified pursuant to Section 1. Rules of Court. De Mesa. The letter bore no caption. Sandoval. Corpuz. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court mandates that upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding. Marquez. it was not signed by a counsel. Valois . and most of all. Pag-IBIG’s letter could not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. it was not even assigned a docket number. the fees prescribed therefore shall be paid in full.31 Rule 7. Third. Section 1. Gloria. there is no verification or certification against forum-shopping. Sy. Reyes. Santos. Rañigo. However. First. Inguillo. Coronel. in fact. no particular relief is sought. Castillo. Asensi. Alcazaren. Section 1. Lumberio. the allegations were not properly set forth. De la Cruz. the so-called claim or cause of action was not properly mentioned or specified. Ramirez. the letter miserably failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7. \ Albano. Francisco. Rodriguez. We have also noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Palad. Page 276 Echiverri. Cabañgon. The case was supposedly “commenced” through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De Guzman.

Tecson.Thus. namely. Rejection and Transfer of Sales Rights. transferring his hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. On March 2. or even express consent. however. Espina. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. Francisco. P-2446. 1979. denied the Motion. is a legitimate son of Telesforo and that Solito sold his hereditary share in the estate of his father to respondent spouses by virtue of a Deed of Transfer of Rights. 1998. TOLENTINO and RODERICK JULAO vs. Valois . the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Baguio City.SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE JESUS G. was issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo. After petitioners rested their case. SONIA J. Palad. Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights. his applications were transferred to his heirs. ANITA VDA. In 1983. two Townsite Sales Applications (TSA). they filed an Answer contending that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the subject property. 176020 September 29. Reyes. Corporal. acquiescence. Petitioners alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel of land located at Naguilian Road. FACTS: Telesforo Julao filed before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Catindig. DENR issued an Order. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. that they acquired the said property from petitioners' brother. The CA found the Complaint dismissible on two grounds: (1) failure on the part of petitioners to identify the property sought to be recovered. Solito went missing. and that contrary to the claim of petitioners. No. Thus. Gloria. The heirs of Solito then moved to intervene and filed an Answer-ln-lntervention. Baguio City. Inguillo. HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO. ISSUE/S: 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT. Sy. P-2446. Corpuz. De la Cruz. on December 21. Valiente. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. Santos. Ramirez. Consequently. Marquez. Coronel. Sandoval. Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription. Page 277 Echiverri. Rañigo. any act or omission of the parties nor can it be cured by their silence. or waived by. TSA No. Albano. Castillo. against respondent spouses. 1999. Asensi. it cannot be acquired through. TSA No. The RTC. De Mesa. Lastimosa. DE ENRIQUEZ. In 1986. On Appeal.Upon his death on June 1. Martinez. V-6667 to respondent spouses Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus. respondent spouses filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File a Demurrer to Evidence. Cabañgon. 1971. and (2) lack of jurisdiction. V-2132 pertain to the same property. Solito. arguing that their father. Lumberio.covering a 641-square meter property. respondent spouses constructed a house on the property they acquired from Solito. covered by OCT No. 2014 DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the complaint. Tabugan. representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo. On April 30. V-2132 and TSA No. Baguio City.V-6667. V-6667 and TSA No. which the RTC denied for lack of merit. Solito. a Complaint or Recovery of Possession of Real Property.R. petitioners.

The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. as aptly pointed out by the CA. Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Martinez. or any interest therein. SEC. Alcazaren. original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts. Valiente. real property.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila. Lumberio.66 It bears stressing that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case. where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50. Palad.000. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts: SEC. Corpuz.00.000. Corporal. petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in their Complaint.000. the assessed value of the property sought to be recovered determines the court's jurisdiction. Asensi.67 In this case. or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20. 33. in civil actions in Metro Manila. Cabañgon. real property. Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint. or possession of. since the assessed value of the property was not alleged. Tecson. HELD: The Petition lacks merit. Based on the foregoing. damages of whatever kind. where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50. In fact. petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe the location. the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. Francisco. no survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove that respondent spouses actually encroached upon the 70-square meter portion of petitioners' property. Rodriguez. De Mesa. in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. the area. – Metropolitan Trial Courts.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to. is duty-bound to clearly identify the land sought to be recovered. Gloria. for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction. it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Espina. therefore. In fact. That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes. Catindig." The plaintiff. Page 278 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Coronel. the property must be identified.000. Castillo. 19. Rañigo. Inguillo. Sy. Article 434 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n an action to recover.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts. Valois .00) or.68 Failing to prove their allegation. it is clear that in an action for recovery of possession. attorney's fees.00) exclusive of interest. Santos.Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. or possession of. the property must be identified Moreover. Lastimosa.000. where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty thousand pesos (₱20. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property. as well as the boundaries thereof. Municipal Trial Courts. In an action to recover. Marquez. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to. the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. Albano. the assessed value of the subject property must exceed ₱20. Sandoval. Municipal Trial Courts. litigation expenses and costs: Provided. In this case. Reyes. Ramirez. which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action. and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. . Tabugan.

De Mesa. Palad. Tabugan. Valois . Sy. Santos. Catindig. Valiente. Sandoval. Corporal. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Reyes. Castillo. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Marquez. Martinez. Tecson. Page 279 Echiverri. Lumberio. Espina. Coronel. Gloria. we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failing to identify the property sought to be recovered. Francisco. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Inguillo. Asensi. Albano. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. All told.

Ramirez. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Inguillo. 2006 Decision on July 17. Valiente. Sandoval. thus. Page 280 Echiverri. Valois . Espina. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not the 15-day period to appeal is mandatory. motion for reconsideration. The bank received a copy of the trial court’s June 15. since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Asensi.R. Sy. HELD: Yes. Reyes. Corporal. Hence the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of execution which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Palad. Coronel. Lumberio. 2014 DOCTRINE: Failure to appeal within the 15-day period amounts to the acceptance of the judgment rendered by the court. Tabugan. it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2. Martinez. it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed. 2006. or a motion for new trial. No. Corpuz. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G. 193650. Cabañgon. De Mesa. GEORGE PIDLIP P. Catindig. Albano. Gloria. October 8. FACTS: The proceedings in the case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo and the CA did not overlook the fact that PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed one day too late. Castillo. Lastimosa. Santos. Tecson. it may no longer question the trial court’s Decision in any other manner. 2006 – within which to file a notice of appeal.Yet. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs. pursuant to the Rules of Court. Francisco. it had 15 days – or up to August 1. "Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him”. 2006.

The petitioners did not have any original certificate of title moreover they are currently applying to buy the lot from the Baguio city coursed thru the DENR. G. Asensi. Marquez. Coronel. and (2) the deed. FACTS: In May 2001. petitioners – residents of Lower Atab & Teachers’ Village. Gloria. Lastimosa. Catindig. claim. represented by BEATRICE T. Sy. Petitioners vs. through townsite sales applications coursed through the DENR. RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB & TEACHERS' VILLAGE. LAPP AO. MICHAEL MADIGUID. Baguio City – filed a civil case for quieting of title with damages against respondent Sta." Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and capable of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner. Reyes. while equitable title means beneficial ownership. Albano. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled for relief thru the remedy of action to quiet title. two indispensable requisites must be present. Sandoval. Sto. Francisco.R. Alcazaren. CRISTINA A. or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. STA. PULAS. The Complaint in said case essentially alleged that petitioners are successors and transferees-in-interest of Torres.TOMAS PROPER BARANGAY. Valiente. Rodriguez. Palad. namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action. 2014 DOCTRINE: An action to quiet title in order to prosper. MONICA INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. De la Cruz. Tomas Proper Barangay. FLORENCIO MABUDYANG and FERNANDO DOSALIN. Cabañgon. Lumberio. they acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the property from the government. Page 281 Echiverri. Martinez. they applied for the purchase of the same – through Townsite Sales applications – with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). STO. Santos. Corporal. Ramirez.198878 October 15. Espina. De Mesa.Legal title denotes registered ownership. Evidently. Inguillo. HELD: No. Castillo. Rañigo. specifically in their pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial court.Petitioners acknowledged that while they declared their respective lots for tax purposes. Tecson. Corpuz. Respondent. encumbrance. And by their own admission in their pleadings. the supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City. No. BAGUIO CITY. there are no certificates of title in their respective names. Tabugan. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. Valois .

The Department of Justice however reverses the decision of the prosecutor and dismisses the case which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2014 DOCTRINE:When the remedy of appeal is available. Castillo. Valiente. petitioner Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Letter of Authority authorizing its revenue officers to investigate respondent spouses’ internal revenue tax liabilities for taxable year 2003 and prior years. Petitioner vs. Asensi. or 7) in other meritorious cases. No. for persuasive reasons. Sandoval. Corporal. COURT OF APPEALS. an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Lastimosa. will not prosper because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal. 5) when. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Lumberio. Rañigo. petitioner issued a letter to respondent spouses requiring them to submit documentary evidence to substantiate the source of their cash. the remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision. and RUBY ONG MANLY. Catindig. 2005. or resolution of the CA is to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. a family-owned corporation. 4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. HELD: No. Respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy when appeal is available.R. The state prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of criminal charges. 197590 November 24. Reyes. the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. which is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On June 6. 2005. Page 282 Echiverri. 2) when the broader interest of justice so requires. G. Espina. Gloria. an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. exceptions to this rule. as represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Rodriguez. 3) when the writs issued are null and void. Alcazaren. Martinez. Sy. De la Cruz. to wit: 1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate. Albano. Tabugan. Coronel. If the remedy of an appeal is available. Inguillo. FACTS: Respondent Antonio Villan Manly (Antonio) is a stockholder and the Executive Vice-President of Standard Realty Corporation. Corpuz. Marquez. Cabañgon. SPOUSES ANTONIO VILLAN MANLY. Palad. However. 6) when the judgment or order is attended by grave abuse of discretion. final order. Francisco. will not prosper because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal. petitioner was able to convincingly show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the dismissal of the criminal charges against respondent spouses despite the fact that there is probable cause to indict them. De Mesa. Santos. On April 27. He is also engaged in rental business. Valois . Ramirez. Tecson.

2015 DOCTRINE: One cannot avail of the remedy provided for under Rule 65 when an appeal is still available. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy. FACTS: In this case. Court of Appeals that the Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just. Corpuz. Litigations should. since it was filed well within the reglementary period provided under the said rule.” Petitioners arguments provide that the petition should have been Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. Tabugan. be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. Espina. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Cabañgon.R. Sandoval. Inguillo. It was held in Sanchez v. Castillo. Sy. Asensi. however their Prefatory statement states that: “Plaintiffs-petitioners are left with no appeal. Marquez. vs. ET AL. Albano. The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is appeal. speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. then in their Arguments/Discussion. the proper remedy for the petitioner should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court since the decision sought to be reversed is that of the CA. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law after the respondent Court of Appeals incorrectly denied their motion for reconsideration. petitioners assail the judgment of the Court of Appeals by interposing on their appeal that the Appellate Court’s decision was not in accord with the law. HELD: Under rule 45. Martinez. Gloria. Reyes. Alcazaren. Santos. Page 283 Echiverri. Coronel. Catindig. Corporal. just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Rañigo. ISSUE: Whether to treat the petition as under Rule 45 or under Rule 65. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari. Francisco. Valiente. De Mesa. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was still available to the petitioner. as much as possible. Thus. Tecson. Rodriguez. speedy. No. Moreover. petitioners question the extent of the easement of right of way granted to them and the indemnity for the same as fixed by the Court of Appeals. Lumberio. Respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction not only in reversing the final ruling of the trial Court. Valois . nor is there any plain. but also on the award of indemnity. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN. petitioners alleged that: The Court of Appeals whimsically and capriciously reversed the final ruling of the Regional Trial Court. because one of the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. Palad. But the title of the petition is petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 191710 January 14.

De la Cruz. GATUSLAO and ERMILA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO vs. Martinez. Catindig. Lastimosa. When the one-year redemption period expired without Limsiaco’s estate redeeming the properties. LEO RAY V. YANSON G. Asensi. Lumberio. therefore. Palad. And since respondent purchased the properties from PNB. T-311125and T-311126 in respondent’s name in lieu of PNB’s titles. De Mesa. Francisco. PNB extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgageand caused the properties’ sale at a public auction on June 24. Marquez. Reyes. FACTS: Petitioner Ermila Leonila Limsiaco-Gatuslao is the daughter of the late Felicisimo Limsiaco (Limsiaco) who died intestate on February 7. Tecson. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner can be stopped from possessing the property by the respondent who fails to redeem it. Rañigo. the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City issued TCT Nos. Espina. On November 10. PNB caused the consolidation of titles in its name. Albano. HELD: No. the former has necessarily stepped into the shoes of the latter. No. respondent. Sy. Upon Limsiaco’s failure to pay. therefore. Ramirez. Corpuz. in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession PNB. Santos. Page 284 Echiverri. Coronel. Cabañgon. Castillo.R. the purchaser. SPOUSES JOSE O. 191540 January 21. Valois . Limsiaco mortgaged the said lots along with the house standing thereon to Philippine National Bank (PNB). 2015 DOCTRINE:It is settled that the issuance of a Writ of Possession may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself. by subrogation. 1989. Alcazaren. 1991 where it emerged as the highest bidder. Valiente. As a consequence thereof. 2006. The petitioner thereafter contest the writ of possession being applied by the respondent-buyer. Tabugan. Limsiaco was the registered owner of two parcels of land with improvements in the City of Bacolod. Corporal. Gloria. Otherwise stated. a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by PNB conveying the subject properties in favor of respondent. Sandoval. as the absolute owner of the properties is entitled to a writ of possession. has the right to pursue PNB’s claims against petitioners as though they were his own. Rodriguez. Inguillo.

signed as ‘tenant. 192270 January 26. HELD: Yes. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence. Palad. of Agrarian reform adjudication board) and not in the MTC. Valois . Martinez. Castillo. and executed a Pagpapatunay stating that: Spouses Andal are not tenants of the said land. 2015 DOCTRINE: The material averments in the complaint determine the jurisdiction of a court. it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. together with her husband Carlos Ofilada (Carlos). Cabañgon. after hearing. As DAR’s adjudicating arm. Miraflor appeared before Anastacio Lajara (Anastacio). The Andals interposed the defense that they are tenants of the land hence the jurisdiction must be in the DARAB (Dept. FACTS: Irene. Sandoval. who brokered the sale of the property. Wherein respondent Miraflor Andal (Miraflor). Tiaong. Francisco. Sy. Albano. Alcazaren. Page 285 Echiverri. De la Cruz. bought from the heirs of Teresita Liwag (Teresita) a 27. On the other hand. municipal trial courts. tenancy is shown to exist. Marquez. Gloria. Quezon. it is the DARAB that has exclusive and original jurisdiction involving all agrarian disputes. 8 years later Irene filed an ejectment case against the Spouses Andals. Lastimosa. Lumberio. if. SPOUSES RUBEN ANDAL and MIRAFLOR ANDAL G. No. San Antonio. Reyes. and the municipal circuit trial courts. Coronel. the then Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman of Barangay Puri. Rodriguez. Tecson. precisely to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction. Asensi. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. Espina. Tabugan. Santos. Ramirez.R. Corporal. Corpuz. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts. Rañigo.’ Apparently. ten days prior to the sale. Inguillo. a number of coconut trees and other fruit-bearing plants located in Barrio Puri. De Mesa. The land was eventually registered in the name of Irene Ofilada. The MTC granted the ejectment case which was affirmed by the RTC.974-square meter parcel of land principally planted with rambutan. the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. and. IRENE D. a court does not lose jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. OFILADA vs. Catindig.

No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC). we cannot presume that only the Supreme Court can conscientiously fulfill the ecological duties required of the entire state. Hon. Rañigo. SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU. 2015 DOCTRINE: The function of the extraordinary and equitable remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan should not supplant other available remedies and the nature of the forums that they provide. Sandoval. v. SBMA. 2012. On July 20. Catindig. that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law). Espina. which was opposed by the Sangguniang Panglusod several times. Santos. De la Cruz.R. a subsidiary of TCC. The SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. Ramon Jesus P. the Casiño Group alleged. and the City of Olongapo. Teodoro A. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Valois . Martinez. Ramon Jesus P. among others. RP Energy requested the DENR to amend its ICC to include additional components in its proposed coal-fired power plant. Inc. Marquez. After all. Ramirez. Sy. Hermosa. respondents filed a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against RP Energy. Paje. In His Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Casiño. Lumberio. Coronel. Hon. February 3. Tecson. Morong. Reyes. The Writ of Kalikasan thus is not an excuse to invoke judicial remedies when there still remain administrative forums to properly address the common concern to protect and advance ecological rights. Cabañgon. Francisco. Tabugan. (RP Energy). Palad. Zambales. In the Petition. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City expressed the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay through the issuance of several resolutions. On July 28. The Writ of Kalikasan is a highly prerogative writ that issues only when there is a showing of actual or imminent threat and when there is such inaction on the part of the relevant administrative bodies that will make an environmental catastrophe inevitable. G. that the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage. Rodriguez. Corporal. 207257. FACTS: In February 2006. Valiente. that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC). Albano. 2006. Paje. Corpuz. Et. Lastimosa. installation. and Hon. Alcazaren. Al. in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR. for the construction. whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. Castillo. and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP). and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore. It is not a remedy that is availing when there is no actual threat or when imminence of danger is not demonstrable. 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy. Page 286 Echiverri. Gloria.. Inguillo. Asensi. TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28. De Mesa. that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic.

Santos. Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved in this case. Ramirez. all amendments to RP Energy’s ECC are null and void. HELD: 1. Page 287 Echiverri. Valiente. Reyes. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap. Palad. Lumberio. Lastimosa. 3.e. Sandoval. Whether compliance with Section 27. Marquez. Tecson. Gloria. Rodriguez. under Section 59 of the IPRA Law. Rañigo. Luis Miguel Aboitiz. On the other hand.. approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to the implementation of the power plant project. 6. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs is ultra vires because the DENR has no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a new EIS. 5. in the Statement of Accountability of the ECC. Asensi. is a precondition to the issuance of an ECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the ECC invalid.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. De Mesa. Corporal. Martinez. Cabañgon. Castillo. Alcazaren. in relation to Section 26. Corpuz. YES.3 of DAO 2003-30. Francisco. The CA rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an environment protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of Kalikasan. Espina. 2. Catindig. Valois . Inguillo. Whether or not the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage. Whether the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Sy. Tabugan. under Section 59 of the IPRA Law. Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure to undergo a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) because of the utilization of inappropriate EIA documents. ISSUES: 1. 4. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap. as representative of RP Energy. of the LGC (i. 7. De la Cruz. Coronel. that Section 8. RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage through its Environmental Management Plan which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards Albano. is a precondition to the consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and RP Energy and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the LDA invalid. and that due to the nullity of Section 8.

Coronel. Inguillo. Catindig. relative to both the procedure and substance of the amendment process. a new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence. in the ECC’s Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court. there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before an ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it invalid. Lastimosa. Corporal. Reyes. Palad. respectively. Aboitiz on December 24. Valiente. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the subject ECC were invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. 4. The appellate court failed to properly consider the applicable provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on amendments to ECCs. 2008. Sy. Ramirez. the particular circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments on this point as the issue only arose during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the appellate court. Tecson. 2008. The Supreme Court ruled that the ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules. there is insufficient basis to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was tainted with bad faith or inexcusable negligence. Albano. we uphold the validity of these amendments. De Mesa. Martinez. Consequently RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the Decision of the appellate court. Castillo. The certified true copy of the ECC bearing the signature Mr. Valois . Rañigo. Sandoval. Asensi. Thus. Our examination of the provisions on amendments to ECCs. shows that the DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second amendments. De la Cruz. as well as the EPRMP and PDR themselves. absent sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality. 2. Cabañgon. Because the signing was done after the official release of the ECC on December 22. the Supreme Court ruled that the signature requirement was substantially complied with. However. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. considering that the issue was not adequately argued nor was evidence presented before the appellate court on the circumstances at the time of signing. Marquez. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability portion was issued by the DENR and remains uncontroverted. which the DENR reviewed. Page 288 Echiverri. Gloria. Alcazaren. 3. No. Corpuz. Tabugan. While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC. Hence. Francisco. Santos. Lumberio. Aboitiz. Rodriguez. Espina. the DENR did not strictly follow its rules which require that the signing of the Statement of Accountability should be done before the official release of the ECC. Through these documents. It showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed Mr.

Tabugan. Rodriguez. violate RP Energy’s right to due process. Asensi. there was no infirmity when the LDA was entered into between SBMA and RP Energy despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians. Rañigo. Marquez. Francisco. Corporal. Santos. Inguillo. Thus. Cabañgon. Tecson. 6. Coronel. The Supreme Court ruled that a CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy. Castillo. Page 289 Echiverri. However. and the SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs. under Section 27 of the LGC. Valiente. Corpuz. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Ramirez. De Mesa. Reyes. Catindig. The Supreme Court ruled that the implementation of the project is not subject to the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians. Gloria. Lastimosa. The appellate court correctly ruled that the issue as to the validity of the third amendment to the ECC cannot be resolved in this case because it was not one of the issues set during the preliminary conference. Valois . 5. and would. Sy. Sandoval. Albano. Alcazaren. by virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227. 7. thus. we refrain from invalidating the LDA due to equitable considerations. Palad. considering that this is the first time we lay down the rule of action appropriate to the application of Section 59. Espina. Martinez.

P/Insp. he must so state in the form of an objection. Asensi. HELD: The records of the case are bereft of evidence that appellant. it was already too late in the day for appellant to have raised the same at that point since he should have done so early on before the RTC. Reyes. the alleged defects appellant is now alluding to were not among those he raised on appeal. Ramirez. Valiente. Calabocal. The RTC likewise held that the prosecution was able to establish the unbroken link in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs in both cases. Castillo. Valois . The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered. Without such objection. because [appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. during trial. and the supposed failure of the police officers to mark the sachets of shabu at the crime scene. It found the buy-bust operation to be valid. Martinez. appellant interposes this appeal where he raises as additional issues in his Supplemental Brief17 the following: (1) the failure of the police officers to mark the seized sachets of shabu not only at the scene of the crime but also in his presence. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Inguillo. Tabugan. and (2) the lack of information on the whereabouts of the shabu after it was examined by the Forensic Chemist. February 16. Calabocal. Gloria. Corpuz. It bears stressing that the Court has already brushed aside an accused’s belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person is inadmissible for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R. 195245. People of the Philippines vs. Alcazaren. The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses charged. FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) and 11 (possession of dangerous drugs). Marquez. Lumberio. Rañigo. Santos. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Catindig. interposed any objection to the non-marking of the seized items in his presence and the lack of information on the whereabouts of the shabu after it was examined by P/Insp.R. Corporal. ISSUE: Whether or not accused can raise objection to evidence for the first time on appeal. Albano. non-taking of photographs of the seized items. he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The defects he raised before the CA were limited to the alleged lack of physical inventory. the warrantless arrest and body search carried out against appellant as justified. when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered. But even then. whose testimony did not cover the manner in which the specimens were handled after the examination. 9165). Francisco. While he questioned the chain of custody before the CA. Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan G. 2015 DOCTRINE: Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Article II of Republic Act No. No. Sy. 9165. and the testimony of PO1 Rosales to be credible. Page 290 Echiverri. Lastimosa. he must so state in the form of an objection. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Espina.A. Tecson. This is considering that “[w]hatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown.A. Without such objection. Insisting on his acquittal. Cabañgon. 91653 (R. Coronel. Palad.

Valois . the CA has already concluded that the identity of the seized drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity preserved. Catindig. Francisco. De la Cruz. Espina. Lumberio. Castillo. Santos. Marquez. De Mesa. Gloria. Page 291 Echiverri. Martinez.” Besides and as already mentioned. Corpuz. Asensi. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Reyes. Valiente. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Palad. Ramirez. Sy. Corporal. he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Albano. Tecson. Alcazaren. Coronel. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Inguillo.

Sandoval. inventory. it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty. Ramirez. Inguillo. Valois . Martinez. Appellant banks on the prosecution's alleged failure to comply with the requirements of law with respect to the proper marking. Gloria. No. he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. No. Corporal. appellant raised the police operatives' alleged non-compliance with Section 21. HELD: The Supreme Court noted that appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2 Coronel's testimony regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial. Santos. Page 292 Echiverri. Appellant assails the trial court's assessment of the credibility of prosecution witness PO2 Coronel. Rañigo." Here. 91653 (R. Alcazaren. for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered. Valiente. Corpuz. In this case. he must so state in the form of objection. ISSUE: Whether or not accused can raise objection to evidence for the first time on appeal.A. he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered. In any event. 2015 DOCTRINE:Objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Catindig. the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the prosecution's case. Marquez. In this appeal. February 25. Rodriguez. it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was seized from appellant up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti. Espina. he must so state in the form of objection. FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) Article II of Republic Act No. Allan Roxas Diaz G. Sy. Asensi. People of the Philippines vs. and taking of photograph of the seized specimen. Article II of R. Thus. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. In fact. The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Tabugan. 197818.A. Without such objection. Palad. despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R. Francisco. De la Cruz. Albano. [No. 9165). Coronel. Without such objection. Lumberio. following established jurisprudence. 9165 for the first time on appeal before the CA. De Mesa. Objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.A. Tecson.] 9165.R. Castillo. at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Reyes.

Fe alleged that the property is not conjugal. and the sale was made without the signature of Teofilo. DBP then sold it spouses Antonio and Lucy Garcia (TCT No. and Decision in Civil Case No. 2004. but paraphernal property belonging to her. the same became conjugal property. 78971. Catindig.” respectively).” “G” and “H. and 3) the trial court’s pronouncement in said case that the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate. Mandaue City. G. are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. 148 of the Civil Code constitute paraphernalia property. her mother executed a quitclaim deed and transferred a portion of the mother lot to her and a new title (TCT {17216}-5415 was issued in her name. on the other. She narrated that the lot was a portion of a bigger lot owned by her mother Petronilla. Alleging that they have been separated in fact and reunion is now an impossibility due to irreconcilable differences. De Mesa. docketed thereat as C. MAN-2683 for partition with damages. or in 1996. x x x married to Teofilo Adolfo. No. Fe. In 2002. 18368 located in Bgy. Castillo. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Answer. TUDTUD. Sandoval. Teofilo B. Gloria. but that the latter refused to subdivide it. Adolfo G. 201427. which became TCT No. the Garcias sold the lot to her and another title issued in the name of “FE M. Lumberio. Valois . Fe failed to answer the Request for Admission. Fe’s sister Florencia and her husband Juanito (Gingoyons) filed Civil Case No. In accordance with Article 135 all the property brought by the wife to marriage as well as all property brought in under Art. hence.R. In her answer. Palad. hence it was null and void. MAN-4821. Inguillo. alleging Albano. Corpuz. and a new title (TCT {17833}-5515) issued in her brother’s name. 2015 DOCTRINE: The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings. Tecson. 1967. On October 11. Page 293 Echiverri. Fe alleged that that early as 1983 when she bought the lot from the Garcia’s. on the one hand. Rodriguez. Coronel. Reyes. Fe sold a 300-square meter lot portion of the lot to the spouses Gingoyon. Teoflio filed a motion to render judgment on the pleadings. 18368. She then sold the lot to her brother.Cabancalan. March 18. MAN-2683 (Exhibits “F. Adolfo vs. 1983. 2) respondent’s declaration in said Answer that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. Lastimosa. Francisco. MAN-4821. On May 25. Prior to the institution of Civil Case No. the RTC ruled in favour of Fe and declared it conjugal property. Adolfo prayed for separation of property in view of the refusal of Fe to divide the lot. Espina. Her brother then mortgaged the property to the DBP which foreclosed the same. Cabañgon. FACTS: On April 4. Marquez. Sy. Fe T. Fe thus alleged that the property exclusively belongs to her and the inclusion of Teofilo’s name in the title does not make him a co-owner but was merely used to describe her marital status.R. In her answer. Ramirez. Corporal. the Gingoyons appealed to the Court of Appeals. MAN-4821) against his wife. Santos. De la Cruz.A. Martinez. Teofilo filed a Request for Admission of 1) the genuineness of the duly marked certified true copies of the Complaint. and their sham or fictitious character. Valiente. alleging that they bought with conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E covered by TCT No. Teofilo (Adolfo) filed with the RTC Mandaue a petition for judicial separation of property (Civil Case No. Going back to Civil Case No. hence. Asensi. 18266). Rañigo. alleging that in 1988.

Lumberio. Rañigo. Tecson. taking judicial notice of its decision in Civil Case No. It stated that in a proper case for judgment on the pleadings. Castillo. The latter rendered judgment granting the motion by Teofilo. while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits. Lastimosa. The Gingoyon’s appeal to the CA. The next thing to be determined is whether this issue is fictitious or sham as to justify a summary judgment.R. It ruled that judicial separation was proper. Teofilo assailed the CA decision to the Supreme Court via petition for review. 18368 is paraphernalia property as established by the records and the evidence. (CA G.G. Valiente.R.A. Asensi. which was docketed as C. there are no ostensible issues at all on account of the defending party’s failure to raise an issue in his answer. Sandoval. Francisco. the appeal filed by Fe on the decision granting her husband’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and treating it as a motion for summary judgment.R. Nilo. Catindig. Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Coronel. The case was eventually transferred to RTC Branch 55. depositions or admissions. Inguillo. Reyes. Corpuz. her claims and documentary exhibits clearly contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request. was favourably acted upon by the CA. fictitious. The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by her failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission. treating it as a motion for summary judgment. Fe appealed to the CA. 01783. Martinez. 78971 had not yet become final. MAN-2683. ISSUE: Albano. that since Fe failed to answer the request for admission. The CA held that the trial court cannot treat Adolfo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. depositions. No. and that finally. such issues exist. In other words. arguing that the decision in CA. CV No. Corporal. Page 294 Echiverri. Rodriguez. with provision for the presumptive legitime of their child. Alcazaren. It became final and executory.A. 0783. a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded. Ramirez. It thus ordered the division of the property. he is now entitled to judgment on the pleading based on Rule 34. the trial court should have been guided by the principles that trial courts have but limited authority to render summary judgments and that summary judgments should not be rendered hastily. that the trial court disregarded the fact that the issue of whether the subject property is conjugal was still unresolved as CA-G. Tabugan. Palad. the CA ruling that TCT No. the court which handled Civil Case No. while in a proper case for summary judgment. MAN-2683 that the property is conjugal property. No. Gloria. it disputed petitioner’s claim that the subject property is their conjugal property. Fe opposed the motion. or admissions. De la Cruz. 78971) was resolved in their favour. 78971 was still pending. With Fe’s failure to provide a verified answer or denial under oath to the request for admission of the documents. the matters included in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26. It added that Fe’s Answer appeared on its face to tender an issue. GR.G. Valois . Cabañgon. or not genuine as shown by affidavits. Sy. C. Espina. Santos. although they are sham. she is deemed to have admitted the genuineness of the same.R. Marquez. De Mesa. No.

It cannot take judicial notice solely of the proceedings in Civil Case No. by invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. De la Cruz. The Albano. MAN-4821. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56 precisely for the reason that it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case No. Tabugan. instead of aiding in the hasty resolution of his case. MAN-2683 to secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief.R. Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case. In rendering summary judgment. CV No. this is not actually the case. Coronel. It should have guided petitioner to this end. in its discretion.R. MAN-2683. Corpuz. be allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G. the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. her admission in Civil Case No. 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. Sy. an appeal is deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower court. On the part of petitioner. considering the failure of Fe to answer or deny under oath the Request for Admission in Civil Case No. Lumberio. Francisco. One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject property is conjugal. Thus. Corporal. it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. HELD: The Court denies the Petition. instead of resolving petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. De Mesa. Asensi. absent any opposition from the other party.R. Alcazaren. or (2) the court. Civil Case No. 78971. While there is nothing irregular with this – as courts may “take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if (1) the parties present them in evidence. CV No. Castillo. CA-G. after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. 78971. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court. After all. the trial court should have considered the pending appeal in CA-G. Tecson. Marquez.R. MAN-2683. CV No. He may not preempt the appeal in CA-G. Gloria. petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is pending. Inguillo. Quite the contrary. Catindig. Sandoval. 78971. as well as its May 15. While it may appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules. Rañigo. resolves to do so” – the trial court however disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G. and ignore the appeal in CA-G. Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner’s request for admission by her failure to reply thereto. or a paraphernal asset of the respondent. MAN-2683. that it would be presumptuous to assume that its own decision would be affirmed on appeal. MAN-2683. Lastimosa.R. Valois . While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. CV No. he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal. Cabañgon. Palad. Reyes. Santos. the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission. 78971. because the result thereof determines whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. MAN-2683. Ramirez. Rodriguez. Espina.petitioner cannot. CV No. it would be premature to render judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. CV No. Valiente. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said case.R. Page 295 Echiverri. Martinez. 78971. In the first place.

principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court. Valiente. Gloria. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Marquez. Catindig. who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Corporal. Asensi. Inguillo. Lumberio. Rañigo. Palad. Reyes. become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party himself. De la Cruz. which became final and executory. Corpuz. is barred from adopting an inconsistent position. Francisco. De Mesa. “In estoppel. either by conventional writing or by representations. Valois . Tecson. Lastimosa. Castillo. Sy. Coronel. express or implied or in pais. Espina. Santos. It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has. Martinez. attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another. Page 296 Echiverri.” Albano. in the contemplation of law. a person. that the subject property is respondent’s paraphernal property. Ramirez.

Marquez. Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court. Section 108 cannot apply to the case as there were contentious issues which need to be Albano. Adriano and Rosario were not co-owners of the property as both of them had prior subsisting marriages at the time of their adulterous relations. however. After trial. Valiente. 2015 DOCTRINE: Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him. Rodriguez. if it does not tend to the truth. Corpuz. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. It ruled that Section 108 of PD 1529 required court authorisation for any alteration or amendment if any mistake. BAGUIS”. Coronel. that Rosario had a prior subsisting marriage to Nolasco. De la Cruz. Tabugan. among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano. Page 297 Echiverri. She prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the spouse married to Adriano. and TCT No. March 23. Gloria. Opposing. TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered. Martinez. No. Inguillo. Rosario Baguis Tambuyat vs. owned several properties. When Adriano died intestate in 1998. Tecson. the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a general court had been eliminated by PD 1529. Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321. error or omission was made in entering a certificate of title. Espina. Francisco. Adriano alone was the vendee in the deed of sale and no evidence was proved that Rosario contributed to the purchase of the property. Sandoval. producing a son named Adrian. De Mesa. and the registration was a result of the insidious machination of Rosario with the assistance of the broker. that it was she who bought it using her personal funds. Cabañgon. the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda. Wenifreda Balcom Tambuyat G. that Rosario is married to one Eduardo Nolasco. 202805. Santos. It was proved that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano. 1988 and lived together as husband and wife. alleging that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano. while Rosario (Baguis) signed as one of the witnesses. When the title to the lot was issued (TCT No. Ramirez. FACTS: Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat).R. Valois . Lumberio. The deed of sale was signed by Adriano as vendee. the later ruled that a separate and different proceeding is not necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in the case as she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the court to prove her allegations. Reyes. Palad. Corporal. T-145321 was issued with her erroneously indicated as Adriano’s spouse. the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him. She argues that the case is essentially a partition of Adriano’s estate which deprives her and her son of their share. she and Adriano were married on September 2. as well as the payment of damages in her favour. Rañigo. Rosario denied that the property was acquired by the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage. It ordered the cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one indicating Wenifreda as married to Adriano. Castillo. T-145321(M). Catindig. married since 1965. that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the proceeding as it is merely a summary proceeding and a thorough determination will have to be made if the property is conjugal or personal. On appeal to the CA. Adrian’s filiation may not be proved in a land registration case. it was registered in the name of “ADRIANO TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. Asensi. Sy.

Alcazaren. in truth and in fact. Inguillo. if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse. then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect. which are thus Albano. registered as married. expectant. she actually owned the property. the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous. Under Section 108 of PD 1529. Lastimosa. and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. Coronel. or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Nonetheless. Martinez. contingent. Corporal. P-443-99 is – who should be included in the title to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse. Gloria. Sandoval. Cabañgon. (2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate. (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed. (3) when any error. (5) when the registered owner has been married. Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse. the proceeding for the erasure. Francisco. which owned registered land and has been dissolved. the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected. Banguis” when. Santos. Rañigo. or inchoate. Tabugan. Lumberio. The present case falls under (3) and (7). De la Cruz. alteration. On the other hand. Espina. the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property. De Mesa. Marquez. Rodriguez. omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate. it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. This Court is not a trier of facts. Valois . or. All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse. Palad. Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title. Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it. respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse. have terminated and ceased. so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. Catindig. Sy. has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution. Ramirez. where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M. Unfortunately for her. while the deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. she acquired the property using her own funds. Corpuz. (6) when a corporation. Page 298 Echiverri. HELD: The Court denies the Petition. Tecson. this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT T-143521 to indicate Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano. and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. resolved by a court of general jurisdiction. whether vested. then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. Asensi. The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321. Castillo. with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence. Reyes. Understandably. based on the evidence. Valiente.

Inguillo. basically.” Albano. Rañigo. Page 299 Echiverri. Tabugan. Francisco. Corpuz. On the other hand. Tecson. Lumberio. Valiente. Sandoval. considered conclusive and binding. Asensi. Sy. Santos. “Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him. De Mesa. renders her claim of ownership doubtful. Lastimosa. if she were the sole purchaser of the property. it would only be logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee. De la Cruz. Reyes. Marquez. Catindig. and common sense.” One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience. Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee. Moreover. Coronel. Espina. if Adriano contributed to its purchase. the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him. Palad. and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred in this case. Alcazaren. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim. thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Rodriguez. Valois . Ramirez. Corporal. logic. Martinez. Cabañgon. if it does not tend to the truth. the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister. Castillo. Gloria. she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof. Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same.

The mistakes of counsel bind his client. No. the record will disclose that petitioner was itself neglectful of its duties relative to its case. Santos. Appellant argues that it should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence or mistakes of its counsel. 2015 DOCTRINE Attorneys. De Mesa. petitioner changed counsel only after the trial court’s January 30. Albano. Lumberio. Valiente. Palad. Sandoval. The general rule still applies that the mistakes of counsel bind his client. petitioner’s counsel and witness failed to appear during the successive scheduled hearings. HELD: Yes. Page 300 Echiverri. Valois . on the other hand. Espina. It appears that despite witnessing firsthand the caliber of its lawyer during the initial presentation of its evidence in 2003. FACTS: After several opportunities for the presentation of its first witness. FAJ CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. vs. Corporal. De la Cruz. Ramirez. Inguillo. which the trial court granted despite respondent’s opposition. SUSAN M. and it continued to retain the services of its counsel which it now conveniently claims to be negligent. ISSUE: Whether or not the mistake of the counsel bind his client. G. Rañigo. Marquez. Cabañgon. Its counsel moved and asked for several postponements of trial. Castillo. Tabugan. petitioner failed to proceed with trial. Alcazaren. to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Francisco. Tecson. Rodriguez. Coronel. Appellant now questions anew the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on ground of failure to prosecute. 200759. Lastimosa. Martinez. Asensi. However. Gloria.R. Reyes. Sy. 2006 Decision on respondent’s counterclaim. Suffice it to state that we have not seen any reason to reverse the CA’s ruling on this matter. even after repeatedly suffering from the latter’s claimed lack of care. Corpuz. prompting the trial court. Catindig. upon respondent’s motion. March 25. SAULOG.

Reyes. De Mesa. DOCTRINE: Remedial Law. particularly after their affirmance by the CA” as petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure from the said doctrine. Cabañgon. On appeal to the Supreme Court. ROGELIO ROQUE. Marquez. Lastimosa. the RTC “had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. Rodriguez. 2015. Palad. the Court. The Petition must therefore be denied on this basis because “one. No. FACTS: Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. Ramirez. Coronel. Gloria. Rañigo. Tabugan. tainted with grave abuse of discretion. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. are evidentiary and factual in nature. Martinez. Francisco. Criminal Procedure. as in this case. Corpuz. April 6. Asensi. the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions. Besides. Inguillo. absurd. Castillo. speculative. or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin. requiring as they do a reappreciation and reexamination of the evidence. Tecson. unless they were mistaken. Appeals. tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Page 301 Echiverri. Petitioner’s assigned errors. speculative. RTC ruled against the petitioner prompting him to file an appeal with the CA which affirmed the lower court’s decision. Albano. Catindig. Valois . will not disturb the factual findings of the CA. De la Cruz. or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin. are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA. HELD: No. petitioner grounded the appeal on CA’s appreciation of evidence with regard to the presence of unlawful aggression. its assessment of the probative weight thereof. Lumberio. The Supreme Court (SC). Corporal.” which was not shown to be the case here. and two. its calibration of the testimonial evidence. absurd. conflicting. as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings. conflicting. unless they were mistaken. not being a trier of facts. Alcazaren. Sy. Espina. will not disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA). Santos. [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC. 193169. findings of facts of the RTC. vs. not being a trier of facts.” “To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s findings of fact. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may reappreciate and reexamine evidence which are evidentiary and factual in nature.R. After all. Sandoval.

Sandoval. Nueva Ecija a Complaint for injunction and damages with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. the issue of the validity of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against petitioner must also be resolved. petitioner and NIA executed a Supplemental Agreement amending Article II of the contract which pertains to payment of taxes. Coronel. Alcazaren. Martinez. multiple demand for payment of RPT was sent to the petitioner which the same paid under protest. 2005. 2005. 1995. petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City. Francisco.R. FACTS: On June 26. CE CASECNAN WATER AND ENERGY COMPANY. Valiente. De la Cruz. A certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. On September 6. After filing for an appeal with the Nueva Ecija Board. Gloria. Asensi. Valois . Petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract relative to the construction and development of the Casecnan MultiPurpose Irrigation and Power Project. Page 302 Echiverri. Albano. a combined irrigation and hydroelectric power generation facility using the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva Ecija. the expanded jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions. its RPT due was P248. Reyes. 2015 DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. Tabugan. On September 29. Espina. Catindig. Tecson. orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. De Mesa.PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA G. Inguillo. petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor a Notice of Assessment of Real Property dated August 2.It states that NIA must reimburse petitioner for real property taxes (RPT) provided the same was paid upon NIA’s directive and with the concurrence of the Department of Finance. Court of Tax Appeals. Rañigo. 2003. Marquez. Castillo. 196278.676. Sy. INC. RTC denied petitioners request. Hence. Palad. on September 23. Santos. Ramirez. VS. thus jurisdiction over the case lies within the Court of Tax Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has a jurisdiction over an interlocutory order issued by the RTC over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.60. Lumberio. Petitioner filed under Rule 65 with the CA which dismissed the same contending that since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction. 2008.349. June 17. Lastimosa. Corpuz. which indicates that for the years 2002 to 2005. Corporal. No.

the Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Cabañgon. It is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. Espina. Coronel. Rodriguez. Gloria. Inguillo. Reyes. Ramirez. Valiente. With respect to the CTA. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions. No doubt. orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. Marquez. Castillo. Lastimosa. Albano. Sandoval. Page 303 Echiverri. a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA. Catindig. its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of acollegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. Tabugan. Corpuz. 9282. Alcazaren. Santos. Thus. Palad. Asensi. Corporal. De Mesa. the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case. HELD: No. Rañigo. De la Cruz. Sy. the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction. Tecson. Lumberio. Martinez. Francisco. Valois . And as earlier discussed.

On September 22. Corporal. 2007-058 dated December 7. petitioner DPI filed with the respondent COA a money claim for the payment of textbooks it allegedly delivered on July 3. De la Cruz. ISSUE 1. pursuant to Section 196 of Republic Act No. Whether or not the absence of GAD renders the COA decision final. Albano. 2008. Decisions and resolutions of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) may be reviewed and nullified only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2015. Gloria. The Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO). Jr. 2. Espina. 2007. Castillo. Inguillo. has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. Tabugan. petitioner DPI filed the instant Petition raising the issue of whether the respondent COA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim on the sole basis of sheer doubt. Page 304 Echiverri. On April 29. Valiente. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Appeals. Sy. 201042. In response to the request. 2007-058 datedDecember 7. 9401 then Department of Budget and Management Secretary Rolando G. 2007. Tecson. Marquez. which yielded the same result. COMMISSION ONAUDIT and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION-AUTONOMOUSREGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO G. Lumberio. Hence. Coronel. 2008. as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Martinez. The respondent Commission on Audit (COA). Whether or not COA committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim. creating a team of auditors to validate and evaluate the alleged unpaid obligation. Andaya. Whether or not the decisions and resolutions of COA may be reviewed and nullified by other grounds except for GAD. Valois . The findings of the FAIO complemented and corroborated the initial observations/findings of the audit team created under LGS Office Order No. Commission on Audit. Palad. Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. INC. FACTS On November 15. DOCTRINE: Commission on Audit. De Mesa. Rodriguez. No. DARAGA PRESS. Reyes. vs. 2007. Catindig. 1998 to the respondent. pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. Jurisdiction. COA denied the money claim because it found no convincing proof that the subject textbooks were delivered. Asensi. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. 3. Corpuz. 1445. Sandoval.R. Cornejo of the LGS issued a Memorandum expressing serious doubts on the validity of the obligation as the actual receipt of the subject textbooks could not be ascertained. Legal Services Sector (LSS) conducted further validation ofpetitioner DPI’s money claim. Santos. Rañigo. June 16. the respondent COA issued Local Government Sector (LGS) Office Order No. Francisco. requested the respondent COA to validate and evaluate the request of then Regional Governor of the ARMM Nur Misuari for the release of funds to cover the region’s alleged unpaid obligation to petitioner DPI for textbooks delivered in 1998.

Tabugan. Lastimosa. Corpuz. Corporal. Valiente. not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers. Albano. Inguillo. Yes. Catindig. Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice. there is sufficient reason for the respondent COA to doubt and disregard the documentary evidence presented by petitioner DPI as the FAIO found inconsistencies. an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. No. The respondent COA. De Mesa. the factual findings of the respondent COA. 2. must be accorded great respect and finality. Francisco. whim. pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. Espina. And as we have often said: It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities. Alcazaren. Sy. Coronel. Reyes. in fact. It is. Rañigo. Ramirez. which are undoubtedly supported by the evidence on record. Valois . De la Cruz. Marquez. has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. Rodriguez. and despotism. Castillo. Page 305 Echiverri. Sandoval. especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA. Tecson. Gloria. 3. Decisions and resolutions of the respondent COA may be reviewed and nullified only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Palad. Contrary to the claim of petitioner DPI. Martinez. as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Santos. and inaccuracies in the dates and figures stated in the documents provided for investigation. No. Lumberio. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Cabañgon. Asensi. 1445. discrepancies. HELD 1.

No. Marquez. Rañigo. Asensi. Allan.R. The list is not all-encompassing because people do not act similarly to a given Albano. Castillo. They believed that when faced with such situation. Alcazaren. and Jojo. Tabugan.ALLAN BRITANICO and JOJO BRITANICO G. Rolando would naturally shout to distract his uncle’s assailants or to seek help. 2009. Francisco. Moreover. De Mesa. Appelants question the same based on the witness' inconsistencies and improbabilities. She claimed that Francisco is her uncle. they insisted that Rolando should have immediately reported the incident to the authorities. For example. Rolly. Coronel. Alma testified that it was Rolando whoinformed her about the hacking incident. he hid in the grassy portion for about 10 minutes. Inguillo. Rolando left and immediately informed his cousin. It is a settled principle that people react differently when confronted with a startling and dangerous experience. resulting in his instantaneous death. DOCTRINE Remedial Law. act with nonchalance. on the other hand. while Jojo. the number of wounds sustained by the victim did not tally with the number of blows supposedly delivered by the assailants as testified to by Rolando. Witnesses. Lumberio. June 22. Lastimosa. Page 306 Echiverri. It is a settled principle that people react differently when confronted with a startling and dangerous experience. Allan and Rolly are her cousins CA affirmed in full the ruling of the trial court. Cabañgon. Tecson. De la Cruz. the RTC rendered its Judgment finding appellants guilty as charged. Martinez. 201836. Alma. Alma. Sandoval. he saw the latter and his sons. Valiente. with the use of bladed weapons. 2003. when he was about to pass by the house of Francisco. Sy. The court a quo lent credence to the eyewitness account of Rolando Toralde (Rolando) who narrated that in the afternoon of August 23. They contended that it was unnatural for Rolando to simply watch for 10 minutes while his uncle was being hacked to death. FACTS Respondents in the case were charged with murder of Segundo belmonte after they allegedly conspired to kill the latter. Fearingfor his life. Evidence. Valois . Hence this petition. or he may act cautiously and seek the help of other people. a person who witnessed a hacking incident may faint. However. Upon seeing his uncle fall to the ground. Gloria. he was on his way to the house of his uncle. Segundo. with treachery and evident premeditation. they claimed that the trial court erred in lending credence to the narration of Rolando as the same was fraught with inconsistencies and improbabilities. he may also act with bravery by coming to the aid and succor of the victim. hacking him several times hitting him on different parts of his body. Corpuz. Catindig. Further. being the brother of her mother. HELD No. and not just to his cousin. Rodriguez. or may hide out of fear for his life. When placed on the witness stand. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. about the misfortune that befell her father. Espina. most especially if the latter is a relative. On December 7. Corporal. ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in lending credence to the narration of Rolando as the same was fraught with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Santos. hack Segundo with the use of bladed weapons. Ramirez. Palad. 2015. Reyes.

De la Cruz. Rañigo. Corpuz. Marquez. Reyes. situation. Francisco. Lastimosa. by the appellants. Martinez. Asensi. Rolando also admitted that he got scared which is also a reasonable and logical reaction to such a startling event. Tecson. Alcazaren. for Rolando to hide in the grassy area upon witnessing the hacking of his uncle. we do not find it unnatural. Lumberio. Santos. Rodriguez. Page 307 Echiverri. Corporal. Espina. Coronel. Cabañgon. Valois . Inguillo. Gloria. Tabugan. as the appellants claim. Castillo. Catindig. Valiente. Hence. Albano. Sandoval. Ramirez. Palad. Sy. De Mesa. Segundo.

Rule 45. On their way home. De la Cruz. Marquez. Branch 172. and RUBEN OLAVARIO y MAUNAO vs. Charlie Penilla (Penilla). Sy. of the Rules of Court. Rañigo. de Leon. from a drinking session. People that: Pursuant to Section 3. Lumberio. conflicting. the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case. Alcazaren. Palad. unless they were mistaken. or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin. Lastimosa. Martinez. Villostas (Villostas) was fetched by his half-brother. Inguillo. Asensi. Castillo. Valenzuela City. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. it found no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as regards petitioners’ culpability. The assigned errors. will not disturb the factual findings of the CA. Catindig. Ramirez. is by petition for review on certiorari. speculative. T.” which was not shown to be the case here.R. De Mesa. The CA. 2015 DOCTRINE: Suffice it to state that the errors raised by the petitioners are all “appreciation of evidence” errors or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 FACTS: The victim Eugene M. however. reclusion perpetua. the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions. are evidentiary and factual in nature. three men who belonged to a group then singing and drinking suddenly stabbed him on different parts of his body. Reyes. Villostas decided to buy cigarettes from a nearby videoke bar at Gen. Tabugan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. The Court had already explained in Batistis v. and two. debunked petitioners’ arguments as it found the inconsistencies pointed out by them as relating to mere minor details. They pointed out inconsistencies in their testimonies respecting the victim’s degree of intoxication at the time of the incident. tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Rule 122. Valiente. Corporal. in its Decision. Cabañgon. not being a trier of facts. Coronel. A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. ISSUE: Whether the petition that requires appreciation and reexamination of trial evidence will prosper HELD:. requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of the trial evidence. Francisco. 197731. Page 308 Echiverri. Albano. Santos. They only stopped when bystanders started throwing stones at them. the Court. Gloria. Barangay tanods immediately responded and brought the malefactors to the Barangay Hall where they were later identified. This whole incident was witnessed by Penilla who was then only seven to eight arms length away from the crime scene. and Section 9. the kind or brand of liquor that he imbibed. wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death. Corpuz. No. The petition must therefore be denied on this basis because “one. Tecson. Inside the bar. Valois . rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty as charged. On the other hand. HERMIE OLARTE y TARUG. Espina. or life imprisonment. Rodriguez. Petitioners questioned the credibility of prosecution witnesses. Petitioners argued that such inconsistencies rendered doubtful their identification as the culprits by said prosecution witnesses. July 6. Sandoval. and the length of time that he had been drinking immediately prior thereto. absurd.

(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. Inguillo. Palad. findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive upon this Court. Asensi. 2015 DOCTRINE:The general rule is that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. argue in their Comment that the Petition requires a reevaluation of the evidence. De Mesa. Coronel. Lumberio. 92. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Ramirez. (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: Respondents received separate demand letters from petitioner and the Trajeras requiring them to remove a portion of the Gabayeron home and fence which they claim encroached upon their respective properties. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration. there is no reason to review their findings of fact and law. however. Page 309 Echiverri. Tecson. Espina. Corpuz. absurd or impossible. surmises or conjectures. Respondents. (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting. Valois . justice. Sandoval. Points of law. issues. Catindig. Santos. The CA issued its Decision affirming the RTC’s judgment. Respondents filed a case for quieting of title and damages against the petitioners before the RTC. which is proscribed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations. that in raising the issue of good faith. JOSE YULO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION vs. Martinez. Francisco. Petitioner and the Trajeras interposed an appeal before the CA. and due process. Marquez. Sy. August 03. Corporal. 197709. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play. and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court. which the CA denied. are final. denying the appeal. No. Lastimosa. Petitioner argues that respondents were not buyers in good faith as they did not cause the survey of the properties at the time they bought the same. Reyes. It has been repeatedly held that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing errors of law. they would have discovered that the house and fence encroached upon adjacent lots. SPOUSES PERLA CABAYLO DAVIS AND SCOTT DAVIS G. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether the petition which requires a reevaluation of the evidence may prosper. Rodriguez. HELD: A petition to review the decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. as far as this Court is concerned.R. Castillo. as it is not its function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. the petitioner questions the findings of fact of the CA which. Tabugan. theories. The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (respondents) and against the defendants (petitioners) confirming plaintiffs’ title to Lot No. Rañigo. or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both Albano. (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case. There are recognized exceptions to the rule. De la Cruz. as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. and that given the unanimous conclusion arrived at by the trial and appellate courts. Gloria. on the other hand. that had they inspected the properties and gone beyond the titles thereto prior to the sale.

if properly considered. Espina. Coronel. Alcazaren. petitioner has not shown that this case falls under any of the above exceptions. Francisco. (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court. Castillo. Rodriguez. Valiente. Rañigo. the appellant and the appellee. or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties. Asensi. Tecson. (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Lastimosa. Marquez. However. Tabugan. Reyes. Ramirez. Page 310 Echiverri. Inguillo. Cabañgon. (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. De la Cruz. Palad. Santos. Sandoval. would justify a different conclusion. the petition was DENIED. De Mesa. Sy. which. Gloria. Catindig. Corpuz. Albano. Martinez. (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent. Valois . Lumberio. Thus. Corporal.

Marquez. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Valiente. Lumberio. Petitioner moved for reconsideration invoking liberal application of procedural laws. to wit: i. Other pieces of evidence/documents adduced before the lower court. Cabañgon. Santos. Castillo. Page 311 Echiverri. Copy of the appellant's brief filed before the RTC. De la Cruz. FACTS: Respondent Joseph Rios filed a criminal case against petitioner Teddy Maravilla for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Some relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents. if any. Reyes. Tecson. It failed to incorporate a written explanation why the preferred personal mode of filing under Section 11. respondent was injured and incapacitated to work for more than ninety days. Espina. Revised Rules of Court. Rule 429 of the Revised Rules of Court. iv. the insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled with the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of his petition. ii. it is the CA that ultimately determines the sufficiency of these attachments. As viewed. August 19. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice. Copy of the appellee's brief. 196875. Tabugan. for failure of the petitioner to comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules. this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. as a result. the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Albano. In this case. in violation of Section 2(d). De Mesa. Catindig. Francisco. Justice eschews anarchy. Lastimosa. but in its second assailed Resolution. Martinez. Palad. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA. TEDDY MARAVILLA vs. Sandoval. Coronel. Corporal. was not availed of. Rule 13. which are necessary for a better understanding and resolution of the instant petition. the instant petition is defective in substance: a. JOSEPH RIOS G. the CA stood its ground.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary b. Thus. Alcazaren. were not attached therein. 2015 DOCTRINE: Even though petitioner exercises the initiative to select what will be attached to his Petition for Review.R. Ramirez. Respondent accused petitioner of recklessly driving his jeep which caused it to collide with the motorcycle he (respondent) was then driving. Gloria. Valois . No. Corpuz. Asensi. Inguillo. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review under rule 42 due to the technicalities. Copy of the information filed before the municipal trial court. iii. Sy.

Also. Corpuz. Albano. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition." it "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Francisco. De la Cruz. Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of "documents which should accompany the petition. He maintained that what he has submitted based on his discretion. Alcazaren. the accompanying documents were insufficient to support the petition. Instead. Cabañgon. Marquez. De Mesa. Rañigo. The CA has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion. Asensi. are all that are necessary to support his allegations in his petition. Valiente. Gloria. the petitioner remained [adamant] in his stand not to submit the additional pleadings and other material portions of the record. Lastimosa. Inguillo. Sandoval. Instead of manifesting that he would submit the additional documentary evidence. Page 312 Echiverri. Moreover. As we have already mentioned. We (SC) cannot agree with the petitioner's arrogant but unworthy proposition. Reyes. Santos. the petitioner stubbornly chose to insist that this Court direct the elevation of the records of the case if we deem that the relevant documents were not appended to the petition. Espina. the petitioner could have easily ended his debacle by merely attaching the supplemental documents in his Motion for Reconsideration. HELD: NO. Valois . Ramirez. Tecson. Corporal. the insufficiency of the supporting documents combined with the unjustified refusal of petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of [his] petition. Tabugan. to see to it that the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. Palad. It is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material portions of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition. Catindig." In this case. Sy. Coronel. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Martinez. Castillo. Petitioner's discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not unbridled.

injunction may be granted. respondent. De Mesa. Francisco. Asensi. (1) it is the DOLE Secretary andnot the RTC which has jurisdiction over cases assailingPOEA Orders which direct the cancellation of license of arecruitment agency. Martinez. Tecson. Catindig. POEA filed with the RTC a Motion toDismiss12 based on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. and in such cases. Two days later Principalia soughtto stay the implementation of the June 8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Court issued 72 hour TRO. was found by the POEA to have collected fromcomplainant Alejandro Ramos an excessive placement fee. vs. Page 313 Echiverri. Palad. filed a Motion toDismiss (With Leave of Court)19 before the RTC. Valiente. Rañigo. 2015 DOCTRINE:While “[w]ellentrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. FACTS: In the Order respondent Principalia Management andPersonnel Consultants. Principalia nevertheless failed to exhaustadministrative remedies since it failed to first seekrecourse from the DOLE. Inc. cannot be questioned in an injunction suit. Corporal. (2) assuming that the RTC hasjurisdiction. Ramirez. Sandoval.failure to exhaust administrative remedies and forumshopping. 198426. Coronel. Reyes. Corpuz. a recruitmentagency. It has been held that “[c]ourts cannot enjoin an agency from performing an act within its prerogative. However. PRINCIPALIAMANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS. petitioner. Marquez. Republic. Gloria. Santos. Itcontended that the immediate cancellation of its license notonly deprived it of due process but also jeopardized thedeployment of hundreds of overseas Filipino workers. Rodriguez. such as in the case at bar. Hence. the RTC denied the said motion. questioned byway of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. No. According to it. on May 22. represented by thePHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA). Principalia believed that the Albano. Principalia. It averredthat due to the length of time that the case has beenpending. (Principalia). Espina. September 2. Valois .Aside from this. 2009 POEAOrder by filing aComplaint for Injunction with Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ ofPreliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. and (3) Principalia committedforum shopping when it also later appealed RTC ruled that the case falls under the exception tothe rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since itappears that Principalia may suffer irreparable damage asa result of the immediate cancellation of its license.” it is not entirely correct to say that an action by an administrative agency. it is no longer interested in pursuing the same. Castillo. Alcazaren. or error of law.R. Tabugan. Inguillo.” Indeed..INC. there is no forum shopping because there is neitheridentity of parties nor identity of relief between the injunction case and the appealbefore the DOLE. G. Lastimosa. 2013. the CA stoodits ground by denying the Republic’s Motion forReconsideration. Sy. fraud. Cabañgon. Lumberio. De la Cruz. through the POEA. except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abused or exceeded its jurisdiction. administrative decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion.

this likewise goes true with respect to themain relief for injunction. The Republiclikewise buttresses its other arguments that Principaliafailed to exhaust administrative remedies when it directlyfiled the injunction case with the RTC and that itcommitted forum- shopping. Ramirez. suffice it to saythat this principle admits of exceptions. Castillo. Alcazaren.. Albano. Parties Arguments: Principalia. (1) there must be a right to be protected. deprivation of dueprocess. Sandoval. Asensi. aside from refuting the substantialarguments of the Republic. Tabugan. and (2) theacts against which the injunction is to be directed areviolative of said right. ISSUE: Whether the RTC is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the injunction case against the Order of POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all pre-employment cases. Lastimosa. Santos. To further convince the Court. the RTC was correct in not dismissing thecase and in allowing the same to proceed to trial.i. Corpuz. As the elements for its issuance. i. Palad. HELD: Anent the failure of Principalia to observe the principleof exhaustion of administrative remedies. Espina.e.e. Coronel. Rodriguez.Principalia raised one of these exceptions. De Mesa. Gloria. This is in view ofthe fact that its 2007 license which was ordered cancelledby the POEA had already long expired and in fact has beenrenewed by the POEA many times over. on the other hand. De la Cruz. as an issue in its suit. the resolution of theinstant Petition is necessary in settling once and for allwhich between the DOLE Secretary and the RTC hasjurisdiction over actions assailing a POEA Order thatinvolves immediate enforcement of penalties for seriousoffenses such as cancellation of license.. Lumberio.39 are matters that must be provedduring trial. Reyes. argues that therenewal of Principalia’s license does not bar this Courtfrom ruling on the matters raised in the Petition. asserts that the presentPetition is already moot and academic. Evenassuming that the Petition has indeed become moot andacademic. the case at bench falls under the exceptions thatauthorize courts to pass upon questions that are alreadymoot.Significantly. Sy. the Republic aversthat in view of the plethora of pending similar cases thatseek injunction from regular courts. Catindig.38 and notably. Inguillo. Marquez. the RTC merely acted in its judicial spherewhen it proceeded to try the case. Tecson. Francisco. Principalia thusasserts that a ruling on this Petition will no longer be of practical value considering that the subject matter thatPrincipalia then sought to enjoin was the immediateenforcement of the POEA Order cancelling its 2007 license. Cabañgon. Valiente. The Republic. And since this issue is aquestion of fact which the Court can only determine afterthe trial is had. Rañigo. Valois . Corporal. Martinez. issuesinvolved in this case have already become moot andacademic in view of the subsequent renewal of its license. Page 314 Echiverri.

[Rev. De la Cruz. established an orphanage and schoolin Cagayan. Francisco. 197472. However. Under the circumstances. More than two decades later President Fidel V. Tabugan. he has been inpeaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located inthe western portion of Palaui Island. De Mesa. In view of these. for the saidpreliminary writ. Reyes. Espina. represented byCommander Raymond Alpuerto of the Naval Base CamilloOsias. Sta. 201 was issued on May 22. Catindig. Gloria. petitioner. President Ferdinand E. Lumberio. (Rev. Valois . Valiente. Marcos issuedProclamation No. Cabañgon. Ramos declared Palaui Island and the surrounding waterssituated in the Municipality of Sta.” FACTS: Respondent Rev. Corpuz. Ana. not to thewhole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Palad. Cortez filed the saidPetition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatoryinjunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession andto not disturb the same. Rev.Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding Officer of thePhilippine Naval Command. No. Ana. SR. Ramirez. amissionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian andcharitable activities. Tecson. at the time that Proc. 201 had the effect of removing Palaui Island from the alienable or disposable portion Albano. Hence. if issued.R. and further. 2015 DOCTRINE:“An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of possession. Cortez and his men were constrained toleave the area. Cortez). September 7. Martinez.REV. Petition was granted. Rañigo. therefore. Sy. the samepertained to five hectares (subject area) only. Cortez. Corporal. CORTEZ. CLAUDIO R. Sr. 201 reserving for military purposes aparcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Alcazaren. respondent. Proclamation No. Page 315 Echiverri. the title of petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains unclear and doubtful. vs. G. Port San Vicente. With the help of Aetas and others. Rev. Even so. Coronel. injunction cannot be issued in order to protect ones alleged right of possession over the same. Marquez. More significantly. Castillo. Cortez] has not perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired any vested right thereto considering that he only occupied the land as alleged by him in 1962 or barely five (5) years before the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation. to be made permanent. No. 1967. Rev. Lastimosa. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Cortez] failed to present in evidence the application for patent allegedly filed by [him] showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land which he possessed or occupied for a long period of time. Cagayan as marine reserve. cleared and developed foragricultural purposes in order to support his charitable.He claimed that since 1962. Sandoval. Claudio R. Asensi..Cortez because the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined or accurately identified the land area. Cortez filed a Petition forInjunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C.humanitarian and missionary works. Santos. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. and [is] seriously disputed by the government. Cagayan. [Rev.

Cabañgon.the applicant is required to show. He alsoclaimed that he has no interest over the land. Since itis a mere preventive remedy. Sy. Lumberio. To be a basis fora final and permanent injunction. Alcazaren. Tabugan. the right and the actviolative thereof must be established by the applicant withabsolute certainty. Valois .” Apreliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an actionor proceeding prior to judgment or final order. Simply stated. Finally. or in case ofmandatory injunctive writ. Martinez. the main action for injunction seeks a judgment thatembodies a final injunction. Corporal. Cortezadmitted during trial that he filed the Petition forinjunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural communitiesin Palaui Island and not in his capacity as pastor ormissionary of the Church of the Living God. CA upheld theRTC’s issuance of a final injunction. as of the date of [the] issuance [of the proclamation]. In so ruling. Sandoval. Valiente. Asensi. Rañigo. Inguillo. it only seeks to preventthreatened wrong. Rodriguez. For its issuance. ISSUE: Whether Rev. Reyes. The main action for injunction is distinct from theprovisional or ancillary remedy of preliminaryinjunction. it is only afterthe court has come up with a definite pronouncementrespecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative ofsuch right. Francisco.” A preliminary injunction does not determinethe merits of a case or decide controverted facts. Palad. Catindig. Otherwise stated. Tecson. 16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. the applicantneeds only to show that he has the ostensible right to thefinal relief prayed for in his complaint. Corpuz. thathe has a right which is not vitiated by any substantialchallenge or contradiction. one which confirms thepreliminary mandatory injunction. of the public domain and therefore the island. the CA found thesame to be a mere obiter dictum. Gloria. the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples’ [Right] Act(IPRA). that a final injunction is issued. withrespect to the RTC’s mention of the IPRA. Marquez. the OSG argued that the Petition shouldhave been dismissed outright for not being the real party-in-interest. Espina. In its brief. Lastimosa. further injury and irreparable harm orinjustice until the rights of the parties are settled. Cortez is entitled to a: (1) Preliminary mandatory injunction (2) Final writ of mandatory injunction. Coronel. It is issued when thecourt. De Mesa. based on its appreciation of the evidencepresented. Based onthese admissions. Castillo. is convinced that theapplicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained ofpermanently enjoined. after trial on the merits. at least tentatively. RTC rendered its Decisionmaking the injunction final and permanent. On the otherhand. Page 316 Echiverri. Albano. Ramirez. A final injunction is onewhich perpetually restrains the party or person enjoinedfrom the commission or continuance of an act. HELD: (1) YES. De la Cruz. has ceased to be disposable public land. “It isusually granted when it is made to appear that there is asubstantial controversy between the parties and one ofthem is committing an act or threatening the immediatecommission of an act that will cause irreparable injury ordestroy the status quo of the controversy before a fullhearing can be had on the merits of the case. Santos.

it is necessarythat such right must have been established by him withabsolute certainty. the Court finds that Rev. Valiente. Rañigo. Being such. Martinez. Alcazaren. In this case. Rodriguez. Viewed in this light. Asensi. Ramirez. Marquez. it cannot be appropriated andtherefore not a proper subject of possession under Article530 of the Civil Code. it must be considered as still inalienablepublic domain. Catindig. he. Gloria. Rev. In view of the foregoing. Coronel. Reyes. Here. the Court notes that while Rev. it is necessary that the Courtinitially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Valois . Hence. As earlier stressed. Page 317 Echiverri. Corpuz. De Mesa. Cortez reliesheavily on his asserted right of possession. Sandoval. Sy.nevertheless. Espina. Palad. Cortez started to occupy the same. Francisco. Inguillo. Lumberio. Cabañgon.” Thus. Santos. Albano.Cortez indeed exists. “Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1)there must be a right to be protected and (2) the actsagainst which the injunction is to be directed are violativeof said right. Castillo. Lastimosa. Corporal. Cortez’claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. there is no such proof showing that thesubject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. De la Cruz. Cortezfailed to conclusively establish his claimed right over thesubject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to theissuance of a final injunction. Tecson. failed to show that the subject area overwhich he has a claim is not part of the public domain andtherefore can be the proper object of possession. Tabugan. (2) No.

on one hand. nevertheless. admits of exceptions. he reprimanded respondent on a daily basis. 199931. Santos. Rañigo. it reviews only questions of law. and budgeting of food supplies of the vessel. Marquez. he also reported to the latter the insufficiency and poor quality of some of the supplies. on the other. in petitions for review on certiorari. Further. keeping in mind his duties. Palad. Asensi. INC SHIPMANAGEMENT. Alcazaren. Martinez. Page 318 Echiverri. No. INTERORIENT NAVIGATION COMPANY LTD. Inguillo. which he refused to accept. corporate officer of INC The LA rendered a Decision declaring that petitioners illegally dismissed respondent. Respondent stated that on September 11. De la Cruz. It declared that the delay in filing the case proved the weakness of respondent's claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be elevated to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari. on the other. 2007. and the NLRC. considering that the factual findings of the LA and the CA. Castillo. Gloria. Valiente. AND REYNALDO RAMIREZv. This Albano. and the NLRC. 2015 DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that this Court is not a trier of facts. FACTS: Ranulfo Camporedondo was hired by INC Shipmanagement. only questions of law may be raised. are at odds. the captain gave him a return ticket to the Philippines to take a vacation. Cabañgon. Interorient and Reynaldo Elamirez. respondent was given a report13 of dismissal. are at odds. in petitions for review on certiorari. Corporal. On August 27. Sandoval. HELD: It is axiomatic that this Court is not a trier of facts. respondent's tasks included food preparation and meals of the ship crew. 10Allegedly. respondent inquired from the captain the budget for the vessel. The NLRC. September 07.RANULFO CAMPOREDONDO G. Espina. Inc as its chief cook on board the vessel M/V Fortunia for a period of 10 months with a monthly salary of US$578. Rodriguez. respondent filed a Complaint15 for illegal dismissal. it reviews only questions of law. As chief cook. Reyes. 2008. INC. Francisco. Sy. Valois . There being contradictory findings of facts. Lastimosa. Lumberio.R. Tecson. as in this case where the factual findings of the LA and the CA. on one hand.00. On September 12. ruled against the respondent stating that it was convinced that respondent's performance as chief cook was below the company's standard. He was purportedly promised to be transferred to another vessel. This rule. custody. 2007 or about a month and a half into his contract.. the Court deigns it right to evaluate the pieces of evidence adduced by the parties and draw conclusions from them. inventory. however.50 and allowance of US$80. De Mesa. As a result. non-payment of overtime pay and attorney's fees against INC. Catindig. Tabugan. As such. These inquiries enraged the captain. As such. Ramirez. Corpuz. Coronel. only questions of law may be raised.

are at odds. Cabañgon. Lumberio. nevertheless. the Court deigns it right to evaluate the pieces of evidence adduced by the parties and draw conclusions from them. Castillo. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Francisco. There being contradictory findings of facts. Asensi. Marquez. Inguillo. Coronel. Corpuz. on one hand. on the other. rule. Catindig. Page 319 Echiverri. Valiente. Santos. Rodriguez. Martinez. Gloria. Reyes. Tabugan. Tecson. Sandoval. admits of exceptions. De Mesa. Palad. Albano. Alcazaren. and the NLRC. Espina. De la Cruz. Corporal. Ramirez. Sy. Valois . as in this case where the factual findings of the LA and the CA.

Gloria. there was speculation that smoked food may be promoting factors. INC/NORWEGIAN CREW MANAGEMENTv. Valiente. It opined that aside from bare allegations. Asensi. Page 320 Echiverri. this rule admits of exceptions and one such exception is where the Court may make its own evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties because the factual findings of the tribunals or courts a quo are in conflict with each other. Thereafter. FACTS: On November 25. Cabañgon. Rañigo. the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the LA. It held that said doctor merely referred to medical literature to explain Demetrio's condition without personally examining him. contributed to or aggravated his gastric cancer. the Norwegian Crew Management (NCM).It gave credence to the medical opinion of the company-designated physician. 2015 DOCTRINE:As a rule. in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Albano. 201793. the burden fell on the latter to disprove the finding of the company-designated doctor. for and in behalf of its foreign principal. Palad. he suffered from "vomiting. Coronel." As a result. Demetrio adduced no competent evidence to prove that his stomach cancer was caused or aggravated by the working conditions on the vessel. Corporal. Rodriguez. The LA held that the company-designated physician declared that Demetrio's illness was not work-related. moral and exemplary damages. No. Sandoval. However. September 16. The LA ruled that Demetrio failed to discharge this burden because he adduced no evidence proving that his work increased the risk of contracting stomach cancer. ALIGWAY (AS SUBSTITUTE FOR HER DECEASED HUSBAND. Castillo. On appeal. Lastimosa. Ramirez. The CA decreed that the LA and the NLRC improperly relied on the findings of the company-designated physician. which involved food intake. Tecson. Inc. De Mesa. the Philippine Transmarine Carriers. G.JULIA T. Alcazaren. Demetrio's employment contract was for nine months with a monthly salary of US$758. and palpitations followed by dizziness and a feeling of lightheadedness. (PTC).R. Marquez. 2008. Espina. Inguillo. while aboard the vessel. he underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit to work. He alleged that his work as chief cook. he was medically repatriated. 2010 for disability benefits. Tabugan. De la Cruz. and attorney's fees against the PTC. Valois . on April 22. The LA rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. Reyes. anorexia. weight loss. Catindig. the NCM. and that because of this. 2009. employed Demetrio as chief cook on board the vessel Amasis. Corpuz. Francisco. Demetrio alleged that prior to his deployment. DEMETRIO ALIGWAY. only questions of law can be raised and be reviewed by this Court. JR. Sy. Santos.00. Consequently. and their officers. Demetrio filed a Complaint13 dated January 22. Martinez. He claimed that although the cause of gastric cancer was unknown. that Dr. Lumberio. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS.

In this case. Coronel. De la Cruz. the CA held that the presumption of compensability prevails and that Demetrio is entitled to full disability benefits pursuant to the CBA. Tabugan. Albano. However. Martinez. Rodriguez. Santos. this rule admits of exceptions and one such exception is where the Court may make its own evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties because the factual findings of the tribunals or courts a quo are in conflict with each other. only questions of law can be raised and be reviewed by this Court. Espina. and of the CA. Page 321 Echiverri. Sandoval. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Demetrio's appeal and in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Rañigo. Thus. Salvador was not Demetrio's original attending physician. Francisco. Valois . Sy. Lastimosa. Salvador did not discuss how Demetrio's work and working environment could have caused or aggravated his illness. this Court has to exercise its mandated authority to examine the evidence on record. and that Dr. In conclusion. Catindig. that the opinion of Dr. Inguillo. Tecson. Palad. if not purely academic. the LA. Corporal. on one hand. Castillo. Ramirez. RULING: As a rule. The CA ruled otherwise. Gloria. Corpuz. Salvador lacked accuracy and was hypothetical. Reyes. on the other. among other claims. as affirmed by the NLRC. Valiente. because of the conflicting findings of fact of the LA and NLRC. Lumberio. Asensi. De Mesa. Alcazaren. found that Demetrio was not entitled to disability benefits. Marquez. Cabañgon. and dismissed his complaint for lack of merit. in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

192955. to 11:00 p. As regards a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the NLRC. be Albano. Sy. Tecson.m. Santos. the NLRC is allowed to liberally apply its rules. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Valiente.v. Catindig. EDILBERTO P. Gloria. It decreed that petitioner was entitled to receive salary differential amounting to P166. Alcazaren. in deciding labor cases. JR. 2009. 2008 less 10% thereof for the facilities provided by respondent.23 the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA but deleted the award of punitive damages. The NLRC concurred with the LA ruling that petitioner was underpaid considering that he was receiving only P2. Martinez. Inguillo. including holidays. the same must be filed within 10 days from the receipt of the assailed decision. be emphasized that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure. He also claimed that he was not given an opportunity to explain and answer any imputation against him by his employer. Asensi.00.R.080. respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari insisting that petitioner was not entitled to salary differential. In its April 30. 2009 Decision. the same must be filed within 10 days from the receipt of the assailed decision. HELD: As a rule. His tasks included cleaning the lodging house and washing towels and bedsheets. from Monday to Saturday. Espina. Thus.9 employed him as roomboy in 1997 with a monthly salary of P2. Undaunted. It must. the perfection of appeal within the period required by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Castillo. the perfection of appeal within the period required by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. FACTS: This case stemmed from a complaint dated April 15.AROMA LODGING HOUSE THROUGH EDUARDO G. ETOM. 2008. nevertheless. On August 20. Marquez. Petitioner claimed that on February 4.00 as monthly salary. On June 30.38 for three years computed from February 20. Rañigo. De Mesa. It must. LEM.500. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it concluded that the respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not filed out of time. No. It also asseverated that it was exempt from Minimum Wage Law since it had no more than 10 employees. respondent refused to allow him to report for work. November 09. 2008 filed by petitioner against Aroma Lodging House (respondent) for illegal dismissal and money claims. Coronel. 2015 DOCTRINE: As a rule. 2005 to February 20.m. Failure to appeal within such period results in the assailed decision becoming final and executory. He averred that his working hours were from 5:00 a. a business engaged in providing affordable lodging. Petitioner alleged that respondent.500. Tabugan. the LA rendered a Decision18 finding petitioner to have been legally dismissed. As regards a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the NLRC. Ramirez. Lumberio. Failure to appeal within such period results in the assailed decision becoming final and executory. Palad. the NLRC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. Valois . PROPRIETOR AND GENERAL MANAGER G. nevertheless. Lastimosa. 13th month pay and holiday pay because he admitted in an affidavit that he had been receiving wages and other benefits in accordance with law. De la Cruz. Corporal. Page 322 Echiverri. Petitioner argued that respondent did not inform him of any violation that would warrant his dismissal. 2008. Rodriguez. Francisco. Corpuz. Reyes.

hence. 1:47 P. the filing of petitioners' (herein respondent) Motion for Reconsideration should be on May 25. we held in Opinaldo v. Inguillo. Reyes. Alcazaren. we note the explanation made by respondent for the seeming late filing of its motion to wit: x x x [I]t is public knowledge that May 23. through a glitch in the docket machine date and time puncher of the NLRC at that date and hour. Marquez. 2009. petitioner alleges that the subject motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period. the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration date of filing was erroneously marked and stamped as May 26. Espina. 2009. Petitioners only managed to take notice of the mistake in the date and time of the docket of their Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. In any event. In this case. x x x Based on the foregoing explanation. Catindig. Gloria. under established rules and relevant jurisprudence. 2009.M. Ramirez." Albano.M. Corpuz. and have forwarded the Motion for Reconsideration of the [petitioners to the NLRC x x x Indeed. in deciding labor cases. emphasized that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure. 2009. Rodriguez. Sandoval. Valois . 2009. Ravina43 that the NLRC may liberally apply its rules and decide a motion for reconsideration on the merits. Cabañgon. However. In fact. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration before the public respondent.M. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Page 323 Echiverri. Asensi. 2009. Rañigo. Palad. Martinez. Santos. Corporal. De Mesa. We upheld the liberal application by the NLRC of its technical rules to resolve the issues on the merits because "a full resolution of the case on the merits is the more palpable explanation for the liberal application of its rules. Thus. however. Petitioners thence quickly went to the NLRC Docket Section to report the mistake and x x x was [sic] told by the Docket Section Personnel that they have already corrected the erroneous date and time of petitioners' docketed Motion for Reconsideration to the x x x correct May 25. Tecson. we are convinced that respondent timely filed its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. May 26. the real May 26. Valiente. Sy. 2009 1:47 A. On May 25. Francisco. the next working day after May 23. De la Cruz. Lumberio. 2009 happens to be a Saturday. the NLRC took cognizance of it and decided the motion on the merit. Castillo. it would be plainly absurd for a government office docket section like that of the public respondent NLRC to be open for business at such unholy hour of 1:47 A. Coronel. the NLRC is allowed to liberally apply its rules.

Page 324 Echiverri. Catindig.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Sy. Tecson. Dismissing petitioner's arguments. petitioner again performed oral sex on "AAA" after convincing him anew to ingest alcohol and to smoke marijuana." FACTS: The prosecution established that on the evening of March 9.People is pertinent: "The petition being a petition for review. 1997. was below 18 years of age ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its finding of facts and hence." In any event. Valiente. Gloria. it found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Section 5(b). Corpuz. Santos. Rañigo. In a Decision dated January 6. Reyes. 1997. Castillo. No. petitioner isolated "AAA" from his companions and other fraternity recruits. Sandoval. and that the child-victim. The following day or on March 10. Lastimosa. Palad. Coronel. November 11. 2015 DOCTRINE: It must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Article in of RA 7610. Martinez. as did the RTC and the CA. we find no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the CA. the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to reviewing questions of law. in this case "AAA" as clearly and specifically spelled out in the trial court's discussion. Inguillo. the Court finds and so holds that the prosecution has presented the required evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt [of] [violation of Section 05 (b) of Article III of Republic Act 7610. Branch 72 and the CA reached the correct conclusion that petitioner was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Section 5(b). that the State had Albano.R. The issue raised by petitioner as well as his arguments pertains to factual findings which are not within the ambit of a petition for review. forcibly disrobed "AAA". the CA held that the government's case was erected upon actual. Olongapo City for initiation rites in a fraternity founded by the latter. De la Cruz. NICANOR PINLAC Y RESOLMEv. While in a daze. and performed oral sex on him by sucking his penis until he ejaculated.e. Ramirez. "AAA" lost control of himself ("nawala ako sa sarili"). 197458. We find.. stupor. HELD: It must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Article III of RA 7610. "AAA. thus: On the basis of the foregoing evidence presented. After succumbing to petitioner's "persuasion" to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana. Espina. Alcazaren. Both the RTC of Olongapo City. Lumberio."3 a 14-year old boy. Valois .People is pertinent: "The petition being a petition for review. Asensi. Corporal. the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to reviewing questions of law. De Mesa. went with petitioner to the Kale Beach Resort in Subic. can be the subject of a petition for review. Our ruling in Ortega v. incontrovertible facts which proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner did in fact commit the crime set forth under Section 5(b). Cabañgon. performing lascivious acts upon a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse. The issue raised by petitioner as well as his arguments pertains to factual findings which are not within the ambit of a petition for review. Marquez. Article III of RA 7610 i. After a thorough review of the records of this case. Tabugan. or near total unconsciousness. Rodriguez. we find that the CA Decision squares with the evidence and with the law as well as with the jurisprudential doctrines laid down by this Court. 2010. Francisco. Our ruling in Ortega v.

Ramirez. Tecson. Alcazaren. Palad. De Mesa. (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse. Francisco. Inguillo. 1997. Sandoval. Rañigo. Gloria. Rodriguez. Albano. De la Cruz. This Court thus finds no reversible error in the assailed Decision. Corporal."17 In this case "AAA" was 14 years and eight months old when he was subjected to sexual abuse by the herein petitioner on March 9 and 10. Cabañgon. and (3) the child. Lastimosa. Corpuz. Sy. whether male or female. Asensi. Page 325 Echiverri. Lumberio. Valois . satisfactorily established the following elements constitutive of the offense charged: "(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Castillo. Catindig. Reyes. Tabugan. is below 18 years of age. Martinez. Marquez. Coronel. Santos. Valiente. Espina.

2002. Upon its finality. On September 21. 2015 DOCTRINE:It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. FACTS: Spouses Gaudencio and Aurelia Mangubat filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondent Belen Morga-Seva (Belen) and two other defendants and were able to obtain a favorable judgment from the RTC. Marquez. 1998. 2006 Order. Valiente. Belen was supposed to make her payment on or before June 30. 2011. Coronel. Hence. On September 3. Santos. 2010. the RTC Decision became final and executory. Vista-Gumba. However. Gaudencio and Belen entered into a compromise agreement to the effect that all claims and counterclaims that the parties may have against each other are hereby waived. No. Rañigo. 2001 RTC Decision approving the Compromise Agreement had long become final and executory. Alcazaren. Albano. Lumberio. Abner. Corpuz. Consequently and purportedly in behalf of all the heirs. 2001. In a Resolution dated July 13. Valois . Ramirez. the same was made only on December 18. on his own behalf. Tecson. 2012. Moreover. Page 326 Echiverri. 2001 rendered a Decision in accordance therewith. Corporal. And since five years had already lapsed from the date of its entry. 202611. the same is null and void for want of consent and participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties. Gaudencio and the heirs prayed for the revival of the RTC Decision. Thus to Abner. De Mesa. hence. Espina. i. it is allowed only on two grounds. Lastimosa. 2002. De la Cruz. Palad. Gaudencio and his children as heirs (the heirs) of the deceased Aurelia filed with the same court a Complaint for Revival of the Decision. Rodriguez. Abner filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Order with the CA. extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Tabugan. On June 24. ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment can be availed of on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Catindig.R. Francisco. Gloria. moved to substitute his father Gaudencio who died on January 31. Such agreement was approved by the RTC and on February 23. Subsequently. it was unjust for the RTC to have issued its September 25. Sandoval.BELEN MORGA-SEVA G.e. the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. Martinez. The Motion for Reconsiderationthereto was also denied in Resolution39 dated June 13. Reyes. 2006 Order divesting the heirs of ownership of the subject property. Sy. He contended that under the Compromise Agreement. the Writ of Execution was ordered issued by the said court. filed a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void. Castillo. Inguillo. It was alleged therein that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the compromise agreement with Belen. Cabañgon. November 23. the RTC had already lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the September 25. ABNER MANGUBATv. 2003 or way beyond the period agreed upon. Asensi. through Atty. They averred that the writ of execution could not be implemented because Belen and her co-defendants evaded service thereof.. Abner. Abner argued that since the February 23. Since Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA and later to this Court were both unsuccessful.

Castillo. the Complaint for revival of judgment was filed in the same court (RTC-Pili Camarines Sur. hence. Martinez. Page 327 Echiverri. P-279. or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. Catindig. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Tecson. Inguillo. 2001 Decision became final." The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment had already been upheld by the Court. the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. He posits that the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case when its February 23. As mentioned. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be filed either 'in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Sy. or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. "In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Marquez. however. Sandoval. any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any jurisdiction. Corpuz. what Abner questions is the RTC's jurisdiction over the case. Cabañgon. Corporal. Rañigo. HELD: It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. 1985 Decision in Civil Case No. "Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. De Mesa. Reyes.. Valiente. Abner anchors his Petition for Annulment of Final Order on lack of jurisdiction." Here. petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. he having asked for affirmative relief therefrom several times. Rodriguez. There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for Annulment of Final Order that Abner filed with the CA. Ramirez. Valois . the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.e. Albano.'" Here. Undoubtedly. it is allowed only on two grounds. i. Asensi. The argument is. Gloria. Francisco. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction. specious. Branch 31) which rendered the August 27. Hence. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law. Coronel. Espina. it is undisputed that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Abner. Palad. Alcazaren. Santos. Lumberio. De la Cruz. extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. that is.

On August 27. De Mesa. Corpuz. On September 13. (ii) ordering the turnover of the property in question to UCPB after the dismissal of the Complaint. the RTC. 2001.R. as ruled by the RTC. Thereafter. the records of CA-G.UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK [UCPB] AND/OR PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION [PDIC]. and (iii) applying the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-corporate Controversies. The RTC held that venue was improperly laid considering that the Promissory Notes sought to be annulled were issued pursuant to a Credit Agreement which. Santos. Cabañgon. Tecson. Page 328 Echiverri. In the meantime. Ramirez. it filed with the Court of Appeals. 2001. Tabugan. Rañigo. No. JAKOB VAN DER SLUIS AND ROBERT T. UNITED ALLOY PHILIPPINES CORPORATIONv.CHUA G. UniAUoy filed with the CA Manila a Motion to Issue and Implement Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. 67079 attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo in (i) dismissing its petition on the grounds of improper venue. Reyes. On the same day. stipulates that any legal action relating thereto shall be initiated exclusively in the proper courts of Makati City. subject matter and issues. Inguillo. 152238 attained finality. acting as Special Commercial Court. the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. respondent Jakob Van Der Sluis took foil control of the management and operation of UniAlloy and that respondents connived with one another to obtain fictitious loans purportedly for UniAlloy as evidenced by Promissory Notes. On September 25. SP No. 67079 were forwarded to CA Albano. the Executive Judge of the RTC. The cases.R. It claimed that. FACTS: UniAlloy and UCPB entered into a Lease Purchase Agreement wherein UniAlloy leased from UCPB several parcels of land located in Misamis Oriental. Francisco. disallowance or revocation of all reliefs ancillary to the main remedy sought in that action. Gloria. 2001-156 which involves the same parties. Valiente. 2001. UniAlloy filed the aforesaid Complaint against respondents.R. and since this Court's Decision in G. in turn. Marquez. have also identical causes of action. Martinez. Castillo. 2015 DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the principal action x x x [carries] with it the denial. forum-shopping and for being a harassment suit. Corporal. November 23. SP No. however. Catindig. 2001. Espina. Lumberio. thru misrepresentation and manipulation. Rodriguez. Coronel. forum-shopping and harassment. Valois . Manila Station (CA Manila) its petition in CA-G. 179257. It also opined that UniAlloy committed forum-shopping for failing to disclose in its certificate of non-forum-shopping the pendency of Civil Case No. Alcazaren. issued an Order granting the motions to dismiss and ordering the dismissal of the case on the grounds of improper venue. Asensi. Sy. Lastimosa. Cagayan de Oro City issued a 72-hour TRO directing UCPB to cease and desist from taking possession of the disputed premises. Palad. Sandoval. De la Cruz. And on October 9. No. UniAlloy received copies of the RTC Orders.R.

Alcazaren. whether prohibitory or mandatory. Gloria. Rodriguez. It found that UniAUoy had lost its right to remain in possession of the disputed premises because it defaulted in the payment of lease rentals and it was duly served with a notice of extrajudicial termination of the LPA. As a matter of course. Page 329 Echiverri. Sy. Asensi. the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from. Catindig. Valiente. Cabañgon. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of UniAlloy's main action carries with it the dissolution of any ancillary relief previously granted therein.45 this Court elucidated that the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction persists only until it is dissolved or until the tepnination of the main action without the court issuing a final injunction. Inguillo. and should not be confused with. Rañigo. 2001. or three days before UniAUoy filed its complaint with the RTC. 44 In Bacolod City Water District v. Under the law. Palad. of a final judgment in the case. Castillo. Ramirez. it could no longer avail of the remedy of preliminary injunction to regain possession of the disputed premises. which may be resorted to by a litigant at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order to compel a party or a court. Lastimosa. in an action for injunction. Corporal. Martinez. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. Valois . Espina. viz. the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the Albano. Reyes. Tabugan. On May 31.: x x x Injunction is a judicial writ. the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction. the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. Corpuz. process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act."43 One of the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court is preliminary injunction. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. Marquez. The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. the CA CDO issued a Resolution denying UniAlloy's motion. may issue. Labayen. "Provisional remedies [also known as ancillary or auxiliary remedies]. 2006. De la Cruz. Francisco. 8246. De Mesa. agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts. Hence. Sandoval. and for purposes of the ultimate effects. HELD: The contention is non sequitur. Tecson. Santos. are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests pending rendition. CDO pursuant to Republic Act No. Hon. Lumberio. Said court also found that UniAUoy vacated the leased premises and UCPB was already in actual physical possession thereof as of August 24. Coronel.

A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. Rañigo. Tecson. De Mesa. Reyes. Ramirez. it is indubitably clear that the August 17. 2007 Decision of CA CDO dismissing UniAlloy's Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus effectively superseded the February 18. Asensi. Martinez. merits can be heard. Marquez. Rodriguez. Valiente. Gloria. Sy. Corpuz. Lumberio. Palad. Alcazaren. Santos. Albano. Page 330 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Tabugan.46cralawlawlibrary Based on the foregoing. Lastimosa. Francisco. Catindig. Castillo. It wrote finis not only to the main case but also to the ancillary relief of preliminary injunction issued in the main case. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. Sandoval. Espina. Cabañgon. 2002 Resolution of the CA Manila granting UniAUoy's ancillary prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Coronel. Inguillo. Valois . Corporal.

Tabugan. Leonides and Ariel. filed an Amended Complaint8 before the PARAD Davao City. De Mesa. ADAM DULAUON.PEING TAN. Ramirez. EMILIANO GUMATAY. Aggrieved. ARIEL Q. Palad. Sy. herein petitioners. Leonides Latayan. EDGAR NARITA. AND ETHEL Q. Alcazaren. Marquez. Simeon died and was substituted by his sons. petitioners elevated the DARAB's judgment to the CA via a Petition for Review. JOHNNY TAN. T-14201 and T-14202 comprising 23. considering that the said ruling is diametrically opposite [the] express provisions of section 50 of republic act 6657 and the jurisprudence promulgated by [the] Albano. LEONIDES Q. LATAYAN. The court or tribunal must look at the material allegations in the complaint. Corpuz. REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT. CIPRIANOAHIT. December 02. Martinez. represented by his son and attorney-in-fact. for cancellation of the CLOAs issued to respondents. HEIRS OF SIMEON LATAYAN. the PARAD rendered a Decision10 in favor of Simeon. Espina. the dispute must be addressed and resolved by the said court or tribunal. Cabañgon. LATAYAN.****Respondents. v. 201652. the issues or questions that are the subject of the controversy. docketed as DARAB Case No. HERMTNIGILDO CASALAN.R. DIOSCOROMOLO. YOLANDA NARITA.. Lastimosa.15 the DARAB set aside the PARAD Decision and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Santos. 2000. Catindig. etc.1488 hectares. Ethel. LARRY CEMAFRANCA.14 While the appeal was pending. Reyes. Respondents filed an appeal with the DARAB. BUENAVENTURA B ACALSO AND SALDE ESPIA. filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a petition for exemption of his landholdings from the operation of the CARP. Inguillo. Gloria. FACTS: On January 31. In its May 9. JESUS ALCONTIN. Rañigo. Castillo. De la Cruz. Corporal. Page 331 Echiverri. The PARAD noted that Simeon was never notified of the coverage by CARP of his properties and that he learned of the same only when he. ISSUE: Whether or notthe Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that it is the dar secretary and not the [darab] which has jurisdiction over cases involving cancellation of cloas[j just compensation. Asensi. Tecson. Coronel. Valiente. WEBINO VILLAREAL. MARIO PEREZ. POLICRONIA CAPIONES. and his daughter. Petitioners. Simeon alleged that he is the registered owner of two adjoining lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. Sandoval. 2005 Decision. G. 2015 DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. NAMELY: LEONIDES Q. Francisco. On July 10. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal. The CA held that the PARAB committed no reversible error when it set aside the decision of the PARAD and dismissed the case recognizing that jurisdiction over the matters involved is rightly vested with the DAR Secretary. Rodriguez. DAMACINO BAYAWA. Valois . FELIXBERTO BULADACO. LATAYAN. ANDRES LOZANO. No. Lumberio. XI-1589-DC-99. Simeon Latayan (Simeon). 2000. He contended that the titles to the subject lots were unilaterally and arbitrarily cancelled without his consent or knowledge. LATAYAN-AMPIL. and the character of the relief prayed for in order to determine whether the nature and subject matter of the complaint is within its jurisdiction. and without notice and placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) sans payment of just compensation. GREGORIO YAGAO.

rules. such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving following: xxx f) Those involving the issuance. HELD: This Petition will not prosper. Castillo. confined only to agrarian disputes. however. and (3) that due process of law was not observed when the original petitioner (Simeon) was divested of the ownership of the subject lots: it thus stands to reason that it is the DAR Secretary that has jurisdiction to resolve the controversy pursuant to applicable law. — The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction. Marquez. As explained in the case of Heirs of Dela Cruz v. The court or tribunal must look at the material allegations in the complaint. Tabugan. The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. Sandoval. the controversy must relate to an agrarian dispute between the landowners and tenants in whose favor CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. Both illuminating and instructive are these pronouncements by this Court that bear with particular relevance on the petition at bench - Section 1. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal. Coronel. over lands devoted to agriculture. Simeon) sought to cancel respondents' registered CLOAs on the grounds: (1) that no agrarian dispute was involved in this case. Reyes.Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. maintaining. provides: Section 1. both original and appellate. Valois . Valiente. De la Cruz. Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. and the character of the relief prayed for in order to determine whether the nature and subject matter of the complaint is within its jurisdiction. 228. Corpuz. tenancy. its jurisdiction is. including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating. Gloria. Espina. De Mesa. Executive Order Nos.e. the dispute must be addressed and resolved by the said court or tribunal. Specifically. Francisco. an agrarian dispute relates to "any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements. changing. Corporal. Asensi. as in this case. correction and cancellation of [CLOAs] and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority. xxx While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of CLOAs. [RA 3844] as amended by [RA 6389]. whether leasehold. or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Palad. Considering that herein petitioners' predecessor-in-interest (i. Martinez. the rule in force at the time of the filing of the petition. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. Tecson. Inguillo. stewardship. the issues or questions that are the subject of the controversy. fixing. Spouses Cesar Caguin. (2) that the subject lots are exempt from CARP coverage. Cabañgon. or otherwise. Honorable Supreme Court. Ramirez. Catindig. Page 332 Echiverri. Rañigo. As defined in Section 3 (d) of [RA 6657]. Lastimosa. [PD 27] and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. 229 and 129-A. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of Albano. to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the [CARP] under [RA 6657]. which expressly conferred exclusive original jurisdiction upon the DARAB to hear cases of this nature. for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction. Sy. and jurisprudence. Heirs of Cruz and reiterated in the recent case of Bagongahasa v. Lumberio. Santos.

Sandoval. Sy. Reyes. tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. Marquez. [RA 9700]. the tenurial. rendering its decision null and void. a punctilious examination reveals that petitioner's allegations are solely hinged on the erroneous grant by the DAR Secretary of CLOA No. Gloria. De la Cruz. and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. leasehold. Tabugan. Francisco. as amended. Rodriguez. Section 24 of [RA 6657]. Martinez. landowner and tenant. Tecson. 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. Albano. Hence. Corpuz. 2009. Santos. the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Page 333 Echiverri. petitioner has not alleged any tenurial arrangement between the parties. or agrarian relations referred to may be established with the concurrence of the following: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Espina. the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the herein controversy. Coronel. Section 1. whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary. De Mesa. and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR. hi this regard. Corporal. Palad. Cabañgon. 00122354 to private respondents on the grounds that she is the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot and that it is exempt from the CARP coverage." To be sure. Valiente. all cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure clearly provides that "matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of [RA 6657]. Inguillo. Jurisdiction lies with the Office of the DAR Secretary to resolve the issues of classification of landholdings for coverage (whether the subject property is a private or government[-]owned land). certificates of land ownership award. Castillo. Valois . the controversy between the parties is not agrarian in nature and merely involves the administrative implementation of the agrarian reform program which is cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Rañigo. 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. and other agrarian refonn laws and pertinent rules. shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Lumberio. x x x In this case. it bears to emphasize that under the new law. or lessor and lessee. and identification of qualified beneficiaries. is further amended to read as follows: xxx All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents. Section 9 of the said law provides: Section 9. x x x which took effect on July 1." Furthermore. Catindig. Asensi. no error can be attributed to the CA in dismissing the case without prejudice to its re-filing x x x. negating the existence of any agrarian dispute and consequently. Consequently. Indisputably. Alcazaren. 4) the purpose of the agricultural relationship is to bring about agricultural production. ownership from landowners to farmworkers. Lastimosa. Ramirez.

Violation of RA 3019 and Falsification of Public Documents against respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. Inguillo. SOLOMON. KING. MASILUNGAN. Reyes. DATU. EDGARDO SANTOS VS. De Mesa. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.. FACTS: In a decision rendered by the NLRC. Espina.. In compliance with such directive. December 07. Cabañgon. it may also dismiss the complaint. Lumberio. executive or judicial intervention. Valiente.[16] the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from legislative. filed criminal complaints for Robbery. He alleged that respondents conspired in the unlawful taking of the machineries and equipment which caused him and the aforesaid companies undue injury. ANTONIO Z. Bulacan were levied upon. Valois . Ramirez. ROBLES. RENE A. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 2015 DOCTRINE: Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned. As such.. based on the sufficiency of the complaint. Albano. Inc. Tabugan. Catindig. Castillo. equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Nos. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Gloria. Marquez. HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT. Contending that the value of the properties taken and hauled by Rogelio through his attorney-in-fact were worth more than the monetary award of the NLRC. Santos. ROMEO MENDOZA REYNALDO DATU. Corpuz. Palad. 197096-97. Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo were adjudged guilty of having illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to reinstate Rogelio to his former position. RODRIGO MENDOZA. Bo. Talipapa. ANTONIO T. Corporal. Inc. ROGELIO GEBILAGUIN AND PRESCILLA GEBILAGUIN G. RESTITUTO S. Lastimosa. Azkcon Construction Development Corporation. Coronel. if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance. De la Cruz. Azkcon Refrigeration Industries. Marilao. Sy.[17] Because of the endowment of broad investigative authority. Lambakan Street. Asensi. petitioner King. FRANCISCO A. Tecson. After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties’ respective position. Rañigo. Page 334 Echiverri. or to act at all in contemplation of law. Arbiter Rosales issued a writ of execution commanding the execution arm of the NLRC “to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at J. 220 Lias Road. claiming to be the President of Azkcon Metal Industries. By constitutional fiat and under RA 6770. Martinez.99 representing [Rogelio’s] backwages and 13th month pay. Rodriguez. the Ombudsman in its Joint Resolution dated August 29. personal properties found inside the compound of Azkcon at No. whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Ramos St.R. TERESITA TIU.P. JOSEPH TIU. the Ombudsman is empowered to determine. Francisco. Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and collect the sum of x x x P471.200. 2008 dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable cause. Azk Trading and PMAFC. to pay him full backwages from the time his salary was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. In contrast.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents
for trial.

HELD:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound
to investigate on its own or on complaint by “any person, any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.”[15] By
constitutional fiat and under RA 6770,[16] the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention.[17] Because of the endowment of broad investigative
authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the sufficiency of the
complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or
substance, it may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court
to review the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it[18] except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[19]
“Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”[20] A
perusal of the Petition shows that petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman’s abuse,
much less grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charges against respondents for lack of
probable cause. On the contrary, a review of the records readily reveals that the Ombudsman’s
assailed Joint Resolution is based on substantial evidence. From the well-explained Joint
Resolution, in our view, petitioner’s Affidavit/Complaint is bereft of sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that the crimes imputed on respondents have been committed and that
they are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In fine, the Ombudsman did not
abuse his discretion warranting the Court’s intervention, in dismissing the charges against
respondents.
Petitioner complained of procedural flaws in the enforcement of the writ of execution arguing in
the main mat the value of the levied and hauled properties were much more than the monetary
award of the NLRC. This we believe is not an adequate ground to reverse the action of the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner’s bone of contention in the present Petition boils down to the appreciation and
determination of factual matters. The question of whether there was indeed an over levy of
properties is one that is essentially a factual concern as it goes into the determination of the fair
market value of the properties levied upon vis-a-vis the value of the properties hauled and taken
out of the company’s premises. Obviously, petitioner invites an evaluation of the evidentiary
matters which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, this Court is not a trier
of facts. Matters pertaining to proofs and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review
under a Rule 45 Petition except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances, none of
which is availing in this case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 335
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS AND
JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE PAGLINAWAN
G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016

DOCTRINE:the Supreme Court held that although the caption of the complaint filed by
therein respondents with the RTC was denominated as one for 'specific performance and
damages,' the relief sought was the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately,
the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in
the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case before
the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or possession of real
property.

FACTS:
In 2005, petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted before the RTC Civil
Case No. 4633-2K5 against respondent Bernardo Sejas (Sejas). In their Complaint for
specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others that Sejas was the
registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur
that by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold said parcel of land to them in
1982; that thereafter, they took possession of the land and constructed a house thereon;
that they resided in said house and continued to reside therein; that Sejas later
reasserted his ownership over said land and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so
doing; and that they caused the annotation of an adverse claim. They prayed that Sejas
be ordered to execute a final deed of sale over the property and transfer the same to
them. In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and
damages, petitioners impleaded respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional
defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject property to her, after which
she caused the cancellation of TCT T-8,337 and the issuance of a new title - TCT
T-46,627 - in her name. Petitioners prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed
of sale in their favor and transfer the property to them; that Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627 be
canceled and the property be reconveyed to them.However, the additional docket fees for
the moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the
additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals ruled correctly when it dismissed the complaint by reason of
Petitioner-Appellants' alleged non-payment of the correct dockets fees due to its failure to
alleged the fair market value or the stated value of the subject property in the amended
complaint?

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition.
As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as
one mainly for specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the
property, as well as the cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words,
petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership
and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 336
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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title
to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 337
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND TOTAL GAZ LPG DEALERS
ASSOCIATION vs. NENA C. ANG, ALISON C. SY, NELSON C. ANG, RENATO C.
ANG, AND/OR OCCUPANTS OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 199371, February 03, 2016
DOCTRINE: Facts discovered during surveillance operations conducted by the
authorities on the basis of information and evidence provided by the complainants
constitute personal knowledge which could form the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant.
FACTS:
Petitioners Petron LPG Dealers Association and Total Gaz LPG Dealers Association,
together with other liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) associations, filed a
letter-complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation-Ilocos Regional Office
requesting assistance in the surveillance, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of
respondents Nena C. Ang, Alison C. Sy, Nelson C. Ang, Renato C. Ang, and National
Petroleum Corporation for alleged illegal trading of LPG products and/or underfilling,
possession and/or sale of underfilled LPG productsDe Jemil and Antonio waited at a
distance. After about one hour, the Barba Gas truck emerged from the compound. De
Jemil then followed the truck back to the Barba Gas sales office at Jose Singson street in
Vigan, where the refilled Starflame LPG cylinders were unloaded. The two then
proceeded to the test-buy phase of the operation; with an empty eleven-kilogram
Starflame LPG tank in hand, they went to Barba Gas and purchased one of the refilled
Starflame LPG cylinders unloaded from the truck. The Barba Gas employee took De
Jemil's empty cylinder and replaced it with a filled one. De Jemil paid P510.00 for the filled
cylinder and received a dated receipt7 for the purchase. Thereafter, the filled Starflame
LPG cylinder was examined, weighed, inspected, marked, and photographed.

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A DECISION NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT AS REGARDS THE DETERMINATION OF PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF WITNESSES IN SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS.

HELD:
The Court grants the Petition.
The Court finds the evidence presented sufficient to prove probable cause; the
issuing court and the CA thus patently erred in quashing the search warrants. Where the

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findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record, the same cannot bind this Court
Thus, applying Ty in its entirety to the present case, the Court finds that there exists
probable cause for the issuance of search warrants as applied for by petitioners.
Probable cause for purposes of issuing a search warrant refers to "such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item, article or object sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.On
the other hand, probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information refers to "such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe mat the offense
charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested." Thus, while Tyrefers to preliminary investigation
proceedings, and the instant case is concerned with applications for the issuance of
search warrants, both are resolved based on the same degree of proof; the
pronouncement in Ty may therefore apply to the present controversy.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

UWE MATHAEUS vs. SPOUSES ERIC AND GENEVIEVE MEDEQUISO
G.R. No. 196651, February 03, 2016

DOCTRINE: a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA,
submitting together with the petition a certification on non-forum shopping.

FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 5579, the Tagbilaran Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1 issued a January 12, 2007 Decision ordering petitioner to pay respondents
spouses Eric and Genevieve Medequiso, the amount of P30,000.00 with legal interest,
attorney's fees, and costs.

Petitioner interposed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 7269, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 48. On September 30, 2008, the RTC issued a
Decision affirming the MTCC judgment.Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the RTC - in
an April 13, 2009 Order - upheld its judgment.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 THAT
WARRANTS A DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS.chanRoblesvirtu

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition.

We have held that Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize
documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their
official functions. Clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the
execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions. Under
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the CA, submitting together with the petition a certification
on non-forum shopping. Under Section 3 of the same Rule, the failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

SPOUSES ALFREDO TEAÑO* AND VERONICA TEAÑO vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NAVOTAS, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO, AND
MUNICIPAL TREASURER MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 205814, February 15, 2016a
nroblesvirtu
DOCTRINE: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
nature that it may be availed of only when, other remedies are wanting, and only if the
judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.

FACTS:
On December 8, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint against the Municipality of
Navotas Petitioners claimed that they were the registered occupants of parcels of land
with improvements situated inside the National Housing Authority Industrial Development
Project (NHAIDP), C-3 Road, Northbay Boulevard South, Navotas, sometime in July
2005, they received a Final Notice to Collect Real Property Tax (Notice) from the
Municipal Treasurer's Office demanding the payment of real estate taxes on the foregoing
properties amounting to P5,702,658.74 for the years 1990 to 2005.
Petitioners argued that other than the warrant of levy on their residential house, the realty
taxes being collected against them were improper for being violative of their right to due
process, and for being unconscionable, abusive and contrary to law. the public auction
sale conducted on December 21, 2005 is valid but since it was conducted prior to the
September 21, 2007 Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case?

HELD:
The Petition lacks merit.
petitioners filed with the CA a petition captioned as "Annulment of Summary Judgment
with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order."
However, petitioners failed to allege therein with particularity the facts and law relied upon
for the annulment, such that the CA, among other reasons, denied the same. When
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with said court, petitioners' line of arguments
was suddenly geared towards their resort to a certiorari petition which, in the first place,
was not the remedy it availed of when it filed the CA Petition. Be that as it may, petitioners
now clarify that the CA Petition is indeed a petition for annulment of judgment and that
they have just "mixed up their discussions in the Motion for Reconsideration with the CA
by arguing that certiorari was the proper remedy against the questioned RTC resolution
and order." Petitioners now pray, among others, that the RTC Resolution dated August
13,2008 and its Order dated December 9, 2008 be annulled for having been issued
without jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 341
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF
BATANGAS, and THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION (PSPC), WILLIE J. SARMIENTO, PSPC Vice-President for Finance
and Treasurer and ATTY. CIPRIANO U. ASILO
G.R. No. 205002

DOCTRINE:Forum shopping exists if the suits raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues; thus, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident
does not necessarily constitute forum shopping.

FACTS:
Respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling petroleum products for distribution
in the Philippines. petitioner District Collector Juan N. Tan, the Collector of Customs of the
Port of Batangas, issued a demand letterasking respondent PSPC to pay the excise tax
and value-added tax (VAT), plus penalty Respondent PSPC, however, refused to heed
the demand and, instead, issued a letter dated February 13, 2009 questioning the factual
or legal basis of the demand.petitioner District Collector issued another letter reiterating
the demand for the payment of the said unpaid taxes. respondent PSPC appealed the
matter to petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) Napoleon Morales. Pending the
resolution of the said appeal, petitioner COC ordered petitioner District Collector to
observe status quo.Meanwhile, petitioner District Collector filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against respondent
Sarmiento in relation to the Verification and Certification he filed before the RTC of
Batangas City, where he declared that the Petition for Review PSPC filed with the CTA
does not involve the same issues and/or reliefs.

ISSUE:
Whether the CTA committed a reversible error when it ruled that respondents did not
commit willful and deliberate forum shopping.

HELD:
The subject matter in the CTA case is the alleged unpaid taxes of respondent PSPC
on its importation of CCG and LCCG for the years 2006 to 2008 in the total amount of
P21,419,603,310.00, which is sought to be collected by petitioners. On the other hand,
the subject matter of the Batangas injunction case is the 13 importations/shipments of
respondent PSPC for the period January to February 2010, which respondent PSPC
claims are threatened to be seized by petitioners pursuant to the Memorandum dated
February 9, 2010 issued by petitioner District Collector.
Also, the cause of action in the CTA case is based on the Letter-Decisions of petitioner
COC, finding respondent PSPC liable for excise taxes and VAT; while the cause of action
in the Batangas injunction case is the Memorandum dated February 9, 2010, ordering the
personnel of petitioner BOC in the Port of Batangas to hold the delivery of all import
shipments of respondent PSPC. Furthermore, the issues raised are not the same.
Respondent PSPC filed the CTA case to assail the Letter-Decisions of petitioner COC,
finding it liable to pay excise taxes and VAT on its importation of CCG and LCCG. Thus, in

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the Petition for Review, the main issue involved is the validity of the Letter-Decisions;
while in the Verified Motion, the issue raised is respondent PSPC’s entitlement to a
suspension order pending the resolution of the validity of the Letter-Decisions.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDINO PERALTAJ MORILLO AND
MICHAEL AMBAS Y REYES, BERNARDINO PERALTA Y MORILLO
G.R. No. 208524, June 01, 2016

DOCTRINE: For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prov|e that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time." If there is the
least possibility of his presence at the locus criminis, the defense of alibi will not prosper.
And with respect to mere denial as a defense, the rule is that this plea cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of an eyewitness to the crime.

FACTS:
That on or about 23rd day of May, 2007 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with three (3) other persons whose true names, identities
and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another,
armed with firearms, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and
intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully., unlawfully, and feloniously rob Supt.
Joven Bocalbos y Canas and Norberto Olitan Jr. y Espajos, in the following manner, to
wit: while complainant Supt. Joven Bocalbos y Canas was driving his vehicle a Nissan
Urban Van with plate No. XED-744 loaded with passengers cruising along
Commonwealth Avenue, and at Dona Carmen Subdivision, Fairview, this City, the said
accused who posed themselves as passengers of the said van, at gun point announced a
holdup and thereafter rob, steal and carry away the following personal belongings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Peralta is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?
HELD:
After a careful review of the records of the case, we affirm the ruling of both the RTC
and the CA finding appellant Peralta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.In this case, all the above-mentioned elements had been
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The taking of Olitan's property was committed with
violence and intimidation. This taking happened after Peralta and Ambas announced a
hold-up in order to rob the passengers of the van of their valuables. Olitan had no choice
but to hand over his cellphone, silver ring, sunglasses, and cash money to Ambas who
was pointing a gun at him. And undoubtedly, homicide was also committed when
Bocalbos was shot in the head on the occasion of that robbery.

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SPOUSES GERARDO AND CORAZON TRINIDAD vs. FAMA REALTY, INC. AND
FELIX ASSAD
G.R. No. 203336, June 06, 2016

DOCTRINE: Where contempt is committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of
contempt charges in court is observed only when there is no law granting contempt
powers to these quasi-judicial entities.

FACTS:
In 1991, petitioners Gerardo and Corazon Trinidad offered to buy from respondent
Fama Realty, Inc. (FAMA) 14 lots of the latter's St. Charbel Executive Village located at
Mindanao Avenue, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, at a total price of P17,620,800.00, or
P5,000.00 to P5,100.00 per square meter. The parties, thus, executed Reservation
Agreements, pursuant to which petitioners made partial payments. Later on, a
controversy arose regarding petitioners' payments, prompting them to file with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) an action for specific performance
against FAMA and herein respondent Felix Assad, then FAMA President and General
Manager. Respondents interposed an appeal before the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, Petitioners moved to reconsider, whereupon the HLURB Board of
Commissioners issued an April 2, 1997 Decision Respondents then filed an appeal with
the Office of the President, which in turn rendered an August 31, 1998 Decision
dismissing the same and affirming the above HLURB Board of Commissioners' April 2,
1997 Decision. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly rebuffed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for filing with the wrong court or
tribunal?

HELD:
The Court dismisses the Petition, Under the circumstances, petitioners should have
sought to cite respondents in contempt before the HLURB itself, and not this Court.
Such pronouncement applies to the HLURB as well; to restate, where contempt is
committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of contempt charges in court is allowed
only when these quasi-judicial entities are not by law granted contempt powers.
Executive Order No. 648, the HLURB Charter, grants the HLURB Board the power to cite
and declare any person, entity or enterprise in direct or indirect contempt "whenever any
person, entity or enterprise commits any disorderly or disrespectful conduct before the
Commission or in the presence of its members or authorized representatives actually
engaged in the exercise of their official functions or during the conduct of any hearing or
official inquiry by the said Commission, at the place or near the premises where such
hearing or proceeding is being conducted with obstruct, distract, interfere or in any other
way disturb, the performance of such functions or the conduct of such hearing or
proceeding;" or "whenever any person, enterprise or entity fails or refuses to comply with
or obey without justifiable reason, any lawful order, decision, writ or process of the
Commission.

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HEIRS OF BABAI GUIAMBANGAN, namely, KALIPA B. GUIAMBANGAN, SAYA
GUIAMBANGAN DARUS, NENENG P. GUIAMBANGAN, AND EDGAR P.
GUIAMBANGAN,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG, SULTANKUDARAT, represented by its MAYOR
ROLANDO P. GARCIA, MEMBERS of its SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, and its
MUNICIPAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 204899, July 27, 2016

DOCTRINE: Neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action," particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; the CA should
simply order that a party be impleaded in the case.
The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of appropriate service of the Petition
for Certiorari on the respondents as required by Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules, although the record indicates that a copy thereof was served upon their counsel of
record. While this is not sanctioned by the 1997 Rules, this Court has excused it in the
past.
Finally, while only one of the heirs, verified the CA Petition for Certiorari, without
proof of authority to file the same obtained from the other heirs, this is not fatal. As heirs,
they all share a common interest; indeed, even if the other heirs were not impleaded, the
Petition may be heard, as any judgment should inure to their benefit just the same. Or,
quite simply, the CA could have ordered their inclusion, as earlier stated above.

FACTS:
Datu Eishmael Summagumbra (Eishmael), heir of the late Babai Guiambangan
(Babai) and ascendant and predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, Kalipa B.
Guiambangan, Saya Guiambangan Darus, Neneng P. Guiambangan, and Edgar P.
Guiambangan, instituted before the RTC Brach 19 of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat (RTC Branch
19) Civil Case No. 989 against herein respondents Municipality of Kalamansig, Sultan
Kudarat, its Mayor, Members of its Sangguniang Bayan, and its Municipal Treasurer for
recovery of possession of real property and among others in connection with a parcel of
land which Eishmael claimed was registered in Babai’s name as OCT 995-A. On March 4,
2002, a Judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 989, which decreed, among others,
ordering the respondents to vacate portions of the subject property and surrender the
possession thereof to the plaintiff, Datu Eishmael Summagumbra. The said Judgment
became final and executory, and in a May 2, 2002 Order, the trial court directed the
issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13, 2002, Sheriff Edwin Cabug (Cabug) issued a
Sheriff’s Notice to vacate the premises. On March 26, 2007, Cabug issued a Sheriff’s
Partial Return of Service, indicating that the writ of execution was not enforced.

On August 4, 2008, fire gutted the Hall of Justice where the file of Civil Case No.
989 was kept; however, the record thereof was not reconstituted. On September 17,
2010, Cabug issued another Sheriff’s Partial Return of Service and a Notice of
Garnishment which he sent to the Manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines Lebak,
Sultan Kudarat Branch, in an apparent attempt to execute the March 4, 2002 Judgment in
Civil Case No. 989. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Issue an Order to the Sheriff

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Prohibiting Him from Executing an Alleged Judgment in the Above-Entitled Case, seeking
to restrain Cabug from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. 989 on the ground that
since the record thereof was not reconstituted, then there is no judgment in said case to
be enforced Petitioners filed their Omnibus Comment18 to the motion, and to this
respondents submitted their Comments/Reply. The trial court issued an Order20 granting
respondents’ Urgent Motion. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however was
denied by the trial court.

Petitioners filed an original Petition for Certiorari before the CA, however in a June
14, 2011 Resolution, the CA resolved to dismiss the Petition, for failing to strictly comply
with Rule 65 and other related provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly for: (a) Failure
to implead Public Respondent RTC Br. 19, Sultan Kudarat in the caption of the case; (b)
Lack of appropriate service of the petition on adverse parties Municipality of Kalamansig
represented by Mayor Rolando P. Garcia, the Sangguniang Bayan Members and the
Municipal Treasurer of the said Municipality as required by Rule 46, Section 3; (c) Being
defective in substance as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
signed by Saya Guiambangan without any proof that she has been duly authorized by the
other heirs of Babai Guiambangan to file the petition on their behalf. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its September 10, 2012 Resolution.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that that the CA should not have
dismissed their Petition for Certiorari on the ground of technicality, and should have
treated their case with more leniency and liberality; that even if the other heirs did not sign
the CA Petition and are not made party to the CA case as a result, still any judgment
obtained will be to their benefit as well, considering that they share a common interest in
the action, as co-heirs to Babai and Eishmael, and as co-owners of the subject property;
that even though the signatory to the CA Petition was designated only as "Saya
Guiambangan," it refers to petitioner herein, Saya Guiambangan Darus, who actually
signed the said petition, thus, "Saya Guiambangan" and "Saya Guiambangan Darus"
refer to one and the same individual; that in any case, they attached a Special Power of
Attorney32 to the instant Petition in order to comply with the procedural requirement; and
that if the CA looked beyond the procedural aspect of the case, it would have realized the
merit in their cause.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Certiorari before the CA was properly dismissed due to
mere procedural technicalities, when these defects should have been overlooked given
the circumstances and merit of their case.

HELD:
Yes. The said Petition for Certiorari should not have been dismissed.

The CA dismissed petitioners’ Certiorari Petition on three grounds: first, for failure
to implead the trial court as required by Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, which states
as follows:

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Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent
or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of
such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and
in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and
the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against
the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is
pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment
to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by
either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties.
However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear
or participate in the proceedings therein.

This, however, is not fatal. In Abdulrahman v. The Office of the Ombudsman, this
Court held that "neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action," particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; the CA should
simply order that a party be impleaded in the case. The Court made the following
pronouncement in said case:

The acceptance of a petition for certiorari, and necessarily the grant of due
course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the court
may reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari (1) when there is no showing of
grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2)
when there are procedural errors, such as violations of the Rules of Court or
Supreme Court circulars.

Indeed, the rules of procedure need not always be applied in a strict,
technical sense, since they were adopted to help secure and not override
substantial justice. "In clearly meritorious cases, the higher demands of substantial
justice must transcend rigid observance of procedural rules."

Thus, we have given due course to a petition because it was meritorious,
even though we recognized that the CA was correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari in the light of the failure of petitioner to submit material documents.
We have affirmed the CA when it granted a petition for certiorari despite the
litigant’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration beforehand. We have also had
occasion to excuse the failure to comply with the rule on the statement of material
dates in the petition, since the dates were evident from the records.

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Next, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of appropriate service of the Petition
for Certiorari on the respondents as required by Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules, although the record indicates that a copy thereof was served upon their counsel of
record. While this is not sanctioned by the 1997 Rules, this Court has excused it in the
past, thus:

True it is that Rule 46, Section 3 mandates that a copy of the petition should
be served on the other party; and that proof of such service should be filed with the
petition in court. However, the rule was substantially complied with when service
was made to petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Dennis Ancheta.

Without the benefit of a proper notice of petitioner’s substitution of counsel,
respondent had no recourse but to serve the copy of its petition to whom it knew
and perceived as being petitioner’s counsel of record. In faithful compliance and
with no intention of delay, service was made on Atty. Ancheta. 41

Finally, while only one of the heirs, Saya Guiambangan Darus, verified the CA
Petition for Certiorari, without proof of authority to file the same obtained from the other
heirs, this is not fatal. As heirs, they all share a common interest; indeed, even if the other
heirs were not impleaded, the Petition may be heard, as any judgment should inure to
their benefit just the same. Or, quite simply, the CA could have ordered their inclusion, as
earlier stated above.

x x x As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for
ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession
of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.

This ponente reiterated this principle in Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo v. Soliman, and
later, in Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr. Indeed, the CA should not have forgotten the guidelines
laid down by the Court regarding verifications and certifications against forum shopping:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule
form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of
defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

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3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling
reasons.’

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons,
the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)

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NAGA CENTRUM, INC., REPRESENTED BY AIDA KELLY YUBUCO
vs. SPOUSES RAMON J. ORZALES AND NENITA F. ORZALES
G.R. No. 203576, September 14, 2016

DOCTRINE: A party cannot be allowed to influence and manipulate the courts' decisions
by performing acts upon the disputed property - during the pendency of the case -which
would allow it to achieve the objectives it desires
.

FACTS:
Respondents own a house and lot situated at No. 28-B Valentin Street, Sabang,
Naga City which is surrounded, by property owned by others. One of which is by the
property of the petitioner. The respondents alleged that when they acquired their property
in 1965, their access to the public highway (Valentin Street) was through Rizal Street,
which forms part of a property now owned by the petitioner. But when the squatters
inhabiting said place were evicted, the petitioner caused Rizal Street to be closed by
enclosing its property with a concrete fence. This prompted the respondents to ask for a
permanent right of way through the intervention of the court after the petitioner refused
their offer to buy the portion where the proposed right of way is sought to be established.
The petitioner, however, alleged, among others that there is an existing passageway
leading to Valentin Street along Lot 1503 of Cad-290 which is available to the
respondents and that the property of the respondents became isolated due to their own
acts. In the course of the proceedings, the trial court, through an order dated August 26,
2005, granted the respondents' petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and ordered the petitioner 'to clear the [respondents'] access from the latter's residence
towards the former Rizal Street to Valentin Street of junks and other materials or vehicles
for repair that blocks [sic] or obstructs [sic] the same during the pendency of the ocular
inspection. Thereafter, the trial court ruled, among others, granting respondents, a legal
easement if right of way.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA and argued that the trial court's Decision
was void as it was issued by a pairing judge even after the regular judge for the sala had
already been appointed; that even assuming that the pairing judge had jurisdiction to
render the decision, he should have held that respondents should have sought a right of
way from the seller when they bought the property; that the judge disregarded the fact
that Felisa Estela (Estela) and Aurora dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) should have also been
impleaded in the case, since respondents were using their properties for ingress and
egress as well; that for failing to implead Estela and Dela Cruz, Civil Case No. 2004-0036
should have been dismissed instead; and that it was error for the trial court to have
ordered the establishment of the easement at the boundary of petitioner, Estela, and Dela
Cruz's respective lots. However, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that that Judge Pablo Formaran
III, then RTC Branch 22 pairing judge, had no jurisdiction to issue the December 23, 2008
Decision since a regular judge (Judge Efren Santos) for the sala had already been
appointed and in fact assumed office and that for this reason, the December 23, 2008

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Decision is null and void. That since respondents are at fault for failing to secure a right of
way from the seller when they bought the property knowing that it was surrounded by
private properties and thus had no means of ingress and egress, then petitioner should
not be obliged to provide the easement; that on account of Article 649 of the Civil Code,
which provides in part that "easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable
is due to the proprietor's own acts," respondents cannot demand an easement since they
are responsible for isolating their property from the highway. On the other hand, the
respondents, in their Comment, argued that prior to the issuance of the trial court's
Decision on December 23, 2008 in Civil Case No. 2004-0036, the authority of the pairing
judge - Judge Formaran III - to decide the case had been questioned before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on consulta, and on November 9, 2008, the OCA issued a
memorandum affirming Judge Formaran III's authority to decide the case based on OCA
Circular No. 90-2004 and that petitioner did not question the OCA's findings, and it was
only on February 2, 2009, or after the unfavorable December 23, 2008 Decision came
out, that it filed a motion to vacate the same on the pretense that Judge Formaran III was
not authorized to decide the case; and that petitioner's actions in this regard are a mere
afterthought which the trial court and the CA themselves did not fail to notice.
Respondents added that there is no basis for the application of Article 649 of the Civil
Code, in that the isolation of their property is not of their own doing but of petitioner's,
since it unduly closed Rizal Street, blocked the same, and built concrete structures
thereon even when Civil Case No. 2004-0036 was already pending

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the pairing judge of branch 22 has jurisdiction to render the
assailed decision.
II. Whether the respondent has the right to demand right of way.

HELD:

I. Yes, the pairing judge has jurisdiction to render the decision. It was only after the
unfavorable December 23, 2008 Decision came out that it moved to vacate the same on
the ostensible ground that Judge Formaran III had no authority as pairing judge to decide
the case. In short, petitioner had multiple opportunities to quell its doubts; by not seizing
upon these opportunities, it confirmed that it did not have any.

... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated - obviously
for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the

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jurisdiction or power of the court... And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said
that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape a penalty.
Elaborating on this ruling, the Court in Crisostomo v. CA, G.R. No. L-27166, March
25, 1970, 32 SCRA 54,60, stated that:
xxxx

The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot
adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel.
The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It
should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent
positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith
(People vs. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541 [1953]). For this reason, this Court closes the
door to the petitioners' challenge against the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and will not even honor the question with a pronouncement.'

A reading of the above-quoted statements may give the impression that the doctrine
applies only to the plaintiff or the party who, by bringing the action, initially invoked but
later repudiated the jurisdiction of the court. But while the rule has been applied to estop
the plaintiff from raising the issue of jurisdiction [Tolentino v. Escalona, G.R. No.L-26886,
January 24, 1969, 26 SCRA 613; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 29264,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Crisostomo v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27166, March 25,
1970, 32 SCRA 54; Ong Ching v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-35356, May 18, 1973, 51 SCRA
13; Capilitan v. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos, L-29536-7, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 706;
Florendo v. Coloma, G.R. No. 60544, May 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 304; Solicitor General v.
Coloma, Adm. Matter No. 84-3-886-0, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 511; Sy v. Tuvera, G.R.
No. L-76639, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 103] it has likewise been applied to the defendant
[Carillo v. Allied Worker's Association of the Phils., G.R. No. L-23689, July 31, 1968, 24
SCRA 566; People v. Munar, G.R. No.L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278; Solano
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41971, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 122; Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65072, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 470] and
more specifically, to the respondent employer in a labor case x x x. The active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to
object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is
tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.

Indeed, far from nullifying his actions, the Court lauds Judge Formaran III for his
prudence and careful handling of his affairs in general, and the instant case in particular.

II. Yes, the respondent has the right to demand right of way. To be entitled to an
easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:

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1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

The only issues raised by petitioner in this case relate to the third and fourth
requisites. It claims that respondents should be faulted for the isolation of their property,
as they failed to secure a right of way from their seller when they bought the same in
1965; that respondents should obtain their right of way from Estela and Dela Cruz
instead; and that the designated right of way granted by the trial court to respondents
already contains permanent structures, which thus requires the appointment of another;
and in this regard, petitioner is willing to negotiate with respondents as to location and
price.

However, respondents may not be blamed for the isolation they are now suffering. By its
very location, their property is isolated, and this is not their fault. Suffice it to say further
that the Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts that the closure of Rizal Street
by the petitioner caused their property to be isolated.

On the contention that respondents should seek a right of way from Estela and
Dela Cruz instead, the Court finds this to be unnecessary. As they are, Dela Cruz's
116-square meter lot and Estela's 90-square meter lot are not sizeable enough to
accommodate a road right of way for respondents; besides, their homes almost entirely
cover their lots, such that there is none left for a road. On the other hand, petitioner's land
is large enough, at 19,000 square meters; a reduction thereof by 40 square meters - 2
meters wide by 20 meters long for respondents' road right of way, would hardly be felt by
it.

All in all, the location of the easement as depicted and illustrated in the sketch
approved by the trial court (Exhibit "17") appears to be legal, reasonable, and just.

Significantly, respondents have been using Rizal Street for so long; petitioner
knew of this, and it even granted access to respondents. At the very least, respondents
have been using Rizal Street for 23 years (or from 1980 up to 2003). While petitioner may
have allowed access by the informal settlers to Rizal Street through tolerance, the same
cannot be said of respondents; they are not informal settlers on petitioner's land.

In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does
not contain any annotation that Lot No. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over
Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware
that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and
residents in the area for a long period of time.

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Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes, testified that respondents
and several other residents in the area have been using the alley to reach Beata Street
since 1932. Thus:

xxxx

In Mendoza v. Rosel, this Court held that:

Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do
not mention any lien or encumbrance on their lots, they are purchasers in
good faith and for value, and as such have a right to demand from
respondents some payment for the use of the alley. However, the Court of
Appeals found, as a fact, that when respondents acquired the two lots
which form the alley, they knew that said lots could serve no other purpose
than as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was
therefore known to petitioners who must respect the same, in spite of
the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not mention any
burden or easement It is an established principle that actual notice or
knowledge is as binding as registration.

Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and
in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on
said certificate. It has been held, however, that 'where the party has knowledge of
a prior existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a light to the
same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him.

In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was
donated by Dalmacio Lozada to his heirs. It is undisputed that prior to and after the
registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of
respondents and the public in general. We quote from the RTC's decision:

x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its
existence. It is admitted that this alley was established by the original owner
of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property the alley established by him
continued to be used actively and passively as such. Even when the
division of the property occurred, the non-existence of the easement was
not expressed in the corresponding titles nor was the apparent sign of the
alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles.

The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms
the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an
alley. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be
used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. x
xx

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Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No.
12-C, even though no registration of the servitude has been made on TCT No.
96886.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner thus acknowledged respondents' right to use Rizal Street. It should have
known from familiarity not only with its own land, but with those adjoining it, and from the
ongoing proceedings in the case, that respondents had no other way to and from Valentin
Street than through its property. For this reason, it is guilty of gross and evident malice
and bad faith when, even while Civil Case No. 2004-0036 was pending, it deliberately
blocked respondents' access to Rizal Street by constructing a building thereon, dumping
filling materials and junk on the main gate of respondents' home, and converting portions
of the road into an auto repair shop and parking space, making it difficult and
inconvenient, if not humiliating, for respondents to traverse the path to and from their
home. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, "(e)very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." Under Article 26, "(e)very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors." Petitioner's action
betrays a perverse and deliberate intention to hurt and punish respondents for legally
demanding a right of way which it nevertheless knew was forthcoming, and which,
considering the size of its land, it may give without the least prejudice to its own rights.

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EVELYN V. RUIZ vs. BERNARDO F. DIMAILIG
G.R. No. 204280 November 09, 2016

DOCTRINE:The determination of presence or absence of good faith, and of negligence
factual matters, which are outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari.
Nevertheless, this rule allows certain exceptions including cases where the RTC and the
CA arrived at different or conflicting factual findings

FACTS:

Bernardo F. Dimailig was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-361747 located in Alapan, Imus, Cavite. In 19 October 1997, he entrusted the
owner's copy of the said TCT to his brother, Jovannie, who in turn gave the title to Editha
Sanggalang, a broker, for its intended sale. In January 1998, the property was
mortgaged to Evelyn V. Ruiz as evidenced by a Deed of REM without Bernardo's
knowledge and consent so Bernardo instituted this suit for annulment of the Deed of
REM. In her Answer, Evelyn contended that she met Jovannie when she inspected the
subject property and assured her that Bernardo owned the property and his title thereto
was genuine. She further claimed that Jovannie mortgaged the property to her. She also
insisted that as a mortgagee in good faith and for value, the REM cannot be annulled
and that she had the right to keep the owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 until the loan
was fully paid to her. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. It held that while
Bernardo was the registered owner of the subject property, Evelyn was a mortgagee in
good faith because she was unaware that the person who represented himself as
Bernardo was an impostor. Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration was denied so he
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.
It held that the innocent purchaser (mortgagor in this case) for value protected by law is
one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner
himself, not by a forged deed. Since the Deed of REM was forged, and the title to the
subject property is still in the name of the rightful owner, and the mortgagor is a different
person who only pretended to be the owner, then Evelyn cannot seek protection from the
cloak of the principle of mortgagee in good faith. Evelyn filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Evelyn V. Ruiz is a mortgagee in good faith.

HELD:

As a rule, the issue of whether a person is a mortgagee in good faith is not within the
ambit of a Rule 45 Petition. The determination of presence or absence of good faith, and

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of negligence factual matters, which are outside the scope of a petition for review on
certiorari. Nevertheless, this rule allows certain exceptions including cases where the
RTC and the CA arrived at different or conflicting factual findings, as in the case at
bench. As such, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine and re-evaluate the factual
findings of the CA as they differ with those of the RTC.

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during. 2016 DOCTRINE: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court. The Regional Trial Court issued its Decision dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Matudan is psychological incapacited. permanent. Marquez. and incurable. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARILYN B. In 1985. (2) she consistently neglected and failed to provide for him and their children with the necessary emotional and financial care. Tecson. Northern Samar on October 26. Page 359 Echiverri. and (3) Sworn Affidavit of Dr. and sustenance. through the Office of the Solicitor General. Branch 94 alleging that (1) before. Sandoval. Corporal. On 20 June 2008. 203284 November 14. ISSUE: Whether or not Marilyn B. support. Lastimosa. The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion between the parties. De la Cruz. the Court ruled that the issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage Albano. (3) based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. HELD: In Perez-Ferraris v. Tayag which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination. They had four children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling so a Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court. when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Gloria. MATUDAN G. Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave. NICOLAS S. De Mesa.R. proceedings were conducted in due course. Ferraris. 1976. The Republic of the Philippines. and even so after leaving for work abroad. No. Asensi. MATUDAN vs. Marilyn left to work abroad an she had not been seen nor heard from by her husband and children thereafter. (2) Judicial Aftidavit of Maricel which was adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination. Matudan and Marilyn B. Santos. Cabañgon. Matudan were married in Laoang. Valois . Francisco. the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother. The following documents were submitted in evidence: (1) Nicolas’ Judicial Affidavit which was adopted as his testimony on direct examination. Alcazaren. Catindig. Tayag. Coronel. Rodriguez. are binding on this Court. Ramirez. Corpuz. Tabugan. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. Valiente. Castillo. save for the most compelling and cogent reasons FACTS: Nicolas S. Martinez. and after his marriage to Marilyn. opposed the Petition. Rañigo. Sy. The trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence. Palad. Lumberio. Espina. Reyes. Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Inguillo.

It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court. Corporal. Cabañgon. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. more than in any field of the law. Valois . Ramirez. Castillo. Gloria. Page 360 Echiverri. Lumberio. Inguillo. Such factual issue. however. Rodriguez. if properly considered. are binding on this Court. Martinez. Alcazaren. Corpuz. save for the most compelling and cogent reasons. Lastimosa. Valiente. Palad. Santos. or fail to notice certain relevant facts which. like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case. Asensi. or when there is a misappreciation of facts. Tecson. will justify a different conclusion. De la Cruz. Sandoval. is beyond the province of this Court to review. Catindig. run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case. which are unavailing in the instant case. Coronel. when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. De Mesa. Albano. Sy. on the facts of the case. Reyes. depends crucially. Tabugan. Marquez. Rañigo. Espina. Francisco.

alcoholic beverage drinking habit. there are exceptions to this rule such as when the factual findings of the CA are not supported by the evidence on record and/or are based on misapprehension of facts. (VVCCI). Sandoval. HELD: As a rule. VILLAMOR vs. Reyes. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G. De Mesa. Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of lipids [cholesterol triglycerides. However. Tabugan. Catindig. Palad. JESUS B. and poor compliance with anti-hypertensive medication increased his risk of developing his illness. After more than a week of confinement. there are exceptions to this rule such as when the factual findings of the CA are not supported by the evidence on record and/or are based on misapprehension of facts. Lumberio. FACTS: In 1978. Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal Ganglia. De la Cruz. but denied his claim for EC TTD benefits on the ground that there is no causal relationship between his illness and his working conditions. Valiente. or both] carried by lipoproteins in the blood). was employed by Valle Verde Country Club. Marquez. Inguillo. 03-4047063-3. Valois . Tecson. Ramirez. It also noted that his smoking history. Santos. Manila. Francisco. Such is the situation in this case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition and Supplemental Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contending that the CA erred in denying his claim for EC TTD filed in the Supreme Court is valid. 204422 November 21. Castillo. Gloria. On 9 March 2007. Infarct Hypertension. However. Sy. Upon further evaluation by SSS-Medical Operations Department. Rañigo. Page 361 Echiverri. he was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. 2016 DOCTRINE: Questions of facts may not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. SSS Pasig Branch granted his claim for sickness benefits under the SSS law. Lastimosa. Coronel. On 3 November 2006. Albano. he was discharged from the said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1. claims for sickness benefits under the SSS law and the EC TTD benefits under the EC law for his CVD or stroke. Espina. Inc. it denied the claim for lack of a causal relationship between his job as clerk and illness. due to dizziness associated with numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. Martinez. questions of facts may not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Jesus B. Corporal. Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute. Cabañgon. Villamor with Social Security System No. No. Rodriguez. Both his appeal and motion for reconsideration was denied by the Employees' Compensation Commission which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Corpuz. he filed before SSS Pasig City Branch.R. Alcazaren. Asensi.

Sy. Grandea. claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Interadent. Catindig. Inguillo. Tecson. De la Cruz. (Interadent) as a rank-and-file employee from May 2. she was rehired as Accounting Manager and subsequently promote to Finance and Accounting manager on April 16. Rañigo. 2010. Alcazaren. Bantegui. On 9 August 2010. Valiente. Corpuz. Castillo. Bernardino and Sonia J. Rebecca through her counsel. Reyes. 207315 November 23. Ramirez. Sandoval. The Labor Arbiter ruled that she was not constructively dismissed. Page 362 Echiverri. because she failed to prove her claim of Albano. FACTS: Rebecca F. 2010 to August 6. wrote a reply-letter arguing that she was already constructively dismissed even prior to her receipt of the Notice to Explain when certain security procedures were directed exclusively against her. On 23 July 2010. No. Martinez. Corporal. 2004 up to March 2006. disconnection of all USB ports and prohibition of cellular phone usage due to an alleged leakage of security information uncovered by the external auditors. A Memorandum was served to her the next day requiring her to submit a written explanation and attend an administrative hearing on August 2. JR. regarding a message she posted on her Facebook account referring to company concerns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and insulting statements against a co-worker. all network and internet connections in the Accounting Department were removed and disabled.. On the following day. REBECCA F. 2010 on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Her suspension was extended up to August 25. On 24 August 2010. Coronel.R. Francisco. In April 2008. Interadent issued a Second Notice informing her termination from service effective August 25. upon the directive of Bernardino G. She was preventively suspended for seven days effective July 29. INC. Interadent sought a company-wide implementation of security measures such as body frisking and bag/personal items inspection of all employees upon ingress and egress of office. Palad. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Cabañgon. On the other hand. Valois . 2010. She was also elected by the Board of Director as Treasurer on March 31. Jr. De Mesa. Espina. AND SONIA J. She asserts that her dismissal was without just cause or compliance with procedural due process since the alleged loss of trust and confidence was based on self-serving allegations and mere speculation. Santos. BANTEGUI. INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PHILIPPINES. Interdadent insisted that she was terminated for a valid and just cause and with compliance with procedural due process. GRANDEA vs. 2010. Simbillo worked at Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines. SIMBILLO G. 2010. Gloria. Inc. On 28 July 2010. Rodriguez. 2010.. Rebecca’s e-mail account was likewise suspended. Asensi. Marquez. 2016 DOCTRINE: In the exercise of its power to review decisions of the NLRC. 13th month pay. she filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal. illegal suspension. the CA can make its own factual determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or disregarding the evidence which are material to the controversy. Tabugan. BERNARDINO G. non-payment of service incentive leave pay.

Marquez. Corpuz. Sandoval. in fact or in law. Reyes. Valiente. Page 363 Echiverri. Tabugan. Valois . Espina. De Mesa." In the exercise of its power to review decisions of the NLRC. Catindig. Lastimosa. Santos. Francisco. Alcazaren. HELD: As a rule. Tecson. Hence. Martinez. Cabañgon. the Court agrees with the CA that the conclusions arrived at by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are manifestly erroneous because the evidence does not support their findings. Ramirez. Such ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. However. Lumberio. Corporal. Gloria. the CA can make its own factual determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or disregarding the evidence which are material to the controversy. discrimination. the CA can review the factual findings or legal conclusions of the NLRC and "is not proscribed from 'examining evidence anew to determine whether the factual findings of the NLRC are supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions derived therefrom accurately ascertained'. Albano. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals may reverse the factual declarations of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was substantial evidence of willful and intentional breach of trust. Castillo. Inguillo. Palad. Rodriguez. Coronel. well-settled is the rule that for want of substantial basis. In the instant case. Rañigo. She filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was granted. these factual findings cannot be given the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to it. Sy. factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but also finality because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters under their specialized jurisdiction. De la Cruz. Asensi.

Sy. FACTS: Insurance Policy Nos. Catindig. the findings of fact by the CA especially where such findings of fact are affirmatory or confirmatory of the findings of fact of the RTC. was revocably designated as the beneficiary in said insurance policies. 2002 and July 25. Gumersindo Solidum Ybañez. Page 364 Echiverri. BPI Family filed a Manifestation praying that either it be dropped from the case or that the case be dismissed with respect to it. 6066517-18 and 6300532-69 was issued by Manulife Philippines. Francisco. Alcazaren. vs. HERMENEGILDA YBAÑEZ G. She filed a Claimant's Statement-Death Claim on December 10. It is horn-book law that in appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. on October 25. This is not allowed. 204736 November 28. Upon investigation. De la Cruz. Asensi. HELD: The present recourse essentially challenges anew the findings of fact by both the RTC and the CA that the Complaint for rescission of the insurance policies in question will not prosper because Manulife failed to prove concealment on the part of the insured. Hermenegilda Ybañez. secondary to Uric Acid Nephropathy. as Albano. Corpuz. Valois . No. Gloria. On 25 November 25. Rodriguez. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. MANULIFE PHILIPPINES. 2003. 2016 DOCTRINE:In appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.. Coronel. Castillo. Sandoval. Ramirez. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. the findings of fact by the CA especially where such findings of fact are affirmatory or confirmatory of the findings of fact of the RTC are conclusive upon this Court. NASCVC. The Death Certificate dated November 17. Tabugan. Lumberio. 2003 to Dr. Corporal. 2003 stated that the insured had "Hepatocellular CA. De Mesa. 2005. Espina. Cabañgon. It subsequently instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Insurance Contracts against Hermenegilda and the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family). 2005. Crd Stage 4. Reyes. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in affirming the RTC Decision dismissing Manulife's Complaint for rescission of insurance contracts for failure to prove concealment on the part of the insured. because it no longer had any interest in the subject insurance policies as asssignee because the insured’s obligation had already been settled or paid. the RTC granted this prayer in its Order of November 25. Rañigo. Marquez. Since no objection was interposed to this prayer by either Manulife or Hermenegilda. Manulife concluded that the insured misrepresented or concealed material facts at the time the subject insurance policies were applied for so it denied the death claims and refunded the premiums that the insured paid on the insurance policies. Inc. Santos. SAM Nephropathy recurrent malignant pleural effusion.R. Lastimosa. Tecson. INC. Palad. Martinez. His wife. Valiente. Inguillo.

(7) when the findings of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record.that Manulife's Complaint for rescission of the insurance policies in question was totally bereft of factual and legal bases because it had utterly failed to prove that the insured had committed the alleged misrepresentation/s or concealment/s of material facts imputed against him. surmises or conjectures. Rañigo. Ramirez. Page 365 Echiverri. Albano. calibrating or weighing all over again the evidence. (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion. Palad. Of course. would justify a different conclusion.as affirmed or confirmed by the CA . De Mesa. Castillo. Lumberio. if properly considered. such as (1) when the conclusion is grounded upon speculations. Sy. Tabugan. Espina. De la Cruz. (8) when the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the RTC. (10) when the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case. Inguillo. that the parties adduced during trial. (6) when there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based. Santos. Marquez. (11) when the CA's findings are contrary to the admission of both parties. Coronel. (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that. Tecson. testimonial or documentary. Gloria. Martinez. (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting. Corpuz. in this case. it does not embark upon the task of dissecting. Corporal. The reason is simple: this Court not being a trial court. this Court must defer to the findings of fact of the RTC . Cabañgon. Asensi. We are satisfied that none of these exceptions obtains in the Petition at bench. Valois . Rodriguez. Thus. Reyes. Alcazaren. and. absurd or impossible. Valiente. Catindig. Francisco. evaluating. there are exceptions to this rule. are conclusive upon this Court. analyzing. Lastimosa. Sandoval.

Cabañgon. Despite the Fire Clearance Certification issued by the Bureau of Fire Protection on April 8. Reyes. De Mesa. ATTY. Marquez. Tabugan. Asensi. Lumberio. while the remaining warehouse was insured for ₱2 million. or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Coronel. No. Sandoval. Malayan claimed that the case of fire was arson. and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case. The five warehouses were insured with Malayan Insurance Co. SONNY RUBIN. but Malayan still denied or refused to pay her insurance claim so she filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against Malayan. Sonny Rubin. On the other hand. such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. 207277January 16. Castillo. and (c) identity of cause of action. 2017 DOCTRINE: The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action. both of which have distinct characteristics. Tecson. Inguillo. Bulacan. On 24 February 2008. (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. Res judicata. has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment must be final.. Lastimosa. in turn. Gloria. Corpuz. EMMA CONCEPCION L. Francisco. Valois . (3) it must be a judgment on the merits. Rodriguez. for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Catindig. Corporal. Espina. Santos. Palad. 2008 stating that the case of fire was accidental.. Francisco Mondelo. against fire for ₱56 million. Alcazaren. for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action. LIN G. YUCHENGCO. ENGR. She sought the assistance from the Insurance Commission (IC). (a) identity of parties. Lin obtained various loans from Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) secured by six clustered warehouses located at Plaridel. the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties. Martinez.R. Matters handled by the Insurance Commission are delineated as either regulatory or adjudicatory. Atty. De la Cruz. the five warehouses were gutted. either simultaneously or successively. Michael Angelo Requijo. Emmanuel Villanueva. it’s corporate officers Yvonne Yuchengco. Rañigo. and (4) there must be. the relief being founded on the same facts.. (b) identity of subject matter. Inc. Sy. YVONNE S. and MICHAEL REQUIJO vs. (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. would amount to res judicata in the other case. Page 366 Echiverri. and the Albano. VILLANUEVA. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. FRANCISCO MONDELO. Engr. INC. EMMANUEL G. Valiente. FACTS: Emma Concepcion L. between the first and second actions. regardless of which party is successful. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters. Ramirez.

De la Cruz. Santos. Malayan filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. the causes of action pleaded." Secondly. acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Corporal. and the reliefs prayed for. Valois . Rañigo. On 17 August 2010. Gloria. RCBC on January 4. Inguillo. Coronel. Sandoval. Catindig. not appealable. it is elementary that "an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and. Castillo." In the present case. Sy. Tecson. petitioners basically insist that Lin committed willful and deliberate forum shopping which warrants the dismissal of her civil case because it is not much different from the administrative case in terms of the parties involved. Tabugan. HELD: We deny this Petition. We hold that the case law rulings in the Go and Almendras cases control and govern the case at bench. Cabañgon. when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal. In the administrative case. or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x to x x x avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court. Marquez. Asensi. Reyes. Page 367 Echiverri. Rodriguez. 2010. 10-122738 based on forum shopping. Lastimosa. "It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. De Mesa. she was seeking a relief clearly distinct from that sought in the civil case by praying for the suspension or revocation of Malayan's license to operate as a non-life insurance company. petitioners herein utterly failed to prove that the RTC. Lumberio. she prayed for the collection of a sum of money with damages. In contrast with the civil case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the Civil Case on the ground of willful and deliberate forum shopping despite the fact that the civil case and the administrative case both seek the payment of the same fire insurance claim. Valiente. represented this time by Yvonne on June 17. Petitioners also posit that another ground warranting the dismissal of the civil case was Lin's failure to notify the RTC about the pendency of the administrative case within five days from the filing thereof. Corpuz. First off." "For grave abuse of discretion to exist. Alcazaren. Albano. in issuing the assailed Orders. It argued that (1) the administrative case was instituted to prompt or incite IC into ordering Malayan to pay her insurance claim and (2) the elements of forum shopping are present in these two cases. Martinez. The Regional Trial Court held that there is no forum shopping. She subsequently filed before the IC an administrative case against Malayan. Espina. Palad. therefore. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals was dismissed. Francisco. 2010. Ramirez.

Lumberio. (3) it must be a judgment on the merits. Marquez. he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case. for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action. (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court. the cognate concepts of litis pendentia and res judicata . De la Cruz. as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Corpuz. Gloria. Valiente. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court. Page 368 Echiverri. which provides: SEC. Francisco. (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties.Certification against forum shopping. Sandoval. Rañigo. Coronel. (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending. without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. has the following requisites: "(1) the former judgment must be final. The proscription against forum shopping is found in Section 5.x x x The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action. (b) if there is such other pending action or claim. On the other hand. --The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief. a complete statement of the present status thereof. Asensi. Alcazaren. Tecson. tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and. Reyes. Corporal. Cabañgon. Palad. The above-stated rule covers the very essence of forum shopping itself. or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith. unless otherwise provided. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. and (4) there must be. the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt. in turn. Inguillo. Catindig.. Santos. Sy. These arguments will not avail. Espina. between Albano. De Mesa. and the constitutive elements thereof viz. 5. Castillo. to the best of his knowledge. Valois . If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping. upon motion and after hearing. regardless of which party is successful. either simultaneously or successively. Martinez. or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions. the relief being founded on the same facts. Rodriguez. would amount to res judicata in the other case. no such other action or claim is pending therein. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Ramirez. Res judicata. the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties. for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.

Rañigo. Espina. as postulated in Almendras Mining Corporation v. Marquez. Sy. Tecson. Page 369 Echiverri. Santos. Lastimosa." In the context of the case at bar. Francisco. Alcazaren. and (c) identity of cause of action. Office of the Insurance Commission: Albano. Corporal. (b) identity of subject matter. both of which have distinct characteristics. Valois . Martinez. Corpuz. Tabugan. Asensi. Coronel. Palad. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Reyes. Cabañgon. the first and second actions. Gloria. De Mesa." "The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters. such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. (a) identity of parties. matters handled by the IC are delineated as either regulatory or adjudicatory. Rodriguez. Valiente. Ramirez. Catindig. Castillo. Inguillo. Lumberio.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES.. Palad. Martinez. ENGRACIO M. Fortunato and Franklin entrusted the original owner's copy of TCT (168302) S-3664 to Atty. and FRANKLIN C. Gloria. 168302 (S-3664). NORMAN R. 11-1192 violated the rule against forum shopping. and Franklin C. Lumberio. Alcazaren. Fortunato C.On February 9. Sunyang. No. Rañigo. Castillo. the title to the subject property was erroneously indicated as "Transfer Certificate of Title No. FCD PAWNSHOP AND MERCHANDISING COMPANY. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2017 DOCTRINE: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer.R. the Registry of Deeds of Makati." The publisher later circulated an Erratum admitting its mistake and it made the corresponding correction. the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata).Meanwhile. Inguillo. Valois . Fortunato and Franklin filed another complaint forannulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and certificate of sale issued with injunctive relief against UBP. Sy. Dionisio owned FCD Pawnshop and Merchandising Company which was the registered owner of a pared of fond in Makati under Transfer Certificate of Title No. FACTS: Felicitas Dionisio-Juguilon. Cabañgon. GABRIEL. and THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR MAKATI CITY G. The case was assigned to Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). 163302 (S-3664). (168302) S-3664. the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia). Lastimosa. Dionisio.In 2009. 2011. It was later discovered that the said title was used as collateral by Sunyang Mining Corporation (Sunyang) to obtain a ₱20 million loan from Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP). ATTY. the title was correctly indicated as "Transfer Certificate of Title No. the Registry of Deeds of Makati. DIONISIO vs. Marquez. Francisco. or TCT (168302) S-3664. In a written opposition. Page 370 Echiverri. Jr. Reyes. and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting causes of action. UBP claimed that the filing of Civil Case No. 11 -1192 and assigned to Branch 133 of the Makati RTC. Coronel. De la Cruz. Valiente. and several others on December 2011." but elsewhere in the notice. Ramirez. De Mesa. Sandoval. and several others Civil Case No. Asensi. Catindig. ATTY. Rodriguez. The Makati Regional Trial Court Branch 33 Albano. Rowena Dionisio. 207914 January 18. On account of perceived irregularities in the foreclosure and sale proceedings. In the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale published prior to the auction sale. Tecson. ESCASINAS.. (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer. UBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property and bought the same at the auction sale. Fortunato and Franklin filed a Petition to annul the Sunyang mortgage and claim for damages against UBP. DIONISIO JR. Corpuz. JR. Santos. Espina. FORTUNATO C. 11-116 based on the premise that TCT (168302) S-3664 was fraudulently mortgaged. Corporal. Adelaida Dionisio. Tabugan.

The trial court dismissed the second case. declaring as follows: There is forum shopping 'when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts. Page 371 Echiverri. Valiente. Catindig. This ponente affirmed the trial court. Rañigo. nor did they violate the rule on litis pendentia. Lastimosa. all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. Francisco. Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Espina. Asensi. the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia). and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting causes of action. Inguillo. De la Cruz. they are not guilty of forum shopping. Such petition was dismissed so a Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court. Valois . the validity of the real estate mortgage. Alcazaren. because Civil Case No. Cabañgon. Reyes. Tecson. An original Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed claiming that there is no forum shopping. and a second for injunction and nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and consolidation of title.’ Albano. Corpuz. Palad. Santos. 11-116 (annulment of mortgage) and Civil Case No. HELD: The Court denies the Petition. (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer. Sandoval. Ramirez. Tabugan. claiming that both cases relied on a determination of the same issue: that is. where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).who moved to dismiss the second case on the ground of forum shopping. Sy. simultaneously or successively. Coronel. and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. De Mesa. the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata). Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer. Martinez. This ponente has had the occasion to rule on a case where a party instituted two cases against the same set of defendants . Cause of action is defined as 'the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. 11-116 and 11-1192. 11-1192 (annulment of foreclosure and sale proceedings) involve different subject matters. issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. Gloria.one for the annulment of a real estate mortgage. 11-1192 on the ground of forum shopping.' The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Rodriguez. Castillo. rooted in the same real estate mortgage . Marquez. but the CA ordered its reinstatement. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners essentially point out that in maintaining Civil Case Nos. Lumberio. Corporal.

Inguillo. so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.the alleged nullity of the REM. inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. shall also be nullified. This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping. Valiente. Page 372 Echiverri. Lumberio. Reyes. there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different. Castillo. The plaintiffs in both cases first filed a case for annulment of the mortgage. Lastimosa. Rañigo. i. Corporal. The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form of the action.. the Court completely agrees with the CA's findings that in the event that the court in Civil Case No. or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 11-1192 (case for annulment of foreclosure and sale) . Francisco. then the same evidence in Civil Case No. Sandoval.' The foregoing view was reiterated in a subsequent pronouncement. Catindig. the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same . Ramirez. what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping. Albano. by varying the form of action. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM.is well-taken. Valois . Palad. De Mesa. Sy. which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. Thus. Martinez. The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland's right to the mortgaged property. 11-116 (annulment of mortgage case) should nullify the Sunyang mortgage. Santos. De la Cruz. followed by the case for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action. The well-entrenched rule is that 'a party cannot. escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. Corpuz. The factual milieu in the present case is the same as in the above-cited cases. and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title). Tecson. Asensi. The identity of the causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both. but with different prayers. There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM. As previously held by the Court. Tabugan. filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action. 11-116 will have to be utilized.e. Coronel. Thus. which happens to form the underlying premise of the CA's disposition. the CA's observation in Civil Case No. For this reason. Rodriguez. the underlying principle in these previously decided cases must apply equally to the instant case. Espina. Cabañgon. then subsequent proceedings based thereon. Marquez. Gloria. Notably as well. including the foreclosure.that since the complaint therein repeatedly makes reference to an "unlawful" and "fraudulent" Sunyang mortgage. Alcazaren.

Tabugan. Rodriguez. Corpuz. De Mesa. However. Corporal. Inguillo. There is therefore a danger that a decision might be rendered by the court in Civil Case No. 11-116. Ramirez. Valois . caprice. to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness. Catindig. thus presenting the court in said case with the opportunity and temptation to resolve the issue of validity of the mortgage. or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Francisco. 11-116. Petitioners maintain that Civil Case No. Lumberio. Rañigo. 11-1192 that contradicts the eventual ruling in Civil Case No. 11-1192 that should properly be rendered or resolved by the court trying Civil Case No. despotism. Martinez. De la Cruz. "Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Palad. Tecson. Asensi. Marquez. Cabañgon. Gloria. 11-1192 (case for annulment of foreclosure and sale) is grounded on specific irregularities committed during the foreclosure proceedings. speedy. The rules of procedure are geared toward securing a just. Alcazaren. or the annulment of mortgage case. Page 373 Echiverri. Reyes. the Court would rather have petitioners try their cause of action in Civil Case No. 11-116." With these principles in mind. rather than leave the trial court in danger of committing error by issuing a decision or resolving an issue in Civil Case No. namely. Sandoval. their Complaint in said case reiterates the supposed illegality of the Sunyang mortgage. Coronel. Espina. Sy. Lastimosa. Albano. Castillo. and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Santos. Valiente.

the amount of ₱30. Sandoval. SOLIS G. Palad. Sy. RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week. they ceased dealer outlet operations on account of lack of personnel. Tabugan.00 as cost of the suit. represented by ARCHEMEDES G. Valiente. Respondent made written demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract.00 as damages. acting as a dealer outlet. De Mesa. On appeal. Hence cognizable by jurisdiction of RTC. Tecson. Santos. Martinez.00.000. In the case for damages. the amount of ₱30. SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. 2012. the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Coronel. Inguillo. however.000. Ramirez.R. Espina. On April 30. but the latter failed to pay thereby constitutes breach of contract. Valois . Marquez. RTC has jurisdiction over claims exceeding ₱300. Respondent alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with petitioners whereby the latter.000. NO. Rañigo. the court that has jurisdiction depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed. Lumberio. the court was convinced that it is an action for damages. Corpuz. Castillo.00 as incidental and consequential damages. or for the total amount of ₱280. 212690 20 FEBRUARY 2017 DOCTRINE: In the specific performance and rescission of contract cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for breach of contract and damages is incapable of pecuniary estimation jurisdiction of which belongs to RTC HELD: No. PAJARESvs. Page 374 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Reyes. Cabañgon. CA reversed the decision and ruled that an action for breach of contract and damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. hence jurisdiction belongs to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Albano. Corporal. Catindig. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING. Gloria. Asensi. The complaint sought the award of ₱200. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. It was petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract.000. and the amount of ₱20. De la Cruz. 129.000. Francisco. After an analysis of the complaint filed by respondents.00 as legal expenses.000. The plaintiffs complaint is for the recovery of damages for the alleged breach of contract. shall accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant or laundry outlet. According to B.00 as exemplary damages.P Blg. FACTS: Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning filed a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against herein Spouses before the RTC of Cebu City.

Gloria.00 on March 20. Section 19 of BP 129." In other words.000. and costs. Coronel. Tabugan. Sy. 2004 pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7691.000. Castillo. Page 375 Echiverri. damages of whatever kind. Francisco. where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages. 09-94this Court declared that "where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. The above jurisdictional amount had been increased to ₱200. Palad. Otherwise. Marquez. Martinez. attorney's fees. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Sandoval. exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC. Lastimosa.00. Tecson. Corpuz. 7691. Albano. Inguillo. Pursuant to paragraph 8. Catindig. Lumberio. Rodriguez. as amended by Republic Act No. Valiente. De Mesa.000. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.00 on February 22. Asensi. jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial Court. litigation expenses. Then in Administrative Circular No. 1999 and further raised to ₱300. 2012 amounted only to ₱280. Valois . or one of the causes of action. Reyes. all claims for damages should be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. provides that where the amount of the demand exceeds ₱l00. Santos. Espina. Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint filed with the RTC on September 3. Corporal. exclusive of interest. Rañigo.000. said court was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case.00.

Lumberio. The RTC also held that there was a faithful compliance on the notice of hearing requirement. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. 2011 Order. Almendras filed an Amended Complaint seeking to annul the Deed of Sale executed by and among respondents Caridad C. Catindig. failed to file a sworn statement specifically denying the matters therein or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot either deny or admit said matters. Gloria. Corporal. Tecson. Francisco. Almendras. Rolando filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus. direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. 1994. Cabañgon. he was in fact served a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment via registered mail and that he received a copy thereof on March 24. Sandoval.3087 hectares. Almendras opposed the summary judgment alleging that he was not personally served a copy of the Request for Admission hereby rendering such defective. Rodriguez. Rolando prayed that the complaint be dismissed. Lastimosa. Coronel. that the validity of the DOS as well as his ownership and possession of the subject property be upheld. Page 376 Echiverri. Thus. 2010. Sy. In particular. Ramirez. Cruz. Martinez. 2010 while his counsel was furnished a copy thereof on March 17. ALEXIS C. he was deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the matters specified therein. and the issue of ownership raised by petitioner being sham or fictitious. it cannot be said that there was violation of Section 5. (SODACO) on April 23. Castillo. 198209 22 MARCH 2017 DOCTRINE: Section 4 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to this Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. The RTC then concluded that by petitioner's failure to respond to the Request for Admission. 1978 until he was forcibly dispossessed by respondent South Davao Development Company. Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Moreover. Valois . He alleged that there being no genuine issue as to any material fact. ROLANDO SANCHEZ. Palad.SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Marquez. INC. Sanchez and Leonardo Dalwampo over a parcel of unregistered land located at Inawayan. Asensi. Reyes. Espina.R. Rolando C. Davao del Sur containing approximately 6. the RTC held that contrary to petitioner's claim. except as to the issue of damages. Valiente. Alcazaren. Normally. FACTS: Petitioner Almendras alleged that he owned and had occupied said parcel of land since September 21. Inguillo. the filing of the case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Tabugan. Santos. Rañigo. Petitioner claimed that Caridad sold the property to Rolando. a purported dummy of SODACO. It noted that the motion was filed on June 29. In the assailed March 28. De la Cruz. 2010. He is entitled to a summary judgment. De Mesa. ALMENDRAS G. LEONARDO DALWAMPO and CARIDAD C. petitioner is deemed to have admitted the fact that the property in Albano. Petitioner. Inc. Sta. ALMENDRAS vs. (SODACO). No. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5. Corpuz.. 2010 while the hearing was scheduled on July 9.

The Supreme Court find it unnecessary to discuss the determination of applicability of summary judgment. Reyes. Inguillo. Catindig. Petitioner went straight to this Court via Rule 45 when he had the more appropriate remedy of appealing before the CA. Cabañgon.” Albano. “As the instant Petition was filed without resorting to a more appropriate remedy before the CA. Hence. Marquez. Asensi. Coronel. Quoting the rule of the High Court. Valiente. Alcazaren. the same should be dismissed following our ruling above. Espina. Tabugan. Corpuz. Castillo. De Mesa. Tecson. Lastimosa. Valois . Santos. Rañigo. Corporal. Gloria. De la Cruz. Sandoval. ISSUE: Whether or not a Motion for Summary Judgment is applicable? HELD: No. Ramirez. Palad. Francisco. Page 377 Echiverri. question had been validly sold to Rolando thereby rendering the complaint without any cause of action. Lumberio. Sy. Rodriguez. it would be proper to conclude that petitioner had forgone his right to open the entire case for review on any matter concerning a question of fact. Martinez.

Cabañgon. Corporal. In a complaint for replevin. he entrusted the vehicle Ong who is a businessman involved in the second-hand car sales. Corpuz. ISSUE: Whether or not Replevin is proper HELD: No. Tabugan. Tecson. Catindig. petitioner may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Valiente. Asensi. No. Petitioner filed before QC Anti-Carnapping Section. De Mesa. and that the defendant. Lastimosa. Reyes. Also. Rañigo. Santos. Sandoval. Q-11-69644 in July. Valois . Ong met with petitioner upon learning of the complaint to arrange the transfer of the vehicle. 205998. wrongfully detains the same. respondent. On appeal. He later found out that the vehicle was transferred to Chua. 2011. Gloria. who Albano. and that the defendant. Rodriguez. Ong still failed to return. The respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Writ of Replevin. Martinez. Palad. However. dismiss the complaint and turnover the vehicle to him. Coronel. after the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer. the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. He alleged that he is the owner of 2007 Range Rover with plate number ZMG 272 that he purchased from Alberto Lopez III. wrongfully detains the same. Ong failed to transmit the proceeds of the purported sale. 24 APRIL 2017 DOCTRINE: In a complaint for replevin. RTC denied the motion for failure to post a counterbond. Thereafter. Castillo. Espina.R. the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. Petitioner thus prayed for a writ of replevin be issued. Ramirez. he alleged that the manager’s check and affidavit of Lopez containing the sale of the vehicle are insufficient to prove the ownership. Page 378 Echiverri. Quite the contrary. Sy. Marquez. De la Cruz. Francisco. Lumberio. Inguillo. WILLIAM ANGHIAN SIY vs. As a result the Highway Patrol Group took custody and impounded the vehicle. who is in actual or legal possession thereof. FACTS: Petitioner Siy filed before RTC Quezon City a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin against herein respondent. He claimed to be the lawful and registered owner of the vehicle. Alcazaren. the CA granted the petition since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction for failure of petitioner to pay the correct docket fees and misdeclaring the real value of the vehilcle. who is in actual or legal possession thereof. Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he filed Civil Case No. The person need not be the owner as long as he specify and show his right to the possession. ALVIN TOMLIN G.

when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the vehicle on March 7. Page 379 Echiverri. 2011. together with his ownership. obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office. Corporal. Coronel. Valiente. he is entitled to its possession. Lastimosa. Valois . Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle. for collection of the proceeds of the sale. Inguillo. Santos. Castillo. Reyes. Q-11-69644. indeed. Palad. as he was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time. Asensi. Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua. Martinez. Rañigo. Tecson. which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its custody. petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof. Lumberio. Sandoval. the CA was correct in decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2010 ‘‘Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with the PNP-HPG. Corpuz. De la Cruz. although it erred in ordering the return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG. Marquez. Tabugan. Petitioner had no right to file said report. Cabañgon. Albano. De Mesa. Espina. Francisco. Alcazaren. As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle. is the rightful owner thereof. His argument that respondent is a buyer in bad faith. Rodriguez. despite having been apprised of petitioner’s earlier November. Sy. Catindig. is unavailing. his right of action is only against Ong. Gloria. the trial court must return the same to respondent. Ramirez. For this reason. petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle. and as such.

Catindig. This fact was noted in the court process server’s Return of Summons. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Lastimosa. which the court granted. Martinez. More so when the result would be the same. Respondents' reply filed thereafter is. in this case. in the language of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal. Corpuz. Coronel. Francisco. CA confirmed the decision of RTC. they have shown only respect and reverence to the latter. Asensi. The matter failed to be settled in the barangay prompting the issuance of Certificate to File Action. RODANTE F. GUYAMIN and EILEEN G. GUYAMIN. respondents must now enjoy the fruits of their ownership. The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default. but on pure technicality. Respondents remain to be the registered owner of the property and the tax declaration in their names. GATARIN vs. LUCINIA F. JACINTO FLORES and MAXIMO FLORES. Rodriguez. Tabugan. The parties Albano. and after all these years of giving unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives. Thus. As applied to the instant case. Further. Reyes. De la Cruz. as it proceeds from the said answer. Sy. and the latter's filing of a reply. Rañigo. Castillo. Sandoval. As owners of the subject property who have been deprived of the use thereof for so many years owing to petitioners' continued occupation. 202189. The Supreme Court ruled that both courts correctly ruled in declaring defendants in default. Valois . Gloria. Palad. like the belated answer. FACTS: Respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property in this case. 25 APRIL 2017 DOCTRINE: As owners. petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit. RTC ordered that petitioners vacate the property. Marquez. De Mesa. Summons was served to herein petitioners who refused to sign and acknowledge receipt. technicalities 'should give way to the realities of the situation'. They filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners who are their relatives occupying the property for years by mere tolerance. respondents chose "'remind". Respondents moved to Declare Defendants in Default for failure to file answer. No. that is. Inguillo. Santos. respondents' substantive rights must be protected in the first instance. represented by RAMON FLORES G.R. they cannot be defeated by a resort to procedural hair-splitting that gets the parties and this Court nowhere. On appeal. when to do so would promote a clear injustice and violation of respondents' substantive rights. Ramirez. Espina. a mere scrap of paper. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in finding RTC was correct in declaring defendants in default HELD: No. instead of using "demand". Respondents have been more than cordial in dealing with petitioners. Page 380 Echiverri. Alcazaren. petitioners would eventually and ultimately lose their case. They reminded petitioners to vacate because they will sell the property petitioners failed to vacate. Valiente. do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. The Court will not pretend to engage in a useless discussion of the virtues of adhering strictly to procedure. Corporal. Tecson. even to the extent of using less offensive language in their complaint for fear of generating more enmity than is required.

Albano. Rodriguez. Coronel. Inguillo. Marquez. the choice of words is understandable. Gloria. Valiente. Santos. Lastimosa. Rañigo. being relatives and the context and circumstances being the way they are. Espina. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. Sy. Palad. Catindig. Corpuz. Page 381 Echiverri. De Mesa. Corporal. Valois . Tecson. Asensi. Reyes. The Court will treat respondents' act as a polite demand. Alcazaren. Ramirez. indeed. Sandoval. Tabugan. the law never required a harsh or impolite demand but only a categorical one. Francisco. Martinez. Lumberio. Castillo.

the Prosecution’s witnesses or the accused appellant’s witnesses? Albano. After the stabbing incident. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. he was able to stab his trust. “I will kill you”. June 5. Tecson. the RTC found him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Palad. Valiente. Catindig. Perfecto yelled at him to step outside. Rañigo. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these tactical findings are to be given the highest respect because it had the better opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note their demeanor. actual damages. Villamor. 7659 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole. Inguillo. that at distance at about five meters. appellant sought recourse before the CA. exemplary damages and to pay the costs of suit. Santos. Aggrieved. Lumberio. but he paid no attention to his pleas. that when he stepped outside their store. Cabañgon. Page 382 Echiverri. he surrendered to Barangay Council man Benigno Lucas who brought him to the police station in Anaturan. Ramirez. Martinez. MARLON SORIANO-NARAG GR. Despite Ederlina and perfecto’s plea to stop his stabbing frenzy. and that afterwards. Ederlina tried to stop the appellant from stabbing her husband but he pushed her away and stabbed her instead at the right wrist and forehead. that he ran inside the kitchen and armed himself with a chisel. NO. Francisco. moral damages. and that his family feud was caused by Perfecto’s desire to deprive appellant’s mother of her legitimate share in the common residential compound at Linao East. Gloria. Coronel. Sandoval. Sy. Reyes. he was brought to the hospital for treatment but said hospital did not issue a medical certificate. Perfecto. Castillo. While Perfecto was attempting to close the door of his room upon learning the shout of his wife Ederlina to close the door of his room. Corporal. Tuguegarao City where he was investigated. Tabugan. He further claimed that on February 9. Said accused was ordered likewise to pay the heirs of Perfecto Narag civil indemnity. Marquez. The CA sustained the findings of the RTC that Marlon’s guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Perfecto Narag and proceeded to Perfecto’s room. conduct and altitude under grueling examination. that when Perfecto tried to hurt him again. FACTS: On the afternoon of February 9. Espina. Appellant claimed that there had been long-standing bad blood between his family and his deceased uncle. Lastimosa. as Amended by Republic Act No. appellant barged into the house of his uncle. Asensi. 2017 DOCTRINE:It has been held time and again that tactical findings of the trial court. After trial. Valois . ISSUE: Whose testimonies are more credible. 2004. Tuguegarao City. Perfecto went near a store he was standing right inside the common residential compound. appellant grabbed his neck and immediately stabbed his chest while uttering the words. 2004. 216063. the tricycle driver in their employ came in and forced appellant returned inside the room and stabbed Perfecto at the back again. Perfecto swung his knife at him and injured his knee. It nonetheless modified the sums awarded by the RTC in concept of actual and exemplary damages. Corpuz.

Albano. we see no reason at all to overturn. Cabañgon. Palad. Valois . Lumberio. Francisco. Asensi. Valiente. and sustained and affirmed by the appellate court. Corporal. is loathe to re-examine and reevaluate the evidence that had been analyzed and dissected by the trial court. Inguillo. Tecson. Page 383 Echiverri. Castillo. Sandoval. Sy. In the case at bench. Catindig. Espina. the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the highest respect by the appellate court. Coronel. Marquez. Santos. HELD: According to the Supreme Court. it is almost trite to say that the factual findings of the trial court. Reyes. Corpuz. This explains why this court. Tabugan. De la Cruz. its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. which is not a trial court. Gloria. the finding of facts and the conclusions of law made by both the trial court and the appellate court relative to the fact that treachery or alevosia in fact attended the stabbing-to-death of Perfecto by the appellant at the time and place alleged in the information. Rañigo. Martinez. whose revisory power and authority is limited to the bare and cold records of the case. De Mesa. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Alcazaren.

2012. HELD: Section 3. FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with a total land area of 229 square meters. V-77660. Asensi.. As a consequence. Corporal. the Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the RTS’s August 23. Inguillo. x x x the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. On August 23. Page 384 Echiverri. respondents received two checks from the DPWH representing 100% of the total value of the subject property and the cost of the onestorey semi-concrete residential house erected on the property amounting to P 161. filed a complaint before the RTC for the expropriation of 83 square meters of said parcel of land as well as the improvements thereon. Ramirez. ISSUES: 1. Gloria. The RTC issued the corresponding writ of procession in favor of the Republic on the same day. Espina. On November 9. Sy. Sandoval. SPOUSES SENANDO F. Valenzuela City.449. it must always be based on all established rules. Coronel. 2012. In this case. Barangay Parada.850. Reyes. Valois . Tecson. De Mesa. the Republic. The RTC likewise directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property in the Republic’s name. 2013 Order of denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Valenzuela City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. upon correct legal principles and competent evidence. Lastimosa. Palad. Lumberio. Whether the RTC correctly denied the Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for having been filed out of time. Marquez. June 07. Although the trial court received the Republic’s Albano. Santos.00 and P 523. represented by DPWH. Cabañgon. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading. SALVADOR and JOSEFINA R. Rañigo. Rodriguez. respectively. respondents manifested that they were no longer intending to claim any just compensation. De la Cruz. No: 205428. Tabugan. Whether the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property can be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents. 202 Decision and January 10. Valiente. Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is files by a registered mail. it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. SALVADOR GR. Catindig. Castillo. the records show that the Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the RTC via registered mail on September 28.22. Alcazaren. the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Republic condemning the subject property for the propose of implementing the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from NLEX to McArthur Highway. Rather. 2012. Represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs. 2011. located in Kaingin St. for the construction of the C-5 Northern link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) turn the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to Mac-Arthur Highway. 2017 DOCTRINE: While it is true that the determination of the amount of just compensation is within the court’s discretion. Francisco. Martinez. Corpuz. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. On February 10. 2.

the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. Henceforth. given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer of the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the remaining property.2012. The herein Petition for Review on Certiorari was GRANTED. the RTC committed a serious error when it directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property. Rañigo. Valiente. On the second issue. Inguillo. De Mesa. in that the award of consequential damages was DELETED. Alcazaren. Page 385 Echiverri. Palad. Corporal. Salvador were ORDERED to pay for the capital gains tax due in the transfer of the expropriated property. as it is a tax on the seller’s gain from the sale of real property. Rodriguez. In addition. 2013 of the RTC. Tabugan. the RTC exceed in denying the Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for having been filed out of time. Catindig. Corpuz. Valois . it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents. Sy. the date of its mailing which is clearly within the reglementary period of 15 days to file said motion. Tecson. Santos. counted from September 13. The Decision dated August 23. 2012 and the Order dated January 10. Reyes. Salvador and Josefina R. no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property as a result of the expropriations. it should have considered the pleading to have been filed on September 28. Asensi. Albano. Branch 270. 2012. Lumberio. Lastimosa. 2012. Francisco. Coronel. the capital gains tax in expropriation proceedings remains a liability of the seller. on the date of the Republic’s receipt of the assailed Decisions. motion only on October 5. Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation. Gloria. Martinez. Marquez. De la Cruz. As far as the government is concerned. Espina. More significantly. In this case. Sandoval. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 175-V-11. were MODIFIED. spouses Senando F. Castillo.

etwo [2] prisoner vans and private vehicles)  By 1630H. 231658. De Mesa. Coronel. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-empt militaryreinforcements. President RodrigoRoa Duterte issued Proclamation No.Marantao. Caloocan. at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur. etc. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Saber. MEDIALDEA.  By evening of 23 May 2017. G. By evening.  As of 2222H. Valois . destroyed its maingate and assaulted on-duty personnel. July 4. Inguillo. etc. Espina. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. Page 386 Echiverri. Gloria. Corpuz. REP. the poweroutrage had spread citywide. A patrol car of the Police Stationwas also taken. NORKAYA S MOHAMAD. persons connected with the Maute Group had occupiedseveral areas in Marawi City. etc. 2017. Corporal. No act of congress can. along with theirsympathizers. as well as the following barangays: BasakMalutlot. Sandoval. Rañigo. G. EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT.Mapandi. Bangolo Street. 2017 in Marawi City. the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reyes.  From 1800H to 1900H the same members of the Maute Group ambushedand burned the Marawi Police Station.  The group took cellphones. After all. 2017. and for a period not exceeding 60 days. BJMP personnel were disarmed. commenced their attack on various facilities – governmentand privately owned – in the City of Marawi. including Naga Street. Article VII. 231771. plunging the city into total black-out). Sy. fell under the control of thesegroups.. personnel-issued firearms. 2017 DOCTRINE: As long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18. which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus.. curtail or diminish such powers. Bubong. Catindig.R No. the extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. and Camp Keithly. The Maute Group facilitated the escapeof at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail.  At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jailbeing managed by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).R.  The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities. Marawi City’s electricsupply was still cut off. the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted andsporadic gunfights were heard and felt everywhere. Barionaga and Abubakar. Castillo.R. Martinez.  A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed thetakeover of the Marawi City Jail. FACTS: On May 23. G. EDCEL C. Alcazaren. Albano. De la Cruz. vs. etc. Lilod Maday. 231774. therefore. Lastimosa. and vehicles (i. Asensi. Banggolo. (As of May 24. Francisco. LAGMAN. Valiente. No. Palad. On the President’s report to congress he explained the events which took placeon May 23.namely. Rodriguez. Tecson. Lumberio. Lilod. Tabugan. Bangon. Santos. Mapandi Saduc. Ramirez. Bangulo and Sauiaran. to wit:  At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG. Cabañgon. Marquez.tied and /or locked inside the cells.  The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affectedareas to evacuate. No.

expressing full support to the martial law and finding Proclamation No. Rañigo. Sandoval. Corporal. Catindig. After all the submission of the report and the briefings.eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and the Philippine NationalPolice have been killed in action. the nun’s quarters in thechurch. As of the time of this Report. It argued that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion. and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. 388 and the House of Representatives. Hostages were taken fromthe church. which they later set ablaze. and offices in the said area. while thirty-five (35) others have beenseriously wounded. A) G.  The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted theDAESH flag there. Filipino-LibyanFriendship Hospital. Tabugan. authority. constitutional and in accordance with the law. and remove his supervisory powers over local governments .  Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP. Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora. They are alsopreventing Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young maleMuslims to join their groups. Valois . As of 600H of 24 May2017. Gloria. the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao. Ramirez. Espina. in an attempt to undermine his control over the executive departments. Inguillo. Lumberio. the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law has nosufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. Coronel. Cabañgon. as well as the classified reports he received. Lastimosa. since there is no proof that Albano. defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed. Valiente. De la Cruz. Santos. Martinez. Alcazaren. the senate issued P. bureaus.SResolution No.  The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital. Francisco. Corpuz. De Mesa. seizing public and private facilitates. perpetrating killings ofgovernment personnel. Palad.  These Lawless armed groups had likely set up road blockades andcheckpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction. 216 “to be satisfactory.  Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippinesand commandeered one of its armored vehicles. Tecson.  Later in the evening. House Resolution No. and committing armed uprising against and opendefiance of the government. Rodriguez. members of the Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates ofAmai Pakpak Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat. The unfolding of these events.there exists a strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in MarawiCity. Marquez. the Maute Group burned Dansalan CollegeFoundation. among other several locations.  Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) ofMarawi City has been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed ofmembers of the Maute group and the ASG. Page 387 Echiverri. Sy. Asensi. Reyes. 231658 (Lagman Petition) First. ledthe President to conclude that these exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power.” Hence the Petitions.  There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching forChristian communities in Marawi City to execute Christians.  About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had beenreportedly killed by the lawless groups. 1050.  Other educational institutions were also burned namely Senator NinoyAquino College Foundation.R No. Castillo.

the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law hadno sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official before making the proclamation. likewise sought the nullification of Proclamation No. De Mesa. Coronel. there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. and (2)render “a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. Rodriguez. the Cullamat Petition assailed the inclusion of the phrases “otherrebel groups” in the last whereas clause of Proclamation No. No. contrived and hyperbolic accounts. its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippine. Santos. Albano. the Lagman Petition asked the Courtto: (1) exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of thefactual basis of Proclamation No. it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group’s plan to take over Marawi city and other parts of Mindanao. exaggerationsand falsities in the reports of the President to congress. as additional factual basis for the proclamation of martial law. Alcazaren. the Mamasapano Carnage and other bombings incidents in Cotabato. Moreover. It contended that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began. Rañigo.” Third. Palad. Marquez. 216 for being unconstitutional because there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. 231771 (Cullamat Petition) The Cullamat Petition. De la Cruz. Reyes. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Inguillo. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi City only and not the entire region in Mindanao. Second. Castillo. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging. Valiente. the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016. Catindig. Corpuz. the Davao marking bombing. The Cullamat Petition claimed that the alleged “Capability of the MauteGroup and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to properly does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole Mindanao. Gloria. Page 388 Echiverri. the Zamboanga Siege. It also pointed there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. Finally. Lumberio. B) G. or its territory. 216. Asensi.R. the Cullamat Petition cited alleged inaccuracies. Espina. its law. Cabañgon. Sy. Article VII” of theConstitution. Tecson. In addition. Francisco. Sultan Kudarat. 216” for lackof sufficient factual basis. inaccurate. Martinez. had long been resolved. Corporal. or with the culprits having already been arrested. the Lagman Petition claimed that the President’s proclamation ofmartial law lacked sufficient factual basis owning to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the whole of the House of Representatives. Fourth. Tabugan. the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law has nosufficient basis since the President’s report mistakenly included the attacks in the military outpost in Butig. the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law hasno sufficient factual basis because the President’s report contained “false. Based on the foregoing augmentation. and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was “”undetermined” which indicates that there are only a meagre number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group. It averred that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. Lanao del Sur on February 2016. “anchored on Section 18. Sandoval. Valois . and Basilan.

Valiente. the Cullamat Petition prayed for the court to declare Proclamation No. Corpuz. ISSUES: 1. It contented that the extraordinary powers of the President showed be dispersed sequentially. With its inclusion of “other rebel groups. c. Is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciationof facts. De la Cruz. to declare the same as unconstitutional in so far as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao. the power to declare. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-inChief. b. Lastimosa. his choice must be dictated only by. Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is promulgated. Tecson.e first. 231774 (Mohamad Petition) The Mohamad Petition posited that martial law is a measure of lastresort and should be involved by the President only offer exhaustion of less sever remedies. Mohamad Petition prayed for the Court to exercise its power to review. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered vague and thus null and void: a. and declaration of martial law. Rodriguez. C) G. 6. Comments were filed thereto and were consolidated. De Mesa. Corporal. There were alsooral arguments on the issues raised by the parties. Section 18. 2. second. Ramirez. namely calling out powers. Lumberio. the power to call the armed forces. Tabugan. Whether or not Proclamation No. Gloria. Is required to take into account only the situation of the proclamation. Marquez. and commensurate to. Sy. 4. Cabañgon. 3. Who has the burden of proof? c. should the court find justification for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City. Rañigo. Espina. Inguillo. Santos.R No. and 231774 are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by Paragraph 3. Catindig. Palad. i.“compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis of the declaration of martial and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao” and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In time.” or Albano. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately. a. Alcazaren. What are the parameters for review? b.216 as unconstitutional or in the alternative. and finally. Francisco. Page 389 Echiverri. Sandoval. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: a. Is required to obtain the favourable recommendation thereon of thesecretary of National Defense. It maintained that the President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use. Castillo. Reyes. the exigencies of the situation. evenif subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported. Martinez. Coronel. Valois . 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis. What is the threshold of evidence? 5. Asensi. moreover. 231771. Whether or not the petitions docketed as GR Nos 231658.

Article VII of the Constitution sets the parameters to determiningthe sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. Rañigo. schools and churches were burned. In his report. 8. Lumberio. Castillo. Martinez. Valois . Valiente. Santos. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. Corpuz. Sy. After the oral argument. b. Catindig.road blockages and checkpoints were set up. Lastimosa. De Mesa. Cabañgon. young male Muslims were forced to join their group. For the existence of actual rebellion. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that Albano. For a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. or b. Rodriguez. Sandoval. Marquez. Espina. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Inguillo. In determining the existence of rebellion. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities. the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. Based on the foregoing. Coronel. Tecson. the parties submitted their respective memoranda andsupplemental memoranda. or b. Also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quelllawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region. Corporal. 55 s. HELD: Section 18. Asensi. and 9. and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power without the concurrence of the two conditions. 2016. non-Muslims or Christians were targeted. 7. “namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion. Gloria. These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities hadalready escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Palad. Since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameterswithin the entire Mindanao region. Francisco. the President only needs to convincehimself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or being committed. For declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus to be valid. Page 390 Echiverri. Proclamation No. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Tabugan. bomb threats were issued. there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered. civilian hostages were taken and killed. the President’s declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. and the security of the entire Mindanao Island were compromised. Reyes. 216 of 23 May 2017 will: a. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]: a. Ramirez. reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hampered. the SC held that the parameters for the declaration ofmartial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Have the effect of recalling Proclamation No.

Reyes. Francisco. Palad. Corporal. Page 391 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Albano. Martinez. Corpuz. Ramirez. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Asensi. Sandoval. Tecson. Catindig. Rañigo. Sy. Santos. Lumberio. Espina. Inguillo. Castillo. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Valiente. rebellion exists and the public safety requires themartial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus. Coronel. Cabañgon. Marquez. Gloria. Valois .

Cabañgon. Francisco. De la Cruz. Tabugan. Marquez. Lastimosa. Tecson. Palad. Valois . Santos. Sandoval. Lumberio. POLITICAL LAW Albano. Coronel. Gloria. Martinez. Sy. Ramirez. Inguillo. Corporal. Corpuz. Page 392 Echiverri. De Mesa. Asensi. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Castillo. Reyes. Valiente. Espina. Catindig.

a higher degree of standard is expected from her and this Office finds that she has abjectly failed to live up to that standard. Municipal Treasurer of Damulog. Corporal. and is accountable to all those he or she serves. No. In the case of Hallasgo. Her acts cannot be considered as done in good faith or constituting only errors of judgment. “public office is a public trust” is not—and should not be—mere hortatory cliché. the former vice-mayor of the Municipality of Damulog. the highest degree of honesty and integrity. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) Regional Office No. Page 393 Echiverri. In the instant case. at all times. Martinez. X. Coronel. Corpuz. HALLASGO. It is in this spirit that we convey our deep disdain for all those whose actions betray the trust and confidence reposed in public officers. It is to be emphasized that the tasks and functions of a treasurer is highly fiduciary in nature. Bukidnon. Valiente. Misconduct in office implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. De Mesa. Catindig. and are expected to uphold the public interest over personal interest at all times. BERDERA. and those who attempt to conceal wrongdoing through misdirection and blatantly belated explanations. Sandoval. Santos. as distinguished from simple misconduct. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Bukidnon and was accused of unauthorized withdrawal of monies of the public treasury amounting to malversation of public funds by the outgoing and incumbent officials of the municipality. FACTS: Petitioner was the Municipal Treasurer of Damulog. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Lumberio. Bukidnon G. the Office of the Ombudsman finds that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of grave misconduct against Hallasgo. Inguillo. 2009 DOCTRINE: The oft-repeated phrase.R. Reyes. Valois . Public office is a public trust. Public officers—particularly those in custody of public funds—are held to the highest standards of ethical behavior in both their public and private conduct. ISSUE: Whether or not Hallasgo is guilty of grave misconduct HELD: Yes. Castillo. or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. she appears to have used her expertise in financial management to obfuscate the subject transactions for the purposes of concealing financial anomalies. Tecson. Gloria. members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Damulog. to audit the records of the alleged anomalous transactions as it could not make a complete evaluation of the issues without conducting an extensive audit. a former member of Sangguniang Bayan and ULYSES TIRADO and ARMANDO AYCO. Rañigo. Albano. the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao requested the Commission on Audit. A public servant is expected to exhibit. ALEJANDRO S. Sy. Palad. After thorough investigation and recommendation of the CoA. Marquez. All of these are evident in the instant case. After preliminary review of the documents presented to support the pertinent claims and defenses of the parties. Alcazaren. GLORIA G. clear intent to violate the law. Tabugan. Francisco. Bukidnon vs. 171340 | September 11. ELIEZER ASOMBRADO. Espina. the elements of corruption. Cabañgon. Asensi. In grave misconduct.

Gloria. Ramirez. Qualified by the term "gross. such conduct as is not to be excused. this Court has refrained from strictly imposing the penalties provided by the law. Corporal. It behooves her to exercise the highest degree of care over the custody. family circumstances. De la Cruz. Lumberio. obstinate or intentional purpose. she should have deposited the funds as she was tasked to do. and merits the most serious penalty provided by law.000. This is a highly pernicious practice that this Court condemns in the strongest possible terms. faithfully. Even if petitioner may have justified some of the transactions. Castillo. aware that in several administrative cases. of course. gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal for the first offense. Palad. Inguillo. Misconduct generally means wrongful. and efficiently. Cabañgon. whether before the Office of the Ombudsman. in light of mitigating factors such as the offending employee's length of service. De Mesa. In stark contrast with the staunch defense she launched for other matters. Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules. Rather. effected only after being directed to do so by the audit team. improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated. or this Court. she never thought to account for these checks. Sy. flagrant. Valois . Page 394 Echiverri. Francisco. Pursuant to Section 52. acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse. advanced age." As treasurer of the municipality.00 in cash placed in her possession makes her unworthy of such humanitarian consideration. Tecson. Valiente. Espina. undertaken as an afterthought accompanied by neither shame nor remorse.000. Coronel. cannot exonerate her from liability. Albano. In particular. Catindig. Santos. we find that petitioner's recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or misuse) of the more than P700.000. 15627907 (for P350. Rañigo. This purported atonement. However. She cannot abdicate responsibility for the checks by claiming that it was the audit team's duty to undertake forensic analysis to uncover how these funds were spent. and other equitable considerations." it means conduct that is "out of all measure beyond allowance. Rodriguez. Sandoval. and subsequently accounted for the use of said funds.00). Asensi. we wish to denounce petitioner's practice of having the municipality issue checks in her name.00) and 15627921 (for P380. Reyes. the CA. We are not convinced that the anomalies complained of are the result of mere inadvertence. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. management. Corpuz. Petitioner's failure to ensure that disbursements are properly documented or that cash advances granted to her are properly and timely liquidated certainly deserves administrative sanction. Lastimosa. it is petitioner's duty to perform her responsibilities diligently. We are. as treasurer. without prejudice to the Ombudsman's right to file the appropriate criminal case against the petitioner or other responsible individuals. a dereliction of duty. Marquez. Martinez. or that responsibility can so easily be shifted by petitioner to her subordinates. shameful. a forbidden act. On the contrary. and disbursement of municipal funds. All these collectively constitute gross misconduct. Alcazaren. these explanations were belatedly done. only to discover that petitioner never actually deposited the cash in the municipality's bank account. It bears stressing that petitioner never bothered to explain what took place with respect to the funds subject of LBP Check Nos. ostensibly to get cash immediately and avoid a three day clearing period. her actions demonstrate her wanton and deliberate disregard for the demands of public service. Tabugan.

Cabañgon. In pursuant to LBC N. JR. 75) providing guidelines on personal services limitation. Ifugao enacted Resolution no.30 September 2002.PETER G.BONIFACIO L. 185001 | September 25. Page 395 Echiverri. Reyes. Lastimosa.JUANITO O. Pursuant to the issuance. Tecson. should not be disturbed. Tabugan. BAICHON. Lumberio. LUMAYNA. CHANG AGAN.R. and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented. Corpuz. RONNIE H. CHAWANA. DEL CASTILLO. and in ordering petitioners to refund the same. Palad. For this purpose. JR. On the following year. authorizing the grant of maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the local government units. REYNALDO B. LICHNACHAN. they are conclusive. the SanggunianPanlalawigan disallowed the 5% salary increase and re-alignment of funds on the ground that the re-alignment is not sufficient to implement a salary increase. De Mesa. finding good faith on the part of the officials of the Municipality. Castillo. the Sanggunian of Mayoyao. Sy. MARTIN. DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. Coronel. LAHINA. representing payments for salary increases of municipal personnel. De la Cruz. However. and COMMISSION ON AUDIT G. 74[4]. are afforded great weight by the courts. that the limitation on personal services had been exceeded. Francisco. 2009 DOCTRINE: Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise. Asensi.. Meanwhile.KLARISA MAE C. the grant of the increase was not in accordance with Sections 325 and 326 of the LGC. Gloria. 41 approving their 2002 Annual Municipal Budget. Rañigo. the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office (RLAO) of the COA-Cordillera Administrative Region (COA-CAR) issued a Notice of Disallowance dated 16 May 2003 of the amount of P895. 75. Martinez.SAMMY C. UCHAYAN. Upon request for the SanggunianPanllawigan to reconsider. a resolution again was enacted to re-align its approved budget..891. Albano. Santos. According to COA-CAR. BONGYO. No. BONHAON.AUGUSTA C. pursuant to Section 325(a) of the Local Government Code. and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution was not the appropriate manner of granting the increase. Marquez.891. Corporal. CHULANA. Ramirez. Sandoval.50. HELEN A. those who received the salary increase for said period were ordered to refund the same. Therefore. 75[12] (LBC No.vs. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of the amount of P895. Espina. ROMEO O. FACTS: The Department of Budget and Management issued Local Budget Circular No. it reconsidered its earlier position. JR. representing the 5% salary increase of the personnel of the municipality of Mayoyao for the period 15 February to 30 September 2002. PANITO. Alcazaren.PERALTA. the Sanggunian enacted another resolution approving its Annual Municipal Budget for 2003. They adopted a first class salary scheme for the municipality and implementing the 5% salary increase for its personnel.. Rodriguez.ROSENDO P. and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure. Valiente. for the period 15 February .JOHN L.50. Inguillo. Valois . Catindig.

Francisco.05. the assailed Decisions of the COA clearly presented the factual findings and adequately explained the legal basis for disallowing the said amount. At the outset. Palad. the municipality adopted the salary rates under LBC No.mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Rañigo. Catindig. and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure. Cabañgon. the Notice of Disallowance was issued only on 16 May 2003. Corporal. or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law .568. the annual budget of Mayoyao for 2002 exceeded the limit for personal services as prescribed in Section 325(a) of the LGC by P3. it was established that the grant of the increase through the adoption of higher salary class schedule is not among the list of items and activities whereby the limitation for personal services may be waived pursuant to LBC No. they are conclusive. Asensi.[38] the SangguniangPanlalawigan reconsidered its prior disallowance of the adoption of a first class salary schedule and 5% salary increase of the Municipality of Mayoyao based on its finding that the municipal officials concerned acted in good faith. Lumberio. Further. Indeed. 74. Moreover. It must be mentioned that the disbursement of the 5% salary increase of municipal personnel was done under the color and by virtue of resolutions enacted pursuant to LBC No. De la Cruz. In fact. after the municipality had already implemented the salary increase. 75. as computed by Ms.944. Coronel. Valiente. Valois . Gloria. the Provincial Budget Officer of Ifugao. Tabugan. HELD: Yes. Sandoval. 2004-1185. Marquez. Ramirez. should not be disturbed. Lastimosa. Finally. Castillo. 69 and not the salary rates under LBC No. and was made only after the SangguniangPanlalawigan declared operative the 2002 municipal budget. Inguillo. Alcazaren. Santos. Sy. Albano. it must be stressed that factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise. Martinez. Corpuz. Although the 5% salary increase exceeded the limitation for appropriations for personal services in the Municipality of Mayoyao. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In this case. Tecson. Reyes. Page 396 Echiverri. No grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can thus be attributed to respondent COA. Rodriguez. in its Resolution No. Espina. this alone is insufficient to overthrow the presumption of good faith in favor of petitioners as municipal officials. Virginia Farro. 74. De Mesa. and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented. are afforded great weight by the courts.

Valois . Rodriguez. perhaps. Remollo made fifteen (15) promotional appointments. It permanently lifted the preliminary injunction. ERLINDA TUMONGHA. Lastimosa. we affirm the validity of a regulation issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC or the Commission) intended to ensure that appointments and promotions in the civil service are made solely on the basis of qualifications. Thus. Martinez. The court reversed Director Abucejo’s on the ground that the questioned appointments may only be invalidated by the Regional Office upon recommendation by the CSCFO. Reyes. JR.. ideologies. Page 397 Echiverri. 181559 | October 2. 2009 DOCTRINE: The integrity and reliability of our civil service is. Catindig. filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a Petition for Mandamus. the vigor and resilience of a professional civil service can only be preserved where our laws ensure that partisanship plays no part in the appointing process. JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI CAMPOS G. Corpuz. Marquez. and platforms. Tabugan. represented by CITY MAYOR AGUSTIN PERDICES.R. prematurely filed the injunction because there was still no invalidation of their appointments. The filing was only prompted by Mayor Perdices’ announcement that he was dishonoring the appointments made by former mayor Remollo. Lumberio. Sandoval. and seventy-four (74) original appointments for various positions in the city government. On the other hand. LEAH M. Alcazaren. No. the Director of the Civil Service Commission Field Ofice. Tecson. FACTS: Agustin R. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for injunction filed by Nazareno et al. Injunction and Damages against the City of Dumaguete. Cabañgon. the appointments made by Remollo were dishonored by Mayor Perdices. After the invalidation. However. Director Abucejo (CSCFO) invalidated and revoked the questioned appointments as they were issued in violation of the guidelines set forth by the CSC. But before Perdices’ assumption. Coronel. The appeal was denied and dismissed by the court. Gloria. 2001. DOMINADOR DUMALAG. Asensi. Francisco. NAZARENO. RTC issued a writ of prelim injunction against the City Government pending the final adjudication of the case. Perdices won over incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Ramirez. is premature. CITY OF DUMAGUETE. HELD: Yes. Espina. Nazareno et al. Nazareno. 2001. Amidst the struggle of personalities. Castillo. Inguillo. et al. Corporal. Palad. Santos. Sy. represented by Mayor Remollo. The invalidation only took place on August 1. Rañigo. Nazareno et al. instead of political loyalties or patronage. Leah M. et. De Mesa. They moved for the dismissal of the injunction case. they had ample Albano. appealed to the CA. they could still file an appeal with the CSC Regional Office. RTC denied the motion to dismiss but agreed with the finality of the decision. Consequently. alvs. De la Cruz. Remollo for the mayoralty post and he was to assume office on June 30. Valiente. never more sorely tested than in the impassioned demagoguery of elections. City of Dumaguete claimed that Director Abucejo’s decision already became final after petitioner’s failed to move for reconsideration of the same.

Page 398 Echiverri. administrative remedies under the law to protect their rights but they chose to go straight to the regular courts. Marquez. Tabugan. Sandoval. Ramirez. Palad. are given by law and related rules adequate remedies to protect their rights and interests. Lastimosa. Rañigo. The Court refused to rule on the validity of the appointments since it was the subject of a separate petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Castillo. Corporal. Tecson. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Santos. Catindig. it held that there was no need for the separate case of injunction since Nazareno et al. Gloria. Francisco. Reyes. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Valois . Inguillo. Espina. Albano. and as such. Asensi. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Valiente.Thus.Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Corpuz. Sy. Coronel. the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no ground for injunction. Martinez.

FACTS: PNP-Regional Office 10 appointed petitioner Eugenio S. EUGENIO S. Tecson. the Regional Director of Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon petitioner the permanent status as PO1. Espina. Palad. According to the CSC. Marquez. he alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM. and all personnel of the PNP are subject to civil service laws and regulations. He also took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission and likewise passed the same. Capablanca into the PNP service with the rank of Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a temporary status and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. Corpuz. The CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute that it was the NAPOLCOM which had the sole authority to conduct the entrance and promotional examinations of police officers. Valois . Tabugan. Lumberio. Santos. 2000. Gloria. the "person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)" and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to the PDS. Ramirez. Rodriguez. pursuant to Civil Service Commission v. When it clearly declares that a subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of a tribunal. Francisco. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. Martinez.R. Sandoval. the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Valiente. the party involved in the controversy must bow and submit himself to the tribunal on which jurisdiction is conferred. During the preliminary investigation. Catindig. Reyes. 2009 DOCTRINE: Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are considered employees of the National Government. Page 399 Echiverri. 2000 was void. 179370 | November 18. Asensi. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity. Albano. Alcazaren. Moreover. Petitioner cannot evade liability under the pretense that another agency has primary jurisdiction over him. Rañigo. The CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII through its Regional Director informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on July 28. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC. Sy. However. Court of Appeals. The petitioner took the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National Police Commission and passed the same. petitioner failed to appear but was represented by counsel who moved to dismiss the proceedings. Cabañgon. CAPABLANCA versus CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G. Thereafter.The CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged examination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was established. since petitioner submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility and not a NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status. Castillo. Coronel. Thus. No. Inguillo. then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. Corporal. De la Cruz.

991936. Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office. the CSC issued Resolution No. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Inguillo. local or national. Asensi. Palad. Lastimosa. to strengthen the merit and rewards system. Section 28. Sy. Gloria. and agencies of the government. Espina. Sandoval. 6975 (1990) or the "Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990" provides that the "Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. Thus: Petitioner's invocation of the law is misplaced. empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies: SECTION 6. Page 400 Echiverri. Ramirez.The Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases: A. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination. Tabugan. Tecson. efficiency and integrity in the civil service. To carry out this mandate. subdivisions. Civil Service Commission[30] that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office. It has already been settled in Cruz v. is mandated to establish a career service. In addition. Valois . or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Castillo. Disciplinary 1. Rañigo. and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations. Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations. Corporal. or brought before. as the central personnel agency of the Government. Marquez. Specifically. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities. The provision is applicable to instances where administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection with their duties and functions of the office. Cabañgon. This is. . Alcazaren. Reyes. however. Santos. thus: Sec. 28. x xx Albano. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. De Mesa. Valiente. Francisco. Martinez. The examinations were under the direct control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. Corpuz. including Civil Service examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of agencies. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. HELD: Yes The CSC." to which herein petitioner belongs. and to adopt measures to promote morale. The civil service embraces all branches. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. Complaints initiated by. within said geographical areas. Catindig. Coronel. it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. x xxx Based on the foregoing. instrumentalities. Lumberio.

Palad. This principle goes hand-in-hand with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. HELD: No. and NUNILON J. Petitioners contend that the Decision and Resolution of the CA were not in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. FACTS: The Sangguiniang Bayan of San Isidro. Instead of submitting their applications. Valiente. CANLAS. a premature invocation of the court's judicial power is often struck down. Lorenzo issued a letter terminating the services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not selected for the new positions. While the case was pending. No. for their part. Rañigo. Otherwise. Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. Gloria. Mayor Sonia R. the Municipal Mayor issued a memorandum informing all employees of the municipal government. Al G. ELVIRA J. specifically Section 2 thereof and RA 7305. otherwise known as "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization". Sy. For this reason. Valois . which precludes courts from resolving. unless it can be shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions. they would not be considered for any of the newly created positions. Corpuz. Sandoval.The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit citing that the assailed acts of respondents are clearly authorized under Section 76 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Santos. Marquez. Tabugan. Coronel. controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. LORENZO. Respondents. petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order. MABINI. Rodriguez. Corporal. Catindig. Likewise. BULANAN. Espina. Alcazaren. De Mesa. 6656. all positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective applications for the newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern. otherwise known as the "Magna Carta of Health Workers". they alleged that they were permanent employees of the Rural Health Unit with corresponding salary grade and date of employment. Francisco. 19-99. 160367 | December 18. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' automatic resort to the Court of Appeals is proper. et. Tecson. states that: Albano.R. CABUNGCAL. Castillo. Nueva Ecija issued Resolution No27 declaring the reorganization of all offices of the municipal government which was approved by the SangguinangPanlalawigan. Inguillo. Cabañgon. argue that petitioners' separation from service was a result of a valid reorganization done in accordance with law and in good faith. it ruled that the reorganization is justified for it creates budgetary savings. DE JESUS. EVELYN S. De la Cruz. Also. Lumberio. Pursuant to the resolution. Lastimosa. judicial intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. Reyes. Martinez. REMEDIOS S. Ramirez. 2009 DOCTRINE: As a rule. versus SONIA R. Page 401 Echiverri. MARIANITA A. Asensi. Courts recognize that administrative agencies are better equipped to settle factual issues within their specific field of expertise because of their special skills and technical knowledge. in the first instance.

Petitioners' filing of a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing provision. Inguillo. directly or on appeal. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 7. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. however. It bears stressing that Albano. Even the laws upon which petitioners anchor their claim vest jurisdiction upon the CSC. 10. Cabañgon. Accordingly. which were cited by the petitioners in their petition. Tecson. Sy. 27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro. when the rule does not provide a plain. Sandoval. Considering that they belong to the civil service. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law. Lastimosa. Asensi. the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office. and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. Page 402 Echiverri. it is the CSC which determines whether an employee's dismissal or separation from office was carried out in violation of the law or without due process. . Valiente. viz: 1. 6. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned. 4. Francisco. when there is irreparable injury. including contested appointments. Santos. the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal. petitioners are former local government employees whose services were terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos. instrumentalities and agencies. The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Corporal. is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions. Martinez. has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches. Castillo. Tabugan. subdivisions. 3. discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. Marquez. Alcazaren. or brought before it. 5. when there is a violation of due process. as the central personnel agency of the Government. 2. Corpuz. De Mesa. Espina. Palad. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. This.The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by. Nueva Ecija. De la Cruz. Rañigo. 8. Section 4. Coronel. 9. Reyes. and 11. the CSC. In this case. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rodriguez. separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct. it is also the CSC which has the power to reinstate or reappoint an unlawfully dismissed or terminated employee. Simply put. Ramirez. speedy and adequate remedy. The case does not fall either under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Gloria. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter. Catindig. when the issue involved is purely a legal question. Under RA 6656 and RA 7305. Valois . Lumberio.

Espina. Tabugan. Lumberio. we find that the CA correctly dismissed the petition but not the grounds cited in support thereof. Lastimosa. Tecson. Rodriguez. Coronel. Francisco. Alcazaren. petitioners should have first brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. being extraordinary remedies. Castillo. Marquez. Thus. De Mesa. Ramirez. resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. Moreover. Albano. Valois . Corporal. Gloria. The CA should have dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Rañigo. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Asensi. the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain. Thus. Reyes. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Catindig. Palad. Cabañgon. Corpuz. Page 403 Echiverri. Santos. instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA. Valiente. Martinez. Sy. Sandoval.

construction and site development of the town center project. the SangguniangPanlalawigan. Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and commitment.R. ISSUE:  Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to sue as taxpayers  Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a political question HELD:  Yes. Corporal. Cabañgon. MAMBA et al. Lumberio. Asensi. Fausto filed a Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents (Gov. December 14. EDGAR R. Gloria. the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers. Coronel. the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one. Santos. Castillo. Valois . however. or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. the court can’t take cognizance of it. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation which provides that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated. dismissed their petition on the grounds that the (1) petitioners have no locus standi to file a case as they are not party to the contract and (2) that the controversy is in the nature of a political question. Petitioners Manuel N. No. Corpuz. Sy. Inguillo. Palad. Mamba. Espina. 165109. Francisco. LARA et al. Reyes. It also ratified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Ramirez. In addition. a liberal approach should be preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice. The RTC. authorized Gov. Rodriguez. to be approved by the SangguniangPanlalawigan. De Mesa. Page 404 Echiverri. Marquez. Tabugan. vs. Lara to negotiate. Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation. sign and execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction and improvement of his priority projects.  No.). Tecson. or that Albano. giving to the latter the planning. G. thus. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed. FACTS: The SangguniangPanlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing Governor Edgar R. including the construction of the New Cagayan Town Center. Rañigo. De la Cruz. Raymund P. MANUEL N. Lastimosa. Guzman and Leonides N. When the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of public funds. Martinez. Lara et al. Alcazaren. Subsequently. Catindig. Valiente. 2009 DOCTRINE: Decision to entertain a taxpayer’s suit is discretionary upon the Court. design. Sandoval.

In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved. Castillo. In the case at bar. a liberal approach must be adopted in determining locus standi in public suits. Ramirez. a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. has relaxed the stringent direct injury test bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. Sy. the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers. Francisco. petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public respondents. So clearly. Catindig. A political question is a question of policy. Palad. the irrevocable assignment of the provincial governments annual regular income. Sandoval. there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In simple terms. in the present case. the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts complained of. or far-reaching implications. Corpuz. In the case at bar. A justiciable question on the other hand. Corporal. Thus. Valois . Martinez. The governor requested the SangguniangPanlalawigan to appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. Espina. the Supreme Court found the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial review. Tecson. Reyes. including the IRA. De la Cruz. calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies wherein there are rights involved which are legally demandable and enforceable. the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation. Lastimosa. which respondents insist are not taxpayers’ money. a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. Tabugan. to protect the interest of the people and to prevent taxes from being squandered or wasted under the guise of government projects. Inguillo. By invoking transcendental importance. Coronel. in recent cases. Valiente. Rañigo. Cabañgon. For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper. They put in issue the overpriced construction of the town center. although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds. Alcazaren. De Mesa. a political question refers to the wisdom. to respondent RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated. Gloria. Marquez. It argued that. Also. Page 405 Echiverri. Santos. and the lack of consultation Albano. two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so. paramount public interest. while a justiciable question refers to the legality of the acts complained of. the Supreme Court explained that the court. ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. As to the second requisite. Asensi. Rodriguez. It is one which is proper to be examined or decided in courts of justice because its determination would not involve an encroachment upon the legislative or executive power. Lumberio. which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full discretionary authority has been delegated. the first requisite has been met.

Inguillo. De la Cruz. even if the issues were political in nature. Albano. Espina. De Mesa. Castillo. Rañigo. Catindig. Marquez. the high court said that. Tabugan. Sandoval. Ramirez. Alcazaren. which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Santos. Coronel. Valois . and discussion with the community regarding the proposed project. Martinez. Palad. Reyes. Thus. Rodriguez. Asensi. Corpuz. Francisco. Lumberio. it would still come within their powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon them by Section 1. Page 406 Echiverri. Gloria. Lastimosa. Sy. Article VIII of the Constitution. as well as a proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center. Valiente. Corporal. Tecson. Cabañgon.

Tecson. Gloria. 7859. he then inserted certain documents in said ballot box. During the canvassing at the Dulag Municipal Hall. Espina. in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dulag. Valois . 2007. on the ground that these were tampered with or obviously manufactured. and tampered/falsified and obviously manufactured returns. Leyte. Reyes. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DULAG. SAÑO. Inguillo. illegal proceedings. Saño filed his written Petition for Inhibition together with the affidavit of Lazar. Serrano verbally ruled that the contested ERs would be opened. Cabañgon. he also sought that he be declared and proclaimed. Ramirez. and the fact that the exclusion of the contested ERs would materially affect the results of the election. 182221. On May 28. 2007. Castillo. Rañigo. As we explained. Palad. JR vs.At midnight of May 16. Saño received a copy of the COMELEC Regional Office's Memorandum designating Ferdinand Serrano as the Acting Election Officer and MBOC Chairperson. Serrano promised that this ruling would be put in writing within 24 hours. Leyte. Asensi. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. then verbally moved for the inhibition of Camposano as MBOC Chairman but declined to inhibit herself until she was ordered to do so by her superiors.R. Sy. Serrano proceeded to hastily open and canvass the contested ERs. and MANUEL SIA QUE G. 7166 and Section 39 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2010 DOCTRINE: Issues raised by the petitioner were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. FACTS: Saño alleged that after the casting and counting of votes.m. Albano. Republic Act No. 2007. Francisco. Marquez. Lumberio. Saño claimed that instead of suspending the canvass as required by law and the canvassing rules. Martinez. Despite the filing of petitioner's Notice of Appeal. at about midnight of May 14. Instead. February 3. Sandoval. THEMISTOCLES A. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. Coronel. took the aluminum seal. before the COMELEC. a man was seen carrying a ballot box that was not locked. Saño sought to have the contested ERs excluded on the following grounds: massive fraud. claims that contested election returns are obviously manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the said documents themselves. Tabugan. Finally. petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and/or Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dulag. No. reiterating his request for the inhibition of the MBOC Chair. FERDINAND A. LEYTE. Saño. Alcazaren. año argued that the MBOC violated Section 20. the MBOC neither made a written ruling nor elevated the appeal to the COMELEC together with the MBOC's report and records of the case. Page 407 Echiverri. SERRANO. through counsel. Camposano inhibited herself and declared the canvassing temporarily adjourned At around 5:00 p. of May 17. Petitioner also sought to exclude the contested ERs from the canvass. and then turned it over to the Reception Group which happened to several precincts. the MBOC proclaimed Que as Municipal Mayor. Santos. sealed the box. Catindig. Valiente. Corporal. Corpuz. 2007.

after the exclusion of the contested ERs. is simply inexplicable and unacceptable. Corpuz.Unfortunately. Francisco. Palad. Valiente. De la Cruz. 2007. Section 20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC. ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations raised by petitioner on the contested ERs are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy. there was no valid ground to delay the proclamation. Rodriguez. As we explained. no copy of the return can be trusted and there must be a recount of the ballots. thus. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory. Marquez. as the winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor. COMELEC issued its Resolution dated October 3. Alcazaren. Page 408 Echiverri. so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. Essentially. Inguillo. Of course the law does not intend that election lawyers submit their written objections at exactly the same second as their oral manifestation. Only one written petition for exclusion was filed for the five contested ERs at 6:50 p. Espina. Coronel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the COMELEC En Banc. Santos.To justify the exclusion of election returns. Ramirez.of May 15. De Mesa. Asensi. But counsel for petitioner herself admitted that "on their face". Reyes. so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible. it is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided. Gloria. indeed. there is absolutely no indication that the contested ERs were falsified or tampered with. 2007 upholding the proclamation of Que. Valois . Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy. Corporal. Albano. petitioner argues that the contested ERs cannot be trusted because all five of the contested ERs were prepared by one person. Castillo. Martinez. Cabañgon. since the unsubstantiated issues raised by the petitioner were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. We find that the MBOC did not err in proclaiming the private respondent. Based on the records of this case. The Board of Canvassers will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. Contrary to petitioner's passionate remonstrations. this petition. While we are willing to overlook the procedural lapses committed by the petitioner his manifestation and subsequent Notice of Appeal do not serve to overturn the assailed Resolutions.m. a lapse of over 12 hours. Catindig. Tabugan. Rañigo. Sy. Lastimosa. the ERs were "okey". HELD: Yes. Sandoval. the allegations that the election returns were obviously manufactured must be evident from the face of the said documents. As such. long after the ERs have been presented for canvass. Tecson. however. Hence. Lumberio. we find that petitioner failed to timely make his objections to the contested ERs. claims that contested ERs are obviously manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the said documents themselves. petitioner has failed to substantiate these allegations.

Martinez. Valois . petitioner failed to present any evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the contested ERs were valid. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Francisco. Castillo. Albano. Page 409 Echiverri. Unlike a pre-proclamation controversy. Coronel. Palad. Catindig. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. This notwithstanding. Inguillo. Santos. Marquez. Corporal. petitioner had every opportunity to ventilate his case and substantiate his allegations before the Commission below. Espina. Corpuz. Tecson. the annulment proceedings before the COMELEC were not summary in character. Gloria. Sy. Alcazaren. Asensi. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Valiente. Lumberio. De Mesa. Reyes.

Asensi. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property. Inguillo. 2010 DOCTRINE: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. Palad. arguing that there was no legal basis for its issuance. Rañigo. This was amended six months later (2004 order). Regional Trial Court. City Mayor vs. When no amicable resolution and a negotiated sale was successful. Such was issued by the trial court in an order dated May 17. Coronel. Valois . Marquez. changing the reckoning point from the time of the filing of the complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. Espina. Reyes. claiming that Javellana can no longer file an action for the recovery of the possession of the lots since the same was already utilized for public use. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA. The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which nullified the 1983 order. Albano. Valiente. ordering the petitioner to immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation after determining the value of the property at the time the complaint was filed.000). Rodriguez. Gloria. Alcazaren. Castillo. 168967. therefore can only demand for the payment of just compensation. On April 2000. and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA G. Sy. No. FACTS: In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent (Javellana). CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. HON. Santos. and that the said orders were subject to amendment and nullification at the court’s discretion. TREÑAS. On April 15. Martinez. Tecson. This argument was opposed by the petitioner. Cabañgon. the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. Lumberio. the commission created for this case submitted a report determining estimates of the fair market value of the properties in question in different reckoning points. Tabugan. Corporal. Corpuz. Ramirez. He alleged that since he was not compensated for the expropriation of his property. the reckoning point for the determination of the fair market value of the property should be the date of the issuance of the order.R. private respondent found out that the amount of Php 40. De Mesa.000 was not eposited by the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said amount (as proved by a certification issued by the PNB). the plaintiff was able to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana for the purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz High School. the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. ruling that since no deposit was made. De la Cruz. This was denied by the trial court. February 12. he (Javellana) filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession. JERRY P. Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. Presiding Judge. which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. A writ of possession was issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the value of the said lots (Php 40. Francisco. Lastimosa. Branch 32. Sandoval. and that the just compensation for the expropriation should be based on the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint. 1983. Private respondent argued that there was no error committed by the trial court. 2004. Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was already final and executory. Catindig. Page 410 Echiverri. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner.

Cabañgon. Rañigo. Asensi. However. It is high time that private respondent be paid what was due him after almost 30 years. Valiente. Catindig. Coronel. De la Cruz. which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings." We commiserate with the private respondent. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property. private respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property. just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Lumberio. Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the petitioner. 4. we have constantly affirmed that: x x x just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. 1981. ISSUE: Whether or not the reckoning point of the determination of just compensation is ascertained as of the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint. Rodriguez. Tecson. Sandoval. Private respondent claims that the reckoning date should be in 2004 because of the "clear injustice to the private respondent who all these years has been deprived of the beneficial use of his properties. the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Francisco. HELD: Petitioner claims that the computation should be made as of September 18. but is entitled to just compensation. private respondent not only accepted the valuation made by the petitioner. Evidently. from his inaction in failing to withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly deposited. Corpuz. or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. Corporal. We agree. Martinez. Gloria. under which the complaint for expropriation was filed." Here. In a long line of cases. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. but also was not interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end. Ramirez. Inguillo. Marquez. the date when the expropriation complaint was filed. Concededly. Albano. Reyes. Page 411 Echiverri. the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure. there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Espina. Palad. Santos. non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot. Tabugan. Castillo. Petitioner and the residents of Iloilo City have long reaped the benefits of the property. Even under Sec. Sy. Lastimosa. As such. Alcazaren. De Mesa. The school was constructed and has been in operation since 1985. Valois .

the certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence to prove tampering. Biron filed his written objections and supporting evidence. FACTS: Petitioner Rose Marie D. That failure to present any certificate of votes shall not be a bar to the presentation of other evidence to impugn the authenticity of the election returns. February 17. alteration. The case was docketed as SPC No. Cabañgon. Gloria. 181809. It also held that the copy of the election return of the MBC was complete with no material defect and duly signed and thumbmarked by the BEIs. Thereafter. During the canvassing of votes. Tabugan. Valiente. Asensi. ROSE MARIE D. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. 2007. this presupposes that the certificate of votes was accomplished in accordance with Section 16. No. De Mesa. On May 18. which contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate. when duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided. Rodriguez. is issued by the BEI upon the request of a duly accredited watcher pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6646. Castillo. Lastimosa. Corporal. falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns concerned. 6646 authorizes the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to make use of the certificate of votes to prove tampering. Palad. Santos. 2007 elections. De la Cruz. In view thereof. It found that there was no tampering on the number of taras for Doromal in the copy of the election return for the MBC. Espina. Biron opposed their inclusion allegedly because there was a discrepancy between the number of votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). 2010 DOCTRINE: While Section 17 of Republic Act No. 17. Inguillo. Sy. this presupposes that the certificate of votes was accomplished in accordance with Section 16 of said law. Sandoval. Aggrieved. which he obtained as the standard bearer of LAKAS-CMD. Coronel. Ramirez. Biron (Biron) were the vice mayoralty candidates for the Municipality of Dumangas. alteration. Catindig. Biron anchored his objections to the inclusion of the 21 returns on the alleged missing taras in Copy 4 of the contested returns. Biron appealed to the COMELEC. HERNAN G. Relative to its evidentiary value. Francisco. Tecson. Iloilo in the May 14. Valois . Reyes. DOROMAL vs. While the above-quoted provision authorizes the COMELEC to make use of the certificate of votes to prove tampering. 881 notwithstanding.R.—The certificate of votes. falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns. the recognized dominant majority party in said elections. the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) deferred the canvassing of the said returns. falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns. Biron orally objected to the inclusion of 25 election returns. Corpuz. As regards the remaining four contested returns. the MBC denied the petitions for exclusion. 07-147 and raffled to the Second Division. Section 17 of said law provides—Sec. Alcazaren. Doromal (Doromal) and private respondent Hernan G. Pending the resolution of the appeal. BIRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G. Martinez. Marquez. alteration. Albano. the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate was ordered suspended. Lumberio.—The provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of Batas Pambansa Blg. Rañigo. Page 412 Echiverri.

Inguillo. Espina. He reasoned that the missing taras did not. Santos. the COMELEC Second Division. the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division. and that an examination of the records of this case supported the Second Division’s findings that the subject returns were tampered or falsified. Further. Francisco. Also. Gloria. Hence. Albano. by themselves. The certificates of votes are inadmissible to prove tampering. the Second Division noted a glaring dissimilarity between the votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificate of votes. Corpuz. Commissioner Rene V. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Asensi. that the use of the certificate of votes to establish tampering in the subject returns was proper in a pre-proclamation controversy. In his view. the proper recourse was not to exclude the subject returns but to order the correction of manifest errors so that the number of votes in figures and words would conform to the number of taras in the subject returns. In excluding three of the 11 subject returns. Valiente. On September 12. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) registered a dissent. Ramirez. Sy. it concluded that the subject returns were falsified and thereafter ordered their exclusion. Martinez. Rañigo. 2008. the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers should not have been given weight for being self-serving. conclusively establish that the subject returns were altered or tampered. Palad. Castillo. Lumberio. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to compare the contested returns with the other authentic copies thereof before ruling that there was tampering or falsification of the said returns. resulting in a discrepancy between the number of tarasvis-à-vis the written figures and words in the said returns. this petition. Reyes. Tabugan. Marquez. instead of on the fifth vote. Sandoval. Alcazaren. It held that eight of the 11 subject returns showed that the taras were either closed on the third or fourth vote. Corporal. Catindig. According to the Second Division. The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the 11 election returns (subject returns) because the same were allegedly tampered or falsified. the COMELEC relied on the alleged glaring dissimilarity between the votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificates of votes. De la Cruz. De Mesa. it lent credence to the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers stating that numerous irregularities attended the tallying of the votes at the precinct level. HELD: Yes. Hence. It ordered the exclusion of only 11 contested election returns while at the same time ordered the inclusion of the remaining 14 election returns in the canvassing of votes. necessitating the exclusion of the subject returns. Coronel. alteration or falsification for failure to comply with Sections 16 and 17 of RA 6646. 2007. Cabañgon. On February 1. Page 413 Echiverri. It held that the Second Division properly appreciated the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers given the serious allegations of irregularities that attended the tallying of votes. Valois . issued a Resolution partially granting Biron’s appeal. voting 2-1. these irregularities pointed to a scheme to increase the votes of Doromal. Tecson. the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to compare the contested returns with the other authentic copies thereof before ruling that there was tampering or falsification of the said returns. With regard to the remaining three returns. thus.

Rodriguez. The procedure is consistent with the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return. Moreover. Lastimosa. Reyes. Sandoval. which contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate. Cabañgon. for they do not contain (1) the thumbmarks of the members of the BEI. and (3) the time of the issuance of the certificates. Inguillo. thus raising grave doubts as to its accuracy. aside from complying with Section 16. we cannot admit the defective certificate because. Corporal. and (3) the time of the issuance of the certificate. the certificate of votes from Precinct 208A is defective because it does not contain (1) the names. By requiring that the certificate of votes be duly authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued the same. Rañigo. Castillo. Gloria. signatures and thumbmarks of the members of the BEI. Martinez. This requirement originated from Section 11 of House Bill (HB) No. Lumberio. the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the election return. Page 414 Echiverri. (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct. Valois . when they may no longer be present to authenticate a document which. The legislature may have reasonably foreseen that the certificate may be easily altered while in the hands of the watcher in order to orchestrate a sham pre-proclamation controversy. by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may be used to controvert the election return’s authenticity and operate as an exception to the general rule that in a pre-proclamation controversy. Albano. 805 and was later consolidated. The rationale of the law is perceptible. we should already dispense with requiring two other members at a subsequent time. De la Cruz. Marquez. she was the one who prepared the entries in the said certificate and not the BEI as required by Section 16 of RA 6646. the law seeks to safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time that it is presented to the board of canvassers to prove tampering. Catindig. Aida Pineda. the law imposes the condition that the certificate. Relative to its evidentiary value. Private respondent’s remedy was to compel the BEI to issue the certificate of votes under pain of prosecution for an election offense. claims that she prepared a certificate of votes reflective of the true tally in the election return. Even if we were to concede that the BEI members unjustifiedly refused to sign. in Section 17 of HB 4046 – the precursor of RA 6646. private respondent’s poll watcher in said precinct. Tabugan. Alcazaren. The certificate of votes. Asensi. In other words. To counterbalance this possibility. Ramirez. Coronel. Santos. Sy. (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct. must be subsequently authenticated at the time of its presentment to the board of canvassers in the event that it shall be used to prove tampering. this would not validate the said certificate. which appears regular on its face. the certificates of votes from Precinct Nos. by Pineda’s own admission. with minor revisions. Espina. 4046. Valiente. Likewise. Section 17 of said law. but the members of the BEI refused to affix their signatures thereto. De Mesa. This way the COMELEC may be assured that the certificate of votes issued by the BEI to the watcher of a protesting candidate contains the same entries as the one thereafter presented before the MBC to prove tampering. Section 17 requires that the certificate be duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate. is issued by the BEI upon the request of a duly accredited watcher pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6646. Corpuz. Tecson. In the instant case. 90A/90Band 7A/7B are defective. before the certificate of votes may be admitted as evidence of tampering. Palad. Francisco. in the first place. has already been signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board in accordance with the proposed Section 16 of House Bill No. At any rate.

Castillo. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Martinez. Albano. Coronel. Tecson. Francisco. Asensi. De Mesa. Ramirez. Rañigo. Reyes. Palad. De la Cruz. Marquez. Valois . Catindig. Corporal. Gloria. Rodriguez. Espina. Tabugan. In the instant case. Santos. Corpuz. Page 415 Echiverri. Cabañgon. the records indicate that Biron failed to comply with the requirements set by Section 17. Lumberio. Sy. Valiente. Sandoval. Alcazaren.

Catindig. HELD: Albano. As to Sharikat. factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies specializing in their respective fields. Hence. petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed in its November 30. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated September 12. which processed his papers and eventually deployed him on September 29. Valiente. Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence. 2004. Ramirez. Marquez. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. the same is already deemed final as against Sharikat. Sandoval. No. Padua further alleged that it was another agency. PADUA. 2006 Decision. Coronel. the DOLE dismissed the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the POEA. sufficient to support a claim. Corporal. Tabugan. 2005.00. fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed. March 5. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation. 2010 DOCTRINE: As a general rule. Alcazaren. Padua did not appeal from the said POEA Order absolving Sharikat from any liability. JR. the POEA issued its Order finding LNS liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation. He paid LNS the amounts of ₱15. 2002 because he was not allegedly paid his salaries and also because of violations in the terms and conditions of his employment contract.000. 179792. 2004. ₱6. Lastimosa. 2003. Aggrieved. (d). Inguillo. Santos. On December 16. He further alleged that he signed an employment contract with LNS as a body builder with a monthly salary of US$370.. especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals must be accorded high respect. Castillo. Rodriguez. and ₱1.000. if not finality.R. he returned to the Philippines on December 23. Martinez.000. Rañigo. Reyes.00 as processing fees. Tecson. Padua filed a Sworn Statement before the Adjudication Office of the POEA against LNS and Sharikat Al Saedi International Manpower for violation of Section 2(b). that respondent was made to believe that petitioner would be solely responsible for the processing of his employment abroad. G. Francisco. Sharikat. Cabañgon. but the motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated May 12. Corpuz. On April 28. However. Valois . Espina. 2002 to Saudi Arabia. 2002. De la Cruz. Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers. Lumberio. Padua alleged that on July 12.00 for trade test. Sy. FACTS: On January 6. Asensi. LNS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES vs. Palad. the POEA found no sufficient evidence to hold it liable for the violations charged. he applied as auto electrician with petitioner LNS and was assured of a job in Saudi Arabia. De Mesa. and (e) of Rule I. The CA opined that the affirmative assertion of respondent that he paid petitioner a placement fee is entitled to great weight than the bare denials of petitioner. 2007.00 for medical expenses. Only LNS filed its Appeal Memorandum with the DOLE. Page 416 Echiverri. Gloria. and. but he was not issued the corresponding receipts. documentary or otherwise. ARMANDO C.

especially when affirmed by the CA. Ramirez. Martinez. Santos. Other than respondent’s self-serving claim. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Valiente. Reyes. In fine. respondent is bound by the terms stipulated therein. We note that respondent did not deny the due execution of the withdrawal form as well as the genuineness of his signature and thumb mark affixed therein. Francisco. we find it rather odd that LNS would require him to fill up the withdrawal form if the intention of LNS was to endorse the papers to Sharikat. In addition. Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence. there is no evidence. Sandoval. On the contrary. Yes. Tabugan. Asensi. Rañigo. Espina. sufficient to support a claim. factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies specializing in their respective fields. petitioner’s denial of these allegations was corroborated by the withdrawal form proffered as evidence. if respondent’s allegations were to be believed. When he voluntarily signed the document. No evidence whatsoever was adduced that LNS was acting as a conduit of Sharikat. fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed. The self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations of respondent cannot defeat the concrete evidence submitted by petitioner. or that petitioner referred or endorsed respondent for employment abroad to another agency. Gloria. Cabañgon. if not finality. On the other hand. for failure to adduce any shred of evidence of payment made to petitioner. the existence and due execution of which were not disputed by respondent. the latter could not have been involved in the recruitment and placement of respondent and consequently could not be held liable for any violation. Albano. other than respondent’s unsubstantiated claim. Castillo. De la Cruz. Valois . Inguillo. However. Coronel. Lastimosa. then there is nothing left for LNS to endorse to Sharikat. Corporal. De Mesa. Likewise. the charges of non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation against petitioner could not possibly prosper. we are not bound to adhere to the general rule if we find that the factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record or are not supported by substantial evidence. there is no proof whatsoever that petitioner endorsed respondent’s application papers to Sharikat. Catindig. Sy. Palad. that petitioner endorsed his application to Sharikat. as in the instant case. documentary or otherwise. he admitted signing the same. must be accorded high respect. By the voluntary withdrawal of respondent’s application from petitioner. Tecson. the petitioner is liable for non-issuance of receipt and mirepresentation. Marquez. As a general rule. Page 417 Echiverri. If LNS allowed respondent to withdraw all his documents. Alcazaren.

No. Sandoval. Coronel. Martinez. establishment. Catindig. April 8. Ramirez. Danton Remoto v Commission on Elections G. which was denied on the ground that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would not benefit the nation as a whole. or anything else which xxx (3) shocks.R. or trans-gendered individuals. Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC. COMELEC’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that it (COMELEC) targets homosexuals themselves as a class. condition of property. Corporal. De la Cruz. but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act 7941. Reyes. ISSUE: Whether or not Ang Ladlad should be allowed to register with the COMELEC as a party-list. 190582. Castillo. Lumberio. rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Rodriguez. Espina. Asensi. Albano. or disregards decency or morality. Alcazaren. HELD: Yes. the crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated. Rañigo. The denial of AngLadlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals. A Petition for Certiorari was thereafter filed by Ang Ladlad. omission. defies. business. not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. Tecson. but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act 7941. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. Inguillo. bisexuals. the crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated. Valois . It is such selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. Lastimosa. gays. 2010 DOCTRINE: The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. Santos.The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. Cabañgon. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds stating among others that Ang Ladlad collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act. Corpuz. On 17 August 2009. FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians. It was incorporated in 2003 and first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. Gloria. Valiente. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party represented herein by its Chair. Sy. Marquez. Francisco. Page 418 Echiverri. Tabugan. De Mesa.’ AngLaglad sought reconsideration. Palad.

(c) the answer keys to the questionnaires. No. Castillo. Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy. The matter was rendered moot since the petitioner passed the May CPA Licensure Exam in 1998 and had already taken her oath as a CPA. petitioner did not make it. 338. as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. On appeal. De Mesa. ANTOLIN vs. Tabugan. Unfortunately. Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals. Valiente. Article IV of PRC Resolution No. Sy. not within the scope of the writ of mandamus. she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets. Ramirez. When the results were released. but these consisted merely of shaded marks. petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against the Board of Accountancy and its members before RTC Manila. Undaunted. petitioner sought and obtained leave to file a Second Amended Petition for Mandamus with Damages where she finally impleaded the PRC as respondent and prayed. and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively. the Examination Papers). Page 419 Echiverri. only permitted access to the petitioner's answer sheet (which she had been shown previously). ANTONIETA FORTUNA-IBE. Inguillo. Thus. the CA ruled that the petition has become moot in view of petitioner's eventual passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exam. HAZEL MA. and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects. Palad. 332. Valois . if warranted. Catindig. series of 1994. Alcazaren. Gloria. not a ministerial and mandatory one. Cabañgon. FACTS: Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board). and that second. series of 1994. Asensi. Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner's request on two grounds: first. Petitioner was shown her answer sheets. Marquez. G. Espina. Martinez. the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers. Santos. After a further exchange of correspondence. Undeterred. hence. C. Albano. 165036. De la Cruz. to make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination.R. Reyes. among others. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Tecson. Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations. so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam. that Section 36. the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than petitioner's answer sheet) by Section 20. Domondon. that judgment be still rendered ordering the commission to give her all documents and other materials as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the same examinations and correctly graded petitioner's performance therein and. 5 July 2010 DOCTRINE: Any claim for re-correction or revision of a party’s board examination cannot be compelled by mandamus—the function of reviewing and re-assessing an examinee’s answers to the examination questions is a discretionary function of the Board. Sandoval. Francisco. she wrote to Abelardo T. Corpuz. Corporal. Coronel. Rañigo. Lastimosa.

Petitioner posits that no remedy was available because the PRC's power to "review" and "approve" in Section 5(c) only refers to appeals in decisions concerning administrative investigations and not to instances where documents are being requested. Alcazaren. resolutions. Corpuz. Asensi. For a writ of mandamus to issue. HELD: No. if any. Tabugan. petitioner could have saved herself a great deal of time and effort had she given the PRC the opportunity to rectify any purported errors committed by the Board. Lumberio. orders or decisions promulgated by the various Boards with respect to the profession or occupation under their jurisdictions including the results of their licensure examinations but their decisions on administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of promulgation thereof. Martinez. for reasons of law. rules and regulations. Not only is this position myopic and self-serving. Palad. The PRC's quasi-legislative and enforcement powers. Valois . Valiente. Gloria. Espina. Francisco. comity and convenience. Lastimosa. 338) that is at issue in this case. More significantly. In addition. petitioner had an adequate remedy from the Board's refusal to provide her with copies of the Examination Papers. resolutions. Undoubtedly. Like the claimants in Agustin. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be equally clear. Ramirez. Sandoval. clear. 223. No such clarity exists here. neither does petitioner's right to demand a revision of her examination results. De Mesa. Marquez. under Section 5(c). should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors. Catindig. Tecson. At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. the applicant must have a well-defined. Indeed. the remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the Board to release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Rodriguez. Courts. Cabañgon. encompassing its authority to review and approve "policies. Reyes. De la Cruz. it is one such regulation (PRC Resolution No. and certain legal right to the thing demanded. Coronel. which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other departments. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. Rañigo. the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that the respondents "make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination" belies this claim. rules and regulations. Page 420 Echiverri. or decisions" cover more than administrative investigations conducted pursuant to its quasi-judicial powers. the PRC has the power toreview. orders. Inguillo. it is bereft of either statutory or jurisprudential basis. Under Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. coordinate. integrate and approve the policies. Corporal. One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is our well-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers. In fact. Castillo. the PRC has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement policies for the regulation of the accounting profession. Albano. it was in the best position to resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. Santos. Sy. And despite petitioner's assertions that she has not made any demand for re-correction. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus was proper. since the PRC itself issued the resolution questioned by the petitioner here. committed in the administrative forum.

The LBP set the price at P3. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he offered it for sale to DAR in 1988. Lumberio. LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has earmarked the amount of P827.189. Santos. Tabugan. He then filed a case before the RTC for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR. its price. Rañigo. Ramirez. The request was denied by Regional Director on the ground that there was already a perfected sale.6329 hectares of sugarland located Pampanga. Inguillo. Palad. Cabañgon. Francisco. not its potential uses.870.21 per square meter or a total of P827. It was only two years later that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that its value had already appreciated from the time it was first offered for sale. 170685. Alcazaren. Castillo. ISSUE: WON there was proper valuation of said land. Sometime between 1987 and 1988. 1991. Lastimosa. respondent offered his sugarland to DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P30. (September 22. the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO G. Valiente. Martinez. Reyes.00 per square meter. Page 421 Echiverri. and the CLOA holders. In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform). it has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier Albano. the propertys character refers to its actual use at the time of taking. LBP.R. Asensi. De Mesa. Moreover. The respodnent was then promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been kept in trust pending [his] submission of the [ownership documentary] requirements however that respodnent did not act upon the notice given to him by both government agencies.943. On September 20. De la Cruz.943. Catindig. Coronel. HELD: NO. Valois . In his letter to the DAR in 1988. Espina. for a total of P9. No. Sandoval. FACTS: Respondent was the owner of 30. Rodriguez. and the time of actual taking.00. Marquez. The DAR referred Liviocos offer to the LBP for valuation.48 as compensation for Liviocos 26 hectares. although it stood adjacent to residential properties. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. respondent manifested that his land is agricultural and suitable for agricultural purposes.48 for 26 hectares. There are three important concepts in this definition the character of the property. 2010) DOCTRINE: For purposes of just compensation. The RTC was of the opinion that Livioco was able to prove the higher valuation of his property with a preponderance of evidence. Sy. Corporal. Corpuz. Gloria. Tecson.

Hence. De Mesa. because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to other uses by DAR. Rañigo. Valois . cases filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under RA 6657 and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Castillo. Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by local government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to residential. Respondents property remains agricultural and should be valued as such. it cannot be said that the character or use of said property changed from agricultural to residential. Alcazaren. Corpuz.The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential. in the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of respondents property or an actual expropriation by an LGU. Reyes. Since the coverage of RA 6657 only extends to agricultural lands. Santos. Thus. Martinez. respondents property should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. Catindig. Lumberio. Rodriguez. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to approve land use conversionsso as to prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform coverage. Corporal. De la Cruz. Tecson. Valiente. Francisco. Tabugan. Cabañgon. industrial or commercial. Sandoval. Marquez. Inguillo. the CA and the trial court had no legal basis for considering the subject propertys value as residential. Lastimosa. Gloria. Palad. Coronel. Albano. Page 422 Echiverri. Espina. Ramirez. Asensi. Sy.

respondents motive in initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned. Valiente. Santos.R. Cinco. Rico) conducted an initial inspection. Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect. Manila. In a Resolution dated March 26. Francisco. It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Corporal. even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. particularly the National Building Code to the Building Official regarding demolition of buildings are executive and administrative in nature. Valois . Lumberio. Sandoval. if not finality. by the courts. This is generally true with respect to acts Albano. and recommended their demolition which was affirmed by the DPWH. On June 17. The contract was for a period of 20 years. OP and the CA ISSUE: WON The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the resolution issued by the Office of the President HELD: YES. 2003. FACTS: Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano entered into an agreement with Francisco Villena to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street. Reyes. they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. or upon petition validly received. Gloria. both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO performed their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. Rico (Engr. In general. Coronel. can still act on the matter pursuant to such mandate. Espina. De la Cruz. Asensi. herein respondents Atty. Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house thereon. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Tabugan. courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. Page 423 Echiverri. so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous and ruinous. Hence. Ramirez. San Andres Bukid. health and well-being of the inhabitants. TERESITA CINCO. Castillo. on reported dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the life. Otherwise stated. Rañigo. and LIZA HIPOLITO vs. Alcazaren. Catindig. notwithstanding petitioners claim that respondents initiated the proceedings to circumvent their rights under the law as builders in good faith. This conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it resolved the petition before it. Remarkably. Teresita Cinco and Dr. CARLOTA BALDE CINCO and ATTY. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Marquez. We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact of the OBO and the other administrative bodies. San Andres Bukid. Tecson. and the general public. Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. (November 28. Acting on the request. 2011) DOCTRINE: By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction. based on its findings. Sy. Pursuant to the agreement. Corpuz. As correctly stated by the CA in its Decision: The powers granted by law. 174143. Cabañgon. Palad. SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO JR. Martinez. No. thus. The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio. the OBO. CARLOS CINCO G. Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis. Carlota Balde Cinco (respondents) filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection of an old structure located at 2176 Nakar Street. 2002. the OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous.

this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling reasons to do so. Alcazaren. Espina. which finding was affirmed by the CA. if not finality. Similarly. thus. in numerous occasions. Albano. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Marquez. Santos. Coronel. even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. Sy. Catindig. Page 424 Echiverri. Valois . Rañigo. must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court. The established exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory authority. Asensi. Rodriguez. their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect. This Court. Gloria. by the courts. Valiente. Corporal. It is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence. Tecson. Inguillo. Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Palad. De la Cruz. De Mesa. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction. exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. The conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved after thoroughly conducting their ocular inspections and hearings and considering all pieces of evidence presented before them. Francisco. None of the said exceptions is present in this case. Castillo. Tabugan. None of these obtains in the case at bar. they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Ramirez. has cited exceptions to the general rule that it is not a trier of facts. Reyes. Cabañgon. Martinez. Corpuz. Sandoval. involving the exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact.

Lastimosa. Valois . Tecson. RTC found Catacutan guilty of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. De Mesa. Catacutan was charged before the RTC of Surigao City. private complainants were not able to assume their new position since Catacutan made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and would not implement them. These promotions were duly approved and attested by the Civil Service Commission. Francisco. Cabañgon. Asensi. Catacutan was not denied Due Process. private complainants filed a complaint against Catacutan before the Ombudsman for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders. Catindig. Gloria. Alcazaren. Martinez. Marquez. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Santos. Reyes. This is especially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding Albano. Castillo. Palad. employees of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and trade. Corporal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded. JOSE CATACUTAN vs. Thus. Tabugan. Despite receipt of the appointment letter. The appointments were transmitted to Catacutan being the officer-in-charge of SNSAT. Sy. there is no denial of procedural due process. 2011 DOCTRINE: There is no violation of due process where the trial court did not allow a party to introduce evidence which it considered irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding at hand. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. Catacutan admitted that he did not implement the appointments because of procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. No. 175991. the Sandiganbayan affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.R. Page 425 Echiverri. Valiente. Ramirez. Coronel. Rañigo. ISSUE: Whether or not Catacutan was denied due process when the RTC did not allow him to introduce as evidence the CA decision? HELD: No. Corpuz. Espina. August 31. Inguillo. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. The RTC did not allow Catacutan to introduce as evidence the CA decision which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that this intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent. it is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of such evidence. On appeal. De la Cruz. FACTS: The Commission on Higher Education promoted private complainants Georgito Posesano and Magdalena Divinagracia. Sandoval.

Corporal. Catacutan is not left without legal recourse. Asensi. Page 426 Echiverri. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Martinez. Inguillo. Valois . Catacutan could have availed of the remedy provided in Sec. Marquez. Tecson. Rodriguez. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Sy. 40. Valiente. Espina. The findings in administrative case are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA decision. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Francisco. Reyes. Coronel. even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. Palad. Ramirez. Castillo. Rañigo. Albano. Tabugan. concerns an administrative matter. Santos. Corpuz. Gloria. Catindig.

Palad. Gloria. DU vs. which the RTC admitted in an Order. ordered petitioner to desist from holding any cockfighting activity. Rañigo. Valois . April 23. enacted Municipal Ordinance No. The Petition for Prohibition was later amended to include damages. Page 427 Echiverri. Corporal. operation and maintenance of a cockpit is lodged in the Sangguniang Bayan. FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini. and that the Municipal Resolution was unlawfully issued as it deprived him of due process. Due to his failure to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. Santos. in a letter. CA denied petitioner’s reconsideration. Albano.R. Castillo. the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Resolution suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation.Jayoma. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. series of 1988. the power to authorize and license the establishment. the winning bidder was Engr. petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality as he was only granted a temporary privilege by the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondents interposed that under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. 1997. Inguillo. Sy. 175042. theSangguniang Bayan adopted Resolution authorizing petitioner Danilo Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal requirements. Upon discovering that petitioner has been operating his cockpit in violation of Municipal Ordinance. NO. Catindig. Petitioner claimed that he has a business permit to operate until December 31. De Mesa. requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the said municipality every four years. Reyes. Espina. The CA reversed the Decision of the RTC. Rodriguez. 2012 DOCTRINE: A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law. Bohol. Coronel. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Edgardo Carabuena. For the period January 1. 1. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol. Corpuz. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the RTC enjoining respondents from suspending the cockpit operation of petitioner until further orders from the court. According to the CA. Martinez. 1989 to December 31. Ramirez. Sandoval. Asensi. Lumberio. Petitioner prayed that a preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent respondents from suspending his cockpit operation. then Mayor of Mabini. a Petition for Prohibition (Special Civil Action) against respondent mayor and nine members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini. Tabugan. Alcazaren. Pursuant to Municipal Resolution. Tecson. 1992. respondent Venancio R. Marquez. but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require. Francisco. De la Cruz. JAYOMA G.

petitioner’s allegation that he was deprived of due process has no leg to stand on. Coronel. Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit. Espina. it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to "authorize and license the establishment. operation and maintenance of cockpits. and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Sandoval. HELD: No. Page 428 Echiverri. therefore." Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from January1." Having said that. the only reason he was able to continue operating until July 1997 was because the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini failed to monitor the status of the cockpit in their municipality. Valois . And even if he was able to get a business permit from respondent mayor for the period January 1. As the chief executive of the municipal government. 1997 to December 31. Reyes. Sy. A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Inguillo. 1989 to December 31. Catindig. had every reason to suspend the operation of petitioner’s cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution. but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require."Corollarily. 1997. petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1. In addition. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. 1997 to December 31. Ramirez. Tecson. Valiente. Albano. respondent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioner’s cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan. this did not give him a license to operate a cockpit. Rañigo. the essential elements of a cause of action are:(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff.1997. we find that petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Gloria. Tabugan. In this case. the Sangguniang Bayan allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning bidder for the period January 1. Corpuz. 1992 failed to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. it is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that "a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law. Asensi. and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. De Mesa. Martinez. Santos. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. 1993 to December 31. 1997. (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right. There was no cause of action. Castillo. Lumberio. Francisco. As we see it. Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC. Palad. Corporal. Under Resolution. Marquez.

The RTC disposed of the case. more than two years after the DAR awarded the property to the farmer-beneficiaries that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) received DAR’s instruction to pay just compensation to the Puyats. Cabañgon. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 44. 175055. Valois . Rodriguez. represented by Attorney-in-Fact MARISSA PUYAT G. Accordingly. De Mesa. Cabanatuan City. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Page 429 Echiverri. pro-indiviso coowners of a parcel of rice land consisting of 46. Nueva Ecija. Francisco. Lumberio. the LBP recommended the payment to the land owners of the net value of Php 87. Tabugan.310.90.510. 27 remains incomplete upon the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. the DAR through LBP was ordered to pay the heirs of Puyat Php 4.3090 hectares of Puyat’s land under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27.3090 hectares. LBP made its initial valuation of Php 2. All of the said patents were annotated on Puyat Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. FACTS: The respondents are the heirs of Maximo and Gloria Puyat. Sy. Thus. Nueva Ecija covered by TCT No. De la Cruz. the RTC modified its decision by reducing the compensable area to only 44.687. Sandoval. Being a judicial function. Ramirez. NO. Espina. courts can choose to rely on the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. 1773 on March 20.8731 hectares.50 per hectare or a total of Php 92. situated in Barangay Bakod Bayan.241. and thereby caused the concomitant partial cancellation of Puyat’s title. when the acquisition process under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1773 with 6% legal interest per annum from date of taking (1990) until fully paid.8731 hectares located in Barangay Bakod Bayan. It was only on September 18. Deducting the farmers’ lease rentals amounting to Php 5. Valiente.20. the process should be completed under the new law. Corpuz. 6657. Rañigo. Cabanatuan City. Asensi. Gloria. Reyes. Corporal. LBP appealed the modified decision to the CA. even if these factors do not appear in PD 27 or EO 228. Catindig. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT and GLORIA PUYAT. Upon motion of LBP. 2012 DOCTRINE: In agrarian reform cases. Inguillo. Alcazaren. which cannot be unduly restricted by requiring the courts to strictly adhere to formulae appearing in legislative and executive acts. Marquez. Coronel. Castillo. The heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City. The Puyats did not receive any compensation for the cancellation of their title over the awarded portions of the subject property. Lastimosa. Tecson. Palad. Albano.10.00 representing just compensation of the property for a total aarea of 46. June 27. and rejected the valuation for being ridiculously low. Santos. Respondents received LBP’s initial valuation together with the Notice of Acquisition and Valuation Form. The CA held that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The DAR issued several emancipation patents in favor of various farmerbeneficiaries in December 1989. 1990.012. Martinez.752.R. 1992.

but does not pay the landowner of his just compensation until after RA 6657 has taken effect in 1988. the respondent did not contest the interest awarded by the lower courts and instead asked for the affirmance in toto of the appellate court’s decision. When the acquisition process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657. No need to reward. but from March 20. Albano. 2. it becomes more equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657. Inguillo. this Petition for Review before the Supreme Court (SC). Catindig. 3. Gloria. 3. Espina. Corpuz. 1773. The assailed June 28. The CA also explained that the legal interest was properly imposed considering that the Puyats were deprived of their property since March 20. therefore. Tecson. Sandoval. Both the taking of respondent’s property and the valuation occurred during the effectivity of RA 6657. Page 430 Echiverri. Castillo. as amended by RA 9700? HELD: 1. Marquez. Palad. Asensi. the court deems it fit not to disturb the interest rate imposed by the courts below. In keeping with the demands of due process. where RA 6657 is sufficient. 1990. In Section 17 thereof. Rodriguez. Francisco. 2. Tabugan. 1990. When the government takes property pursuant to PD 27. the court is not unaware that the current jurisprudence sets the interest rate for delay in payments of agrarian cases at 12% per annum. 1990 without receiving just compensation therefor. However. LBP approved the initial valuation for the just compensation that will be given to respondents. the CA modified the RTC decision by imposing the legal interest not from 1990. Lastimosa. Sy. Among the matters where RA 6657 is sufficient is the determination of just compensation. Santos. however. Valois . As to the interest rate awarded for the delay. the legislature has provided for the factors that are determinative of just compensation. Valiente. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Reyes. Can lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the factors appearing in Section 17 of RA 6657? 2. Corporal. 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. respondent’s title to the property was cancelled and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries on March 20. Lumberio. In this case. with PD 27 and EO 228 having suppletory effect only. the process should be completed under RA 6657. Coronel. In the case at bar. Should the case be remanded to the trial court for the recognition of just compensation using Section 17 of RA 6657. In 1992. Cabañgon. De Mesa. Hence. Is it proper to impose the 6% legal interest per annum on the unpaid just compensation? 3. This means that PD 27 applies only insofar as there are gaps in RA 6657. PD 27 is superseded. Ramirez. Martinez. Petitioner cannot insist on applying PD 27 which would render Section 17 of RA 6657 inutile. ISSUES: 1. which is the date when the emancipation patent were inscribed on TCT No.

In its decision promulgated on October 26. Hence this petition. ALFONSO LAGAYA Y TAMONDONG vs. De Mesa. Tecson. the following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory. Tuguegarao City. Lastimosa. Petitioner claimed that the issuance of the memorandum was done in the performance of his official duty and in good faith considering that his objective is to help the private respondent. Espina. accused Alfonso Lagaya y Tamondong. Castillo. b) it must be malicious. July 25. Cabañgon. 2012 DOCTRINE: The freedom to express one’s sentiments and beliefs does not grant one the license to vivify in public the honor and integrity of another. Rodriguez. and. Asensi. Alcazaren. Plant Manager of the Cagayan Valley Herbal Processing Plant (HPP) of the PITAHC. De la Cruz. On account of the issuance of the said memorandum. civil and criminal charges against petitioner. hence. Valois . proof beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Sandiganbayan denied the same. issued a Memorandum all Plant Managers and staff. Marilyn Martinez. 176251. needs to undergo psychological and psychiatric treatment to prevent deterioration of her mental and emotional stability as recommended by McGimpers. Tabugan. Rañigo. that is. Ramirez. Reyes. Marquez. Santos. with salary grade 28. Catindig. NO. Inguillo. not libelous HELD: All the requisites of the crime of libel are obtaining in this case.” For an imputation to be libelous. or blacken the memory of one who is dead. Lumberio. FACTS: On or about August 5. Sandoval. Francisco. Corporal. required by law 2. The subject of said memorandum is “Disclosure and Misuse of Confidential and Classified Information. or of a vice or defect real or imaginary. Province of Cagayan. or any act. Sy. Whether the subject memorandum falls within the ambit of the privileged communication rule. or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Gloria. d) the victim Albano.” a salient portion thereof states that private respondent Dr. c) it must be given publicly. Valiente. condition. Page 431 Echiverri. Coronel. distributed to the plants all over the country. ISSUES: 1. She sought the assistance of a lawyer to file the necessary administrative. private respondent was exposed to public ridicule and humiliation. Martinez. the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution has convincingly established proof beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements essential to support the charge and thus adjudged petitioner guilty of the crime of libel. status or circumstances tending to cause dishonor. A liber is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime.R. Whether the prosecution’s evidence to prove the commission of libel fell short of the degree of proof. 2002 in Caraig. Director General of the Philippine Institute of Traditional and Alternative Health Care (PITAHC) an attached agency of the Department of Health. Corpuz. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. omission. 2006. discredit. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. Palad.

Sandoval. Inguillo. Coronel. certainly. 2. even if it be true. Reyes. Valiente. Rodriguez. Espina. Cabañgon. must be identifiable. Corpuz. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. Petitioner’s invocation of the rule on privileged communication is misplaced. Albano. Lumberio. Castillo. Tabugan. Marquez. Corporal. Gloria. Though private respondent is a public officer. Asensi. and. Sy. or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature. De la Cruz. of any judicial. or of any statement. report or speech delivered in said proceedings. Alcazaren. except in the following cases: 1. Francisco. Valois . Page 432 Echiverri. moral or social duty. legislative. Martinez. Catindig. if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Ramirez. Tecson. or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. A fair and true report. Rañigo. De Mesa. Palad. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 354: Requirement for publicity. the defamatory remarks are not related to or relevant to the discharge of her official duties but was purely an attack in her mental condition which adversely reflect on her reputation and dignity. made in good faith. Santos. Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal. Lastimosa. without any comments or remarks.

Baylon. (b) With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion thereof. Reyes. Rodriguez. Francisco. before the RTC. No. Lumberio. No. Santos. SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON G.00 per square meter for the 6. or such market value as determined by the assessor. 173520 January 30.820 square meters determined as of the date of the taking of the property. Ramirez. full and ample.00 per square meter. Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the Commissioners reports are not supported by documentary evidence. Bataan and that it urgently needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Lines. Balanga City. Corporal. 2013 DOCTRINE: Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. substantial. Alcazaren. Bataan alleging that Spouses Zabala and Baylon own parcels of land located in Balanga City. Cabañgon. Coronel. Gloria. De la Cruz. the same shall: (a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof. Inguillo. Asensi. Valois . but the owner’s loss.A. The word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real. Catindig. Napocor argued that the RTC did not apply Section 3A of R. Marquez. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. The measure is not the taker's gain. The Commissioners submitted their Report/ Recommendation fixing the just compensation at P150. Castillo. Valiente. Albano. 2004." In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to be acquired through expropriation proceedings. Zabala& L. whichever is lower. CA affirmed the RTCs Partial Decision. Tecson. FACTS: On October 27. the RTC rendered its Partial Decision and ordered Napocor to pay Php150. Palad. 6395 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of the property traversed by its transmission lines. Corpuz. 1994. The Commissioners submitted their Final Report fixing the just compensation at P500. Napocor prayed that the report be recommitted to the commissioners for the modification of the report and the substantiation of the same with reliable and competent documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the time of its taking. Espina. Page 433 Echiverri. Sy. Lastimosa. De Mesa. Rañigo. Martinez. not to exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property. R. plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation (Napocor) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants-appellees Sps. or such market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower.00 per square meter. On June 28. not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property. Sandoval.R. Tabugan.

Rañigo. Alcazaren. Gloria. Catindig. As such. Valois . Martinez. it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property. Asensi. Ramirez. Coronel. Valiente. Tabugan. at best. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. It is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land. De Mesa. Espina. Sy. Albano. Castillo. Sec. are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. Tecson. Cabañgon. Marquez. Santos. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Corporal. Lumberio. no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts to determine just compensation. De la Cruz. The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that since the high. Lastimosa. Inguillo. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of Php150. Page 434 Echiverri. Palad.00 per square meter as the fair market value of the property subject of the easement right of way of Napocor HELD: The petition is partially meritorious. Francisco. Reyes. Statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and. Corpuz. 3A of RA No.

Alcazaren. Espina.155 square meters of the lot at P100 per square meter. Catindig. Gloria. Martinez. Respondent s claimed that the valuation was based on the BIR zonal valuation. FACTS: Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Lipa City. Page 435 Echiverri. No. Cabañgon. Albano. or such market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower. ISSUE: Whether or not the reliance by the CA on the Joint Commissioners’ Report is erroneous. Tabugan. not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property. Sy. not to exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property. in arriving at the amount of just compensation. Marquez. Petitioner offered to purchase an additional 1. Lastimosa.R. Corpuz. Palad. Ramirez. or such market value as determined by the assessor. Inguillo. Sandoval. but the Sps. represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS vs. (b) With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion thereof. To this. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. which is not a fair consideration. respondents filed their comment accepting such valuation as fair and reasonable. whichever is lower. The only legal question raised by the petitioner relates to the commissioners’ and the trial court’s alleged failure to take into consideration.960 and P2. Asensi. there are standards for the assessment of the value of the expropriated land which the trial court and the commissioners concerned failed to consider. Petitioner then filed a complaint with the RTC of Lipa City for the expropriation of the 1. Castillo. No. 181218 January 28. Bautista refused to sell. De Mesa. Santos. Valiente.155-square meter portion. Respondents are their children. Coronel. 8974. through DPWH. Tecson. Valois .500 per square meter. the same shall: (a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof. HELD: No. Corporal. HEIRS OF SPOUSES PEDRO BAUTISTA and VALENTINA MALABANAN G. In determining just compensation under R. Francisco. Rañigo. The Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds concluded in their Joint Commissioners’ Report that just compensation for the subject portion should be within the range of P1. 2013 DOCTRINE: In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to be acquired through expropriation proceedings. Lumberio. Reyes. De la Cruz. Republic of the Philippines. acquired by negotiated sale a portion of the lot for use in the STAR (Southern tagalog Arterial Road) Toll way project. Rodriguez.A.

De la Cruz. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 180463 January 16. Valois . Tecson. No. 2273. Respondent-intervenors together with AFP-RSBS argued that their predecessors-in-interest Kusop had acquired vested rights having occupied the same for more than 30 years. the land had lost its alienable and disposable Albano. Asensi. 168. RTC rendered judgement nullifying the AFP_RSBS titles and ordering the return of Lot X to the Republic. as well as the subsequent issuance of sales patents in their names. but instead require him to concede it before availment. AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM. have already been recognized and respected through the subsequently issued Proc. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Evidently. Corpuz. 2013 DOCTRINE: The processes of the State should not be trifled with. No. Espina. Coronel. Ramirez. Santos. as a consequence. Valiente. the succeeding sales patents and OCT’s in the names of the respondents-intervernors should be declared null and void not only for being in iolation of law. Rañigo. They claimed that these vested rights were alienable and disposable land of public domain. In 1997. Tabugan. Alcazaren. on the thesis that they issued over a public park. Reyes. 168. Sy. which is classified as inalienable and non-disposable public land. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in their decision HELD: Yes.R. but also because respondents-intervenors did not deserve to acquire more land. DENR approved respondents-intervenor’s application for issuance of miscellaneous patents over Lot X and later that year those titles were conveyed to AFP-RSBS. After a year. Francisco. Palad. Inguillo. Catindig. Hence. Martinez. Corporal. the sales patents over Lot X are null and void. The failure of a party to avail of the proper remedy to acquire or perfect one's title to land cannot justify a resort to other remedies which are otherwise improper and do not provide for the full opportunity to prove his title. HEIRS OF CABAL KUSOP and ATTY. De Mesa. for at the time the sales patents were applied for and granted. respondents-intervenors have acquired title without need of judicial or other action. this petition. which were guaranteed under Proc. Marquez. petitioner Republic instituted a civil case for reversion and cancellation against AFP-RSBS of those titles. Page 436 Echiverri. Lumberio. Castillo. FACTS: Three lots which are of the public domain located in General Santos are the disputed lands in this case were reserve for recreation and health purposes by Proc. Gloria. CA reversed the RTC decision based on that as a consequence of their predecessor’s possession of Lot X since time immemorial. NILO J. A subsequent Proclamation declared that 2 of the 3 lots were open for disposition to qualified applicants leaving the remaining lot which is Lot X to be remained part of the reservation now known as Magsaysay Park. Rodriguez. FLAVIANO G. Their private rights. and the properly ceased to be public land and thus became privately properly.

timber or forest and grazing lands.” We deem this case worthy of such principle. the Court sustains the petitioner’s view that “any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. and shall be conserved and may not be increased nor dismissed. Lastimosa. or of the inhabitants thereof. and that the applicant acknowledges this and surrenders to State ownership. as successor-in-interest. in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose. as regards AFP-RSBS’ rights. It is erroneous to suppose that respondents-intervenors possessed to Lot X when they applied for miscellaneous sales patents. as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege. Sandoval. Under Section 83 of CA 141. national parks. Corpuz. giving the government great leeway for classification. only agricultural lands may be alienated. except by law. AFP-RSBS cannot acquire a better title than its predecessor. Tecson. Reyes. Page 437 Echiverri. Albano. is the owner of Lot X. “the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches. their act of applying for the issuance of miscellaneous sales patents operates as an express acknowledgement that the State. we cannot ignore the basic principle that a spring cannot rise higher than its source. Rañigo. Martinez. residential. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural. Espina. is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands. Francisco. Catindig. Castillo. for the premise of such grant or privilege is precisely that the State is the owner of the land. The government. Tabugan. Gloria. the herein respondents-intervenors. Palad. and not respondents-intervenors. as a recreational park. resettlement. Rodriguez. agricultural. or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Valois . industrial or commercial. Santos. Valiente. Respondents-intervenors no longer had any right to Lot X – not by acquisive prescription. there is no other recourse but for AFP-RSBS to surrender to the rightful ownership of the State. Ramirez. Marquez. not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. character. Coronel. Sy. Lumberio. Cabañgon. national parks are declared part of the public domain. when the public interest required it and under the present Constitution. It was set aside and was being utilized for a public purpose. and certainly not by sales patent. the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition. Besides. De Mesa. In fact. Asensi. that is. Corporal. Alcazaren. Meanwhile. mineral. as the agent of the State. Finally. Inguillo. Having acquired no title to the properly in question. Of these. De la Cruz. and such other classes as may be provided by law. forest or timber.

(Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products. Marquez.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. G. Corporal. of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Laboratories’ (YSS). Sy. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. that the trial court – nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories. Galon and Lopez liable. Valois . In view. No. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH’s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss case. Espina. Gloria. The trial court. although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. including the antibiotic – Penicillin G Benzathine. Corpuz. jointly and severally to plaintiff. Santos. Coronel. Tecson. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. Inc. Petitioner DOH issued an invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1. however. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. Page 438 Echiverri. Rodriguez. FACTS: Secretary of Health Romualdez. Martinez. mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying. 182358 February 20. Palad. and direct petitioners DOH et al. Sandoval. De Mesa. Francisco. Rañigo. issued an Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner DOH. Petitioners DOH et al. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not the change against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper Albano. Lumberio. Castillo. the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. inter alia. Catindig. denied the motion to dismiss. Asensi. Reyes. 2013 DOCTRINE: Defense of State Immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity. Jr. and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and – adjudge defendants Romualdez. Respondent Pharmawealth .R. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Inguillo. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH INC. Valiente. Alcazaren. however. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth’s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products. to declare Pharmawealth the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract. Ramirez. Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction.

Moreover. Gloria. Palad. Castillo. suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act – illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissile. Cabañgon. for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Martinez. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Corporal. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Reyes. in consonance with the foregoing principles. As regards petitioner DOH. Marquez. Hence. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. De Mesa. Catindig. Lumberio. Page 439 Echiverri. the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government. Asensi. and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a change or financial liability against the government. agency or a person. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. Albano. In the present case. although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Ramirez. the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. HELD: The suitability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official jurisdictional capacity. Sy. the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for facts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Espina. Valiente. it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. Tecson. Francisco. Santos. Lastimosa. In its complaint. Under Section 1. Coronel. De la Cruz. Corpuz. preliminary injunction may be directed against a party of a court. Sandoval. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution. Tabugan. Valois .

2013 DOCTRINE: "It is universally accepted that a State. Santos. Coronel. the CA found that Azucena's financial condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473. in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition. Marquez. Palad. Sandoval. Castillo. Tabugan. the RTC held that the public has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to intervene. petition for naturalization is granted. Espina. Corpuz. Reyes. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS G. Martinez. Hence. Thus. Corporal. contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that Albano." FACTS: Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.R. called derivative naturalization. After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473 had been complied with. De Mesa. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISSUE: Whether or not Azucena failed to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473. Valois . Page 440 Echiverri. Rañigo. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss. Rodriguez. Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. A third option. Inguillo. as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases. The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA. 9139 (the"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). Gloria. Under existing laws. In dismissing the OSG's appeal." Under this provision. Asensi. Rejecting this argument. HELD: No. October 7. which provides that: "[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. 183110. Ramirez. Azucena's counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte. an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. De la Cruz. Tecson. Alcazaren. Sy. Catindig. which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473. Francisco. Valiente. Lumberio. which the RTC granted. No.

Sy. which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization. the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473. Palad. Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider. and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she has known since birth. they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Rodriguez. Asensi. On the submitted evidence. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended. Together. Castillo. Catindig. Under judicial proceeding. Lumberio. Espina. He also submitted voter's registration. land titles. De la Cruz. husband and wife were able to raise all their five children. Marquez. Martinez. Sandoval. and business registrations/licenses. Santiago's Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Santos. Albano. Ramirez. Her profession never leaves her. Certainly. Francisco. provided them with education. As the records before this Court show. nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act. Corpuz. Reyes. Corporal. the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members. all of which are public records. Cabañgon. Tabugan. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen. an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473. Rañigo. De Mesa. Inguillo. this is proof enough of both husband and wife's lucrative trade. Valiente. Page 441 Echiverri. Alcazaren. in order to support her family. Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at any time. Lastimosa. Gloria. Coronel. Tecson. Moreover. and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country. together with her husband. Valois .

Sy. 3019. Tabugan. The suspension order. Catindig." FACTS: Petitioner was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo. HELD: We dismiss the Petition for being moot and academic. Palad. Lanao del Sur. Reyes. Ramirez. respondent granted in its Resolution of October 9. the Court dismissed the Petition. De Mesa. Castillo. petitioner emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race and again sat as Mayor of Mulondo. Martinez. 2003. Inguillo. 2004. 2003 the OSP's motion and accordingly ordered the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused from their respective positions and from any other public office which they may now or hereafter be holding for a period of 90 days from notice. 2004. along with Abdul and Domado. Sandoval. which dismissal attained finality on July 12.| Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) moved for the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused as mandated under Section 13 of Republic Act No. Lanao del Sur. 2013 DOCTRINE: "Where the issue has become moot and academic. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Information on September 5. 184496. Corpuz. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. December 2. HADJI HASHIM ABDUL vs.R. De la Cruz. however. Lastimosa. Gloria. Marquez. Rañigo. Corporal. there is no justiciable controversy. Finding the charge as squarely falling within the ambit of Section 13. In a Resolution dated March 10. 2008. Alcazaren. No. Tecson. On February 21. Asensi. Albano. Santos. Coronel. Valiente. Lumberio. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor of Mulondo. 2004 he filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO alleging that the suspension order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. with falsification of public documents. and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest. however intellectually challenging. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES||| G. Valois . RA 3019. Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 election and re-elected for a second term in the May 2001 election. on March 2. Rodriguez. 2002 charging petitioner. Francisco. but the same was denied. Espina.Thus. defined and penalized under Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). During the May 2007 election. Cabañgon. Page 442 Echiverri. was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the expiration of petitioner's second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May 2004 election. the OSP once again moved for his and his co-accused's suspension pendente lite to implement respondent's final and executory suspension order of October 9.

Sy. De la Cruz. Inc. Catindig. Tecson. Cabañgon. Thus. Page 443 Echiverri. we have ruled that "[w]here the issue has become moot and academic. Alcazaren. in Mattel. Castillo. for legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged. Francisco. there must be an actual case or controversy. and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer. Francisco. Rañigo. Rodriguez. petitioner nevertheless implores us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is included in the term "fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019. v. Marquez. Gloria. Corpuz. Martinez." In the present case. Lumberio. Tabugan. Palad. Santos. Coronel. Asensi. Corporal. there is no justiciable controversy. Valiente. Espina. De Mesa. Ramirez. the acquittal of herein petitioner operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Reyes. Inguillo. Sandoval. Valois . Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication. Lastimosa. Albano.

Marquez. Palad.(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity. Valiente. An actual case or controversy exists when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." The Petition must therefore show that "the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse Albano. praying that Section 4 of RA 7432. Inguillo. and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated. When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue. Rañigo. While the Constitution protects property rights. Corpuz. Reyes. Page 444 Echiverri. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT. Sandoval. granting senior citizens privileges|||. (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the [question of constitutionality]. FACTS: On April 23. 1992. b.R. Rodriguez. Martinez. Respondents. 175356. that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same. vs. Santos. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. ISSUE: a. Castillo. judicial review may be availed of only if the following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case. HELD: a. Valois . however. Tecson. petitioners filed the present recourse. and (4) the [question of constitutionality] is the lis mota of the case. Espina. RA 7432 was passed into law. Tabugan. Ramirez. December 3." In this case. Asensi. Coronel. the burden of proof rests upon him. INC. Whether or not the petition presents an actual case or controversy. Cabañgon. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE||| G. Francisco. Whether or not Section 4 of RA 9257 – insofar as it provide 20% discount to Senior Citizens may be claimed as tax deduction by the private establishments.is invalid and unconstitutional. Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme. We do not agree with respondents. INC. MANILA MEMORIAL PARK. in the exercise of police power. Yes. can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Gloria. and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction. 2013 DOCTRINE: When a party challenges the constitutionality of a law. petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State. as amended by RA 9257. petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme provided in RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. oppose the Petition on the ground that there is no actual case or controversy. Corporal. Alcazaren. Catindig. No. Sy. De Mesa.

Castillo. or senior citizens for that matter. this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens. therefore. Coronel. However. thus. Inguillo. for the use or benefit of the public. it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties. Rañigo. b. are less likely to be gainfully employed. De Mesa. Ramirez. Sy. Tecson. price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. Nonetheless. the subject regulation is a police power measure. in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. Marquez. Corporal. and. to the degree material to the resolution of this case." In this case. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services. De la Cruz. Santos. In other words. but with substantial distinctions from. Sandoval. No. Palad. the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals. Cabañgon. and. Asensi. senior citizens. and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Lumberio. Rodriguez. but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to. On its face. at their age. senior citizens. Thus. Page 445 Echiverri. for which the Constitution affords preferential concern. In turn. Valois . used in the operation or conduct of the business of private establishments. the subject regulation affects the pricing. Francisco. Valiente. effect on the individual challenging it. the profitability of a private establishment. Gloria. Corpuz. Reyes. more prone to illnesses and other disabilities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. We found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. Tabugan. As to its nature and effects. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. hence. the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on them. the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. Martinez. and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments may derive from.||| The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who. Catindig. it cannot be denied that there exists an actual case or controversy. These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the general public. Albano. Espina.

2004. De la Cruz. the DENR treats all small-scale miners equally as theproduction limit applies to all of them. Tabugan. Rañigo. they were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in a 20-hectare mining site in SitioBugnang. Palad. INC.R. Espina. DENR Secretary Angelo T. Rodriguez. The fact is. the EMB sent the mining corporations a Notice of Violationinforming them that they had exceeded the allowed annual volume of 150.Hence. this Petition. The mining corporations’ ECCs contain a restriction that the amount of Ni-Co ore they are allowed to extract annually should not exceed 50.000 MTs combined production as their stockpile inventory of NickelifeThe CA denied the mining corporations’ Petition.rous ore had already totaled 177. Santos. SR METALS. Subsequently. SAN R MINING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP. Castillo. Ramirez. Amante (Governor Amante). Tubay. DOCTRINE: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) treats all small-scale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them. Sy. La Fraternidad. It must be stressed that the DENR is the government agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the country’s resources. Brgy. Agusan del Norte Governor. 2014. HELD: Yes. Lastimosa. Reyes. Francisco. With the 50. INC. June 4. Cabañgon. however. it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of mining laws. Page 446 Echiverri. Erlpe John M. imputing abuse of discretion on the part of DENR in issuing the CDO. THE HONORABLE ANGELO T. notonly because the ECCs have been mooted by their expiration. Valiente. REYES. and GALEO EQUIPMENT AND MINING COMPANY. 2006. Valois . Tecson. Alcazaren. Marquez. There is therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize and comply with the said limitation.. Asensi. Sandoval.297 dry metric tons (DMT). Reyes issued a Cease and Desist Order(CDO) against the miningcorporations suspending their operations. Martinez. Inguillo.000-MTs production limit applies to small-scale miners. the issue raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. Catindig. Gloria. vs. each of the petitioners was awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining Permit(SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte. The mining corporations then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.On November 26. but also due to its recognition of the power of the DENR to issue the CDO as the agency reposed with the duty of managing and conserving the country’s resources under Executive Order 192. FACTS: On March 9. Corpuz. in his capacity as Secretary of DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) G. Coronel. Albano.000 MTs pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899.Meanwhile. 179669. ISSUE: WON the 50. questioned the quantityof ore that had been mined and shipped by the mining corporations. De Mesa. Agusan del Norte.000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA 7076. Lumberio. No. Corporal.

Valiente. Hence. 2010 Resolution. there is no tenurial arrangement. and FELIPE DOMINCIL. but in a November 9. SPOUSES ROGELIO and ZOSIMA PADRE. there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. Tomas. and belying respondent’s claim that he took possession of the property in 1993 when petitioners supposedly abandoned the same. FACTS: Petitioners are the registered owners. Isabela. Corporal. As correctly argued by petitioners. Corpuz. petitioners filed a Complaintfor forcible entry against respondent before the 2nd Municipal CircuitTrial Court (MCTC) of Cabagan-Delfin Albano.Respondent appealedthe MCTC Decision before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). however. 2005. or possessors of agricultural land. G. Reyes. that respondent’s own witnesses declared that the subject property was never tenanted nor under lease to tenants. No. In reversing the trial court. Martinez. Sandoval. Alcazaren. De Mesa. successors-in-interest.Respondent went up to the CA by Petition for Review. is the fact that as between petitioners and the respondent.R.For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case. CHARLES BUMAGAT. There are conditions orrequisites before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee or tenant. HELD: No. were in actual possession of the land. Coronel. the CA agreed that the parties’ dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB since petitioners’ titles were obtained pursuant to PD 27. correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority fall under DARAB jurisdiction. Tabugan. Tecson. Lastimosa. Espina. Sto. Marquez. located in Bubog. petitioners were in actual possession of the subject parcels of land.Petitioners moved for reconsideration. and the pleadings do not allege such fact. “[I]n Albano.The MCTC added that it had jurisdiction over the case since there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor anagricultural lessee or tenant. ISSUE: WON the dispute is within the jurisdiction of DARAB. a case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute.What the appellate court failed to realize. consisting of about eight hectares. Palad. not even an implied one. The certificates of title to the above titled properties were issued in 1986 pursuant to emancipation patents. 2014. Cabañgon. Castillo. Inguillo. since respondent himself admitted that he brought an action against petitioners before the MARO to collect rentals which have remained unpaid since 1995 — thus implying that petitioners. De la Cruz. Lumberio. there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. Francisco. Catindig. ROSARIO PADRE. DOCTRINE:For the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to acquire jurisdiction over the case. and the subject being agricultural land constitutes just one condition. cases involving the issuance. Valois . Santos. and under the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. insisting that the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case. Ramirez. Gloria.On July 19. vs. 194818. June 9. and not respondent. REGALADO ARRIBAY. Asensi. Page 447 Echiverri. the present recourse. Rodriguez. The MCTC held that based on the evidence. Rañigo. the CA stood its ground. Isabela. Sy. JULIAN BACUDIO.

Gloria. Martinez. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Palad. De la Cruz. Santos. 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship. Albano. Corpuz. Lastimosa. Francisco. Corporal. 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. Asensi. as both parties claim ownership over the property. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Inguillo. order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute. Marquez. 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements. Alcazaren. Valiente.”In the present case. Sy. Castillo. Valois . Tecson. De Mesa. and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. there is no tenant. Reyes. 5) that there is personal cultivation onthe part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. Lumberio. Espina. Page 448 Echiverri. Coronel. Rañigo. it is quite evident that not all of these conditions are present. For one. Sandoval. Catindig.

Tabugan. Francisco. Ramirez. Alcazaren.545. which valuation was rejected by Galle. 2014 DOCTRINE: It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that the determination of just compensation is basically a judicial function.R. She likewise filed in DARAB Case seeking annulment of the titles which were issued subsequent to her original titles. and it had no jurisdiction over the case for cancellation of titles since it was not the designated Special Agrarian Court (SAC). No. The estate is a fully developed and income-producing farm.2257 hectares of the estate at P6. The Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds cancelled Galle's titles and transferred the entire estate to the State. Santos.4 hectares barangay road in the total valuation. Asensi. The rejected amount was supposedly deposited in the name of Galle. No. 171836 Aug 11. Sandoval. Catindig. De Mesa. Valiente. Rodriguez. Likewise. Palad. 171836 and partially grants the Petition in G. Martinez. Inguillo. Coronel. both Section 17 of Republic Act No.producing copra.26. The estate contained between 35. FACTS: Respondent Susie Irene Galle owned two contiguous parcels of land known as the Patalon Coconut Estate in Patalon. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. it is settled that in the computation of just compensation for land taken for agrarian reform. Zamboanga City. Valois . Also. CA ruled that the RTC had no power to review decisions of the DARAB. Corporal.R.083. Reyes.810 to 38. in the form of cash and bonds. Marquez. Lumberio. Castillo. New titles were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines Department of Agrarian Reform. Rañigo. ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR JUST COMPENSATION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.666 coconut trees. De la Cruz. Page 449 Echiverri. Gloria. Albano. Lastimosa. 195213. Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. SUSIE IRENE GALLE GR No. Espina. Tecson. Corpuz. the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) conducted summary administrative proceedings for the acquisition of the estate it rendered a decision directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to determine and include the value of the 1. 6657 (RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988/CARL) and the formula prescribed in the applicable Administrative Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) should be considered. and covered by two titles issued in her name.In August 1992. Meanwhile. Respondent instituted a case for "Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconveyance. carabao and horses were raised therein. Sy. HELD: The Court denies the Petition in G. petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued 356. and Damages" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City. cattle. Cabañgon. It favored the respondent ordering the Registry of Deeds to cancel the issue in favor of the government.

baseless and even contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation. Espina. Asensi. Alcazaren. it was held that the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the property must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657 and. Reyes.8257 hectares as the CA has found. Francisco. Albano. Coronel. series of 1994. Marquez. No. Valois . at the very least. Sy. series of 1992. Sandoval. Tecson. Palad. taking into consideration both Section 17 of RA 6657 and AOs 6 and 11. as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 2005 Resolution in its entirety. Santos. This system will likewise ensure that the just compensation fixed represents. Corporal. It relied upon Manalo's Commissioners' Report. which likewise did not apply the formula in AOs 6 and 11. the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R. as far as practicable. In an earlier case decided by this ponente. Moreover. These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property subject to agrarian reform. Catindig. De Mesa. it readily appears that the SAC did not apply the formula in the applicable Administrative Circulars of the DAR (AOs 6 and 11) in arriving at its own independent valuation of Galle's estate. In other words. both Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula prescribed in the applicable AO of the DAR must be considered in the computation. DAR Administrative Order No. a close approximation of the full and real value of the property taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the landowner. Lumberio. Cabañgon. although it took into consideration some of the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657. Ramirez. the computation of the exact amount of just compensation remains an issue that must be resolved. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Page 450 Echiverri. which thus makes its pronouncement incomplete. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The CA is guilty of the same mistake. all that were considered were the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. Reading the August 15. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Gloria. Valiente. 6. This uniform system will ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd. in the exercise of the Court's essentially judicial function of determining just compensation. Rañigo.A. Thus. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Martinez. Nowhere in the appellate court's decision can it be seen that the formula prescribed by AOs 6 and 11 were taken into account. while this Court acknowledges that Galle's estate was expropriated to the extent of 356. Castillo. 11. 6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors.

Corporal. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. Lorenzo C. Coronel. Sy. Corpuz. docketed as Civil Case No. that the value of the lot at the time of NPC’s taking thereof or filing of Civil Case No. Lumberio. Sandoval. Albano. 197329 September 8. Case is dismissed without prejudice.500. NPC insists that Section 4.After almost three (3) years since the said order was issued. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should have been observed in fixing the amount of just compensation for the subject lot. Atty. 83. ruled the value of the subject lot at ₱1. RTC. No. Valois . HELD: The Court grants the Petition. Asensi.100. Inguillo. Respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint. Catindig. Page 451 Echiverri.00 to ₱1. However. Santos. Espina. Martinez. Colarina. Orense. Tabugan. LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR G. Palad.00 per square meter valuation.00 per square meter. Alcazaren. Tecson. proposed a ₱1. Marquez. Gloria. Ramirez. NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line denominated as Tower No. to wit . commissioner for NPC. De Mesa. Castillo. IR-2678 be remanded to the trial court for determination of just compensation applying Section 4. Cabañgon. recommended a valuation within the range of ₱1. Rañigo.000. NPC thus prays that Civil Case No. for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the dismissal of Civil Case No. the Committee has not met nor deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not exerted efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a time. WenifredoPornillo. The court representative. IR-2243 with the RTC. NPC filed an appeal to CA which was denied. RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. IR-2678 in 1995. did not set an amount.020-square meter lot which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line.R. FACTS: Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. Francisco. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. 2014 DOCTRINE: Determination of just compensation under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. IR-2678. the trial court issued another Order5 dismissing Civil Case No. The RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. IR-2243 in 1990 should have been the basis for computing just compensation and not the prevailing market value at the time of the filing or pendency of Civil Case No.00 per square meter. IR-224. Rodriguez. although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing market prices of agricultural. seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar’s 1. De la Cruz. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT REMANDING THE COURT FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY INACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4. and not residential. IR-2243 without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Esteban D. Accordingly. lands within the area. Valiente. Lastimosa.000. Reyes.

Rañigo.’ However. Coronel. Catindig. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. Martinez. Tabugan. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. Francisco. we held in Republic v. Reyes. Santos. Ramirez. Valois . waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67.. Asensi. Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements. De Mesa. and hence. Valiente. If no such complaint is filed. Sy. Albano. Marquez. not of the filing of the complaint. Sandoval. if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the order of expropriation. the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession. Rodriguez. Court of Appeals. including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. Page 452 Echiverri. Inguillo. In National Power Corporation v. Castillo. Corporal. De la Cruz. However. Cabañgon. provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable. Espina. and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i. The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Alcazaren. Tecson. Corpuz. Lumberio. we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation. Lastimosa. Court of Appeals. Gloria. In Republic v. Palad. the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.e.

00 per hectare. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G. As a final note. Castillo. Alcazaren. petitioner Nilo A. If the RTC finds these guidelines inapplicable. for which petitioners were offered P287.R. it becomes necessary to ensurecompliance with the law and to give everyone — the landowner. Tabugan.O. Mercado (Nilo) rejected respondent’s valuation. Tecson. suited for agriculture and has improvements. that they sold the remaining 4. Lastimosa. and (3) just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 and outlined in a formula provided in DAR A.000.8940 hectares of agricultural land in Kilate. Valois . (2) interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case. we remind the RTC to observe the following guidelines for the proper determination of just compensation: (1) just compensation must be valued at the time of taking of the property expropriated. He claimed that the fair market value of their property is P250. Sandoval. is a government financial institution organized and existing by virtue of RA 3844. Guidelines for the Proper Determination of Just Compensation (see ruling) Remand of Cases. 5.16 as just compensation. SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO vs. or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. Toril. Asensi. and.00 per hectare as just compensation for the subject. Rañigo. Santos. 2002.6316-hectare portion. 2015 DOCTRINE: Expropriation Proceedings. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. De Mesa. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation was properly determined by the RTC.227. Marquez. Thru a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition. While remand is frowned upon for obviating the speedy dispensation of justice. Corporal.7 the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Davao City informed petitioners that 5.373-04. No. Palad. the farmers. and the State — their due. T-44107. Francisco. No. Respondent. Rodriguez. on the other hand.000. Espina. Page 453 Echiverri. it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the property expropriated. FACTS: Petitioners spouses Nilo and Erlinda Mercado (petitioners) were the registered owners of 9. which is hilly and uncultivated. Lumberio.2624 hectares of their aforesaid property (subject portion) shall be placed under the CARPcoverage. Inguillo. petitioners filed a Complaint for payment of just compensation before the RTC acting as SAC which was docketed as Civil Case No. Catindig. Davao City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Valiente. Just Compensation. Martinez. that said property is adjacent to “Eden.Thus. Sy. June 17. Albano. Ramirez. for such price. Corpuz. HELD: No. 30. In his letter dated October 27.” an eco-tourism area.6 and is the financial intermediary for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). compared to the subject portion which is flat. Gloria. Petitioners prayed that the DAR and respondent be ordered to pay them P250. 196707. Reyes. Coronel. and likewise suitable for housing and other uses.

the Court finds that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the property’s value at the time of its taking. Inguillo. Martinez. its remand to the RTC is deemed proper. Lastimosa. Page 454 Echiverri. Corpuz. Catindig. Sy.” Albano. Tecson. Tabugan. Castillo. De Mesa. Suffice it to state that “[w]hile remand is frowned upon for obviating the speedy dispensation of justice. Corporal. Valois . Sandoval. Cabañgon. Coronel. it becomes necessary to ensure compliance with the law and to give everyone — the landowner. Valiente. Palad. Marquez. it is premature to make a final determination of the just compensation due to petitioners. Francisco. Alcazaren. Espina. Given all these. the farmers. Gloria. Santos. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Thus. Reyes. Lumberio. Asensi. And as the Court cannot receive new evidence from the parties for the prompt resolution of this case. Rodriguez. Rañigo. and the State — their due.

Tecson. Albano. contrary to the entry in his application form. Rodriguez. Santos. . 191787. petitioner should have interposed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). after removing his deficiency of 1. filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director. Sandoval. Falsification of Official documents. Tabugan. petitioner was charged with Dishonesty. Marquez.The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review. Alcazaren. Also. HELD: No. as “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Corporal.5 units in Military Education. Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.” When petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC 19. a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS Bangued. “The CSC. June 22. Asensi. Francisco. Palad. as the central personnel agency of the Government. that he obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only. as the central personnel agency of the Government. De la Cruz. vs. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. Castillo. Lastimosa. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. instrumentalities and agencies. FACTS: On March 10. JR.R. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA can take cognizance of the petition without violating well established doctrines and procedures. After preliminary investigation. subdivisions. respondent Jerome Japson. Espina. specifically. Rañigo. alleging that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application. including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charters. Page 455 Echiverri. MACARIO CATIPON. No. Civil Service Commission. has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches. Corpuz. Valiente. The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it. The Civil Service Commission (CSC). 43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. Valois . Reyes. he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1). Inguillo. Catindig. Dismissal from Service. Coronel. JEROME JAPSON G. subdivisions. 2003. De Mesa. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993 since he was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course. the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Martinez. DOCTRINE: Administrative Agencies. Gloria. 2015. Lumberio. has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches. Sy.

” In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. Martinez. Palad. Asensi. Marquez. Ramirez. Castillo. including government-owned or . De la Cruz. Corporal. Albano. Lumberio. De Mesa. Simply put. Lastimosa. Gloria. it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. Valois . Corpuz. Tabugan. Tecson. Sandoval. Rañigo. Rodriguez. instrumentalities and agencies. Santos. Espina. Inguillo. Page 456 Echiverri. Coronel. Alcazaren. Catindig. Sy. Reyes. Valiente. Francisco.controlled corporations with original charters. Cabañgon.

FACTS: Petitioner Ruby Ruth S. Marquez. respondents — instead of registering the supposed sale in their favor — executed an Affidavit of Non-Loss. Serrano Mahilum is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TransferCertificate of Title No.R. 855336 (TCT 85533) of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City. Lastimosa. Tabugan. with TCT 85533 serving as collateral. Martinez. she entrusted the original owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 85533 to Teresa Perez (Perez) — a purported real estate broker — who claimed that she can assist petitioner in obtaining a loan. in June 2004. 1875. Ramirez. who claimed that the property covered by the title was sold to them. In September 2003. Sandoval. Espina. Tecson. Sy. after much prodding. LP-07-0109 with the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City. Gloria.00 with right to repurchase thesame within a period of 90 days. RUBY RUTH S. Lumberio. De Mesa. SERRANO MAHILUM vs. DOCTRINE: Civil Law. as respondents have not registered the unnotarized and undated Deed of Absolute Sale. spouses Edilberto and Lourdes Ilano. title remained in petitioner’s name. Catindig. 2007. Castillo. Albano. In this connection. on which documents petitioner’s purported signatures were affixed. Thus. Coronel. petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss andcaused the same to be annotated upon the original registry copy of TCT 85533 as Entry No. instead. where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. 2006 as Entry No.27. Francisco. Page 457 Echiverri. After several months. Rañigo. petitioner received a letter from the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City informing her that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 85533 was not lost. Petitioner told respondents that she did not execute these documents. Corporal. but that it was presented to the registry by respondents. 1668-247 on October 7. Inguillo. They claimed that the property was sold to them by Perez and “a companion. In June 2006. petitioner and her husband Richard instituted against respondents and Perez Civil Case No. Asensi. June 22. SPOUSES EDILBERTO ILANO and LOURDES ILANO G. Reyes. She demanded the return of TCT 85533.8 Petitioner confronted respondents. petitioner demanded the return of the title. Perez admitted that the title was lost. Since a new title was never issued in respondents’ favor and. These documents indicate that petitioner sold the property covered by TCT 85533 to respondents for P250. Valiente. No. Corpuz. 2015. the former never came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens system. 197923. Rodriguez.000. 2003 and an unnotarized and undated Deed of Absolute Sale. De la Cruz. where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. Palad. Torrens System. Santos.” All this time.On June 20. but Perez failed to produce the same. Land Registration. but respondents refused to surrender the title to her. who showed her a notarized Agreement with right of repurchase dated December 4. Alcazaren. title to the property remained in petitioner’s name. 2004. and that her purported signatures therein were in fact falsified and forged. which was entered on TCT 85533 on June 28. Cabañgon. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is within the coverage and protection of the torrens system. Valois .

Gloria. Sandoval. Since respondents never acquired a new certificate of title in their name. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Palad. Asensi. title remained in petitioner’s name. Cabañgon. and not one to annul title since the certificate of title is still in her name. Valiente. Tecson. Lumberio. where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. HELD: No. Catindig. Page 458 Echiverri. they cannot apply to petitioner’s case where title remains in her name. Santos. De la Cruz. 563 SCRA 309 (2008) — involved complaints for annulment of new titles issued to the buyers. Valois . Inguillo. Corpuz. Espina. The jurisprudential bases for the CA’s pronouncement that there is a failure to state a cause of action ifthere is no allegation in the complaint that respondents were purchasers in bad faith — Castillo v. instead. Coronel. Tabugan. Reyes. Since a new title was never issued in respondents’ favor and. 198 SCRA 556 (1991). and Heirs of Julian Tiro v. Rodriguez. Corporal. Castillo. De Mesa. petitioner’s case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed of Absolute Sale. the former never came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens system. Albano. Marquez. the issue of their good or bad faith which is central in an annulment of title case is of no consequence. Philippine Estates Corporation. Martinez. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal. Sy. Francisco. Lastimosa. Ramirez.

former clerk. Inguillo.10. Sorsogon. He was directed through a Resolution(1) x x x and (2) to comply by submitting the said documents. Guan explained that while he was able to secure from the MTO a list of cash bond deposits made by him. 2007 requesting that the monetary value of his leave credits be applied as payment for his accountability amounting to P53. Bulan. Rañigo. JOEBERT C. The OCA concluded that Guan was remiss in the performance of his duties and is administratively liable ISSUES: Whether Guan should be held accountable for simple neglect of duty HELD: As found by the audit team. July 15. Castillo. Corporal. Lumberio. the Fiscal Monitoring Division (FMD) of the OCA did not accept the same for being incomplete. Corpuz. Guan’s accountabilities were either due to unreported or undeposited collections or to deposited collection but with lacking documentation. Espina. as well as his Judiciary and General Fund reports. 0612411MTC) DOCTRINE: Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance “constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively liable. Francisco. former Clerk of Court. Sorsogon covering the period July 28. Tecson. Cabañgon.323. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. Sy. Sandoval. No. Coronel.* (formerly A. then followed. Reyes. specifically the deficient supporting documents on cashbonds withdrawal transactions. 2004 disclosed thatthere areincurred shortages in the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund. the Court disagrees with the OCA’s finding that Guan’s transgressions constitute simple neglect of duty only. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Bulan.M. 2015. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Santos. A. Alcazaren. Valois . GUAN. Marquez. He explained that he could no longer account for the shortages because some of the records pertaining thereto. A complaint against Guan. Asensi. P072293. No. could no longer be found.” FACTS: A financial audit of the books of accounts of MTC. 1993 to August 31. Municipal Trial Court. Guan wrote the Court a letter dated March 12. Martinez. De Mesa. The Court deferred action on Guan’s request. Valiente. Ramirez. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and Albano.M. The audit team noted that Guan’s FF accountability was not due to undeposited collections but to lacking documentations. Page 459 Echiverri. Gloria.This only demonstrates Guan’s disorganized way of managing and documenting his collections However. Palad. Catindig.

Lastimosa. Valiente. Asensi. Sandoval. Sy.. Espina. from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances. Ramirez. Palad. Page 460 Echiverri. Francisco. Inguillo. De Mesa. Albano. makes respondent’s neglect of duty so serious in its character as to threaten the public welfare. Tecson. becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. the frequency of the instances alone. for two separate periods of accountability. i. Rañigo. Marquez. Cabañgon. Valois . Reyes. Santos. “[g]ross neglect is such neglect which. Rodriguez.e. Guan was both found to have incurred shortages with respect to the JDF and SAJF due to unreported and undeposited collections. Corporal. Martinez. As held. Lumberio. Gloria. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Catindig. Coronel. the delay in the actual remittance thereof constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively liable. Castillo. Alcazaren. Tabugan.”In this case.

Page 461 Echiverri. her counsel and witness were present but they did not commence trial because they honestly believed that the respondent’s pending motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s August 19. it cannot be concluded that she has failed to prosecute her case. Espina. August 5. and so the circumstances surrounding the case should be considered to the end that technicality shall not take precedence over substantial justice.R. and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. Corpuz. while respondent himself admitted during pretrial that his supposed predecessor in interest Avelina Casimero had no document or tax declaration to support her title to the subject property. Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint. Alcazaren. She points out that the trial court erred in not giving the parties the opportunity to present their arguments on their pending motions for reconsideration. Lumberio. ALICIA Y. that she still had one more opportunity to present her evidence on the scheduled hearing on November 23. and that the power to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute should be exercised with care. Sandoval. petitioner claims that she has a meritorious case since she purchased the property from a seller who has a valid tax declaration in his name. VARDELEON G. petitioner Laurel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent Vardeleon concerning an island in Aklan. Palad.FERDINAND M. he maintains that the CA is correct in affirming the dismissal. De Mesa. substituted by her sole heir and legal representative JUAN MIGUEL Y. Marquez. Reyes. In any case. 2005. 2005 PreTrial Order needed to be resolved first. LAURELvs. In addition. No. 2005 Order denying his motion to correct/amend the July 6. and instead denied them outright on October 12. 2005 scheduled hearing. it was already agreed upon during pretrial and allowed by the trial court in its pretrial order. Asensi. as it may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief. Valois . Petitioner essentially maintains in her Petition and Reply that during the October 12. Martinez. the RTC — instead of dismissing the case — should have allowed her to present evidence on said date. Rodriguez. Francisco. Catindig. Inguillo. LAUREL. thus the necessity of resolving it first. 2015. Lastimosa. He labels petitioner’s insistence for the RTC to resolve first the pending Albano. Tecson. Valiente. Cabañgon. Santos. Petitioner insists that said motion for reconsideration had a direct bearing on the course of the trial. and that petitioner was guilty of laches in filing her claim. Sy. De la Cruz.Since she had one more scheduled hearing available to her. claiming that he bought the island from Avelina Casimero. Tabugan. FACTS: On July 23. 202967. 2005. Coronel. Gloria. Rañigo. DOCTRINE: The general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action. Castillo. Ramirez. In Respondent’s Comment. Corporal. 2004. Petitioner posits that agreements reached at the pretrial conference and embodied in the pretrial order control the course of trial and should not be disturbed unless there would be manifest injustice. Thus.

Castillo. 2005. He was expected. Francisco. to wait until the termination of these three scheduled hearings. Sy. 2005. Ramirez. the delay or failure to prosecute contemplated under Section 3. and that if petitioner was keen on pursuing her case.” In petitioner’s case. then the substitute counsel (Atty. Villa) should nonetheless have been prepared on October 12. Lumberio. 2005. Reyes. ISSUES: (1) Whether there is a failure to prosecute on the part of the plaintiff (2) Whether there was unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving the pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct HELD: (1) No. and for her to be allowed to commence the presentation of evidence on November 23. Inguillo. (2) Yes. the continuance she sought was not for an unreasonable length of time. Martinez. Corpuz. Catindig. Page 462 Echiverri. Within such period. it was only until the next scheduled setting on November 23. Tabugan. He argues that these claims even constitute glaring proof of petitioner’s lack of interest in prosecuting her case. Gloria. Finally. Besides. which was just over one month away. as he agreed. So long as the parties act within schedule. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Coronel. This may not be characterized as delay. He avers that petitioner has exhibited a complacent attitude toward her case in violation of his right to speedy trial/dis position of his case. De la Cruz. Santos. Valois . The trial court should be reminded that “the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. respondent could not have been prejudiced by the postponement being sought. Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules must be for an “unreasonable length of time. Espina. Rañigo.” Albano. as specious and flimsy. as such scheduled hearing was expected by respondent and could not have come as a surprise to him. the trial court was remiss in its duty to act on the two pending motions before it. unless petitioner terminates it earlier. Tecson. Lastimosa. Sandoval. It was within the period expected by and made known to the defendant and the trial court during pretrial. In fact. Rodriguez. Asensi. then none of them should complain. 2005 scheduled hearing. Marquez. De Mesa. For its part. and instead simply summarily denied them in open court during the October 12. he can do nothing but await his turn to present evidence. he contends that petitioner has been accorded due process and given ample opportunity to present her case. Palad. It appears that it did not even grant the parties the opportunity to comment respectively on these motions. motions for reconsideration before trial could commence. Moreover. Corporal. Valiente.

it agreed with the Investigating Justice that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct OCA recommended the penalty of P20. 05464. Tecson.2 Respondent allegedly made it appear that said pleading was timely filed on November 4. Sy. he may commit a mistake. except accrued leave benefits. it opined that respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having received a pleading beyond office hours and without authority to do so. Lumberio. Reyes.M. Asensi. respondent denied the accusations. Cebu station. Valiente. No. Santos. She averred that the issue of tampering had already been clarified and that it did not prejudice the rights and interest of any of the parties in C. the anonymous letter does not deserve the attention of this Court and that the same has caused undue stress and pain to her father-in-law.G.P. There must be substantial evidence to support a finding that respondent is responsible for the reprehensible act imputed against her. of tampering the date of receipt of the Petition for Review filed in C.P. We should also consider the man’s sincerity in his repentance. his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life. DOCTRINE: Man is not perfect. Alcazaren. Albano. Castillo. In OCA’s Memorandum dated February 17. Francisco. Records Officer II Elizabeth Gilos (Gilos). Anent the unauthorized withdrawal.R. 2010 to favour her husband’s kumpadre who filed it. Court of Appeals. Gloria. But we should not look only at his sin. Espina. ISSUES: Whether the respondent should be liable for: (1) tampering the date of actual receipt of the Petition (2) taking the ATM card of her officemate and making unauthorized withdrawal. Administrative liability cannot rest on mere suspicion or speculation. Abarintos. Marquez. Coronel. Cabañgon. Corporal. August 17.R. Sandoval. In her Comment. Ramirez.000. At one time or another. Page 463 Echiverri. Tabugan. S.Associate Justice Pampio A. Rañigo. Palad. According to respondent. Records Officer IV. and withdrawing therefrom P10. former Records Officer IV at the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals. and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. De la Cruz. ANA MARIE ABARINTOS.G.A. respondent was likewise accused of taking the ATM card of her officemate. 2015. S. In the same letter. Catindig. Inguillo. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATORvs. respondent explained that the same is a personal issue between two friends arising from a simple misunderstanding. Valois . 2015. No. 05464. Martinez. FACTS: This administrative complaint stemmed from an anonymous letter1 dated February 9. HELD: (1) No. CA1226P.00 without the latter’s knowledge and consent. Cebu City A.000.A. 2011 addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona charging respondent Anna Marie Abarintos. De Mesa.00 fine with forfeiture of retirement benefits. Lastimosa. With regard to the alleged unauthorized withdrawal. Rodriguez. Corpuz. No.

Catindig. There is simply no such presumption that exists inthe Rules on Evidence or in statute books. Coronel. Francisco. Espina. ultimately.there is no proof that respondent. Rañigo. Palad. Furthermore. Ramirez. De Mesa. she should not be administratively held liable for doing so. lack of integrity. Sandoval. even if they arrive a few minutes after the prescribed working hours. Martinez. probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings Out of compassion and mercy. Lumberio. it is basic that court officials and personnel are presumed to have regularly performed their official duties. Tecson. Lastimosa. Asensi. Page 464 Echiverri. Rodriguez.”20 They are not intended to deny public service to the same people who come to court to transact business.”22 Dishonesty. Marquez. The Court adoptsthe recommendation of the OCA that the acts of respondent in taking the ATM card of her officemate and making an unauthorized withdrawal therefrom do not only constitute grave misconduct. The Court deem it just and proper to reduce the recommended fine to P5. lack of honesty. Valois . Tabugan.The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption. It implies untrustworthiness. Corporal. Santos. At this point. but amount to dishonesty as well. is prohibited from receiving pleadings. when there are still court personnel present who could serve them. willful intent to violate the law. we cannot subscribe to the recommendation of the OCA that respondent’s receipt of subject pleading several minutes after office hours raises a presumption that she used her office to extend a favour to a litigant. Corpuz. it may not be amiss to state that the circulars issued by this Court pertaining to the observance of prescribed working hours19 are intended to promote punctuality and prevent tardiness or absenteeism “if only to recompense the government and. which must be established by substantial evidence. (2) Yes. Inguillo. cheat. or to disregard established rules. Albano. “has been defined as a disposition to lie. On the other hand. Sy. Cabañgon. the people. As regards respondent’s alleged lack of authority.00. who is the head of the Judicial Records Division. Castillo. Valiente. Reyes.000. De la Cruz. on the other hand.Since it has not been established that respondent is forbidden to receive pleadings. Gloria. deceive or defraud. who shoulder the cost of maintaining the Judiciary. Alcazaren.

Disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground.R. 9225 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso. Valois . On November 30. the May 10. De la Cruz. Marquez. Unfazed. Hence. Gloria. 2015 DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. On May 10. Rañigo. Subsequently. Arnado’s proclamation is void and without any legal effect. Thus. anzano. Reyes. among others. Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. 2013. Lumberio. Asensi. On April 3. Ramirez. Castillo. Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado’s continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3. Francisco. Lanao del Norte for the May 10. Page 465 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Coronel. a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local position. he was disqualified. No. Santos. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10. an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. ARNADO vs. Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by Albano. Lastimosa. Arnado’s lone rival for the mayoralty post. USA. HELD: Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code. 2009. Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. While Balua’s petition remained pending. On May 14. there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Alcazaren. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 2008 and.”Subsequent. 210164. Espina. Inguillo. that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling. filed a Petition seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. ISSUE: Whether Arnaldo satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225. 2013. August 18. Valiente. on even date. Catindig. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE CAPITAN G. 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. In Mercado v. Corporal. Sandoval. Capitan. Corpuz. 2009. Sy. and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines. He argued that with the April 16. Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Tabugan. ROMMEL C. Martinez. Tecson. De Mesa. 2010 national and local elections. Capitan filed another Petitionthis time seeking to nullify Arnado’s proclamation. Palad. 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Cabañgon. FACTS: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA).it was clarified that the phrase “dual citizenship” in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.

Francisco. Valois . Page 466 Echiverri. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities– Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: xxxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and. as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc. Cabañgon. 2013. Asensi. affirming his April 3. Lumberio. Palad. Catindig. Gloria. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9. (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Coronel. Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. Corpuz. Consequently. Corporal. Rañigo. make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Castillo. ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because. as held in Maquiling v. Lastimosa. Valiente. 2013 elections. the Comelec Second Division. at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Reyes. De Mesa. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws. Ramirez. the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed. and. De la Cruz. 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. 2012 for purposes of the May 13. his April 3. Inguillo. Thus: Section 5. Commission on Elections. In the case at bench. Marquez. reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. Martinez. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Tecson. Albano. Rodriguez. Espina. at the time he filed his CoC on October 1. Santos. Sandoval. 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Sy.

Francisco. THE PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) vs. Lastimosa. CEB-33982. it was denied. Rañigo. Tecson. thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. Petition for Certiorari was filed by the respondent. FACTS: Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation in charge of port administration and operation in the country. Sy. Palad. there ceases to be any justiciable controversy. Valiente. represented by HECTOR E. Corpuz. Thus. which has been rendered moot and academic. there ceases to be any justiciable controversy. Tabugan.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. et al.R. Sandoval. the wellsettled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Martinez. De Mesa. and that the instant Petition has been rendered moot and academic by judgment on the merits ISSUES: whether x x x respondent can be compelled to perform an act which the law (RA 6758) HELD: Considering that judgment on the merits has been issued in Civil Case No. represented by Hector E. De la Cruz.. Coronel. thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. Page 467 Echiverri. Rodriguez. No. Asensi. MIOLE. is an aggrupation of PPA employees set up as a result of the instant case. 2015 DOCTRINE: Where the issues have become moot and academic. Where the issues have become moot and academic. seeks denial of the Petition and claims that the Petition should be denied as the CA correctly held that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Orders. Alcazaren. Espina. 203142. Cabañgon. Respondent in its Comment. Respondent sought mainly to compel petitioner to pay all its employees cost of living allowance (COLA) and amelioration allowance (AA). Reyes. in its Petition and Reply praying for reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and that the trial court be ordered to conduct a hearing on its affirmative defences said the trial court’s refusal to conduct a hearing on its affirmative defenses violates Rule 3. there is no need to resolve the instant Petition. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Miole. Castillo. Valois . Inguillo. Respondent Coalition of PPA Officers and Employees. Gloria. Thereafter filed an Amended Petition for Mandamus with Damages and was granted. Lumberio. Santos. pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. however. PPA. Corporal. Marquez. G. Catindig. Courts will decline jurisdiction over moot cases because there is no Albano. 6758. There is no need to scrutinize the actions of the trial court relative to its issuance of the assailed orders after it has rendered judgment in the case. Ramirez. COALITION OF PPA OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES. August 26.

Coronel. Rañigo. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Palad. Inguillo. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Sy. Castillo. Catindig. Corpuz. Marquez. Espina. Tabugan. Lumberio. Cabañgon. indeed. there are no exceptional circumstances to justify such action. Francisco. While in their respective pleadings the parties insist on a resolution of the case on its merits — respondent even went so far as to suggest that the instant case be ordered consolidated with G. Page 468 Echiverri. No. The Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for. Tecson. 209433 — the Court finds no cogent reason to do so. Alcazaren. substantial relief to which petitioner will be entitled and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Reyes.R. Martinez. De Mesa. no constitutional question or paramount public interest is involved. Valiente. Santos. Valois . Corporal. The case involves a simple controversy regarding the application of a clearcut law that has become the subject of a number of precedents. Albano. Asensi. Rodriguez. Gloria.

settled in the U. a citizen of both the Philippines and the United States of America (U.A. No.S. On August 31. petitioner. Rodriguez. he/she is the representation and the representative of the Filipino people. Aquino III. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. and pardons.Her biological parents were unknown. Santos. the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued an Order granting her petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under the said law. or U. 9225(RA 9225). 2010. after conviction by final judgment. 2001. on December 9. FACTS: On September 3.On October 20. Alcazaren. Lucia. Iloilo City. Marquez. Francisco. Ramirez. Cabañgon. and started a family there. Lastimosa.S.He/she is also the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and can "grant reprieves. On July 12.. petitioner secured a Philippine passport valid until October 12. Valois . Corporal. A person who aspires to occupy the highest position in the land must obey the highest law of the land. Corpuz. petitioner graduated from Boston College in Massachusetts. Coronel. petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation). Vice-Consul.S. Castillo. Page 469 Echiverri. On October 18. 2011. For the rest of the world. Sy. 1991. De Mesa. as well as amnesty. 2011. 2010. Five years later. ELAMPARO G. San Juan. petitioner was appointed as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. 221697 DOCTRINE: The right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who would impose through force or stealth their will on the majority of citizens. at the Santuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan. Tabugan. who was then still an infant. On July 18. Inguillo. Sandoval. Thus.On October 6. with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies. Asensi. Reyes. petitioner took her Oath of Allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. De la Cruz. petitioner registered as a voter in Barangay Sta. Espina. petitioner executed a document entitled Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States before the U. 2006.S. 1968. petitioner took her Oath of Office as M1RCB Chairperson before President Benigno S. petitioner was adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. Lumberio. 2010. Martinez. Catindig. the latter issued her a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United Albano. was found abandoned in Jaro. Valiente. October 21. Llamanzares. On July 29. The following day. On July 7. the couple left the Philippines. 1991. subject to the concurrence of Congress. and remit fines and forfeitures. commutations.R. Tecson. bureaus and offices. In 1991. The President wields a vast array of powers which includes "control of all the executive departn1ents. Rañigo. After more than three years. 2006. MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. petitioner became a naturalized U. 2006. Gloria. citizen. On July 27.) from birth. Palad. 2014.

an indication of the intention of the framers of our Constitution to make it mandatory. it could be deduced that by her own reckoning. among others.held that the term residence is synonymous with domicile. Inguillo. eventually intends to return and remain"(animus manendi). this Court.' or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated. Section 2 was couched in a negative form . Reyes. 2016. Gloria. Lastimosa. In contrast. as early as 1928. that a person aspiring to become a President must be a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election. De Mesa.Domicile denotes the place "'where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home. as reproduced above. Santos. Rañigo. Catindig. no matter where he may be found at any given time.' where he. 2016 elections is "10 years and 11 months. or 'ought not. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Sy. Marquez. Corporal. petitioner secured and accomplished a CoC for Senator on September 27. 2016. Lumberio. "A statute or provision which contains words of positive prohibition. Section 2 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Palad. Page 470 Echiverri. Rodriguez.In a bid for a Senate seat." Clearly. petitioner attested in her 2015 CoC that her period of residency in the Philippines on the day before the May 9. is mandatory. Ramirez. Francisco. This rendered her vulnerable to the charge that she committed material misrepresentations in her 2015 CoC. This requirement is mandatory and must be complied with strictly. Alcazaren. Thus by May 8. Section 63 of Article IX of the OEC imposes the same 10-year residency requirement. Valiente. For purposes of election laws. or short of the mandatory 10-year residency requirement for the presidential post. such as 'shall not. 2012 (2012 CoC). Martinez. Castillo." Moreover. Espina. States. De la Cruz. Tecson. petitioner started residing in the Philippines in November 2006. these are contrasting declarations which give the impression that petitioner adjusted the period of her residency in her 2015 CoC to show that she is eligible to run for the Presidency.' 'cannot. her period of residency in the Philippines would only be nine years and six months. ISSUE: The respective petitions filed by respondents with the Comelec were properly characterized as petitions for cancellation and/or denial of due course to petitioner's 2015 CoC HELD: The controversy with respect to petitioner's residency qualification arose when it was observed that she made the following entry in Item 11 of her 2012 CoC for Senator: Based on the said entry. Albano. Tabugan. Coronel. For one. Asensi. requires. For another. or the day immediately preceding the elections on May 9. Valois . no less than our Constitution itself imposes it.

On July 7. 2003. Surigao del Norte Congressman. 2003. On May 19. 204267. Lumberio. 2003. Marquez. and communications relative thereto were forwarded to Marcelo for appropriate action.On August 25. Jr. Villa-Ignacio and Marcelo. to the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte on June 3. petitioner's motion for reconsideration and all other pleadings. Valiente. De la Cruz. Almeda. Corpuz. petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of Information before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte. which in turn referred the said motion to the Ombudsman. Marcelo. Valois . 2003 and filed via a commercial courier service her Motion for Reconsideration. who in turn indorsed and forwarded the same. with a prayer for reversal of the Ombudsman's ruling and to hold in abeyance the filing of an information against her until the motion is resolved. Reyes. Tecson. FACTS: In 2001. Sy. Cabañgon. then Schools Division Superintendent of the DepEd. Albano. Castillo. if otherwise. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case. to the effect that probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. Navarro. 2003 Resolution on May 29. ALMEDA vs. of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. its 'salutary objective' is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or. The criminal charges were consolidated and Resolution was issued in said case by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. Espina. Santos. Akin to the right to speedy trial. Inguillo. Asensi. De Mesa. Page 471 Echiverri. An advance copy of the motion was transmitted to the Ombudsman by fax on June 16. orders. and implemented through the DILG and the DepEd. Coronel. Sandoval. Petitioner received a copy of the Ombudsman's March 19. dela Cruz-Likit. and it prepared the corresponding Information against petitioner. Surigao del Norte. This Resolution was disapproved in part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Palad. and several other public officers and employees were charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman. for appropriate filing in court. On July 18. together with the Ombudsman's Resolution. 2003. Gloria. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. Catindig. Ramirez. July 25. Martinez.. 2003. dela Cruz-Likit issued an Order giving due course to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and a similar motion filed by one of her co-respondents. LUZ S. Through a June 16. the Information was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. in connection with the alleged improper use and disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to petitioner's co-respondent Constantino H. 2004 Indorsement of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. Navarro filed his Commentto petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. No.R. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. 2003. petitioner Luz S. Rañigo. 2016 DOCTRINE:The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. petitioner filed before the Ombudsman her Supplemental motion for reconsideration. Tabugan. which was approved by then Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Rodriguez. Francisco. Corporal.

it is "not limited to the accused in criminal Albano. Sandoval. petitioner received copies of Indorsements dated September 28. and considering that the OSP has taken over the case. However. HELD: Yes. quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. referring and forwarding to the OSP petitioner's September 1. Reyes.On September2011. Asensi. On November2011. Valois . 2012. is a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case. Corpuz. that despite her repeated manifestations and follow-ups. was then on official study leave and no GIPO was as yet assigned to the case. or from July 2003 to September 2012. Tecson. pursuant to Office Order No. Section 16. Tabugan. Catindig. Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11. Inguillo. Martinez. 2011 and signed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Humphrey T. Meanwhile. Rañigo. Valiente. The petitioner before the Supreme Court alleged that the Ombudsman's failure to promptly act on her case for nine years from the filing of her motion for reconsideration. 2004 Order issued by Marcelo ordering the OSP to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. In 2010. Ramirez. Alcazaren."This time petitioner bewailed the inaction and procedure taken by the Ombudsman and OSP in not taking cognizance of the complaint and instead indorsing and repeatedly tossing the case back and forth to each other. Lumberio. and noting and informing that the entire record of the case has been forwarded previously to the OSP. or decisions emanating from sectoral offices. entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to Speedy Trial with Prayer for Dismissal of the Case. petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman. 2011 Manifestation and other pleadings and documents filed in OMB-MIN-01-0183. petitioner sent a letter to the Ombudsman. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Sy. quasi-judicial. she filed a second Manifestation with the Ombudsman with a prayer for dismissal of the complaint against her. the letter was not acted upon. instead of the OSP. On September 6. In another Indorsement dated October 11. as the handling dela Cruz-Likit. then Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Antonio E. Francisco. De Mesa. 2004 Order which ultimately closed and terminated the complaint as far as the Ombudsman for Mindanao is concerned. petitioner filed before the Ombudsman a Manifestation. On August 2012. the Ombudsman through dela Cruz-Likit issued the assailed Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Castillo. De la Cruz." which pertains to cases where the Ombudsman disapproves orders. 2011 and December 9. Coronel. no action was taken on her case. Santos. seeking the early resolution of her motions. 2004. Marquez.seeking resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration. resolutions. Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. or administrative bodies. Corporal. ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and prompt disposition of cases when it failed to resolve the motion for reconsideration and motion to hold in abeyance the filing of information for a period of nine (9) years from the date of its filing. Gloria. Palad." This right applies to all cases pending before all judicial. Lastimosa. 31 entitled "Review and Consideration of Motions for Reconsideration Filed in Relation to Orders and Resolutions Issued by the Tanodbayan. Espina. Page 472 Echiverri. pursuant to an August 4. Monteroso.

Lumberio. "The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. In this accord. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire. as well as all proceedings. De Mesa. and prejudice to the defendant resultingfrom the delay. Corpuz. proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases. Asensi. Sandoval. the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right. There is also prejudice if the defense Albano. Reyes. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. during and after trial. Of these. Lastimosa. any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. Ramirez. Espina. either judicial or quasi-judicial. it may be said that "[i]t is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor. Palad. and oppressive delays. the most serious is the last. Rañigo. and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter." Regarding delays. The right to a speedy disposition of a case. or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured. Francisco. Tabugan. Valiente. Tecson. to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial. De la Cruz. capricious."It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint. Alcazaren. or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Sy. is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Rodriguez. Santos. Gloria. Cabañgon. namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration. Coronel." A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial." For this reason. it is the State's duty to expedite the same "within the bounds of reasonable timeliness. respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings are not required to follow up on their cases. especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. Indeed. because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." such as preliminary investigations and fact-finding investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. as mandated by the Constitution. and such factors as length of the delay. Castillo. Inguillo. Page 473 Echiverri. delay prejudices the accused or respondent -and the State just the same. Corporal. regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him."Failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended. Martinez."It "includes within its contemplation the periods before. yet unjustified delay nonetheless causes just as much vexation and oppression."41 These principles should apply to respondents in other administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as well. "[a] balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. It must also be remembered that generally. Valois . Marquez. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect. Catindig. in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. like the right to speedy trial. are considered. reason for the delay. be it civil or administrative in nature.

Valois . His financial resources may be drained. Tabugan. Inguillo. suspicion and often. Albano. which warrants the dismissal of the criminal case. Valiente. Catindig. Alcazaren. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. Espina. Lumberio. Corpuz. Francisco. he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety." Finally. Marquez. De Mesa. Coronel. Cabañgon. Gloria. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. Lastimosa. Ramirez. his association is curtailed. and he is subjected to public obloquy. Sandoval. Rañigo. hostility. Delay is a two-edge sword. Reyes. Sy. Corporal. De la Cruz. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. Santos. Palad. Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Rodriguez. the Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases. Page 474 Echiverri. witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Castillo. Tecson. Asensi. Martinez.

that the owner's copy of TCT No.. et al. however. On December 1. Atty. Jr. except for an attachment issued in connection with Civil Case No. 3399 entitled "Tantrade Corporation vs. 195975. Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land. Castillo. The writ of attachment on the certificate of title to the subject property was. and in having title to the subject property transferred to its name. Atty. Valiente. along with the Deed of Sale that was executed by the Tecson spouses. Tecson and Asuncion Tecson (Tecson spouses). Asensi. According to Cattleya. Jr. 1993. which Cattleya wanted to purchase. Inc. Tecson. Inc. the Tecson spouses could not deliver TCT No. De la Serna refused to annotate both deeds because of the writ of attachment that was annotated on the certificate of title of the subject property. TECSON AND ASUNCION ORTALIZ-TECSON G. Inguillo. including the subject property. Lastimosa. Cabilao. Troadio B. Jr. which was in possession of the Tecson spouses. Catindig. Bohol. Coronel. The Contract of Conditional Sale was entered in the Primary Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol that same daythe parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property. 17655 to it. 17655. Pizarras again requested Atty. 3399 reached an amicable settlement or compromise agreement. TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE vs. Corporal. Francisco. however. Corpuz. Cabilao. Espina. because Atty. 1992. Federico C. Rodriguez. Palad.. AND SPOUSES TROADIO B. an 8. De la Cruz. is registered in the name of the Tecson spouses. Alcazaren. CATTLEYA LAND. 3399. lifted. Marquez. in connection with the said Civil Case No. Bohol. Even then. Jr. Martinez. void. 17655 had in fact been presented by Taina Manigque-Stone at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol. neither the Contract of Conditional Sale nor the Deed of Absolute Sale could be annotated on the certificate of title covering the subject property because the then Register of Deeds of Bohol. because according to the Tecson spouses this certificate of title had been destroyed in a fire which broke out in Sierra Bullones. after the parties in Civil Case No. Tabugan. This Deed of Absolute Sale was also entered in the Primary Book on October 4. September 05." On November 6. to Tagbilaran City to investigate at the Office of the Register of Deeds in that city the status of the properties of spouses Col. came to know. Atty. Panglao. sent its legal counsel. Sandoval. Lumberio. Pizarras. INC. because it could not surrender the owner's copy of TCT No. found that no encumbrances or liens on the subject property had been annotated on the TCT thereof. violates the Constitution and is thus. Cattleya Land. One of these properties. Salvador S. No. however. 1993. Rañigo. In this transaction the Tecson spouses were represented by Atty. Page 475 Echiverri. in favor of Taina Albano. De la Serna to annotate the Deed of Absolute Sale but he refused anew – this time saying that he would accede to the request only if he was presented with a court order to that effect. Cabilao. 2016 DOCTRINE: The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner. Santos. Cattleya did not still succeed in having the aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale registered. Atty. even if titled in the name of his Filipino spouse. Narciso S.R. FACTS: In July 1992. De Mesa. Valois . Gloria. Cabilao. Bohol Resort Hotel.805-square meter parcel of land located at Doljo. Sy. This claim by the Tecson spouses turned out to be false. Ramirez. Cabañgon. and Atty. Reyes. However.

Reyes. the delivery of the owner's copy of TCT 17655 to TAINA is dubious.000.805. Additionally. Anent the issue on validity of the sale to Taina Manigque-Stone. Troadio Tecson.000.00. and on that occasion presented the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655. in October 1986. Mike and Taina made an initial downpayment of US$1.750. visited Bohol sometime in December 1985. Ramirez. however.000. the fundamental law is perspicuous in its prohibition against aliens from holding title or acquiring private lands. Francisco. Lumberio. Taina and Mike got married. Martinez. Subsequent payments were made by Mike totaling P40.00. 17655. 17655. and the latter agreed to sell them a portion of the beach lot for US$8. They met with Col. Castillo. Sy. delivered to Taina the owner's copy of TCT No. plus legal interest. in the name of the Tecson spouses. The appellant herself had admitted in court that the buyer was Mike Stone and at the time of the negotiation she was not yet legally married to Mike Stone. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision and ratiocinatedthe notarization of the deed of sale of Tania’s defective. Taina filed a Notice of Adverse Claim covering the subject portion.00. The RTC of Bohol gave judgment for Cattleya and held that the sale entered by the Tecson spouses with Cattleya and with Taina involving one and the same property was a double sale.00. 21771. Valois . Santos. Rañigo. a new certificate of title. Gloria. Tabugan. decided to buy a portion of the beach lot in Doljo. Sandoval. Michael (Mike) Stone. although another payment of P5.Taina likewise filed a motion for leave to admit a third-party complaint against the Tecson spouses. in lieu of TCT No. De Mesa. but did not ask for a receipt for this initial downpayment. 1987. Tecson and his lawyer had filed a petition for the issuance of a second owner's copy over TCT No. Inguillo. Marquez. In the meantime. Panglao. On June 1. In 1990.00 was made sometime in August 1987. Page 476 Echiverri. was issued in the name of Taina. Corporal. The last payment in the amount of P32. Catindig. Cabañgon. On April.000. Asensi. as of August 29. after she learned that Col. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Thereafter. TCT No. Lastimosa. The result was that on February 10. Taina sought to have her Deed of Absolute Sale registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol. Corpuz.It appears that when Taina's then common-law husband. this motion was granted by the RTC.00 at that time) for a portion of a beach lot. Article 1477 of the Civil Code provides that the ownership of the thing sold is transferred upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. Palad. Rodriguez. 17655. and that Cattleya had a superior right to the lot covered thereby. Even if the Deed of Absolute Sale is in the name of Taina Manigque-Stone that does not change the fact that the real buyer was Mike Stone. Tecson and Taina's brother-in-law. a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject portion was executed by Col. 1994.. was made in September 1987. They cannot do indirectly what is prohibited directly by the law. Taina also caused a Memorandum of Encumbrance to be annotated on this certificate of title. Tecson. Bohol. because Cattleya was the first to register the sale in its favor in good faith. Valiente. 1986. except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen. the son of Col. Tecson. As regards Taina's third-party complaint against the Tecson spouses. a foreigner. Jr. Albano.000. Espina. Tecson in Taina's favor. covering the subject property. Coronel. 1995. A scrutiny of the records would show that the trial court aptly held that the petitioner was only a dummy for Mike Stone who is a foreigner.00 (or equivalent P35. the RTC ordered the return or restitution to her of the sum of P77.

De la Cruz.In the first place. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: Save in cases of hereditary succession. it has been held that "[a]liens. she was a mere dummy. Gloria. Catindig. Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the subject lot. whether individuals or corporations. Francisco. thus — A scrutiny of the records would show that the trial court aptly held that the petitioner was only a dummy for Mike Stone who is a foreigner. Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate. Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. In this case. for her erstwhile common-law husband. who was not a Filipino then. Asensi." In the case at bench. Corpuz. 1544 of the Civil Code. it was simply because she and Mike wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines. Art. De Mesa. Indeed. Petitioner's arguments. Cabañgon. Reyes. Tecson. Page 477 Echiverri. Espina. which falls within the constitutional ban on sales of land to foreigners. corporations. Santos. Valiente. More than that. and never attempted to become a naturalized Filipino citizen thereafter. the previous sale having been found to Albano. Ramirez. no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. Valois . must fail. which rest on the assumption that there was a double sale. Lumberio. there is only one sale to advert to. ISSUE: Whether the CA is legally correct in considering that the verbal contract of sale between spouses Tecson and Mike transferred ownership to a foreigner. this Court ruled that the Civil Law provision on double sale is not applicable where there is only one valid sale. it bears stressing that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject property was placed under her name. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Sy. The CA put things in correct perspective. Tabugan. they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. Tibe. Palad. a foreigner. Even if the Deed of Absolute Sale is in the name of Taina Manigque-Stone that does not change the fact that the real buyer was Mike Stone. Hence. Marquez. They cannot do indirectly what is prohibited directly by the law. that between the spouses Tecson and respondent. In Remalante v. Section 7. there is no double sale to speak of. hence. The appellant herself had admitted in court that the buyer was Mike Stone and at the time of the negotiation she was not yet legally married to Mike Stone. a spurious stand-in. are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Martinez. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. HELD: Yes. Inguillo. applies only to a situation where the same property is validly sold to different vendees. Castillo. Corporal. which provides the rule on double sale. both the CA and the RTC exposed and laid bare Taina's posturing and pretense for what these really are: that in the transaction in question. Alcazaren. Coronel. Sandoval.

Sy. Martinez. Albano. Marquez. this Court must affirm. as it hereby affirms the CA's ruling that. Coronel. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found to be a forgery. "there is only one sale to reckon with. De la Cruz. Palad. De Mesa. as it bears the forged signature of Asuncion. Castillo. Asensi. Lumberio. the result of this being that the right of the other vendee should prevail. which merely involves a violation of the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. Valerio. the sale to Cattleya. In view of the fact that the sale in the case at bench is worse off (because it is constitutionally infirm) than the sale in the Fudot case. Santos. where the same parcel of land was purportedly sold to two different parties. Valiente. Likewise. Corpuz. Rañigo. Valois . Inguillo. that is. Alcazaren. Espina. Tabugan. The trial court declared that the sale between the spouses Tecson and petitioner is invalid. Lastimosa. in Espiritu and Apostol v. Cabañgon. Reyes. be fraudulent. Gloria. Art. Rodriguez. Francisco. Catindig. Page 478 Echiverri. the Court held that despite the fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other. Corporal. Sandoval. Ramirez. Tecson.

and cash. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure. Tecson. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. RTC rendered judgment declaring them as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Corporal. De la Cruz. Marquez. a driver. Inguillo. Santos. Palad. Coronel.00 in different denominations. a calculator. The High Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts. 200396 22 MARCH 2017 DOCTRINE: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. Lumberio. described by the Bicol term "revisar. Catindig. According to the police officers. the "papelitos. Espina. Sandoval. Consequently. Valiente. HELD: No. A team composed of PD Peñaflor. they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant." which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos.500. Albano. they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1. and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN vs. the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar. While there are instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant. Sy. and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report. papers. CA affirmed. Rodriguez." which are slips of paper containing bet numbers. Subsequently. Rañigo. MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON. Castillo. 2005. and a pen. a cellphone. Reyes. De Mesa. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. PO1 Ami." a calculator. Page 479 Echiverri. No. and counting money bets. a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Alcazaren. a cellular phone. Martinez. none applies in the case at bar. Gloria. Saraspi. Valois . When they entered the gate of the compound.R. Asensi. Cabañgon. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant regarding an on-going illegal numbers game at the residence of Bonaobra. houses. FACTS: Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as lotteng and possessing a list of various numbers. Corpuz. PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES G. On June 17. Francisco. Tabugan. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be upheld. Ramirez.

Ramirez. Cabañgon. is actually committing. Rañigo. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed. Santos. two elements must concur. Palad. or were actually committing. Valiente. and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Reyes. Asensi. Gloria. Martinez. Page 480 Echiverri. Espina. Inguillo. Coronel. Further the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2). the Court acquits petitioners. Lastimosa. Corporal. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a). or is attempting to commit a crime. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Sandoval. Tabugan. Castillo. or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. the same having been obtained in violation of the said right. Marquez. Rodriguez. Albano." The Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. Catindig. Francisco. Lumberio. the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners. Sy. Corpuz. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged. Valois . De la Cruz. Tecson. Rule 113.

Coronel. as it stands. it failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the truthfulness or correctness of its assertions. Valois . Asensi. LBP appealed the decision. Rodriguez. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Corpuz. 192345 29 MARCH 2017 DOCTRINE: Case law dictates that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete. Corporal. in determining just compensation.R. Lastimosa. SPOUSES ESTEBAN and CRESENCIA CHU G. Espina. Rañigo. actual use and income. Sy. In this case. such as in this case where the just compensation due to the landowner has yet to be settled. Page 481 Echiverri. Alcazaren. the cost of acquisition of the land. the tax declarations. Lumberio. the current value of like properties. Cabañgon. Santos. to determine just compensation. Albano. Marquez. Palad. Although the LBP maintained that it stringently applied the pertinent law and its relevant implementing rules in arriving at its computation. De la Cruz.Respondents rejected LBP's valuation. De Mesa. Dissatisfied. ISSUE: Whether or not LBP was able to substantiate its valuation of the property HELD: No. we hold that the LBP was not able to justify its valuation. its nature. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. Francisco. No. Catindig. Tabugan. Reyes. Tecson. the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. Sandoval. Under Section 17 of RA 6657. the sworn valuation by the owner. as amended. or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. Castillo. Therefore. CA modified the ruling. Martinez. such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657. Gloria. Valiente. Ramirez. Hence. the RTC and the CA were duty-bound to utilize the basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the passage of RA 9700. the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. summary administrative proceedings were conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to determine the just compensation. FACTS: Respondents were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Sorsogon which were acquired by the government pursuant to its agrarian reform program. LBP filed a petition for Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC. Inguillo. For the purposes of determining just compensation.

Catindig. Asensi. CIVIL LAW Albano. Ramirez. Francisco. Lumberio. Sandoval. Martinez. Coronel. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Santos. Rodriguez. Valois . Valiente. Palad. Marquez. Sy. Espina. Gloria. Corpuz. De Mesa. Page 482 Echiverri. Inguillo. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Corporal. Tecson. Castillo. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Reyes.

Castillo.00 more than the contract price). on the other hand. It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. Rañigo.R. respondent went to his house and told him to stop the work. Palad. Ultimately. Santos. Respondent likewise alleged that. In fact. However. Marquez. petitioner's workmanship on the incomplete residential house was substandard. and celebration of barangay fiesta.The contentions lack merit. 165679 | October 5. 2009 DOCTRINE: It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. Corpuz. We will not review. but petitioner obstinately refused to make good his contractual obligations. De la Cruz. Corporal. Gloria. ENGR. Ramirez. Petitioner. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Francisco. Sandoval. Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's finding that he was guilty of negligence.000. The complaint alleged among others that a Construction Contract was entered into for the demolition of the ancestral house and the construction of a new four-bedroom residential house for the purpose of the forthcoming wedding. the factual findings of the Court of Appeals especially Albano. Lastimosa. alleged that the delay in the construction of the house was due to circumstances beyond his control. ALICE GUCE-AFRICA G. Inguillo. alleging among others that the delay in the construction was due to circumstances beyond his control HELD: No Petitioner contends that he neither abandoned the project nor violated the contract. Several demands were made. Worse. the project was started without securing the necessary permit from the City Engineer’s Office. Valois . Martinez. Tabugan. APOLINARIO DUEÑAS VS. No. as well as collectibles from the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not Duenas can escape liability. However. Espina. she gave petitioner P550.000. Also. Cabañgon. Page 483 Echiverri. Tecson. and despite knowledge that the construction of the house was intended for the forthcoming marriage of respondent's sister. He maintains that continuous rains caused the delay in the construction of the house and that he was not able to finish the project because respondent ordered him to stop the work. Catindig. the house remained unfinished on the day of the wedding ceremony. Lumberio. Likewise. much less reverse. there was no reason for him to stop the project because he still had available workers and materials at that time. Reyes. all in all.00 (which is P50. he was not able to complete the project because on May 27. namely: heavy rains. observance of Holy Week. petitioner unjustly and fraudulently abandoned the project leaving it substantially unfinished and incomplete. FACTS: A complaint for breach of contract and damages was filed against petitioner before the RTC. Asensi. Rodriguez. Valiente. Coronel. the Appellate Court found no reason to depart from the trial court’s decision. Sy. 1998. The RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondent.

surmises or conjectures. Tecson. Asensi. Palad. Francisco. as in this case. Inguillo. Sy. Rañigo. Marquez. absurd or impossible. Gloria. Coronel. Castillo. and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Santos. Reyes. in making its findings. Ramirez. (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion. went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. Corpuz. would justify a different conclusion. (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which. Albano. Cabañgon. save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. if properly considered. where. Espina. Page 484 Echiverri. Valiente. such findings coincide with those of the trial court. (5) when the Court of Appeals. (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Valois . Corporal. Rodriguez. The established rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding on us. Sandoval. We are not wont to review them. Catindig. (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. since we are not a trier of facts. Lumberio. De Mesa. Martinez. (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts. De la Cruz.

the spouses Tan undertook to pay the mortgage debt within six months or until August 17. SPS.00. respondent Tan was left to pay the loan. that the interest rate imposed is unconscionable. Under the Kasulatan. De la Cruz. in principles of justice. Clemente. . 1994. Sandoval. FACTS: Respondent Angelina de Leon Tan. Coronel. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property. On September 26. and her husband Ruben Tan were the former registered owners of a 240-square meter residential lot. Sps. Reyes. Catindig. Castillo. Carpio. she failed to pay the same upon maturity. Rañigo. Palad. Corporal. De Mesa. Corpuz. The same was affirmed by the CA. Gloria.000. 1994.00 they obtained from the latter. Santos. Thereafter. SPS. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Asensi. However. Soliman. repulsive to the common sense of man. CONCEPCION T. she offered to pay petitioners the principal amount of P30. and Julius Amiel Tan filed a Complaint for Nullification of Mortgage and Foreclosure and/or Partial Rescission of Documents and Damages before the RTC. Page 485 Echiverri. Valois . 168940 | November 24. Cabañgon. CLEMENTE and ALEXANDER C. Lumberio. Ramirez. inter alia. SPS.000. Valiente. or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.000. Martinez. Espina. SPS. Sy.00 plus a portion of the interest but petitioners refused and instead demanded payment of the total accumulated sum of P359. ISAGANI CASTRO and DIOSDADA CASTRO versus ANGELINA DE LEON TAN. CARPIO and ALVIN CARPIO. ISSUE: Whether or not thejudgement nullifying the interest rate voluntarily agreed upon by the petitioners and respondents and expressly stipulated in the contract was proper HELD: Yes. situated at a barrio in Bulacan. Albano. Tecson. joined by respondents Sps. Rodriguez. Francisco. They alleged. 2009 DOCTRINE: The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt. even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed.R. MARIE ROSE T. compounded monthly. with an interest rate of 5% per month. No. SOLIMAN and ARVIN SOLIMAN and JULIUS AMIEL TAN G. ELIZABETH T. It has no support in law. Petitioners then caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and emerged as the only bidder in the auction sale that ensued.On February 17. Sps. The RTC declared the foreclosure null and void and interest lowered to 12% a year from 5% a month. 2000. they entered into an agreement with petitioners spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro denominated as Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay (Kasulatan) to secure a loan of P30. Marquez. 1994. Inguillo. respondent Tan. CLEMENTE. is immoral and unjust. Tabugan. When her husband died on September 2.

Catindig. they assert that the Court of Appeals should have given due respect to the provisions of the Kasulatan. In both cases. we have ruled that stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests are contrary to morals. There is certainly nothing in said circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Inguillo. it is also worth stressing that interest rates whenever unconscionable may still be declared illegal. In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals. the interest rates were reduced to 12% per annum. unconscionable and exorbitant. compounded monthly. Tabugan. safety and welfare. Ramirez. we annulled a stipulated 5. if not against the law. Lumberio. They also stress that it is a settled principle that the law will not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise. De Mesa. provided they are not contrary to law. Petitioners' contentions deserve scant consideration. One such legislative regulation is found in Article 1306 of the Civil Code which allows the contracting parties to "establish such stipulations. and the law. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health. The Court of Appeals did not unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the Contract of Mortgage entered into between the petitioners and the respondents. we similarly hold the 5% monthly interest to be excessive. good customs. Corporal. and in accord with the Medel and Ruiz cases. While we agree with petitioners that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate on any interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. Espina. Sy. for being excessive. stipulated in the Kasulatan is even higher than the 3% monthly interest rate imposed in the Ruiz case. we held that the freedom of contract is not absolute. Rañigo. Gloria. Cabañgon. Foster Wheeler Corporation. Marquez. foolish or disastrous contract. or 60% per annum. Valiente. Petitioners allege that the Kasulatan was entered into by the parties freely and voluntarily. In Abe v. Alcazaren. public order or public policy. compounded monthly. 1982 which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1. In several cases. Palad. is unconscionable and should be equitably reduced to the legal rate of 12% per annum. iniquitous. Lastimosa. They maintain that there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as regards the principal amount of the loan. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. Tecson. 905 s." Albano. morals. Rodriguez. entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing. Francisco. It is therefore void ab initio for being violative of Article 1306 of the Civil Code. With this. Thus. 1983. we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the legal interest of 12% per annum in place of the excessive interest stipulated in the Kasulatan.5% per month or 66% per annum interest on a P500. we declared a 3% monthly interest imposed on four separate loans to be excessive. Asensi. De la Cruz.00 loan and a 6% per month or 72% per annum interest on a P60.00 loan. Reyes. Corpuz. Court of Appeals. Page 486 Echiverri. Santos. contrary to morals. iniquitous. Martinez. which must be complied with in good faith. In Medel v. morals. Sandoval.000. respectively.000. Castillo. clauses. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the 5% monthly interest. Valois . the interest thereon and the property given as security for the payment of the loan. the 5% monthly interest rate. Hence. Coronel. In this case. unconscionable and exorbitant.

Page 487 Echiverri. Sandoval. Martinez. Asensi. Cabañgon. To reiterate. Coronel. Rodriguez. the legal interest of 12% per annum must be imposed in lieu of the excessive interest stipulated in the agreement. De Mesa. Sy. Tecson. Lumberio. Albano. Corporal. Espina. Palad. Valois . Reyes. Valiente. Alcazaren. Gloria. Inguillo. Catindig. Rañigo. Castillo. Accordingly. Francisco. we fully agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that the compounded interest rate of 5% per month. Being a void stipulation. De la Cruz. The debt is to be considered without the stipulation of the iniquitous and unconscionable interest rate. Santos. it is deemed inexistent from the beginning. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Marquez. Corpuz. Ramirez. is iniquitous and unconscionable.

Respondent filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners because of their encroachment into the disputed realty. Meanwhile. FACTS: Juan Mari. 17526. Rodriguez. Sandoval. filed a new tax declaration for a certain 50-square meter parcel of land. Santos. no matter how long continued. Tecson. He took possession of the same by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence. the father of respondent. After investigation. 147951 | December 14. The tax declarations show that he had a two storey house on the realty. respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration. Valois . Castillo. Tabugan. Page 488 Echiverri. 17553 and 14356. Corpuz. Reyes. Lumberio.R. Juan Mari. De Mesa. ISSUE: Whether or not prescription has set in. G. versus Pedro C. represented by Lilia C. 2009 DOCTRINE: Possession. Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court's findings. Marquez. Rañigo. and subsequently his successor. The RTC in its decision ruled in favor of the petitioners alleging that the complaint was filed beyond the prescriptive period and failed to prove his ownership pf any portion of the lots in dispute. had declared the disputed realty for tax purposes as early as 1916. Asensi. declared his ownership over a parcel of land in Nancasalan. Arsenio Olegario and HEIRS OF Aristoteles F. The CA found respondent to have adduced stronger evidence of prior possession and ownership of the disputed realty. He also planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos Albano. Espina. planting various fruit bearing trees and bamboos and constructing a house thereon. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not in the concept of an owner and such possessory acts. After discovering the amended entries in Arsenio Olegario's Tax Declaration. Francisco. Inguillo. Olegario. Mari. WenceslaoOlegario. inter alia. Alcazaren. Gloria. Corporal. No. Martinez. which encroached the land of Mari. was deprived by the Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty which respondent owned. Catindig. Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision became final and executory. Respondent alleged. therefore the disputed land belongs to the petitioners HELD: No As previously mentioned. Sy. respondent's predecessor. Palad. Mangatarem for tax purposes. must be possession under a claim of title or must be adverse. Ramirez. to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription. Lastimosa. that Juan Mari. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Coronel. Mari-Camba. do not start the running of the period of prescription. Valiente. the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario. said office decided in favor of the respondent and found the latter to be the owner of Lot Nos.

Petitioners' omission. the respondent is the preferred possessor because. they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties". Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code. Rañigo. Sandoval. Tabugan. 17526 for tax purposes in their name in 1989. or any other person. possession. Lastimosa. Ramirez. it must be adverse. On the other hand. his predecessor. Firstly. occupation and use. Corporal. unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right. No matter how long tolerated possession is continued. it does not start the running of the prescriptive period. that is. through his predecessor. petitioners never acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription of the subject realty. petitioners did not acquire ownership. shows a lack of sufficient adverseness of the formers' possession to qualify as being one in the concept of owner. On the other hand. Inguillo. Marquez. Rodriguez. Petitioners have failed to prove that their possession was adverse or under claim of title or right. only one year had elapsed. Sy. Since then and until the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession in 1990. Espina. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto. Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner. Petitioners' acts of a possessory character . Cabañgon. therefore. thereon. Valiente. All these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in possession of subject realty in the concept of owner. Secondly. benefiting from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916. Francisco. Palad. Alcazaren. he has been in possession thereof for a longer period. publicly and peacefully since 1916 or long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965. Page 489 Echiverri. petitioners did not have either the courage or forthrightness to publicly declare the disputed lots as owned by them for tax purposes. Asensi. must be possession under claim of title. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right. being the sole transferree of his father. De la Cruz. Tecson. could not acquire the disputed real property by ordinary prescription through possession for 10 years. Unlike respondent. De Mesa. Corpuz. Santos. Coronel. it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. 17526 and 17533 were transferred to them. Petitioners. payment of taxes on and possession of the subject realty. will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots. The records also show that the 897-square meter property had a bamboo fence along its perimeter. Castillo. respondent showed through his tax declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he. Hence. Lumberio. Martinez. Petitioners did not present any document to show how the titles over Lot Nos. Gloria. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title. whether from respondent.did not constitute possession. Catindig. had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916. The only instance petitioners assumed a legal position sufficiently adverse to respondent's ownership of the disputed properties was when they declared Lot No. they had no just title. however long. In other words. when viewed in conjunction with respondent's continued unequivocal declaration of ownership over. Albano. therefore. petitioners acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.acts that might have been merely tolerated by the owner . Tax declarations "prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Reyes. Valois .

Ramirez. Cabañgon. Tabugan. De Mesa. Albano. Rañigo. "Open. Coronel. Espina. therefore. De la Cruz. Martinez. Francisco. Alcazaren. Santos. Catindig. the possession by respondent and his predecessor had already ripened into ownership of the subject realty by virtue of prescription as early as 1946. Castillo. Sandoval. Valois . Palad. Inguillo." Ownership of immovable property is acquired by extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years. Tecson. Marquez. ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Lastimosa. Reyes. Corporal. exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land. Corpuz. Sy. upon completion of the requisite period . Page 490 Echiverri. Gloria. Rodriguez.ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction. Lumberio. For purposes of deciding the instant case. Valiente. Asensi.

to their daughter Rosemarie for P7. 2009 DOCTRINE: Contract. Hence. NENITA BUENVENIDA PASTRANA et al. 1985 and November 2. Inguillo.00. When the respondents were about to levy these properties to satisfy the judgment in the Possession Case. JESUS CAMPOS et al. No. He then appealed to the CA and subsequently to this Court. Francisco. 1988. 1995. De Mesa. void contract. While the appeal in the Agrarian Case was pending before the CA. spouses Campos sold the residential lots. an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract is imprescriptible. despite the expiration of their contract of lease in 1980. Espina. Carlito filed an agrarian caseagainst his lessor. Palad. Branch 14. but was unsuccessful. rescission.Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. vs. Lastimosa. Catindig. Corpuz.600. the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding Carlito to have retained possession of the fishpond notwithstanding the expiration of the contract of lease and ordering him to pay rentals. Rodriguez. to their son Jesus for P5.393 square meters. Marquez. HELD: No. Ramirez. Asensi. FACTS: The first case arose from the refusal of Carlito Campos (Carlito). Coronel. Corporal. De la Cruz. an Alias Writ of Execution was also issued. Under Article 1410 of the Civil Code. Tabugan. The Decision became final and executory and a Writ of Execution was issued. Subsequently. Cabañgon. petitioners’ contention that respondents’ cause of action is already barred by prescription is without legal basis. the value of the produce and damages to the herein respondents. Specifically. SalvacionBuenvenida. against Carlito for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction involving the same fishpond subject of the earlier agrarian case. The sale of subject properties to petitioners are null and void. Contract. Sandoval.R. void contract. Valois . Martinez. on September 19. found that Carlito was not an agricultural tenant. ISSUE: Whether or not an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract is imprescriptible. Tecson. Alcazaren.00 and the agricultural lots with a combined area of 7. December 8. Gloria. herein respondents filed the second case. Alleging that he was an agricultural lessee. On November 27. G. Santos. Reyes. Sy. herein petitioners. Page 491 Echiverri. the father of herein petitioners. Petitioners’ argument that the applicable law in this case is Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code on rescissible contracts and not Article 1409 on Albano. Both were returned unsatisfied as per Sheriffs Return of Service. Rañigo. by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale dated October 18.000. with a total area of 1. prescription. 1990. to surrender the possession of a fishpond he leased from respondents mother. Civil Case.972 square meters. Castillo. they discovered that spouses Carlito and Margarita Campos transferred these lots to their children Rosemarie and Jesus Campos. Valiente. Lumberio. 175994.

Francisco. Asensi. Cabañgon. Corporal. Castillo. Corpuz. De Mesa. Coronel. Marquez. It is true that the CA cited instances that may constitute badges of fraud under Article 1387 of the Civil Code on rescissible contracts. Page 492 Echiverri. Alcazaren. Tecson. This issue had already been settled several decades ago when we held that “an action to rescind is founded upon and presupposes the existence of a contract”. void contracts is not a question of first impression. Gloria. In the instant case. Consequently. Rañigo. Lumberio. Santos. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Valiente. Ramirez. Sy. Tabugan. we find that the CA properly applied the governing law over the matter under consideration which is Article 1409 of the Civil Code on void or inexistent contracts. Lastimosa. the Deeds of Absolute Sale are fictitious and inexistent for being absolutely simulated contracts. Palad. Reyes. But there is nothing else in the appealed decision to indicate that rescission was contemplated under the said provision of the Civil Code. Valois . A contract which is null and void is no contract at all and hence could not be the subject of rescission. De la Cruz. Espina. Sandoval. The aforementioned badges must have been considered merely as grounds for holding that the sale is fictitious. Catindig. Albano. Martinez.

1995. because she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open. Castillo. Cabañgon. continuous. in the absence of other competent evidence. or even prior to 1945. In brief. mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership. tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarants right to registration of title. Alcazaren. Catindig. continuous. these unsubstantiated statements do not meet the required quantum of evidence in land registration cases. De Mesa. Reyes. Petitioner claimed the benefits of the Property Registration Decree or. Inguillo. De la Cruz. or of the petitioners open. Gloria. Tabugan. It asserted that Lot No. Sy. There is nothing in the records which would substantiate her claim that Julian Gonzales was in possession of Lot No. Ramirez. 1994. December 8. the benefits of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. Lumberio. Valois . 177384. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Rañigo. On March 15. Francisco. public. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. Page 493 Echiverri. petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over a 4. JOSEPHINE WEE vs. Martinez. Santos. through the Office of the Solicitor General. 1993 executed by Julian Gonzales in her favor.R. continuous. the Republic of the Philippines. Asensi. petitioner alleged in her application that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 1. Marquez. contrary to her testimony that her late husband inherited the property from his parents a long time ago. 8349 since 1945.Even if we were to assume that the coffee was planted by petitioners predecessor-in-interest. No. HELD: No. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12. Lastimosa. Sandoval. 1945 or prior thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. 1945 or prior thereto. In fact. Certainly. or earlier is applicable to this case. Rodriguez. Espina. should said Decree be inapplicable. Palad. the Albano. Corpuz. Corporal. 8349 is part of the public domain and consequently prayed for the dismissal of the application for registration. peaceful and adverse possession of the land since time immemorial. 8349 since June 12. 141. Coronel. other than the bare allegations of Juana Gonzales. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. Valiente.870-square meter parcel of land situated in Silang. 1945. The OSG likewise averred that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts submitted by the petitioner do not constitute competent or sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject lot. Cavite. FACTS: On December 22. Tecson. 2009 DOCTRINE: In any event. filed its Opposition alleging that neither the petitioner nor her predecessor-in-interest has been in open. continuous.

De Mesa. Castillo. De la Cruz. showing actual possession and occupation. It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957. Valois . in the absence of other competent evidence. Corporal. it automatically follows that the lot is cultivated. 1967. Catindig. Sy. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. since she could not point to any acts of occupation. Inguillo. Lumberio. Gloria. Coronel. Petitioner claims that because the property is planted with coffee. Valiente. whether these plants are maintained or harvested or if any other acts were undertaken by petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property. Cabañgon. tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarants right to registration of title. Corpuz. Ramirez. a fruit-bearing tree. continuous. Albano. Espina. Palad. Sandoval. Tabugan. In any event. Alcazaren. Rañigo. earliest tax declaration that was presented in this case is one declared by Julian Gonzales only in 1957 long after June 1945. Francisco. This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open. 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). 1961. Tecson. Santos. development. cultivation or maintenance over the property. Martinez. Asensi. petitioner failed to explain who planted the coffee. Rodriguez. Page 494 Echiverri. However. Marquez. Reyes. Lastimosa. We agree with the CA that petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the alleged possession was in the concept of an owner.

Sandoval. 2002 Memorandum until such time that the terms and conditions of the lease and the capability of the sub-lessees are re-evaluated and approved. then Secretary Heherson Alvarez of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources approved the recommendation of the LMB to renew the contract of lease for another 25 years with several conditions on the sublease. Petitioner filed a case for forcible entry against DKS and Dy. 1978. Rodriguez. The contract was effective from August 1. Santos.R. Petitioner alleged that during the period recited above. it was in continuous and peaceful possession of the property including the subject 9.500-square meter portion which it operated as a car park until DKS. Cabañgon. assign or encumber its leasehold rights in whole or in part on the leased area to any person or corporation without the prior written approval of the government. (2) that DKS shall start its development of the portion of the property within two years from May 6. Tabugan. However. 2003 and renewable for a similar period upon agreement of the parties. Inguillo. Gloria. the Land Management Bureau denied petitioners request to sublease said portion of the property to DKS. Andres S.727-square meter land located at Numancia St. applied for the sublease of a 9. Marquez. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. Lastimosa. Coronel. Manila. Petitioner informed Mr. the DENR came up with a Final Endorsement signed by Sec. Valois . and MICHAEL DY G. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. FACTS: On June 9. In a Memorandum dated May 6. Castillo. Dy of DKS that petitioners Executive Committee had already approved the amendments on the terms and conditions of the sublease. Reyes. 179161. Ramirez. Palad. On October 12.. Corporal. Petitioner signified its intention to renew the lease for another 25 years as the original lease was about to expire. January 22.. among which were: (1) that petitioner shall sublease the 9. petitioner shall not directly or indirectly sublease. however. While said case was pending. the Philippine Government and petitioner Philippine National Bank entered into a Contract of Lease where the former leased in favor of the latter its 21. intimidation. through force. 1978 to July 31. Alcazaren. stealth and threat. Valiente. De Mesa. It also stipulated that except for its subsidiary corporations. Binondo. 2000. Alvarez on Albano. Catindig. Sy. Alvarez ordered the recall of his May 6. Espina.500-square meter area in favor of DKS for the same period of 25 years and. Francisco. Lumberio. 2002. Tecson. Page 495 Echiverri. 2002 and complete its development as proposed within seven years. forcibly and unlawfully took over possession on October 9. INC. Martinez. Asensi. 2010 DOCTRINE: It is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with the requisites provided inSection 19. Rañigo.500-square meter portion of the aforesaid property with petitioner. No. DKS INTERNATIONAL. 2002. 2002. De la Cruz. Corpuz. On August 6. respondent DKS International Inc. Sec.

Rodriguez. Valiente. of the DENRs approval of petitioners request for renewal of the lease contract. Castillo. Sy. 2003 for another period of 25 years. the RTC-Manila. Such an assessment is imperative because the resolution of the issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion hinges on it. On March 10. Asensi. Martinez. Page 496 Echiverri. Espina. Francisco. Inguillo. Coronel. Corporal. We find that the CA correctly took notice of the governments take-over and repossession of the subject property. RTC recalled the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order. Cabañgon. Mr. November 29. Lumberio. the CA would not be able to make a determination whether the recall of the writ of execution was proper under the circumstances. rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the MeTC and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution with break open order. By virtue of the Decisions of the MeTC and the RTC which both ruled in favor of petitioner in the subject forcible entry case. the CA promulgated its Decision in denying the petition for lack of merit. Without discussing these issues. Tecson. Sandoval. Rañigo. Palad. A Decision has already been rendered in the Pasay case on August 29. Tabugan. Lorenzo V. 2008 wherein it was held that the Contract of Lease between petitioner and the government has been validly and effectively renewed on July 31. Upon motion of petitioner. Catindig. It considered the Sheriffs Partial Return. De la Cruz. as a matter of right. informing petitioners president. Our attention was caught by the phrase posted in the premises that the same is government property. 21. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with break open order HELD: No. Santos. Gloria. Marquez. entitled to a writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 2002. was not implemented because of the timely appeal of respondents to the RTC. On March 16. It ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with break open order. 2004. the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution which. Alcazaren. Thus. petitioner was indeed. Lastimosa. 2007. De Mesa. however. MatusalemRuperto further informed the undersigned that Judge Marquez issued an order [preventing us] from implementing the Writ. Commander of Sphinx Security Investigation and Detective Services informed us that DKS has already turned over the premises to Land Management Bureau. Ramirez. It held that the expiration of the lease contract between petitioner and the government and the latter’s take-over and/or repossession of the premises from respondents were supervening events. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. as these are the very same facts which the RTC considered to be the reasons why the writ of execution with break open order it earlier issued cannot anymore be implemented. Reyes. Corpuz. Tan. the RTC ordered Albano. Valois .

Marquez. Rañigo. the CA still affirmed the recall of the issuance of the writ of execution with break open order. Valois . Lumberio. in fact. Gloria. Petitioner stresses that in order to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case while an appeal is pending. Albano. Corporal. Sy. The respondents had already surrendered possession of the subject premises to the government. Santos. the recall of the writ of execution with break open order was warranted. Page 497 Echiverri. 2004 Decision. Ramirez. We thus hold that under these circumstances. Lastimosa. Espina. Sandoval. Corpuz. the defendant must perfect his appeal. Valiente. Inguillo. the issuance of a writ of execution with break open in the dispositive portion of its March 10. would be ordered to vacate the same in order that possession thereof may be delivered to petitioner. inescapable material facts and circumstances were brought to the attention of the RTC. Alcazaren. as correctly observed by the RTC. But before said writ could be implemented. For how can respondents surrender possession of the premises when they were no longer in possession? And. Reyes. But despite the failure of respondents to post the required supersedeas bond. Tecson. Asensi.This is not the situation here. had already rendered its judgment on the appeal. Cabañgon. Catindig. file a supersedeas bond and periodically deposit the rentals which became due during the pendency of the appeal. De Mesa. it would be a misstep if the government which is admittedly the owner of the subject property and which was not a party to the ejectment case. Francisco. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Tabugan. Martinez. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Coronel. It is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with the requisites provided inSection 19. Respondents are not staying the execution of the judgment of the MeTC pending appeal to the RTC as the latter court. Castillo. Clearly. Palad. the portion of the Decision ordering respondents to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender possession thereof to petitioner has become impossible to implement.

and misrepresentation. Espina. 1995. FACTS: Petitioners Bienvenido T. 180374. G. Lastimosa. Buadaet al. However. But. they will be paid a disturbance compensation of P3. Corporal. BUADA et al. Pangasinan. De Mesa. Region 1 in Urdaneta City. Palad. were tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Cement Center.000. Valiente. Tabugan. Francisco. Sandoval. Alcazaren. despite respondents repeated demands. Theindicated income derived from the properties and the Albano. BIENVENIDO T. deceit. In their Answer. Gloria. 12) nullifies the contract HELD: Yes. January 22.00 together with the income from a single cropping as comprising the disturbance compensation package. Petitioners alleged that respondent assured them that they would only apply for the conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the land only upon the approval of said application and that thereafter. should the application for conversion be denied. for and in consideration of the sum of P3. 2010 DOCTRINE: Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices. Marquez. Catindig.. Rodriguez. A perusal of the subject Compromise Agreement reveals that the parties considered the amount of P3. Reyes. Sy. Petitioners also claimed that respondent promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. Castillo. CEMENT CENTER. Lumberio. petitioners will continue to be tenants and could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Asensi. vs.000. Valois . Santos. Corpuz. ISSUE: Whether or not the deficiency of consideration (which is not in accordance with administrative order no.000. No. petitioners entered into a Compromise Agreement with respondent whereby the former. respondent filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages against petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. Inc. Martinez. voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. Inguillo. Page 498 Echiverri. Ramirez. It claimed that on June 28. petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through fraud. On March 13. Tecson. Rañigo. Cabañgon. petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.00 each. They claimed that sometime in 1995.R. INC. Coronel. respondent induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that the subject landholdings are no longer viable for agricultural purposes. De la Cruz. 1998.00 each.

Gloria. Sy. Series of 1990 of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Coronel.As an exception to this security of tenure. Valois . Corporal. 1. Sandoval. financial assistance of P3. assail the disturbance compensation package provided in the Compromise Agreement as insufficient and contrary to Administrative Order No. Ramirez. Martinez. Tabugan. Despite the above contentions of petitioners. such beneficiaries shall be entitled to a disturbance compensation. Petitioners. Albano. There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed advantageous to petitioner’s families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood. Section 8 of RA 3844 specifically enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relations: (2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee. Page 499 Echiverri. Francisco. Reyes. Espina. however. Asensi. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. 12.000. written notice of which shall be served three months in advance. it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their sole source of livelihood. Catindig. Alcazaren. Series of 2004. It is the policy of the State to promote the Security of Tenure of Farmers over their leasehold. Valiente. De Mesa. Santos. Moreover. Tecson. however. In all cases of petitions for conversions resulting in the displacement of farmer-beneficiaries. Rañigo. Inguillo. Lumberio. which should not be less than five (5) times the average of the annual gross value of the harvest on their actual landholdings during the last 5 preceding calendar years. Rodriguez. respondent failed to present evidence to show that the disturbance compensation package corresponds with the compensation required by the said Administrative Order. Palad. Cabañgon. tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices. They claim that they would not have acceded to such a measly amount were it not for the agreement that respondent will hire them as workers on the planned project on the subject land. Marquez. Corpuz. To stress. Castillo. Neither was there any showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five times the average annual gross value of the harvest on petitioner’s actual landholdings during the preceding five calendar years.00 shall be considered as the disturbance compensation package in favor of the SECOND PARTY by reason or as a result of their vacating the premises in accordance with Administrative Order No. The voluntary surrender of the landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.

Albano. Corpuz.6698 hectare land was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Petitioner insisted that during this entire time. the area around the house was already planted with bananas. the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. Hence. Valois . The 6. De Mesa. Marquez. Corporal. FACTS: Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land in Sitio Camambaey. JULIET AWISAN. He admitted including in his tax declaration a communal sacred lot (patpatayan) even if he did not acquire free patent title over the same. save for two. On March 7. he buried her in the lot beside the house in 1975. and for the removal of petitioner and his improvements from the property. Respondent’s tax declaration. Rañigo. alleging that the latter occupied and encroached on the northern portion of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes. these were generally purchased without any documentation. Espina. Page 500 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Mountain Province. Francisco.R. Cadwising also claimed having introduced improvements on the subject property as early as the 1960s. denied the encroachment and asserted ownership over the subject property. Lastimosa. and adverse possession. Tabugan. Castillo. Palili. His own home had been standing on the property for the past 20 years. February 12. Santos. she filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner Modesto Palali. Inguillo. Asensi. No. Ramirez. public. 1994. According to respondent. Coronel. Reyes. Sy. who eventually donated the same to respondent. Catindig. while his father was buried near the same plot in 1993. Valiente. the 6. MODESTO PALALI vs. therefore. at that time. which acquired it in the foreclosure sale. Tecson. Respondent prayed to be declared the rightful owner of the northern portion. cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war. He maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-interest have openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. no one disturbed his ownership and possession thereof. The latter testified that he and his wife were able to consolidate ownership over the land by declaring them from public land as well as by purchasing from adjoining landowners. Palad. this petition. Bauko. When his mother died. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. alnos.6698 hectare land was originally owned by her father. Lumberio. Tapapan. Cabañgon. 158385. Gloria. As for the properties he bought.6698 hectares. represented by her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO AWISAN G. Sandoval. in his defense. allegedly consisting of 6. DBP then sold the land to one Tico Tibong. Martinez. and coffee. Cresencio Cadwising. for the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration. 2010 DOCTRINE: The absence of actual. He and his siblings were born on that land and.

Respondent’s tax declaration. Tecson. Lastimosa. he transferred no better right to his transferees. Coronel. Sandoval. especially as far as third parties are concerned. the petitioner has the better right ti the subject property. Thus. it is the petitioner who has the better claim or title to the subject property. It certainly is more weighty and preponderant than a tax declaration alone. Rañigo. But tax declarations. the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. Sy. For it may very well be that the transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred. Tabugan. since respondent’s predecessor-in-interest Cadwising appeared not to have any right to the subject property. we hold that as between the petitioner and the respondent. Ramirez. when coupled with a tax declaration. Lumberio. therefore. petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the subject property coupled with his tax declaration. Cabañgon. They do not conclusively prove that the transferor actually owns the property purportedly being transferred. Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments dealing with the 6. Martinez. Valiente. cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war. are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. Rodriguez.6698-hectare property covered by her tax declaration. public. Marquez. No one can give what he does not have – nemo dat quod non habet. including respondent. ISSUE: Who between the parties has the better right to the subject property? HELD: Palili. Reyes. her claim rests solely on her tax declaration. Alcazaren. Palad. Francisco. De la Cruz. and adverse possession. by themselves. Espina. All told. Such public documents merely show the successive transfers of the property covered by said documents. In the absence of actual. De Mesa. respondent having failed to prove possession. We have ruled in several cases that possession. Castillo. Corpuz. Valois . Page 501 Echiverri. Albano. Santos. Gloria. Inguillo. Catindig. While the respondent merely relied on her tax declaration. Corporal. in which case he transfers no better right to his transferee. Thus. is a weighty evidence of ownership. Asensi.

Gloria. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in declaring that the deed of sale is null and void. and no longer communicated with each other. the CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court. contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. 1996. DAVID. David" and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Inguillo. Cabañgon. TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Catindig. De Mesa. married to Manuel A. On Appeal. 1957. the spouses separated de facto. Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. since the property was a conjugal property. and MARTHA S. the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains. 130129 in the name of Titan. which was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. Tecson. and that a new title be issued in their names. Sometime in March 1995. 1995. Sy. Castillo. of legal age. In its Answer with Counterclaim. MANUEL A. Page 502 Echiverri. SR. 2010 DOCTRINE: All property acquired during the marriage whether the acquisition appears to have been made. Santos. In 1970. 2005. on March 13. (ii) ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and Manuel. 130129.00 through a Deed of Sale dated April 24. Palad. Albano.R. Corpuz. Martinez. 169548. Sandoval. Asensi. Thus. DAVID G. Espina. Corporal. the RTC issued a Decision which (i) invalidated both the Deed of Sale and TCT No. Reyes. Ramirez. and that TCT No. FACTS: Manuel and Martha were married on March 25. and therefore void. Rodriguez. Valiente. Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for ₱1. DAVID. Alcazaren. No. 130129 be invalidated. Titan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on August 31.000. 2000. 1995 signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Filipino. On March 7. Quezon City. Valois . Rañigo. Coronel. 156043 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1976. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Tabugan. Marquez. that the property be reconveyed to the spouses. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent. De la Cruz. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. Francisco. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4. March 15.500. Presumption applies even when the manner in which property was acquired does not appear.

Valois . Lastimosa. whether the acquisition be for the partnership. Tabugan. Martinez." We are not persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s exclusive property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970. Cabañgon. and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. Inguillo. Asensi. Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides: Article 153. Miat. Alcazaren. Rather. Valiente. or for only one of the spouses. Corporal. is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. The property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership. the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. or for only one of the spouses. Lumberio. xxxx These provisions were carried over to the Family Code. HELD: No. 117. Catindig. Coronel. Rodriguez. The Civil Code of the Philippines. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Tecson. Palad. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Gloria. Castillo. provides: Article 160. Ramirez. De Mesa. Sandoval. Santos. Page 503 Echiverri. the Court of Appeals’ ruling is correct. In particular. De la Cruz. hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970. we find that Titan Albano. Francisco. Rañigo.21 the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957. The following are conjugal partnership properties: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund. whether the acquisition appears to have been made. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund. Marquez. Article 117 thereof provides: Art. Reyes. Sy. Corpuz. Espina. contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses. Here. xxxx Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that "[a]ll property acquired during the marriage. Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. whether the acquisition be for the partnership.

Cabañgon. Lastimosa. we fully concur with the findings of the CA that: Albano. Ramirez. Asensi. Rañigo. Marquez. Rodriguez. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. Corpuz. Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. Lumberio. Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. except in cases provided by law". In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void. As regards defendant Titan Construction Corporation’s assertion that plaintiff’s failure to verify his Reply (wherein the validity of the Special Power of Attorney is put into question) is an implied admission of its genuineness and due execution. the Deed of Sale is void. Sections 7 and 8. On this point. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Sandoval. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. Thus: Art. [this] appears at first blush a logical conclusion. Likewise. Santos. Francisco. 124. was part of the conjugal partnership. Palad. such disposition is void. De Mesa. Page 504 Echiverri.36of the Rules of Court. the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses. Similarly. Espina. Reyes. Corporal. Gloria. Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse. Alcazaren. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership". However. Sy. Tabugan. Inguillo. which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. Valois . the Court could not yield to such an argument considering that a rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium when it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interest of justice. However. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. Catindig. Castillo. Coronel. Valiente. In the absence of such authority or consent. otherwise. In the absence of Manuel’s consent. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy. failed to overturn the presumption that the property. in accordance with Rule 8. purchased during the spouses’ marriage. Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of the SPA in his Reply. the husband's decision shall prevail. De la Cruz. Martinez. In case of disagreement. he is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said document. Tecson.

express or implied. It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery was not made under oath. Corpuz. Marquez. Corporal. Tecson. Lumberio. in favor of Titan was without his knowledge. Ramirez. Rodriguez. Santos. Sandoval. consent. Gloria. Reyes. which was verified by Manuel under oath. Espina. Albano. Alcazaren. The absence of Manuel’s data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Sy. Page 505 Echiverri. it is no less true that there were defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed. Rañigo. such clear and convincing evidence is present here. Valois . Lastimosa. Catindig.1avvph!1 While it is true that the SPA was notarized. De Mesa. Francisco. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Curiously. in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuel’s true signature. the complaint. the details of Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent. Martha. Castillo. It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein. Coronel. Martinez. De la Cruz. Asensi. However. Moreover. Valiente. alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by his wife. yet Martha’s are complete. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption. Palad. and approval. and that there is nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his consent thereto. we have Manuel’s positive testimony that he never signed the SPA. Tabugan. However.

However. Meanwhile. Francisco. Asensi. Lastimosa. Atty. Rovira filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging among other that the respondent’s notice of appeal failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. as done by the petitioner herein. Voltaire Rovira files as an incident to the said Civil Case a motion to resolve his claim for attorney’s fees for services rendered to Dr. Page 506 Echiverri. and Ruben Alex Deleste G. Castillo. On 24 May 2001. a record on appeal is not necessary. 2010 DOCTRINE: A trial court’s ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees initiated through a motion. The choice of asserting a claim for attorney's fees in the very action inwhich the services in question have been rendered. March 26. FACTS: A suit for recover of ownership and possession of 34 hectares of land was instituted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte." The main case handled by petitioner lawyer has already been decided with finality up to the appeal stageand is already in the execution stage.R. The trial court has also already resolved the incident of attorney's fees. Voltaire Rovira v Heirs of Jose Deleste. Santos. will not convert a regular caseinto one falling under the category of "other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules sorequire. Rañigo. Espina. Jose Deleste to return half of it to the plaintiffs. Albano. Palad. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner.The main action involved herein. Reyes. Tecson. The respondents filed their opposition to the said motion. Jose Ray Deleste. Sandoval. Rovira filed a Motion for Writ of Execution and to Dismiss Appeal. Tabugan. the RTC dismissed the appeal filed by defendants and issued a writ of execution in favor or Atty. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the Notice of Appeal. Deleste. Thereafter. HELD: Yes. Atty. De la Cruz. Since the suit is not one where multiple appeals are taken. Raul Hector Deleste. Atty. This case was decided with finality in 1995 by the Supreme Court which declared the parties as co-owners of the land and ordered defendant Dr. Catindig. in a suite for recover of ownership and possession of land. Sy. Marquez. Corpuz. is not one where multipleappeals can be taken or are necessary. Martinez. Deleste. which was denied. Lumberio. 160825. Valiente. Coronel. De Mesa. Alcazaren. The Regional Trial Court thereafter issued an order granting the motion of Atty. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal. being a suit for recovery of ownership and possession. Inguillo. Corporal. may be appealed by a mere notice of appeal. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. namely JosefaDeleste. Valois . No. Ramirez. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents perfected their appeal thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees. Rovira. Rovira and awarded him attorney’s fees of 25% of the 17-hectare portion adjudicated to Dr. Gloria.

Valois . Tabugan. Corpuz. The case has not been made out for multiple appeals. De Mesa. Albano. Hence. Ramirez. The only requirement to perfect the appeal in the present case is the filing of a notice of appeal in due time. Coronel. a record on appeal is therefore unnecessary to perfect the appeal. Alcazaren. Martinez. Santos. De la Cruz. Reyes. Castillo. there is no reason why the original records of the case must remain with the trial court. Inguillo. Sy. There was also no need for respondents to file a record on appeal because the original records could already be sent to the appellate court for the resolution of the appeal on the matter of the attorney's fees. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Valiente. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Palad. Francisco. Gloria. Catindig. Espina. Corporal. Asensi. This the respondents did. Page 507 Echiverri. Marquez. Tecson.

Lastimosa. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Reyes. April 23. Page 508 Echiverri. Reina Comandante and Spouses Beinvenideo Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan G. Rodriguez. RT-6604 which became the subject of an alleged loan secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract which was later on obtained by Comandante.Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code. Lumberio. that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid. Inguillo. Castillo. Ferrer. Sandoval. Ferrer. the trial court. from Atty. the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. De Mesa. Martinez. Francisco. Santos. Ramirez. De la Cruz. it declared the Real Estate Mortgage as binding. Albano. Thereafter. in an order deemed both motions for summary judgment submitted for resolution. no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Sy. a summary judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Meanwhile. Palad. Catindig. Ferrer executed and Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Hence. Alcazaren. Valois . Corporal. Tabugan. by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was denied. Espina. Pedro Ferrer vs. Cabañgon. Rañigo. the contract entered into between Ferrer and Comandante cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation among the parties. Marquez. wherein it declared Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights null and void. When Comandante failed to pay her obligation.R. Asensi. Comandante asserted in her Answer to te amended complaint that said complaint states no cause of action against her because the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint were not duly and validly executed by her. 165300. Atty. Gloria. For the inheritance to be considered “future”. Atty. Atty. No. hence it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor. Tecson. 2010 DOCTRINE: FACTS: The suit originated from an alleged execution by Reina Comandante of a Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests over a Real Property. HELD: No. Spouses Alfredo Diaz and Imelda Diaz. However. Coronel. The said waiver was annotated at the back of TCT No. After the filing of the parties’ respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary judgment. Corpuz. Valiente.

Palad. Espina. it failed to comply with these notices. 2010 DOCTRINE: The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on. De Mesa.R. Tabugan. Alcazaren. requesting the immediate payment of its tax liabilities. is justice according to natural law and right. No. Percival T. Tecson. Sy. Francisco. BIR served upon it three Notices of Presentation of Records. vs. On appeal. Lastimosa. the CTA En Banc affirmed the cancellation of the assessment notices. As a result. Valiente. Corpuz. 178087 May 5. 2003. Ramirez. Reyes. The BIR rendered a final Decision on the matter. This was followed by a Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices for taxable year 1998. and has its origin in equity which. However. Coronel. Marquez. 1999. Petitioner insists that by acquiescing to the audit during the period specified in the waivers. Catindig. It found the first Waiver of the Statute of Limitations incomplete and defective for failure to comply with the provisions ofRMO20-90. Believing that the government's right to assess taxes had prescribed. Salazar. KUDOS METAL CORPORATION. FACTS: Kudos Metal Corporation filed its Annual ITR for the taxable year 1998. This was challenged by the latter by filing its "Protest on Various Tax Assessments"and its "Legal Arguments and Documents in Support of Protests against Various Assessments". petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from adopting a position contrary to what it has previously taken. Martinez. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. executed two Waivers of the Defense of Prescription. Asensi. Sandoval. Nelia Pasco. Lumberio. Rañigo. The same was subsequently accepted by the Assistant Commissioner of the Enforcement Service. G. Cabañgon. through its accountant. As such. broadly defined. Inguillo. CTA Second Division issued a Resolution canceling the assessment notices issued against respondent for having been issued beyond the prescriptive period.Pursuant to a Letter of Authority dated September 7. effectively tolled or extended the period within which the assessment can be made. the doctrine of estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy. which was received by the the BIR Tax Fraud Division on 4 February 2002 and 28 February 2003. Petitioner argues that the government's right to assess taxes is not barred by prescription as the two waivers executed by respondent. On August 25. the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice for the taxable year 1998 against the respondent. Santos. In disputing the conclusion of the CTA that the waivers are invalid. Rodriguez. Valois . Castillo. respondent's accountant. respondent fileda Petition for Review with the CTA. Gloria. Corporal. De la Cruz. respondent led the government to believe that the "delay" in the process would Albano. Page 509 Echiverri.

it must be stressed that in the said case. It is obvious from the foregoing that petitioner refrained from collecting the tax by distraint or levy or by proceeding in court within the 5-year period from the filing of the second amended final return due to the several requests of respondent for extension to which petitioner yielded to give it every opportunity to prove its claim regarding the correctness of the assessment. Catindig. Rodriguez. which is not present in the instant case. As to the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence relied upon by petitioner. Inguillo. persuaded to postpone collection to make him feel that the demand was not unreasonable or that no harassment or injustice is meant Albano. it was the one which asked for additional time to submit the required documents. Because of such requests. Reyes. Sy. respondent counters that the principle of equity comes into play only when the law is doubtful. Asensi. who executed the same without any written authority from it. 5-01. However. Santos. Coronel. HELD: No. respondent may no longer repudiate the validity of the waivers and raise the issue of prescription. as the BIR was able to make an assessment within the prescribed period. Valois . Valiente. After inducing petitioner to delay collection as he in fact did. Corporal. Thus. Tabugan. De Mesa. Suyoc Consolidated Mining Company. estoppel was applied as an exception to the statute of limitations on collection of taxes and not on the assessment of taxes. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of estoppel apply in this case. Espina. Martinez. there are cases however where a taxpayer may be prevented from setting up the defense of prescription even if he has not previously waived it in writing as when by his repeated requests or positive acts the Government has been. We find no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent is now estopped from claiming prescription since by executing the waivers. it is most unfair for respondent to now take advantage of such desistance to elude his deficiency income tax liability to the prejudice of the Government invoking the technical ground of prescription. Alcazaren. While we may agree with the Court of Tax Appeals that a mere request for reexamination or reinvestigation may not have the effect of suspending the running of the period of limitation for in such case there is need of a written agreement to extend the period between the Collector and the taxpayer. Palad. the doctrine of estoppel prevented the taxpayer from raising the defense of prescription against the efforts of the government to collect the assessed tax. Corpuz. In Collector of Internal Revenue v. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Page 510 Echiverri. Castillo. not be utilized against it. Lumberio. for good reasons. as the record shows. Ramirez. Rañigo. lasted for several months. Cabañgon. Marquez. Lastimosa. Francisco. in clear violation of RDAO No. Respondent maintains that prescription had set in due to the invalidity of the waivers executed by Pasco. several reinvestigations were made and a hearing was even held by the Conference Staff organized in the collection office to consider claims of such nature which. Gloria. Tecson.

and to indicate the date of acceptance and the receipt by the respondent of the waivers. and has its origin in. It should be resorted to solely as a means of preventing injustice and should not be permitted to defeat the administration of the law. for the law says to him in effect "this is your own act. Neither can the BIR use this as an excuse for issuing the assessments beyond the three-year period because with or without the required documents. Stearns Co. And when such situation comes to pass there are authorities that hold.. Rodriguez. the BIR failed to verify whether a notarized written authority was given by the respondent to its accountant. It cannot shift the blame to the taxpayer. As we have often said. the CIR has the power to make assessments based on the best evidence obtainable. ed. that such an attitude or behavior should not be countenanced if only to protect the interest of the Government. Asensi. Supp. To stress. Lastimosa. the BIR must bear the consequence. Also. As stated earlier. is justice according to natural law and right. As Mr. Martinez. Gloria. Inguillo. Marquez. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in this case as an exception to the statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper execution of the waiver. Francisco.. Sandoval. a waiver of the statute of limitations. Santos. Valiente. 588]."' "(R. Cabañgon. Catindig. Moreover. 34 F. Justice Cardozo has said: "The applicable principle is fundamental and unquestioned. `He who prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the nonperformance which he has himself occasioned. being a derogation of the taxpayer's right to security against prolonged and unscrupulous investigations. must be carefully and strictly construed. Palad. U. Corpuz. Coronel. H. Or. Page 511 Echiverri. the doctrine of estoppel is predicated on. Corporal. The plaintiff is now estopped and should not be permitted to raise the defense of the Statute of Limitations. but the government withheld action at the specific request of the plaintiff. As to the alleged delay of the respondent to furnish the BIR of the required documents. Reyes. U. (DC-WIS). or to accomplish a wrong or secure an undue advantage. Valois . the doctrine of estoppel must be sparingly applied.S. and therefore you are not damnified. the assessments were issued beyond the prescribed period. or to extend beyond them requirements of the transactions in which they originate. by the Government. broadly defined.. in this case. Ramirez. as was aptly said.S. Tecson. Tabugan. vs. Lumberio. Having caused the defects in the waivers. De Mesa. which the BIR must strictly follow. Sy. there is no showing that respondent made any request to persuade the BIR to postpone the issuance of the assessments. Castillo. Rañigo. which the BIR itself issued. Conversely. 647). Simply put. De la Cruz. As such." [Newport Co. This case has no precedent in this jurisdiction for it is the first time that such has risen. Espina. vs. the doctrine of estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy. based on weighty reasons. this cannot be taken against respondent. equity which. "The tax could have been collected. 78 L. but there are several precedents that may be invoked in American jurisprudence. Albano. Alcazaren. the BIR cannot hide behind the doctrine of estoppel to cover its failure to comply with RMO 20-90 and RDAO 05-01.

With the sale. Tabugan. Contrary to Mario's allegations of co-ownership over Lot No. Ramirez has a right to continue occupying the property he bought. Mario's heirs insist in the action for specific performance that the heirs agreed on a partition prior to the sale. Lumberio. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoña. Veñaranda and the heirs of Mario filed the instant complaint for specific performance against Ygoña and Ramirez. the parties are co-owners thereof. One of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. and LOURDES all surnamed PACRES. Cabañgon. Castillo. Rodriguez. 1996. Ramirez. At the very least. These admissions may be given in evidence against them. 9 where the lots of Ramirez's vendors are located. He argued that he should pay rentals to him for occupying the front lot and should transfer to the rear of Lot No. LELISA. a writ of possession was also issued to her. Albano. Martinez. Asensi. Valois . Coronel. Subsequently in 1974. De la Cruz. On June 3. namely: VALENTINA Vda. Corporal. LEOVIGILDO. JOSERINO. and VICENTE YAP1 and HILARIO RAMIREZ. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Catindig. ELENA. It held that the deeds of sale in favor of Ramirez clearly described the object of the sale as the ancestral house and lot. Page 512 Echiverri. He claimed sole ownership of the lot occupied by the latter by virtue of the oral partition. G. at the very least. HEIRS of CECILIA YGOÑA. The total area sold to Ygoña was 493 square meters. MARIA YAP DETUYA. Santos. Reyes. It was also admitted that they leased "the ground floor of the [ancestral home] together with a lot area of 300 square meters including the area occupied by the house" to respondent Hilario Ramirez. and VEÑARANDA Vda. the polarity of their previous admissions and their present theory makes the latter highly suspect. 174719. Valiente. Co-owners are entitled to occupy the co-owned property. Francisco. namely BAUDILLO YGOÑA YAP. Rodrigo. In 1983. FACTS: The subject lot in this case originally belonged to Pastor Pacres who left it intestate to his heirs. Mario. Margarita also sold her share to Ygoña. Thus. Espina. Gloria. Sy. They seek compliance with such agreement from their siblings' vendees. The Pacres siblingsexecuted a Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate of Pastor Pacres. Palad. Corpuz. who did not sell their shares in the house and lot.On various dates in 1971.R. Inguillo. They admitted that at the time of Pastor's death in 1962. The court further held that since Mario did not sell his pro-indiviso shares in the house and lot. 9 in the legal redemption case. four of the Pacres siblings sold their shares in the ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez. Rañigo. Tecson. who immediately took possession thereof. respondent Ramirez's possession as lessee turned into a co-ownership with petitioners Mario and Veñaranda. 5 May 2010 DOCTRINE:The statements in the legal redemption case are extrajudicial admissions. Francisco. Ygoña and Ramirez.The court dismissed Mario's assertion that his siblings sold the rear lots to Ramirez. JOSEFINA YAP. Sandoval. DE PACRES. Lastimosa. Marquez. EGYPTIANA YAP BANZON. his heirs were already occupying definite portions of the lot. DE ABABA vs. filed an ejectment case against the successor-in-intererest of Hilario. the petitioners. and Simplicia sold their remaining shares in Lot No. which were not disputed by petitioners. HEIRS OF MARIO PACRES.

De la Cruz. as evidenced by petitioner Valentina's sketch. Castillo. the trial court held that the parties' actual occupation of their portions in Lot No. Ygoña also denied ever agreeing to the additional obligations being imputed against her. Asensi. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove the existence of the alleged oral agreements. Tecson. is the real agreement to which the parties are bound. whom they insist agreed to additional. hence bound to comply therewith. Catindig. Santos. The sketch undermined petitioners' allegation that the heirs partitioned the property and immediately took possession of their allotted lots/shares. Sandoval. Alcazaren.It. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. Their other cause of action is directed solely at Ygoña. On appeal. Veñaranda and Mario's heirs insist that Ygoña contracted with her vendors to assume all obligations regarding the payment of past and present estate taxes. the trial court further ordered that a survey of the lot according to the parties' actual occupation thereof be conducted. The appellate court explained that while it was conclusive that Ygoña and Ramirez bought portions of the property from some of the Pacres siblings. Corporal. Apparently unsatisfied with the parties' state of affairs. Rañigo. Gloria. Corpuz. Ramirez. reversed the trial court on the latter's order to survey the lot in accordance with Valentina's sketch. survey Lot No. Reyes. Rodriguez. the issue of the actual area and location of the portions sold to them remains unresolved. It held that petitioners failed to prove partition of the lot in accordance with petitioners' version. the court sustained the ruling of the trial court insofar as it dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of evidence. Lastimosa. It held that the oral partition was not valid because the heirs did not ratify it by taking possession of their shares in accordance with their oral agreement. De Mesa. however. respondents presented Exhibit No. Cabañgon. Instead. 9. Page 513 Echiverri. Martinez. In compliance with such partition. albeit unwritten. To discredit petitioners' assertion of an oral partition. petitioners insist it is not subject to the Statute of Frauds since these obligations were allegedly partly complied with by Ygoña. HELD: Albano. Lumberio. Palad. 9 in accordance with the oral partition. 1. which demonstrated Valentina's recollection of the actual occupation of the Pacres siblings. They further maintained that no such partition took place and that the portions sold to and occupied by them were located in front of Lot No. obligations other than the payment of the purchase price of the shares in Lot No. Coronel. They cite as evidence of Ygoña's compliance the survey of her purchased lots and payment of realty taxes. While these obligations were not written into the deeds of sale. Valiente. their heirs and vendees. Francisco. and obtain separate titles for each portion. Espina. Ygoña and Ramirez should desist from claiming any portion of the expropriation payment for the front lots. Marquez. Tabugan. Inguillo. Sy. 9. 9. Valois . on the basis that the two were privy to these agreements. hence they are the ones entitled to the expropriation payment. Respondents denied privity with the heirs' oral partition.

Page 514 Echiverri. Sy. the lower courts' conclusion was justified. While petitioners claim that the trial and appellate courts did not appreciate their Albano. Asensi. Instead. At the very least. Corpuz. Castillo. In fact. Santos. Coronel. sworn to as truth by Mario and Veñaranda. Our examination of the records indicates that. several years after respondents Ygoña and Ramirez took possession of the front portions of Lot No. and Simplicia. which were not disputed by petitioners. Martinez. but the actual occupation shown in her sketch is not in accordance with the terms of the alleged oral partition. In this case. Tecson. they only asserted their ownership over the front lots beginning in 1993 (with the execution of their joint affidavit) when expropriation became imminent and was later filed in court. Alcazaren. petitioners failed to present any evidence that the petitioners took actual possession of their respective allotted shares according to the supposed partition. described Lot No. Rodriguez. Francisco. but Valentina's sketch indicates that the actual occupants of the said portions are respondents. contrary to petitioners' contention. Inguillo. Petitioners did not adequately explain why the affidavit was executed only in 1993. Cabañgon. Lumberio. the front portions of Lot No. petitioners failed to show that the Pacres siblings took possession of their allotted shares after they had supposedly agreed on the oral partition. Espina. Petitioner Valentina herself drew a sketch showing the location of the actual occupants of Lot No. 9 is further belied by their predecessor-in-interest's previous assertion of co-ownership over the same lot in the legal redemption case filed 10 years before. 9. Corporal. we rule that the records contain ample support for the trial and appellate courts' factual findings that petitioners failed to prove their allegation of oral partition. In fine. Margarita. We find no compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule and disturb the trial and appellate courts' factual finding that the existence of an oral partition was not proven. The allegations therein. Rañigo. however. According to the terms of the alleged oral partition. If there had been an oral partition allotting the front portions to petitioners since Pastor's death in 1962. Francisco. to the effect that such an oral partition had previously been agreed upon. Tabugan. Petitioners' only piece of evidence to prove the alleged oral partition was the joint affidavit (entitled "Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate") supposedly executed by some of the Pacres siblings and their heirs in 1993. 9. Palad. Sandoval. Reyes. Lastimosa. No. the evidence of the parties point to the contrary. The statements in the legal redemption case are extrajudicial admissions. Gloria. Valiente. the polarity of their previous admissions and their present theory makes the latter highly suspect. Catindig. 9 were supposed to have been occupied by petitioners. 9 as a parcel of land that is co-owned by the Pacres siblings pro indiviso. Ramirez. Valois . De Mesa. De la Cruz. These admissions may be given in evidence against them. Marquez. Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with the alleged partition would have been strong proof of an oral partition. Moreover. they should have immediately objected to respondents' occupation. It was further alleged that Ygoña bought the undivided shares of Rodrigo. Petitioners' assertion of partition of Lot No.

Lastimosa. Petitioners allege that when Ygoña bought portions of Lot No. Tabugan. Corporal. De Mesa. The Parol Evidence Rule applies to "the parties and their successors in interest." This refers to stipulations pour autrui. between the parties and their successors in interest. Sy. much less proved. we find that these assertions by petitioners have not been sufficiently established. and to pay for all their past and present estate and realty taxes. Consequently. With respect to the alleged additional obligations which petitioners seek to be enforced against respondent Ygoña. Inguillo. their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable here). Lumberio. While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation." Conversely. It has been held that a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract. to preclude the application of Parol Evidence Rule. Ramirez. free of cost. the written contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the petitioners. Page 515 Echiverri. evidence regarding the existence of the alleged oral partition. Sandoval. under Article 1311 of the Civil Code." While the Rule admits of exception. she also bound herself to survey Lot No. "[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing. Ygoña agreed to these undertakings as additional consideration for the sale. Thus. he may demand its fulfillment. Castillo. Valiente. 9. For purposes of the Parol Evidence Rule. Coronel. Like the trial and appellate courts. According to petitioners. Rodriguez. Under this Rule. Moreover. Asensi. This is why under Article 1311. it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be. no such exception was pleaded. Martinez. or stipulations for the benefit of third parties. Palad. Tecson. Alcazaren. Gloria. Corpuz. Santos. Rañigo. Espina. the titles corresponding to their definite shares in Lot No. 9 from petitioners' four siblings. Reyes. no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. It is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a contract under the second paragraph of Article 1311. cannot sue for the enforcement of the supposed obligations arising from said contracts. it cannot be proven under the Parol Evidence Rule. it must be shown that "at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written Albano. even though they were not written in the Deeds of Sale. Francisco. However. which provides that "if a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person. it has no application to a stranger to a contract. Catindig. we likewise find that the trial and appellate courts did not err in rejecting them. to deliver to petitioners. Valois . by petitioners. not being parties to the contracts of sale between Ygoña and the petitioners' siblings. Cabañgon. only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under said contract. a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. De la Cruz. the reality is that their evidence is utterly unconvincing. contracts take effect only between the parties. 9 including the shares of the petitioners (the non-selling siblings). a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. aside from paying the purchase price. Marquez. petitioners. In the first place.

De Mesa. Reyes. Coronel. Rodriguez. Thus. Rañigo. Castillo. Sandoval. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule. Corpuz. Francisco. Ramirez. Tecson. Sy. Asensi. Marquez. Valois . Palad. Inguillo. Cabañgon. because they are barred from proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. Lumberio. Santos. Alcazaren. still petitioners' claim cannot prosper. Gloria. Tabugan. Albano. Catindig. Martinez." A beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. Lastimosa. Page 516 Echiverri. Valiente. Espina. De la Cruz. even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour autrui. Corporal.

Inguillo. The RTC disagreed with the MeTC on the aspect of off-setting the amount allegedly spent by petitioners for the repairs of the structural defects of subject property with their unpaid rentals. 164791. Asensi. Sandoval. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to compensation. Cabañgon. for which the petitioners spent P125. MeTC rendered its Decision finding that the unpaid rentals stood at only P95. it filed a Complaint for sum of money with the MeTC Quezon City. Valiente. Castillo. Rañigo. No.000. Lumberio. Francisco. De Mesa. The Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when two persons. Inc.000. Santos. Gloria. 354 Quezon Avenue.00 for unpaid rentals. Page 517 Echiverri. Martinez. Alcazaren. Palad. Coronel. Ramirez. it was renewed for a period of eight months at a rental rate of P23. Valois . They likewise asserted that SPI did not deliver the leased premises in a condition fit for petitioners' intended use. SPI sent a Demand Letter to the petitioners asking for full payment of rentals in arrears. Albano. CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision. are creditors and debtors of each other. After service of summons. Article 1663 of the Civil Code allows the lessee to make urgent repairs in order to avoid an imminent danger at the lessor's cost. Quezon City.Receiving no payment. Corporal. Reyes. Thus. are creditors and debtors of each other. SELWYN F.000. It also found that SPI is solely responsible for repairing the structural defects of the leased premises. SPECIAL PLANS. LAO AND EDGAR MANANSALA vs. Lastimosa. FACTS: Petitionerstogether with Benjamin Jim entered into a Contract of Lease with Special Plans. (SPI) over the latter’s building at No. petitioners filed their Verified Answer faulting SPI for making them believe that it owns the leased property.00. RTC rendered a Decision affirming with modification the MeTC Decision by ordering petitioners to pay SPI the amount of P95.R. Marquez. Catindig. Espina.000. Petitioners intended to use the premises for their karaoke and restaurant business known as "Saporro Restaurant". claiming that Jim and petitioners have accumulated unpaid rentals of P118. which SPI failed and refused to reimburse.Upon expiration of the lease contract. It held that even assuming that petitioners did not notify SPI about the structural defects and the urgency to repair the same.00. De la Cruz.000. 29 June 2010 DOCTRINE: Compensation shall take place when two persons. HELD: No. Rodriguez. in their own right. Tabugan. Sy. Corpuz. in their own right.00. G. petitioners claimed that they were constrained to incur expenses for necessary repairs as well as expenses for the repair of structural defects. Tecson.00 per month. INC.

Besides. Castillo. and a judgment is rendered liquidating such claim. it is contrary to human experience that a lessee would continually renew the lease contract if the subject property were not in good condition free from structural defects. although not in writing. who has an unliquidated claim. Rodriguez. the testimony of Tamayo. Further manifesting the present appeal's lack of merit. Alcazaren. Asensi. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Based on the arguments presented by both parties. it can be compensated against the plaintiff's claim from the moment it is liquidated by judgment. Tabugan. Corporal. A claim is liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed. Lumberio. Francisco. Further. we agree with the observation of the CA that: Petitioners did not present any convincing evidence of proof which could support their allegation on structural defects and the subsequent repairs made on the leased premises. Valiente. Sy. If acknowledged by the debtor. Marquez. the claim must be treated as liquidated. Cabañgon.e. Reyes. Palad. Rañigo. De Mesa. Coronel. Espina. i. Valois . legal compensation is inapplicable. did not define the lessor's and the lessees' understanding of the demarcation between "repairs of structural defects" and "necessary repairs. sets it up by way of counterclaim. the alleged subcontractor who made the repairs on the leased premises did not convince Us that there were repairs made thereat since he failed to present any receipts of acknowledgments of payments which was allegedly made to him. Ramirez." Albano. Santos. Consequently. petitioner Lao. documentary evidence (receipts of payments made to subcontractor Tamayo for the repairs made on the building) except for the self-serving testimony of petitioner Lao. They (petitioners) merely submitted an estimated statement of account which did not show that there were actual expenses made for the alleged structural defects. Tecson. Martinez. Catindig. De la Cruz. Inguillo. We have restated this in Solinap v. Page 518 Echiverri. Hon. Gloria. as shown above in his testimony. Corpuz. When the defendant. Del Rosario where we held that compensation takes place only if both obligations are liquidated. Neither were they able to submit proofs of actual expenses made on the alleged structural defects. Petitioners failed to properly discharge their burden to show that the debts are liquidated and demandable.

Catindig. Valois . Coronel. namely. he is in actual possession of and continues to cultivate the land. In their Answer. RONALD TANCO. Inguillo. Palad. and PATRICK TANCO. Ramirez. to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner. De la Cruz. 168164. respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property. He averred that in 1970. Marquez. Presently.4692 hectares located in Norzagaray. Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant. She asked him to vacate the property as soon as possible. It opined that since Vicente was performing functions more than just a mere caretaker and was even allowed to live in subject landholding with his family. Sandoval. then an implied tenancy was created. Geraldine. and Patrick. and spraying of the mango trees. Valiente. GERALDINE TANCO. and that they divided the fruits equally between them. Later on. Corporal. each receiving 7 hectares. Sy. expressly or impliedly. that respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees. Vicente fileda Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. it was partitioned amongher and her three children. Bulacan which was devoted to mango plantation.4692 hectare. Asensi. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve and establish his home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation. It held that since the landholding is an agricultural land. such as clearing. pruning. Albano. Castillo. Martinez. 5 July 2010 DOCTRINE:Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree. G. The fruits were then divided equally between them. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. No.Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicenteinforming him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). They likewise alleged that it was impossible for the late Arsenio to institute Vicente as tenant in 1970 since the Tanco family acquired the mango plantation from Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. De Mesa. Tabugan. Tecson. Rodriguez. Page 519 Echiverri. On appeal. he has been performing all phases of farm works. Espina. except Alice who got an extra 0. VICENTE ADRIANO vs. Corpuz. only in December 1975.R. Ronald.Insofar as Alice is concerned. as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. Arsenio Tanco. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente. smudging. he is therefore a tenant. FACTS: Alice purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28. Rañigo. Since then. Alcazaren. the husband of Alice.Respondents moved for reconsideration which was denied. Lumberio. Reyes. Gloria. ALICE TANCO. DARAB which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. Francisco. Santos. respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker. Respondents maintained that Alice agreed to this setup since the MARO made it clear to both parties that the contract was for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees only and that the same will not ripen into tenancy relationship.

After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case. petitioner's allegations of continued possession and cultivation do not support his cause. Page 520 Echiverri. The essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that the landowners recognized Vicente. Gloria. Tecson. as discussed above. must be presented to show that there was sharing of the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. Castillo. Independent evidence. there was no evidence presented to show sharing of harvest in the context of a tenancy relationship between Vicente and the respondents. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. for implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present. Lumberio. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. De la Cruz. Self-serving statements are not sufficient. Espina. Rañigo. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Sandoval. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests were the allegations of Vicente which. (3) there is consent between the parties. These cannot suffice because independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove consent of the landowner. Bulacan. Likewise. Valiente. Cabañgon. Valois . the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant. Santos. were self-serving and have no evidentiary value. Inguillo. Martinez. Here. It is essential that. the agricultural tenant must prove that he transmitted the landowner's share of the harvest. as their legitimate tenant. HELD: No. Besides. Catindig. (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. Coronel. All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship. and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal. Ramirez.Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree. And. (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant. to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner. For tenancy relationship to exist. such as receipts. (4) the purpose is agricultural production. Asensi. no evidence was presented to establish the presence of consent other than his self-serving statements. together with the other requisites of tenancy relationship. Tabugan. Lastimosa. as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. Corporal. although Vicente claims that he is a tenant of respondents' agricultural lot in Norzagaray. Reyes. Moreover. expressly or impliedly. (2) the subject matter is agricultural land. or that they hired him. we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking. the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship. Neither can we agree with the DARAB's theory of implied tenancy because the landowner never acquiesced to Vicente's cultivating the land. Albano. Francisco. Marquez. Palad. Sy. De Mesa. and that he has continuously cultivated and openly occupied it. and.

The property was declared in the name of Andres under Declaration of Real Property No. 2000. Tecson. Federico instructed Vicente to construct a perimeter fence on his property but he was prevented by Jose. Coronel. (Mano). Lastimosa. Espina. Ramirez. Mano sold a portion of the land covered by OCT No. 2010 DOCTRINE: “The rule that a Torrens Certificate of Title is conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein does not apply when such land. Valois . P-351. De la Cruz. 1991. Alcazaren.292 square meters. was issued in his name. Asensi. on February 7. Marquez. Jr.On March 4. SPS VALENZUELA vs. Palad. Inguillo. Bulacan. 1992. and the possession of the property was transferred to Federico.SPS MANO G. The RTC ruled in favor of Frederico. wherein the former agreed to sell to the latter a 2. This time. Rañigo. Gloria. Martinez. P-351 to Roberto S. 172611 July 9. On the same date. On January 8. Sandoval. trial ensued. T-112865 was issued in the name of Balingcongan covering 2. Balingcongan (Balingcongan). Lumberio. Cabañgon.R.739 square meters. Hence the present case ISSUE: Whether or not the CA properly heldrespondents as the owners of the disputed 447 square meter property Albano. On the other hand. Santos. Page 521 Echiverri. Pulilan. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. Thecase was set for pre-trial conference on March 27. Castillo. Corporal. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. the petitioners lodged a Complaintfor Annulment of Title and/or Reconveyance. Andres died on October 10. the CA reversed the decision. Sometime in 1999. Mano applied for a Free Patent and on April 10. claiming that the 447 square meters was his property as reflected in his TCT No. De Mesa. Vicente Joson (Vicente). Damages with the RTC of Malolos. Meanwhile. T-112864.056-square meter parcel of land located at Dampol 1st. Sy.Subsequently. located at Dampol 1st. Rodriguez. 1992. Reyes. Bulacan. Pulilan. 1998. 7187. 1959.When the matter could not be settled amicably. more or less. but on appeal.” FACTS: Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico) is the son of Andres Valenzuela (Andres) who was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land with an area of 938 square meters. Andres. or a portion thereof. Tabugan. Francisco. the property was indicated as covering an area of 2. T-112864 was also issued in the name of Jose covering 447 square meters. Bulacan. Federico left the care of the property to his nephew. was illegally or erroneously included in said title. The corresponding Deed of Salewas subsequently executed in March 1991. a Deed of Conditional Sale was executed between Feliciano Geronimo (Feliciano) and herein respondent Jose Mano. Thereafter. No. Valiente. Corpuz. Catindig. Federico is claiming it as part of the property he inherited from his father. TCT No.

Lot 1307 and 1308 and West. East. T-112865 was issued in the name of the spouses Balingcongan. Containing an area of Two Thousand Fifty Six (2. The certificate of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner. Valois . Alcazaren. 14312) situated at Dampol 1st. Reyes. Palad. 1305-A. Marquez. Rañigo." Feliciano sold a portion of Lot 1305 to Jose. 10175 which represents the upper portion of Lot No. Bounded on the North. does not become the owner of such land by virtue of the certificate alone. This exceeds the area of 2. South. No. Chavez. Santos. In another Sketch/Special Plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Norberto C. This is also known as Lot No. Chavez. Sandoval. Valiente. 10176-A with an area of 447 square meters had been made to appear as part of the lot sold by Feliciano to Jose. De Mesa. Tecson. It is clear from such document that Lot 1305-A representing the upper portion with an area of 1. We rule that Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot.Lot 1304 & 1299. (Bulacan). This is also known as Lot No. However. whose certificate of title included by mistake or oversight the land owned by another.D. The disputed 447 square meter property should be declared as Frederico’s. Cabañgon. "Settled is the rule that a person. After the sale was made. Martinez. Lot No. TCT No.Lot 6225. a Sketch/Special Plan was prepared by Geodetic Engineer Fortunato E. Gloria. T-112864 was issued in the name of Jose. Francisco. If indeed this disputed area is part of Lot No. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Castillo. Pulilan. Espina. 10176-B with an area of 2. Tabugan.056 square meters indicated in the above sale transaction. Catindig. 1305-B. TCT No.292 square meters with a right of way going to Camino Provincial Highway was the one sold to Jose and which was also sold by him to the Balingcongan spouses. Asensi. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but is not intended to perpetrate fraud against the real owner of the land.292 square meters. Corpuz. Bulacan.Lot 1306 & 1311. Lumberio. 1305-B with a total area of 2.112 square meters was retained by Feliciano and what was sold was the lower portion thereof which became Lot No. more or less. 1305 then it should have been part of Lot No.056) square meters. what is surprising is that the said plan showed that Lot No." Albano. it is shown that Lot No. Lastimosa. Page 522 Echiverri. HELD: No. Corporal. 1305 was retained by Feliciano. Inguillo. The Deed of Conditional Sale described the property purchased by Jose as follows: A part of parcel of land (T. Coronel. Sy. 1305-A which was retained by Feliciano as it is at the East side of the said property. Ramirez.

Castillo. C.G. Palad. Valiente. and G of the twin modules. informed AWIA of the situation. Cabañgon. not on the personal knowledge of the court. Espina. Rañigo. and specifications. Page 523 Echiverri. and electrical engineering services. ADRIAN WILSON INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATES. Construction began in 1979 and was completed in 1980. however. Gloria. 162608 July 26. Inguillo. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not AWIA properly discharged its duty as construction administrator (2) Whether or not AWIA should be liable for the reimbursement of the salaries paid to the employees of TMX. Martinez. Corporal. 2010 DOCTRINE:“Actual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been before he was injured. Francisco.R.e. as well as structural. Asensi. Under the Civil Code. Santos. Reyes. i. Under the aforementioned provisions. De la Cruz. mechanical. Sandoval. Tabugan. Corpuz.” FACTS: TMX engaged the services of AWIA for the construction of its watch assembly plant in Cebu (composed of twin modules and another separately designed module). INC. Catindig. Coronel. P. Tecson. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented. AWIA was tasked to guard TMX against construction problems and to ensure the quality Albano. plans. TMX could solely and absolutely rely on the assessments and recommendations of AWIA. Rodriguez.TMX PHILIPPINES. to guard TMX from defects and deficiencies during the construction phase by determining the progress and quality of the work of the general contractor. F. Sy. TMX noticed numerous cracks and beam deflections (vertical shifting) along the roof girders and beams in columns B. Ramirez. After five years. the CA found AWIA negligent of its duties and ordered them to pay the employees fees paid by TMX during the work stoppage. and certainly not on flimsy. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. one of AWIA’s duties was construction administration. De Mesa. Valois . opining that the problem may have been due to design errors. Dakay Construction Company (P. Lumberio. Lastimosa. HELD: (1) Yes. Alcazaren. Dakay). The RTC ruled in favor of TMX and ordered AWIA to reimburse TMX the partial cost of the repair but denied the reimbursement of employee’s fees. 1978 provided that AWIA would provide basic and detailed architectural designs. On appeal to the CA.. No. Their Agreement dated December 29. speculative and nonsubstantial proof. INC vs. G. remote. Marquez. TMX. AWIA failed in its duty to guard TMX against the contractor’s work deficiencies As can be inferred from the contract.G.Specifically. This is to ensure that this contractor works in accordance with the directed specifications.

The latter was compelled to shutdown the plant during the workdays in December to repair the roof. Ramirez. Inguillo. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented. Actual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been before he was injured. There is a causal connection between AWIA’s negligence and the expenses incurred by TMX. not on the personal knowledge of the court. Asensi. Rodriguez. Martinez. Tabugan. Page 524 Echiverri. Corporal. Moreover. Valois . Santos. therefore. Palad. Sy. Castillo.00 reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances. Corpuz. instead of 118. Dakay’s performance. Rañigo. (2) Yes. and it could issue certificates of payments for the progress billings of the contractor only if it found the latter’s job as covered by each of the billings satisfactory. Catindig. and certainly not on flimsy. Reyes. We find the amount of ₱500. Sandoval. AWIA should reimburse the cost of employment fees. we however acknowledge that TMX had to pay its employees during the shutdown and had suffered pecuniary loss for the structural problem. AWIA is not liable for the contractor’s construction errors on the following conditions: a) that it promptly and adequately informs TMX of whatever defects and deficiencies in the construction are and b) that it determines how these problems could be repaired. a relief to TMX in the form of temperate damages is warranted. Alcazaren. Thus. AWIA should not release a final certification of payment in favor of the contractor unless these had been done. Under the Civil Code. Albano. the cracks and deflections could have been rectified by the contractor before it was issued its final certification of payment and the owner could have been spared from further expenses. Coronel. including the salaries of its workers who were put on forced leave. of P. for which it can ask for reimbursement as actual damages. Tecson. Marquez. Espina. In the process. De la Cruz. De Mesa.G. Lastimosa. Francisco. Under the contract. Valiente. it incurred expenses for the repairs. Cabañgon.000. it is irrelevant whether TMX has its own engineering staff to evaluate the reports about the construction work. Had the effects on the marginal strength of the concrete been promptly disclosed to TMX. Gloria. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. remote. speculative and nonsubstantial proof. we concede to AWIA’s stance that the installation of only 11 shoring columns. Lumberio. As a matter of equity. While TMX failed to prove the exact amount of the salaries it had paid. would significantly reduce the number of days allotted for the repairs. It also had the authority to approve or reject the contractor’s work.

a Decision was rendered in petitioners favor. HELD: NO. Francisco. Rañigo. Tabugan. Coronel. Page 525 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Santos. ISSUE: WON a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat can be enforced against their successors-in-interest or holders of derivative titles. serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk. LUIS CESAR DELA MERCED. including the subject properties. In its October 28. petitioners filed a Motion for Execution. (November 23. petitioners filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties on the ground that petitioner. Sy. COL. FACTS: The Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots to the GSIS. Asensi. PAREDES vs. On September 11. Alcazaren. which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties. Valois . Ramirez. 23554 was issued in GSISs name. The Court nullified GSIS’s foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part of its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. and MARIA OLIVIA M. Lumberio. No. No. Sandoval. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED.R. the CA dismissed GSIS’s petition and held that execution may be enforced against it. TCT No. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation. substituted by his heirs namely. BLANQUITA DELAMERCED nee MACATANGAY. Corpuz. Catindig. Inguillo. 167140. Castillo. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and Spouses VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT G. 23554 on September 21. After a protracted litigation. 1984 in order to protect his interests in the subject properties. Tecson. Cabañgon. Dela Merced caused the annotation of lis pendens on GSISs TCT No. Martinez. or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. 2005 Decision. serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled. GSIS argues that the inclusion of derivative titles in the September 11. Pursuant to the finality of the above Decision. GSIS opines that the holders of the derivative titles are not bound by the judgment against GSIS because these holders are strangers to the action between GSIS and petitioners. Upon learning of the foreclosure. or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. was the owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. the case reached the SC. Lastimosa. Marquez. The effect of the annotation of lis pendens on future transactions over the subject property is Albano. not the Zuluetas. 140398 would deprive the holders of these derivative titles their day in court. 2001. 2011) DOCTRINE: A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation. and TCT No.R. De Mesa. Gloria. Espina. Reyes. Corporal. Palad. Valiente. Upon consolidation of GSISs ownership. Further. 2001 Decision in G.

respondents timely registered a notice of lis pendens to warn the whole world that the property Albano. Vda. 1998. whose title is expressly subject to the outcome of the litigation by the fact of the annotation of lis pendens. De Mesa. 23554. the Court allowed the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the transferees pendente lite. Tabugan. Santos. Valois . 1985 and August 24. Rañigo. Alcazaren. which this Court has finally adjudicated to be null and void. When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of lis pendens. Sy. who had knowledge of the pending litigation on the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on their titles. it follows that Dimaguilas and Victorinos titles. would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. Palad. both Victorino and Dimaguila had notice of the litigation involving GSISs ownership over the subject properties. 1984. Corpuz. As held in Selph v. Inguillo. Rodriguez. the title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no special protection. TCT No. as early as September 21. during the pendency of the case. The Court clarified therein that there was no need for the victorious [parties] to file a separate action to enforce their right to recover the property as against the new registered owners. As explained by this Court in another case. Espina. In other words. The existence of these entries on Dimaguilas and Victorinos titles bars any defense of good faith against petitioners and effectively makes Dimaguila and Victorino mere privies of GSIS and subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the subject properties. which (as it turns out) is none at all. the Court affirmed the judgments of the trial and appellate courts cancelling the titles of the spouses Vaca. Marquez. What Dimaguila and Victorino possess are derivative titles of the GSISs title over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2. Reyes. Lumberio. The Court explained therein: Admittedly. 23554 was cancelled with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 and new individual titles were issued to Victorino and Dimaguila. he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest. Francisco. are likewise null and void. despite the fact that the spouses Vaca were not parties to the case between Associated Bank and the Pronstrollers. who were transferees pendente lite of Associated Bank. 23554 of the GSIS. any cancellation or issuance of the title of the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same. Sandoval. de Aguilar. discussed by an authority on land titles and registration: Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered. Ramirez. Catindig. an order to cancel the transferors title may be enforced against his transferee. Castillo. It is not disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. Ineluctably. Valiente. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Martinez. upon the termination of the litigation there can be no risk of losing the property or any part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens. In Voluntad v. and were bound by the outcome of the litigation. Gloria. Both titles had the notice of lis pendens which was carried over from TCT No. or any other title over the subject properties that are derived from TCT No. Pronstroller. Corporal. Coronel. 23554. In Associated Bank v. Spouses Dizon. On July 29. such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of the litigation. Page 526 Echiverri. Asensi. Tecson. De la Cruz. which covers Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2. Given the legal maxim that a spring cannot rise higher than its source.

Their inclusion in the writ of execution does not vary or exceed the terms of the judgment. Judge Tiro. Gloria. refers to the jurisdiction. gives the court clear authority to cancel the title of the spouses Vaca. No. De Mesa. Valiente. Espina. De la Cruz. Corporal. Valois . In Cabresos v. Coronel. No. Founded upon public policy and necessity. Lumberio. since the sale of the subject property was made after the notice of lis pendens.R. Catindig. Ramirez. Santos. Sandoval. Martinez. GSISs narrow interpretation would render nugatory the principle that a final judgment against a party is binding on his privies and successors-in-interest.R. Marquez. Page 527 Echiverri. Reyes. pending the continuance of the action. Palad. 140398 is enforceable only against GSISs title because it does not contain the phrase and all its derivative titles. and until final judgment. Lastimosa. This registration. and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Castillo. Sy. of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Tabugan. We cannot sustain this interpretation. power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit. Asensi. lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated. Inguillo. Alcazaren. the Court upheld the respondent judges issuance of an alias writ of execution against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite the fact that these successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were never parties to the case. The Court explained that an action is binding on the privies of the litigants even if such privies are not literally parties to the action. 140398 ordering the cancellation of GSISs title. Tecson. therefore. the inclusion of the derivative titles in the writ of execution will not alter the Decision in G. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Corpuz. which literally means pending suit. Francisco. Albano. bona fide or not. Lis pendens. and (2) to bind a purchaser.x x x The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations. x x x The Court cannot accept GSISs theory that the dispositive portion of the Decision in G. In the same way. was the subject of a pending litigation.

5% per month or 6. which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1. Tecson. ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred when it held that the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent (6%) to seven percent (7%) is not contrary to law. 1983. A document entitled Acknowledgment of Debt for the amount of P290. Annulment. Francisco. 1998. such stipulated interest rates may be declared as illegal if the same is unconscionable. 1993 up to December 31.000. filed with the RTC of Cebu City a complaint against Marilou for Declaration of Nullity and Payment. Lastimosa. Castillo. threatened. or intimidated in signing the document referred to as Acknowledgment of Debt and in issuing the postdated checks which was affirmed by the CA. Nevertheless. Martinez. Thus. 1982. MARILOU HYDEN G. Valois . however. Coronel. Inguillo. 1982. De Mesa. There is certainly nothing in said circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Tabugan.000. the defendant-spouses were never able to pay their indebtedness from the very beginning and when their obligations ballooned into a staggering sum. which compelled Albano. parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate interest rates. morals. Sandoval. Catindig.R.00 remained unpaid. Marquez. the debtor. Corporal. The RTC did not find any showing that petitioner was forced. 905 s. there was no urgency of the need for money on the part of Jocelyn. good customs. the creditors filed a collection case against them. No. Corpuz. Injunction and Damages. 1997. iniquitous. JOCELYN TOLEDO vs. In view of Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. However. Court of Appeals we annulled a stipulated 5. Alcazaren. Asensi.00 loan for being excessive. However. Gloria. FACTS: Petitioner obtained several loans from respondent. Rodriguez. There is certainly nothing in said circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. public order or public policy. parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate interest rates. in Medel v. in April 1998. From August 15. Sum of Money. Palad. respondent visited petitioner in her office at CAP in Cebu City and asked petitioner and the other employees who were likewise indebted to her to acknowledge their debts. HELD: NO. Santos. Sy. Rañigo. Valiente.6% per annum interest with additional service charge of 2% per annum and penalty charge of 1% per month on a P500. 1983. (December 8. we cannot consider the disputed 6% to 7% monthly interest rate to be iniquitous or unconscionable vis--vis the principle laid down in Medel. However petitioner ordered the stop payment on the remaining checks and on October 27. In this case. unconscionable and exorbitant. 172139. Page 528 Echiverri. Ramirez. In this case. such stipulated interest rates may be declared as illegal if the same is unconscionable. In fact. Espina. Noteworthy is the fact that in Medel. Cabañgon.000. which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1. petitioner had been religiously paying respondent the stipulated monthly interest by issuing checks and depositing sums of money in the bank account of the latter. Reyes. 2010) DOCTRINE: In view of Central Bank Circular No.00 was signed by the petitioner with two of her subordinates as witnesses. De la Cruz. Lumberio. Nevertheless. the total principal amount of P290.

In this way. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Valois . This is the reason why she did not mind the 6% to 7% monthly interest. It is patently clear from the above summary of the facts that the conduct of Jocelyn can by no means be characterized as nobly fair. hence. Cabañgon. Castillo. Jocelyn religiously paid the agreed amount of interest until she ordered for stop payment on some of the checks issued to Marilou. and reasonable. thereby entitling her to 50% rebate on her sales. In fact. and absolutely revolting to the conscience of man. Palad. Ramirez. Santos. Reyes. Lastimosa. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity. her to enter into said loan transactions. there was an available balance of P276. Marquez. Gloria. It was clearly shown that before Jocelyn availed of said loans. She used the money from the loans to make advance payments for prospective clients of educational plans offered by her employer. Jocelyn cannot now go to court to have the said interest rate annulled on the ground that it is excessive. and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. she knew fully well that the same carried with it an interest rate of 6% to 7% per month. Tecson. an employee of the Bank of Commerce where Jocelyn is one of their clients. Asensi. Valiente. Coronel. This Court likewise notes certain acts of Jocelyn before filing the case with the RTC. Rodriguez. The checks were in fact sufficiently funded when she ordered the stop payment and then filed a case questioning the imposition of a 6% to 7% interest rate for being allegedly iniquitous or unconscionable and. Sandoval. yet she did not complain. Corporal. Corpuz. unfair and dishonest. Francisco. Rañigo. But as testified by Serapio Romarate. Inguillo. Page 529 Echiverri. she requested Marilou not to deposit her checks as she can cover the checks only the following month. She then caught Marilou by surprise when she surreptitiously filed a case for declaration of nullity of the document and for damages.203. Alcazaren. exorbitant. On the next month. It turned out that she was only sweet-talking Marilou into believing that she had no money at that time. unconscionable. Sy. Jocelyn again requested for another extension of one month. Martinez. just. Albano. or fraudulent. De Mesa. In September 1998. After years of benefiting from the proceeds of the loans bearing an interest rate of 6% to 7% per month and paying for the same. contrary to morals. when she availed of said loans. a business transaction of this nature between Jocelyn and Marilou continued for more than five years. Tabugan. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable.03 in the latters account and yet she ordered for the stop payments of the seven checks which can actually be covered by the available funds in said account. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. her sales production would increase. Espina. We are convinced that Jocelyn did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean hands. an advance interest of 6% to 7% was already deducted from the loan amount. iniquitous. or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. yet she never uttered a word of protest. Catindig. Notably too.

Quezon City. Inguillo. The offer made by Lourdes is no longer binding and effective at the time she decided to sell the subject lot to the De Leons because the same was not accepted by Roberto. Reyes. No. Gloria. Rañigo. De Leon. and her two grandsons. except Lourdes Q. On May 30. Tabugan. nor an agreement that he shall have lands. and GUILLERMA L. SANDICO-SILVA. Espina. Rodriguez. Lumberio. On November 8. Page 530 Echiverri. (December 8. Barangay Old Balara. or rather. It is simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. Coronel. Ramirez. Cabañgon. her son-in-law Wilfredo De Leon. LOURDES Q. the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. as attorney-in-fact of the defendants. Catindig. Alcazaren. Sy. Corporal. Guillerma S. except to the second party. respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale. Corpuz. The owner parts with his right to sell his lands. Asensi. ROBERTO TUAZON vs. Albano. located along Tandang Sora Street. 168325. Lourdes sold subject parcel of land to her only child. Tecson. but he does sell something. Del Rosario-Suarez G. Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction against Lourdes and the De Leons. 1994. DE LEON. Roberto refused hence. 2000. from his point of view. More than four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease.R. the court a quo rendered a Decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Lourdes in favor of the De Leons as valid and binding. On August 30. Valois . but he does get something of value. that is. 2005. The offer made by Lourdes to Roberto did not ripen into a contract to sell because the price offered by the former was not acceptable to the latter. for a limited period. MIGUEL LUIS S. Lastimosa. the CA issued its Decision dismissing Robertos appeal and affirming the Decision of the RTC. The second party gets in praesenti. not lands. After trial. De Leon and Rommel S. On June 24. the right to call for and receive lands if he elects. WILFREDO DE LEON. 2010) DOCTRINE: Option Contract is an agreement in writing to give a person the option to purchase lands within a given time at a named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. Marquez. Palad. notified respondent to vacate the premises. he does not then agree to sell it. Valiente. Miguel Luis S. DEL ROSARIO-SUAREZ. petitioner and executed a Contract of Lease over the abovementioned parcel of land for a period of three years. He does not sell his land. he receives the right to elect to buy. Reconveyance. while the ejectment case was on appeal. Santos. that is. FACTS: Respondent was the owner of a parcel of land. ROMMEL LEE S. Sandoval. Martinez. Castillo. Silva. the MeTC rendered a Decision ordering Roberto to vacate the property for non-payment of rentals and expiration of the contract. 2000. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Francisco. SUAREZ-DE LEON. DE LEON. Catalina Suarez-De Leon. The new owners through their attorney-in-fact. The second party receives this right. ISSUES: WON the petitioner violated the respondent’s right to buy subject property under the principle of right of first refusal by not giving him notice and the opportunity to buy the property under the same terms and conditions or specifically based on the much lower price paid by the De Leons. CATALINA R. the De Leons filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer before MeTC of Quezon City against him.

He does not sell his land. On the other hand. or. De la Cruz. an elucidation on the right of first refusal was made thus: In the law on sales.. De Mesa. Lacking these two essential requisites. it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by. the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a determined price. Sandoval. for a limited period. the so-called right of first refusal is an innovative juridical relation. The second party gets in praesenti. It is not to say. that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. but he does sell something. the exercise of the right. he receives the right to elect to buy. Lastimosa. HELD: NO. the nature of an option contract is explained thus: In his Law Dictionary. per se be brought within the purview of an option under the second paragraph of Article 1479. 695. Page 531 Echiverri. Rodriguez. It is simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. edition of 1897. Rep. in the following language: A contract by virtue of which A. In a right of first refusal. it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. that the right of first refusal would be inconsequential for. Coronel. to the case where there was cause or consideration for the obligation x x x. given. what amounts to the same thing. 24 Am. or selling to. while the object might be made determinate. Court of Appeals. Reyes. Prior thereto. the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. what is involved is only a right of first refusal. 420. Santos. except to the second party. But the two definitions above cited refer to the contract of option. Neither can the right of first refusal. 5. Valois . like here.) From Vol. Asensi. that is. 6. however. From the foregoing. The second party receives this right. understood in its normal concept. the right to call for and receive lands if he elects. Valiente. nor would it sanction an action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts. Ramirez. that is. it is thus clear that an option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first refusal in that in the former. among other things. but he does get something of value.. B certain securities or properties within a limited time at a specified price. the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct. or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 of the same Code. Needless to point out. an unjustified disregard thereof. Corpuz. Castillo. (Story vs. page 5001. the circumstances expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Palad. from his point of view. In Beaumont v. 10 Mont. would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms. Tabugan. An option or an offer would require. a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. for instance. nor an agreement that he shall have lands. in consideration of the payment of a certain sum to B. of the work Words and Phrases. in Ang Yu Asuncion v. Martinez. Rañigo. aforequoted. Tecson.. Bouvier defines an option as a contract. 17) the following quotation has been taken: An agreement in writing to give a person the option to purchase lands within a given time at a named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. its breach cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its existence. or rather. however. including the price. Leiser (24 Pac. The owner parts with his right to sell his lands. St. citing the case of Ide vs. Gloria. among other laws of general application. Espina. 71 N. Salamon.. Marquez. Prieto. Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under a final judgment. Corporal. he does not then agree to sell it. Alcazaren. acquires the privilege of buying from. Albano. Sy. Catindig. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Lumberio. not lands. Y. can warrant a recovery for damages. such as already intimated above. Francisco.

Marquez. Francisco. Raul. remove the improvements thereon. Corpuz. the case was eventually dismissed. Coronel. filed a complaint for "maintenance and damages" against Letecia. Albano.R. 2010 DOCTRINE: There is a presumption of regular performance of official duty only when there is nothing on record that would arouse suspicions of irregularity. for reasons undisclosed by the records. Martinez. Espina. Corporal. Santos. This Court will not disturb the conclusions arrived at by the CAR and the appellate court when these are well-supported by the evidence. and to return possession thereof to respondents. No. The court explained that Raul’s unilateral installation as Alipio’s successor was void because it violated the landowners’ right to choose the successor as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Agrarian Reform. vs. Catindig. Tecson. The Colmenareses admitted that Alipio was their agricultural lessee but denied any knowledge of the survey which led to the issuance of the CLT in Alipio’s favor. Sy. The complaint alleged that Alipio Palomata (Alipio) was the bona fide agricultural lessee of Letecia. Tabugan. Page 532 Echiverri. Lumberio. and Teresa Gurrea. hence. Rañigo. As landowner. Valiente. filed a criminal complaint for squatting against Raul in 1981. the subject property remained part of Colmenareses’ landholding. The trial court held that Raul. Iloilo on which stand petitioner’shouse and talyer. However. Palad. Appellate Court ruled that since Raul did not prove that the subject property was part of his father’s farmlot. the trial court’s order for Raul to vacate the subject property was correct ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ordering the petitioner to vacate the subject property. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Sandoval. Alcazaren. together with his father Alipio. her son Nestor Colmenares. De la Cruz. The refusal of the Bureau of Lands and DAR officials to affirm their written findings in open court indicates that the presumption should not apply in the evaluation of these reports. Asensi. Colmenares had the right to oust an intruder thereon. Inguillo. Gloria. December 15. had no right to a homelot. De Mesa. NESTOR COLMENARES and TERESA GURREA G. Ramirez. HELD: All these circumstances support the trial and the appellate court’s refusal to give the investigation reports much weight and credence. Lastimosa. Reyes.claiming ownership over the said land. In order to prevent further ejectment from the subject property. FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land along the Camambugan Creek in Balasan. Letecia Colmenares. Valois . not being an agricultural lessee of the Colmenareses. RAUL PALOMATA. Raul contended that the subject property occupied by his house and talyer was part of Alipio’s farmlot. 174251. The Colmenareses countered that the property claimed by Raul is within their subdivision. Castillo. not within the agricultural land tenanted by Alipio.

There is a presumption of regular performance of official duty only when there is nothing on record that would arouse suspicions of irregularity. Espina. Gloria. as he did fail. the CLT. Raul then maintains that the Colmenareses did not prove their ownership over the subject lot. Raul then argues that the trial and appellate courts should have given more weight to the surveys of the Bureau of Lands because these carry the presumption of the regular performance of official duty. Marquez. In fact. Martinez. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Albano. if Raul fails. by alleging their right to the subject property as tenant-farmers of the Colmenareses. then the presumption is that it remains the property of the Colmenareses. they even prove quite the opposite: that the subject property is actually not included in the farmlot. De la Cruz. hence it should be presumed that the lot is owned by its current possessor. at best. A necessary consequence to the exclusion of the subject property from Alipio’s CLT is the ejectment of the Palomatas therefrom. Asensi. tax declaration and investigation reports offered by the Palomatas as evidence of their right to the subject property are. Santos. Sandoval. Rodriguez. The argument fails to convince. Catindig. Thus. to prove that the subject property was awarded to his father through a CLT. Alcazaren. Raul’s argument ignores the fact that. While the Colmenareses’ prayer does not expressly include the ejectment of the Palomatas. Corporal. The Palomatas have no right to stay on the subject property if it is not covered by Alipio’s CLT. The refusal of the Bureau of Lands and DAR officials to affirm their written findings in open court indicates that the presumption should not apply in the evaluation of these reports. Valois . De Mesa. Valiente. Castillo. inconclusive and insufficient to prove their claim that the subject property is included in Alipio’s farmlot. Rañigo. Tecson. the Palomatas readily admitted that the land belonged to the Colmenareses. Coronel. it does include a prayer for the court to declare that the subject property was excluded from Alipio’s CLT. which was limited to the annulment of the CLT or the exclusion of the subject property from the CLT’s coverage. Lumberio. Page 533 Echiverri. Raul proceeds to question the trial and appellate court’s order for him to vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof to the Colmenareses. He contends that the said order goes beyond the prayer of the Colmenareses. Reyes. Francisco. Palad. Corpuz. Inguillo. In sum. The argument is specious at best. Sy.

hence. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ G. FACTS: The BANK is a domestic financial corporation that extends loans to subdivision developers/owners Petitioner DELTA is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling real estate properties. but ordered DELTA to accept payment of the balance of P108. Francisco. the BANK. The Board held that DELTA and Enriquez were presumed to have had a meeting of the minds on the object of the sale and the purchase price. instead of foreclosing the REM. either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved. The Board upheld the validity of the contract to sell between DELTA and Enriquez despite the alleged violation of the price ceilings in BP 220. and (upon such payment) to deliver to Enriquez the title to the house and lot free from liens and encumbrances. that the dacion en pago was not annotated on the TCT of Lot 4. Said Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases. It appears. DELTA executed a Contract to Sell with respondent Enriquez over the house and lot in Lot 4. among the properties assigned to the BANK was the house and lot of Lot 4.013. Alcazaren. Both Enriquez and the BANK appealed to the Office of the President. Absent any circumstance vitiating Enriquezconsent. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Santos. unless the parties by agreement.36 from Enriquez. HLURB upheld the validity of the purchase price. Tabugan. Valois . No. agreed to a dation in payment or a dacion en pago. 168646. the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage. in which case the obligation is totally extinguished. she was bound by the terms of the contract. Palad. DELTA is owned by Ricardo De Leon who is the registered owner of a parcel of land which corresponds to Lot 4 of Delta Homes I. Sy. Asensi. particularly Delta Homes I in Cavite. Martinez. consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation. Lastimosa. Unknown to Enriquez. however. Catindig. Ramirez. Castillo. De Leon and his spouse obtained a P4 million loan from the BANK for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. The BANK disagreed with the ruling upholding Enriquezs Contract to Sell. and insisted on its ownership over Lot 4. The records do not bear out and the parties are silent on whether the BANK was able to transfer title to its name. Reyes. The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered. DELTA then obtained a Certificate of Registration and a License to Sell from the HLURB. To secure the loan. Sandoval. Tecson. It argued that it has become impossible for DELTA to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and to deliver Lot 4s title to Enriquez given that Albano. Cabañgon.R. Corporal. Espina. Lumberio. Rodriguez. When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation. Enriquez filed a complaint against DELTA and the BANK before alleging that DELTA violated the terms of its License to Sell. or by their silence. express or implied. Page 534 Echiverri. she was presumed to have willingly and voluntarily agreed to the higher purchase price. Rañigo. Marquez. which is the subject of her Contract to Sell with DELTA. Inguillo. Valiente. Corpuz. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. Coronel. Gloria. January 12. 2011 DOCTRINE: The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt.

if title to Lot 4 is ordered delivered to Enriquez. Valois . Francisco. Espina. According to the BANK. Valiente. Like in all contracts. Castillo. Alcazaren. The Court is not persuaded. The BANK then posits that. Tecson. Inguillo. In the case at bar. the intention of the parties to the dation in payment is paramount and controlling. Lumberio. Coronel. Marquez. Corpuz. Lastimosa. the dation in payment extinguished the loan only to the extent of the value of the thing delivered. Albano. De Mesa. has assumed the risk that some of the assigned properties are covered by contracts to sell which must be honored under PD 957. the BANK. Contracts of sale come with warranties. Cabañgon. DELTA would remain indebted to that extent. Sandoval. To be sure. such that DELTA has no more obligations to the BANK. Since Lot 4 would have no value to the BANK if it will be delivered to Enriquez. Tabugan. DELTA has the obligation to pay the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. Sy. ISSUE: Whether or not the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation. DELTA had already relinquished all its rights to Lot 4 in favor of the BANK via the dation in payment. Gloria. The OP adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB Decisions. however. Martinez. Rodriguez. which it affirmed in toto. the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the BANK indicates a clear intention by the parties that the assigned properties would serve as full payment for DELTAs entire obligation: A dacion en pago is governed by the law of sales. it is waivable and cannot be invoked if the buyer knew of the risks or danger of eviction and assumed its consequences. Page 535 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Palad. Ramirez. in accepting the assigned properties as full payment of DELTAs total obligation. either express (if explicitly stipulated by the parties) or implied (under Article 1547 et seq. of the Civil Code). The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered. Santos. the Dation in Payment has no express warranties relating to existing contracts to sell over the assigned properties. As the Court have noted earlier. Reyes. HELD: No. unless the parties by agreement. The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt. in which case the obligation is totally extinguished. or by their silence. express or implied. Rañigo. In this case. The CA ruled against the validity of the dacion en pago executed in favor of the BANK on the ground that DELTA had earlier relinquished its ownership over Lot 4 in favor of Enriquez via the Contract to Sell. As to the implied warranty in case of eviction. Asensi. either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved. Catindig. consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation. the BANK does not even point to any breach of warranty by DELTA in connection with the Dation in Payment. Corporal.

the issuance of a writ of possession. Castillo. the court cannot exercise its discretion. Spouses FERNANDO and ANGELINA EDRALIN vs. Albano. it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof.R. Sandoval. After consolidation of title in the purchaserâs name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property. Corpuz. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK G. Lumberio. No. ISSUE: Whether or not Veterans Bank is entitled to a writ of possession HELD: Yes. Veterans Bank applied for a writ of possession in the trial court. The purchaser. Reyes. Palad. Alcazaren. Rodriguez.000. becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. First among its arguments. Veterans Bank maintained that it was the trial courtâs ministerial duty to grant a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has consolidated and registered the property in its name. Veterans Bank foreclosed the property extrajudicially. Santos. Cabañgon. FACTS: Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin (Edralins) a loan in the amount P270. In due course. Rañigo. Gloria. The Edralins failed to pay their obligation to Veterans Bank. Tabugan. upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. Valois . Despite the foregoing. Espina. Veterans Bank filed a petition for mandamus before the CA. Veterans Bank acquired absolute ownership of the subject property. Ramirez. Effectively. Coronel. petitioners executed a REM in favor of Veterans Bank over a real property owned by Fenando. consequently. As security thereof. The appellate court ruled in favor of Veterans Bank. who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period.00. Francisco. Corporal. Marquez. 168523 March 9. Asensi. Catindig. 2011 DOCTRINE: The right to possess a property follows the right of ownership. the purchaserâs right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. Inguillo. Page 536 Echiverri. De Mesa. The trial court dismissed Veterans Bankâs application due to an agreement in the REM that the bank shall take possession of the property without any judicial intervention. At that point. Valiente. Lastimosa. Sy. the foreclosure sale was held and Veterans Bank emerged as the highest bidder at the said foreclosure sale and was issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale. Upon the Edralinsâfailure to redeem the property during the one-year period. the Edralins failed to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to Veterans Bank. Martinez. De la Cruz. Tecson.

Alcazaren. Upon appeal. OCHOA namely: RUBY B.00 for attorney’s fees and the Albano.000. The RTC found the taxicab driver negligent and found the evidence adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Tabugan. Catindig. No. MICAELA B. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION G. 170071 July 16. Page 537 Echiverri. P100. De Mesa. Asensi. Valiente.000. No. Tecson. Lumberio. However. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. Castillo.000. Francisco. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on the night of March 10. Rodriguez. Corpuz. the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the following MODIFICATION: “appellant is ordered to pay appellees the sum of P50. Sandoval. OCHOA and JOMAR B. the trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. 2012 DOCTRINE: Acquittal in the criminal case does not affect the prosecution of an independent civil action arising from a contract of carriage.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the deceased Jose Marcial K. a common carrier. the heirs filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC. OCHOA.R. OCHOA. for lack of receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual damages. P50. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. De la Cruz. P200. FACTS: Jose Marcial K. 2012 x-----------------------x G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. 170125 July 16. the trial court denied the heirs’ claim for actual damages. Coronel. Sy. Gloria. Inguillo. Ramirez. Palad. Reyes. Rañigo. Marquez.As G & S failed to heed the same. Ochoa. OCHOA.R. vs. MICAELA B. Espina.000. It also denied them moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. Valois . OCHOA and JOMAR B.00 as exemplarydamages. Hence.00 as moral damages. OCHOA G. Corporal. Santos. 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation (G & S). Cabañgon. Martinez. Lastimosa.

the same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. De Mesa. viz: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. Gloria. it is an independent civil action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident. same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. Martinez.R. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Page 538 Echiverri. In this case. Santos. Palad. Ramirez.244. Catindig. No. Lastimosa. while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case. costs of litigation. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it overlooked the fact that the MTC Decision convicting Padilla of reckless imprudence has already been reversed on appeal by the RTC with Padilla having been accordingly acquitted of the crime charged. The trial court’s award of P6. Valiente. They point out that as correctly found by the trial court. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides. Sandoval. Espina. Lumberio. Moreover. Valois . Marquez.537. Corporal. Cabañgon. Rañigo. Francisco. Castillo.96 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is DELETED for lack of basis. Also. There was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case. 170125 G & S reiterates its arguments that the proximate cause of the accident is a fortuitous event and/or the negligence of the driver of the delivery van which bumped the right portion of its taxicab and. Alcazaren. Sy. that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Rodriguez. Tecson. De la Cruz. the Albano. The heirs contend that fortuitous event was not the proximate cause of the mishap. Corpuz. Hence. Even without those quoted portions. This was why the impact was so strong when the taxicab rammed the fly-over railings and was split into two when it hit the ground. G & S remains to be civilly liable to the heirs for its breach of contract of carriage and from its negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Padilla was running at an extremely high speed.” G. Reyes. the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. Asensi. Clearly. Tabugan. HELD: Regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case. we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S’ claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case. Inguillo. Coronel.

Valois . The fact that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial. Tabugan. Marquez. Reyes. Cabañgon. already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. Rañigo. Palad. Castillo. Martinez. Catindig. Page 539 Echiverri. Espina. Corpuz. Coronel. in fact. Santos. Rodriguez. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Francisco. Corporal. Lumberio. This is because the CA has. appellate court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the same. Lastimosa. Sy. Valiente. Albano. Ramirez. Inguillo. Sandoval. Gloria. Tecson. Asensi. Alcazaren.

Tecson. Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 20. The CA affirmed. Sen. Francisco. and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. Hence. Castillo. De la Cruz. De Mesa. argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. No. Tamano is void 2.inter alia. in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Valois . Corpuz. Sandoval. Sy. Instead of submitting her answer. Cabañgon. under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge on June 2. HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. 1995. The CA then denied Zoraydas Motion to Dismiss. Tamanos Legitimate children with Zorayda. or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code).Tamano for being bigamous. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31. Marquez. Martinez. Summons were served to Estrellita but she failed to file an Answer. TAMANO G. Page 540 Echiverri.filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Gloria. in the case of subsequent marriage laws. Santos. solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. leaving Estrellita to file a petition for certiorari. not what is past. Regarding the nullity case filed by Zorayda in the RTC. Whether or not Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case HELD: First issue: The marriage between the late Sen. prompting her to file a petition of certiorari with the SC. 1083. Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. Espina. Palad. no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple. In their marriage contracts. The RTC denied. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced. On November 23. however. 1993. Inguillo. 2011 DOCTRINE: A new law ought to affect the future. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958. questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Ramirez. Valiente. Lastimosa. Meanwhile. Reyes. Rodriguez. 1993 in Cotabato City and. Tabugan. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. hearings there were repeatedly postponed at the instance of Estrellita. 169766 March 30. referred to the CA. that Sen. Rañigo. Tamano (Adib). private respondents HajaPutriZoraydaA.The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950. the RTC declared the marriage between Estrellita And Sen. under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given Albano. Coronel. Catindig. ISSUES: 1. Tamano void. Alcazaren. FACTS: Around 11 months before his death. Asensi. which still upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27. subsequently.R. Corporal. 1958 under civil rites. Sen. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Lumberio.The complaint alleged. 1994.

which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Catindig. No.M. Inguillo. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him. Tecson. Second issue: Under A. any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription. Castillo. Sy. Lastimosa. it has been held that in a void marriage. this is not what the Rule contemplated. divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4. Francisco. Asensi. Marquez.394 which was not availed of during its effectivity. No. Espina. time. Page 541 Echiverri.M. In view of Sen. Rañigo. Albano. Ortiz. Tabugan. Coronel. Ramirez. Corpuz. For Estrellita. "Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Palad.While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A. Corporal. 02-11-10-SC. in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights. PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Gloria.As ruled in Tamano v. the law that codified Muslim personal laws. 02-11-10-SC. Sen. Santos. De Mesa. However. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083. Rodriguez. Valiente. and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen." as in bigamy cases. Hon. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code. Moreover. Lumberio. Reyes. Valois . Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. If Estrellitas interpretation is employed.Surely. Martinez. De la Cruz. 1977. Tamano and Zorayda. Alcazaren. their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio. Cabañgon. Sandoval." This refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse.

Lastimosa. Valiente. If he claims a right granted or created by law. Valois . Francisco. Sandoval. title to the same was consolidated in favor of China Bank and the title of the property was issued in its name. Corporal. it was only in November 2003 that it knew of the foreclosure of the subject property when it received a letter from China Bank informing it that as early as August 2000. Bulacan. Lumberio. FACTS: Enrico Santos filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. No. Rañigo. Notwithstanding receipt. Coronel. De Mesa. Since petitioner likewise failed to redeem the property within the redemption period. Alcazaren. the payment of which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgageconstituted over the subject property. Santos. title to the property had already been effectively consolidated in the name of Albano. Respondent alleged that petitioner and his wife obtained a loan from China Banking Corporation (China Bank) in the amount of ₱20 million. Maria. Tabugan. According to respondent. Corpuz. he must prove his claim by competent evidence. Inguillo. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE G. Catindig. Asensi. Palad. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent. Cabañgon. Hence. For failing to pay despite demand the rentals for several months and for its refusal to vacate the property even after the termination of the lease contracts. Marquez. April 6. Tecson. Page 542 Echiverri. Castillo. Sy. petitioner sent respondent a formal demand for the latter to pay its unpaid monthly rentals and to vacate the property. Ramirez. 171129. It claimed that when petitioner entered into a contract of lease with it in 1998. He claimed therein that he is the registered owner of the subject property. the complaint. Rodriguez. Reyes. the property was eventually sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale where said bank emerged as the highest bidder. When petitioner failed to pay his obligation with China Bank. Despite this and again without informing respondent.R. De la Cruz. He entered into a Contract of Leasewith respondent National Statistics Office for the lease of the property which will be paid monthly. Gloria. Martinez. ENRICO SANTOS vs. respondent still refused to pay and to vacate the property. 2011 DOCTRINE:The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. petitioner misrepresented himself as still the absolute owner of the subject property and entered into the second and third contracts of lease with respondent. he did not inform respondent of the existence of said loan. Espina.

respondent believed that the second and third contracts of lease it entered with him had ceased to be in effect. Santos. and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent. the presumption will not apply. Page 543 Echiverri. Conversely. Corpuz. Reyes. Ramirez. It is clear from the above-quoted provision that "[w]hat a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. Martinez. "the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself. The conclusive presumption found in Sec. Francisco. petitioner has no legal right to demand that respondent pay him said rentals and vacate the leased premises. Rañigo." In other words. Coronel. Alcazaren." Hence. Sy. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court known as estoppel against tenants provides that “the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them”. Petitioner having ceased to be the owner of said property. Cabañgon. Tecson. if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation. Catindig. The documents submitted before the court. respondent has no legal obligation to pay to petitioner the rentals for the use and occupancy of the subject property. Gloria. a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in Albano. Otherwise. Palad. De la Cruz. 2(b). Valois . then the presumption does not apply. ISSUE: Whether or not the lessor and the lessee has better possession of the premises against the lessee. Lumberio. if the nature of the landlord’s title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant. Castillo. Hence. Asensi. the bank. De Mesa. then estoppel lies against the tenant. In this case. Lastimosa. Sandoval. HELD: The Court ruled that the lessor cannot claim the subject property. Rodriguez. Corporal. respondent has satisfactorily shown that title to the property has already been conveyed to China Bank. undeniably show that China Bank is the owner of the property and not petitioner. if there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease. Valiente. Tabugan. "As a matter of law. Espina. Marquez. Inguillo.

Palad. to whom it pays rents for its use. Tabugan. Santos. Sy. Lastimosa. petitioner’s action for unlawful detainer must fail. Page 544 Echiverri. Ramirez. De Mesa. Lumberio. Valois . Albano. Hence. we hold that petitioner does not have a better right of possession over the property as against respondent who is in actual possession thereof and who claims to derive its right of possession from the titleholder. China Bank. Rodriguez. The title holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property. Martinez." Not being the registered titleholder. Gloria. Coronel. Castillo. Asensi. Valiente. Inguillo. Francisco. Tecson. De la Cruz. Catindig. Sandoval. favor of the person in whose name the title appears. Cabañgon. it is obvious that petitioner is likewise not entitled to payment of damages for the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Corporal. Rañigo. Corpuz. including possession. Marquez. Alcazaren. Espina. subject only to limits imposed by law. Reyes. This being settled.

Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Tecson. that despite their objection. Castillo. HELD: The Court denied the petition. June 29. Santos. Whether or not the real estate mortgage and auction sale is valid. the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale. included their properties among the list of properties mortgaged. Corporal. and P1. Page 545 Echiverri. Reyes. No. 172227. SPOUSES WILFREDO PALADAand BRIGIDA PALADA vs. the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the properties at public auction. They received from the bank the amount of P1 million as additional working capital evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a real estate mortgagein favor of the bank covering several real properties situated in Santiago City.5 million under the time loan from respondent Solidbank Corporation (bank). Marquez. ISSUES: 1. Sandoval. Lumberio. Sy.000. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and SHERIFF MAYO DELA CRUZ G. Tabugan. Rañigo. Martinez. Gloria. Coronel. P500. 2011 DOCTRINE: Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ramirez.R. Palad. Petitioners alleged that the bank. without their knowledge and consent. 2. Valois . FACTS: Petitioners applied for a P3 million loan broken down as follows: P1 million as additional working capital under the bills discounting line. Whether or not there is bad faith on the part of the bank when they executed the real estate and the auction sale. Inguillo. Catindig. Due to the failure of petitioners to pay the obligation. Lastimosa. Francisco. De Mesa. Corpuz. Albano. that it was only when they received the notice of sale from the sheriff in August 1998 that they found out about the inclusion of the said properties. and that the auction sale was done in Santiago City in violation of the stipulation on venue in the real estate mortgage. Rodriguez.00 under the bills purchase line. Espina. Petitioners filed a Complaint for nullity of real estate mortgage and sheriffs certificate of salewith prayer for damages. Asensi. Alcazaren. Valiente.

Except for the bare denials of petitioner. Besides. Santos. Cabañgon. Sy. Corpuz. De la Cruz. a loan contract is perfected only upon the delivery of the object of the contract. Reyes. Petitioners claim that there was fraud and bad faith on the part of the bank in the execution and notarization of the real estate mortgage contract. the same day that it was notarized. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. 1997. Albano. Below the list of properties mortgaged are the signatures of petitioners. A careful perusal of the real estate mortgage contract would show that the bank did not make it appear that the real estate mortgage was executed on June 16.In this case. Alcazaren.00. Palad. no other evidence was presented to show that the signatures appearing on the dorsal portion of the real estate mortgage contract are forgeries. Espina. 2. Coronel. Page 546 Echiverri. Castillo. a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents. Corporal. only the amount of P1 million was approved by the bank because petitioners became collaterally deficient when they failed to purchase the subject property which had an appraised value of P1. Rañigo. as the date of execution of the real estate mortgage contract was left blank. Lumberio. Under Article 1934of the Civil Code. only the amount of P1 million was released by the bank to petitioners. And the mere fact that the date of execution was left blank does not prove bad faith. 1. Marquez. De Mesa. although petitioners applied for a P3 million loan. Tecson.944. any irregularity in the notarization or even the lack of notarization does not affect the validity of the document. Asensi. Catindig. Valiente. Martinez. Francisco. Absent any clear and convincing proof to the contrary.000. Gloria. Ramirez. Valois .Hence. Tabugan. Sandoval.There is nothing on the face of the real estate mortgage contract to arouse any suspicion of insertion or forgery.

Melecio A.June 13. Melecio A. Sandoval. Marquez. Sy. and Treasurer. The title of the purchased property was not immediately transferred to them because the duplicate and original copies of the title were destroyed by a fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. the issuance of a new title in his name for his one-half share of the Quezon City property. Lumberio. Albano. Asensi. Inc. and the nullification of real estate mortgage insofar as his one-half share is concerned. Rodriguez. petitioner agreed to delay the filing of a case in court. Tabugan. Corporal. represented by its President. Catindig.Lydia filed with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City an Affidavit of Cancellation of Adverse Claim which caused the cancellation of the adverse claim annotated on TCT. Javier. title to the said property was reconstituted and registered solely in the names of Lydia and her four children. Reyes. 171628. Slumberworld. was an innocent mortgagee in good faith. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G. ISSUE: Whether defendant Maunlad Savings and Loan Association. the brothers purchased a residential house. a loan secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the property. The brother of the petitioner died leaving behind his wife. who adjudicated to themselves the property. Francisco. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. obtained from Maunlad Savings and Loan Association. and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Coronel. Inc. Corpuz. ARMANDO V.R. ALANO vs. FACTS: Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing his brother to sell their property in Manila. and four legitimate children. Javier. Valois . Inc. Lastimosa. Valiente. Petitioner filed a Complaint against Lydia. Maunlad Savings and Loan Association. Inc. Tecson. De Mesa. This prompted petitioner to execute an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the TCT. Alano (Lydia). Inguillo. Rañigo. Page 547 Echiverri. Consequently. Ramirez.. Gloria. Lydia J. Palad. No. Castillo. Cabañgon. Petitioner sought the cancellation of TCT. Santos. But because of the assurance of his nieces that they would put things right. 2011 DOCTRINE: No one can give what he does not have" (Nemodat quod non habet). Lydia. Martinez. Espina. From the proceeds of the sale.

Rañigo. Inc. Asensi. Sy. failed to exercise due diligence in inspecting and ascertaining the status of the mortgaged property because during the ocular inspection. and not the share of his co-owners. Reyes. Lumberio. they are expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals. Martinez. Had he done so. Espina. Corpuz. Consequently. Rodriguez. it is deemed a mortgagee in bad faith. De la Cruz. Santos. Since Maunlad Savings and Loan Association. Gloria. petitioner contends that Maunlad Savings and Loan Association. Coronel. Thus. Palad. Albano. Inc. Imbued with public interest. Valois . he. the credit investigator failed to ascertain the actual occupants of the subject property and to discover petitioners apartment at the back portion of the subject property. Lastimosa. he would have discovered that the subject property is co-owned by petitioner and the heirs of his brother. Francisco. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Sandoval. the real estate mortgage executed in its favor is valid only insofar as the share of the mortgagor Lydia in the subject property. however. HELD: No. Valiente. Marquez. Cabañgon. Failure to do so makes them mortgagees in bad faith. Corporal. Inguillo. De Mesa. Catindig. failed to ascertain whether the property was occupied by persons other than the mortgagor. the standard practice for banks and other financial institutions is to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof. Tecson. The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of them. Tabugan. before approving a loan. Castillo. was remiss in its duty in ascertaining the status of the property to be mortgaged and verifying the ownership thereof. Page 548 Echiverri. While the credit investigator conducted an ocular inspection of the property as well as a neighborhood checking and found the subject property occupied by the mortgagor Lydiaand her children. We need not belabor that under Article 493of the Civil Code. In this case. a co-owner can alienate only his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property.

Reyes. Lastimosa. Vicente was supposed to pay P42. Intending to appeal the portion of the RTC Decision which declared him liable to Jesus for the sum of P300. the interest rate was increased to 3.00 from petitioner Dr. Jesus M. FACTS: Atty. Tecson. Palad. Catindig. From March 24. Rodriguez.000. Vicente D. Corporal. Alcazaren. it must be executed strictly according to its tenor.00 as well as the P8. The RTC ordered Vicente to pay Jesus his monetary obligation amounting to P300.000.Subsequently and with Vicente’s consent. MONTEMAYOR vs.00 plus interest of 12% from the time of the filing of the complaint on August 17. 168251. 2011 DOCTRINE: When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal. Page 549 Echiverri. VICENTE D. Ramirez. Francisco.00 as interest but was able to pay only P24. Millora (Vicente) obtained aloan of P400.000.000. Coronel.00 representing the interest for the period July 24 to August 23. At the same time.000. MILLORA G.000. and which shall be set-off with the amount Vicente is adjudged to pay Jesus. The parties executed a loan contractwherein it was provided that the loan has a stipulated monthly interest of 2% and that Vicente had already paid the amount of P100. the trial court found merit in Vicente’s counterclaim and thus ordered Jesus to pay Vicente his attorneys fees which is equivalent to the amount of Vicente’s monetary liability. JESUS M. Corpuz. Montemayor (Jesus) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by Vicente. 2000 on the ground that the Decision has already become final and executory on July 1. Jesus made several demandsfor Vicente to settle his obligation but to no avail.July 27. Castillo. 1993 until fully paid. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Gloria. Vicente filed on July 6. 2000. Espina. Valiente. Martinez. ISSUE: Albano. This was the last payment Vicente made. 1991 to July 23.00 a month. De Mesa. Asensi. Santos. 1990. 1993 until fully paid. No.R.500. Marquez. Tabugan.00.This was however denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 10. 1991. or for a period of four months. 2000 a Notice of Appeal.000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum counted from the filing of the complaint on August 17. Cabañgon. Rañigo. Lumberio.5% or P10. Valois . Sy.

quoted below. commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated. (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money. there are two parts to be executed. Catindig. Sy. in their own right. The first part is the computation of the amount due to Jesus. (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy. Inguillo. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Page 550 Echiverri.000. (4) That they be liquidated and demandable. Martinez. ARTICLE 1279. Sandoval. Francisco. must be present. the same could be validly offset against the specific amount of award mentioned in the decision in favour of the petitioner. Castillo. The product is then multiplied by Albano. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Tecson. Rañigo. Whether the absence of a specific amount in the decision representing respondent’s counterclaim.00 is to be multiplied by the interest rate of 12%. the requirements set forth in Articles 1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code. they be of the same kind. De Mesa. it is necessary: (1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally. Coronel. De la Cruz. Corporal. HELD: Yes. Marquez. For legal compensation to take place. Asensi. Alcazaren. Gloria. Espina. Santos. Reyes. The principal amount of P300. Palad. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Lumberio. This is achieved by doing a simple arithmetical operation at the time of execution. are creditors and debtors of each other. ARTICLE 1278. Valiente. It is therefore clear that in the execution of the RTC Decision. (3) That the two debts be due. In order that compensation may be proper. and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other. or if the things due are consumable. Valois . Compensation shall take place when two persons.

Therefore. Page 551 Echiverri. Suffice it to say that the dispositive portion of the decision is clear and unequivocal such that a reading of it can lead to no other conclusion. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Albano. Lumberio. Inguillo. modification. This is achieved by following the clear wordings of the above fallo of the RTC Decision which provides that Vicente is entitled to attorney’s fees which is equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from him by Jesus. Sy. Gloria. Marquez. if indeed there is any ambiguity in the dispositive portion as claimed by Jesus. Tecson. Tabugan. Asensi. De Mesa. Reyes. De la Cruz. correction or alteration to an already final decision as it is conceded that such cannot be done anymore. the number of years that had lapsed from the filing of the complaint on August 17. Coronel. Catindig. This clarification is not an amendment. Corporal. What the RTC simply did was to state in categorical terms what it obviously meant in its decision. Espina. that is. Santos. Alcazaren. Legal compensation or set-off then takes place between Jesus and Vicente and both parties are on even terms such that there is actually nothing left to execute and satisfy in favor of either party. Cabañgon.00 is the total amount that Vicente must pay Jesus. The second part is the payment of attorney’s fees to Vicente. Ramirez. Francisco. Rodriguez. Valois . Rañigo. A reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision would clearly show that no ambiguity of any kind exists. Palad. 1993 up to the date when the judgment is to be executed. any amount due in favor of Jesus and against Vicente is set off by an equivalent amount in the form of Vicente’s attorney’s fees for past legal services he rendered for Jesus. whatever amount due to Jesus as payment of Vicente’s debt is equivalent to the amount awarded to the latter as his attorney’s fees.000. Castillo. Martinez. Furthermore. The result thereof plus the principal of P300. Valiente. the RTC had already clarified it through its Order by categorically stating that the attorney’s fees awarded in the counterclaim of Vicente is of an amount equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from him by Jesus. Corpuz.

PNB argued that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of FFCI. Corporal. Reyes. PNB should bear the whole loss.. Inguillo. INC. RTC ruled in favor of PNB and held that FFCCI was guilty of negligence in clothing Caparas with authority to make decisions on and dispositions of its account which paved the way for the fraudulent transactions. Tabugan. Lumberio. where the bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence.31. 2011 DOCTRINE: As between a bank and its depositor. De Mesa. the greater proportion of the loss shall be borne by the bank. The amounts of these checks were then debited by the PNB against the combo account of FFCCI. When Angelita returned to the country. Asensi.950. Gloria. ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in holding PNB of negligence and FCCI guilty for contributory negligence? HELD: Yes. Martinez. and P3. The said signatories on separate dates left for and returned from the United States. Ramirez. Corpuz. FFCI thus filed a suit for damages against PNB and its own accountant Aurea Caparas. Page 552 Echiverri. A higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative to the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary Albano. PNB had the last clear chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from FFCCI’s account. 260. G. Cabañgon. 173259. Valiente. The allocation of damages between the bank and the depositor is 60-40. De la Cruz. CRUZ and CO. thus. Tecson. JULY 25. Francisco. Rodriguez. Sandoval. Coronel. The banking business is impressed with public trust. PNB refused. FFCCI requested PNB to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks. 500. On appeal to the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. making it partly liable for the loss arising from the unauthorized withdrawal from its combo account. Marquez. The CA is correct in holding PNB negligence and FFCCI to be guilty of contributory negligence. Espina. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. NO. It also found PNB negligent in not calling or personally verifying from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject withdrawals considering that they were in huge amounts. Castillo. applications for cashier’s and manager’s checks bearing Felipe’s signature were presented to and both approved by the PNB. For this reason. Rañigo. Sy. Lastimosa. Catindig.F. FACTS: Respondent opened savings/current or so-called combo account with Petitioner with its President Felipe Cruz and Secretary-treasurer Angelita Cruz as the named signatories.R. While they were out of the country. Claiming that these were unauthorized and fraudulently made. Santos. Valois . Alcazaren. The applications for manager’s check have passed through the standard bank procedures and it was only after finding no infirmity that these were given due course.000. F. Palad. she examined the PNB statements of account and she noticed the deductions of P9.

Santos. Castillo. In the case at bar. Valois . Ramirez. Corporal. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Rodriguez. business enterprise. Thus the degree of responsibility. Alcazaren. Page 553 Echiverri. Francisco. Reyes. Espina. PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent fraud. Gloria. Rañigo. Albano. Where the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence. Catindig. Corpuz. Coronel. Sy. De la Cruz. Asensi. Martinez. Palad. De Mesa. Tabugan. Valiente. Cabañgon. Sandoval. care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises. Tecson. Marquez. we allocate the damages between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio.

Salvacion and Agustin Ladanga. Francisco. The SC affirmed the CA decision with regard the Diliman property. NO. They contended that under the Probate case they have a 50% undivided interest in the Cubao property which the RTC hearing the reconveyance case adjudicated in favor of Clemencia. through her adopted son and judicially-appointed guardian. Inguillo. Bernardo and Sps. Sps. Lastimosa. Bernardo Aseneta filed a reconveyance case against Sps. Albano. Ladanga appealed the Reconveyance case to the CA. According to Bernardo. Ladanga entered into a Compromise Agreement with respect to the Cubao property which they agreed to sell the Cubao property to a third party. Marquez. The probate case was eventually decided based on a compromise agreement executed by Bernardo and Maninang. While the probate case was still pending. 2011 DOCTRINE: The CA’s actions of refraining from acting on the motions of one party does not amount to grave abuse of discretion considering the issues raised by petitioners were not related to the subject matter of the appeal before the CA. SALVACNION SERRANO LADAGNGA and AGUSTIN LADANGA AND BERNARDO ASENETA G. Clemencia’s death also brought about estate proceedings between Soledad Maninang. It also provided that as to “any other properties. Coronel. Ramirez. Tabugan. Martinez. a development in the Reconveyance case took place. The complaint sought to annul the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by Clemencia in favor of the Sps. Palad. Catindig. Alcazaren. Lumberio. FACTS: Celemencia Aseneta. The RTC ordered the reconveyance of both the Diliman Property and Cubao property to Bernardo. Valois . It was in this stage that Maninang and QT attempted to join Bernardo as appellees in the Reconveyance case. Santos. The compromise agreement identified certain properties of the estate and provided for their distribution among the parties. known or unknown” Maninang would get 35% interest while Quisumbing Torres will get 15% interest. Later on. Valiente. Page 554 Echiverri.R. Ladangan appealed the CA decision to the SC. Corporal.CA. Castillo. Without acting on petitioner’s Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties. Sps. Espina. De la Cruz. Celemencia died during the pendency of the reconveyance case and was substituted as plaintiff by Bernardo. Tecson. The Reconveyance case was decided in favor of Clemencia’s estate. Corpuz. Asensi. Rañigo. Sandoval. and Bernardo. Ladanga over a Diliman property and a Cubao property on grounds of lack of intent to convey and lack of consideration. the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Gloria. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Sy. Reyes. Rodriguez. SPS. Bernardo opposed stating that the appeal in the reconveyance case does not include the Cubao property. 167285. Maninang claimed that Clemencia bequeathed to her the entire estate in her last will and testament. THE ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANINANG AND THE LAW FORM OF QUISUMBING TORRES vs. JULY 6. Bernardo countered that the will is void on the ground of preterition.

the CA did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow Maninang to join and participate in the appeal in the reconveyance case. Martinez. Page 555 Echiverri. Santos. Marquez. In the case at bar. Corpuz. Gloria. Lastimosa. Corporal. Asensi. Ladanga over the Cubao property. Albano. Rodriguez. Maninang and QT filed a Motion for partial reconsideration. such appeal covered the Diliman property and not the Cubao property. WON the CA was correct in refusing to act on the Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties and in refusing to act on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration on the basis of a pending appeal to the SC. HELD: No. De la Cruz. Tecson. Maninang’s and QT’s motions was improper and moot. Sy. and Second. Ladanga to Clemencia’s estate. this cannot be litigated in the appeal of the reconveyance case but must be subject of a separate suit or proceeding. Valois . while the subject of the appeal was the Diliman property. ISSUE: WON Maninang have a right to adjudicate their claim to the Cubao property in the appeal in the Reconveyance case. Based on the foregoing. Lumberio. Francisco. there is no need for Petitioners to join the appeal in the Reconveyance case because: First. as to the Cubao property. Alcazaren. Castillo. The CA refused to act on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration because of the pending appeal in the SC. Palad. Rañigo. Maninang’s interest is in the Cubao property. The SC held. the same did not amount to grave abuse of discretion considering the issues raised by petitioners were not related to the subject before the CA. Maninang again filed for MR which was also denied. Inguillo. Espina. Sandoval. Coronel. it has already been settled with finality that such property must be reconveyed by the Sps. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Tabugan. De Mesa. Or. As to Maninang’s objective of getting their share in the Cubao property. while the CA’s actions may not have been ideal. Catindig. they prayed for the nullification of the compromise agreement between Bernardo and Sps. Valiente. Reyes.

Valois . Lastimosa. holding that the contract of pledge entered into between Juniat and Nonwoven is valid and binding. Gloria. Rañigo. FACTS: Union Bank filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint against Juniat.. Ramirez. and the person in possession of the mortgaged motorized sewing machines and equipment. Although Nonwoven was not impleaded in the complaint. NO. The fact that the Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of UCPB was not notarized does not affect UCPB’s cause of action. Rodriguez. Reyes. the RTC likewise served summons upon Nonwoven since it was in possession of the mortgage properties. since the Chattel Mortgage in favor of UCPB was executed earlier. Corporal. Valiente. NONWOVEN FABRIC PHILIPPINES G. Page 556 Echiverri. It ruled that both the Chattel Mortgage and the Agreement in favor of Nonwoven have no obligatory effect on third persons because the documents were not notarized. Martinez. RTC issued writs of preliminary attachment and replevin in favor of UCPB. Inguillo. Cabañgon. stronger in right”. However. the CA reversed the RTC. UCPB only needed to show that the loan of Albano. August 1. and that the motorized sewing machines and equipment were ceded to Nonwoven by Juniat by virtue of a dacion en pago. Winwood and Wingyan. Alcazaren. De Mesa. WINWOOD APPAREL. Santos.R. The writ was served upon Nonwoven as it was in possession of the motorized sewing machines and equipment. Catindig. Coronel. 171569. UCPB alleged that Juniat acting for and in behalf of Winwood and Wingyan executed a promissory note and a Chattel mortgage over several motorized sewing machines and other equipment to secure their obligation arising from export transactions. Nonwoven contended that the unnotarized Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of petitioner has no binding effect on Nonwoven and that is has a better title over the motorized sewing machines and equipment because these were assigned to it by Juniat pursuant to their Agreement. UCPB has a better right than Nonwoven over the mortgaged properties. Sy. De la Cruz. Francisco. Corpuz. Tabugan. Tecson. Espina. that the loans remains unpaid and that the mortgaged properties are insufficient to answer for the obligation. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INC. ALAIN JUNIAT. Marquez. Lumberio. UCPB has a better right over the motorized sewing machines and equipment under the doctrine of ‘first in time. Sandoval. Palad. Castillo. Asensi. RTC ruled in favor of UCPB. On Appeal. ISSUE: WON UCPB has a better right over Nonwoven over the mortgaged equipments HELD: Yes. 2011 DOCTRINE: A pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public instrument.

Valois . Nonwoven had to prove that is has a better right of possession or ownership over the attached properties. Francisco. the pledge executed by Juniat in favor of Nonwoven cannot bind petitioner. Corpuz. Gloria. Catindig. Coronel. Ramirez. Page 557 Echiverri. De Mesa. Considering that the writs were issued by the RTC. under Article 2096 of the NCC: “a pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public instrument. Cabañgon. just like the chattel mortgage executed in favor of petitioner. Marquez. Rodriguez. However. Martinez. and Winwood remains unpaid and that it is entitled to the issuance of the writs of attachment and replevin. Reyes. Wingyan. Albano. Castillo. Tecson. Palad. Rañigo. Inguillo. Santos. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Sy. Tabugan. Alcazaren. Corporal. Lastimosa. Juniat. Asensi.” Hence. Valiente. Sandoval. Espina.

Tecson. After Antonio and Rosalia failed to pay their obligation. PNB foreclosed the mortgage and title to Lot 13521 was transferred to PNB. August 3. reconveyance and damages. Palad. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Coronel. 169901. Alcazaren. The court then ordered the heirs of Antonio to reconvey said land to Ciriaco. De la Cruz. Albano. Rañigo. Espina. Francisco. Since PNB is a banking institution. Page 558 Echiverri. Apparently. the bank had prior notice that the disputed lot is subject of litigation. P-4952 which is registered in the name of Antonio Pace. De Mesa.R. it is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. FACTS: The RTC Branch 19 of Digos City.5002 hectares from Lot 13521. Tabugan. Ciriaco averred that PNB is not an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value because prior to the execution and registration of PNB’s deed of sale with the RD. Marquez. The court found out that the said land belonged to Sesinando Jumamoy (predecessor-in-interest of Ciriaco) and was erroneously included in OCT No. P-4952 since said title was already cancelled and transferred in favor of PNB and since PNB was not impleaded in the said case. Martinez. Catindig. Corporal. PNB argued that it is a mortgagee and a buyer in good faith since at the time of the mortgage Antonio’s certificate of title was clean and devoid of any adverse annotations. Reyes. Sandoval. Antonio and his wife Rosalia mortgaged Lot 13521 to PNB as security for a series of loans. Valiente. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as a security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations. Santos. CIRIACO JUMAMOY and HEIRS OF ANTONIO GO PACE G. Corpuz. by force of law. No. Inguillo. Said decision by the RTC became final and executory but the Deed of Conveyance issued in favor of Ciriaco could not be annotated on OCT No. 2011 DOCTRINE: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud. foreclosure sale. Valois . considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Ciriaco then filed a complaint against PNB and Pace for Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage. Sy. the person obtaining it is. Asensi. Rodriguez. Castillo. Lastimosa. Davao del Sur rendered a Decision ordering the exclusion of 2. Ramirez. ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith? HELD: PNB is not an innocent purchaser/mortgagee for value. On the other hand. RTC found out that PNB was not a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith because it failed to take necessary steps to protect its interest and thus ordered PNB to reconvey the subject land claimed by Ciriaco. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. Gloria.

Since the 2. Page 559 Echiverri. Reyes. PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith from the time the land was offered as collateral. Santos. Albano. Francisco. Sandoval. Rodriguez. and. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Sy. Palad. Lumberio. De Mesa. Marquez. that it observed due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws in the title. Corporal. 5002 hectare portion of the mortgaged property has been adjudged in favor of Ciriaco’s predecessor-in-interest. Valois . Gloria. Alcazaren. that it verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the land. Tecson. Castillo. Espina. that it visited subject premises to determine its actual condition before accepting the same as collateral. Asensi. Ramirez. Rañigo. Corpuz. Tabugan. Valiente. PNB cannot raise as a defense that it relied on Antonio’s clean title. Martinez. Catindig. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Coronel. There was no showing that PNB conducted an investigation.

The audit revealed that one bag was missing. Respondent’s maintained that the Swift personnel who instructed them to release the stocks to customers should answer for the cash shortages. Asensi. As for their defense. Gloria. Tecson. SPS. Swift personnel conducted an audit of the stocks stored in respondents’ warehouse. Jose were required to post a bond to secure his faithful compliance with his obligations. September 12.R. FACTS: Jose and Swift entered into an agreement where Jose will lease their warehouse to Swift. Thereafter. Swift refused to surrender the said titles. Unless a contracting party cannot read or does not understand the language in which the agreement was written. The RTC held that respondents did not breach the agreement. As proof of these instructions they presented handwritten letter they received from a Swift personnel. De Mesa. Swift countered by alleging that it was respondent’s breach of the agreement which facilitated the unauthorized sales committed by the sales personnel. Sy. Swift alleged that such unauthorized release caused Swift a cash shortage of 2 million pesos. No. it was therefore incumbent upon Swift to have conducted training and seminars for respondents’. SWIFT FOODS. Catindig. Francisco. he is presumed to know the import of his contract and is bound thereby. Martinez. INC vs. JR AND IRENE MATEO G. Valiente. and that the cash shortages is attributable to Swift’s negligence in the supervision of its personnel. respondent’s explained that they were instructed by Swift personnel to release the stocks directly to customers. Page 560 Echiverri. The acknowledgement receipt indicates that they were for “collateral for feeds warehousing. Respondent’s also demanded the return of their land titles. Rodriguez. The violations were evident on the document which does not contain the signatures of Swift’s sales personnel. Espina. Santos. Lastimosa. they merely followed the instructions given to them by Swift’s sales personnel. Tabugan. Respondents in compliance with the bond requirement delivered three land titles to Swift. Reyes. Cabañgon. 2011 DOCTRINE: A contract is the law between the parties and those who are guilty of negligence in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Corpuz. Corporal. JOSE MATEO. Respondent’s filed a complaint against Swift arguing that Swift is retaining the said titles without justification. Rañigo. It was Swift’s failure to Albano. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Swift informed respondents that it was terminating their contract for violations of their agreement wherein it is stated that the warehouse operator should release stocks only to Swift’s sales personnel. Ramirez. Under the Agreement. Palad. Lumberio. Castillo. for which respondents should be held liable. Swift also retained respondent’s three land titles until the latter shall have fully complied with their obligation. Coronel. Alcazaren. 170486. The RTC further held that since respondents were first-time warehouse operators. Marquez. Valois . Inguillo.’ The receipt was duly signed by Swift officials and Jose.

Asensi. He simply followed all the verbal instructions given to him. De la Cruz. the parties agreed that petitioner will pay respondents a monthly warehousing fee and in return. Sy. Marquez. Instead. the warehouseman should only release stocks to Swift’s sales personnel who present a clearance to withdraw stocks. Their contract also required respondents to post a bond to answer for whatever obligations they may have the petitioner. Santos. Gloria. Catindig. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Jose admitted not reading. Both decisions did not make categorical findings on the matter. Under the agreement. Sandoval. ISSUE: Whether or not the decisions of the RTC and CA are proper finding Jose’s breach of the agreement excusable due to his being a novice in the warehousing business. Page 561 Echiverri. Under the said contract. Further.” Although the respondent delivered their land titles to Swift. Palad. Castillo. it cannot be said that a bond has actually been posted or constituted. Lastimosa. The vinculum that binds the parties is their contract. They admitted in court that they never required a clearance prior to the release of stocks. The records reveal that. and ordered Swift to return the three land titles. Tabugan. HELD: At the heart of the case is the issue of whether respondent committed a breach of the warehousing agreement for which they may be held liable to Swift. Corporal. Espina. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Tecson. the court determines that Swift has no basis for retaining the titles for “collateral for feeds warehousing. One’s newness to the business is not an excuse to violate the clear terms of one’s contract. respondents will warehouse petitioner’s stocks and be accountable for all the stocks duly received and released by them. respondents released stocks without the necessary clearance. the agreement. On appeal. The RTC and CA side-stepped the issue of breach. Rañigo. Francisco. they did not execute any bond agreement or security instrument. Reyes. much less understanding. Ramirez. These admissions were ignored by the RTC and CA which seemed to brush off Jose’s negligence. Coronel. Valois . Valiente. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Rodriguez. Albano. Cabañgon. Corpuz. conduct such trainings that allowed Swift sales personnel to take advantage of novice warehouse operators. they pronounced that respondents’ actions were justified because petitioner neglected to inform respondents of their duties under the agreement and to conduct trainings and seminars to orient respondents to warehouse operations. In the absence of such bond agreement or security agreement. Lumberio. De Mesa. Martinez.

mush have existed at the time of marriage. Corporal. Reyes. At most. Francisco. Valerio started living with Jocelyn. On Trial. and must be incurable. womanizing and physical violence. Meanwhile. De la Cruz. Catindig. Sandoval. the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and held that the ruling of the RTC was not supported by the facts on record. Alcazaren. 166357. Gloria. Espina. De Mesa. they resumed physical custody of the two younger children. No. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity. Valerio had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano.R. RTC held that both parties are psychologically incapacitated and declared the parties marriage void ab initio. Coronel. He left his 4 children with Elena in a rented house in Valle Vered with only a house help and a driver. The allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. and neglect of their children. Tabugan. Valerio filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Elena. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son. Elena on her defense denied being psychologically incapacitated. going out with friends. Rañigo. 2011 DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. ELENA FERNANDEZ G. Valois . MA. VALERIO E. Tecson. habitual drinking. Later on. September 19. Ramirez. who bore him 3 more children. Inguillo. Lastimosa. who also gave birth to a son. The parties’ faults tend to only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility. the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father. Castillo. Valerio narrated the alleged infidelity of Elena and presented a psychologist to testify on Elena’s psychological incapacity by her constant mahjong sessions. FACTS: Valerio and Elena got married in Hong Kong and had 4 children. Upon the return of Valerio and Jocelyn in the Philippines. Martinez. Cabañgon. Marquez. Valiente. from that time on. Santos. Sy. Elena appealed to the CA. Elena narrated that she left the conjugal home because Valerio was an abusive husband. Lumberio. Asensi. petitioner failed to Albano. 9 years after their de facto separation. HELD: Psychological Incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. He alleged that Elena was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with her marital obligations. Rodriguez. Valerio went to the United States with Jocelyn and their children. In the case at bar. Palad. She further alleged that Valerio was the one psychologically incapacitated as manifested by his drug dependence. there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation. Page 562 Echiverri. KALAW vs. Corpuz. According to Elena. Elena left the conjugal home and their 4 children with Valerio. the psychological problem must be grave.

Valiente. but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and wife. Espina. Tabugan. Lumberio. For instance. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Santos. Reyes. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Ramirez. Palad. petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. De Mesa. Coronel. Albano. Lastimosa. Asensi. Corporal. Marquez. Valois . Sy. there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised in the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. prove that his wife suffers from psychological incapacity. Tecson. Catindig. Gloria. Francisco. Rodriguez. Castillo. Page 563 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of narcissistic personality disorder. Martinez. Respondent admittedly played mahjong. Corpuz. Inguillo. De la Cruz.

CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION vs. Ramirez. 1990. the repairman cannot be made to pay for loss of production as a result of the unsuccessful repair. However. On March 13. FACTS: Sometime in July 1990. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recovery of production and opportunity losses. including production and opportunity losses of P 10. Tabugan.000. ASEA BROWN BOVERI. due to the repeated failure of respondents to repair the Kiln Drive Motor. Coronel. De Mesa. the production reports for the months of August 1990 to March 1991 were not presented. Cabañgon. October 17. 1990. Sy. the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Corp. Alcazaren. Without these production reports. petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC). 1991. Valiente. Valois . ERIKSON G. Lastimosa. Moreover. the motor was installed and tested. Corpuz. petitioner presented its monthly production reports for the months of April to June 1990 showing that on the average it was able to produce 1040 MT of cement per day. obtained the services of respondents.. To support its claim.00. CORP. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. attached to the letter of offer dated July 4. the liability of respondent ABB does not extend to consequential damages either direct or indirect. The defendants were given a third chance to repair the 160 KW Kiln DC Drive Motor. Page 564 Echiverri.040 MTD for two days. 1990 that the plaintiff resumed operation. it was installed in the kiln. On October 4. No. Lumberio. The plaintiff removed the DC Drive Motor and replaced it with its old motor. On appeal. the test failed. Respondents.600. The plaintiff suffered production losses for five days at the rate of 1. The plaintiff sustained production losses at the rate of 1. AND TORD B. Catindig. a corporation engaged in the business of producing cement.040 MTD daily.040 MTD per day from October 5 to October 9.. claimed that under Clause 7 of the General Conditions. Inguillo.42. A claim for damages amounting to P10. Corporal. as to respondent Eriksson. 1990 issued by respondent ABB to petitioner. petitioner filed with Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint for sum of money and damages. Rodriguez. Asensi. Palad. HELD: NO. Rañigo. BBC BROWN BOVERI. It was only on October 9. there is no lawful and tenable reason for petitioner to sue him in his personal capacity because he did not personally direct the repair of the Kiln Drive Motor. The plaintiff lost 1. 1990. 1990 the test failed. Castillo.983. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. 1990. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner entitling him recovery of production losses. (ABB) and BBC Brown Boveri. thus. the 160 KW Kiln Drive Motor was installed for testing on October 3. The plaintiff resumed operation with its old motor on November 19. 2011 DOCTRINE: Except as provided by law or by stipulation. Asea Brown Boveri. Martinez. after the defendants had undertaken the second repair of the motor in question. it cannot be determined with reasonable Albano. Francisco. Tecson.R. to repair its 160 KW Kiln DC Drive Motor (Kiln Drive Motor). The RTC rejected the defense of limited liability interposed by respondents since they failed to prove that petitioner received a copy of the General Conditions. Again. Gloria. De la Cruz. On October 23. 1991.017. Reyes. INC. 177160. After the first repair by the defendants. Santos. Espina.On November 14. Marquez. Sandoval. The CA applied the exculpatory clause in the General Conditions and ruled that there is no implied warranty on repair work. The test failed again. The plaintiff resumed operation on March 15. however. 1991.

Ramirez. Lumberio. Espina. Tecson. Corpuz. may be recovered only if such damages were reasonably foreseen or have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting. respondent ABB. Francisco. Rañigo. Besides. Catindig. speculations. could not have reasonably foreseen that it would be made liable for production loss. Tabugan. conjectures. assertions or guesswork are not sufficient. Page 565 Echiverri. Castillo. Reyes. It may not be amiss to say that competent proof and a reasonable degree of certainty are needed to justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages. consequential damages. Considering the nature of the obligation in the instant case. Albano. certainty whether petitioner indeed incurred production losses during the said period. especially since the motor under repair was a spare motor. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Sy. Coronel. Santos. at the time it agreed to repair petitioners Kiln Drive Motor. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Gloria. De Mesa. Valois . Palad. Sandoval. Alcazaren. such as loss of profits on account of delay or failure of delivery. labor cost and rental of the crane in case it fails to repair the motor or incurs delay in delivering the same. Asensi. Corporal. Marquez. Valiente. Martinez.

2012 DOCTRINE: Where a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is. driven by Loreto Lucilo (Loreto). Jr. Martinez. Lastimosa. the Pathfinder hit the Fuso’s left door and left body. His Isabela-bound passengers were the owners of said vehicle. with plate number PAE-160. January 25. Valois . Reyes. of June 28. Anacleto Edurese. Page 566 Echiverri. by collusion with others or otherwise. Police Investigator SPO2 Emmanuel Banag responded at about 2:15-2:30 a. Mylene. Coronel. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.R. MINORS: DENNIS. it would be easy for him. Tabugan. 1990 and investigated the incident as gathered from the information and sketchprovided by the PNCC patrol as well as from the statements provided by the truck helpers Charlie and Rodolfo. ALL SURNAMED MANGALINAO G. FACTS: On June 27.R. Corporal. Asensi. De Mesa. the latter suddenly swerved to the left and cut into the Pathfinder’s lane thereby blocking its way. Sandoval. No.m. As their letters to the registered owners of the trucks demanding compensation for the accident were ignored. As a result. MINORS: DENNIS. at about 11:15 p. 174089. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. who was then with helper Rodolfo Navia (Rodolfo). Santos. Tecson. Francisco. to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person. Following behind the Pathfinder was another 10-wheeler truck.m. The Fuso was then already moving in an erratic and swerving motion. Rodriguez. or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. 174266. The impact caused both vehicles to stop in the middle of the expressway. MELANIE AND MARIKRIS. MYLENE. Just when the Pathfinder was already cruising along the NLEX’s fast lane and about to overtake the Fuso. who was with truck helper Charlie Palomar (Charlie). Cabañgon. It was raining that night. Marquez. the inevitable pileup happened. Corpuz. Although Antonio stepped on the brakes. spouses Roberto and Josephine Mangalinao (Mangalinao spouses). Alcazaren. ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. Bulacan. Inguillo. three vehicles were traversing the two-lane northbound NLEX in the vicinity of Barangay Tibag. January 25. 1990. Valiente. Almost instantly. Lumberio. Gloria. De la Cruz.. the Isuzu’s front crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder leaving it a total wreck. Castillo. the minor children of the Mangalinao spouses. Ramirez. Sy. Espina. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. Dennis. Soon after. Before them on the outer lane was a Pampanga-bound Fuso 10-wheeler truck (Fuso). MYLENE. No. Catindig. an Isuzu Cargo (Isuzu) with plate number PNS-768 driven by Antonio. Pulilan. Rañigo. their daughter Marriane. MELANIE AND MARIKRIS. Albano. (Edurese) was driving a Pathfinder with plate number BBG-334. housemaid Rufina Andres and helper Armando Jebueza (Jebueza). ALL SURNAMED MANGALINAO G. 2012 SONNY LI AND ANTONIO DE LOS SANTOS vs. the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) patrol arrived at the scene of the accident and informed the Pulilan police about the vehicular mishap. Palad.

Santos. it then filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim. Valois . be held liable. Coronel. Corpuz. Rañigo. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. 1983. Cabañgon. Espina. Page 567 Echiverri. HELD: YES.a. Lastimosa. Martinez. Gloria. it already sold the Fuso truck to MMO Trucking owned by Manuel Ong (Manuel). Manuel Tan. De la Cruz. Sy. Valiente. Sandoval. Castillo. Marquez. Inguillo. De Mesa. Albano. Asensi. it would be easy for him. a. Orix in its Motion to Dismiss interposed that it is not the actual owner of the Fuso truck. Melanie and Marikris. Palad. as well as the registered owners of the Fuso and the Isuzu trucks. through their legal guardian. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati impleading the drivers Loreto and Antonio. by collusion with others or otherwise. Tecson. Lumberio. or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. The latter being the alleged owner at the time of the collision. Orix reiterated that the children had no cause of action against it because on September 9. Francisco. Ramirez. respectively. to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. 1991 a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict. consequently filed on January 16. namely Orix and Sonny. Orix filed a Third Party Complaint against Manuel. Where a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is. Reyes. Tabugan. Alcazaren. ISSUE: Whether or not the registered owner who already transferred ownership of vehicle at the time of accident.k. Rodriguez. Catindig. Corporal. As the trial court denied the motion. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage.

T-137261. his alleged title over Lot 1131. Lastimosa. Ramitex consolidated and subdivided its 17 lots including the disputed LOT 1131 into six lots. Ramitex’s title being a later title should have the presumption of invalidity. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Ramitex filed its opposition to Oliveros’ petition asserting that TCT No. De la Cruz. while claiming priority. 1956. Espina. Petitioners insist that the mere existence of Oliveros’ earlier title negates the conclusiveness of Ramitex’ title. Gloria. as the older title. Thus. Page 568 Echiverri. Oliveros’ TCT No. Martinez. Coronel. De Mesa. Cabañgon. 2012 DOCTRINE: A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Tabugan. Marquez. Tecson. Alcazaren. In light of Ramitex’ opposition and ownership claims over Lot 1131. Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrines of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title in favor of respondent SMC. Oliveros argues that SMC failed to prove the validity of its title. Oliveros filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of Ramitex’ title over Lot 1131. Meanwhile. SMC showed that Oliveros’ title. Asensi. Santos. NO. between SMC and Oliveros. 173531. T-17186. the CA agreed that there is no evidence that Oliveros’ title came from official sources. Castillo. Catindig. which should be cancelled accordingly. for consolidated Lot 4 which included Lot 1131. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION G. T-17186 does not exist. T-17186 in his favor on November 14. is actually spurious. should enjoy presumptive conclusiveness of ownership and indefeasibility of title. Valiente.R. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. the Bulacan RD issued TCT No. He claimed that the original copy was destroyed in the fire that gutted the office of the Bulacan RD on March 7. Respondent SMC (which substituted Ramitex) argues that the principle of indefeasibility of titles applies only to an existing valid title to the litigated property. Corollarily. February 1. Inguillo. it is only SMC which has a valid title and in whose favor the doctrine of indefeasibility of title applies. Reyes. T-18460) and issued a new title. Sandoval. Oliveros claimed that he bought the subject property sometime in November 1956 from the spouses Domingo De Leon and Modesta Molina. Palad. thus. In the instant case. Valois . After trial. T-17186 never existed in the records of the Bulacan RD and cannot therefore be reconstituted. By virtue of this consolidation. Albano. TCT No. Corpuz. 1987. T-17186. Ramirez. Rañigo. the trial court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Oliveros’ TCT No. FACTS: In 1986. SMC has the burden of overcoming this presumption. After reviewing the factual findings of the trial court. and pursuant to such sale. Corporal. OLIVEROS vs. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision. Francisco. Sy. The Caloocan RD cancelled Ramitex’ individual title to Lot 1131 (TCT No. Oliveros filed a petition before the RTC for the reconstitution of TCT No.

Espina. Santos. “a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Martinez. Whether the decisions of the CA and the trial court allowed a collateral attack on Oliveros’ certificate of title. Alcazaren.” Moreover. HELD: 1. Asensi. A counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant against the plaintiff and stands on the same footing as an independent action. Coronel. De la Cruz. Valiente. Catindig. petitioners cannot assert priority or presumptive conclusiveness. Inguillo. Thus. Corporal. Lastimosa. No. Tabugan. it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their title. Tecson. The prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles. Sandoval.” Here. Francisco. Gloria. Ramitex’s counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on Oliveros’ title. Rodriguez. The existence of the earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice. Reyes. 2. since such titles do not enjoy indefeasibility. Without a title. As stated in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Palad. “Well -settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Cabañgon. Castillo. On the other hand. an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. T -17186 does not exist in the official records is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. In view of these circumstances. the attack on Oliveros’ title was not a collateral attack.No. or to enjoin its enforcement. Albano. Lumberio. Page 569 Echiverri.” Clearly. Sy. Marquez. Valois . Corpuz. Rañigo. “An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title. in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief. The trial and appellate courts’ shared conclusion that petitioners’ TCT No. De Mesa. Ramirez. The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a single property. SMC/Ramitex assailed the validity of Oliveros’ title as part of its counterclaim in an action to declare SMC/Ramitex’s title a nullity. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment. it is indirect or collateral when. which petitioners themselves cite. Court of Appeals. and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. 2. a mere allegation of an earlier title will not suffice. Since petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than SMC’s title. it was as if no title was ever issued in this case to the petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral attack against a title.

NO. Roberto S. 2012 DOCTRINE: Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n an action to recover.R. Samson. Lastimosa. Francisco. Martinez. and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. Corporal. Rodriguez. the complaint was filed before the Prosecutor’s office. Upon his retirement from the government service. Page 570 Echiverri. Corpuz. and (2) his title. Thus. hence. Valiente. he went to visit his property and discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo Dulfo and his family. BARANGAN G. in order to recover possession. Gloria. through his son-in-law Atty. Castillo. No amicable settlement was reached. Tecson. Inguillo. Dulfo. ISSUE: Whether or not Barangan is entitled to recover possession of the property? HELD: Yes. Coronel. FACTS: Respondent Col. Lumberio. De la Cruz. JAKOSALEM AND DULFO vs. he was often assigned to different stations in the Philippines. Jakosalem. and Estrado. who conducted the relocation survey. February 15. the property must be identified. 175025. Joco. replied that the said property was owned by them through a deed of assignment from the previous owner. Asensi. Prescription and laches are already set in and Barangan was not able to sufficiently prove his claim. But the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Rañigo. to prove that Barangan was the registered owner of the lot. The RTC dismissed the case. The TCT over the land was likewise transferred to his name. Barangan entered into a Land Purchase Agreement with Citadel Realty Corporation. Palad. Catindig. the caretaker of the Albano. Ramirez. Barangan filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the RTC of Antipolo and presented the following as evidence: (1) testimony of Estrado (caretaker of the subdivision) to the effect that the Dulfos were previously occupying an adjacent lot. Upon full payment of the purchase price. Barangan was unable to physically occupy the subject land as he was then a member of the Philippine Air Force. Espina. Sandoval. In other words. Santos. Barangan sent a letter to Dulfo demanding that they vacate the property. Barangan filed a complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law before the barangay. Barangan offered the testimonies of Engr. and (3) testimony of Engr. Sy. (2) testimony of an employee of the Municipal Assessor of Rizal. Reyes. Cabañgon. De Mesa. Alcazaren. a person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed. Jonco. a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in his favor. The case was dismissed as the issue of ownership must be resolved in a civil action. but then started squatting on Barangan’s property. Valois . to prove that the land owned by Barangan and that occupied by Dulfo were one and the same. Marquez. The Property was sufficiently identified. Tabugan.

Tecson. Barangan was able to prove his title thereto. Lumberio. Alcazaren. Rañigo. who showed Barangan the exact location of the Property. and (3) TCT. Lastimosa. Reyes. Martinez. Laches and prescription do not apply. De la Cruz. Corporal. Asensi. Espina. Tabugan. Valois . Subdivision. Palad. Castillo. Coronel. Moreover. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Sy. Marquez. He likewise submitted the Verification Survey Plan of the lot based on the technical description in the TCT. Valiente. Catindig. De Mesa. Sandoval. Albano. Francisco. Prescription does not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system. Corpuz. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Under PD 1529. (2) Deed of Absolute Sale. Santos. Barangan presented the following in evidence: (1) Land Purchase Agreement. no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Gloria. Page 571 Echiverri.

Castillo. Marquez. such as selling the condominiums but was not able to proceed because the building permits was not yet been approved and there were still accrued real property taxes that were unpaid. Upon the decision. Also.171076. which the CA granted in favor of the GSIS. Palad. The parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of their contract.R. Under Section 2. April 1. if Goldloop fail to start construction Should Goldloop fail to start the construction works within the thirty (30) working days from date all relevant permits and licenses from concerned agencies are obtained. Page 572 Echiverri. which both was owned by the GSIS. Tecson. Goldloop received a letter from GSIS to rescind the MOA and Goldloop replied that the work stoppage was caused of the pendingapproval of the building permits. Ramirez. Tabugan. Catindig. the petitioner will pay GSIS for the land in eight installments. the petitioner appealed with the Supreme Court. the parties will share for the profits of every condominium sold with a certain percent. the Court ruled that GSIS have every right to rescind the contract under the terms of the MOA. Goldloop then performed the preparatory works.Goldloop filed a complaint with the RTC contending that it had begun with the preparatory works and such MOA should not be rescinded. Inguillo. good customs. Valois . Francisco. INC. GSIS sent a notice of rescission because Goldloop stillhave pending obligations under their MOA.4 of the MOA. In contractual relations. Asensi. Thus. 2012 DOCTRINE: It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. morals. Gloria. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Reyes. Martinez. De Mesa. public order or public policy – shall be binding as between the parties. Corporal. Espina. FACTS: The petitioner Goldloop Properties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) undertaking the construction of a condominium on the parcel of land and the renovation of the façade of Philcomcen Building atits own expense. which RTC granted in fa vor of Goldloop. Lumberio. NO. or within six (6) Albano. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Sy. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement may be rescinded? HELD: Yes. and the stipulations therein – provided that they are not contrary to law. the law allows the parties much leeway and considers their agreement to be the law between them. Coronel. Later on. De la Cruz. GSIS appealed with the CA that it had the right to rescind the contract for failure of Goldloop to comply with the obligation as stated in the MOA. GOLDLOOP PROPERTIES. Corpuz. GSIS G. Valiente. vs. Rodriguez. Under the terms of their agreement. Still. Santos.

If it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract. Palad. Sandoval. months from the date of the execution of this Agreement. De Mesa. Martinez. Santos. Sy. Corpuz. Tecson. Alcazaren. Corporal. Coronel. Castillo. Tabugan. Ramirez. Catindig. thus both parties shall bear the damages. De la Cruz. this agreement shall be deemed terminated and cancelled without need of judicial action by giving thirty (30) days written notice to that effect to Goldloop who hereby agrees to abide by the decision of the GSIS. Valiente. and each shall bear his own damages. The first infractor cannot be determined in this case but it cannot be conclusively presumed who is the first infractor. Valois . Thus. The Court also held that rescission constitute a mutual restitution of the things pursuant toArticle 1191 of the Civil Code. Lumberio. the same shall be deemed extinguished. Page 573 Echiverri. Albano. Inguillo. Gloria. Espina. Asensi. Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of the property subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever amount it had received from the latter by reason of the MOA and the Addendum. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. whichever is earlier. equipment and materials in the premises of the lot. or at any given time abandon the same or otherwise commit any breach of their obligations and commitments under this Agreement. it was direct by the Court for Goldloop to surrender possession of the land to the GSIS and that Goldloop should be reimbursed for the amount of expenses plus the return of the machineries. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation. Reyes. It is the duty of both parties to surrender whatever amount received or property to part with. Francisco. Marquez. the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. Rañigo.

Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. 1981. and the character of the testamentary act. Rodriguez. After which. Cabañgon. hence. 2000 one of petitioners. Castillo. executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin. 13. or that his mind be wholly unbroken. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1. Conversely. Coronel. 2 and 4 thereof. Childless and without any brothers or sisters. Asensi. she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. There. Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Ramirez. the proper objects of his bounty. April 11. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and Albano. his predecessor-in-interest. Sandoval. the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. 27. 2012 DOCTRINE: To be of unsound mind. she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. 1996. he being a citizen and resident of the USA. LAXA G. unimpaired. 19. Francisco. Marquez. Catindig. Page 574 Echiverri. 2000. Reyes. Lastimosa.R. 174489. Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. The will. Gloria. Tecson. Valiente. De Mesa. Inguillo. Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such. More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. Santos. Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua. RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will. Rañigo. Corpuz. injury or other cause. Lumberio. or unshattered by disease. Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. Paciencia left for USA. Palad. Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. Also. 1981). Valois . Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. Corporal. Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio. was read to Paciencia twice. On June 23. Tabugan. On appeal. 4. In the interim. Sy. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of. Martinez. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan. BALTAZAR vs. one of the petitioners. FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. Espina. it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. NO.

Francisco. Ramirez. Valiente. Reyes. Rodriguez. or unshattered by disease. are all present and evident on the Will. Gloria. Corporal. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Inguillo. it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Corpuz. In fact. Paciencia. and the character of the testamentary act. Rañigo. The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. Marquez. Further. Sy. the proper objects of his bounty. her instrumental witnesses and the notary public. De Mesa. unimpaired. Catindig. De la Cruz. the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. Besides. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. Santos. Martinez. Page 575 Echiverri. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Castillo. Espina. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.” Albano. The signatures of the testatrix. Lumberio. Tabugan. granted the probate of the will. injury or other cause. Tecson. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind. Valois . Sandoval. Asensi. Cabañgon. ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate? HELD: Yes. or that his mind be wholly unbroken. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of. Palad. Art. even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act. Coronel.

it affords reasonable Albano. Cabañgon. Geronimo Bacou filed an independent civil action againt the former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses. Valois . April 25. Valiente. Del Carmen Jr. Santos. “where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants. Oscar Jr. Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by the former. 17738770. Catindig. BACOY G. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. FACTS: Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. 2012 DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury. Alcazaren. Sandoval. he was a conductor (and had been released from employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by the operation of such? HELD: Yes. RTC held del Carmen Jr. Coronel.R. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. DEL CARMEN vs. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. Rodriguez. Palad. Ramirez. Lumberio. Reyes. Corporal. Tabugan. and the accident. the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers’ house and not returned to del Carmen’s residence. Tecson. Del Carmen Jr. De Mesa. After a day’s work.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because. NO. Rañigo. Inguillo. Espina. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for insufficient evidence. Martinez. Corpuz. Del Carmen Jr. the said parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan. given the circumstances. Monsalud. would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr. Gloria. Page 576 Echiverri. in the ordinary course of things. the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary liable. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case while the father of the late Mrs. Lastimosa. Francisco. Sy. Asensi. the former also admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Castillo. Marquez. De la Cruz. Rodrigo who was hired as a driver. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to said jeep.

Catindig. De la Cruz. Santos. Valois . Rañigo. Corporal. Espina. Tecson. Lumberio. Marquez. Gloria. Francisco. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Page 577 Echiverri. Castillo. reasonable and logical explanation by defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. Valiente. Alcazaren. Reyes. Ramirez. Martinez. Lastimosa. evidence – in the absence of a sufficient. Albano. Corpuz. Coronel. De Mesa. Sandoval. Asensi. All three are present in the case at bar. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Palad. Sy.

2012 DOCTRINE: Gross negligence can never be equated with a mere mistake of fact. Cabañgon. Corporal. De Mesa. Informed about the bounced check. Valiente. Ramirez.000. approached her to ask if she could have Filipina’s check cleared and encashed for a service fee of 0. payable to cash. it was processed by PNB. Lastimosa. Because Adelina does not have a dollar account in which to deposit the check. NO. The Cable Division of PNB received a SWIFT message from Philadelphia Nationa lBank informing PNB of the return of the subject check for insufficient funds. FACTS: Ofelia and her friend Adelina were having a conversation in the latter’s office when Adelina’s friend.%1. Sy. Valois . Ander this setup. In their effort to recover the money. spouses Cheah then sought the help of the NBI. Rodriguez. 190 under the account of Alejandria Pineda and Eduardo Rosales and drawn by Atty. which must be something excusable and which requires the exercise of prudence. Catindig. Said agency’s Anti-Fraud and Action Division was later able to apprehend some of the beneficiaries of the proceeds of the check and recover from them $20.R. Sandoval. Francisco. Ofelia agreed. Santos. she asked Ofelia if she could accommodate Filipina’s request since she has a joint dollar savings account with her Malaysian husband Cheah Chee Chong. The check is Bank of America Check No. No recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence. Marquez. Espina. Chee Chong in the end signeda PNB drafted letter which states that the spouses Cheah are offering their condominium units as collaterals for the amount withdrawn. Lumberio. Castillo. ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Cheah should return the withdrawn money under the Principle of Solution Indebiti? Albano. Asperilla likewise assured the spouses Cheah that the letter was a mere formality and that the mortgage will be disregarded once PNB receives its claim for indemnity from Philadelphia National Bank. Tabugan. Eduardo Rosales against Bank of America with a face amount of $300. SPOUSES CHONG G. Asensi. Page 578 Echiverri. Martinez. Corpuz. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. Gloria.00 Spouses Cheah have been constantly meeting with the bank officials to discuss matters regarding the incident and the recovery of the value of the check while the cases against the alleged perpetrators remain pending. Alcazaren. Reyes. Hence. April 25. Palad. Tecson. Rañigo. But the latter told her that all the money had already been given to several people who asked for the check’s encashment. Inguillo. De la Cruz.000. Ofelia immediately contacted Filipina to get the money back. the amount withdrawn would be treated as a loan account with deferred interest while the spouses try to recover the money from those who defrauded them.170865. Filipina. Coronel.00.

and (b) that the payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact In the case at bench. In the first place. (a) that he who paid was not under obligation to do so. Asensi. De la Cruz. Santos. Rañigo. the gross negligence of PNB wherein the cash was withdrawn before the required 15 days clearing period. Lumberio. Alcazaren. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. are. Ramirez. No recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence Albano. Tabugan. Incidentally. Valiente. Cabañgon. Coronel. Rodriguez. Marquez. Martinez. Catindig. can never be equated with a mere mistake of fact. the obligation to return it arises. which must be something excusable and which requires the exercise of prudence. Espina. Corpuz. Sandoval. Francisco. PNB obliges the spouses Cheah to return the withdrawn money under the principle of solutio indebiti. Sy. Tecson. Castillo. Gloria. Page 579 Echiverri. which is laid down in Article 2154 of the Civil Code: If something is received when there is no right to demand it. HELD: No. Inguillo. Corporal. Reyes. Valois . PNB cannot recover the proceeds of the check under the principle it invokes. The indispensable requisites of the juridical relation known as solution indebiti. Palad. Lastimosa. De Mesa.

R.5M by the Spouses. Page 580 Echiverri. Lastimosa. In a letter in 2000. Gloria. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Valois . Corporal. Reyes. De la Cruz. Spouses filed a complaint with the RTC against Estores and Roberto Arias (allegedly acted as Estores’ agent) In Answer. Rañigo. ESTORES vs. the applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum “when the obligation arises out of a loan or a forbearance of money. Spouses agreed but imposed an interest of 12% annually. Asensi. Alcazaren. On appeal. Martinez. Albano. Estores promised to return the same within 120 days. Inguillo. Espina. After almost 7 years and despite the payment of P3. Sandoval. That attorney’s fees not proper because both RTC and CA sustained her contention that12% interest was uncalled for so it showed that Spouses did not win. Catindig. Valiente. Castillo. In reply. De Mesa. Tecson.” FACTS: In Oct. April 28. 1993. Hermojina Estores and Spouses Supangan entered into a Conditional Deed ofSale where Estores offered to sell. Tabugan. 175139. and Spouses offered to buy a parcel of land in Cavite forP4. Palad. Ramirez. Sy. Estores still failed to comply with her obligation to handle the peaceful transfer of ownership as stated in provisions in the contract. Spouses demanded the return of the amount within 15 days from receipt. SPS. CA affirmed RTC that interest should start on date of formal demand by Spouses to return the money not when contract was executed as stated by the RTC and that Arias not be solidarily liable as he acted as agent only and did not expressly bind himself or exceeded his authority Estores contends she is not bound to pay interest because the deed only provided for the return of the down payment in case of failure to comply with her obligations.‰ Absent any stipulation. NO. Estores still failed despite demands. In other cases. Marquez. CA said that the issue to resolve is whether it is proper to impose interest for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties. the general rule is that the applicable rate of interest „shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the parties. goods or credits. Francisco. Estores said they were willing to pay the principal amount but without theinterest as it was not agreed upon that since the Conditional Deed of Sale provided only for the return of the down payment in case of breach. Santos. 2012 DOCTRINE: Anent the interest rate. they can’t be liable for legal interest as well RTC ruled saying that the Spouses are entitled to the interest but only at 6% per annum and also entitled to attorney’s fees.7M. Coronel. it shall be six percent (6%). Rodriguez. Corpuz. ARTURO and SUPANGAN G.

Sy. Forbearance “contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain during a given period of time. De la Cruz.” Estores failed on her obligations despite demand. no stipulation was made. Court of Appeals. Castillo. She is now in default. Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “interest may. Valois . Asensi. be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable. Corporal. Francisco. She admitted that the conditions were not fulfilled and was willing to return the full amount of P3. Contract involved in this case is not a loan but a Conditional Deed of Sale. Inc. Ramirez. goods or credits. Valiente. Cabañgon. Martinez. Lastimosa. Page 581 Echiverri. Corpuz. Gloria. in the discretion of the court. No question that the obligations were not met and the return of money not made. 2000. Tecson. Catindig. Spouses contend that It is only fair that interest be imposed because Estores failed to return the amountupon demand and used the money for her benefit and Estores failed to relocate the house outside the perimeter of the subject lot and complete the necessary documents. it shall be 6%. Palad. Sandoval. Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the contract. Reyes. v. Lumberio. applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum. Santos. While the exception is if there is no stipulation. the stipulation governing the return of the money can be considered as a forbearance of money which requires 12% interest. The interest at the rate of 12% is applicable in the instant case. As to the fees.5M but hasn’t done so.” Estores’ unwarranted withholding of the money amounts to forbearance of money which can be considered as an involuntary loan so rate is 12% starting in Sept. In this case. De Mesa. In other cases. Espina. Even if transaction was a Conditional Deed of Sale. Alcazaren. The award of attorney’s fees is warranted. Rañigo. Marquez. The General Rule is that the applicable interest rate shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the parties. In Crismina Garments. Albano. they claim that they were forced to litigate when Estores unjustly held the amount ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of interest and attorney’s fees is proper? HELD: Yes. Inguillo. Rodriguez. When obligation arises out of a loan or forbearance of money. Tabugan. Coronel.

that despite demand. Sy. Page 582 Echiverri. exclusive of interests. Tecson. Rodriguez. Coronel. Valois . the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading. Ramirez. Asensi. In the complaint. Accordingly. however. Sec 7 of Rule of the Rules of Court states: Section 7. Alcazaren.177. respondent was compelled to engage the services of council. Espina. Whether the charge invoice are actionable documents 2. respondent alleged that from the period of August 7. On appeal. petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaims denying liability for the claims and interposing the defense of lack of cause of action. 2000. Lumberio. MENDOZA G. Castillo. ISSUES: 1. 2000. or said copy may like effect be set forth in the pleading. 1997 to March 4. The presentation of evidence for petitioner. Corpuz. Catindig. Whenever an action is based upon a written document. Inguillo. Reyes. a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Asian Construction and Development Corporation. sole proprietor of Highest Steel Fabrications (Highett). in an order dated March 1. Martinez. Whether respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees HELD: I. shall be deemed to be part of the pleading. and the original or a copy thereof shall be attacked to the pleading as an exhibit.R NO. Marquez. Gloria. Tabugan. In Albano. Branch 126. 1998. Mendoza. Petitioner moved for a bill of particulars on the ground that no copies of the purchase orders and invoices were attached to the complaint to enable petitioner to prepare a responsive pleading to the complaint. Cabañgon. filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City. FACTS: On January 6. petitioner failed and/or refused to pay. Whether the delivery of the alleged materials was duly proven 3. and that due to the failure and/or refusal of petitioner to pay the said amount. The RTC. the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC the modification was that the reckoning point for the computation of the 1% monthly interest shall be 30 days from the date of each delivery.00. denied the motion. respondent Lourdes K. Palad. Based on the foregoing provision. Francisco. 2000. a document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument or document. which. Rañigo. Corporal. LOURDES K. Sandoval. Lastimosa. the party with the most convincing evidence prevails. De Mesa. 2012 DOCTRINE: In civil cases. however. petitioner purchased from Highett various fabricated steel materials and supplies amounting to Php 1. 176949 June 27. was deemed waived and terminated due to the repeated non-appearance of petitioner and its counsel. De la Cruz. The petition is partly meritorious. On December 1. Santos. Valiente. the RTC rendered a Decision in favour or respondent.206. On the instant the charge invoice are not actionable documents per se as these only provide details on the alleged to or stated in the complaint as these are evidenciary in nature. Action or defense based on document. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

Santos. Espina. Asensi. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Valois . III. Corporal. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Rañigo. De la Cruz. respondent’s cause of action is not based on these documents but on the contract of sale between the parties. Delivery of the supplies and materials was duly proved. Corpuz. Catindig. Reyes. we are constrained to disallow the same as the rationale for the award was no stated in the text of the RTC Decision but only in the dispositive portion. Lumberio. fact. Alcazaren. Marquez. was sufficient to prove that the petitioner indeed ordered supplies and materials from Highett and that these were delivered to petitioner. the Court found that these. Tabugan. along with the Purchase Order. Basis for the award of Attorney’s fees must be stated in the decision. Martinez. Albano. Page 583 Echiverri. Coronel. II. However. Francisco. Sy. Ramirez. But although the charge invoices are not actionable documents. Inguillo. with respect to the award of attorney’s fees to respondent. Palad. Tecson. Gloria. Castillo. Valiente.

Alcazaren. Respondents countered that Ladano’s Complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit.” As a possessor and builder in good faith. Edwin Soto. does not apply either because the property was not planted with rice and corn. Marquez. Francisco. Ladano maintained that he has been its possessor in good faith for more than 30 years.R. Cruz. Gloria. 6657. He is not entitled to the reliefs he sought because he does not have. located in Manalite I. The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed Ladano’s Complaint. Ladano alleged that on May 7. Not too long afterwards. which he and his family have been peaceably occupying and cultivating since 1970. Sy. Tecson. Espina. as he did not even allege having. EDWIN SOTO. is not covered by RA No. Adan Espanola and Ernesto Blanco. 2003. Asensi. Cabañgon. FELINO NERI. Coronel. Reyes. Neither is it covered by other agrarian tenancy laws because Ladano had not presented any evidence of his tenancy relationship with the landowner. as amended. Rañigo. Valois . Moreover. he cannot pursue his complain before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board whose jurisdiction lies over agrarian disputes between parties in a tenancy relationship. The DARAB held that Ladano’s 30-year occupation and cultivation of the land could not have possibly escaped the landowner’s notice. Inguillo. No. he cannot be removed from the subject property without being compensated for the improvements that he had introduced. Ladano prayed that he be declared the rightful “occupant/tiller” of the property. Tabugan. He believed then that the property was part of the “public land and [was] open to anybody. Barangay Sta. Presidential Decree No. Valiente. 27. November 12. which only covers agricultural properties beyond five hectares. The said respondents informed him that the property belongs to Neri and that he should vacate the same immediately. with the right to security of tenure thereon. the respondents fenced the property and destroyed some of the trees and kawayan planted thereon. Lumberio. he prayed that the respondents compensate him for the improvements that he introduced in the property. In the alternative that the judgment is in the respondents’ favor. 3844. Catindig. 2012 DOCTRINE: A person who is not an agricultural tenant cannot claim the right to security of tenure under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. Martinez. Sandoval. Antipolo City. the supposed owner of the land he is occupying. FACTS: This case originated from a Complaint10 filed by petitioner Luciano Ladano (Ladano) before the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator against respondents FelinoNeri (Neri). Instead of arguing that he has a right to remain on the property as its bona fide tenant. the respondents forcibly entered the two-hectare land. 178622. She determined that the two-hectare property. Castillo. Corporal. ADAN ESPANOLA and ERNESTO BLANCO G. Santos. Palad. a leasehold arrangement with Neri. while agricultural. Ramirez. Rodriguez. or Republic Act No. De Mesa. Since the landowner must Albano. LUCIANO LADANO VS. as amended. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. as amended. Corpuz. Page 584 Echiverri.

Castillo. to exist. and whether he has a right to be compensated for the improvements he introduced on the property. Coronel. respondents failed to discharge such burden. he is not entitled to security of tenure [nor is he] covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The petitioner is not an agricultural tenant. The CA concluded that there is no evidence supporting the DARAB’s conclusion that a tenancy relationship exists between Ladano andNeri. express or implied. Ladano himself admitted that he entered and tilled the subject property without the knowledge and consent of the landowner. (4) the purpose is agricultural production. Reyes. Sy. De la Cruz. expressly or impliedly. Rañigo. In the case at bar. The CA also faulted the DARAB for considering Ladano’s lengthy occupation of the land as an indication of the existence of a leasehold relationship. (3) there is consent by the landowner. Corporal. “Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant. Lumberio. Asensi. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural tenant on the subject property. “A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree. to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landholder. Tabugan. have known about. The landowner. Ramirez. the following requisites must be present: (1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant. (2) the subject matter is agricultural land. Marquez. Corpuz. In the instant case. and acquiesced to. Martinez. Sandoval. Alcazaren. has the burden of proving that the occupant of the land is a mere intruder thereon. He asserted his rights based on his prior physical possession of the two-hectare property and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. Valiente. Lastimosa. Ladano’s actions. and (6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the tenant. the DARAB held that there is an implied tenancy because Ladano had been occupying and cultivating the subject property for more than 30 years. Catindig. A person’s tillage of another’s landholding. without anything else. Francisco. Independent and concrete evidence of the foregoing elements must be presented by the party asserting the existence of such a relationship. Valois . Albano. Ladano’s Complaint did not assert any right that arises from agrarian laws. In fact. Espina. De Mesa. RULING: No. Rodriguez. who denied the existence of a tenancy relationship. will not raise the presumption of an agricultural tenancy. Santos. Page 585 Echiverri. The issues that he wanted resolved are who between himself and the respondents have a better right to possess the property. Gloria.” For a tenancy relationship. They cannot be arrived at by mere conjectures or by presumptions. Cabañgon. Palad. Such admission negates the requisites of consent and of an agreement to share harvests. Tecson. Inguillo. an implied tenancy is deemed to exist between them.

Alcazaren. The DARAB failed to consider that one’s occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land. Corporal. Coronel. Valiente. Petitioner did not even allege in his Complaint that he is a tenant of the landowner. Marquez. Sandoval. Espina. The CA rightfully reversed this conclusion. Palad. Valois . Lastimosa. Petitioner is not a tenant on the land and is not entitled to security of tenure nor to disturbance compensation. the DARAB concluded that the landowner must have consented to petitioner’s occupation. Inguillo. the DARAB arrived at a conclusion that is utterly bereft of factual bases. It should not have considered such occupation as a basis for assuming the landowner’s consent. De Mesa. Without such factual assertions from Ladano. Cabañgon. Sy. no matter how long. Ramirez. Gloria. Lumberio. Tabugan. Santos. His Complaint was properly dismissed for lack of merit. Castillo. From such a lengthy occupation. especially when the occupant himself never alleged that he obtained the landowner’s consent. Corpuz. will not ipso facto make him a de jure tenant. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Asensi. Neither did he allege that he shared his harvests with the landowner. Page 586 Echiverri. Martinez. Albano. Francisco. Catindig. Reyes. Tecson.

De Mesa. before a contract to sell can be validly and effectively cancelled. Gloria. petitioner. Unfazed by the unfortunate turn of events. This time. Respondent-spouses.000. Corpuz. titles were transferred in the names of respondent-spouses and submitted to Capitol Development Bank for loan processing. however. Valiente. The case was later withdrawn and consequently dismissed because the judge found out that the titles were already registered under the names of respondent-spouses. 176791. filed before Branch 18 of the RTC. Cagayan de Oro City. to pay for the monthly amortizations. Recovery of Possession. Sometime in 2000. Rodriguez. Lumberio. petitioner sent respondent-spouses a notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell due to the latter’s failure to pay the monthly amortizations. Sandoval. Thus. Reconveyance and Damages. Valois . Alcazaren. Francisco. Asensi. 2003. Coronel. Martinez. the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notarized notice of cancellation. herein respondent Angeles. undertaking to pay the loan over four years. and ANGELES NANOL G. from 1997 to 2001. respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house allegedly valued at P3. did not avail of petitioner’s inhouse financing due to its high interest rates.00. Marquez. vs SPOUSES ARSENIO. INC. Page 587 Echiverri. Instead. a simulated sale over the property was executed by petitioner in favor of respondent-spouses. Accordingly. leaving his wife. more or less. Petitioner filed before Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City. To facilitate the loan. the seller has (1) to send a notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to refund the cash surrender value. In July 2001.5 million. Palad. an action for unlawful detainer. and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. respondent Angeles offered to pay P220. 2012 DOCTRINE: Under the Maceda Law. When the case was referred for mediation. In other words. November 14. against respondent-spouses and all persons Albano. Unfortunately. Sy. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. No. Tabugan. COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN.R. respondent-spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner over the same property for the same price of P368. using the property as collateral. Corporal. against respondent-spouses. Inguillo. Cagayan de Oro City. whereby the latter agreed to sell to spouses a house and lot at Camella Homes Subdivision. FACTS: Respondent-Spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol agreed to enter into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Communities Cagayan Inc. Ramirez. On September 10. Castillo. Santos. Rañigo. respondent Arsenio died. they obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank. Espina. a Complaint for Cancellation of Title.000. Reyes. a sister company of petitioner. respondent-spouses availed of petitioner’s in-house financing thus.00 to settle the case but petitioner refused to accept the payment. Catindig. Tecson.. the bank collapsed and closed before it could release the loan.

and may “still reinstate the contract by updating the account during the grace period and before the actual cancellation” of the contract. claiming rights under them. Rodriguez. the buyer has the right to continue occupying the property subject of the contract to sell. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent-spouses the value of the new house minus the cost of the original house. Until and unless the seller complies with these twin mandatory requirements. Lastimosa. Tecson. In her Answer. Santos. which governs sales of real estate on installment. Gloria. respondent Angeles averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid. Petitioner alleged that the transfer of the titles in the names of respondent-spouses was made only in compliance with the requirements of Capitol Development Bank and that respondent-spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations beginning January 2000. Inguillo. to refund the cash Albano. In this case. Considering that this case stemmed from a Contract to Sell executed by the petitioner and the respondent-spouses. Valois . Rañigo. It failed. Espina. Sandoval. Thus. Page 588 Echiverri. Cabañgon. before a contract to sell can be validly and effectively cancelled. De la Cruz. Inc. Lumberio. petitioner complied only with the first condition by sending a notarized notice of cancellation to the respondent-spouses. the contract to sell between the parties remains valid and subsisting. Valiente. Instead of appealing the Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Alcazaren. petitioner opted to file the instant petition directly with this Court on a pure question of law. Sy. should be applied. we agree with petitioner that the Maceda Law. Coronel. Thus. Palad. Corpuz. and Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to respondent-spouses all the monthly installments paid HELD: Respondent-spouses are entitled to the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made. Castillo. Catindig. Under the Maceda Law. T-105202 and T-105203 be cancelled. petitioner prayed that TCT Nos. Francisco. the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notarized notice of cancellation. the seller has (1) to send a notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to refund the cash surrender value. however. Martinez. Corporal. and that respondent Angeles be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay petitioner reasonable monthly rentals from January 2000 plus damages. Asensi. De Mesa. and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. Ramirez. Marquez. Tabugan. Reyes. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale invalid for lack of consideration. and that petitioner is not the proper party to file the complaint because petitioner is different from Masterplan Properties. In other words.

First. Consequently. Tecson. Castillo. In such case. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. Palad. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. Sandoval. the proper rent. respondent Angeles cannot be compelled to purchase the lots. the Contract to Sell remains valid and subsisting and supposedly. Unfortunately. Lumberio. he shall pay reasonable rent. we cannot reverse the Decision of the RTC directing respondent-spouses to vacate and turnover possession of the subject property to petitioner because respondent-spouses never appealed the order. sown or planted in good faith. has two options. and the one who sowed. In conformity with the foregoing pronouncement. Corporal. The RTC Decision as to respondent-spouses is therefore considered final. respondent Angeles would have “a right of retention which negates the obligation to pay rent. De Mesa. Albano. Ramirez. respondent-spouses have the right to continue occupying the subject property. Asensi. no evidence was presented to show that petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. Page 589 Echiverri.” In the alternative. Lastimosa. Third. Under this option. It may appropriate the new house by reimbursing respondent Angeles the current market value thereof minus the cost of the old house. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. Valois . Valiente. Espina. good faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-spouses. Cabañgon. Santos. ART. as landowner. petitioner must have given the respondent-spouses permits to commence and undertake the construction. Catindig. She can only be obliged to pay petitioner reasonable rent. petitioner may sell the lots to respondent Angeles at a price equivalent to the current fair value thereof. after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548. if the value of the lots is considerably more than the value of the improvement. Marquez. Tabugan. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. Rodriguez. Respondent-spouses are entitled to reimbursement of the improvements made on the property. Gloria. we can validly presume that petitioner consented to the improvements being constructed. Rañigo. sowing or planting. Francisco. Alcazaren. Sy. However. the court shall fix the terms thereof. We thus hold that Article 448 is also applicable to the instant case. The owner of the land on which anything has been built. we hold that petitioner. surrender value to the respondent-spouses. De la Cruz. Corpuz. Martinez. Reyes. 448. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. Second. This presumption is bolstered by the fact that as the subdivision developer. Inguillo. petitioner failed to rebut this presumption. However. Thus. Coronel.

R. and that Jack Daniel’s sale to Regis-Schmitz be declared null and void. It held that with the admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea. Petitioners claim that from 1921 up to 2000. Sandoval. and thus possesses the right to dispose of his undivided share therein. he is thus a co-owner of the land which forms part of Andrea’s estate.177 square meters of land in Macrohon. peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner. Andrea conveyed a portion thereof to one Crispina Gloria de Cano via a document written in the vernacular wherein she categorically stated that she inherited the land from her father and she was the true and exclusive owner of the land. Valois . 22447. Rodriguez. Marquez. that the respondents be restrained from creating a cloud upon OCT No. and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in the name of Andrea’s heirs upon application of Teofila G. and MansuetoMaceda are descendants of Rafael Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife. Martinez. his son Jack Daniel (herein respondent) came into possession andenjoyment thereof. Paz Royeras-Soler. Rañigo. Gloria. FACTS: Petitioners Joaquin G. petitioners filed Civil Case No. 22447 is registered in the name of “Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. November 21. Lumberio. with a prayer that Jack Daniel be declared without right to sell the land or a portion thereof. that in 1954. They add that during Andrea’s lifetime. No. 179754.Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. her son Fortunato Mondragon took over. Santos. JOAQUIN CHUNG. Tabugan.500-square meter portion of the land to his co-respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz). Andrea Baldos (Andrea). Cabañgon. Inguillo. that their rights and those belonging to the legitimate heirs of Rafael and Eleuteria be declared valid and binding against the whole world. Francisco. Page 590 Echiverri. Reyes. Coronel. Maceda (Teofila). Alcazaren. Southern Leyte (the land). 2003 Decision dismissing the case. R-3248. Espina. After trial. respondents claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the land. On the other hand. he being the latter’s grandson and therefore her heir.On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that the sale to Regis-Schmitz created a cloud upon their title.. the court a quo rendered its May 19. the demurring party should not mistake brevity for levity. Chung. vs JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON G. The trial court held that petitioners’ remedy was to seek partition of the land in order to obtain title to determinate portions thereof. paying taxes thereon religiously. Tecson. Jack Daniel sold a 1. having inherited the same from her father Blas Baldos.. JR. Lastimosa. EleuteriaCalunia (Eleuteria). Rafael appeared as owner of the land in its tax declaration. and when Fortunato died. Corporal. who is petitioners’ sister. she was in lawful. Jr. 2012 DOCTRINE: In making the indictment that a court’s decision fails in the fundamental mandate that no decision shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Asensi. De la Cruz. that after Andrea died in 1955. Albano. Valiente. Catindig. Castillo. Ramirez. Maceda” and covers 16. Palad. while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon (Jack Daniel) is Rafael’s descendant by his second wife. De Mesa. Corpuz. Sy.

And whether or not the Decision of the trial court violated the constitutional requirement that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. It held that petitioners were bound by the agreement during pre-trial and by the pre-trial order to limit the determination of the case to the sole issue of whether Jack Daniel possessed the capacity to dispose a portion of the land. give the impression that the land belonged solely to the heirs of Andrea. The trial court’s Decision is complete. because he is not even named in OCT No. 22447. she could have no better right. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Coronel. Corporal. Sy. they should not mistake brevity for levity. Albano. Martinez. De Mesa. It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of AndreaBaldos. and that he is not even named in the title. Marquez. Reyes. they being descendants-heirs of Rafael. The CA sustained the trial court. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood – such fact is not borne out by the record – they could not be heirs to each other. With greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners. As mere representative. Tecson. If this were not true. Cabañgon. Castillo. Indeed. Gloria. Palad. Rafael’s second wife. the fact that Rafael died ahead of Andrea. HELD: The Court finds in this case no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. petitioners are bound to abide by the same. And if indeed Eleuteria and Andrea were blood relatives. Santos. Valois . Corpuz. Valiente.” ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Jack Daniel to Regis-Schmitz be declared null and void. Catindig. Since they did not object to the trial court’s pre-trial order. not even the fact that their sister Teofila Maceda’s name appears in the title could warrant a different conclusion. Asensi. Espina. clear. Alcazaren. then petitioners would have so revealed at the very first opportunity. who are Rafael’s children by his first wife Eleuteria. then the title should have as registered owners the “Heirs of Rafael and Andrea Mondragon”. Francisco. Ramirez. Her name appears therein only as a representative of Andrea’s heirs. De la Cruz. and concise. Petitioners should be reminded that in making their indictment that the trial court’s Decision fails to express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. to the exclusion of Rafael. Lumberio. Page 591 Echiverri. Moreover. Sandoval. Add to this the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. Tabugan. A different view would have been taken if they were. Yet OCT No. Inguillo. It concluded that the other issues which were not related to Jack Daniel’s capacity to dispose deserved no consideration. 22447 is not so written. The land could not have belonged to Rafael. in which case the petitioners certainly would possess equitable title. that “the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal. Lastimosa.

Martinez. Valiente. have themselves declared as Andrea’s heirs so that they may claim a share in the land. Catindig. Petitioners cannot. Santos. Lumberio. Valois . Alcazaren. the trial court and the CA did so by an erroneous appreciation of the facts and evidence. Corpuz. Sandoval. Marquez. Albano. Tecson. Sy. on the pretext of maintaining a suit for quieting of title. Cabañgon. Corporal. De Mesa. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Castillo. If they truly believe that they are entitled to a share in the land. Francisco. Inguillo. Rañigo. or recover damages in the event prescription has set in. such that the only recourse left for the trial court was to dismiss the case. Asensi. Ramirez. Espina. Coronel. Reyes. Lastimosa. Page 592 Echiverri. Tabugan. although they both arrived at the correct conclusion. Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to the land. or sue for the annulment of the title and seek issuance of new titles in their name. Gloria. Thus said. they may avail of the remedies afforded to excluded heirs under the Rules of Court. Palad.

Catindig. Coronel. in the absence of proof that Iluminardo and Prescilla have completed installment payments thereon. Espina. or were awarded titles to the lots. Asensi. Castillo. In October 1984. No. Consequently. De Mesa. a Decision was rendered in favor of the Mananquils. In 1991. it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to. Francisco. And if the couple disposed of these lots even before title could be issued in their name. but it turned out that Prescilla had a child by a previous marriage – namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). Legal title denotes registered ownership. was sold to Prescilla in February 1980 by its occupant. Valiente. Palad. the Mananquils instituted Civil Case No. while equitable title means beneficial ownership. Rañigo. Sy. Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated by the National Housing Authority (NHA) and placed under its TondoDagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project – where occupants. Valois . had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale. Corporal. 180076. Ramirez. Marquez. and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) – executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. Alcazaren. Moico began evicting the Mananquils’ tenants and demolishing the structures they built on Lots 18 and 19. 2012 DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper. Tecson. Eulogio and two others. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Inguillo. Reyes. Lastimosa. DIONISIO MANAQUIL vs ROBERTO MOICO G. Albano. Page 593 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and PrescillaMananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell. thus disqualifying them from the NHA program.R. Lumberio. on the other hand. Rodriguez. In the absence of such legal or equitable title. EulogioBaltazarMaypa and Brenda Luminugue. thus suspending eviction and demolition. Martinez. 2741-MN for quieting of title and injunctive relief. FACTS: Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan. November 21. and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico). Tabugan. After trial on the merits. applicants or beneficiaries may purchase lots on installment basis. Corpuz. Iluminardo’s supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) – his brothers and sisters and herein petitioners Dionisio and EstanislaoMananquil (Estanislao). Gloria. After the spouses’ death. or interest. the property which is the subject-matter of the action. the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997. Lot 19. They took possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties. Santos. In May 1997. or interest in. on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla. there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Iluminardo and Prescilla died without issue. LaudenciaMananquil-Villamor (Laudencia). Sometime later. The CA noted that Lots 18 and 19 must still belong to the NHA. Sandoval. In June. then they may have been guilty of violating conditions of the government grant. De la Cruz.

Tecson. Corporal. a ruling to this Albano. Corpuz. Asensi. Rañigo. encumbrance. Lastimosa. and even to abuse the property as he deems best. and (2) the deed. prohibition. Sy. namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action. for lack of legal or equitable title to or interest in Lots 18 and 19. De Mesa. then no suit for quieting of title could prosper. Ramirez. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. however. not only to place things in their proper place. or terms that govern the TondoDagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on their part. HELD: No. Castillo. But “for an action to quiet title to prosper. lack of qualifications or otherwise. Rodriguez. Sandoval. or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project. They failed to present any title. to use. Page 594 Echiverri. Lumberio. at the very least. For this reason. and are not disqualified by non-payment. award. to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. but also for the benefit of both. so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants. Catindig. Santos. They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. of the specific law. two indispensable requisites must concur. It was erroneous. grant. If this is the case. In the absence of proof. Marquez. and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire. Reyes. Palad. Martinez. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Gloria. provisions. their rights or interest in the property could not be established. They failed to present proof. there is no right in respect to these properties that the Mananquils may succeed to. Valois . Inguillo. it appears that the petitioners have failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project.” From the evidence adduced below. Francisco. for the CA to assume that Iluminardo and Prescilla may have violated the conditions of the NHA grant under the TondoDagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project by transferring their rights prior to the issuance of a title or certificate awarding Lots 18 and 19 to them. Valiente. claim. document or certification from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19. An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. taking over Iluminardo’s rights after his death. Espina. Coronel. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have equitable or legal title to initiate the action of quieting the title. the court ruled “Proof of heirship alone does not suffice : the Mananquils must prove to the satisfaction of the courts that they have a right to succeed Illuminardo under the law or terms of the NHA project. or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Alcazaren. regulation or terms covering the program/project which allows for a substitution or succession of rights in case of death. De Mesa. to the satisfaction of the courts that under the NHA program project governing the grant of the lands in question. the certificate of title. or. Page 595 Echiverri. Sy. Tabugan. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Instead. Albano. Valois . Inguillo. Palad. not only as his heirs. they are entitled and qualified to succeed or substitute for Illuminardo in his rights upon his death. this takes the form of evidence – apart from proof of heirship. Cabañgon. Asensi. Catindig. in the absence thereof. Sandoval. or grant from the proper agency (NHA or otherwise) in the name of their predecessor Iluminardo. either: 1) a certificate of title. Coronel. or the testimony of competent witnesses from the NHA. the trial court – and the CA on appeal – should have required proof that petitioners had. 2) a right to succeed to Iluminardo’s rights to Lots 18 and 19. Lumberio. Gloria. award. in resolving the case. award or grant itself. Reyes. Tecson. Corporal. Ramirez. Francisco. Marquez. effect is speculative. As earlier stated. Valiente. Castillo. Santos. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Corpuz. but also as qualified legitimate successors/beneficiaries under the TondoDagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project terms and conditions as taken over by the NHA. Martinez. Espina. of course – of the specific law. Petitioners should have shown.

are owners of several parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. Sometime in the first week of August 2000. ALBERT M. Adriano and Eulogio Sta. G. 2012 DOCTRINE: It is essential that for damages to be awarded. ANTONIO O. Santos. Albano. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of agency may be revoked HELD: Yes. they agreed to defray the costs or expenses involved in processing the loan because respondents promised that they would have an equal share in the proceeds of the loan or the subject properties. represented by RAUL STA. Martinez. they were informed that the loan was approved in the amount of P25M and that their share would be P6M. De la Cruz. BANTOLO. CRUZ JR. the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) approved the loan application of petitioner Ching in the amount of P25M. Ramirez. Sandoval. Valois . Coronel. Jr. Palad. Petitioners alleged that the SPA is irrevocable because it is a contract of agency coupled with interest. 2000.00 without any condition. Bantolo (Bantolo). Sy. Asensi. petitioner Ching thru a letter informed respondents of the approval of the loan. On the other hand. Considering that the loan application with PVB did not push through. CRUZ JR. a claimant must satisfactorily prove during the trial that they have a factual basis and that the defendant’s acts have a casual connection to them. FELIX M. petitioner Ching advanced the amount of P500. Page 596 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Cruz. Reyes. respondents are liable to return the said amount to petitioner Ching. Alcazaren.. According to them. petitioner Ching is entitled to actual damages in the amount of P500. Catindig. 2000. respondents revoked the SPA and demanded the return of the titles. Castillo. This is because their bilateral contract depends upon the agency. 177086 December 5.00 to respondents.R. Gloria. Tecson. CHING and ROMEO J. Bautista a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing petitioners to obtain a loan using respondents’ properties as collateral. it cannot be revoked at the sole will of the principal. On July 18. Valiente. De Mesa. Rañigo. Francisco. Corporal. FACTS: Respondents Felix M.000. On July 31. No. There is no question that the SPA executed by respondents in favor of petitioners is a contract of agency coupled with interest. substituted by his children. BAUTISTAvs. respondents alleged that they executed the SPA in favor of petitioners because of their assurance that they would be able to get a loan in the amount of P50M and that P30M would be given to respondents within a month’s time. 2000. Espina.000. On April 3. Corpuz. Furthermore. ADRIANO and EULOGIO STA. Hence. In exchange for his possession of the titles. Since it was not the amount agreed upon. Tabugan. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Inguillo. respondents executed in favor of petitioners Albert Ching (Ching) and Romeo J. petitioners learned about the revocation of the SPA. Antonio O. Later.

HELD: The Court finds no reason to disturb the trial and appellate courts’ award in this regard. Subsequently. respondents instituted a civil case for collection of a sum of money with damages before the RTC. Francisco. Albano. Rañigo. Tecson. De Mesa. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable and thus ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages to the respondents. Marquez. for another. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Corporal. leased out these fishponds to petitioners. Palad. They incurred delay in their payments. they subleased the premises to Reyes. Asensi.R. for one. In 1994. GERARDO ANTONIO ABELLO. MARGARET DEL ROSARIO ISLETA. Page 597 Echiverri. Santos. Rodriguez. Tabugan. 184698 January 21. AMPARO PALENZUELA. They have been found guilty of several violations of the agreement. Lastimosa. the petitioners did not vacate and continued to occupy and operate the fishponds. No. Coronel. Gloria. Martinez. Castillo. oppressive. Valiente. Even though respondents received payments directly from the sublessee Reyes. fraudulent. Corpuz. and not just one. On appeal. thirdly. The lease was for five years. 2013 DOCTRINE: Exemplary damages may also be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant acted in a wanton. Sy. Respondents may have been compelled to accept payment from Reyes only because petitioners have been remiss in honoring their obligation to pay rent. through their duly appointed attorney-in-fact and co-respondent Palenzuela. respondents. in blatant disregard of the express prohibition in the lease agreement. Reyes. Respondents then sent a letter to petitioners declaring the latter as trespassers and demanding the settlement of the latter’s outstanding obligations. reckless. When the lease expired. as stipulated under the lease agreement. Ramirez. HANS DEL ROSARIO. SPOUSES ALBERTO AND SUSAN CASTRO vs. they refused to honor their obligation. FACTS: Respondents own several fishponds in Bulacan. this could not erase the fact that petitioners are guilty of subleasing the fishponds to her. and their check payments bounced. Valois . Petitioners have not been exactly above-board in dealing with respondents. for herself and as authorized representative of VIRGINIA ABELLO. or malevolent manner. Cabañgon. to pay the fishpond license and other permit fees and. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Inguillo. Catindig. they refused to vacate the premises after the expiration of the lease. ENRIQUE ALENZUELA and CARLOS MIGUEL PALENZUELA G. Lumberio. ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO. Espina. INGEBORGREGINA DEL ROSARIO. CA sustained in toto the decision of the RTC. finally.

Lastimosa. Ramirez. Castillo. Gloria. Sy. Sandoval. Corpuz. Albano. Valiente.Exemplary damages may also be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant acted in a wanton. Palad. Cabañgon. By refusing to honor their solemn obligations under the lease. Bad faith means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. Catindig. Lumberio. as stipulated in the lease agreement. Santos. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Coronel. fraudulent. Rañigo. oppressive. Inguillo. Tecson. Moral damages may be awarded when the breach of contract is attended with bad faith. Page 598 Echiverri. Reyes. Asensi. Alcazaren. and instead unduly profiting from these violations. Marquez. Corporal. Espina. reckless. Martinez. petitioners are guilty of bad faith. or malevolent manner. And since the award of exemplary damages is proper in this case. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Valois . attorney's fees and costs of the suit may also be recovered. Francisco.

Amurao) entered into a Construction Contract Agreement (CCA) with Aegean Construction and Development Corp. Section 4 of Executive Order (E. (Manila Insurance) and Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (Intra Strata). limited to the amount of the bond. No. guarantees the performance by another party. the complaint must still be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently. Francisco. 179628 January 16. Lumberio. Page 599 Echiverri. Amurao is premature. of an obligation or undertaking in favor of a third party. Castillo. Manila Insurance elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. De Mesa.) No. THE MANILA INSURANCE COMPANY. Manila Insurance contends that the dispute between the spouses and Aegean should be brought first before the CIAC for arbitration. I 008. Hence. A contract of suretyship is defined as “an agreement whereby a party. Palad. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Insurance can be held liable as surety of Aegan HELD: Yes. they filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Martinez. Valois . otherwise known as the Construction Industry Arbitration Law. that although the contract of suretyship is secondary to the principal contract.Hence. Aegean failed to comply with its obligation. Aegean posted performance bonds secured by petitioner Manila Insurance Company. and determined strictly by the terms of contract of suretyship in relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the obligee. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Coronel. But while there is a cause of action against Manila Insurance. Catindig. Manila Insurance and Intra Strata discovered that the CCA contained an arbitration clause. Marquez. INC. is broad enough to cover any dispute arising from. Corpuz. 2013 DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) is conferred by law. called the obligee. FACTS: Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao (Sps. Lastimosa. During the pre-trial.It bears stressing.O. To guarantee its obligation. or connected with construction contracts. Rañigo. however. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Espina. Santos. Manila Insurance appealed to the Court of Appeals.vs. Sandoval. Corporal. Sy. and absolute. Tecson. The Court has consistently held that a surety’s liability is joint and several. SPOUSES ROBERTO and AIDA AMURAO G. the spouses filed a complaint before the RTC to enforce its claim against the sureties. The CA dismissed the petition. the surety’s liability to the obligee is nevertheless direct. Albano. called the surety. De la Cruz. Asensi. Alcazaren. whether these involve mere contractual money claims or execution of the works. Gloria. Reyes. Valiente. (Aegean) for the construction of a six-storey commercial building. primary. Tabugan. Ramirez. Manila Insurance argues that it cannot be held liable as a surety because the claim of Sps. called the principal or obligor. Cabañgon. Inc.R.

DIEGO and EDUARDO P. Santos. Corporal. However. It also shows that the vendor reserved title to the property until full payment. Francisco.00.000. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Significantly. it is also not disputed that the parties agreed that the remaining amount of ₱250. The stipulation to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price is a unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract to sell. ₱250.000. Reyes. Sandoval. and Nicolas received. Meanwhile. Corpuz. Valiente. Rodriguez. Marquez. Alcazaren. On appeal. Coronel. It held that since there was a perfected contract of sale between Nicolas and Rodolfo. as co-owner of the family’s Diego Building. 179965 February 20. RODOLFO P. this Court declared in categorical terms that "[w]here the vendor promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the vendee of the payment of the price. Asensi. There is no dispute that in 1993. The aforecited stipulation shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase price. Tuparan. The contract entered into by Nicolas and Rodolfo was a contract to sell. Catindig. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is a contract to sell HELD: Yes.00 would be paid after Nicolas shall have executed a deed of sale. DIEGO G. Ramirez. Lumberio.000. the contract is only a contract to sell. Inguillo. respondent herein. entered into an oral contract to sell covering Nicola’s share. No. Sy. Valois . Castillo. Rodolfo failed to render an accounting and remit his share in the rents and fruits of the building prompting Nicolas to file a complaint. DIEGO vs. De Mesa. the latter may compel the former to execute the proper sale document. Rodolfo agreed to buy Nicolas’s share in the Diego Building for the price of ₱500. Eduardo gave Nicolas’ monthly share in the rents to Rodolfo. Gloria. Palad. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit and ordering Nicolas to execute a Deed of absolute sale in favor of Rodolfo upon payment by the latter of the balance of the agreed purchase price. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Albano. It was agreed that the Deed of Sale should be executed upon payment of the remaining balance. There is also no dispute that of the total purchase price. another brother of Nicolas. Despite demands and protestations." FACTS: Petitioner Nicolas and his brother Rodolfo.00. Rodolfo and Eduardo failed to pay the remaining balance. the CA sustained the RTC’s decision in toto. 2013 DOCTRINE: An agreement which stipulates that the seller shall execute a deed of sale only upon or after until payment of the purchase price is a contract to sell. He prayed that Eduardo be ordered to deliver to Nicolas his share in the rents. Espina. Tecson. In Reyes v. not a contract of sale. Martinez. Rodolfo paid. Page 600 Echiverri. Rañigo. Rodolfo made a down payment. NICOLAS P.R.

Catindig. Francisco. Coronel. The Court further held that "[j]urisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price. Marquez. "[w]here the vendor promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the vendee of the payment of the price. Sandoval. to execute a deed of absolute sale upon full payment of the purchase price. Sy." indicates that the parties entered into a contract to sell. Corpuz.. In Reyes v. Santos. i. Alcazaren. this Court ruled that a stipulation in the contract. Lumberio. Inguillo. Valiente. Martinez. Gloria. De la Cruz. Corporal. the Court ruled that the agreement to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price "shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase price. Tabugan. Cabañgon. According to this Court. This stipulation. this particular provision is tantamount to a reservation of ownership on the part of the vendor. Palad. Castillo. the contract is only a contract to sell. is a unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract to sell.e. Rodriguez. Explicitly stated. Valois . Lastimosa. Page 601 Echiverri. Rañigo. Asensi. Benolirao. Tecson. Ramirez. Tuparan. Espina." Albano." In Tan v. Reyes. De Mesa.

Catindig. 2013 DOCTRINE: This Court cannot presume the existence of a sale of land. Inguillo. Rañigo. Ramirez. Ututalum-Al Haj. thru Davao Branch Manager Abraham D. Cabañgon. informing him of the Head Office's disapproval of PELA's offer to buy the said 2. if any. Corporal.000. acting on Robern's undated written offer. Dalig (OIC Dalig). Marquez. Lumberio.00 per square meter. ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. Al-Amanah. PELA had deposited P150.Eight days later. Martinez. unless they are interested to buy it. as well as the payment of Albano. The informal settlers together with other members comprising PELA offered to purchase the lot for P300. Coronel. half of which shall be paid as down payment and the remaining half to be paid within one year. 1993 addressed to its Board Operations Committee.4 On December 12.000. Sandoval. 1992. Reyes. Francisco. thru its officer-in-charge Febe O. De Mesa. Robern was informed of the acceptance. Meanwhile. 1993. On November 29. Al-Amanah stressed that it is Robern's responsibility to eject the occupants in the subject lot. Rodriguez. that it is buying the lot on "as is" basis. 138914.R. Asensi. PEOPLE’S LANDLESS ASSOCIATION G. Corpuz. 1993. Davao City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. In the lower portion of the said letter. indicating therein that Robern is interested to buy the lot for P400. Al-Amanah reiterated its demand to the informal settlers to vacate the lot. In the meantime. 1993.00. asked some of the members of PELA to desist from building their houses on the lot and to vacate the same. that it is willing to shoulder the relocation of all informal settlers therein.00. Valois .000-square meter lot. De la Cruz.000. the Head Office informed the Davao Branch Manager that the Board Operations Committee had accepted Robern's offer.00 on or before April 15. On December 29. FACTS: Al-Amanah owned a 2000-square meter lot located in Magtu-od. Tabugan. Sr. Al-Amanah Davao Branch.00 as evidenced by four bank receipts. Page 602 Echiverri. Lastimosa. which Al-Amanah turned down for being far below its asking price. Santos. Consequently. Valiente. the PELA members remained in the property and introduced further improvements. wrote then PELA President BonifacioCuizon. Espina. No. They. Tecson. 1993. Sy. Al-Amanah issued a Recommendation Sheet dated December 27. absent any direct proof of it. By May 3. and. that it has already deposited 20% of the offered purchase price. Castillo. Gloria. Al-Amanah made the following annotation: Subject offer has been acknowledged/received but processing to take effect upon putting up of the partial amt. of P150.000. sent demand letter to vacate the lot. then. 173622 March 11. The informal settlers thus expressed their interest to buy the lot at P100. Palad. Alcazaren.

Corpuz. "But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties. Catindig. Albano.. we held: x xx The rule is that except where a formal acceptance is so required. the remaining amount within 15 days. Marquez. Robern expressed to Al-Amanah its uncertainty on the status of the subject lot. ISSUE: Whether or notthere was a perfected contract of sale between PELA and Al-Amanah. and Robern's President and General Manager. or words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. Valois . Cabañgon.000. It "can be inferred from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting parties. Ramirez.000-square meter lot. Martinez. Robern. This leaves us to resolve whether there was a concurrence of the remaining elements. Sy. although they did not affix their signatures to any written document. all of the following essential elements must concur: "a) consent or meeting of the minds. Alcazaren. there is no contract. if accepted by the other. Lastimosa. Castillo. "when there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance of the other. the P80. a binding contract may exist between the parties whose minds have met.A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Francisco." The decision to accept a bidder's proposal must be communicated to the bidder. in an apparent act of bad faith and in cahoots with Robern. the 2. PELA filed a suit for Annulment and Cancellation of Void Deed of Sale against Al-Amanah. Sandoval. as acceptance may be expressed or implied. Carpizo). Rodriguez. Valiente. Tabugan. i. the resolution of which will decide whether the sale of the lot to Robern should be sustained or not. Inguillo. Rañigo. Asensi. b) determinate subject matter. Coronel. Page 603 Echiverri. for a contract of sale to be valid. It insisted that as early as March 1993 it has a perfected contract of sale with Al-Amanah. Palad.e."49chanroblesvirtualawlibrary In the case at bench. as its members were already facing eviction and possible demolition of their houses. and c) price certain in money or its equivalent. Al-Amanah proceeded with the sale of the lot despite the prior sale to PELA. its Director Engr. it may be made either in a formal or an informal manner. otherwise. OIC Dalig. fixing it can never be left to the decision of only one of the contracting parties. Thus. Tecson. and may be shown by acts. there is no controversy anent the determinate subject matter. Gloria. Espina. Lumberio. De la Cruz. However. However. De Mesa.00 deposit shall be forfeited.48 Thus. Farouk Carpizo (Engr. HELD: NO. gives rise to a perfected sale." Thus. conduct. Santos. Reyes. and in order to protect their rights as vendees. although the acceptance must be affirmatively and clearly made and must be evidenced by some acts or conduct communicated to the offeror. Corporal. Three months later. petitioner Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo) before the RTC of Davao City. As for the price." As regards consent.

Valois . Lastimosa. there is no double sale. acceptance may be shown by the acts. Palad. Page 604 Echiverri. Tecson. There is no perfected contract of sale between PELA and Al-Amanah for want of consent and agreement on the price. Corporal. Al-Amanah expressly rejected its offered purchase price. De Mesa. Martinez. Asensi. although it took the latter around seven months to inform the former and this entitled PELA to award of damages. Francisco. Coronel. Before the lapse of the 1-year period PELA had set to pay the remaining balance. Valiente. Marquez. Reyes. conduct. Tabugan. In the case at bench. Ramirez. De la Cruz. we find no reason to disturb the consummated sale between Al-Amanah and Robern. Lumberio. for no oral or documentary evidence categorically proves that Al-Amanah expressed amenability to the offered P300. Espina. Corpuz. Sy. thus. Rodriguez. Gloria. Al-Amanah's act of selling the lot to another buyer is the final nail in the coffin of the negotiation with PELA. Albano. or words of a party recognizing the existence of the contract of sale. Sandoval.000. The offer never materialized into a perfected sale. Inguillo. Alcazaren. the transaction between Al-Amanah and PELA remained in the negotiation stage. Catindig. Clearly. Castillo. Santos. Rañigo.00 purchase price. Cabañgon.

Rodriguez. Upon inquiry. Moldex thus suggested to Flora to execute a written authorization for the sale of the subject lot to a new buyer and a written request for refund so that she can get half of all payments she made. Alcazaren. Catindig. Coronel. FACTS: Interested in acquiring a 180-square meter lot known as Lot 2. De Mesa. While the cash purchase price for the land is P396. Francisco. Sta.969.91. Inc. Cavite. Gloria. Espina. 176289 : April 8. she owed Moldex P247.295. vs FLORA SABERON G. In Spouses Co Chien v. 2013 DOCTRINE: The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision developer to register the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds does not result to the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation. Tecson. In April.265.10.569.49. respondent Flora A.89. Flora was shocked to find out that as of July 1996. Corporal. Flora. Marquez. this Court has already ruled that the lack of a certificate of registration and a license to Albano. De la Cruz. Block 1 of Metrogate Subdivision in Dasmariñas. Inguillo. Lumberio. No. 1992.97 payable in five years with 21% interest per annum based on the balance and an additional 5% surcharge for every month of delay on the monthly installment due. However.20 at monthly amortizations of P8. however. Lastimosa.140. and October 1996. Santos. Castillo. the amount ballooned to P491. Saberon (Flora) asked Moldex. It then sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Reservation Application and/or Contract to Sell. Page 605 Echiverri.R. HELD: NO. the developer. Sandoval.00. Flora never made a written request for refund. Moldex computed Flora’s unpaid account at P576. August. In November 1996. Ramirez.Moldex sent Flora notices reminding her to update her account. on the other hand. Valiente. Tabugan. filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional Field Office IV a Complaint for the annulment of the contract to sell. Sy.498. The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting. Valois . recovery of all her payments with interests. MOLDEX REALTY INC. damages. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract to sell between Moldex and Flora. As of April 1997. Cabañgon. to reserve the lot for her as shown by a Reservation Application dated April 11. Corpuz. Rañigo. Asensi. Flora opted to pay on installment and began making aperiodical payments from 1992 to 1996 in the total amount of P375. and the cancellation of Moldex’s license to sell.000. Palad. Martinez. the price if payment is made on installment basis is P583. Reyes.

non-registration of an instrument of conveyance will not affect the validity of a contract to sell. Tabugan. Sandoval. void. Coronel. did not possess a certificate of registration and license to sell. Corporal.D. Lastimosa. Valois . Santos. nothing therein provides for the nullification of a contract to sell in the event that the seller. Tecson. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the clear language of the law shall prevail. Ramirez. the Court upheld the validity of the contract to sell notwithstanding violations by the developer of the provisions of PD 957. Asensi. 4 and 5). Lumberio. It will remain valid and effective between the parties thereto as under PD 1529 or The Property Registration Decree. De la Cruz. registration merely serves as a constructive notice to the whole world to bind third parties. Palad. at the time the contract was entered into. Castillo.D. or when a penalty is provided for the violation thereof. Thus. Reyes. De Mesa. the general penalties provided in the law shall be applied. Catindig. We held that nothing in PD 957 provides for the nullity of a contract validly entered into in cases of violation of any of its provisions such as the lack of a license to sell.D. As can clearly be seen in the aforequoted provisions. 957. Espina. Rañigo. Marquez. Page 606 Echiverri. With regard to P. the contract to sell entered into between Flora and Moldex remains valid despite the lack of license to sell on the part of the latter at the time the contract was entered into. otherwise validly entered. The penalty imposed by the decree is the general penalty provided for the violation of any of its provisions. Rodriguez. This principle particularly enjoins strict compliance with provisions of law which are penal in nature. Corpuz. Gloria. just like in Section 5 which did not penalize the lack of a license to sell with the nullification of the contract. Alcazaren. Section 17 similarly did not mention that the developer’s or Moldex’s failure to register the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds resulted to the nullification or invalidity of the said contract or deed. The general penalties for the violation of any provisions in P. in violation of Section 17 of PD 957. Inguillo. Thus: A review of the relevant provisions of P. thus. sell on the part of a subdivision developer does not result to the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. the same do not include the nullification of contracts that are otherwise validly entered. Martinez. In said case. Flora claims that the contract she entered into with Moldex is void because of the latter’s failure to register the contract to sell/document of conveyance with the Register of Deeds. However. Absent any specific sanction pertaining to the violation of the questioned provisions (Secs. Moreover. Valiente. 957 reveals that while the law penalizes the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units without prior issuance of a Certificate of Registration and License to Sell by the HLURB. 957 are provided for in Sections 38 and 39. it does not provide that the absence thereof will automatically render a contract. Cabañgon. Sy. The Co Chien ruling has been reiterated in several cases and remains to be the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Extrapolating the ratio decidendi in Co Chien. Albano. Francisco. The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting.

00) bills were handed to Adelaida and Ariel Hael to vote for Mayoralty Candidate Homer RoxasAlumisin and other candidates listed in the yellow pages. Asensi. A formal investigation is necessary to thresh out the truth and also to afford herein respondent the chance to face his accusers. Reyes. Municipality of San Teodoro. He admits that on the date stated in the complaint he was indeed at Barangay Calsapa. two (2) pieces of Five Hundred (P500. Ramos may be held liable for Grave Misconduct HELD: NO. Marquez. Tabugan. Martinez. entered the house of Ms. much less take part in partisan politics. A case for Violation of Article 22. AdelaidaCaegHael. Catindig. Coronel. Respondent adds that he was with Manuel RoxasBae and that he was able to talk with Ariel [Caeg] Hael but their discussion has nothing to do with politics. Rañigo. P-06-2256 : April 10. Gloria. Albano. Sy. Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines was also filed against respondent together with his co-conspirators. Tecson. Espina. Lastimosa. Valiente. Oriental Mindoro to buy charcoal which he sells for a profit to augment his income. 2013 DOCTRINE: A formal investigation is necessary to thresh out the truth and also to afford herein respondent the chance to face his accusers. The said vote buying incident was reported by Adelaida and Ariel Hael to San Teodoro Municipal Police Station. De la Cruz. San Teodoro. Castillo. Corporal. ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Respondent alleges that the charges in the complaint are utterly false. De Mesa. Ramirez. He insists that he was not financially capable to buy two (2) votes at P500.M. Palad. PO2 PATRICK MEJIA GABRIEL vs. FACTS: On 10 May 2007 at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon at Barangay Calsapa. Alcazaren. who both executed their respective Sworn Statements enclosed as Annexes A and B hereof. SHERIFF WILLIAM JOSE RAMOS A. He is aware that as a government employee he cannot campaign. Oriental Mindoro said respondent together with several persons. in conspiracy and on agreement with former Municipal Mayor Manuel RoxasBae. including herein complainant for openly campaigning for a certain candidate during the election period. Soon thereafter. Lumberio. Sandoval. Santos. No. Francisco. Valois .00 each. Page 607 Echiverri. He points out that buying votes several days before election is incongruous because the voters could change their mind on election day. Corpuz. Rodriguez.The conflicting versions of both parties present a factual issue which could not be resolved based only on the pleadings submitted before us. Cabañgon. Inguillo. malicious and intended to intimidate him from prosecuting cases of robbery as well as administrative charges against several policemen.

Valiente. Asensi. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Catindig. 2009. PO2 Gabriel failed to prove his complaint against Sheriff Ramos. Sy. both at 10:00 oclock in the morning. for investigation. Valois . only respondent and his counsel appeared while respondent who was notified via LBC failed to appear despite due notice. 2008. 3) In the conduct of the investigation. Marquez. Sandoval. 459 SCRA 340). Castillo. Pasig City. Albano. Indeed. Palad. De Mesa. this Office notified all the parties for conference/hearing with directive to submit their respective sworn statements on December 8 and 15. Accordingly. De la Cruz. The Court took note of the OCA report and referred the case to the Executive Judge of the RTC. complainant failed to establish the allegations of grave misconduct against herein respondent. Lastimosa. the OCA forwarded the case record to Executive Judge Amelia C. Corporal. 2) On both dates. Pasig City. Francisco. Judge Manalastas recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence. Reyes. Coronel. respondent vehemently denied all the charges against him. Martinez. this Office has no choice but to recommend dismissal of the present complaint. Espina.Manalastas. In administrative proceedings. 4) From the evidence adduced. 2008. 5) With no hard evidence except unconfirmed self serving assertions to back up the complaint. Page 608 Echiverri. RTC. The evidence submitted to this Office reveals that the filing of the instant administrative case appears to be a mere leverage and stemmed from a case filed by herein respondent against the complainant for Robbery. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Santos. Tecson. In a report submitted on January 26. the burden of proof that respondent committed the act complained of rests on the complainant (Gotgotao versus Millora. The Court finds Judge Manalastas recommendation to be in order. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Rañigo. Tabugan. Ramirez. The report states: 1) On November 24. Gloria.

For fear of his life. petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26. In effect. Espina. Chioco had no right to evict petitioner and enter the property.R. where the landed elite have free rein over their poor vassals. Lumberio. that the corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between them be executed. petitioner. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling. Corporal. Martinez. Valiente. Santos. A CLT serves as “a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner. In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Gloria. Tecson. Reyes. Nueva Ecija (the farm).It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under the coverage of RA 3844. attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. No. De Mesa. 2013 DOCTRINE: The Court cannot sanction the use of force to evict beneficiaries of land reform. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO G. In 1980. Sy. Rodriguez. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare farm in Lupao. thus. Inguillo. might is right. individuals connected with Chioco – who was a former Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. Corpuz. Lastimosa. 180476 : June 26. His standing crops (corn and vegetables) and house were bulldozed. On March 9. De la Cruz. together with his family. his standing crops. Catindig. This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. Ramirez. Palad. petitioner already had an expectant right to the farm. Asensi. In fact. Coronel. Rañigo. More significantly. As tiller of the farm. Castillo. Valois . MARLON CODERIAS vs. left the farm. ISSUE: Whether or not Chioco has a right to evict the petitioner and enter the property HELD: NO. 1995 petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Talavera. FACTS: The deceased Juan O. that he be awarded actual damages for the destruction of his house.” Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. Albano. Tabugan. Chioco had no right to claim that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed. Page 609 Echiverri. Eviction using force is reversion to the feudal system. 1974. a CLT had been issued in favor of the petitioner. Marquez. Nueva Ecija a Petition against respondent Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected. Sandoval. petitioner and his family re-established themselves on the farm. unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993. Francisco.

Tecson. the termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law. under Section 12 of this Code. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. and now. Valiente. petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. x xx (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted) The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris. x xx [S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their [landholdings] is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Rañigo. x xx In addition. (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee. Sy. which the latter is bound to respect. Perforce.” In this case. the farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under Section 11 of the Code. or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x xx. Catindig. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Page 610 Echiverri.” None of these is obtaining in this case. Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant. as well as the right to redeem the land. Inguillo. Espina. De Mesa. x xx [T]he Land Reform Code forges by operation of law. Corporal. Corpuz. Francisco. to wit: “(1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor. we deem it proper to reckon Albano. written notice of which shall be served three months in advance. he filed the instant Petition. we have held that transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership. Lumberio. Tabugan. Asensi. the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances. Under Section 8 of RA 3844. Castillo. No. between the landowner and the farmer — be [he] a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum juris with certain vital consequences. Gloria. Palad. Section 10 of R. Two years after. such as the sale or transfer of legal possession. 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale.A. will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest. that exists between the petitioner and Chioco. this juridical tie. It will be recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. such that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law. With unyielding consistency. Martinez. if sold to a third person without his knowledge. Reyes. Valois . Lastimosa. Ramirez. or in 1995. more basically. In particular. Coronel. De la Cruz. To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants. Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that “[a]n action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. Santos. Cabañgon. His house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed. Marquez. such as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's right to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons. Indeed.

Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death. as well as the right to redeem the land. Marquez. Francisco. Tecson. Lumberio. Palad. Valiente. Ramirez. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb existed. Sy. Gloria. Valois . Rodriguez. to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons. Martinez. petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993. Alcazaren. Espina. Catindig. if sold to a third person without his knowledge. Inguillo. Castillo. Reyes. Corpuz. Corporal. Lastimosa. Tabugan. These rights. petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period commenced. include the right to security of tenure. De la Cruz. as enumerated above. Santos. and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Asensi. Rañigo. Coronel. petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. De Mesa. the pre-emptive right to buy the land. Albano. Page 611 Echiverri.

Sandoval. Sy. Rañigo. 1998. Malaybalay. 1995. and (3) respondents be ordered to pay damages. Corpuz. Espina. Coronel. Albano. and. 1997.000. 2013 DOCTRINE: In a contract to sell. that they are natural born Filipino citizens but petitioner Delfin acquired American citizenship while his wife.000. petitioners filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity ab initio of sale. Rowena Gay T.R. through a deed of sale for an unconscionable amount of P95. FACTS: On March 23. Reynalda sold the subject land to her daughter. to wit: (1) the title to the subject land was not immediately transferred. and recovery of ownership and possession of land with the RTC of Malaybalay City. Visitacion Lopez (respondent Rowena).00 by respondent Rowena to petitioner Aurora on January 25. Ramirez. Martinez. Valiente. T-25334 (subject land) in the name of petitioner Aurora. respondents should be held liable for damages. petitioners received 22 intermittent monthly installments from respondent Rowena in the sum of $500. Santos. Rodriguez. De la Cruz.000. its existence and partial execution were sufficiently established by. Alcazaren. In their Complaint. remained a Filipino citizen. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners and respondent Rowena entered into a contract to sell over the subject land HELD: YES. Catindig. for these fraudulent acts. Tecson. through a deed of sale. Page 612 Echiverri. Valois . Tabugan. and may be reasonably inferred from the actuations of the parties. (2) the subject land be reconveyed to petitioners. petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land located in Sumpong. Cabañgon. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property prior to the full payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell. that on July 23. the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid the price in full.000. through a formal deed of conveyance. Reyes. Petitioners prayed that (1) the deed of sale dated July 23. Palad. Bukidnon covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. petitioner Aurora. 1997. Marquez. Francisco. SPOUSES DELFIN TUMIBAY vs SPOUSES MELVIN LOPEZ G. (3) in her testimony. in the name of respondent Rowena prior to or at the time of the first payment of $1. Corporal. that petitioner Aurora is the sister of ReynaldaVisitacion (Reynalda). (2) after this initial payment. 171692 : June 3. De Mesa. Inguillo. and that. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Asensi.00.In the case at bar.00. respondent Rowena admitted that she had the title to the subject land transferred in her name only later on or on July 23. Castillo. while there was no written agreement evincing the intention of the parties to enter into a contract to sell. Gloria. No. that the subject sale was done without the knowledge and consent of petitioners.00 although said property had a market value of more than P2. 1997 be declared void ab initio.

1997. Martinez. Although we rule that there was a contract to sell over the subject land between petitioners and respondent Rowena. Gloria. because she believed that she had substantially paid the purchase price thereof. Valois . Francisco. Marquez. Corpuz. Tabugan. Tecson. Valiente. Coronel. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Inguillo. Santos. Rañigo. Catindig. Lumberio. De la Cruz. at the time the aforesaid deed of sale was executed on July 23. the full price of the subject land was yet to be paid. Alcazaren. Asensi. Page 613 Echiverri. we find that respondent Rowena was in breach thereof because. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Espina. Palad. De Mesa. Sy. Castillo. Reyes. Albano. Corporal. and that she was entitled thereto as a form of security for the installments she had already paid.

000.000. Unpaid monthly amortization shall likewise be deducted from the initial down payment in favor of the VENDOR.000.00 payable on or before July 31. 2013 DOCTRINE: In a contract to sell. 1993. Rodriguez. De la Cruz.00 payable to the New Capitol Estate. No. [t]he VENDEE will pay starting May 1. HELD: No. (c) P330. Also worth noting is the fact that the contract to sell entered by the parties refers to real property on installment basis. A year after. SPOUSES NAMEAL and LOURDES BONROSTRO vs. In a contract to sell.000. Tabugan.250. Corporal.00downpayment.000.00 monthly. rescission is not the proper remedy for failure to pay the installments in a contract to sell real property.000.00 shall be deemed forfeited in favor of the VENDOR.000. Palad.R. Asensi. but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to convey title to the supposed buyer. Coronel. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not rescission is the proper remedy for failure to pay the installments in a contract to sell real property. Corpuz.000. but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to convey title to the supposed buyer. except for P200. 1191 cannot apply since they are governed by the Maceda Law. Page 614 Echiverri. Reyes. After execution of the contract.00 shall be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR in the following manner: (a) P200. Espina.00 upon signing x xx [the] Contract To Sell. SPOUSES JUAN and CONSTANCIA LUNA G. Gloria. petitioner took possession of the property. payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition. Sandoval. (d) P417. Valois .867. respondent then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Rescission of Contract and Damages. in the event the VENDEE fails to pay the amount of P630. Sy. respondent sold it to Lourdes Bonrostro (petitioner) under the ff. Rañigo. Inguillo. payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition. Likewise.12] a month. x xx [I]n the event the VENDEE fails to pay the second installment on time. she failed to pay subsequent amortization. entered into a contract to sell with Bliss Development Corporation involving a house located in Quezon City. FACTS: Constancia Luna (respondent). for 15 years at [P6. 1993. Cabañgon. Tecson. Catindig. Francisco. in which Art. De Mesa. However. this CONTRACT TO SELL shall likewise be deemed cancelled and rescinded and x xx 5% of the total contract price [of] P1. Alcazaren. July 24. Santos. Failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Martinez.00 payable on or before April 30. Valiente.000. Castillo. (b) P300. 172346. as buyer.250. Failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Lumberio. 1993 a 2% interest on the P300. terms: The stipulated price of P1. Lastimosa. Ramirez.00 on the stipulated time. Albano.

Edmundo. Cabañgon. Corporal. Santos. Consolacion. CARLOS LIM. Martinez. FACTS: Carlos. subpoenas. Catindig. Carlito. Ramirez. Rañigo. obtained loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (respondent). All correspondence relative to this mortgage. Tecson. as agreed upon by the parties. We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate. Reyes. Such public auction sale was held after a Notice of such sale was published for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in General Santos City. July 01. Castillo. summons. petitioners were forced to abandon their cattle ranch. In this case. CARLITO LIM. De Mesa. a public auction sale for the mortgaged properties was held where respondent was the highest bidder. of the foreclosure sale would render such sale void. Sy. After years of negotiation between the petitioners and respondent for the payment of their loan. Asensi. ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of personal notice. Shirley and Arleen (petitioners). we are constrained to nullify the foreclosure sale due to the bank’s failure to send a notice of foreclosure to petitioners. Tabugan. Rodriguez. all surnamed Lim. Page 615 Echiverri. Lastimosa. HELD: Yes. Corpuz. Valiente. No. 2013 DOCTRINE: Personal notice to the mortgagor of the auction sale is necessary if the same has been stipulated in the Mortgage contract. as agreed upon by the parties. among other things. De la Cruz. Due to the iolent confrontations between government troops and Muslim rebels in Mindanao from 1972 to 1977. SHIRLEY LEODADIA DIZON AND ARLEEN LIM FERNANDEZ vs. Marquez. claim that the foreclosure sale was void for lack of personal notice as provided in Mortgage contract. Coronel.R. Alcazaren. or notification of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be sent to the Mortgagor at xxx or at the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor or the Mortgagee. "personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because Section 3of Act 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G. the parties stipulated in paragraph 11 of the Mortgage that: 11. Lumberio. 177050 . Francisco. As a result. Sandoval. Albano. EDMUNDO LIM. Palad. Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint for the Annulment of Foreclosure and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. Valois . 1994. CONSOLACION LIM. Espina. Gloria. on July 11. But while DBP had a right to foreclose the mortgage. of the foreclosure sale would render such sale void. Petitioners. their business collapsed and they failed to pay the loan amortizations. including demand letters. The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage over several parcels of land. the lack of personal notice. Inguillo.

Gloria. Marquez. Castillo. 1994. Rañigo. no notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was sent by DBP to petitioners about the foreclosure sale scheduled on July 11. Francisco. Valiente. Asensi. Espina. Alcazaren. i. Santos. Corpuz. 1994 advising petitioners to immediately pay their obligation to avoid the impending foreclosure of their mortgaged properties are not the notices required in paragraph 11 of the Mortgage. Tecson. Corporal. The failure of DBP to comply with their contractual agreement with petitioners. Palad. De Mesa. 1994 and March 11. De la Cruz. Valois . Reyes. Cabañgon. to send notice. Catindig. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Sy. Martinez. Sandoval. Tabugan. Ramirez. Coronel.. is a breach sufficient to invalidate the foreclosure sale. Lastimosa. Page 616 Echiverri. However.e. Albano. The letters dated January 28. Inguillo.

Francisco. which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Cabañgon. No.R. with damages. vs. Crispulo M. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). RTC ruled. are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). In their Answer with counterclaim. Castillo. Aklan. Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega. Alcazaren. LEONARDO R. 174727. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made. married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela). VEGA et al. Sandoval. Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. and Leonardo was aware of this fact. Vega. Valois . Valiente. Marquez. recovery of ownership and possession. herein respondent Leonardo R. FACTS: Leon Roldan (Leon). Rañigo. Ramirez. Asensi. stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits – even his Albano. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. on the other hand. De la Cruz. ANTIPOLO INING et al. Page 617 Echiverri. 2013 DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Reyes. Rodriguez. who in turn acquired the same from Leon. that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria). Corporal. In 1997. the substituted respondents. Palad. In short. Aklan Civil Case No. on the other hand. Lumberio. Consequently. De Mesa. but from Lucimo Sr." the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. was survived by her six children. The Court of Appeals (CA). he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs. Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson. the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively. which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141. among others that Leonardo only had 30 years to file the partition case from the time of Leon’s death in 1962 since Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides that an action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera). The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr. herein petitioners. Consequently. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez).’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979. Vega. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code. acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir. which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. 5275 for partition. Sibling # 2: Gregoria. against Gregoria’s heirs. Corpuz. Inguillo. Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them. is the owner of a 3. Gloria.120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo. G. who are now both deceased. ruled that prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962. Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property. Lastimosa.’s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either. Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo. Santos. Coronel. Martinez. Tabugan. Tecson. Espina. August 12. Sy. Catindig.

he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law. Alcazaren. Reyes. Leonardo’s right of action did not yet prescribe. may not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property. What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice. Lucimo Sr. 150. Marquez. Francisco. Page 618 Echiverri. Sandoval. Catindig. Santos. he is not an heir of Gregoria. Espina. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership. Corporal. Albano. Cabañgon. he is not a co-owner of the property. Rodriguez. whether of the full or half blood. the fact is. is not a co-owner of the property. he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership. prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo. continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as against strangers. which he was never part of. is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. For this reason. Palad. and (4) Among brothers and sisters. Asensi. and absent a showing that this was effectively made known to Leonardo. Rañigo. Consequently. HELD: No. Lumberio. Sy. Coronel. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Teodora is. De Mesa. Art. Ramirez. Corpuz.Under the Family Code. De la Cruz. Indeed. family relations. however. Gloria. which is the primary basis for succession. and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost. therefore. Inguillo. Valois . (2) Between parents and children. Tecson. (3) Among other ascendants and descendants. exclude relations by affinity. Castillo. being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. While the CA was correct in Held that prescription had not yet set in against Leonardo. ISSUE: Whether or not Leonardo’s right of action prescribed because 30 years had lapsed as provided in Article 1141 of the Civil Code. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife. Martinez. Valiente. its ratio is mistaken. In point of law.

Mekeni's offer was contained in an Offer Sheet which was presented to petitioner. Corporal. Inguillo. 2007. petitioner filed against Mekeni and/or its President. Marquez. Rodriguez. De Mesa. 2006. Tecson. De la Cruz.000. The parties negotiated. petitioner made an offer to purchase his service vehicle by paying the outstanding balance thereon. To be able to effectively cover his appointed sales territory. Ramos rendered a Decision directing respondents to turn-over to complainant the subject vehicle upon the said complainant's payment to them Albano. a total of P112. Ramirez. Sandoval. Page 619 Echiverri. Mekeni supposedly put in an equivalent amount as its share under the car plan. Garcia. Martinez. Asensi. Lastimosa.00. MEKENI FOOD CORPORATION||| G. Petitioner began his stint as Mekeni Regional Sales Manager on March 17. sick/vacation leave benefits. Petitioner paid for his 50% share through salary deductions of P5. benefits. In his resignation letter. Petitioner made personal and written follow-ups regarding his unpaid salaries. Valois . Tabugan. Prudencio S. and recovery of monthly salary deductions which were earmarked for his cost-sharing in the car plan. a Complaint for the recovery of monetary claims consisting of unpaid salaries. Corpuz. under which one-half of the cost of the vehicle is to be paid by the company and the other half to be deducted from petitioner's salary. Coronel.||| FACTS: In February 2004. Sy. Petitioner thus returned the vehicle to Mekeni on May 2. Mekeni offered petitioner a car plan. the balance that petitioner should pay on his service vehicle stood at P116. Mekeni furnished petitioner with a used Honda Civic car valued at P280. the former may not retain the installment payments made by the latter on the car plan and treat them as rents for the use of the service vehicle. and offer to purchase his service vehicle. On May 3.000.00 if he opts to purchase the same. Lumberio. but could not agree on the terms of the proposed purchase. Reyes. 192105. No. Catindig. Palad. which used to be the service vehicle of petitioner's immediate supervisor.00 each month. Subsequently. ANTONIO LOCSIN II vs. commissions. Santos. Mekeni replied that the company car plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the company for five years. Cabañgon. Espina. Valiente. in the event that the employee ceases his employment and is unable to complete the installment payments on the vehicle.500.00 had been deducted from his monthly salary and applied as part of the employee's share in the car plan. Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. The underlying reason is that the service vehicle was precisely used in the former's business. Locsin resigned effective February 25. Castillo. Rañigo. commissions. Alcazaren.380. By then. Gloria. December 9. for this reason. 2013 DOCTRINE: In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing a car plan agreement between the employer and employee. any personal benefit obtained by the employee from its use is merely incidental. respondent Mekeni Food Corporationoffered petitioner Antonio Locsin II the position of Regional Sales Manager to oversee Mekeni's National Capital Region Supermarket/Food Service and South Luzon operations. In addition to a compensation and benefit package. 2006. 2004. Francisco.R.

Inguillo. if not. it may not be said that the car plan arrangement between the parties was a benefit that the petitioner enjoyed. Espina.84. There is no evidence to suggest that if petitioner failed to completely cover one-half of the cost of the vehicle. and poor monitoring of the sales territory are the necessary consequences of lack of mobility. a high rate of product spoilage resulting from stagnant inventory. petitioner would have been unable to rapidly cover the vast sales territory assigned to him. Castillo. it is seen that the Mekeni car plan offered to petitioner was subject to no other term or condition than that Mekeni shall cover one-half of its value. Secondly. Francisco. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. In addition. Alcazaren.|||CA modified NLRC’s decision. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. and sales or marketing of Mekeni's products could not have been booked or made fast enough to move Mekeni's inventory. by documentary evidence or otherwise. Mekeni has not shown. Asensi. even in the absence of express stipulation. petitioner would have been placed at the mercy of inefficient and unreliable public transportation. as the vehicle remained in the possession and ownership of Mekeni. Palad. Marquez. Santos. Page 620 Echiverri. Indeed. Lastimosa. and shall not be refunded. his official schedule would have been dependent on the arrival and departure times of buses or jeeps. Without a service vehicle. the Court cannot allow that payments made on the car plan should be forfeited by Mekeni and treated simply as rentals for petitioner's use of the company service vehicle. Corporal. Coronel. there is precisely no stipulation to such effect in their agreement. of the sum of P100.||| HELD: Yes. Catindig. in which case the car plan agreement should be construed in petitioner's favor. Ramirez. De Mesa. Lumberio. on the contrary. Tabugan. unjust enrichment would result. Indeed. Rañigo. It was made clear in the above pronouncement that installments made on the car plan may be treated as rentals only when there is an express stipulation in the car plan agreement to such effect. that there are other terms and conditions governing its car plan agreement with petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund of all the amounts applied to the cost of the service vehicle under the car plan. inability to market Mekeni's products. Gloria. as it would have this Court believe. Poor sales. Martinez. it was an absolute necessity in Mekeni's business operations. Valois . It held further that Mekeni's claim that the company car plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the company for five years has not been substantiated by its evidence. Sy. The NLRC held that petitioner's amortization payments on his service vehicle amounting to P112. not to mention the Albano. Valiente. Corpuz. there is no such stipulation or arrangement between them. then all the deductions from his salary going to the cost of the vehicle will be treated as rentals for his use thereof while working with Mekeni. Tecson. which benefited it to the fullest extent: without the service vehicle. petitioner's payments on the car plan may be considered as rentals which need not be returned.00 should be reimbursed. Rodriguez. Nor may they be retained by it as purported loan payments. In the first place. Reyes. and petitioner shall in turn pay the other half through deductions from his monthly salary. It was therefore patent error for the appellate court to assume that. From the evidence on record. the employer's share in the monthly car plan payments should likewise be awarded to petitioner because it forms part of the latter's benefits under the car plan. Sandoval.435.500.

Espina. Martinez. if not fully." Article 2142 of the same Code likewise clarifies that there are certain lawful. availability of seats in them. In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing the car plan arrangement between the petitioner and Mekeni. Corporal. Francisco. Valois . Lumberio. the car plan arrangement benefited Mekeni for the most part. Sandoval. Inguillo. or any other means. Rañigo. Coronel. to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. without a service vehicle. Mekeni's business could only prosper at a snail's pace. Sy. Corpuz. under the claim that petitioner's payments constitute rents for the use of the company vehicle. the subject vehicle is an old car that is substantially. a quasi-contractual relation was created between them. Alcazaren. Asensi. if not completely paralyzed. Santos.||| Albano. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code. Tabugan. refuse to refund what petitioner had paid. It may not. Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging petitioner for the use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the full and effective promotion of its business. Reyes. Cabañgon. Gloria. depreciated. Rodriguez. and any personal benefit obtained by petitioner from using the vehicle was merely incidental. De la Cruz. it is unfair to deny petitioner a refund of all his contributions to the car plan. Catindig. De Mesa. Consequently."[e]very person who through an act of performance by another. Page 621 Echiverri. voluntary and unilateral acts which give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract. Marquez. shall return the same to him. Clearly. Palad. Lastimosa. Castillo. Valiente. Tecson. In light of the foregoing. Ramirez. for the reasons that the car plan did not carry such a condition. acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground.

ANA GRACE ROSALES AND YO YUK TO||| G. The "Hold Out" clause applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. 03I-25014. and Use of Falsified Documents. Rañigo. Cabañgon. petitioner. Tecson.693.00.||| HELD: Yes. petitioner failed to show that respondents have an obligation to it under any law. whether it is liable for damages. Valois . Since Liu Chiu Fang could speak only in Mandarin. RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for damages for breach of contract. docketed as I. contracts. In this case. Petitioner accused respondent Rosales and an unidentified woman as the ones responsible for the unauthorized and fraudulent withdrawal of US$75. Page 622 Echiverri. Respondent Ana Grace Rosales (Rosales) is the owner of China Golden Bridge Travel Services. quasi-contracts. In 2000. De Mesa. Rodriguez. As of August 4. filed before the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila a criminal case for Estafa through False Pretences. through its Special Audit Department Head Antonio Ivan Aguirre. January 13.||| FACTS: Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company is a domestic banking corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.R. On July 31. 2003. Sandoval. Ramirez. Francisco. respondent Rosales acted as an interpreter for her. petitioner issued a "Hold Out" order against respondents' accounts. delict. respondents' Joint Peso Account showed a balance of P2. must be paid upon demand by the depositor. Lumberio. Inguillo. Marquez. Reyes. a Taiwanese National applying for a retiree's visa from the Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority (PLRA).000. And although a criminal case was filed by petitioner against Albano. Deceit. 2003. Respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Complaint for Breach of Obligation and Contract with Damages.to wit: law.000. On March 3. Alcazaren. Espina. Martinez. Petitioner's reliance on the "Hold Out" clause in the Application and Agreement for Deposit Account is misplaced. Gloria. to petitioner's branch in Escolta to open a savings account.515. Sy. 2004. Asensi. In May 2002. 2014 DOCTRINE: Bank deposits. Respondent Yo Yuk To is the mother of respondent Rosales. ISSUES: Whether petitioner breached its contract with respondents and if so. and quasi-delict. Palad. 183204.S. Coronel. respondents opened a Joint Peso Account with petitioner's Pritil-Tondo Branch. Tabugan. Santos. Misrepresentation. No. Corporal. as required by the PLRA. CA affirmed. 2003. No. quasi-contract. De la Cruz. respondent Rosales accompanied her client Liu Chiu Fang. delict. or quasi-delict. Corpuz.00 from Liu Chiu Fang's dollar account with petitioner's Escolta Branch. against respondent Rosales. respondents opened with petitioner's Pritil-Tondo Branch a Joint Dollar Account with an initial deposit of US$14.52. a travel agency. Lastimosa. \ THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. Catindig. Valiente. Castillo. contract. On September 3. which are in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum.

Corporal. Rañigo. Gloria. we find that petitioner is guilty of breach of contract when it unjustifiably refused to release respondents' deposit despite demand. De Mesa. Coronel. petitioner is liable for damages Albano. Sy. Rodriguez. respondent Rosales. Catindig. Cabañgon. Marquez. Valiente. we agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the "Hold Out" clause does not apply in the instant case. Tecson. Having breached its contract with respondents. the criminal complaint had not yet been filed. this is not enough reason for petitioner to issue a "Hold Out" order as the case is still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered against respondent Rosales. Page 623 Echiverri. Espina. Asensi. Inguillo. Thus. Tabugan. Castillo. Ramirez. Reyes. it is significant to note that at the time petitioner issued the "Hold Out" order. Francisco. Lastimosa. In fact. De la Cruz. Palad. considering that respondent Rosales is not liable under any of the five sources of obligation. In view of the foregoing. Valois . Lumberio. Alcazaren. Accordingly. there was no legal basis for petitioner to issue the "Hold Out" order. Sandoval. Santos. Martinez. Corpuz.

Dulos Realty executed a duly notarized “Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of the spouses and delivered to them the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT (No. Tecson. they presented (1) the copies of the contracts to sell on the two lots. Juan B. 2014 DOCTRINE: "Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. De Mesa. (6) tax declarations and receipts. (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 20. S-39849). Sy. Corpuz. Valois . until its President. Corporal. Vilbar learned about such titles. When the Sps. the lots were awarded to him at an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Sale. No. But it turned out that said lots were among those levied upon by (a certain) Gorospe."||| FACTS: This is the case of conflicting claims over two parcels of land in a subdivision more particularly designated as Lots 20 and 21. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Santos. Catindig. the former Board Chairman and CEO of Dulos Realty by virtue of a Court judgment he obtained for recovery of benefits. Castillo. Reyes. The first claimant here is the Spouses Vilbar who bought said lots under contracts to sell with the subdivision developer Dulos Realty and Development Corporation (or Dulos Realty for Brevity) sometime in July 1979. Dulos (Juan). To prove the spouses’ claim. The spouses pointed out that as an officer of Dulos Realty. Subsequently. Ramirez. and when Gorospe defaulted in paying Opinion the obligation secured by said mortgage. Espina. he mortgaged said lots to herein respondent. died without the subdivision being accomplished. they filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against Opinion claiming the latter is a buyer in bad faith because Gorospe’s titles from which Opinion derived the titles were acquired in bad faith. (3) the Real Estate Mortgage Agreement with the bank over Lot 21. These lots were sold at public auction with Gorospe emerging as highest bidder under which TCT Nos. De la Cruz. Valiente. Inguillo. Later on. Subsequently. Palad. 36777) although she only presented the contract to sell. Page 624 Echiverri.. Coronel. Marquez. with the permission of Dulos Realty after making an advance payment thereon. Alcazaren. (5) owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. OPINION G. On one hand. respondent Opinion alleged that he is a buyer Albano. privileges and various allowances that said developer failed to pay him as Chairman. Gorospe should have known that the subject lots were already sold to them. 176043. Spouses Vilbar took possession of Lot 20 (B) in the concept of owners and exercised acts of ownership (or occupied the same). Asensi. But eventually she was able to obtain title (TCT No. Gloria. (4) original Official Receipts issued by SLR for installment payments of the purchase price of the lots. in 1981 Spouses Vilbar also took possession of Lot 21 and obtained tax declarations thereon in their name and paid its realty taxes. Tabugan. Lastimosa. January 15. Lumberio. Sr. However. they mortgaged Lot 21 to a bank and used the proceeds of the loan to pay in full the purchase price of Lot 20 Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20. Opinion. SPOUSES BERNADETTE and RODULFO VILBAR vs. Francisco. Martinez. and.R. ANGELITO L. Rañigo. 36777 in her name. 44797 (Lot 20) and 44796 (Lot 21) were issued in his name. they were not able to register and transfer the title in their name because the developer allegedly failed to have the lot formally subdivided despite its commitment to do so. Cabañgon.

TCTs in the hands of respondent were the ones which cancelled the titles of Dulos Realty over the lots and not the TCT presented by the spouses Vilbar. Catindig. this Court has ruled that "(1) a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. he was assured by Gorospe that the spouses were merely tenants of the lots and not the owners. said the RTC. Francisco. Asensi. Coronel. Sy. Reyes. Gorospe. or at the very least. 36777 (TCT respecting LOT 21) was questionable because there was no proof that the purchase price was already paid since only the “Contract to Sell” was available. “Deed of Absolute Sale” over Lot 20 was never annotated in the transfer certificate of title. Bad faith cannot be presumed and there was no clear and convincing proof that Gorospe had knowledge of such transaction." (3) "Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title x x x is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. Tabugan. De Mesa. Espina. The evidence proves that respondent Opinion lawfully acquired his title over the lots. RTC ruled in favor of Opinion declaring him to have better right over Lots 20 and 21. For some unknown reasons. in good faith because before entering into the mortgage agreement with Gorospe. the SC reached a conclusion same with that of as that of the RTC. Registry of Deeds of Pasay itself certified that the TCT respecting Lot 21 is presumed not to be validly issued. Lastimosa. Further. Sandoval. Tecson. Issuance of TCT No. he had verified with the Registry of Deeds that there were no annotations or encumbrances registered in the titles of Lots 20 and 21. However. Marquez. sadly. Lumberio. S-39849 and are presently enjoying actual possession of said property. Inguillo. Page 625 Echiverri. HELD: YES. Sr. annotate or register such sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty. Martinez. Corporal. Time and time again. Palad. This. spouses Vilbar have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim. De la Cruz. Herein petitioners only had an inchoate right over the property. With regard to Lot 20. proved fatal to their cause. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Castillo. Alcazaren. Gloria. the spouses Vilbar cannot claim a greater right over Opinion. Cabañgon. cannot be considered to be in bad faith because he was not the one who executed and signed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners only have an inchoate right over the property. who acquired the property with clean title in good faith and registered the same in his name by going through the legally required procedure. Valiente. Valois . these are not sufficient proofs of ownership. the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the certificate title in their name. Santos. Ramirez." Having no certificate of title issued in their names. Albano. it is an established rule that (2) "registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A review of the documents presented by the Spouses in support of their claim of ownership." Failing to annotate the deed for the eventual transfer of title over Lot 20 in their names. Corpuz. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Further. spouses Vilbar brag of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Dulos Realty in their favor and aver that they have the owner’s copy of TCT No.

a Deed of Absolute Sale will be executed instead of a conditional sale. Sy. be it greater or less than the price of the sale. The trial court ruled that Union Bank. Palad. which was registered in his and his wife Rosario’s name. it annulled the mortgage and declared that Rosario was still the owner of the undivided one-half of the property. Hence. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES. acted in bad faith in selling the subject property to Bignay. the CA held that Union Bank is for the amount of the land and the building constructed on it. Castillo. the vendee shall have the right to demand of the vendor. Espina. Alcazaren. Union Bank and Bignay separately appealed to CA. Francisco. petitions were filed. gross negligence of a party amounting to bad faith is a ground for the recovery of damages by the injured party. From an examination of the evidence and by the concurring opinions of the courts below – that Bignay purchased the property without knowledge of the pending Civil Case filed by Rosario. Rosario filed a case for annulment of the mortgage alleging that the property was mortgaged without her consent. Corpuz. Eviction shall take place whenever by a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or an act imputable to the vendor. in culpa contractual or breach of contract. Coronel. Tabugan. It also granted Union Bank’s counterclaim as to Bignay’s loan. As indicated in the offer. Gloria. amounts to bad faith. After the redemption period expired. with damages. Quezon City. FACTS: Alfonso de Leon mortgaged to Union Bank of the Philippines a real property situated at Esteban Abada. Both were dismissed. the bank consolidated its ownership. This documentation is intended to isolate the property from any lis pendens that the former owner may annotate on the title and to allow immediate reconstitution thereof since the original Torrens title was burned in 1988 when the City Hall housing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was gutted by fire. In 1988. 171590 February 12. Thereafter. 2014 DOCTRINE: The gross negligence of the seller in defending its title to the property subject matter of the sale . Valiente. Lastimosa. Sandoval. ISSUES: (1) w/n Union Bank is liable to pay Bignay for the cost of the land and the amount of the building constructed (2) w/n Union Bank’s counterclaim is a permissive counterclaim HELD: (1) Yes. Inc purchased property from the bank. INC. The property was foreclosed and sold at auction to Union Bank. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Santos. Ramirez. Martinez. Tecson. In the lower court’s ruling. De la Cruz. the expenses of the Albano. Rodriguez. No. Bignay filed a case for breach of warranty against eviction under Articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code. Asensi. through VP Robles. De Mesa. Lumberio. Bignay mortgaged the property to Union Bank. against Union Bank and Robles. Loyola Heights. Cabañgon. the return of the value which the thing sold had at the time of the eviction. Catindig. Later. Corporal. the vendee is deprived of the whole or of a part of the thing purchased. and the buyer is entitled to the remedies afforded under Article 1555 of the Civil Code. among others. Inguillo. Marquez. Valois . On appeal. In case eviction occurs. presumably to secure a loan obtained from the bank.thereby contravening the express undertaking under the deed of sale to protect its title against the claims of third persons resulting in the buyer's eviction from the property -. Indeed. Rañigo. Reyes. Page 626 Echiverri. In 1989 Bignay Ex-Im Philippines. vs.

and ornamental expenses. Coronel. Sandoval. if the sale was made in bad faith. if they are not entirely anomalous. The counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are permissive counterclaims. Lastimosa. The Court finds true and credible the trial court's express declaration that no docket fees have been paid on the bank's counterclaim. Cabañgon. Tecson. Palad. and the damages and interests. Indeed. Marquez. Asensi. Lumberio. During the pre-trial. Valiente. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. This Court therefore has not acquired jurisdiction over said case. Tabugan. Page 627 Echiverri. Ramirez. Sy. Francisco. contract. Santos. the trial court's pronouncement enjoys the presumption of regularity. Espina. Corporal. the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. Castillo. Catindig. Corpuz. the sudden appearance of the receipts supposedly evidencing payment of the docket fees is highly questionable and irregular. the actuations of the bank relative thereto go against the common experience of mankind. Inguillo. The award is proper. Martinez. Albano. Rañigo. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer. Valois . (2) Yes. De la Cruz. if the vendee has paid them. this Court had already ruled that the counterclaims were permissive yet the records showed that defendant had not paid the docket fees. Gloria. and deserves to be thoroughly investigated. Reyes. De Mesa.

the allegations in her complaint are not Albano. More particularly. lack of integrity. Santos. Michaelina Ramos Balasbas accused Patricia B. or defraud. Rañigo. Sy. inter alia. or integrity in principle. Rodriguez. 6713) enunciates. rather than encourage. Coronel. The complaint was filed in CSC. fraud. Valiente. the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. Corporal. petitioner’s accusations do not appear to hold water. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. and lack of fairness and straightforwardness. the effective performance of their duties and functions. dishonesty and refusal to implement an Order issued by DENR in a land dispute filed by petitioner’s brother against respondent’s father. 190524 February 17. Monayao of misrepresentation. Inguillo. and loyalty. Petitioner is a lawyer. Hence. cheat. Page 628 Echiverri. misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action. Castillo. Marquez. Martinez. Asensi. the Mayor stated that the complaint may not be acted upon as the acts complained of were not in relation to the latter’s duties and responsibilities as Municipal Population Officer. to her children via a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed by her father. Lastimosa. FACTS: A complaint was filed in DSWD wherein Atty. On the other hand. 2014 DOCTRINE: While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility. Ramirez. Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. integrity. De la Cruz. competence. and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The CSC Office of the Legal Affairs held that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint as it stemmed from a private transaction between the protagonists. She was advised to file the complaint in the municipality of Alfonso Lista in the province of Ifugao. Espina. ISSUE: w/n the respondent committed acts of dishonesty HELD: No. Corpuz. As long as the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office. yet she could produce none. is a forbidden act. Upon appeal. However. Sandoval. De Mesa. Tabugan. However. Tecson. Gloria. Francisco. Palad. untrustworthiness. Valois . Cabañgon. lack of honesty. respondent’s father was already deceased. No. Lumberio. All that is required is substantial evidence. DSWD informed Michaelina that respondent was no longer an employee thereof. is a dereliction of duty. the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS vs. PATRICIA B. the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect. it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. Alcazaren.R. probity. accountability. which was simulated because as early as 1987. deceive. she should know that as the complainant in the administrative case. MONAYAO G. Reyes. Michaelina alleged that Patricia illegally sold the portion. In 2003. Catindig. over which she had waived her rights. is willful in character. the petition. CA also dismissed complaint stating that CSC cannot take cognizance of the complaint. upon her lies the burden of proof to establish her cause of action against the respondent. It implies a disposition to lie.

Inguillo. "this does not mean that the rules on proving allegations are entirely dispensed with. in the eyes of the law. Reyes. Corporal. Rañigo. Sy. While technicalities may be dispensed with in administrative proceedings. Ramirez. Palad. Albano. Tabugan. respondent committed as yet no visible wrong. De Mesa. Lastimosa. duly supported by necessary documents that would demonstrate the justness of her claims. Gloria. Tecson. Castillo."Thus. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Valiente. Alcazaren. Catindig. Francisco. Page 629 Echiverri. Marquez. Sandoval. Lumberio. Corpuz. Espina. Santos. Coronel. Cabañgon. Asensi. Martinez. Valois . Bare allegations are not enough. these must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least.

The Real Estate Mortgage. the CA reversed the decision. Tabugan. It also rendered judgment on the Third-Party Complaint ordering Erlinda Concepcion and her husband to indemnify the bank. Bucton filed a casefor Annulment of Mortgage. signed and sealed in the name of the principal. Poizat. As early as the case of Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. Rodriguez. Palad. Foreclosure. however. In Far East Bank and Trust Company. Espina. Concepcion mortgaged petitioner’s house and lot to respondent bank using a SPA. De la Cruz. De Mesa. BUCTON (deceased). Valiente. was signed by the daughter and her husband as mortgagors in their individual capacities. Concepcion obtained a loan in the amount of ₱30. Francisco. Tecson. petitioner moved to drop her as a defendant. Gloria. Coronel. Reyes. Hence. Lumberio. Concepcion failed to pay the loan so the petitioner’s house and lot were foreclosed. the deed must upon its face purport to be made. Sandoval. the mother executed an SPA authorizing her daughter to contract a loan from the bank and to mortgage her properties. v. RURAL BANK OF EL SALVADOR. and SPA against Erlinda Concepcion. The Real Estate Mortgage was entered into by Concepcion in her own personal capacity. Rañigo. The bank denied the allegation of petitioner that the SPA was forged. Concepcion borrowed the title on the pretext that she was going to show it to an interested buyer. the petition. Santos. Page 630 Echiverri. 179625 February 24. substituted by REQUILDA B. The mortgage. YRAY vs. ISSUE: w/n petitioner is liable on the litigated loan/mortgage when she did not execute either in person or by attorney-in-fact subject mortgage HELD: No. the authorized agent failed to indicate in the mortgage that she was acting for and on behalf of her principal."The mere fact that the agent was authorized to mortgage the property is not sufficient to bind the principal. Lastimosa. Catindig.that as security for the loan. Inguillo. Asensi. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. Corporal. 2014 DOCTRINE: A mortgage executed by an authorized agent who signed in his own name without indicating that he acted for and on behalf of his principal binds only the agent and not the principal.which the RTC granted in its Order. Petitioner alleged that she is the owner of a parcel of land. This prompted respondent bank to file a Third-Party Complaintagainst spouses Concepcion and Agnes Bucton Lugod (Lugod). Since summons could not be served upon Concepcion. The trial court sustained the claim of petitioner that the SPA was forged. Alcazaren. NICANORA G. in this case.000. explicitly shows on its face. FACTS: Nicanora G. Corpuz. Valois .R. Marquez. Martinez. without stating that the daughter was executing the mortgage for and on behalf of her mother. On appeal. and REYNALDO CUYONG vs. Ramirez. INC. Castillo. No.. unless the deed was executed and signed by the agent for and on behalf of his principal.the court already ruled that "in order to bind the principal by a deed executed by an agent. that it was signed by Concepcion Albano. ERLINDA CONCEPCION AND HER HUSBAND AND AGNES BUCTON LUGOD G. Cabañgon. Sy. the daughter of petitioner.00 from respondent bank. Similarly.

Valois . Sandoval. Concepcion. Simply put. 1982. thus. Alcazaren. Corporal. Palad. Martinez. Sy. Page 631 Echiverri. Consistent with the law on agency and established jurisprudence. For even if the SPA was valid. is liable to pay respondent bank her unpaid obligation under the Promissory Note dated June 11. Francisco. Lastimosa. Gloria. Tecson. Santos. Asensi. Marquez. Lumberio. she cannot escape liability. Concepcion signed the Promissory Note in her own personal capacity. Valiente. there is nothing in the document to show that she was acting or signing as an agent of petitioner. De Mesa. attorneys' fees. there is no need to delve on the issues of forgery of the SPA and the nullity of the foreclosure sale. the Real Estate Mortgage would still not bind petitioner as it was signed by Concepcion in her personal capacity and not as an agent of petitioner. and costs the latter is adjudged to pay petitioner in this case. Reyes. She is also liable to reimburse respondent bank for all damages. Cabañgon. on the other hand. Corpuz. Coronel. petitioner cannot be bound by the acts of Concepcion. the Real Estate Mortgage is void and unenforceable against petitioner. De la Cruz. In fact. Rañigo. Inguillo. Albano. with interest. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Castillo. Catindig. in her own name and in her own personal capacity. In light of the foregoing. Espina. As we have said. Ramirez.

Sandoval. De la Cruz. Rañigo. The bank informed them that the property could be purchased at the fair market value of ₱2. The petitioners moved for a reconsiderationof the issuance of the Writ of Possession. June. upon the posting of a bond. Gloria. 2014 DOCTRINE: During the one-year redemption period. De Mesa. they were hoping that he would agree to advance the money and. Tecson. Marquez. Tabugan.During the one-year redemption period. they promised to sell him a portion of the property where one of the buildings is located. Inguillo. the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court. PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Lumberio. They sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Martinez. Santos. Reyes. No. Espina. Garay. Upon learning that Atty. The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the RTC Bukidnon in holding in abeyance the implementation of the said writ is proper HELD: No. Rodriguez. GARAY and PNB G. Ramirez. no discretion is left to the court. which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan. spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. in exchange. Francisco.But after the one-year Albano. The issuance of a writ of possession isministerial upon the court.On April 14. Palad. Catindig. Castillo. They told Atty. Atty. Lastimosa. Asensi. The RTC issued an Orderholding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Garay that they wanted to reacquirethe property from PNB. Garaysince spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment. Coronel. FACTS: Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon (Spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a property. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a down payment. The following day. SPOUSES SOMBILON vs. Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of PNB. Valiente. 16. without need of a bond. but had no money to repurchase it. ATTY. RTC Bukidnon issued a Writ of Possessionin favor of PNB. Thus. thus. Alcazaren. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself. 2005. the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property. 179914. Page 632 Echiverri. owner of a lot adjacent to the property. a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB. inBukidnon. Corpuz. Corporal. Sy. with two buildings constructed on it. Valois . A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property. The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claimto formalize their offer.On the same date. the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court. the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court. was foreclosed and sold at public auction where PNB emerged as the winning bidder.9M. But after the one-year period. Cabañgon.R. Once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser. Eventually. upon the posting of a bond. The said property.

Reyes. Thus. Rañigo. Castillo.Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. Espina. the registered owner of the subject property. Palad. thus. Cabañgon.The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession. Valois . period. Gloria. Martinez. De la Cruz. Santos. it was ministerial upon the judge to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB. the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property. Valiente. In this case. Ramirez. Tecson. no discretion is left to the court. De Mesa. Inguillo. Tabugan. Page 633 Echiverri. Sandoval. without need of a bond. Lumberio. Asensi. Catindig. Lastimosa. Sy. Albano. In fact. the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court. Coronel. Corpuz. Francisco. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Marquez. Corporal.And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser. the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession.

Castillo. Tabugan."Petitioners failed to pay the amount demanded by PNB.PNB G. SPOUSES SILOS vs.The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification. the rate of interest is a principal condition. July 2. and as a result. Palad. Sandoval. Martinez. Espina. Sy. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum. PNB may modify interest rates depending on future policy adopted by it. Asensi. Rodriguez. Spouses Silos (petitioners) constituted in a Real Estate Mortgageover two lots. on the other hand.5% per annum. Ramirez. Petitioners theorized that after the first promissory note where they agreed to pay 19. No. Rañigo. without need of notice to the Borrower.R.5% interest. Francisco. contained a stipulation granting PNB the right to increase or reduce interest rates "within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board. Lastimosa. (b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future. Corpuz. Valiente. Cabañgon. these rates are void. that petitioners agreed that without prior notice. the succeeding stipulations for the payment of interest in their loan agreements with PNB – which allegedly left to the latter the sole will to determine the interest rate – became null and void. It added that the imposition of penalties is supported by the all-inclusive clause in the Real Estate Mortgage agreement which provides that the mortgage shall Albano. Marquez. thus the latter foreclosed on the mortgage. such as the interest rates. In the case of loan agreements. the Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may. Tecson. which is equal to the Bank’s spread over the current floating interest rate. They issued eight Promissory Notesand signed a Credit Agreement which contained a stipulation on interest which provides as follows: (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of 19. 2014 DOCTRINE: Any modification in the contract. Coronel. The spouses filed a case. De Mesa. increase or decrease its spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future. Alcazaren. and that the imposition of penalties was agreed upon in the Credit Agreement. Interest shall be payable in advance every one hundred twenty days at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal. including without limitation. must be made with the consent of the contracting parties. if not the most important component. Petitioners added that because the interest rates were fixed by respondent without their prior consent or agreement. especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. Reyes. or vice versa. Inguillo. petitioners should only be made liable for interest at the legal rate of 12%. Santos. Corporal. Catindig. PNB denied that it unilaterally imposed or fixed interest rates. The Promissory Notes. the shifting from the floating interest rate system to the fixed interest rate system. seeking annulment of the foreclosure sale and an accounting of the PNB credit. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Gloria. Page 634 Echiverri. 181045.The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the same right to increase or reduce interest rates "at any time depending on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future. Valois . FACTS: To secure a one-year revolving credit line obtained from PNB.

2013. De la Cruz. Albano. stand as security for any and all other obligations of whatever kind and nature owing to respondent. when 1) the circumstances warrant such escalation or de-escalation. Alcazaren. Gloria. Santos. Petitioners never agreed in writing to pay the increased interest rates demanded by respondent bank in contravention to the tenor of their credit agreement. must be made with the consent of the contracting parties. Thus. Cabañgon. the interest rate which appears to have been agreed upon by the parties to the contract in this case was the 21% rate stipulated in the interest provision. and such notes shall instead be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum up to June 30. Catindig. Reyes. That an increase in interest rates from 18% to as much as 68% is excessive and unconscionable is indisputable. in Article 1956 that "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Ramirez. especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement." in reference to the original 21% interest rate. De Mesa. and starting July 1. and 3) upon agreement. Asensi. Corpuz. Page 635 Echiverri. six percent (6%) per annum until full satisfaction. if not the most important component. Francisco. which thus includes penalties imposed upon default or non-payment of the principal and interest on due date. Coronel.In this case no attempt was made by PNB to secure the conformity of private respondents to the successive increases in the interest rate. otherwise. Martinez.The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification. 2) within the limits allowed by law. Marquez. Sy. Valois . any modification thereof must be mutually agreed upon. In fact. it has no binding effect. 2013. Inguillo. applying the legal interest of 12% per annum. Private respondents’ assent to the increases cannot be implied from their lack of response to the letters sent by PNB. Lumberio. Espina. Corporal. In the case of loan agreements. Any modification in the contract.The RTC ruled in favor or PNB. therefore. Rodriguez. Castillo. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in declaring that PNB is not entitled to any interest except the legal rate from the time of demand HELD: Yes. Rañigo. It is plainly obvious. Tabugan. Palad. The interest rates imposed and indicated in the 2nd up to the 26th Promissory Notes are DECLARED NULL AND VOID. informing them of the increases. Any doubt about this is in fact readily resolved by a careful reading of the credit agreement because the same plainly uses the phrase "interest rate agreed upon. Indeed. Valiente. the manner of agreement is itself explicitly stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides. no one receiving a proposal to change a contract is obliged to answer the proposal. the rate of interest is a principal condition. Tecson. such as the interest rates. from the undisputed facts of the case that respondent bank unilaterally altered the terms of its contract with petitioners by increasing the interest rates on the loan without the prior assent of the latter. Sandoval. Lastimosa. subject to a possible escalation or de-escalation. For as stated in one case. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification as to the interest." What has been "stipulated in writing" from a perusal of interest rate provision of the credit agreement signed between the parties is that petitioners were bound merely to pay 21% interest.

Manuel appealed to the CA. The RTC and the CA affirmed the same. Pro-Guard stresses that the CA erred in affirming the lower courts’ award of ₱20. Manuel. Pro-Guard entered into an agreement with Edgardo for the rentof a unit in the 3rd floor of Torres Building. the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. Incorporated (Torres-Pabalan).Tormil filed a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission to compel Manuel to fulfill his obligation by turning over the documents necessary to effect the registration and transfer of titles in its name of the properties assigned to it by Manuel.and this was later affirmed by the SEC en banc.. together with two other persons. On the other hand. Corporal. Valois . Page 636 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Gloria. TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. Valiente. Sandoval.Torres. 2014 DOCTRINE: In such a case. Augustus Cesar Azura (Augustus) in the 2nd floor of the building. Martinez. Tabugan. Rañigo. Marquez. During the pendency thereof. Lastimosa.000. Tormil sent lettersto Edgardo and Augustus (for the law office) and Pro-Guard asking them to validate their possession/enter into a lease contract with Tormil and at the same time settle their past and current rentals.R. however.Despite the assignment. Edgardo continued to actas the administrator of Torres Building allegedly on behalf of Torres-Pabalan. Santos. Tormilsent them separate demands to vacate the premises and pay the monthly rental from the time of their occupation thereof untilthe same are actually turned over to Tormil. De la Cruz. Espina. Tormil argues that Pro-Guard’s stay ‘out of tolerance’ does not bar it from claiming arrears from the time the latter occupied a unit in the building. Torres Building was thereafter declared by Torres-Pabalan for tax purposes. Pro-Guard maintains that in any case. Castillo. 176341.Manuel unilaterally revoked the transaction.00 monthly rental reckoned from the time it occupied the unit. (Manuel)assigned to respondent Tormil Realty and Development Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of land and all the improvements thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said corporation. Ramirez. Cabañgon. He then set up a law office with Atty. PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION vs. Sy. Asensi. Meanwhile. Tecson.Subsequently. No. The SEC rendered judgment in favor of Tormil. it owes no unpaid rentals to Tormil for the entire period of its stay in the building out of Tormil’s tolerance. the latter being then in possession of the building. Corpuz. Jr. The MeTC ruled in favor of Tormil. but only for the purpose of counting the prescriptive period to file a case for unlawful detainer. Reyes. established Torres Pabalan Realty. Francisco. July 7. Coronel. It contends that the demand to vacate was not for the purpose of counting the reckoning period for payment of rental arrears. FACTS: Manuel A. Alcazaren. It contends that it cannot be blamed if it relied on the representations of Torres-Pabalan when it entered into a lease contract with it. Catindig. The same was ignored thus Tormil filed an ejectment suit before the MeTC. title to the real properties remained in Manuel’s name as he neither registered the transaction in the Registry of Deeds nor provided Tormil the necessary documents to have the titles over the properties transferred inits name. Albano. De Mesa. Inguillo. Later. Palad. one of whom is Edgardo Pabalan (Edgardo). Lumberio. Since these letters were ignored.

While indeed Tormil. Santos. it is settled that: A person who occupies the land ofanother at the latter’s tolerance or permission. Valois . Alcazaren. who permitsthem out of friendship or courtesy. Rañigo. Reyes. Sy. De Mesa."while tolerated acts are "those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity. the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.000. Tolerance or "toleration isdefined as ‘the act or practice ofpermitting or enduring something not wholly approved of. the owner of the property allowshis neighbor or another person to do on the property. Valiente. Corporal. "In unlawful detainer cases. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Castillo. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Tabugan. the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal. Tecson. Lastimosa.00 per month with legal interest beginning of the demand to vacate up to the time that the premises are fully vacated. In such a case. without any contract between them." Pro-Guard is to pay for the fair and reasonable rental of the premises in the amount of ₱20. the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possessionis to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance. Corpuz. is entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the unit in the building. Espina. Page 637 Echiverri. Palad. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Francisco. Marquez. The allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not because of non-payment of rentals. as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit. failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Martinez. Gloria. Rodriguez. Albano. Coronel. they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner. ISSUE: Whether or not Tormil is entitled to collect the rentals from Pro-Guard HELD: Yes. is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand."In other words. but from the time of the demand to vacate. such compensation should not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same. Sandoval. Catindig. but because of withdrawal of tolerance. Ramirez. Asensi.

finds that the Caswells were not only after securing permits. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Corporal. 1715 of the New civil code The contractor shall execute the work in such a manner that it has the qualities agreed upon and has no defects which destroy or lessen its value or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use. Corpuz. They suffered other major problems as shown by their narration. Tabugan. ZambalesII Electric Cooperative (Zameco II). Engr. the Caswells asked the sole distributor of electricity in the area. MACKAY vs.00 to rectify the mistakes in the construction made by the petitioner. Francisco. Gloria. the installation of electrical materials in the Caswell home.00. Martinez. Rodriguez. Rañigo.000. Tecson. how much its service for the installation would be.The inspection showed the defects which lead him to spend Php53. De Mesa. i. Pulangco quoted an estimate of ₱456. Lastimosa. Anent the permits. OWEN PROSPER A. the Caswells hired Owen who offered to do the job for only ₱250. Albano. Owen failed to execute his work in such a manner that it has no defects which destroy or lessen its value or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use.e. thru its sub-office manager. Asensi. FACTS: In their search for someone who could provide electrical installation service in their newly built home in San Narciso. 183872 November 17. Considering all the undisputed facts.805. however. Lumberio. he avers that securing the same is not part of his work but is the responsibility of the Caswells. Owen claimed that the installation was completed and ready for power service connection as of August 1998. Marquez. Pulangco). Alcazaren. With the help of Cesar Badua (Badua) and Albert Galeng. Reyes. Valiente. Ramirez. but the installation of an electrical system. Coronel.000. Catindig. Sy. ISSUE: Whether or not Owen Mackay may be held liable for the reconstruction and repair of the electrical installations..R. Castillo. Sandoval. Palad. Engr.00. Page 638 Echiverri. Santos. Owen insists that as far as he is concerned. Zambales. Zameco II inspected the installation work and tested the distribution transformers.SPOUSES DANA CASWELL and CERELINA CASWELL G. HELD: Yes. Espina. Valois . Victor Pulangco (Engr. However. he had done what was required of him. De la Cruz. At Cerelina Caswell’s (Cerelina) request. the Court. No. 2014 DOCTRINE: Art.

R. No. but Young refused to accept the payment. who was an employee of petitioner. Martinez. since said payment was merely coursed through petitioner’s receiving clerk. Corpuz. Eleazer went directly to First Optima’s office offering to pay the property in cash which he brought with him. Because of the refusal of First Optima to sell the property. January 28. and that respondent was simply motivated by a desire to acquire the subject property at any cost. Asensi. De la Cruz. respondent sent a Letter of even date to petitioner. that its board of directors did not authorize the sale thereof to respondent.000. Rodriguez. the RTC ruled in favour of Securitron and opined that there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties. but only between Eleazar and Young’s secretary. Valois . Lastimosa. Catindig. At this point. Lumberio. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between First Optima and Securitron.000. Antonio Eleazar (Eleazar) sent a letter to the petitioner offering to purchase the subject property at P6. 2015 DOCTRINE: in a potential sale transaction. that the P100. respondent –through its General Manager. Gloria. Subsequently. Tecson. In the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. G. Ramirez. hence First Optima filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to assail the CA ruling.00 check payment cannot be considered as earnest money for the subject property. averring that she still need to secure her sister’s advice. Reyes. Eleazar then told her he will await the approval. 2005. issued for P100. Eleazar was unable to personally negotiate with Young or the petitioner’s board of directors. The check was eventually deposited with and credited to petitioner’s bank account Thereafter. First Optima Realty Corporation vs. Cabañgon. and cannot be used to bind the owner to the obligations of a seller under an otherwise perfected contract of sale. Castillo. Tabugan. who was forced to accept the same. Securitron then filed a complaint for specific performance with damages to compel First Optima to proceed with the sale of the property. Eleazar likewise personally negotiated with a certain Maria Remoso (Remoso). Securitron Security Services. Rañigo. as no corresponding board resolution to such effect was issued. Coronel.00 per square meter.000. A series of telephone calls ensued. Marquez. Francisco. Sy. Palad. Valiente. Sandoval. respondent through counsel demanded in writing that petitioner proceed with the sale of the property. Page 639 Echiverri. First Optima denied that it agreed to sell the subject property.00 and made payable to petitioner. De Mesa. Santos. Alcazaren. Espina. Albano. Inc. After trial. On February 4. 199648. the prior payment of earnest money even before the property owner can agree to sell his property is irregular. It was accompanied by Philippine National Bank Check No.. FACTS: The petitioner looking to expand business and add to its existing offices. Corporal. Inguillo. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. She also informed him that prior approval of the Board of Directors is required for the sale. 24677.

De Mesa. Reyes. an anomaly which the Court will certainly not condone. Young informed Eleazar during said meeting that she still had to confer with her sister and petitioner’s board of directors. HELD: The Court grants the Petition. De la Cruz. 2005 letter. An agreement where the prior free consent of one party thereto is withheld or suppressed will be struck down. Inguillo. Coronel. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Francisco. and the Court shall always endeavor to protect a property owner’s rights against devious practices that put his property in danger of being lost or unduly disposed without his prior knowledge or consent. Tabugan. Castillo. Asensi. Ramirez. Martinez. (2) object or subject matter of the contract. and cannot be used to bind the owner to the obligations of a seller under an otherwise perfected contract of sale. Earnest money applies to a perfected sale. Gloria. the parties never got past the negotiation stage. It cannot be denied that there were negotiations between the parties conducted after the respondent’s December 9. Palad. In the present case. Corporal. and (3) price or consideration of the sale. Cabañgon. namely. The property owner-prospective seller may not be legally obliged to enter into a sale with a prospective buyer through the latter’s employment of questionable practices which prevent the owner from freely giving his consent to the transaction. Tecson. 2004 letter-offer and prior to the February 4. Instead.” In a potential sale transaction. 1482 of the Civil Code. Since there is no perfected sale between the parties. These negotiations culminated in a meeting between Eleazar and Young whereby the latter declined to enter into an agreement and accept cash payment then being tendered by the former. to cite a well-worn cliché. respondent had no obligation to make payment through the check. (1) consent or the meeting of the minds of the parties. nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money to petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. Marquez. Valiente. Lastimosa. this constitutes a palpable transgression of the prospective seller’s rights of ownership over his property.” “Where the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers. Catindig. in turn. Nothing shows that the parties had agreed on any final arrangement containing the essential elements of a contract of sale. Espina. As contemplated under Art. the carriage cannot be placed before the horse. Albano. Rodriguez. the prior payment of earnest money even before the property owner can agree to sell his property is irregular. “there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of earnest money. Valois . Page 640 Echiverri. Eleazar told Young that respondent shall await the necessary approval. Lumberio. Sy. Sandoval. no contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Corpuz. Santos.

Espina. Included in their estate are two parcels of land. the same being an express recognition in a public instrument. Tabugan. but entrusted to her for safe. the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former. Lastimosa. By itself. Valois . Rodriguez. and such due recognition in any authentic writing is. January 28. It is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof. Alcazaren. that the petitioner discovered that the subject titles were missing. Palad. and no further court action is required. Sy. No. De la Cruz. 2015 DOCTRINE: filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. HELD: Yes. Castillo. As petitioner correctly argues. 200169. Catindig. that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses. and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same.eeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar. Rodolfo S. Aguilar vs. but a mere stranger who was raised by' the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness. Martinez. Corpuz. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can prove filiation to the Spouse Aguilar by presenting Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1. Rañigo. when he was born. Gloria. Petitioner Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Siasat and alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Lumberio. Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946. Francisco. which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence.R. Coronel. particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 to prove filiation. that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar. Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Tecson. of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed. said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar. a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child. FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died. Marquez. her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue. Cabañgon. Edna G. Albano. Santos. Ramirez. Reyes. that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife. Siasat G. in itself. Valiente.respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Page 641 Echiverri. Corporal. Inguillo. who is her aunt. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172of the Family Code. Sandoval. Asensi. In her Answer. and that the subject titles were not stolen. De Mesa. intestate and without debts.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. told of his alleged violation. Macapagal. He was detained after being informed that he violated the law pertaining to drugs. they saw petitioner holding and examining a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu. 2002. Thereupon. HELD: Albano. Castillo. Valois . He was brought to the Police Station 2 where he was frisked but nothing illegal was found on him. Manila. Gloria. confiscated the same. Espina. Corpuz. Tecson. Santos. Palad. Together with PO1 Sta. Tondo. Valiente. PO1 Garcia prepared a letter request for the examination of the substance found inside the plastic sachet by the WPD Crime Laboratory. Sandoval. March 11. De Mesa. Maria demanded P 6. he was merely told to follow their instructions. Rodriguez. Petitioner denied the charges against him. was found to be positive for metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Corporal. petitioner and the confiscated plastic sachet were brought to the police station where the seized item was marked by PO1 Garcia for investigation and disposition. Coronel. Maria and PO1 Fernando Reyes were conducting an anti-criminality patrol in Parola Compound. Reyes. 2002. Ramirez. Asensi. FACTS: At around 3: 45 in the afternoon of July 24. PO1 Sta. Rañigo. II of RA 9165. Marquez. No. PO1 Joel G. Petitioner was arrested. When he asked them why he was being arrested. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Art. They approached petitioner and after ascertaining the contents of the plastic sachet. Maria.000 from him in exchange for his release but no money was forthcoming. and apprised of his constitutional rights. He recounted that in the morning of July 24. It accorded the police officers the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties since they were not impelled by the improper motive of imputing the crime against petitioner. PO1 Garcia then brought the seized item to the crime laboratory. Martinez. Lumberio. The RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crime of violation of Section 11 (3). Cabañgon. Sta. he was sitting in from of his uncle’s house when policemen approached and arrested him. People of the Philippines G. Alcazaren. It also upheld the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item after observing that its chain of custody was duly established. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence was able to discharge the burden of proof notwithstanding the apprehending team’s failure to prove the integrity and identity of the alleged confiscated shabu. 2015 DOCTRINE: The failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the law is not fatal and will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Catindig. Francisco. Inguillo. which after examination by P/Insp.R.000. 192284. Sy. Tabugan. the CA found the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drug present in the case. From a distance of about three meters. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. On appeal. Page 642 Echiverri. Alex Ortega Tioncovs.

Coronel. Reyes. Rañigo. Ramirez. Catindig. Lumberio. Valois . Asensi. It reiterated that it has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the law is not fatal and will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Failure to conduct physical inventory and the fact that no photograph of the seized item was taken did not convince the Court to rule in favour of the Accused-Petitioner. De Mesa. Tabugan. Gloria. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Espina. Marquez. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Corporal. Page 643 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Castillo. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. Inguillo. Albano. Tecson. De la Cruz. Martinez. documentary and object evidence the elements to establish the crime charged.The prosecution in this case was able to establish through testimonial. Sandoval. Palad. Francisco. Valiente. Sy. Santos.

let alone irregular.” This principle applies in land registration cases. Republic of the Philippines vs. Reyes. The CA directed petitioner to file its appellant’s brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. It likewise granted petitioner’s Motion for Extension. filing at least three motions for extension of time before finally turning in its appellant’s brief. Corpuz. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) to a 293-square meter lot in Barangay BatongMalake. On August 17. Asensi. Palad. Lastimosa. Francisco. the CA issued another Resolution denying petitioner’s second motion for extension and dismissing its appeal pursuant to Section 1(e). ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law when it ordered the dismissal of the appeal although the delay in the filing of the appellant’s brief was caused by the trial court and the respondents. HELD: The Court finds for petitioner. March 11. Spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno G. Castillo. through the Office of the Solicitor General. was admittedly ornery in the prosecution of its case.However. 2015 DOCTRINE: The State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. 205492. No. On June 22. petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of time to file its brief. 2012. Tabugan. Espina. FACTS: Spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno (respondents. petitioner took its liberties in the prosecution of its appeal. and taking the demeanor consistent with expecting that each motion for extension of time would be granted. Indeed. within which to file its brief. Corporal. Sy. Tecson. Sandoval.It is truethat the power conferred upon the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to file an appellant’s brief is discretionary. 2012. De Mesa. Martinez.R. on October 9. 2012. while petitioner. Lumberio. 2012. 2012. However. 2012.” and “the Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials. Coronel. the CA required petitioner to comment on respondents’ Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Los Baños. We likewise agree with the CA’s application of Section 1(e). Rule 50 of the Rules. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Page 644 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Marquez. 2012. Valiente. Santos. Cabañgon. praying for an extension of 30 days from August 20. Albano. Petitioner filed an appeal. illegal acts of government agents do not bind the State. Laguna. Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules). Catindig. petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of time to file its appellant’s brief. more so if they are erroneous. collectively) filed with the RTC of Calamba. or until August 20. it is nonetheless true that “[a]s a matter of doctrine. It sought an extension of 60 days from June 21. petitioner did not file its brief within the period stated in its second motion for extension. Valois . Rañigo. Laguna an Application for Registration of title under Presidential Decree No. Inguillo. In a Resolution25 dated June 26. 2012. Gloria. Alcazaren. Thus. or until September 19. within which to file the same.

Asensi. De la Cruz. Francisco. Castillo. Alcazaren. Palad. Santos. Therefore. De Mesa. Valiente. Martinez. Albano. Rañigo. Valois . Corporal. Tabugan. Tecson. Catindig. we nevertheless cannot allow respondents’ application for registration since they failed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable public land. Certainly. Espina. Reyes. the State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. Inguillo. Lumberio. Ramirez. Sandoval. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Marquez. Cabañgon. Page 645 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Sy. Gloria. even if the Office of the Solicitor General was remiss in the handling of the State’s appeal. Coronel.

2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization. Santos. Sandoval. and. leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income. Lastimosa. No. Robert Uy. Highlights of his petition to prove compliance with C. Lumberio. The CA denied the OSG’s appeal hence. does not have sufficient monthly income since he merely receives salary from the family corporation which is not even sufficient for his family.000.A. 200983. Sy. a. Catindig.a. Reyes. After trial. his petition for naturalization will be denied. Rañigo. the RTC granted the petition for naturalisation filed by Huang. Corporal. Huang Te Fu G. he does not prepare his income tax returns. and. Alcazaren. much less lucrative. Marquez. Page 646 Echiverri. in a Deed of Sale executed on August. and is not even included in the payroll of the company. Huang signed in the Deed of Sale and falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Chan. Martinez. In its brief. hence the OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals. his income tax returns for the years 2002. among others. Gloria. he does not possess a lucrative trade or profession. his failure to cite particular principles underlying the Philippine Constitution were brought about by his not having been confronted about it. filed a petition for naturalisation with RTC of Quezon City. most of his expenses are taken care of by his parents who own the corporation. FACTS: Huang Te Fu. Palad. 2001 for a parcel of land in Antipolo City. De la Cruz. otherwise. and born in Taiwan. Huang alleged that he merely signed and did not prepare the Deed of Sale. Francisco.k. 2015 DOCTRINE: An applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law.00 from their family business of manufacturing zippers. on cross-examination by petitioner. Coronel. married to Irene D. March 18. 473 are the following:he had resided continuously in the Philippines for 23 years. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of Philippine citizenship to Huang was proper. received primary. Tabugan. HELD: Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires. he could not cite any of the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. that an applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some Albano. Castillo. exhibiting his lack of good moral character. Asensi. Ramirez. Valois . Rodriguez. secondary and tertiary education in Philippine schools. the OSG pointed to the following disqualifications warranting the reversal of Huang’s grant of naturalisation: he does not own real estate in the Philippines. Republic of the Philippines vs. and he derive a monthly income of P15. Valiente. the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court on petition for review via certiorari. Corpuz.R. De Mesa. In his Comment. a Chinese businessman allegedly engaged in the business of manufacturing zippers. Tecson. Espina.

Corpuz. sickness. Gloria. one may not be faulted for believing that respondent’s alleged employment in his family’s zipper business was contrived for the sole purpose of complying with the legal requirements prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship.” Lastly. and a charge upon. Palad. the qualification of “some known lucrative trade. In regard to the requirement that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade. Sandoval. even assuming that respondent was indeed employed by his parents. known lucrative trade. Valois . Tecson. it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. his parents. He cannot support his own family on his own. Rañigo. profession. Inguillo. On the other hand. De la Cruz. an attempt to circumvent with impunity the tax laws. most of his family’s daily expenses are still shouldered by his parents who own the zipper manufacturing business which employs him. De Mesa. One of the most effective pieces of evidence to prove employment – aside from the employment contract itself and other documents such as daily time records – is a worker’s inclusion in the payroll. Valiente. or lawful occupation” means “not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life.00 to P18. in accordance with the prevailing standard of living. He admitted during trial that he was not even listed or included in the payroll of his family’s zipper business. or lawful occupation. Alcazaren. It is concealment of the truth. Catindig. With this admitted fact. and consistently with the demands of human dignity. Asensi. it may be concluded that there is no basis for the CA finding that respondent is engaged in a lucrative trade. Martinez. his non-inclusion in the payroll for all the years he has worked in his parents’ businesssuggests – as correctly argued by petitioner – an intent to evade taxes or to conceal the true nature of his employment and the amount of his salary or income. Lastimosa. Francisco. Tabugan. at this stage of our civilization.” Moreover. Lumberio. This simply means that respondent continues to be a burden to. his supposed income of P15. Marquez. then he may not be considered an employee thereof. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment. If this is the case. Espina. Sy. Reyes. or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge. Page 647 Echiverri. Castillo. the courts should consider only the applicant’s income. his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment. Santos. Indeed. labor laws Albano.000. Cabañgon. From the above.” His income should permit “him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort. profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Rodriguez. profession.00 per month as found by the CA is not enough for the support of his family. it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income. this ponente declared: Based on jurisprudence. Indeed. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial “for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade. he lives on the charity of his parents. By his own admission. Ramirez.000. the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. Corporal. Coronel.

Sy. De Mesa. Reyes. respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August 2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen – which he did to secure the seamless registration of the property in the name of his wife – is further proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character. Coronel. Indeed. It is also a violation of the constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals. Espina. Francisco. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Marquez. Gloria. Martinez. If such is the case. Valiente. and other laws that would otherwise regulate respondent’s actions during his stay in this country. Lumberio. Moreover. Asensi. Palad. Corpuz. relative to the employment of aliens. Rodriguez. Tecson. Lastimosa. Castillo. Santos. then respondent is not required to state in his income tax return – as is the case – his employer and what he actually receives as salary therefrom. Page 648 Echiverri. it can never be said that respondent works for his parents’ zipper business. Catindig. Tabugan. without payroll records. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Albano. Valois . Corporal. Cabañgon. Sandoval. he is free to conveniently declare any amount of income in his tax returns.

including those of the Department of Agriculture (DA). Jose Daclan (the Daclans) – and several others donated around 13 hectares of land to the Republic. the deeds of donation8 stipulated – a. the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on a 1. Corporal. for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government. 197267 – Federico Daclan. Teodoro Daclan. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated the provisions of the deeds of donation. Inguillo. The donation was subject to the conditions that these parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding station. Sy. were devolved to the local government units pursuant to Republic Act No. 2015 DOCTRINE: As a general rule. through the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). March 23. except with the previous consent of the DONOR or his heirs. c. otherwise known as the “Local Government Code”.5-hectare portion of the 13-hectare donated property. et. Espina. the Daclans and other donors demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding station has ceased operations and that the land has been abandoned. plaintiffs6 executed four (4) documents denominated as Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines (or “Republic”) donating to the latter four (4) parcels of land. In a September 4. In particular.That the land herein mentioned shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose. Reyes. Palad. abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY. Thus. rights and obligations derived from contract are transmissible. Alcazaren. Federico Daclan. the powers and functions of certain government agencies. Martinez. Coronel. Region I. Francisco. including the above stipulations relative to exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion. In support of the said project. Josefina Collado. Page 649 Echiverri. the Agoo Breeding Station (or “breeding station”) was established by the Department of Agriculture. Republic of the Philippines vs. Corpuz. Marquez. Ramirez. 2003 Letter to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. Castillo. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. FACTS: Sometime in May 1972. Cabañgon.al G.R. Gloria. No. defendant Province of La Union (or “Province”) assumed the powers and functions of the DA. The uniform deeds of donation covering these parcels of land contained the same conditions. De Mesa. 197115/197267. Sandoval. Albano. Tecson. the petitioners in G.That in case of non-use.R. Sometime after the donations were made. Santos. Sometime in 1991. Valois . Rañigo. Asensi. De la Cruz. in the operation of the breeding station. except with the previous consent of the donors or their heirs. Tabugan. No. Valiente. possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the DONOR and all permanent improvements existing thereon shall become the property of the DONOR. 7160. and 2) shall not be used for any other purpose. Catindig. All in all. Lumberio.

that in 1989. he saw upon ocular inspection that there remained six cows and fifty goats on the premises. Espina. Santos. these activities were merely transferred to the Province. Tecson. testified that he was directed by the Governor and the Provincial Administrator to take photographs of the breeding station in order to verify the complaint filed by the Daclans. Rañigo. the operation of the Agoo Breeding Station continued. and goats. CresenciaIsibido testified that as Farm Foreman. that he then proceeded to the Agoo Breeding Station. La Union Provincial Assessor. Inguillo. Reyes. Palad. Albano. Region 1 declared that after the breeding station was transferred to the Province. Castillo. the testimonies of public officers are given full faith and credence. Atty. Nida Gapuz. Valiente. Tabugan. Lumberio. Valois . Corpuz. De la Cruz. that he took photographs of the animals – cows and goats – therein. Particularly. she started receiving her salary from the Province. as they are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Jr. Lastimosa. as well as goat dispersal and cattle production. Alcazaren. Regional Director ReinerioBelarmino. of the Department of Agriculture. Asensi. It cannot be said that the deeds of donation may be nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct. the witnesses for the Daclans and the Republic uniformly declared that the breeding station remained operational even after the Local Government Code of 1991 was put into effect. Page 650 Echiverri. the testimonies of the above public officers are credible. HELD: The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that the breeding station remained operational even after its transfer from the Republic to the Province. she received her salary from the BAI. she exercised supervision over her co-employees in the breeding station. The activities of the BAI did not cease even after it was dissolved after the government adopted the policy of devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991. its functions continued in the government offices/local government units to which said functions were devolved. there were six personnel assigned at the breeding station. that after devolution. Coronel. Ramirez. Sy. and that the Province owned said animals at the breeding station. its activities continued when its functions were devolved to the local government units such as the Province of La Union.” Thus. Gloria. La Union Provincial Veterinarian. Dr. As against the bare assertions of the Daclans that the breeding station was abandoned and became non-operational. “In the absence of any controverting evidence. that from 1974 until 1989. said that natural as well as artificial insemination activities were being conducted at the breeding station. Rodriguez. and that even after devolution. Martinez. Thus. even if the BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office. Cabañgon. Marquez. De Mesa. Corporal. cattle and swine were being maintained thereat. Francisco. Mauro Cabading. Catindig. Sandoval.

000.000. equivalent to P320.000. “not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow. As a farmer her husband produces 270 cavans of palay a year with a price of P135. Santos. Loss of Earning Capacity. less the necessary expense for his own living. Lastimosa. Francisco.” It is settled that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the form of actual damages. treacherously shot and killed the victim. her husband earns P50. we note that the indemnity for lost earnings was erroneously computed.000. Tabugan.00 a year as farmer. Lumberio. It is already settled jurisprudence that “the formula that has gained acceptance over time has limited recovery to net earning capacity. Espina.00 a day as tricycle driver and P150. Palad. the computation for lost income of P16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. x xx [meaning]. It is already settled jurisprudence that “the formula that has gained acceptance over time has limited recovery to net earning capacity.00 a cavan weighing 50 kilos. Sy. FACTS: Respondents were charged with the murder of Jesus Ylarde. it is also on record that the widow of the deceased subsequently testified that “before his death. Gloria. x xx [meaning]. 2015.000. Marquez. Valiente. Albano. sari-sari store owner. Cabañgon. Jesus Ylarde. Rañigo.00 was awarded computed as follows: “2/3 x (80-49)=life expectancy of 20 years . Page 651 Echiverri. it must be proved by competent proof. Castillo. No. Reyes. 202708. Inguillo. Corpuz. De Mesa.” Here. Alcazaren. less the necessary expense for his own living. in conspiracy with his co-accused. April 13.00). After it has been sufficiently established that appellant.R.” Thus. Coronel. Valois . Corporal. multiplied by the annual net income of the deceased (P16.000. De la Cruz.” ISSUE: How should the court compute the award for damages based on the loss of earning capacity? HELD: Preliminarily. as such.00 from their sari-sari store and had a net income of P4. Martinez. Tecson.00 a month. Records show that the widow of the deceased testified that her husband “has a net income of P16. VICTORIANO VILLAR @ Boy G. Catindig. . Sandoval. Rodriguez. Asensi. lost earnings in the amount of P320.” However. driver and operator of two tricycles and caretaker of Hacienda Bancod. . Ramirez. Damages including Loss of Earning Capacity was awarded to the heirs of Jesus Ylarde. vs.00 did not take into consideration the deceased’s necessary expenses. DOCTRINE: Damages.00.

Gloria. Valois . De la Cruz. it must be proved by competent proof. Marquez.” By way of exception. Cabañgon. Coronel. Rañigo. Sy. as such. De Mesa. Tabugan. Catindig. Martinez. Espina. Alcazaren. Reyes. and 2) the deceased was employed as a daily wage worker and receiving less than the minimum wage. damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded in two instances: 1) the victim was self-employed and receiving less than the minimum wage under the current laws and no documentary evidence is available in the decedent’s line of business. Asensi. In fine. Corpuz. Inguillo. Albano. Ramirez. “not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow. Castillo. Palad. it is settled that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the form of actual damages. Page 652 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Corporal. Santos. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Francisco. Valiente. Sandoval. Tecson.

Martinez. Land Titles and Deeds. Coronel. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if. vs. Philippine National Police Directorate for Personnel and Records Management. Valiente. Espina. Lastimosa. such petition has no merit FACTS: Respondents argues that “no person came forward to contest the reconstitution of the subject title even after the requirements of posting and publication have been complied with. The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance. on the basis of the law and the evidence on record. Corporal. Cabañgon. Page 653 Echiverri. such petition has no merit. Tabugan. as government representative. No.R. Rodriguez. because the State cannot be estopped bythe omission. mistake or error of its officials or agents. Palad. This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance.” in light with our ruling in Macawadib v. Santos. to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner’s petition for correction of entries in his service records. 2015 DOCTRINE: Civil Law. Valois . PASICOLAN. PASICOLAN and GREGORIO C. Inguillo. mistake or error of its officials or agents. De la Cruz. Tecson. Marquez. Ramirez. HELD: No. Reyes. G. CESAR C. April 15. 702 SCRA 496 (2013). Castillo. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Alcazaren. Sy. Gloria. Lumberio. because the State cannot be estopped by the omission. Reconstitution of Titles. Catindig. Rañigo. Francisco. Asensi. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if. thus: On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG. Sandoval. Albano. ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of opposition from government agencies equates to estoppel by omission. De Mesa. on the basis of the law and the evidence on record. Corpuz. 198543.

Benguet. De la Cruz. appellee Angeline sold Lots 6 and 7 to co-appellees Agustina and Lawana. the application on the ground that respondents failed to prove that they or their predecessorsininterest have been in open. and not the applicants. which is the subject of the survey and present application. open. Appellees declared the questioned properties for taxation purposes. Valois . AGUSTINA TAUEL. Page 654 Echiverri. Francisco. Corporal.* DOCTRINE: The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. Such notations do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject properties remain part of the inalienable public domain. From that time on. 1945 or earlier. Catindig. as the basis in attesting that the land. Espina. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. Reyes. Castillo. is alienable and disposable because it is inside Lot A opened by the presidential proclamation “todisposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act. anadministrative action. Tabugan. Sandoval. Santos. Tecson. herein respondents Angeline. July 8. or in 1979. Asensi. Cabañgon.” The certifications categorically cited Proclamation No. Corpuz. Palad. Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana Batcagan4 (Lawana) filed an Applicationfor Registration5 of three parcels of land located in Barangay Tabangaoen. Alcazaren.R. who must prove that the properties subjects of the application are alienable and disposable. No. to show that the land still forms part of the public Albano. Previously. FACTS: Dayaoen (Angeline). Martinez. 209. Inguillo.** andLAWANA T. Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner cannot be admitted as evidence of the subject properties’ alienability and disposability. investigation reports of Bureau of Landsinvestigators. exclusive. Valiente. Marquez. DAYAOEN.November 2007. they continuously occupied and possessed the properties. There was no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said parcels of land. 200773. pursuant to an Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed ofAbsolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land. exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12. Lumberio. Coronel. uninterrupted and continuous possession thereof in the concept of an owner. 2015. De Mesa. Rañigo. and a legislative act or statute. In 1976 and 1977. therefore. BATCAGAN G. Ramirez. Sy.” It is incumbent upon the State. ANGELINE L. the court a quo granted appellees’ application for registration. Lastimosa. Antonio gave the parcels of land in question to appellee Angeline and Dado as a wedding gift. Gloria. Rodriguez. La Trinidad. appellees and their predecessorininterest have been in public. The subject parcels of land were originally owned and possessed since prewar time by Antonio Pablo (Antonio). continuous. Agustina and Lawana filed a similar application for registration of the herein subject property. LotA. that the applicants have satisfactorily complied with their burden of proving “that the land subject of anapplication for registration is alienable” considering that they have established “the existence of a positive act of the governmentsuch as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. It is clear. The Republic opposed the application. Since 12 June 1945. respectively.

He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable. Palad. Rodriguez. the Court declared that: Respecting the third requirement. De Mesa. they have not sufficiently shown that the property applied for is alienable and disposable at the time their application for registration was filed. the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. Rañigo. While respondents have complied with most of the requirements in connection with their application for registration. the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Roche. In this connection. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. Tabugan. Corpuz. Valois . In the present case. Valiente. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA correctly ruled in favour of the applicants? HELD: No. De la Cruz. However. an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. Lumberio. Further. while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR. Reyes. Gloria. Page 655 Echiverri. The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. The tax declaration of applicant Angeline Dayaoen and religious payment of real property taxes lend strong corroboration to the evidence of the applicants. which the Court does not even accord any weight and credence. Castillo. Sy. the nation’s interests will be best served by a strict adherence to the provisions of the land registration laws. Santos. Francisco. Tecson. Corporal. InRepublic v. Asensi. Petitioner argued that RTC erred in granting respondents’ application for registration since they failed to prove that the subject property constitutes alienable and disposable land. Sandoval. To be sure. Coronel. Marquez. the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. In the case at bar. Albano. Alcazaren. the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. domain. Inguillo. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable. Catindig. The State has utterly failed to overcome the presumption with the sole testimony of Irene Leaño Caayas. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators. and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Martinez. theCourt has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or PENRO of the DENR. an administrative action. this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. Espina. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny their application for registration. and a legislative act or statute.

Before the RTC. Republic of thePhilippines.R. Francisco. Gloria. an easement of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable property or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same. STA. and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa. as well as with respect to extraordinary acquisitive. Castillo. CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and possession of the subject property.500 square meters (subject property). Tabugan. respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision owned by petitioners and Liza. INCORPORATED G. FRANCISCO v. It was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rodriguez. Reyes. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Pagasa. In its Answer. Catindig.petitioners and Liza are consideredowners of the subject property through extraordinary prescription. Rañigo. It wasonly later in their Motion for Reconsideration39 therein that they averred that their ownership could also be based on ordinary acquisitive prescription.Even if timely raised. the Court notes that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. however. Valiente. AND PABLO B. De la Cruz. petitioners initially asserted ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Sy. RONNIE ANDRES. Tecson. Inguillo. LIWAYWAY ANDRES. A few years back. De Mesa. Palad. Marquez. therefore. Corporal. At any rate. RTC ruled. However. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT. Martinez. that based on Article 113724 of the Civil Code. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Binangonan. No. Under the law. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent. Valois . Asensi. 2006 Decision. it pointed out that petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existenceof the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way. 201405 August 24. that only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for Albano. 2015 DOCTRINE: Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way.Also with the CA. developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East. Rizal with a total area of more or less 10. Santos. Lumberio. Coronel. Page 656 Echiverri. such argument of petitioners. Having real right over the same. Corpuz. respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property. FACTS: Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent. HELD: Anent petitioners’ invocation of ordinary acquisitive prescription. petitioners based their claim of ownership on extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code such that the said court declared them owners of the subject property by virtue thereof in its May 22. they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Espina.

Catindig. Palad. petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles. Asensi. or removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership. Inguillo. Page 657 Echiverri. Lumberio. public use or for the development of national wealth. they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for lack of personality. Sy. which provides that property ofthe State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription. Reyes. whether ordinary or extraordinary. Rañigo. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Coronel. In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case. Tecson. Martinez. Corpuz. Rodriguez. applies. Santos. may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. Tabugan. it must first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period. Gloria. Valiente. Castillo. And if the mode of acquisition is prescription. Francisco. Corporal. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Article 1113 of the Civil Code. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Valois . Marquez. Albano. Espina. Otherwise. Conversely.

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS G. Bustos (Engr. Bustos).63 In this case. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. No. due to the alleged absence of spoil sites. Castillo. petitioner requested permission from Director Soriquez to allow it to undertake side dumping (dumping within the river) chargeable against the dredging works. Valiente. Bustos issued a letterrequiring petitioner to provide additional pipelines for distance pumping. 1997. De Mesa. petitioner could still pump the dredge spoils to the following spoil sites: Pascual "A. Palad. Alcazaren. On August 18. Espina. Engr. He reminded petitioner that side dumping was not allowed and that as per the report of Engr. On September 29. Martinez. Marquez. Engr. Inguillo. 2015 DOCTRINE: Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Corporal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's blatant defiance of the prohibition on side dumping is a violation of the contract that should not be ignored just because petitioner was able to complete the project. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Page 658 Echiverri. Asensi. Reyes. Lumberio. September 22. the contract specifically Albano. 1997. which were affected by the Mt. Bustos. Director Soriquez issued a letter9 denying the request. Pinatubo eruptions and mudflows. the Area Engineer of respondent DPWH. Gloria. Coronel. On August 13." Pascual "B. 204835. Marcelino P.R. Rañigo." and the Regala fishpond. Ramirez. HELD: It is a basic principle in law that contracts have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith. Tecson. Sandoval. despite the denial and the prohibition issued by Director Soriquez and Engr. Lastimosa. MOVERTRADE CORPORATION v." However. Catindig. Valois . Santos. Bustos also reiterated in his letter that "Pascual spoil site can still accommodate more materials" and that '[respondent DPWH] is not allowing or giving any instruction to use side dumping process for whatsoever reason. petitioner continued to side dump. Tabugan. Sy. FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) entered into a Contract Agreement5 for dredging and other related works in Pampanga Bay and the primary Pasac-Guagua-San Fernando Waterways in Pampanga. 1997. Francisco.

Francisco. Corporal. Palad. Valois . Castillo. Corpuz. Coronel. Martinez. What is crucial is the admission of petitioner that it did not dump the dredge spoils at the designated spoil sites but dumped them back into the river. Alcazaren. petitioner's failure to dump the dredge spoils at the designated spoil sites constitutes a breach. Sandoval. dredge spoils are not dumped at spoil sites. "[A] breach occurs where the contractor inexcusably fails to perform substantially in accordance with the terms of the contract. Valiente. Otherwise. Ramirez. Thus. De Mesa. Page 659 Echiverri. Espina. Gloria. Rañigo. Lumberio. Petitioner's attempt to split hairs between "side dumping" and "free dumping" is unavailing as both are not allowed under paragraph 11 of the Contract Agreement. Marquez. Tabugan. Albano. Inguillo." 64 Without a doubt. It makes no difference whether petitioner performed side dumping or free dumping activities considering that in both instances. De la Cruz. Reyes.65 The act of dumping dredge spoils back into the river clearly violates paragraph 11 of the Contract Agreement. Sy. petitioner for the first time claims that the dredge spoils were not side dumped but were "freely" dumped. Tecson. Asensi. As a last-ditch effort. petitioner cannot unilaterally change the manner of disposal without first amending the contract or obtaining the express consent or approval of respondent DPWH. provides the manner of disposing dredge spoils. Santos. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Catindig. petitioner would be guilty of breaching the contract.

195654. NORMAN LACSAMANA. v. and Ledesma were employees of respondent Napar. complainants. Corporal. eye test results and medical/physical examination results. AND PHILIP YOUNG G. before they could be posted to their new assignments. drug test results. and (4) to take and pass qualifying examinations. Tabugan. Cabarle. Santos. binding on the parties.NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES. Espina. Corpuz. NOELJAMILI. Bernal. however.000. Complainants failed to fully comply. machine operator. according to Napar. holiday pay. November 25. Article 2041 of the Civil Code. 13th month pay. Ramirez. reported to Napar. Inguillo. Lumberio. a corporation engaged in the manufacture of various food products with respondent Young as its President. AGUSTEV ESTRE. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. overtime pay. ROGER BERNAL. Palad. Castillo.. They were paid P7. IVY CABARLE. hence they were not given new assignments. Francisco. NOEL AYSON. petitioners and other co-workers (complainants) filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC three separate complaints for wage differentials. FACTS: Petitioners Inutan.00 each as part of the agreement but were required by Napar. Napar assigned petitioners at respondent Jonas. Hular. De la Cruz. 2015 DOCTRINE: A judicially approved compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata. to work as factory workers. Cabañgon. RAYMUNDO TUNOG. Ayson. Health Certificate. are needed to properly assess complainants' skills for new placement with the agency's other clients. In accordance with the Joint Compromise Agreement. On January 13. (2) to attend orientation seminars. HELEN CARTE. Catindig. (3) to undergo series of interviews. Tunog. Coronel. community tax certificate. Martinez. Estre. *** JONAS INTERNATIONAL. MARILOU SAGUN. NBI Clearance. on several instances. Marquez. Sandoval. Carte. quality control inspector. REYNALDO INUTAN. (1) to submit their respective bio-data/resume and several documents such as Police Clearance. JR. Sy. premium pay for holiday and rest day. MARITES HULAR.R. allows the aggrieved party to rescind the compromise agreement and insist upon his original demand upon failure and refusal of the other party to abide by the compromise agreement. Barangay Clearance. and warehouseman. Valiente. mixer. INC. Mayor's Permit. Sagun. complainants and respondents entered into a Joint Compromise Agreement which was approved by the Labor Arbiter. Asensi. ISSUE: Albano. Tecson. Sometime in September of 2002. De Mesa. and enforceable through a writ of execution. ROLITOAZUCENA.2 It is final. selector. a recruitment agency owned and managed by respondent Lacsamana. Gloria. Azucena. Alcazaren. No. Valois . 2003. and unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) against respondents. Reyes. Page 660 Echiverri. Jamili. These requirements. AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA. service incentive leave pay. Rañigo.

as if there had never been any compromise agreement. In exercising the second option under Art. Lumberio. Coronel. if he chooses. Sandoval. Where a party violated the terms of a compromise agreement. Page 661 Echiverri. Ramirez. Corpuz. Catindig. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party. we clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art. When the new Civil Code came into being. public order.: [B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code. et al v. in Heirs of Zari. morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. Thus. Gloria. public policy. bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand. we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law. Francisco. Reyes. it becomes more than a binding contract. the aggrieved party may. Inguillo. Asensi. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. However. Espina. Valiente. Valois . De Mesa. Lastimosa.32 Article 227 of the Labor Code provides that any compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment shall be final and binding upon the parties. Compromise agreements between employers and workers have often been upheld as valid and accepted as a desirable means of settling disputes. Martinez. Rañigo. its Article 2041 xxx created for the first time the right of rescission. without bringing an action for rescission. If judicially approved. 2041 of the same Code. it is a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery. Santos. We explained. Palad. Santos. the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. 2037 is qualified by Art. there was no right to rescind compromise agreements. Tecson. Castillo. Alcazaren. the only recourse open to the other party was to enforce the terms thereof. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved." Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata. Marquez. HELD: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. De la Cruz. 2041. Albano. Sy. Rodriguez. Whether Petitioners validly exercised the option of rescinding the Joint Compromise Agreement under Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Cabañgon. Tabugan. which provides: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise. Corporal. viz.

that the respondents have a better right of possession over the disputed 2-hectare portion of the 8-hectare property by the mere fact that said disputed portion is covered by a certificate of title in their names? HELD: The Court denies the Petition. AUGUSTO ONG TRINIDAD II. respondents filed with the RTC of Lucena City a Complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Augusto. De Mesa. ISSUE: Whether or not. December 09. AUGUSTO ONG TRINIDAD III FOR HIMSELF AND REPRESENTING LEVY ONG TRINIDAD AND ROHMEL ONG TRINIDAD v. Joaquin Trinidad that this five-hectare property was acquired by his father from GenaroKausapin who was his father's client. Rañigo. that since 1980. that Felicidad secured her title through dubious means. No. Lastimosa.SPOUSES BONIFACIO PALAD AND FELICIDAD KAUSAPIN G. respondents spouses BonifacioPalad and FelicidadKausapin- bought from Renato Ramos an eight-hectare parcel of land located within Lucena City. Augusto claimed that respondents were not the owners of the subject property. Reyes. 1985. Catindig. Castillo. Tabugan. Sandoval. Asensi. Cabañgon. Respondents later caused the subject property to be surveyed. Alcazaren. Valois . Palad. Lumberio. 1985 segregation agreement between Albano. the subject property constitutes a portion of an eight-hectare parcel of land acquired by respondents from Ramos by purchase in 1985. 1992. Gloria. Atty. 203397. Coronel. Inguillo. Augusto thus prayed that the complaint be dismissed. Espina. he has been in possession of the five-hectare property. Page 662 Echiverri. and it was discovered that a two-hectare portion thereof was occupied by Augusto Trinidad who converted the same into a fishpond. FACTS: On July 23. that the subject property formed part of a five-hectare piece of property that was given to him by his father. Rodriguez. and that Felicidad was motivated by greed and bad faith in filing the case. 2015 DOCTRINE: in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. and was not the result of a June 5. De la Cruz. Martinez. Santos. that said five-hectare property was declared for taxation purposes by his father. On May 29. Tecson. The evidence on record also suggests that contrary to petitioners' claim. that he filed criminal cases for falsification against Felicidad. Marquez.R. The fact is undisputed that the subject two-hectare property lies within Lot 13-C which is registered in the name of respondents as TCT T-47318. Francisco. Corpuz. Valiente. 1985 deed of extrajudicial settlement and September 9. Sy. Corporal. Ramirez.

Catindig. Marquez. On the other hand. Tecson. Martinez.and this is admitted by petitioners in their Petition. Coronel. Santos. Espina. Asensi. as registered owners of the subject property. Rodriguez. which specifically adopted the findings of fact of the RTC on this score. Corporal. Tabugan. Valiente. Sandoval. Gloria. Lastimosa. Palad. Valois . De Mesa. Albano.petitioners are mere intruders with respect to the subject property. respondents have the right to exercise all attributes of ownership including possession which they cannot do while petitioners remain there. Ramirez. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Castillo. De la Cruz. they have no right to own or possess the same. Rañigo. Francisco. the original owners and respondent Felicidad. Sy. Page 663 Echiverri. This is a finding of fact arrived at by both the RTC and the CA . Lumberio. Reyes. Corpuz. Alcazaren.

SAREÑOGON.1996. Castillo. they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. Because of these. For three months. Gloria. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question the RTC''s Decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code. They later became sweethearts and on August 10. Sareñogon Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin. Sarefiogon. Rañigo. Inguillo. Tabugan. G. No. Corpuz. Palad. Misamis Occidental in 1991. respondent Jose B. Reyes. 2016 DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge a trial court''s declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the Philippines FACTS: On November 4. Coronel. JOSE B. 2008. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. Rodriguez. Santos. Catindig. Asensi.R. Valiente. 199194. Valois . Martinez. Sandoval. Misamis Occidental. it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article Albano. While still abroad. JR. he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. Jr. Page 664 Echiverri. HELD: This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious. Lumberio. but failed. Ramirez. Sy. he did not receive any communication from Netchie. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Netchie S. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. De Mesa. he tried to contact Netchie''s parents. but they also did not know where she was. Espina. Marquez. filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. Corporal. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Tecson. He then inquired from Netchie''s relatives and friends about her whereabouts. February 10. ISSUE: THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT'S ABSENT WIFE IS PROBABLY DEAD. they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. He returned home after his contract expired.. as the latter had allegedly left Clarin. However. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Francisco.

Lastimosa. Corporal. Ramirez. Santos. Espina. Rañigo. Albano. Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. Corpuz. Valois . Sy. Castillo. Lumberio. For. Page 665 Echiverri. Reyes. 41 of the Family Code. Sandoval. Asensi. Coronel. De la Cruz. Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. De Mesa. Tecson. Catindig. Gloria. Palad. If anything. Francisco. Martinez. aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Valiente. Marquez. in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. Tabugan.

De Mesa. 2393-A. Valiente. Espina. the property which is the subject-matter of the action. ISSUE: Who between the parties have the better right over the land in dispute? HELD: There is no merit in the Petition. Rodriguez. rely on the failure of the Absolute Sale to state that the 207-square meter portion conveyed by Artemio and his co- heirs to the spouses Sillero was Lot 3154-A.As mentioned. When Hospicio and Severina died single and without issue. Tabugan. EDELINA MACALINO. Catindig. Asensi. FACTS :Under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. Santos. Martinez. AND GILDA MACALINO v. or interest in. Lastimosa. GILBERTO MACALINO. It is necessary to determine the true intention of the parties to the instruments relevant to this case. EDUARDO MACALINO. As a result. No. JR. Sandoval. GIL MACALINO. Valois .R. 204056. Reyes. to wit: the portion which was converted into a barangayroad and the portions on both sides of said barangay road. Subsequently. Legal title denotes registered ownership. TERESITA MACALINO. it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to. in order to further their case. Emeterio as their sole heir inherited the portions pertaining to them and thus became the owner of the whole lot. the Absolute Sale did not specifically indicate that Artemio and his co-heirs were conveying to the spouses Sillero Lot 3154-A. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Lot 3154 was divided into three portions. ARTEMIO PIS-AN G. Gloria. Dumaguete City. June 01. Negros Oriental. there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Coronel. the City of Dumaguete built in the 1950's a barangay road which cut across said lot. In the absence of such legal or equitable title. LEONARDO MACALINO. Inguillo. APOLLO MACALINO. MA. Page 666 Echiverri. Emeterio Jumento (Emeterio) was the owner of the half portion. Castillo. Francisco. It simply stated that they were selling to the said spouses a 207-square meter portion of Lot 3154. HERMILINA MACALINO.The subject of the sale between Artemio and his co-heirs and the spouses Sillero was Lot 3154-A only.Petitioners. Ramirez. ELPIDIO MACALINO. Corporal. EMMANUEL MACALINO.Since what the spouses Sillero bought from Albano. 2016 DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper.. on the other hand.Apparently. FE MACALINO. Emeterio also passed away. Alcazaren. Artemio. puts emphasis on the fact that the Deed of Sale between Gil and the spouses Sillero expressly stated that the lot subject of the sale was Lot 3154-A only. Marquez. Corpuz. Palad. EDLLANE** MACALINO. or interest. Tecson. Sy. Rañigo. PILAR MACALINO. and his children Hospicio Jumento (Hospicio) and Severina Jumento (Severina) of the other half in equal shares. Lumberio. of Lot 3154 consisting of 469 square meters and located in Junob. while equitable title means beneficial ownership.

Alcazaren. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Albano. Corporal. Gloria. Marquez. it logically follows that what they sold to Gil was the same and exact property. Castillo. Reyes. Tecson. Cabañgon. Lumberio. Corpuz. Valiente. Valois . Asensi. Rañigo. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Martinez. Francisco. Palad. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Artemio and his co-heirs was Lot 3154-A. De Mesa. Santos. Catindig. Sy. Coronel. Page 667 Echiverri. Espina.

Martinez. having defaulted in the payment of her obligation. none of them may expect positive relief from the courts in the interpretation of their agreement. she obtained the right to collect the rentals from the apartment tenants. Peña. 1998. 201070. In 1978. however. Leonora Mariano filed with the NHA Application No. Rodriguez. Asensi. and that as a result of the sale. NICOLAS vs. Sy. Leonora Mariano obtained a P100. Coronel. Mariano sued Nicolas before the RTC of Caloocan City and sought to be released from the second mortgage agreement and stop Nicolas from further collecting upon her credit through the rentals from her apartments.00.00 in the aggregate. this time mortgaging the subject property and the improvements thereon for a consideration of P552. similarly defaulting on the second obligation.000. Espina.R. MARIANO G.000. De la Cruz. On June 7. 2000. 99-02-0323 for a land grant under the Bagong Barrio Project. Gloria. Santos. claiming that she has fully paid her debt. FACTS: The subject of the instant controversy is the one-half portion of a 155-square meter parcel of land which is part of the National Housing Authority's (NHA) Bagong Barrio Project and built thereon is Leonora Mariano's five-unit apartment which she leases out to tenants. is subject to a mortgage. she executed a Mortgage Contract over the subject property. LEONORA C. Corporal. Lumberio. or P10. Reyes. Lastimosa. Catindig.00 loan from petitioner Luz Nicolas with a payment term often (10) months at the monthly interest rate of 7%. Leonora Mariano. On July 8.000. Luz Nicolas' rental collection amounted to P600. the trial court ruled in favor of Marano and inclined to believe that what had been entered into by and between the parties was a mere contract of mortgage of Albano. Francisco. After trial. attested to the full payment of the P600. thus. the tenants of Leonora Mariano's five-unit apartment have been remitting monthly rentals to Luz Nicolas in the amount of P2. Sr. Cabañgon. De Mesa. instead. her institution as grantee of the foregoing parcel of land. 2004. Palad. Castillo. Rañigo.000.000. From said period until June 2004. Nicolas denied that she collected rentals from Mariano's apartments. It appears that from June 1999. executed before Punong Barangay Crispin C. executed a deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Tabugan. Marquez. Ramirez. they shall be left as they were at the time the case was filed.000.000. To secure the loan.00. August 01. Inguillo. Alcazaren. LUZ S. comprising the one-half portion of the parcel of land. that the subject property and the improvements thereon were later sold to her via a deed of absolute sale executed by Mariano which. Valiente. On January 28.00. Leonora Mariano. did not bear the written consent of the latter's husband.00 to Leonora Mariano. The Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay provides for a payment term of one (1) year. the NHA approved the Application. conveying to Luz Nicolas the ownership of the subject property and the improvements thereon for a purchase price of P600.000. Valois . that Mariano's debt remained unpaid.00 inclusive of the original loan of P100. Tecson. Page 668 Echiverri. A document denominated Pagtanggap ng Kabuang Halaga. Corpuz. In her Answer. Sandoval. 2016 DOCTRINE: When both parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault. however.00. executed in favor of Luz Nicolas a second mortgage deed denominated as Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay. The grant. No.

Mariano even goes so far as to concede. then she could not validly mortgage and sell the same to Nicolas. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. the mortgagor must be the owner of the property subject of the mortgage. object. in her Comments and Opposition to the Petition. De la Cruz. the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. otherwise. For a person to validly constitute a mortgage on real estate. Leonora Mariano. Martinez. Corporal. if she never became the owner of the subject property. both the Mortgage Contract and the Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay she executed are void ab initio. The original owner's copy of TCT No. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. and the latter could only present a photocopy thereof to her. De Mesa. Francisco." Nicolas is charged with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the subject property. Gloria. Besides. Marquez. Santos. Tecson. HELD: While title is in the name of Mariano. that she is not the owner of the subject property. real property and not a sale of real property. the supposed vendor of the subject property. Coronel. For a sale to be valid. C-44249 is not in Mariano's possession. and consideration. Sy. Indeed. The CA declared the Absolute Sale of Real Property is invalid on the ground that Leonora Mariano. Sandoval. the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Corpuz. this fact is not disputed. Asensi. The Court could not uphold the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated June 7. Valiente. it is imperative that the vendor is the owner of the property sold. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Ramirez. Valois . The CA agreed with the RTC in declaring the Absolute Sale of Real Property invalid. Thus. Castillo. and as a matter of fact. Indeed. Mariano admits it. Before one could part with his money as mortgagee or buyer of real property. Page 669 Echiverri. The principle nemo dat quod non habetcertainly applies. By title. Palad. 2000 because it is tainted with flaws and defects. Nicolas filed an appeal before the CA and maintained that the Absolute Sale of Real Property is valid. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Reyes. the Torrens system of land registration "merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Inguillo. Lumberio. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. she has not completed her installment payments to NHA. being not the owner of the subject property. Lastimosa. Catindig. he must be the absolute owner of the property mortgaged as required by Article 2085 of the New Civil Code. Otherwise stated. Rañigo. it is only natural to demand to be Albano. the mortgage is void. but cannot uphold that the invalidity thereof due to lack of the essential requisites of consent. Espina. ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale over the subject property between the parties is valid and binding. is not the owner thereof.

she would have discovered that Mariano was delinquent in her installment payments to the NHA. 98464/C-39393 on the dorsal side of TCT No. Sandoval. Gloria. Asensi. Lumberio. "[n]either one may expect positive relief from courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract." Albano. and for this. Rañigo. C-44249 constitutes sufficient warning as to the subject property's condition at the time. Realizing that she is not the owner of the subject property and knowing that she has not fully paid the price therefor. Mariano cannot recover damages on account of her claimed losses arising from her entering into contract with Nicolas. Santos. and if Nicolas exercised diligence. Inguillo.TCT No. Marquez. Rodriguez. Palad. Espina. The courts will leave them as they were at the time the case was filed. presented with the original owner's copy of the certificate of title covering the same. Page 670 Echiverri. Castillo. Coronel. Martinez. Catindig. As correctly held by the CA. C-44249 was not a clean title. both parties herein are not in good faith. Valiente. De la Cruz. Valois . Francisco. Sy. Secondly. which in turn would have generated the necessary conclusion that the property belonged to the said government agency. Lastimosa. they are deemed in pari delicto or in equal fault. De Mesa. Entry No. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Tabugan. she is as guilty as Nicolas for knowingly mortgaging and thereafter selling what is not hers. Tecson. In other words. Corpuz. Ramirez. Corporal. Reyes.

Corporal.000. The said motion was granted. Santos.000. it ruled against the petitioner and held that petitioner’s failure to abide by the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement. 2010 Judgment.000. Corpuz. Lastimosa. Before the CA. a thrift banking institution whose business name was later changed to Equicom Savings Bank. De la Cruz. Anchor later on filed a Manifestation and Motion for Execution in the trial court claiming that petitioner had not been paying the agreed monthly installments in accordance with the compromise agreement. which had the force and effect of a final and executory judgment when it was approved by the trial court in its August 16. Pursuant to the said agreement. After the issuance of a Pre-Trial Order by the trial court. Rañigo. Once the compromise is perfected. and thus the trial court may not be faulted for granting respondent’s motion for execution and directing the issuance of the corresponding writ. In filing the complaint. the parties are bound to abide by it in good faith. 2016 DOCTRINE: The main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. Thus. the parties agreed to an amicable settlement and entered into a Compromise Agreement. Petitioner defaulted in paying her monthly obligations which prompted [Anchor] to rescind the contract to sell. Gloria.580. Sandoval. Valois . Castillo. [Anchor] prayed that a writ of execution be issued by the trial court in its favor ordering: (1) that the contract to sell that was entered into between the parties be rescinded. Rodriguez. 205623August 10. Tecson. Page 671 Echiverri.00. FACTS: The petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of rescission of contract and damages in the trial court against Anchor Savings Bank.00 payable in 60 monthly installments amounting to Php47. Inguillo. Espina. Tabugan. and (3) that petitioner immediately vacate the subject property. the parties entered into a Contract to Sell whereby the petitioner agreed to pay the amount of Php200. Petitioner alleged thatshe agreed to purchase a real property from Anchor for the sum of Php2. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK/EQUICOM SAVINGS BANK G. CONCHITA A SONLEY vs. Reyes. Martinez.Anchor contended that the post-dated checks which were issued by the petitioner in its favor covering the monthly installments for the purchase of the subject property were all dishonored by the drawee bank when they were presented for payment. Coronel. Marquez. Catindig. petitioner averred that the rescission of the contract to sell was null and void because she had already substantially paid her obligation to the bank. No. Cabañgon. Ramirez. the other party could either enforce the compromise by a writ of execution or regard it as rescinded and so insist upon his/her original demand. authorized the enforcement thereof by execution.200. Should a party fail or refuse to comply with the terms of a compromise or amicable settlement. (2) that [Anchor] be allowed to apply all the payments that were made to it by the petitioner as rentals.R. Palad. Alcazaren. However.00 asdownpaymentwith the balance ofPhp2. ISSUE: Albano. Valiente. Asensi. In its Answer. Sy.000. the trial court rendered a Judgment whereby the petitioner agreed to repurchase the subject property from [Anchor. Lumberio. Francisco. On the basis thereof.00. De Mesa. The said real property pertained to a parcel of land that had been foreclosed by Anchor.

" 19 This principle was reiterated in a subsequent case. 09-217 as the issuance thereof was not authorized and specifically provided for in its August 16. that – Albano. Sycip. Asensi. to wit: It is worthy of notice. Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code. The language of this Article 2041. and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may. Whether that the trial court had no power to issue a writ of execution in Civil Case No. may just consider it already rescinded. Palad. Lumberio. particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039. thus suggesting an action for annulment or rescission. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. "(i)f one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise. thus: In the case of Leonor v. This shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to rescind this Compromise Agreement as provided under the "Contract to Sell" dated 21 December 2007 upon compliance with the requirements provided for under the law. Sy. or the right to "demand" the rescission of a compromise. The Contract to Sell provides. not a "cause" for rescission. a penalty charge of FIVE PERCENT (5%) per month or a fraction thereof. said Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned. The parties’ Compromise Agreement states that – (c) Penalty. based on unpaid installments computed from due date until fully paid. Valois . De Mesa. denotes that no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041. but the authority. Espina. as if there had never been any compromise agreement. by the breach of compromise agreement. Sandoval. Corpuz. Page 672 Echiverri. Tabugan. for he may ‘regard’ the compromise agreement already ‘rescinded’. Castillo. 2010 Judgment. Alcazaren. and separate from. Martinez. bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand. Cabañgon. as if there had never been any compromise agreement. in this connection. without bringing an action for rescission thereof. for he may "regard" the compromise agreement already "rescinded". and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may. Inguillo. the interest rate agreed upon. which speaks of "a cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be annulled r rescinded" for the cause therein specified. Gloria. Coronel. without bringing an action for rescission thereof. but. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission. also. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission. that. for any reason whatsoever. in addition to. to "insist upon his original demand". and the aggrieved party. Catindig. the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. if he chooses. Reyes. In case of failure of the plaintiff to pay. Tecson. Francisco. not only to "regard it as rescinded". Rañigo. Valiente. the plaintiff hereby agrees to pay. HELD: No. on the other hand. unlike Article 2039 of the same Code." "The language of this Article 2041 x x x denotes that no action for rescission is required x x x. if he chooses. bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand. Santos. Rodriguez. the Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to explain this provision of law. Ramirez. Corporal. Marquez. It ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for rescission. the amount provided in the Schedule of Payment.

pursuant to the stipulations in the Contract to Sell. Catindig. an option which it is equally entitled to by contract and under the law. Coronel. Court of Appeals. Marquez. Santos. respondent chose to rescind the same. and for her eviction. she openly admitted liability. Respondent must have thought that if past actions were a gauge. Martinez. it may be said that respondent’s motion for execution. Lumberio. with whatever amount paid by petitioner to be applied as rental for the use and occupation of the subject property as agreed upon. constituted sufficient written notice to petitioner. and thus evict petitioner from the premises. Tabugan. Gloria. and pleadings are clear and within the cognizance of the trial court. Francisco. The facts. Castillo. Cabañgon. a compromise agreement becomes the law between the parties and will not be set aside other than [sic] the grounds mentioned above. Page 673 Echiverri. or if. Rañigo. as a matter of right. but she could not proffer any defense. Alcazaren. Indeed. quite the opposite. De la Cruz. Respondent’s claim is straightforward: it seeks rescission and eviction. Reyes. Ramirez. petitioner was no longer in a position to honor her obligations under the Contract to Sell. the parties are bound to abide by it in good faith. Albano. however. De Mesa. and it was duly heard. Sy. Palad. Espina. In Ramnani v. evidence. Valois . Lastimosa. Certainly. for the application of petitioner’s payments as rental. Inguillo. and petitioner was given the opportunity to oppose the same. with a prayer for rescission.21 she in fact acknowledged and admitted that she was in default and that she violated the Compromise Agreement by her failure to make regular payments as required therein. Rodriguez. the other party could either enforce the compromise by a writ of execution or regard it as rescinded and so insist upon his/her original demand. petitioner’s failure to abide by the agreement should result in execution. to rescind this Contract. Corporal. Petitioner may be right in arguing that respondent has the option to proceed with the sale and charge corresponding penalties instead. While the assailed dispositions of the trial court and the CA do not specify the remedies that respondent is entitled to. cancellation and rescission of the Compromise Agreement and Contract to Sell. In her Opposition to the Motion for Execution. Sandoval. petitioner opposed the motion and even filed a rejoinder to respondent’s reply. The failure of the BUYER to pay on due date any monthly installment in accordance with the Schedule of Payment provided in Paragraph 2 – Manner of Payment. Should a party fail or refuse to comply with the terms of a compromise or amicable settlement. at any time. and her eviction from the property. Once the compromise is perfected. Tecson. Valiente. Asensi. Corpuz. we held that the main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. then the SELLER shall be entitled. the SELLER is of the opinion that the BUYER would be unable to pay or meet his obligations under this Contract or in case the BUYER was declared in default by any other creditor. it is clear that rescission and eviction were specifically sought and prayed for in respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Execution.

IBM PHILIPPINES.610. Such askewed Albano. In its Answer." ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's imposition of 3% monthly interest constitute a written stipulation under Article 1956 of the Civil Code HELD No. coupled with respondent's request for the reduction of monthly interest to the latter's express agreement to a 3% monthly interest. which petitioner placed in writing in its letter dated December 29. Nothing could be further from the truth. FACTS: Petitioner entered into an agreement with respondent whereby the former will deliver 45 automated teller machines (ATMs) and several computer hardware to respondent's customers for the total price of ₱24.266." The RTC in its Decision ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner and debunked respondent's allegation of payment finding that respondent's only evidence . Catindig. Lastimosa.was not even verified by the finance or accounting employees of respondent and is overturned by petitioner's evidence that respondent's checks were all dishonored. It has been a long-standing rule that for interest to become due and demandable. the Court properly applied the legal rate of 6% annual interest.R. Alcazaren.which were misappreciated by the trial court. Ramirez. Inguillo. Petitioner has gone through great lengths to. the CA found that "there is no showing that the parties had actually agreed on the imposition of the 3% monthly interest for invoices which remained unpaid 30 days from its delivery. Sy. Coronel. Francisco. Valiente. Tecson. Reyes.22 representing respondent's unpaid obligation with 3% monthly interest.43. leading to a different conclusion. Tabugan. Santos. Asensi. attribute respondent's alleged silence. petitioner instituted a Complaint for sum of moneyagainst respondent and sought to have respondent pay the former ₱45. Citing Article 1956 of the Civil Code. Cabañgon. two requisites must be present: (1) that there must be an express stipulation for the Payment of interest and (2) . Castillo. vs. 2016 DOCTRINE: In the absence of agreement as to the exact rate of interest. INC. No. Corpuz. petitioner insists that there was an express agreement for a 3% monthly interest. The CA in its Decision partly granting respondent's Petition and found that there were certain pieces of evidence - particularly those relating to the imposition of 3% monthly interest . De la Cruz. Marquez. Espina. Sandoval. Rañigo.a handwritten memorandum of respondent's president . Page 674 Echiverri. On September 2002.PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS. Palad. Lumberio. Petitioner adamantly claims that respondent's act of requesting for a lower interest rate shows the latter's agreement to a 3% monthly interest. De Mesa. thus.743. Corporal. respondent alleged among others that ''it had fully paid for the (56 ATMs it purchased from petitioner during the December 1997 to February 1998. Gloria. INC. 1997. Rodriguez. Here. The Court found that the evidence points to respondent's lack of consent to a 3% monthly interest. Martinez. Valois . 203192 August 15.the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing. G.997.

Palad. Inc. series of 2013. Santos. Asensi. Court of Appeals26 and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas MB Circular No. Albano. Sandoval. Sy. De la Cruz. Martinez. Reyes. Valois . Lumberio. Coronel. Cabañgon. Page 675 Echiverri. Ramirez. Rodriguez. To accept petitioner's misplaced argument that the parties mutually agreed to a 3% monthly interest when respondent subsequently ordered ATMs despite receiving petitioner's letter in1posing a 3% monthly interest will render the second condition . Lastimosa.so that both parties clearly agree to and are fully aware of the price to be paid in a contract. In the absence of agreement as to the exact rate of interest. Valiente. reasoning escapes us . Tecson. Corpuz. Francisco. Tabugan.futile. Although respondent did agree to the imposition of interest per se. Rañigo. This is precisely the reason why Article 1956 was included in the Civil Code . Marquez. Inguillo. Alcazaren. the fact that there was never a clear rate of interest still leaves room to guess as to how much interest respondent will pay. the CA properly applied the legal rate of 6% annual interest following our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines. Espina. v.especially here where respondent's authorized representative never assented to petitioner's letter. De Mesa. Gloria. 799. Corporal. Castillo.that the agreement be reduced in writing . Catindig.

and Girls' Dormitory Building I . 2009 but the power distribution activities had not yet been installed. As mobilization fee. It stated that the payment could not yet be made pending correction of the noted defects and remaining work activities. 2009 to validate PIRRA's accomplishment thereon. Sy. FACTS: PIRRA Construction Enterprises (PIRRA). Valois . 5 could not be processed yet as it was awaiting the COA Report. Tabugan. the accomplishment for Project A was already at 94. At the same time. 5. Sandoval. may recover as if it had strictly and completely fulfilled its obligation. with approved 65-day extension until August 22. PSHS informed PIRRA that its PB No. Espina. and that representatives from the COA. With regard to Project A. and to prepare for its occupancy for School Year 2010-2011. the obligor. Later. 3 and 7) and its construction materials. the COA sent its Inspection Report dated October 7.Phase I). 2009 to PSHS. the DOST and the Consultant (D&D Engineering Co.PSHS replied to PIRRA's request for substantial acceptance and completion of Project A. Coronel. Inguillo. On July 2009. Cabañgon.Phase I. PSHS reminded PIRRA that the due date of the contract was August 22. and its Project C (Academic Building II . Lumberio. and School Canteen . PIRRA requested payment for its PB No. 1 to 4 amounting to P23. Ramirez. Later. PSHS informed PIRRA that it would take over Project A in the interest of the government. De la Cruz.09%. it paid PIRRA its Partial Billing (PB) Nos. In its reply. No. On January 2010. PSHS paid PIRRA 15% of the contract price. the final inspection of the concerned agencies.Phase I.95. It also stated that it would implement the repair of the identified defects through a third party. Thereafter. Palad. it sent PSHS a letter requesting for substantial acceptance and completion of Project A and submitted its Summary of Accomplishment Report stating that as of July 24. PSHS informed PIRRA that the Commission on Audit (COA) would inspect Project A on September 29. 2016 DOCTRINE:If the obligation had been substantially performed in good faith. Rodriguez. 2008. De Mesa. Rañigo. and for payment of PB No. Boys' Dormitory Building . 2009. Martinez. Lastimosa. Page 676 Echiverri. On August 6. Gloria. 5. 5 as PIRRA's final billing such that it had to account PIRRA's liabilities relating to Project A. September 14. Santos. PIRRA and PSHS entered into a Joint Inspection Agreement and agreed that the inspection date must be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Valiente.Phase IV). a business engaged in general contracting and a licensed contractor filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint for Damages against Philippine Science High School-Cagayan Valley Campus' (PSHS) relative to the construction contracts for PSHS' Project A (Academic Building I . Marquez. PIRRA CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES G. Francisco. Asensi. Catindig.Another Joint Inspection Agreement was agreed. among other reasons. Reyes. Corpuz.194. Alcazaren. PSHS declared that it considered PB No. Corporal. It declared that the disallowances indicated in the COA Report (particularly its Findings Nos. Albano.020. 2009. On October 2009. 2009.R. duration of which was for 180 days from December 20.) shall be invited for the inspection. less the damages suffered by the obligee. the expenses of which would be deducted from PIRRA's final billing.Phases IV and V. PHILIPPINE SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL-CAGAYAN VALLEY CAMPUS vs. Tecson. Castillo. 204423. On the same day.

despite such invalid termination. Reyes. and. Cabañgon. PSHS approved this request. Tecson. On October 12. save for some minor deficiencies. Castillo. Corporal. and footing tie beams. Alcazaren. PIRRA requested a total time suspension on Project C. Ramirez. As regards Project C. It stressed that PSHS failed to give it the intended revisions of the building plan for Project C as well as the necessary documents to secure a building permit for the project. Project C was stopped and PIRRA incurred a slippage of 75.PIRRA requested a time suspension on Project C because of affected footings. it directed PIRRA to file a variation order (VO) with time extension. Gloria. Francisco. 2009 Joint Agreement that PSHS would submit revised drawings and issue a VO on Project C. Tabugan. Rañigo. In its reply. The CIAC decreed among others that PSHS had no basis in taking over Project A and that the COA inspection is not a condition precedent for the payment of any progress billing or for the acceptance of Project A. Sy. Santos. Instead. the CIAC explained that PSHS may withdraw at will the construction of work. However. On Project C. work. Coronel. Catindig. PSHS informed PIRRA that it was terminating the Project C contract because of the latter's delay. Lumberio. the CIAC stated that PSHS failed to comply with the November 20. It likewise declared that the contract for Project A did not specify that the completion date on August 22. when parties entered into a Joint Inspection Agreement. and the notice of takeover did not elite PIRRA's purported delay as the cause of the takeover. the CA ruled that when PSHS created an Inspectorate Team and ordered an inspection for punch listing. regards Project C. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Page 677 Echiverri. Asensi. subject to indemnification for the expenses. Rodriguez. there being no changes in the structural design. Anent Project C. the Consultant shall submit the cross-sections of the foundation and evaluate PIRRA's claim. the CA decreed that PSHS validly terminated the contract for it. PIRRA requested the suspension of the construction of the canteen because PSHS decided to relocate the canteen site to a difficult place of construction. it held that PSHS should be held liable for the PB No. PIRRA suspended work on Project C without its approval. PIRRA requested another suspension. 5 less the defective works. Corpuz. Palad. Martinez. the COA Report cannot be used to refuse or delay payment of PB No.But PSHS informed PIRRA that suspension was not the solution. Marquez. 2009.99%. In the same letter. Albano. 5. 2009 was due to the opening of classes in June 2010. default. It noted that even the COA Report indicated that Project A was practically 100% complete. and the uselessness PIRRA may have obtained. The CIAC rendered its Final Award in favor of PIRRA. It held that during the pendency of Project C contract. Sandoval. It thus held that PSHS breached its obligations and invalidly terminated the contract for Project C. and damages. 2009. columns. with regard to Project A. PIRRA requested the suspension of work due to the relocation of the canteen site. Espina. Before the CA. Valiente. Eventually. PIRRA sent a letter to PSHS stating that delay was incurred on Project C because it received no response from PSHS or from the Consultant on its request for time suspension. PIRRA contended that the termination of the contract is unjustified. Thus. thus. and abandonment. De Mesa. in turn.As cited earlier. PSHS granted this request. they agreed that PIRRA shall submit to the Consultant the shop drawing for the foundation. as a. which PIRRA allegedly used without permission would also be deducted from the final billing. result. PSHS alleged that it found out that as of October 12. it treated Project A as substantially completed. Valois . Lastimosa.

Lastimosa. Castillo. Page 678 Echiverri. PSHS initially expressed its willingness to pay only to put it on hold because of the COA Report. PIRRA. ISSUE: I. The CA added that PIRRA not only incurred delay but was also guilty of refusing to accept correspondences from PSHS and of failing to comply with the requirements for a VO. PIRRA suspended work on Project C on October 12. Coronel. Tabugan. Reyes. When PIRRA requested substantial acceptance and completion of Project A. It also sustained the award of the value of fabricated steel bars. as the payment was due on the performed items that were completed or were otherwise performed. Rañigo. the SC sustained the finding that PSHS accepted and treated Project A as a substantially completed project. Sandoval. Rodriguez. based on the detailed drawing submitted by Consultant. and for which reason. Whether or not PSHS treated Project A as substantially completed such that it is liable for the residual value of PB No. In fact. Valiente. Valois . De la Cruz.The CA reasoned that since there was no showing that the affected work fell on critical path. Albano. Whether or not PSHS validly terminated the contract for Project C HELD I. the Court agreed with the CA that the contract for Project C was validly terminated. as provided for under Article 1234 of the Civil Code. windows with grills and steel ratings to PIRRA as there was no showing that the CIAC misappreciated facts in arriving at this technical finding. shall prepare a proposal for variation order. Alcazaren. may recover as if it had strictly and completely fulfilled its obligation. PSHS did not object to such a request. It acted upon it and even created an Inspectorate Team for punch listing. Espina. Palad. PSHS. Corpuz. Cabañgon. 5 as the final billing for Project A. Ramirez. and for the purpose of determining PIRRA's PB No. this time. [PIRRA]. II. Notably. PSHS denied this second request. It noted that without PSHS' approval. Gloria. the obligor. 5. Marquez. Inguillo. less the damages suffered by the obligee or in this instance.5. the CA affirmed that PSHS is liable for the value of the work done on Project C because otherwise there would be unjust enrichment on the part of PSHS. Nonetheless. Francisco. Asensi. In the November 20. thus. Yes. Lumberio. the parties agreed on how to proceed with the contract for Project C. as correctly explained by the CIAC. Sy. there was no reason for the second suspension of work. Martinez. PSHS repeatedly referred to PB No. save for the defects. such Report cannot affect PSHS' obligation to pay PIRRA because the existence of the defective or undelivered items was not an excuse to avoid payment of the progress billing. 2009. Catindig. Santos. 2009 Agreement (which CIAC used as basis in justifying PIRRA's work suspension). Corporal. 2. 2009 Agreement. PIRRA already incurred delay on Project C. II. [PSHS] together with its consultant shall visit the project site and the latter shall prepare a detailed drawing for the variation order to be submitted to [PIRRA]. even before the November 20. De Mesa. and the pertinent portions of their Agreement read: 1. Tecson. Nonetheless. in this case. In addition. steel awnings. for time suspension. Yes. if the obligation had been substantially performed in good faith.

Lastimosa. causes stoppage of work without the authority of PSHS. Albano. 4. similar to their non-compliance with their October 2. PSHS has sufficient basis to terminate the contract for Project C. among other grounds. Corporal. [PSHS] shall process Billing 1 and 2 of the project. Francisco. Sy. 2009 made by PIRRA on Project C. De la Cruz. Tabugan. 2009 Joint Agreement. is not entirely faultless. Santos. as observed by the CA. Reyes. Espina. Indeed. Valiente. abandons the project. Cabañgon. Marquez. and abandonment of the project. Page 679 Echiverri. Rañigo. PIRRA and PSHS were brought back to their previous situation as if the November 20. 5. Martinez. Valois . suspension of work without any approval from PSHS. Rodriguez. Thus. Coronel. Gloria. by reason of PIRRA's delay. Ramirez. 3. 2009 Agreement was not entered. PIRRA no longer coordinated with PSHS. [PSHS] shall evaluate the variation order. Catindig. Inguillo. 2009 Agreement. Sandoval. cannot be ignored. the suspension of work as of October 12. PSHS may terminate the contract if PIRRA incurs delay. While records reveal that PSHS failed to submit the revised drawing for the preparation of a VO. De Mesa. Pursuant to the General Conditions of Contract. Lumberio. Asensi. Tecson. 2009 Agreement. Such being the case. Castillo. Thus. Neither did it explain why it did riot demand from PSHS the submission of the needed drawing. This is because after the November 20. Palad. without PSHS' approval. Corpuz. Alcazaren. both parties failed to abide by their November 20. PIRRA. [PIRRA] shall submit revised payment schedule (Bar Chart) for [PSHS]'s approval. on its end.

De Mesa. Nissin Universal Robina Corporation (NURC). Bicomong died on the spot.. Page 680 Echiverri. the registered owner of a Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number WRN 403 (URC van). the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply. Therefore. Abejar. collided head-on with the URC van. Tecson. Valois . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks [. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION AND NISSIN UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION G. Inguillo. (Grepistar) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation. which was then being driven Quezon province-bound by NURC's Operations Manager. Cabañgon. Lumberio. the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. First. Corpuz. Valiente. even assuming that it is the fault of defendants' employee that was the direct and proximate cause of their damages. Catindig. Corporal. Alcazaren.R. Renante Bicomong. Sayson. while petitioner Fruto L. while the colliding vehicles sustained considerable damage.. and its subsidiary.. Palad. SAYSON. Jr. HELD: No. Sy. URC and NURC filed their respective Answers. October 17. Inc. v. the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their Vehicles. Respondents Universal Robina Corporation (URC). Petitioners filed an appeal before the CAbut the latter affirmed the trial court’s decision. INC. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the respondents are not liable to petitioners for the damages they sustained considering that the accident was attributed to the negligence of their employee. Article 2180's specification that 'employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees .]' Second. JR. Castillo. Gloria. the employers cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs. a declared national holiday. The RTC dismissed the complaint and found that the accident having occurred outsideBicomong's assigned tasks. Coronel. Petitioners filed a Complaintagainst NURC to recover damages sustained during the collision. AND FRUTO L. premised on negligence and later URC was impleaded as additional defendant. vs. petitioner's bus. Martinez. Santos. 2003. Rodriguez. In Caravan Travel and Tours International. Francisco. On February 25. there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been Albano. Espina. No. Ramirez. where they particularly alleged and claimed lack of negligence on their part and on the part of Bicomong. which was then being driven toward the direction of Manila by Sayson. Sandoval. Inc. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership. Rañigo. Tabugan. the Court made the following relevant pronouncement: The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. Lastimosa. 2016 DOCTRINE: FACTS: Petitioner Greenstar Express. 205090. Marquez. is one of its bus drivers. Asensi. GREENSTAR EXPRESS. De la Cruz. Reyes.

but was on his way home to Quezon on a personal undertaking. Catindig. Valiente. Asensi. Santos. The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong. Reyes. This may be done by proof of any of the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 1. Rañigo. Here. Bicomong was not in the performance of his work. It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. to give money to his daughter and spend the holiday with his family. This disputable presumption. Alcazaren. As a consequence. the presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached. insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned. Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence. Corporal. respondents claimed in their respective answers the defense of absence of negligence on their part. having shown that when the collision took place. Lastimosa. on the other hand. and that the vehicle he was driving was not an NURC vehicle. His burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. or 2. Espina. Corpuz. In denying liability. respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that hit Reyes. which was a declared national non-working holiday. Page 681 Echiverri. but was registered to URC and assigned to its Logistics Manager. or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment. Sy. Applying the above pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and Tours case. that he was in possession of a service vehicle that did not belong to his employer Albano. nor was it assigned to him. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Coronel. 3. De Mesa. that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. in many cases. the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. is accessible to the public. a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver. or third. Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van. De la Cruz. proven. second. that is. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong. Francisco. that it had no employment relationship with Bautista. Valois . That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks. and as Bicomong's employer. Consistent with the rule we have just stated. Lumberio. it must be said that when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were proved. Gloria. Rodriguez. recognizes that between the owner and the victim. Palad. The registration of the vehicle. The victim is. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first. Bicomong was not perforating his work. Castillo. that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks. Inguillo. Marquez. Sandoval. as the registered owner of the van. it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. During trial. a presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. Tecson. Tabugan. Martinez. they presented evidence to the effect that on the day of the collision.

but to another employee. Sandoval. or in Laguna where the collision occurred. Palad. Asensi. Sy. Alcazaren. Tabugan. and that Bicomong had no official business whatsoever in his hometown in Quezon. Cabañgon. that the accident occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was on his way home to his family in Quezon province. this does not amount to implied permission. Reyes. Valois . Lastimosa. that his use of the URC van was unauthorized . Francisco. and which vehicle was not officially assigned to him. Rañigo. Marquez. Coronel. Corpuz. Gloria. Martinez. but to URC. Espina. Corporal. Albano. Tecson. Inguillo. Castillo. De la Cruz. his area of operations being limited to the Cavite area.even if he had used the same vehicle in furtherance of a personal undertaking in the past. Catindig. De Mesa. Santos. Valiente. Ramirez. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Page 682 Echiverri. NURC.

mortgaged the property to another. Catindig. FACTS: Bernardo F. Asensi. EVELYN V. Marquez. RUIZ vs. the impostor must have succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title in his name and thereafter in Albano. Cabañgon. Palad. She also insisted that as a mortgagee in good faith and for value. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. Cavite. Where the mortgagor is an impostor who only pretended to be the registered owner. BERNARDO F. ISSUE: Whether or not Evelyn V. No. and the title to the subject property is still in the name of the rightful owner. De Mesa. In January 1998. Reyes. Coronel. Evelyn filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court. Ruiz is a mortgagee in good faith. Inguillo. and acting on such pretense. he entrusted the owner's copy of the said TCT to his brother. Evelyn contended that she met Jovannie when she inspected the subject property and assured her that Bernardo owned the property and his title thereto was genuine. Rañigo. then Evelyn cannot seek protection from the cloak of the principle of mortgagee in good faith.R. DIMAILIG G. Ramirez. Tecson. Rodriguez. 204280 November 09. In 19 October 1997. T-361747 until the loan was fully paid to her. Valiente. the impostor must have succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title in his name and thereafter in mortgaging the property. Ruiz as evidenced by a Deed of REM without Bernardo's knowledge and consent so Bernardo instituted this suit for annulment of the Deed of REM. In her Answer. who in turn gave the title to Editha Sanggalang. 2016 DOCTRINE: In order for a mortgagee to invoke the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith. She further claimed that Jovannie mortgaged the property to her. the property was mortgaged to Evelyn V. Imus. HELD: In order for a mortgagee to invoke the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith. Lumberio. Evelyn was a mortgagee in good faith because she was unaware that the person who represented himself as Bernardo was an impostor. Corporal. Page 683 Echiverri. Gloria. De la Cruz. Corpuz. It held that the innocent purchaser (mortgagor in this case) for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself. Jovannie. Alcazaren. for its intended sale. Since the Deed of REM was forged. Martinez. Sy. T-361747 located in Alapan. Espina. Santos. not by a forged deed. Castillo. a broker. Lastimosa. and the mortgagee cannot rely on such pretense as what appears on the title is not the impostor's name but that of the registered owner. It held that while Bernardo was the registered owner of the subject property. Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration was denied so he appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision. Dimailig was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. Tabugan. Sandoval. the mortgagor evidently did not succeed in having the property titled in his or her name. Francisco. and the mortgagor is a different person who only pretended to be the owner. Valois . the REM cannot be annulled and that she had the right to keep the owner's copy of TCT No.

Lastimosa. Castillo. the mortgagor evidently did not succeed in having the property titled in his or her name. Sandoval. Sy. Valois . Marquez. Alcazaren. Where the mortgagor is an impostor who only pretended to be the registered owner. Rañigo. Tabugan. She has the burden to prove such claim and must provide necessary evidence to support the same. She deliberately ignored pertinent facts that should have aroused suspicion on the veracity of the title of the mortgagor "Bernardo. Ruiz insists that she is a mortgagee in good faith and for value. De Mesa. Evelyn failed to discharge her burden. Asensi. Coronel. Francisco. Evelyn V. Third. Evelyn cannot not seek refuge therefrom. Evelyn cannot invoke the protection given to a mortgagee in good faith. Unfortunately. Page 684 Echiverri. Corporal. Corpuz. This is because Evelyn did not take the necessary steps to determine any defect in the title of the alleged owner of the mortgaged property. Evelyn would still not be deemed a mortgagee in good faith. It was not transferred to the impostor's name when Evelyn transacted with the latter. Martinez." Albano. Palad. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Cabañgon. and the mortgagee cannot rely on such pretense as what appears on the title is not the impostor's name but that of the registered owner. Ramirez. mortgaged the property to another. Catindig. even assuming that the impostor has caused the property to be titled in his name as if he had rightful ownership thereof. First. Inguillo. In this case. and acting on such pretense. the title to the subject property remained registered in the name of Bernardo. Tecson. the principle of mortgagee in good faith finds no application. Hence. Gloria. Reyes. Espina. Second. Its nullity conveys no title. Santos. correspondingly. the Deed of REM was established to be a forged instrument. As discussed. De la Cruz. mortgaging the property. Valiente.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARILYN B. Corporal. Matudan is psychological incapacited. and (3) Sworn Affidavit of Dr. 203284 November 14. proceedings were conducted in due course. Inguillo. MATUDAN G. Lumberio. should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which. De la Cruz. Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Asensi. during. NICOLAS S. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Ramirez. Sy. Francisco. Coronel. In 1985. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling so a Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court. Santos. Page 685 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Martinez. and sustenance. Valois . Castillo. and even so after leaving for work abroad. Tayag which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination. On 20 June 2008. The trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence. The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion between the parties. Alcazaren. Matudan and Marilyn B. Espina. FACTS: Nicolas S. the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother. support.' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Tabugan. Marquez. The Republic of the Philippines. (2) she consistently neglected and failed to provide for him and their children with the necessary emotional and financial care. observe love. Marilyn left to work abroad an she had not been seen nor heard from by her husband and children thereafter. They had four children. Gloria. and incurable. and after his marriage to Marilyn. permanent.R. Corpuz. (3) based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. De Mesa. Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave. Rañigo. MATUDAN vs. 2016 DOCTRINE: 'Psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court issued its Decision dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Northern Samar on October 26. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. Branch 94 alleging that (1) before. (2) Judicial Aftidavit of Maricel which was adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination. ISSUE: Whether or not Marilyn B. Matudan were married in Laoang. Palad. No. Lastimosa. among others. Tecson. Albano. through the Office of the Solicitor General. as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code. Valiente. 1976. The following documents were submitted in evidence: (1) Nicolas’ Judicial Affidavit which was adopted as his testimony on direct examination. opposed the Petition. Catindig. Tayag. Sandoval. Reyes. respect and fidelity and render help and support. include their mutual obligations to live together.

Lastimosa. Nicolas S. which could have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on his one-sided account. Gloria. Just as well. Coronel. This fact gave more significance and importance to Nicolas’ other pieces of evidence. Matudan are untrue. observe love. among others. she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment – such as the lack of emotional and financial support. respect and fidelity and render help and support. Cabañgon.' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon. Santos. should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which. Francisco. Espina. they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. Valois . Dr. Valiente. Castillo. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Catindig. include their mutual obligations to live together. Page 686 Echiverri. Albano. Rañigo. Lumberio. Corporal. they are based on the personal accounts of petitioner. history. but she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity. Martinez. as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code. Growing up. Tabugan. Asensi. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. Sy. Marquez. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself. On the other hand. Corpuz. Dr. At most. Rodriguez. HELD: 'Psychological incapacity. Palad. as well as the nature. Reyes. at the very least. Maricel cannot be of help either. Inguillo. If any. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family. and gravity thereof. Matudan's accusations against Marilyn B. Ramirez. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Tecson.

SPOUSES DESIDERIO AND TERESA DOMINGO vs. FRANKLIN ESTABILLO. Valiente.00. executed a notarized agreement involving the property with spouses Desiderio and Teresa Domingo on June 1. Franklin and Carmelita.00 balance in December 2001.000. De Mesa. As of November 2001. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of spouses Manzano. They offered to pay the remaining P555. Corpuz. Corporal. No. but failed to tender full payment of the balance on March 200. the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus. and a new title .R. Valois . Espina. Coronel. Reyes.000. They later filed an Amended Complaint. praying further that Carmelita's new title be cancelled and spouses Manzano be reinstated. They subsequently made payments amounting to P160. Alcazaren. Asensi. Catindig. Rodriguez. Francisco. Martinez. such as full payment of the purchase price. Lumberio. They filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with injunctive relief against spouses Manzano and Franklin.00.000. De la Cruz. What the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only when the entire amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him. the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition. 2001. Page 687 Echiverri. Spouses Manzanos. C-359293 . 201883 November 16. Palad. 2002. AND CARMELITA AQUINO G.00 reservation fee upon the execution of the agreement. 160752. ISSUE: Whether or not spouses Desiderio and Teresa Domingo have a better right over Carmelita Aquino over the property sold. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Tecson. She refused spouses Domingo’s tender of payment and informed them the property was no longer for sale which prompted them to cause the annotation of an affidavit of adverse claim upon TCT No. He advised them to await Tita’s arrival from abroad. but Franklin refused to accept payment. Castillo. ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer' FACTS: Spouses Emmanuel and Tita Manzano were the registered owners of a 35. Sandoval. Ramirez. Santos. 2016 DOCTRINE: A contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer until the happening of an event. 160752.00. Inguillo. They later discovered that Carmelita Aquino bought the subject property on May 7. Caloocan City covered by TCT No.had been issued in her name with their adverse claim carried over to the new title. Lastimosa.TCT No.000. HELD: Albano. Franklin advised them to continue their additional payments amounting to P85. 'In other words. Rañigo. Sy. SPOUSES EMMANUEL AND TITA MANZANO. through their duly appointed attorney-in-fact Franklin Estabillo. they paid the total amount of P345.000. The Regional Trial Court declared that spouses Domingo have priority in the contract of sale. Marquez. while spouses Manzano remained in possession of the subject property. Spouses Domingo paid the P100.281-square meter parcel of land with improvements in Bagong Barrio. Gloria.

Lastimosa. "Since there is only one valid sale. Inguillo. such as full payment of the purchase price. Rodriguez. the rule on double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply. Corpuz. Corporal. Castillo. And it is precisely for the above reason that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot apply. Asensi. Page 688 Echiverri." Albano. Valois . on account of the fact that there was never a sale in their favor . Marquez. Thus. Valiente. Gloria. De la Cruz. A contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer until the happening of an event. while Carmelita Aquino did. 160752 is equivalent to registration or claim of ownership necessarily fails. Sandoval. Even spouses Desiderio and Teresa Domingo’s posture that their annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. Lumberio. Martinez. there could be no double sale which would justify the application of Article 1544. Tabugan. then there is no sale to speak of. Cabañgon. Espina.and that is. They failed to pay the purchase price in full. ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer'. as between the parties to the instant case. Rañigo. they could not register or claim ownership of the subject property. As far as this Court is concerned. Palad.and without a sale in their favor. De Mesa. and thereafter she was able to register her purchase and obtain a new certificate of title in her name. the one in Carmelita's favor. Tecson. Ramirez. Sy. What the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only when the entire amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him. Alcazaren. the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus. Santos. Reyes. there is only one sale . Francisco. the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition. 'In other words. Catindig. Coronel. Since failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell renders the same ineffective and without force and effect.

That way. credit card arrangements are simple loan arrangements between the card issuer and the card holder. 202573 19 APRIL 2017 DOCTRINE: This Court cannot completely blame the MeTC. RTC. ALARTE G. Corporal. although it would have helped if they just endeavoured to derive such an understanding of the process. Cabañgon. Asensi. (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can collect from respondent from her purchases from the credit card HELD: Yes. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Catindig. BANKARD vs. (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment. RTC reversed the decision and ruled in favour of Bankard. CA affirmed holding Alarte liable to pay his credit card dues. This is to say that while the Court believes that petitioner's claim may be well-founded. and lastly. Inguillo. No. Sandoval. Albano. Valiente. and this time it may arrive at a just resolution of the case. De Mesa. and penalty charges incurred from past transactions which are too multiple or cumbersome to enumerate but nonetheless remain unsettled by the card holder. interest. and CA for their failure to understand or realize the fact that a monthly credit card statement of account does not always necessarily involve purchases or transactions made immediately prior to the issuance of such statement.R. This Court cannot judge them for their lack of experience or practical understanding of credit card arrangements. extending credit accommodations to its member-cardholders for the purchase of goods and services. Francisco. On appeal. Palad. It must prove the validity of its claim. Ramirez. Page 689 Echiverri. Alcazaren. LUZ P. Reyes. Gloria. After all. certainly. petitioner filed a collection case against respondent Luz P. this it may do by amending its Complaint and adducing additional evidence of respondent's credit history and proving the loan transactions between them. The Court ruled to remand the case to the MeTC where petitioner would be required to amend its Complaint and adduce additional evidence to prove its case. Lumberio. namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card. Tecson. Coronel. Sy. every credit card transaction involves three contracts. it is not enough as to allow judgment in its favor on the basis of extant evidence. the lower court can better understand the nature of the claim. Valois . De la Cruz. Espina. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Marquez. Castillo. and the statement of account sent to him or her refers to principal. Corpuz. Rañigo.Simply put. Alarte before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. Lastimosa. Martinez. FACTS: Petitioner Bankard (now RCBC) is a duly constituted domestic corporation doing business as a credit card provider. Santos. In 2007. it may be that the card holder did not at all use the credit card for the month.

(8) bid evaluation. Cabañgon. Lagoc wrote back disavowing any liability and claiming that Datumanong's directive was a supervening event that prevented the award of the subject project to respondent. (9) post qualification. Asensi. Espina. prompting calls for immediate repairs and other appropriate action from local government units. Barangay Hibao-an Section project may not be awarded to her. Lastimosa. and concerned private citizens and interest groups.R. Corporal. De Mesa. respondent won as the lowest bidder for the above-mentioned projects. (7) bid opening and examination. Marquez. 204906 05 June 2017 DOCTRINE: The procurement process basically involves the following steps: (1) pre-procurement conference. Sandoval. However. the Mandurriao-San Miguel Road. the road condition in Barangay Hibao-an was severely deteriorated to an almost impassable state on account of the prevailing typhoon and monsoon season. Castillo. before a government project is awarded to the lowest calculated bidder. Coronel. Rañigo. Alcazaren. MALAGA G. (6) modification and withdrawal of bids. Reyes. ISSUE: Whether or not Malaga is entitled for damages sustained HELD: No. and until it is nullified or set aside. Barangay Hibao-an Section project shall be undertaken by administration as directed. it appears that after the publication of the invitation to bid but prior to the scheduled bidding. Corpuz. FACTS: Respondent Maria Elena L. Valois . Page 690 Echiverri. No. a Member of the House of Representatives. Inguillo. 2001. Santos. Lumberio. Palad. Respondent replied with formal written demands that the project be awarded to her in spite of Datumanong's directive. Construction.E. Gloria. a private contractor and the lowest bidder for two concreting projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways. the DPWH Regional Office VI proceeded with the dropping and opening of bids as scheduled. his bid must undergo a mandatory post-qualification procedure whereby the procuring entity Albano. 2001 Memorandum. An urgency of the request was acted upon. Lagoc informed respondent that the Mandurriao-San Miguel Road. Valiente. (4) eligibility check of prospective bidders. (3) pre-bid conference. Malaga owns B. Tabugan. in view of Datumanong's November 7. Thus. Sy. Francisco. (10) award of contract and notice to proceed. under pain of civil action and claim for damages. MARIA ELENA L. (5) submission and receipt of bids. On November 15. Tecson. Martinez. Since no response was forthcoming from Datumanong. Ramirez. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS v. Thus. (2) advertisement of the invitation to bid. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Catindig.

only when there is an invasion of primary rights. Palad. Inguillo. Albano. De Mesa. does the adjective or remedial law become operative. Corporal. Ramirez. and ascertains all statements made and documents submitted by the bidder with the lowest calculated or highest rated bid using a non-discretionary criteria as stated in the bidding documents. Rodriguez. Tecson. verifies. Consequently. From the foregoing. Catindig. Castillo. Martinez. then she cannot demand indemnity for lost profits or actual damages suffered in the event of failure to carry out the same. Coronel. Francisco. validates. Valois . then she cannot claim that the project was awarded to her. Tabugan. 27059. Santos. Page 691 Echiverri. Alcazaren. such a demand would be premature. If she has no right to the project. Espina. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Indeed. Sy. Marquez. Without a formal award of the project in her favor. and no cause of action in Civil Case No. Valiente. Asensi. Corpuz. Rañigo. it must be concluded that since respondent's lowest calculated bid for the subject project did not undergo the required post-qualification process. then she has no right to undertake the same. Gloria. Reyes. And if the project was never awarded to her. she has no right of action against petitioners. not before. Lastimosa. Lumberio. De la Cruz.

Inguillo. Francisco. Sy. Page 692 Echiverri. Reyes. Lumberio. Martinez. De Mesa. Alcazaren. Marquez. Espina. Valiente. Rodriguez. Catindig. Rañigo. LABOR LAW Albano. De la Cruz. Asensi. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Corporal. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Coronel. Gloria. Valois . Tabugan. Castillo. Palad. Santos. Ramirez. Tecson.

were separated from the service. including the privatization of NPC's assets and liabilities. in addition to the separation package mandated by the EPIRA. government employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service are entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service for the first 20 years. the Energy Regulatory Board. Corpuz. Sandoval. UNREHIRED and RETIRED EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION versus NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION G. Cabañgon. finding that employees who received the separation benefit under RA No. Lumberio. Page 693 Echiverri. Alcazaren. The NPC. Coronel. all the employees who held permanent positions at the NPC opted for and were paid the corresponding separation pay equivalent to one and a half months' salary per year of service. EFREN M. are entitled to their retirement benefits in addition to the separation pay granted by law. Castillo. Santos. Under these laws. one and a half months' salary for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years. Nonetheless. As a consequence. Marquez. to obtain confirmation that RA No. Corporal. as amended by RA No. Rodriguez. Espina. Gloria. 9136 are no longer entitled to retirement benefits. Reyes. and two months' salary for every year of service in excess of 30 years. Sy. 2009 DOCTRINE: Absent an express provision of law. Tecson. GALVEZ. Valiente. HERRERA and ESTHER C. 9136 was enacted to provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry.R. Albano. the grant of both separation and retirement benefits from one single act of separation from employment would amount to double compensation. Lastimosa. After submission of the respondents' respective Answers and Comments. Rañigo. Catindig. One necessary consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of employees from the Department of Energy. Inguillo. the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision. De la Cruz. Palad. took the position that the grant of retirement benefits to displaced employees in addition to separation pay was inconsistent with the constitutional proscription on the grant of a double gratuity. the NPC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against several parties. De Mesa. Martinez. the National Electrification Administration and the NPC. Francisco. including the petitioners. Ramirez. for and on their behalf and on behalf of OTHER SEPARATED. FACTS: RA No. a number of NPC employees also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 9136 did not specifically authorize NPC to grant retirement benefits in addition to separation pay. Asensi. As a result. former employees of the National Power Corporation (NPC) who were separated from service due to the government's initiative of restructuring the electric power industry. on the other hand. Unable to amicably resolve this matter with its former employees. Valois . No. Tabugan. 660 and RA No. 186. 1616. 166570 | December 18. all NPC employees. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners. including the petitioners.

Santos. Rañigo. Lumberio. this does not mean that both benefits shall be given to an affected employee. 021112. unless specifically authorized by law". In CSC Resolution No. Espina. 6656 as follows: x xx While the aforequoted provision of law used the conjunctive "and" between the words "separation pay" and "retirement". Tecson. Corporal. Inguillo. Sy. Alcazaren. the grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to double compensation from one single act of separation from employment. Here. Castillo. Sandoval. we have ruled that there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee. Albano. Tabugan. This interpretation is supported by the phrase "if entitled thereto" found before the phrase "be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing laws". Marquez. In prior decisions. Palad. the CSC interpreted the phrase "separation pay and retirement" in RA No. Valiente. or indirect compensation. Gloria. instead. Coronel. Rodriguez. payment of both separation and retirement benefits is not absolute. The CSC has previously ruled that employees similarly situated to petitioners herein were not entitled to both separation pay and retirement benefits. De Mesa. absent an express provision of law. Page 694 Echiverri. Valois . Cabañgon. the concerned employee must either avail of the separation benefit or opt to retire if qualified under existing laws. double. Ramirez. Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that "[n]o elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional. Lastimosa. Francisco. Asensi. Catindig. Martinez. Thus. HELD: No. Corpuz. Reyes. De la Cruz.

Martinez. Palad. The same was affirmed by the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay. As a result. Inguillo. we held that a series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct. gross and habitual neglect of duty. 171023 | December 18. Santos. a dereliction of duty. Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against respondent assailing the legality of his dismissal. FACTS: Petitioner was employed as branch teller by respondent Manila Electric Company. It ruled that no evidence was presented to prove that the absences of petitioner were authorized. he was not deprived of due process and his habitual absenteeism without leave did not violate the company’s rules and regulations which justified his termination. Asensi. He also claimed that he was denied due process. fraud or willful breach of trust. Espina. a notice of dismissal was sent to the petitioner which eventually led to his termination. Valiente. ARSENIO S. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. and indicative of wrongful intent and not Albano. Corporal. Notice of investigation was served upon the petitioner for his unauthorized and unexcused absences. However. however. Sy. petitioner did not participate in the investigation. 2009 DOCTRINE: Labor adjudicatory officials and the Court of Appeals must demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee’s dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience.. Catindig. Wyeth Philippines. It appears from his employment records. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G. Rañigo. Reyes. No. The LA rendred a decision dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. Inc. despite receipt of such notice. De Mesa. Tecson. Gloria. Corpuz. Lumberio. Serious misconduct is said to be a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. He was assigned at respondent's Mandaluyong office and was responsible for the handling and processing of payments made by respondent's customers. Coronel. Sandoval. In Gustilo v. While petitioner did not dispute his absences. that petitioner has repeatedly violated the Company Code of Employee Discipline and has exhibited poor performance in the latter part of his employment. Rodriguez. Page 695 Echiverri. he nonetheless averred that the same were incurred with the corresponding approved application for leave of absence. Ramirez. Marquez.R. Lastimosa. He was likewise required to appear at the investigation and to present his evidence in support of his defense. Francisco. QUIAMBAO vs. or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family—grounds under Article 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. Castillo. a forbidden act. Tabugan. We also held that gross neglect of duty becomes serious in character due to frequency of instances. Valois . HELD: No We have examined the records which indeed show that petitioner's unauthorized absences as well as tardiness are habitual despite having been penalized for past infractions. De la Cruz. willful in character.

we discussed the parameters of awarding separation pay to dismissed employees as a measure of financial assistance. De la Cruz. Lumberio. Marquez. viz: To reiterate our ruling in Toyota. he is not entitled to severance pay. still. Gloria. Inguillo. Oddly. Lastimosa. Sandoval. we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the law. Valois . Espina. De Mesa. Palad. Alcazaren. Catindig. Sy. They must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. Ramirez. labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee's dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience. Corpuz. Reyes. Diasnes. even assuming that the ground for petitioner's dismissal is gross and habitual neglect of duty. Asensi. Tecson. Rañigo. Valiente. The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right. Thus. Corporal. In fine. Francisco. Rodriguez. Page 696 Echiverri. Inc. Indeed. or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family . as here. Coronel. Tabugan.) Albano. In Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders. v. Castillo. gross and habitual neglect of duty.(Emphasis supplied.grounds under Art. Martinez. there can be no good faith in intentionally and habitually incurring unexcusable absences. the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in equating petitioner's gross neglect of duty to serious misconduct. mere error of judgment. petitioner never advanced any valid reason to justify his absences. Cabañgon. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. Petitioner's intentional and willful violation of company rules shows his utter disregard of his work and his employer's interest. Besides. fraud or willful breach of trust. Santos.

2002. On January 17. Corpuz. made known to the employee. petitioner still reported for work on February 13. Tabugan. The Memo was allegedly served on February 7. Palad. Valois . 1995. 2002. 2002 denying all the allegations in Soriano's letter-complaint. i. Reyes. In a Memo dated February 6. 180302. 2002. 2002. February 5. Hyacinth Soriano. lawful. Rodriguez. On January 27. an investigation on the insubordination case was conducted which was attended by the parties and their respective counsels. SKYCABLE PCC-BAGUIO G. Gloria. Catindig. 2002. Asensi. Lastimosa. the investigating committee found petitioner guilty of having made malicious statements against Soriano during the January 7. 2002. respondent issued a Memorandum requiring petitioner to submit an explanation within 76 hours from notice thereof. Soriano averred that petitioner's unscrupulous behavior constituted serious and grave offense in violation of the company's Code of Discipline. she was again insulted by petitioner when the latter approached her and said that she was seen going out with Aldrin Estrada. Valiente. Espina. Tecson. Francisco. Consequently. Alcazaren. petitioner was employed as a cable technician by respondent Skycable PCC-Baguio. the latter spread false rumors about her. On the same day. Cabañgon. petitioner uttered. Martinez. "Ikawlangangnakakaalamngtotoo" with malicious intent and in a provocative manner. however. No. Lumberio. characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. An administrative investigation was accordingly conducted on January 31. and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable. Sandoval. FACTS: On January 17. Marquez. By reason thereof. respondent sent petitioner a letter denominated as 1st Notice of Termination requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be terminated for insubordination.. During that incident. 2002 but petitioner refused to sign it. sent to the human resource manager a letter-complaint against petitioner alleging that on two separate occasions. 2010 DOCTRINE: As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code. an accounting clerk of respondent. Ramirez. and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Rañigo. On March 15. De la Cruz. willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders requires the concurrence of two elements: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful. Baguio City. Corporal. Through a Final Notice Albano. Santos. Notwithstanding the suspension order.R. 2002 conversation. Coronel. Petitioner submitted his written explanationdated January 23. 2002. petitioner was suspended for three days without pay effective February 13-15. Page 697 Echiverri. JR vs. at Central Park. their field service supervisor. which is categorized as an offense under the Company Code of Discipline. JIMMY ARENO. Sy. Inguillo.e. De Mesa. Castillo.

He immediately defied the order by reporting on the first day of his suspension. Coronel. Castillo. Martinez. Alcazaren. Marquez. It is noteworthy that upon receipt of the notice of suspension. Ramirez. Reyes. As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code. made known to the employee. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Santos. a final notice apprising him of the decision to terminate his employment was served. Sandoval. Rañigo.e. respondent validly dismissed petitioner for cause after complying with the procedural requirements of the law. Sy.. Corporal. petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground of insubordination or willful disobedience in complying with the suspension order. characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders requires the concurrence of two elements: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful. Valiente. De Mesa. A hearing was conducted wherein both parties with their respective counsels were present. Palad. Francisco. and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable. Page 698 Echiverri. It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Catindig. Lumberio. Both requisites are present in the instant case. and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. All things considered. lawful. Tecson. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was validly dismissed from work due to insubordination HELD: Yes. Corpuz. Tabugan. 2002. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced. i. Espina. Asensi. Valois . Petitioner was served the first notice of termination and was given time to submit his written explanation. After finding cause for petitioner’s termination. petitioner did not question such order at the first instance. Gloria. Inguillo. Albano. Cabañgon. of Termination dated April 1. De la Cruz.

7730 had effectively removed the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code insofar as inspection cases. Lastimosa. the Director of Regional Office No. as Republic Act No.R. Director Manalo issued an Order directing TCDC to pay P2. Page 699 Echiverri. On September 30. 164141. The DOLE officials issued a Notice of Inspection Results to petitioner directing it to rectify the violations within five days from notice. Coronel. 2002 were null and void for want of jurisdiction. 2002 in the same case.AL. Marquez. Tomas (Secretary Sto.90 to its employees representing underpayment of salaries. Tecson. and underpayment of service incentive leave pay and regular holiday pay. in an apparent reversal of Director Manalos endorsement. Before the NLRC could take any action. Gloria. 2002 referring the case to the NLRC on the ground that the aggregate money claim of each worker exceeds the jurisdictional amount which is Five Thousand Pesos Only (P5. issued an Order on July 25. Catindig. No. Sto. Corpuz. Pursuant to such authority. Inguillo. which jurisdiction is not affected by the amount of claim involved. Reyes. hence. reiterating the argument that Director Manalo had lost Albano. However. issued another inspection authority on August 2. ET. For failure to comply with the directive. which dismissal had attained finality. TCDC filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Tabugan.123. FACTS: On the basis of a complaint filed by respondents Reynaldo Abay and fifty-nine (59) others before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).00). 2010 DOCTRINE: Under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code. Several labor standard violations were noted. Lumberio. Asensi. this July 25. Espina.235. Sy. an inspection was conducted by DOLE officials at the premises of petitioner Tiger Construction and Development Corporation (TCDC). February 26. The case was then set for summary hearing. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. are concerned. the regional directors. 13thmonth pay. Valois . According to petitioner. 2002Order endorsing the case to the NLRC. Santos. Corporal. Francisco. Sandoval. TIGER CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary and her representatives. have jurisdiction over labor standards violations based on findings made in the course of inspection of an employer’s premises. Palad. De Mesa. Rañigo. Ramirez. DOLE Secretary Patricia A.000. 7730. REYNALDO ABAY. Martinez. the case was set for summary hearing. Tomas). Petitioner allegedly questioned the inspectors findings and argued that the proceedings before the regional office had been rendered moot by the issuance of the July 25. V. Manalo (Director Manalo). DOLE officials conducted another investigation of petitioners’ premises and the same violations were discovered. as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. Castillo. Glenda A. De la Cruz. 2002. before the hearing could take place. 2002 Order was tantamount to a dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Ma. G. Cabañgon. Valiente. pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary. all proceedings before the DOLE regional office after July 25.

Inguillo. the regional directors. Francisco. Sy. Valiente. as a general rule. Director Manalos initial endorsement of the case to the NLRC. Secretary Sto. Valois . While it is true that orders issued without jurisdiction are considered null and void and. may be assailed at any time. Director Manalo then issued a writ of execution. but such exception is neither an issue nor applicable here. Espina.as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. Palad. the fact of the matter is thatin this case.The last sentence of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code recognizes anexceptionto the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary and her representatives. Coronel. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Jurisdiction or authority to try a certain case is conferred by law and not by the interested parties. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can still assail the Order of Director Manalo allegedly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. did not oust or deprive her of jurisdiction over the case. Alcazaren. Ramirez. which prevented her from subsequently assuming jurisdiction over the same. jurisdiction over the matter. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Gloria. pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary. Petitioners theory that Director Manalos initial endorsement of the case to the NLRC served as a dismissal of the case. Tecson. are concerned. have jurisdiction over labor standards violations based on findings made in the course of inspection of an employers’ premises. De Mesa.Director Manaloactedwithin her jurisdiction. Sandoval.The said jurisdiction isnotaffected by the amount of claim involved. Director Manalo finally denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Asensi. Catindig. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the petition was dismissed for failure to certify against non-forum shopping. Marquez. Corpuz. as RA 7730 had effectively removed the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code insofar as inspection cases. the petitioner can still assail the Order of Director Manalo allegedly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.She therefore retained the jurisdiction to decide the case when it was eventually returned to her office by the DOLE Secretary. Lumberio. and should be exercised precisely by the person in authority or body in whose hands it has been placed by the law. much less by one of them. Cabañgon. Reyes. Corporal. HELD: Yes. Martinez. after said Order has attained finality and is already in the execution stage. Acting on the ill-timed appeal. The NLRC returned the entire records of the case to Director Manalo on the ground that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint. Santos. Tabugan.the DOLE Secretary and her representatives. after said Order has attained finality and is already in the execution stage.The said endorsement was evidently not Albano. Tomas issued an Order dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit. on the mistaken opinion that the claim was within the latters’ jurisdiction. Page 700 Echiverri. 7730. Director Manalo again endorsed the case to the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch V (LegaspiCity). Castillo. Apparently convinced by petitioners’ arguments. is wrong. Under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code.

Cabañgon. Palad.Likewise. Reyes. Corpuz. there is no more need to address petitioners contention that the CA erred in dismissing its petition on the ground of its belated compliance with the requirement of certification against forum-shopping. Catindig. Page 701 Echiverri. Ramirez. Tabugan. Martinez. Corporal. particularly since it was a labor case whereprocedural lapses may be disregarded in the interest of substantial justice. Sy. When a decision has already become final and executory. an appellate court loses jurisdiction to entertain an appeal much less to alter. Valiente. Asensi. the January 29. Lumberio. Valois . modify or reverse the final and executory judgment. Castillo. Rodriguez. the NLRC. Sandoval. De Mesa. De la Cruz. 2003 Order was rendered with jurisdiction and can no longer be questioned (as it is final and executory). Alcazaren. Santos. it was a mere referral to another agency. Tecson. meant as a final disposition of the case. petitioners half-hearted and unsubstantiated arguments that the said Order was allegedly based on erroneous computation and included non-employees. Gloria. Espina. Coronel. on the mistaken belief that jurisdiction was lodged with the latter. Lastimosa. Albano. Inguillo. Marquez. can no longer be entertained. It cannot preclude the regional director from subsequently deciding the case after the mistake was rectified and the case was returned to her by the DOLE Secretary. Rañigo. therefore. Francisco. In the instant case.

Lastimosa. Valois . appellant was arraigned on September 6. the same were served only against appellant and Julius Martinez whereas accused Jenilyn Martinez remains at large. Tabugan. 1999. Thus. Jenilyn Martinez. 1995. Castillo. were also charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. and Arnulfo Suyat. Corporal. Martinez. 1995 where she entered a plea of not guilty to the charges of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment in large scale. The cases were raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila. Reyes. Coronel. complainants Walter Isuan. During his arraignment on August 18. However. Corpuz. and Crizaldo Fernandez failed to testify despite being given several opportunities. Ramirez. Marquez. were charged with seven counts of Estafa before the RTC of Manila.Meanwhile. Sy. De la Cruz. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Alcazaren. Further it mandates the promotion of full employment and equality of employment opportunities. The same individual could also be held liable for the crime of Estafa. Rañigo. Vivencio Martinez. Cabañgon. to wit: Dominador Ilacin. herein appellant Maritess Martinez and her daughter. Lumberio. Inguillo. 2010 DOCTRINE:No less than the Constitution ordains that labor – local and overseas. Thereafter. On October 12. complainants parted with their money and gave the same to appellant. Espina. Julius Martinez pleaded not guilty to the charge of Illegal Recruitment. warrants of arrest were issued against the three accused. March 5. Valiente. Gloria. the trial court issued its Decision acquitting JuliusMartinez of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale while finding appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment and four counts of Estafa. that based on said false representations. Page 702 Echiverri. The cases were consolidated upon motion of the prosecution. Tecson. appellant together with her children Jenilyn Martinez and Julius Martinez. that appellant falsely represented herself to have the capacity to send complainants as factory workers in South Korea. The following complainants were presented by the prosecution as witnesses. Asensi. However. MARITESS MARTINEZ y DULAY G. organized and unorganized – shall be given full protection. Santos. Sandoval. De Mesa. FACTS: On June 21. that she asked from complainants various amounts allegedly as placement and processing fees.R. Catindig. 158627. Palad. Necito Serquiña. he shall be meted the penalty of life imprisonment and fined. No. Francisco. that appellant appropriated for herself the amounts given her to the damage and Albano. On even date. Rodriguez. if an individual illegally recruits another for employment abroad. The trial court found that appellant was not a holder of a license or authority to deploy workers abroad. Nelson Laplano. 1995.

Martinez. and that she was merely an agent of the latter. Rañigo. Corpuz. She claimed that there is no truth to the claim of the complainants that she was holding office in her residence considering its very limited space and that the same is occupied by her six family members. Page 703 Echiverri. Palad. the CA correctly held that: x x x Even if [appellant] did no more that "suggest" to complainants where they could apply for overseas employment. Espina. Rodriguez. 2002. Notwithstanding said promises and payments. Hence. Coronel. Alcazaren. HELD: No. 322 SCRA 38). all prove that the latter was engaged in recruitment and placement activities. As explicitly enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. Inguillo. whether for profit or not. the same still constituted an act of recruitment. In this case. Reyes. Even conceding that appellant merely referred the complainants to JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. Tecson. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed palpable error in not finding that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant. Referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected Albano. the CA rendered its assailed Decision denying the appeal for lack of merit. Corporal. De la Cruz. Gloria. Cabañgon. On December 11. Sandoval. Tabugan. Appellant appealed to the CA arguing that no evidence was presented to show that she falsely represented herself as having the capacity to send complainants as factory workers in South Korea. her act constituted "referral" within the meaning of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code (People v. Ramirez. Catindig. and that she failed to deploy complainants for work abroad. all the four complainants unanimously declared that appellant offered and promised them employment abroad. prejudice of the complainants. this petition. Ong. the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in proving the guilt of the appellant.. Valiente. Lumberio. Sy. Thus. They also testified that they gave various amounts to appellant as payment for placement and processing fees. Lastimosa. These testimonies. The Court hereby certifies this case and elevates the entire records to the Honorable Supreme Court for the mandated review. Castillo. Valois . Asensi. as well as the documentary evidence they submitted consisting of the receipts issued them by the appellant. It found appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale. they were not able to leave for abroad to work. De Mesa. She maintained that she merely assisted complainants in their applications with JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. Marquez. She alleged that there was no proof that she personally undertook to deploy them for work abroad. "recruitment and placement" includes the act of making referrals. Santos. Francisco.

nevertheless. Under said law. Palad. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. It was [appellant] whom they approached regarding their plans of working overseas. Consequently. Martinez. and c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons. Tabugan. Catindig. Lumberio. the imposable penalty is life imprisonment and a fine of ₱100. Valiente. By this fact alone. Cabañgon. It was x x x [appellant] from whom they learned what papers or documents to submit. There was no evidence at all that said recruitment agency authorized herein appellant to act as its agent. she is deemed to have engaged in illegal recruitment and the same was committed in large scale because it was carried out against the four complainants. The CA therefore correctly imposed upon herein appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱100.000. 247 SCRA 780). Santos. Rañigo. Having already established that appellant was engaged in "recruitment and placement. De Mesa. Lastimosa. are present in the instant case. Marquez. and b) the offended party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. Goce. Likewise.00. to wit: a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant was not a licensee or holder of authority to deploy workers abroad. the elements of which are: a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit. Tecson. Despite the denial. Corporal. In the instant case. x x x The three elements of the crime of illegal recruitment. was a holder of a valid license to deploy workers abroad did not serve to benefit herein appellant. applicant for employment to a selected employer. Valois . Corpuz. Ramirez. Inguillo. we rule that the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale. Coronel. 95-143318. Albano. Sandoval. Asensi. Page 704 Echiverri. one of the staff of Imperial.00 in Criminal Case No. As aptly noted by the appellate court: From the testimonies of the complainants." the issue that must be resolved next is whether such activities may be considered illegal and whether the acts were committed in large scale. Castillo. Sy. the applicable law at the time of the commission of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale was Article 39 of the Labor Code. it is clearly shown that [appellant] did more than just make referrals. placement officer or bureau. We also affirm the findings of the trial court and the CA that appellant is guilty of four counts of Estafa. to whom she allegedly turned over the money she collected from the complainants or any officer from the recruitment agency to prove that she was merely a conduit thereof. failed to explain why recruitment activities were done in her residence. Espina. [appellant]. b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.000. (People v. De la Cruz. Gloria. The fact that JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. In the instant case. she failed to present Milagros Lopez. individually or as a group. or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042). It was [appellant] who collected the fees and receipts [therefor] were issued in her name. Francisco. Reyes.

Albano. Castillo. Lumberio. Estafa is a public offense that must be prosecuted and punished by the Court in its motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party. Gloria. De Mesa. Inguillo. Sy. Cabañgon. Francisco. Rañigo. Tabugan. Valiente. Asensi. Martinez. Reyes. Alcazaren. Catindig. Coronel. De la Cruz. Valois . Corpuz. Tecson. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Corporal. Compromise or novation of contract pertains and affects only the civil aspect of the case. Palad. Santos. Criminal liability for estafa already committed is not affected by the fact that [appellant] returned a portion of their money. Ramirez. Marquez. Page 705 Echiverri. Espina. Sandoval.

vs. Alcazaren. ALIVIADO. Sy. work or service for a principal and any of the following elements are present: i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS. They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS. FACTS: Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. Gloria. De la Cruz. SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons such as habitual absenteeism. Reyes. supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. Santos. supplies or places workers to perform a job. Palad.R. work or service to be performed and the employees recruited. petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization. service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits. Rodriguez.AL. 2011 DOCTRINE:The law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs. Valiente. Tabugan. Proctor and Gamble is the employer of the petitioners. works or services. June 6. and PROMM-GEM INC. Corporal. Cabañgon. Espina. regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature. Page 706 Echiverri. De Mesa. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS. Ramirez. To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products. JOEB M. In order to resolve the issue of whether P&G is the employer of petitioners. However. it must be made to an independent contractor because the current labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.. 160506. Valois . Catindig. Francisco. Marquez. dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice. INC. G. ISSUE: Whether or not Procter and Gamble is the employer of the petitioners. Rañigo. Asensi. in order for such outsourcing to be valid. Indeed. it is management prerogative to farm out any of its activities. it is necessary to first determine whether Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors or legitimate job contractors. Albano. To emphasize. Lastimosa. Tecson. or ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee. No. Sandoval. HELD: Yes. Corpuz. P&G entered into contracts with Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products. In December 1991. ET. Lumberio. supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. They were assigned at different outlets. Coronel. Castillo. Inguillo. Martinez...

Rodriguez. it must be made to an independent contractor because the current labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting. Considering that SAPS has no substantial capital or investment and the workers it recruited are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of P&G. Gloria. Tabugan. Lumberio. Espina. or ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual Under the circumstances. Palad. there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits. Martinez. De la Cruz. Santos. Cabañgon. However. Catindig. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Valois . we find that the former is engaged in “labor-only contracting”. Tecson. Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor. Corpuz. To emphasize. De Mesa. Castillo. works or services. work or service to be performed andthe employees recruited. work or service for a principal and any of the following elements are present: i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job. Marquez. in order for such outsourcing to be valid. Francisco. Inguillo. supplies or places workers to perform a job. the law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs. Rañigo. Where labor-only contracting exists. Clearly. Sandoval. Sy. The statute establishes this relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. Albano. Corporal. the Labor Code itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the employees of the labor-only contractor. Valiente. Reyes. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Coronel. Asensi. Page 707 Echiverri. We find that it is a legitimate independent contractor.

Asensi. and/or Vicente Khu v NagkakaisangLakasngManggagawa (NLM) – Katipunan on behalf of its member. Valois . Page 708 Echiverri. The Labor Arbiter decided against Capor. As decided in San Miguel Corporation vs NLRC: “a dishonest employee cannot be rewarded with separation pay or any financial benefit after his culpability is established xxx. Santos. as well as moral and exemplary damages. On appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. Marquez. Lastimosa. RENO FOODS INC. Reyes. NenitaCapor G. finding the latter guilty of serious misconduct which is a just cause for termination and that as such. On 8 December 1998. 164016. such as serious misconduct. being of retirement age and having served petitioners for 39 years. 2010 DOCTRINE:Social justice and equity are not magical formulas to erase the unjust acts committed by the employee against his employer. Corpuz. Aggrieved. Tecson. However. While compassion for the poor is desirable. March 15. Alcazaren. ISSUE: Whether or not financial assistance should be granted to an employee who was validly dismissed for theft of company property. filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Reno Foods Inc. Palad. Sandoval. No. the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s award of financial assistance to Capor. Meanwhile. The law is clear in saying that separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault. De Mesa. On 19 October 1998. Sy. FACTS: It is a standard operating procedure of Reno Foods to subject all its employees to reasonable search of their belongings upon leaving the company premises. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Francisco. the Court cannot award any financial assistance in her favor because it is not only against the law but also a retrogressivepublic policy. To hold Albano.R. HELD: No. NagkakaisangLakasngManggagawanfiled on behalf of Capor a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against Reno Foods Inc. De la Cruz. they argued that theft of company property is a form of serious misconduct for which no financial assistance in the form of separation pay should be allowed. the decision of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed but added an award of financial assistance in the form of separation pay equivalent to on-half month pay for every year of service. as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible.. six Reno canned goods were found inside NenitaCapor’s fabric clutch bag. Rodriguez. the company sent a Notice of Termination to Capor after her repeated failure to provide an explanation. Inguillo. Lumberio. Espina. Catindig. Rañigo. Reno filed a complaint-affidavit against Capor for qualified theft. Ramirez. The same is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause. Gloria. Capor is not entitled to reinstatement and backwages. The award of separation pay is not warranted under the law and jurisprudence. Castillo. Corporal. Martinez. Coronel. Valiente. Thereafter. While the Court sympathize with Capor’s plight. it is not meant to coddle those who are unworthy of such consideration.

Albano. Rodriguez. Marquez. Valois . Asensi. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Francisco. Rañigo. Palad. De Mesa. otherwise. Alcazaren. Valiente. would be to send a wrong signal not only that ‘crime pays’ but also that one can enrich himself at the expense of another in the name of social justice. Corpuz. Coronel. Gloria. Martinez. Corporal. Lastimosa. Tecson. Reyes. even in the name of compassion. Lumberio. Ramirez. Sy. De la Cruz. Espina. Catindig. Page 709 Echiverri. Inguillo. Sandoval. Castillo. Santos.

HELD:No. Cabañgon. The decision was appealed by both parties to the National Labor Relations Commission. MalotBouffard. rather he is a mere contractor hence there can be no dismissal to speak of. and Dona Bouffard. Lastimosa. respectively. The records are bereft of any indication that petitioners were prevented from returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment by respondents. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision exonerating respondent company from the charge of illegal dismissal as petitioner were the ones who did not report for work despite respondent’s call. Reyes. Albano. positive and convincing. Corpuz. Inguillo. Valois . On 29 August 2001. and/or Bruno Bouffard III. Coronel. Martinez. Bernie Bouffard. FACTS: Romeo Basay.R. however. Sandoval. Thereafter. 175532. as owners G. in the three months following the case filed against respondent. it is incumbent upon the employee to first establish the fact of his or her dismissal. Marquez. while as regards Basay and Literal. April 19. Employer Hacienda denied that Abueva is an employee. no evidence was proffered by the petitioners that they were dismissed from employment. Julian Literal. Corporal. the same was dismissed and affirmed the findings of the NLRC. Rodriguez. Basay. petitioners remained listed and included in respondent’s payroll. Asensi. Castillo. The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and the proof should be clear. No. De Mesa. In fact. Ramirez. Valiente. Romeo Basay. Page 710 Echiverri. Lumberio. Jose Ramon Bouffard. Spouses Carmen and Steve Bumanlag. The NLRC decided in favor of the respondents after finding that respondents have satisfactorily proven payment of the correct amount of wages and 13th month pay. Espina. Rañigo. AnalynBouffard. and Julian Abueva were hired by Hacienda Consolacion as tractor operators and laborer. Tabugan. Tecson. De la Cruz. Santos. ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and are entitled to their money claims. it was admitted that both were regular employees but were allegedly to have abandoned their jobs. Gloria. Francisco. In the case at bar. Alcazaren. Catindig. 2010 DOCTRINE: Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employers are burdened to prove that they did not commit illegal dismissal. There was no illegal dismissal. aside from mere allegations. Sy. Abueva and Consolacion filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims against Hacienda Consolacion. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC. Julian Literal. petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. and Julian Abueva v Hacienda Consolacion. Palad.

Hence. Tecson. Valois . ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal. Castillo. Asensi. Espina. Sy. Marquez.R. Employer SCA Hygiene was ordered to reinstate Pantoja. A Motion for Reconsidered was filed but was denied. Lumberio. Ramirez. He contested that the alleged redundancy never occurred as there was no permanent shutdown of Paper Mill No. a notice of termination of employment was sent to petitioner as his position was declared redundant. 4 but gave them an option to be transferred to posts of equal rank and pay. Catindig. Palad. Rañigo. Pantoja v SCA Hygiene Products Corporation G. HELD: No. Page 711 Echiverri. Rodriguez. No. Lastimosa. respondent. did not outrightly dismiss the workers affected by the closure of Paper Mill No. Dannie M. FACTS: Petitioner Pantoja was employed as a utility man at SCA Hygiene Products Corporation. 4 due to its continuous operation. respondent filed a petitioner for certiorari with the Court of Appeals where the NLRC decision was reversed reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Retrenchment was utilized only as an available option in case that the affected employee would not want to be transferred. Santos.Despite an apparent reason to implement a retrenchment program as a cost-cutting measure. petitioner rejected the offer for his transfer. Corpuz. Valiente. Corporal. April 23.Respondent Corporation’s exercise of management prerogative was exercised in good faith. However. 2010 DOCTRINE:The employer’s exercise of its management prerogative is upheld because it was done for the advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating the lawful rights of an employee. Coronel. the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by finding petitioner’s separation from employment illegal. however. Meanwhile. 5 as part of respondent’s reorganization plan. on 20 June 2000. Albano. Francisco. Thereafter. Gloria. Cabañgon. De Mesa. 163554. Tabugan. Upon appeal with the NLRC. respondent informed DOLE of its reorganization and partial closure. Alcazaren. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. On 5 April 1999. Martinez. Petitioner was later on offered to be transferred to Paper Mill No. Sandoval. De la Cruz. He then received separation pay. Such act of the corporation is an indication of good faith as it exhausted other possible measure other than retrenchment. petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal assailing his termination as without any valid cause. Inguillo. Reyes.

The case was pursued by his widow. Valiente. FEDERICO U. Valois . Federico went back to the Philippines where he was diagnosed at the Philippine General Hospital to be suffering from a form of cancer called Hodgkin's Lymphoma. Espina. Lastimosa. Corporal. his heirs could still claim death benefits because the cause of his death was the same illness for which he was repatriated.R. but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers. LTD.. Inguillo. De Mesa. 22 June 2010 DOCTRINE: Article 291 of the Labor Code covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship—it is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code. Gloria. Rodriguez. Federico filed a complaint against petitioners with the arbitration branch of the NLRC claiming entitlement to disability benefits. The CA found that the claim for benefits had not yet prescribed despite the complaint being filed more than one year after Federico's return to the Philippines. He worked as roustabout during the first contract and as a motorman during the succeeding contracts. Page 712 Echiverri. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca dismissed the complaint on the ground that Hodgkin's Lymphoma is not one of the occupational or compensable diseases or the exact cause is not known. His latest contract was approved by the POEAfor 56 days extendible for another 56 days. Santos. loss of earning capacity. G. Corpuz. NAVARRA. Catindig. Evelyn. Cabañgon. ISSUE: Whether or not the claims of Federico is covered by the Labor Code. Ramirez. and attorney's fees. Unfortunately. HELD: Albano. While on board the vessel. JR. Rañigo. 167678. the diagnosis was confirmed in another test conducted at the Medical Center Manila. Coronel. The decision was reversed by NLRC. Tabugan. He also developed a soft mass on the left side of his neck and was given medication. Castillo. on behalf of its foreign principal. FACTS: Southeastern Shipping. SOUTHEASTERN SHIPPING GROUP. Palad. Lumberio. vs. De la Cruz. Marquez. Sy. No. Nodular Sclerosing Type (also known as Hodgkin's Disease). Tecson. Martinez. Federico complained of having a sore throat and on and off fever with chills. hired Federico to work on board the vessel "George McLeod. Alcazaren. Reyes. Francisco. he died during the pendency of the case." Federico signed 10 successive separate employment contracts of varying durations. moral and exemplary damages. It also found that although Federico died 17 months after his contract had expired. Sandoval. Asensi. Labor Arbiter Ermita T.

The Constitution affirms labor as a primary social economic force. Valiente. Cabañgon. 291. we held that Article 291 of the Labor Code covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship. The applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code. insofar as it limits the prescriptive period within which the seafarers may file their money claims. Valois . Castillo." In Cadalin v. Rañigo. Based on the foregoing.-All money claims arising from employer-employee relations during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued. public order or public policy. Ramirez. Thus. Palad. they have the force of law between the parties. Along this vein. the Labor Code states: Art."Recognizing the peculiar nature of overseas shipboard employment. The employment contract signed by Federico stated that "the same shall be deemed an integral part of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. it being more favorable to the seafarers and more in accord with the State's declared policy to afford full protection to labor. is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are hired or rehired. Sandoval. "It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code. De la Cruz. Francisco. "The employment of seafarers. Alcazaren. On the other hand. De Mesa. is hereby declared null and void. for the guidance of all. Santos. Lastimosa. Gloria. the State vowed to afford full protection to labor. Tecson. The prescriptive period in the present case is thus three years from the time the cause of action accrues. This law prevails over Section 28 of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which provides for claims to be brought only within one year from the date of the seafarer's return to the point of hire. morals. Albano. Page 713 Echiverri. Martinez. Corporal. Section 28 of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. including claims for death benefits. local and overseas. Catindig. Sy. Money claims. Rodriguez. it is therefore clear that Article 291 is the law governing the prescription of money claims of seafarers. Asensi. otherwise they shall forever be barred. Espina. Inguillo. Corpuz. and as long as the stipulations therein are not contrary to law. Tabugan. but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers". Lumberio. Coronel. Reyes. the employer and the seafarer agree that all claims arising from this contract shall be made within one (1) year from the date of the seafarer's return to the point of hire. a class of overseas contract workers. Marquez. organized and unorganized. POEA's Administrator. Yes.

Ramirez. Palad. Marquez. Nevertheless. 1998 which is the date of his last contract. Albano. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Reyes. Tabugan. Hence. Catindig. Coronel. In the present case. De la Cruz. Francisco. the claim has not yet prescribed. Gloria. Castillo. Page 714 Echiverri. Valois . Sandoval. Espina. Martinez. Corporal. Rañigo. it could not have accrued earlier than January 21. Valiente. Asensi. De Mesa. 1999. since the complaint was filed with the arbitration branch of the NLRC on September 6. Tecson. Sy. Alcazaren. Corpuz. there is no exact showing of when the cause of action accrued. Inguillo. Lumberio. Santos.

This is as it should be because a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and. She claimed that she was a mere casualty of the war of attrition between Lim and the Binamira family. Lim is married to Rhodora Binamira. which may be held liable for illegal dismissal of employees or for other wrongful acts. Binamira). Catindig. In her Position Paper. 1998. Moreover..R. Valois . Boler Binamira. Castillo. In their Position Paper. Coronel. or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders. such as over hiring of workers. or automation. Lumberio. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Sr. dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company. seasonal fluctuations. in general. Sandoval. (Atty. Cabañgon. partnership or association or any other entity. Gloria. No. Marquez. Espina. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lim. Tecson. Martinez. Palad. Asensi. Corporal.” “only the employer-corporation. 2010 DOCTRINE:“Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of and without prejudice to the employees. Ramirez. decreased volume of business. or phasing out of a service activity previously undertaken by the business. Lastimosa. its gross income for 1998 dropped from ₱1million to ₱665. and declared no illegal dismissal. The corporation suffered a marked decline in profits as well as substantial and persistent increase in losses. she claimed that there was no proof that the company was suffering from business losses.000. Corpuz. On September 14.HELEN BINAMIRA G. petitioners asserted that they had no choice but to retrench respondent due to economic reverses. shortage of materials. De Mesa. Rañigo. Francisco. Page 715 Echiverri. Helen alleged that she was dismissed without cause and the benefit of due process. from the people comprising it. conversion of the plant to a new production program. Helen received a letter from Lim terminating her employment effective that same day. Albano. and not its officers. Tabugan. Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation – Tagbilaran Branch hired Helen as an appraiser in July 1995 and designated her as Vault Custodian in 1996. It is resorted to during periods of business recession. Santos. Reyes. In its Statement of Income and Expenses.” FACTS: Petitioner Lambert Lim (Lim) is a Malaysian national operating various businesses in Cebu and Bohol one of which is Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation. Lim cited business losses necessitating retrenchment as the reason for the termination. Sy. Helen thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Rodriguez.00. Inguillo. daughter of Atty. Valiente. industrial depression. who is also the counsel and father-in-law of respondent Helen Binamira (Helen). LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS and JEWELRY CORPORATION vs.” “A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors. 170464 July 12.

Moreover. It observed that for retrenchment to be valid. a written notice shall be given to the employee and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date thereof. On petition for certiorari. Corporal. ISSUES: (1) Wherther or not the Certiorari petition was proper (2) Whether or not the CA was correct in finding the dismissal of Helen as illegal (3) Whether or not Private Petitioner Lim should be held personally liable for the illegal dismissal HELD: (1) Yes. Since none was given in this case. Gloria. Rañigo. wherein the NLRC set aside its Decision dated September 27. Catindig. Espina. Tabugan. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Helen was denied by the NLRC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Francisco. Sy. Lumberio. declaring the dismissal of petitioner. There was likewise no retrenchment because none of the conditions for retrenchment is present in this case. then the retrenchment of Helen was not valid. Page 716 Echiverri. On appeal. Coronel. Helen B. Asensi. necessary and desirable position in the pawnshop business. the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. as illegal and directing the private respondents to pay to the petitioner monetary awards: The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied. Castillo. Santos. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Valiente. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Cabañgon. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction. As a rule. Tecson. in this instance. Binamira. De la Cruz. Inguillo. or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to Albano. 2002 and entered a new one declaring that what was actually implemented by the petitioners was not retrenchment due to serious business losses but termination due to redundancy. Martinez. Reyes. The NLRC observed that the Tagbilaran operations was overstaffed thus necessitating the termination of some employees. Valois . the CA found that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to consider substantial evidence showing that the exercise of management prerogative. Marquez. Palad. was done in bad faith and in violation of the employee’s right to due process. the redundancy program was not properly implemented because no written notices were furnished the employee and the DOLE one month before the intended date of termination. Corpuz. The CA rendered a new decision. The CA ruled that there was no redundancy because the position of vault custodian is a requisite. The CA correctly reviewed the factual findings of the labor tribunals. De Mesa. Rodriguez.

Tecson. however. (2) (a) No. are not merely de minimis. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Espina. However. Rañigo. the following elements must be present: (1) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which. Francisco. Rodriguez. Valois . seasonal fluctuations. Asensi. serious and real. The Labor Arbiter found that Helen’s dismissal was valid on account of retrenchment due to economic reverses. the NLRC originally ruled that Helen’s dismissal was illegal as none of the requisites of a valid retrenchment was present. if already incurred. and is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code To effect a valid retrenchment. Alcazaren. Sandoval. inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Tabugan. (3) the employer pays the retrenched employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code. conversion of the plant to a new production program. On the other hand. De Mesa. or automation. Lumberio. Ramirez. Coronel. Gloria. or when too much is concluded. are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. Santos. Corporal. It is a management prerogative resorted to avoid or minimize business losses. Palad. or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders. Castillo. Inguillo. or only if expected. they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings. Sy. Hence. the NLRC changed its posture and ruled that the dismissal was valid on the ground of redundancy due to over-hiring. (2) the employer serves written notice both to the employee/s concerned and the DOLE at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment. (4) the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith. There was no valid dismissal based on retrenchment. but substantial.22 Albano. lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. industrial depression. upon motion for reconsideration. shortage of materials. We find that the CA rightfully reviewed the correctness of the labor tribunals’ factual findings not only because of the foregoing inadequacies. but also because the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter came up with conflicting findings. Martinez. and (5) the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched or retained. It is resorted to during periods of business recession. Page 717 Echiverri. Corpuz. Catindig. courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Considering the diverse findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. as in the present case. Marquez. Occasionally. Lastimosa. Valiente. it behooved upon the CA in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction to determine which findings are more in conformity with the evidentiary facts. Reyes. Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of and without prejudice to the employees.

Inguillo. To make matters worse. Sy. Thus. Castillo. Page 718 Echiverri. Alcazaren. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors. no written notices were served on the employee and the DOLE prior to the implementation of the retrenchment. A mere decline in gross income cannot in any manner be considered as serious business losses.000. Their Position Paper. Redundancy. There was no valid dismissal based on redundancy. We perused over the financial statements submitted by petitioners and we find no evidence at all that the company was suffering from business losses. Coronel. Santos. 1998. however. Finally. 1999. De Mesa. Tabugan. it is highly improbable that the management already knew on September 14. Marquez. such as over hiring of workers. 1998. Lastimosa. Tecson. decreased volume of business. Sandoval. the Statement of Income and Expenses for the year 1997-1998 submitted by the petitioners was prepared only on January 12. Espina. Ramirez. and Albano. The normal method of discharging this is by the submission of financial statements duly audited by independent external auditors. Rodriguez. Martinez. In this case. Reyes. Under these conditions. Francisco. Gloria. that they would be incurring substantial losses. the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of termination of employment. Helen received her notice only on September 14. De la Cruz. Asensi. Corpuz. Cabañgon. the day when her termination would supposedly take effect. on the other hand. (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service. the date of Helen’s retrenchment. Lumberio. Palad. Catindig.00. there was also no showing that petitioners adopted other cost-saving measures before resorting to retrenchment. dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company. sustained and real. This is not the business losses contemplated by the Labor Code that would justify a valid retrenchment. The losses must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence. Valiente. For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid. Rañigo. exists when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise. This is in clear violation of the Labor Code provision which requires notice at least one month prior to the intended date of termination. petitioners merely alleged a sharp drop in its income in 1998 from ₱1million to only ₱665. It should be substantial. They also did not use any fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched. Valois . or phasing out of a service activity previously undertaken by the business. (2) (b) No. the employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business. Corporal. (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions.

Coronel. Page 719 Echiverri. Asensi. (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. This is as it should be because a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and. Rañigo. Obligations incurred as a result of the directors’ and officers’ acts as corporate agents. Lastimosa. In fine. Corporal. Valiente. Francisco. Inguillo. and not its officers. Sandoval. from the people comprising it. De la Cruz. Palad.It is settled that in the absence of malice and bad faith. Tecson. Santos. Sy. Corpuz. Reyes. partnership or association or any other entity. (3) No. A corporation. there is no proof that the essential requisites for a valid redundancy program as a ground for the termination of the employment of respondent are present. officers and employees. They are only solidarily liable with the corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with malice or bad faith. which may be held liable for illegal dismissal of employees or for other wrongful acts. Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation is solely liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent. Marquez. Lumberio. Catindig. in general. Gloria. Valois . are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent. Espina. Rodriguez. As a general rule. De Mesa. Martinez. only the employer-corporation. as a juridical entity. a stockholder or an officer of a corporation cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities. In this case. Helen’s dismissal is illegal for lack of just or authorized cause and failure to observe due process of law. There was no showing that the function of respondent is superfluous or that the business was suffering from a serious downturn that would warrant redundancy considering that such serious business downturn was the ground cited by petitioners in the termination letter sent to respondent. Tabugan. may act only through its directors. Castillo. Albano. Ramirez.

Gloria. Asensi. Sandoval. 185215 July 22. Sy. responsibilities. ISSUES: Albano. Castillo. on February 15. No.00 which is equivalent to the 14th step of Salary Grade (SG)-20. petitioner was temporarily appointed in January 1987 as Account Officer with an annual salary of ₱62. the reorganization of DBP pursuant to Sections 32 and 33 thereof. Palad. Inguillo.250. As a consequence. Valiente." took effect on July 1.” FACTS: Petitioner began her career in DBP on June 1. 10 (DBM-CCC No.00 or the 8th step of SG-24 which was made to retroact to July 1. Ramirez. As part of DBP’s reorganization. Tecson. 1982. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Corpuz. On December 1. 1989. Page 720 Echiverri.00. 2010 DOCTRINE: “There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting to a diminution in duties. She thus opined that her appointment to the position of BEO II constituted a demotion due to the attendant diminution of benefits and emoluments arising from said appointment. Aquino issued Executive Order No. VIRGINIA D. Lastimosa. 1991. Tabugan. Rañigo. she was promoted to the position of Technical Assistant. then President Corazon C. Cabañgon. 10) which authorized the GFIs to match their current set of position titles to those prescribed by the GFIs Index of Occupational Services. there is no demotion and the appointment is valid. 1989. was assigned a salary grade of 25 while that of BEO II has a salary grade of 24. petitioner was appointed on a permanent status as BEO II with an annual salary of ₱131. The Department of Budget and Management and the CSC as well as the CA denied petitioners claims that there was demotion. In November 1988. Rodriguez. Marquez. De Mesa. 1978 when she was appointed as Chief of Division. Francisco. Santos. Espina. Corporal.640. the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) promulgated the Government Financial Institutions’ (GFIs) Index of Occupational Services which mandated GFIs. petitioner occupied the position of Account Officer with SG-20 (24th step) with an annual salary of ₱102. this appointment was made permanent subject to the result of the ongoing reorganization of DBP and the approval of the CSC. To implement the aforesaid law. Lumberio.000. like the DBP. Petitioner protested her appointment as BEO II before the Head of the Personnel Administration Department of the DBP because it allegedly amounted to a demotion. status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. prior to the reorganization of DBP. 1989 (the date of effectivity of RA 6758). the DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. to adopt a uniform set of position titles in their plantilla. Catindig. Valois . among others. BAUTISTAvs. 1986. she occupied the position of Account Officer which.R. 81 which authorized. Reyes. Prior to her appointment thereto. Coronel. under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services. Martinez. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same duties and responsibilities but a rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position. On October 2.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G. According to petitioner. On December 3. RA 6758 or "The Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.

250. Rodriguez. Lumberio. It will also be recalled that the DBM had earlier denied petitioner’s request that her position as Account Officer with SG-20 be matched to Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services because the Account Officer position in DBP is not commensurate with the position of Account Officer with SG-25 under the said index. Sy. including DBP. petitioner failed to prove that the position of Account Officer with SG-20 in the plantilla of DBP prior to its reorganization and the position of Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services are the same. there is no room for us to rule that a demotion took place because petitioner even benefited from an increase in rank and salary. Cabañgon. Espina. Palad. thus. In this jurisdiction." petitioner’s duties and responsibilities before and after the reorganization remained practically the same. Corporal. Corpuz. De Mesa. said appointment resulted to an increase of her salary grade from 20 to 24 translating to an increase of her annual salary from ₱102. Page 721 Echiverri. Coronel. As a general rule. Whether or not the appointment of petitioner as BEO II constitutes as demotion HELD: No. Thus. There was even an increase in her rank and salary." What is more. The DBM then issued DBM-CCC No. Sandoval. a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. Albano. petitioner’s position of Account Officer with SG-20 was matched to the position of BEO II with SG-24 because she exercised supervisory functions over certain bank personnel. Alcazaren. While there was a change in title from "Account Officer" to "Bank Executive Officer. Valois . the DBM promulgated the GFIs Index of Occupational Services which mandated the adoption of a uniform system of position titles in GFIs. There was no demotion when petitioner was appointed as BEO II. pass the test of good faith. Asensi. the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. hierarchy of jobs. Valiente. her new appointment merely stated as reason therefor: "Change in Item Number due to Reorganization.Removal from office as a result of reorganization must. Upon the passage of RA 6758. Castillo. We affirm the findings of the CA and DENY the petition. As correctly found by the CA. De la Cruz. Marquez. and existing salary range. There was no demotion because petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to the one she previously occupied. Tecson. Santos. Francisco.000. qualification requirements for the position. Reyes. Lastimosa. Ramirez. 10 which authorized DBP to match its current set of position titles to those prescribed under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services based on the nature of duties and responsibilities. Inguillo. Tabugan.00. Gloria. Consequently. Under these circumstances. Rañigo. Martinez.00 to ₱131. Catindig.

Verceles). Sandoval. Cabañgon. They are akin to ordinary contracts in that their provisions have obligatory force upon the federation/ union and its member. and strong opposition and protest of respondent Atty. Montaño’s premature assumption of duties and formal induction as vice-president will cause serious damage. 2001. Page 722 Echiverri. Election ensued on May 26-27.R. Verceles (Atty. the convention delegates allowed Atty. Atty. Tabugan. the FFW COMELEC. De Mesa. however. He alleged that. Atty.ATTY. Verceles likewise prayed for injunctive relief. The CA set aside the BLR’s Decision and nullified the election of Atty. which is an affiliate union of FFW. through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC. filed before the BLR a petition for the nullification of the election of Atty. VERCELES G.Atty. Ramirez. Catindig. Espina. 2010 DOCTRINES:“The Federation/Union’s Constitution and By-Laws govern the relationship between and among its members. What has been expressly stipulated therein shall be strictly binding on both. ALLAN S. Claiming that Atty. 16858 July 26. Montaño is not qualified to run for the position because Section 76 of Article XIX of the FFW Constitution and By-Laws prohibits federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board. as already ruled by the FFW COMELEC. Montaño as FFW National Vice-President. Valiente. Lastimosa. In a letter dated May 25. a delegate to the convention and president of UEEA-FFW. Despite the pending motion for reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC. as President of UEEA-FFW and officer of the Governing Board of FFW. Verceles sent a follow-up letter to the President of FFW requesting for immediate action on his protest. De la Cruz. MONTAÑO vs. ERNESTO C. Inguillo.” FACTS: During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW. Atty. Atty. Gloria. Montaño as FFW National Vice-President. He emerged victorious and was proclaimed as the National Vice-President. Montaño’s election as VP was prematurely filed Albano. 2001. Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. On June 18. Lumberio. Verceles. ATTY. Tecson. Montaño’s motion for reconsideration. Montaño’s candidacy. 2001. On July 13. On May 28. Valois . Corpuz. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the BLR has jurisdiction over the issues at hand (2) Whether or not the petition to annul the election of Atty. Rodriguez. Martinez. Atty. No. Palad. Sy. Corporal. The BLR rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.The CA denied both Atty. 2001. Santos. Reyes. Atty. Verceles thus elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari. Montaño was nominated for the position of National Vice-President. Francisco. Castillo. Rañigo. Ernesto C. informed him that he is not qualified for the position. the Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the BLR. Asensi. Marquez. Coronel. Montaño’s candidacy which he manifested during the plenary session before the holding of the election in the Convention. Alcazaren. 2001.

Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes. After the election. already assumed and started to perform the duties of the position. Castillo. Albano. (3) No. Montaño is not qualified to run as FFW National Vice-President The FFW COMELEC is vested with authority and power. Francisco. Coronel. Sy. However. (3) Whether or not Atty. Alcazaren. Catindig. Thus. Ramirez. thus. Rodriguez. no doubt as to the BLR’s jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federation’s constitution and by-laws. especially so that Atty. De la Cruz. It is true that under the Implementing Rules. immediately after being proclaimed. under the FFW Constitution and By-Laws. Tabugan. The petition to annul Atty. Marquez. Tecson. Asensi. De Mesa. Rañigo. Gloria. Verceles had no other recourse but to take the next available remedy to protect the interest of the union he represents as well as the whole federation. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers’ association officers. Reyes. Still. Atty. Montaño’s election as VP was not prematurely filed. Lumberio. Martinez. Valiente. this requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances. Sandoval. Espina. Valois . the FFW COMELEC failed to timely act thereon. The BLR has jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving a federation. Atty. Montaño’s candidacy/proclamation with the FFW COMELEC. Page 723 Echiverri. Cabañgon. to screen candidates and determine their qualifications and eligibility to run in the election and to adopt and promulgate rules concerning the conduct of elections. Montaño is qualified for the election HELD: (1) Yes. (2) No. Corporal. He exhausted the remedies under the constitution and by-laws to have his protest acted upon by the proper forum and even asked for a formal hearing on the matter. Santos. The FFW Constitution and By-laws are clear that no member of the Governing Board shall at the same time perform functions of the rank-and-file staff. There is. Corpuz. Atty. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Verceles made his written/formal protest over Atty. redress must first be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-laws. Montaño. Palad.

the complaint was endorsed for compulsory arbitration at the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on February 13. On November 3. Rañigo. Marquez. Palawan. Respondents refused to attend said hearing.” FACTS: Petitioner New Puerto Commercial hired respondent Felix Gavan (Gavan) as a delivery panel driver on February 1. 2000 to give their side with regard to the foregoing charges. Tecson. ordering petitioners to pay nominal damages for failure to comply with procedural due process. the CA modified the decision. Sy. Inguillo. Coronel. NEW PUERTO COMMERCIAL AND RICHARD LIM vs.When the case reached the Court of Appeals. Lumberio. Sandoval. Even if the aforesaid procedure is conducted after the filing of the illegal dismissal case. Procedural due process requires that the employee be given a notice of the charge against him. the legality of the dismissal. Respondents were duty-bound to collect the accounts receivables and remit the same upon their return to petitioners’ store on a weekly basis. 1999. 1999 and respondent Rodel Lopez (Lopez) as roving salesman on October 12. No. and a notice of termination. As a result. Corporal. Valois . petitioners sent respondents notices to explain why they should not be dismissed for gross misconduct based on (1) the alleged misappropriation of their sales collections. Corpuz. and (2) their absence without leave for more than a month. The notice also required respondents to appear before petitioners’ lawyer on December 2. Espina. Lastimosa. Valiente. Catindig. De Mesa.R. as to its procedural aspect. 2000. Tabugan. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were accorded procedural due process HELD: Albano. a conciliation conference was held but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Gloria. he must be accorded both substantive and procedural due process by the employer. will be upheld provided that the employer is able to show that compliance with these requirements was not a mere afterthought. 2001. an ample opportunity to be heard. Cabañgon. Previously or on November 28. Reyes.Under a rolling store scheme. Page 724 Echiverri. The LA and the NLRC upheld the legality of the dismissal. Martinez. Petitioner Richard Lim is the operations manager of New Puerto Commercial. Rodriguez. Ramirez. 2010 DOCTRINE:“In order to validly dismiss an employee.RODEL LOPEZ AND FELIX GAVAN G. respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against petitioners with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in Puerto Princesa City. 2000. Castillo. Asensi. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. 16999 July 26. On November 20. 2000. Santos. petitioners assigned respondents to sell goods stocked in a van on cash or credit to the sari-sari stores of far-flung barangays and municipalities outside Puerto Princesa City. Francisco. Palad.

On November 18. Sometime in the third week of October 2000. As a result. 2000 for respondent Lopez and October 28. Gloria. Espina. Lastimosa. 2000. When the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied. termination proceedings were commenced against respondents by sending notices to explain with a notice of hearing scheduled on December 2. on November 28. 2000. 2000 for respondent Gavan) after they got wind of the fact that they were being investigated for misappropriation of their sales collection. Lumberio. by itself. 2000 to attend a hearing on December 15. In termination proceedings of employees. Catindig. establish that the same was a mere afterthought. Castillo. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard. and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. petitioners received information that respondents were not remitting their sales collections to the company. 2000 but respondents again refused to attend. in the route being serviced by respondents. De Mesa. Marquez. 2000. Tecson. Reyes. The surrounding circumstances of this case adequately explain why the requirements of procedural due process were satisfied only after the filing of the labor complaint. Francisco. Alcazaren. Ramirez.03 in sales collections. Rodriguez. Sy. there was sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing even if the notices were sent and the hearing conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Subsequently. under the peculiar circumstances of this case. Martinez. To prevent a possible cover up. petitioners served notices of termination on respondents for gross misconduct in misappropriating their sales collections and absence without leave for more than a month. Sandoval. The mere fact that the notices were sent to respondents after the filing of the labor complaint does not. Bagasala. and. petitioners initiated an investigation by sending one of their trusted salesmen. Santos. Asensi. 2000. Rañigo. respondents filed the subject illegal dismissal case to pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing investigation. on November 3. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. Thereafter. Corporal. Tabugan. respondents stopped reporting for work (i. Inguillo. As narrated earlier. As can be seen. For this reason. Valois . Yes. 2000. respondents failed to give their side despite receipt of said notices. Petitioners sent another set of notices to respondents on December 7. it cannot be concluded that the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a mere afterthought because petitioners were still awaiting the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the subject labor complaint.e. and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Albano. Bagasala returned from his month-long investigation in the far-flung areas previously serviced by respondents and reported that respondents indeed failed to remit ₱2. on December 18. Valiente. respondents were temporarily reassigned to a new route to service. Palad. De la Cruz. Coronel. starting from October 22. Page 725 Echiverri.257.. Thus. Cabañgon. Corpuz.

Ramirez. Palad. submitted a memorandum regarding the incident to the Human Resources and Administration Department on the same date. Francisco. Corpuz. Tabugan. in her explanation. 2003. Sy. did not reckon that respondent company would terminate her services for her admitted offense. in turn. Reyes." “The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. called her to his office and directed her to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. Espina. "(a) it must be serious. No. When the lady guard on duty inspected Helen’s bag. Corporal. On September 5. On September 26. admitted the offense and even manifested that she would accept whatever penalty would be imposed upon her. Santos. Martinez. NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA KEIHIN (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) and HELEN VALENZUELA vs. Helen received a notice of disciplinary action informing her that Keihin has decided to terminate her services. Page 726 Echiverri. or any attempt to commit theft or robbery. while Helen was about to leave the company premises." Paul Cupon. Tecson. who. It is a standard operating procedure of Keihin to subject all its employees to reasonable search before they leave the company premises. she found the packing tape inside her bag. Lastimosa. which says. 2003. Catindig. The following day. or on September 6. she saw a packing tape near her work area and placed it inside her bag because it would be useful in her transfer of residence. She. Sandoval. Albano. Inguillo. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION G. Rodriguez. Valois . Helen. Gloria. 2003. respondent company issued a show cause notice to Helen accusing her of violating F. 171115 August 9. Lumberio." FACTS: Petitioner Helen Valenzuela (Helen) was a production associate in respondent Keihin Philippines Corporation (Keihin). Asensi. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Castillo. of any company property or other associate’s property. and (b) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. 2010 DOCTRINE:“For serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law. Cabañgon. (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties. De la Cruz. Penalty: D (dismissal). De Mesa. Valiente. Marquez. Helen’s supervisor. Coronel. The guard confiscated it and submitted an incident report dated September 5. and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. "Any act constituting theft or robbery. however.2 of the company’s Code of Conduct.R. 2003 to the Guard-in-Charge.

De Mesa. Inguillo. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. because the same was done with no malicious intent. petitioners claimed that her punishment was disproportionate to her infraction. Catindig. Coronel. De la Cruz. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Asensi. Tabugan. Espina. and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. Cabañgon. Gloria. (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. non-payment of 13th month pay. Corporal. Sandoval. Marquez. in taking the packing tape for her own personal use. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of KEIHIN. Ramirez. (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. Martinez. with a prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages. Termination by employer. Petitioners alleged that Helen’s act of taking the packing tape did not constitute serious misconduct. Tecson. Alcazaren. which the NLRC and the CA affirmed ISSUE: (1)Whether or not the punishment of dismissal was proper (2) Whether or not HELEN was afforded proper due process HELD: (1) YES. Castillo. Corpuz. Francisco. Sy. They believed that the tape was not of great value and of no further use to respondent company since it was already half used. It provides: ARTICLE 282. Rañigo. Helen committed serious misconduct. which is a just cause for her dismissal from service. Santos. Although Helen admitted that she took the packing tape. Lumberio. as well as moral and exemplary damages. The issue boils down to whether. Valiente. Palad. Valois . Albano. Page 727 Echiverri. Reyes.

Rañigo." In other words. Tecson. Cabañgon. or any attempt to commit theft or robbery. Coronel. Reyes. Valiente." For serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law. Martinez." In this case. We hold that Helen is guilty of serious misconduct in her act of taking the packing tape. respondent company issued two memoranda implementing an intensive inspection procedure and reminding all employees that those who will be caught stealing and performing acts of vandalism will be dealt with in accordance with the company’s Code of Conduct.2 of the company’s Code of Conduct which says. Asensi. When Helen was asked to explain in writing why she took the tape." We find that such notice sufficiently informed Helen of the charge of theft of company property against her. Gloria. she stated. Lumberio. It is noteworthy that prior to this incident. there was intent on her part to benefit herself when she attempted to bring home the packing tape in question. "Kumuha po ako ng isang packing tape na gagamitin ko sa paglilipat ng gamit ko sa bago kong lilipatang bahay. Lastimosa. Palad. De la Cruz. and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Misconduct is defined as "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action. De Mesa. there had been several cases of theft and vandalism involving both respondent company’s property and personal belongings of other employees. Rodriguez. Helen was afforded procedural due process We reject petitioners’ claim that respondent company failed to observe the requirements of procedural due process. "(a) it must be serious. All these circumstances point to the conclusion that it was not just an error of judgment on the part of Helen. Espina. Helen took the packing tape and was caught during the routine inspection. a forbidden act. Page 728 Echiverri. (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties. willful in character. Tabugan. Inguillo. Santos. 2003 accusing her of violating F. by her own admission. Francisco. of any company property or other associate’s property. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought.” In the case at bar. and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Catindig. and (b) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. but a deliberate act of theft of company property. (2) Yes. a dereliction of duty. it has been consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process. "In the dismissal of employees. respondent company furnished Helen a show-cause notice dated September 6. Valois . Despite these reminders. Albano. Sandoval. Corpuz. In order to address this issue of losses. Ramirez. Corporal. Marquez. Helen took the packing tape with the thought that she could use it for her own personal purposes. Castillo. Alcazaren. "Any act constituting theft or robbery. Sy.

We are convinced that such notice satisfies the due process requirement to apprise the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which dismissal is sought.

With regard to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an
opportunity to be heard. Such opportunity was afforded the petitioner when she was
asked to explain her side of the story. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Barrientos, we held that, "the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be
heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held."
Similarly in Philippine Pasay Chung Hua Academy v. Edpan, we held that, "[e]ven if no
hearing or conference was conducted, the requirement of due process had been met
since he was accorded a chance to explain his side of the controversy."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 729
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

MEDLINE MANAGEMENT, INC. and GRECOMAR SHIPPING AGENCY vs. GLICERIA
ROSLINDA AND ARIEL ROSLINDA
G.R. No. 168715, (September 15, 2010)

DOCTRINE: All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.

FACTS:
Petitioners hired Juliano Roslinda to work on board the vessel MV Victory. Juliano was
previously employed by the petitioners under two successive separate employment contracts of
varying durations. In accordance with which, he boarded the vessel MV Victory on October 25,
1998 as an oiler and, after several months of extension, was discharged on January 20, 2000.
Months after his repatriation, or on March 6, 2000, Juliano consulted Dr. Pamela R. Lloren. He
complained about abdominal distention which is the medical term for a patient who vomits
previously ingested foods. From March 8 to August 24, 2000, On August 27, 2001, Juliano
died. On September 4, 2003, his wife Gliceria Roslinda and son Ariel Roslinda, respondents
herein, filed a complaint against MMI and GSA for payment of death compensation,
reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC

ISSUE:
WON claim is not yet barred by prescription despite the fact that it was filed beyond the
one-year prescriptive period provided by the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

HELD:
NO. The employment contract signed by Juliano stated that Upon approval, the same
shall be deemed an integral part of the Standard Employment Contract (SEC) for seafarers.
Section 28 of the POEA SEC states: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) or the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over any and all disputes or controversies arising out of or by virtue of this Contract.
Recognizing the peculiar nature of overseas shipboard employment, the employer and the
seafarer agree that all claims arising from this contract shall be made within one (1) year from
the date of the seafarer's return to the point of hire. (Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, the
Labor Code states: ART. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.

In Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr.,[19] we ruled that Article 291 is the law governing
the prescription of money claims of seafarers, a class of overseas contract workers. This law
prevails over Section 28 of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which provides for
claims to be brought only within one year from the date of the seafarer's return to the point of
hire. We further declared that for the guidance of all, Section 28 of the Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers, insofar as it limits the prescriptive period within which the seafarers may
file their money claims, is hereby declared null and void. The applicable provision is Article 291
of the Labor Code, it being more favorable to the seafarers and more in accord with the State's

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 730
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

declared policy to afford full protection to labor. The prescriptive period in the present case is
thus three years from the time the cause of action accrues. In the present case, the cause of
action accrued on August 27, 2001 when Juliano died. Hence, the claim has not yet prescribed,
since the complaint was filed with the arbitration branch of the NLRC on September 4, 2003.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 731
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

SHIMIZU PHILS. CONTRACTORS INC. vs. VIRGILIO P. CALLANTA
G.R. No. 165923, (September 29, 2010)

DOCTRINE: As an authorized cause for separation from service under Article 283 of the Labor
Code, retrenchment is a valid exercise of management prerogative subject to the strict
requirements set by jurisprudence: (1) That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely
to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively
and in good faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to the
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees
separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees
right to security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such
as status, x x x efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers. In the present case, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found sufficient compliance
with these substantive requirements, there being enough evidence to prove that petitioner was
sustaining business losses, that separation pay was offered to respondent, and that notices of
termination of service were furnished respondent and DOLE.

FACTS:
Petitioner, employed respondent as Safety Officer assigned at petitioners Yutaka-Giken
Project and eventually as Project Administrator of petitioners Structural Steel Division (SSD) in
1995. In a Memorandum dated June 7, 1997 respondent was informed that his services will be
terminated effective July 9, 1997 due to the lack of any vacancy in other projects and the need to
re-align the company’s personnel requirements brought about by the imperatives of maximum
financial commitments. Respondent then filed an illegal dismissal complaint against petitioner
assailing his dismissal as without any valid cause. The LA rendered a decision holding that there
was a valid retrenchment which was affirmed by the NLRC. However, CA invalidated the
retrenchment, held respondent to have been illegally dismissed, and ordered respondents
reinstatement and payment of backwages.

ISSUE:
WON There was substantial compliance for a valid retrenchment.

HELD:
YES. As an authorized cause for separation from service under Article 283 of the Labor
Code, retrenchment is a valid exercise of management prerogative subject to the strict
requirements set by jurisprudence: (1) That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely
to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively
and in good faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to the
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 732
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees
right to security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such
as status, x x x efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers. In the present case, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found sufficient compliance
with these substantive requirements, there being enough evidence to prove that petitioner was
sustaining business losses, that separation pay was offered to respondent, and that notices of
termination of service were furnished respondent and DOLE. In fine, we hold that petitioner was
able to prove that it incurred substantial business losses, that it offered to pay respondent his
separation pay, that the retrenchment scheme was arrived at in good faith, and lastly, that the
criteria or standard used in selecting the employees to be retrenched was work efficiency which
passed the test of fairness and reasonableness.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 733
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. MANUEL P. BESITAN
G.R. No. 178901 (November 23, 2011)

DOCTRINE: Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the
employees working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a
connection between his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of
work-connection, not direct causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a
non-occupational disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation
proceedings; thus, any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social
legislations, like PD No. 626, were enacted.

FACTS:
Respondent was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas) on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner. Subsequently, he was promoted as
Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III. In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with
End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a
kidney transplant at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI), for which he incurred
medical expenses amounting to P817,455.40. Believing that his working condition increased his
risk of contracting the disease, Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. The GSIS, however, denied the claim
and the ECC affirmed the denial by the GSIS. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the
ECC. The CA ruled that respondent is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended, because his ailment was aggravated by the nature of his work, as evidenced by the
Medical Certificate.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended.

HELD:
YES. Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the
employees working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a
connection between his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of
work-connection, not direct causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a
non-occupational disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation
proceedings; thus, any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social
legislations, like PD No. 626, were enacted. Moreover, direct and clear evidence, is not
necessary to prove a claim. Strict rules of evidence do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. In this case, since Besitans ailment, End Stage Renal Disease
secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not among those listed under Annex A, of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, he needs to show by substantial evidence that
his risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. After a careful study
of the instant case, we find that Besitan has sufficiently proved that his working condition
increased his risk of contracting Glomerulonephritis, which according to GSIS may be caused
by bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection (i.e. Typhoid fever, Syphilis, Leptospirosis,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 734
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Toxoplasmosis, Varicella, Mumps, Measles, Schistosomiasis, Hepatitis B and C infection, etc.).
When Besitan entered the government service in 1976, he was given a clean bill of health. In
2005, he was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic
Glomerulonephritis. It would appear therefore that the nature of his work could have increased
his risk of contracting the disease. His frequent travels to remote areas in the country could have
exposed him to certain bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection, which in turn could have caused
his disease. Delaying his urination during his long trips to the provinces could have also
increased his risk of contracting his disease. As a matter of fact, even the Bank Physician of
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Dr. Gregorio Suarez II, agreed that Besitans working condition
could have contributed to the weakening of his kidneys, which could have caused his disease.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 735
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Now BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.) vs. CASTOR
DOMPOR
G.R. Nos. 163293 and 163297, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: To justify willful disobedience or insubordination as a valid ground for termination,
the employees assailed conduct must have been willful [or] characterized by a wrongful or
perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. On the
other hand, willful breach of trust requires that the loss of confidence must not be simulated; it
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified; it may
not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; it must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and, the employee
involved holds a position of trust and confidence.

FACTS:
Respondent was employed by then PCIB, which came to be Equitable PCI Bank and
now herein petitioner Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. In 1995, he was assigned as branch
manager of PCIBs Makati Cinema Branch. On July 24, 1996, PCIBs Operations Subcenter
Head, called the attention of PCIBs Ayala-Makati Area Head, regarding a number of PLDT
dividend checks being sent for clearing by PCIB Makati Cinema Branch. It appears that
respondent allowed Luz Fuentes to deposit several second-endorsed PLDT dividend checks
beginning the last quarter of 1995. A special audit was then conducted and the audit found out
that such transaction made by the respondent was anomalous transactions. On September 2,
1996, a hearing was held by the investigating committee whereby several officers and
personnel including respondent were queried in relation to the irregular transactions involving
the account of Fuentes. After the hearing, on February 7, 1997, respondent received a
Memo dated January 7, 1997 dismissing him from employment on the grounds of serious policy
violations, willful breach of trust, and loss of confidence, with further sanction of forfeiture of
benefits and contingent restitution of the total amount of P6,712,756.61 including
costs. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by the LA and
affirmed by the NLRC. However, such decision was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
WON respondent committed willful disobedience and willful breach of trust sufficient as
just causes for his dismissal.

HELD:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

YES. To justify willful disobedience or insubordination as a valid ground for termination,
the employees assailed conduct must have been willful [or] characterized by a wrongful or
perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. On the
other hand, willful breach of trust requires that the loss of confidence must not be simulated; it
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified; it may
not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; it must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and, the employee
involved holds a position of trust and confidence. In the case at bench, we hold that respondent
was validly dismissed on the grounds of willful disobedience and willful breach of trust under
Article 282 of the Labor Code. While petitioners manual of procedures does not absolutely
prohibit the negotiation or acceptance of second-endorsed checks for deposits, it does
expressly disallow the acceptance of checks endorsed by corporations, societies, firms, etc. and
checks with unusual endorsements. As shown by the records, this explicit policy was
transgressed by respondent intentionally and willfully. It was not denied that on June 27, 1996,
respondent was instructed by management to stop accepting second-endorsed checks due to
the irregularities attendant to the transactions with Fuentes. Despite such reasonable order, on
two occasions, respondent unhesitatingly accommodated the request of Fuentes to accept her
checks allegedly on the strength of the Area Heads approval on the first instance and on the
second instance, respondent justifies his acceptance of the checks as the same were
nevertheless returned and cancelled on the ground that the checks include those payable to
corporations. Indeed, the return and cancellation of these checks do not change the fact that
respondent had accepted for deposit checks which are payable to corporations, thereby
flagrantly violating bank guidelines. Respondent admittedly disobeyed not only his superiors
directives but also simple bank rules. Moreover, in the investigation conducted on September 2,
1996, Gabriel observed that the signatures appearing at the back of the checks accepted by
respondent bore the same strokes. As correctly noted by the Labor Arbiter, the negotiation of
checks by hundreds of payees to only one individual should have alerted respondent as to the
authenticity of the endorsements. These considerations have convinced the Court that the
PLDT dividend checks indeed contain unusual and suspicious endorsements and cannot be
overruled by the mere denial of respondent. . . Respondent, as bank manager, has the duty to
ensure that bank rules are strictly complied with not only to ensure efficient bank operation which
is imbued with public interest but also to serve the best interest of the bank as he holds a position
of trust and confidence. As emphasized by petitioner, respondent was in charge of the overall
administration of the branch and is tasked to ensure that all policies and procedures are strictly
followed. Indubitably, any negligence in the exercise of his responsibilities can be sufficient

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 737
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

ground for loss of trust and confidence demanded by his position. As held in Etcuban, Jr. v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., the mere existence of a basis for believing that [a managerial] employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal x x x. [P]roof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. Respondent’s wanton violation of bank policies equates to
abuse of authority and, therefore, abuse of the trust reposed in him. Such intention to violate the
trust of petitioner is enough for his dismissal from service.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 738
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PLDT vs. EUSEBIO HONRADO
G.R. No. 189366, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: The requisites for a valid dismissal are: (a) the employee must be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself; and (b)
the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code or for
any of the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code.

FACTS:
Private respondent was an employee of petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company assigned at the PLDT North Paraaque Exchange. On November 29, 1999, spouses
Mueda went to PLDT to verify their application for telephone because according to them, a
person named Rony Hipolito who introduced himself as a PLDT employee went to their house
on November 26, 1999 in the afternoon and that they can pay directly to him since he is a PLDT
employee and that the balance can be paid to PLDT within six months on installment basis.
Spouses Mueda further stated: that because of this, they paid Hipolito P1,500.00 as partial
payment for the installation of their new telephone line. However, the spouses found out that the
respondent and Rony Hipolito was only one person who defrauded the spouses. Thus, they
filed a complaint against the respondent. There was a formal hearing that took place which both
sides were heard. Thereafter, per inter-office memorandum dated February 13, 2001, private
respondent was notified that he was found liable as charged, hence, dismissed from service
effective February 15, 2001 at the close of business hours. Thus the respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal which was denied by the LA. However on appeal, the NLRC
granted such appeal which was also affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
WON there was a valid termination against the respondent.

HELD:
YES. The requisites for a valid dismissal are: (a) the employee must be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself; and (b)
the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code or for
any of the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. It is hornbook in
employee dismissal cases that [t]he essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side x x x. A formal or trial
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of
which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy. Neither is it necessary that the witnesses be cross-examined by counsel
for the adverse party. The CA cited this Courts ruling in Asuncion v. National Labor Relations
Commission citing Ruffy v. National Labor Relations Commission that ample opportunity would
be every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employee to enable him to
prepare for his defense. However, a careful reading of the factual setting of both cases belies

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 739
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

their inapplicability to the instant case. In Asuncion, this Court took note of the fact that the
two-day period for the petitioner to answer the charges against her was unreasonable
considering that she was charged with several infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108
tardiness. On the other hand, in Ruffy, the employee was terminated prior to the
investigation. We further held in the latter case that in order to enable the employee to prepare
adequately for his defense, he may be provided with a representative. In this case, in addition to
the actual confrontation proceeding with Mrs. Mueda, Honrado asked for and was given a
formal hearing where he together with his counsel and his union representative had ample
opportunity to rebut the accusation lodged against him. However, despite said opportunity, other
than his general denial, he did not present his counter-statement in the company
proceedings. Clearly, Honrado was afforded ample opportunity to air his side and defend
himself. Hence, there was no denial of his right to due process.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 740
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PABLO POLSOTIN, JR., ARWIN RAYALA, GERONIMO LIMPANTE, RAUL
DOMDOM, AND OSCAR ANDRIN, vs. DE GUIA ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 172624, December 5, 2011

DOCTRINE: A worker cannot be deprived of his job, a property right, without satisfying
the requirements of due process. As enshrined in our bill of rights, no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

FACTS:
Petitioners Polsotin, Rayala, Limpante, Domdom and Andrin (petitioners) were bus
drivers and conductors of respondent De Guia Enterprises, Inc. (respondent). Alleging
that they were dismissed without cause and due process, petitioners filed on July 17,
2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of backwages and damages against
respondent before the NLRC.

Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners’ complaint for lack of
merit. It held that petitioners were validly terminated from employment for violation of
company rules and regulations as well as for gross and habitual neglect of duties. NLRC
dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to append thereto a certificate of non-forum
shopping and proof of service upon the other party. The NLRC then affirmed the Decision
appealed from. CA rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing the petition
for the following reasons: first, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached to the petition was not signed by all of the petitioners; and, second, there was no
showing of grave abuse of discretion since the NLRC merely complied with the
procedural rules governing appeals before it. Therefore, it could not be faulted in denying
petitioners’ appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in spite of the technicalities, petitioners are still entitled to due
consideration of their petition

HELD:
Yes. Strict application of technical rules should be set aside to serve the broader
interest of substantial justice.

It bears stressing that "the dismissal of an employee’s appeal on purely technical ground
is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to labor." The Court has
often set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities to serve the broader
interest of substantial justice.
A careful consideration of the facts of the case convinces us that petitioners’ appeal
should have been given due course. It may be recalled that respondent failed to timely
submit its position paper when required by the Labor Arbiter, hence, the case was

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

submitted for decision sans the same. Nonetheless, when respondent filed its position
paper, the Labor Arbiter admitted the same and relied on it in coming up with a decision
that petitioners were validly terminated. More important is that petitioners were not even
furnished a copy of respondent’s position paper in order for them to refute the contents
and allegations therein. And since neither did respondent appear in any of the hearings
conducted before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were never really afforded an opportunity
to rebut respondent’s allegations and charges against them or to introduce evidence to
refute them. Petitioners’ right to due process was thus clearly violated.

Indeed, labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure. However, in every proceeding before it, the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process should not to be ignored but must at all times be
respected. Besides, petitioners’ case concerns their job, considered as a property right,
of which they could not be deprived of without due process.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 742
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

RENATO REAL, vs. SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. and/ or KIICHI ABE
G.R. No. 168757, January 19, 2011

DOCTRINE: To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is
to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court
to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of
the parties, and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

FACTS:
Petitioner was removed from his position as Manager through Board Resolution
adopted by respondent corporation’s Board of Directors. Petitioner complained that he
was neither notified of the Board Meeting during which said board resolution was passed
nor formally charged with any infraction. Respondents, on the other hand, refuted
petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal by alleging that after petitioner was appointed
Manager, he committed gross acts of misconduct detrimental to the company since
2000. As he was almost always absent, petitioner neglected to supervise the employees
resulting in complaints from various clients about employees’ performance. Labor Arbiter
in a Decision declared petitioner and his co-complainants as having been illegally
dismissed.

Respondents thus appealed to the NLRC and raised therein as one of the issues the
lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over petitioner’s complaint. Respondents claimed
that petitioner is both a stockholder and a corporate officer of respondent corporation,
hence, his action against respondents is an intra-corporate controversy over which the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. The NLRC found such contention of respondents to be
meritorious. CA sided with respondents and affirmed the NLRC’s finding that aside from
being a stockholder of respondent corporation, petitioner is also a corporate officer
thereof and consequently, his complaint is an intra-corporate controversy over which the
labor arbiter has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal constitutes an
intra-corporate controversy and thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

HELD:
Two-tier test in determining the existence of intra-corporate controversy. The better
policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider
concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of
the question that is subject of their controversy. In the absence of any one of these
factors, the SEC will not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that
every conflict between the corporation and its stockholders would involve such corporate
matters as only SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) can resolve in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Guided by recent jurisprudence, we thus find no merit in respondents’ contention
that the fact alone that petitioner is a stockholder and director of respondent corporation
automatically classifies this case as an intra-corporate controversy. To reiterate, not all
conflicts between the stockholders and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate.
There are other factors to consider in determining whether the dispute involves corporate
matters as to consider them as intra-corporate controversies.

An examination of the complaint for illegal dismissal, however, reveals that the root
of the controversy is petitioner’s dismissal as Manager of respondent corporation, a
position which respondents claim to be a corporate office. Hence, petitioner is involved in
this case not in his capacity as a stockholder or director, but as an alleged corporate
officer. In applying the relationship test, therefore, it is necessary to determine if petitioner
is a corporate officer of respondent corporation so as to establish the intra-corporate
relationship between the parties.

The Court have have however examined the records of this case and we find
nothing to prove that petitioner’s appointment was made pursuant to the above-quoted
provision of respondent corporation’s By-Laws. No copy of board resolution appointing
petitioner as Manager or any other document showing that he was appointed to said
position by action of the board was submitted by respondents. What we found instead
were mere allegations of respondents in their various pleadings that petitioner was
appointed as Manager of respondent corporation and nothing more.” Having said this, we
find that there is no intra-corporate relationship between the parties insofar as petitioner’s
complaint for illegal dismissal is concerned and that same does not satisfy the
relationship test.

With the elements of intra-corporate controversy being absent in this case, we thus
hold that petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents is not
intra-corporate. Rather, it is a termination dispute and, consequently, falls under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Section 217 of the Labor Code.

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ISLRIZ TRADING/VICTOR HUGO LU, vs. EFREN CAPADA, LAURO LICUP,
NORBERTO NIGOS, RONNIE ABEL, GODOFREDO MAGNAYE, ARNEL SIBERRE,
EDMUNDO CAPADA, NOMERLITO MAGNAYE and ALBERTO DELA VEGA.
G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries during the period between
the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
Otherwise stated, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, the employer is still obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court or tribunal.

FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay,
holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner. On his part,
petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of the respondents and ordered payment of full back wages from date of dismissal to
actual reinstatement. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC which granted the
appeal. NLRC ordered respondents’ reinstatement but without backwages. Labor Arbiter
issued a Writ of Execution. Before the CA, petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction upon Labor Arbiter Castillon for issuing the
questioned Writ of Execution. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may collect their wages during the period between the
Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.

HELD:
In resolving the case, the Court examined its conflicting rulings with respect to the
application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code, viz:
At the core of the seeming divergence is the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of
the Labor Code which reads:
‘In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.’
The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:

‘x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal,
it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the

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dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period
and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to
reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually
rendered services during the period.

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the
Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is
immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor
Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to
comply therewith.

Hence, the conclusion is that respondents have the right to collect their accrued
salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s Decision ordering their
reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning the same because
petitioner’s failure to reinstate them either actually or through payroll was due to
petitioner’s unjustified refusal to effect reinstatement. In order to enforce this, Labor
Arbiter Castillon thus correctly issued the Writ of Execution dated March 9, 2004 as well
as the Order dated June 3, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
and granting respondents’ Urgent Motion for Issuance of Break-Open Order.
Consequently, we find no error on the part of the CA in upholding these issuances and in
dismissing the petition for certiorari before it.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 746
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

EXODUS INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ANTONIO P.
JAVALERA, vs. GUILLERMO BISCOCHO, FERNANDO PEREDA, FERDINAND
MARIANO, GREGORIO BELLITA and MIGUEL BOBILLO
G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to first
establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to prove
that the dismissal was legal.

FACTS:
Exodus obtained from Dutch Boy a contract for the painting of the Imperial Sky
Garden. Guillermo was assigned at the Imperial. Fernando worked in the same project.
All of them were then transferred to Pacific Plaza Towers. Guillermo, Fernando,
Ferdinand, and Miguel filed a complaint8 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and night-shift differential pay. Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision exonerating petitioners from the charge of illegal dismissal as
respondents chose not to report for work. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision exonerating
petitioners from the charge of illegal dismissal as respondents chose not to report for
work. The Labor Arbiter ruled that since there is neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment
of job, respondents should be reinstated but without any backwages. NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. It opined that in a situation where the employer has
complete control over the records and could thus easily rebut any monetary claims
against it but opted not to lift any finger, the burden is on the employer and not on the
complainants. This is so because the latter are definitely not in a position to adduce any
documentary evidence, the control of which being not with them.

ISSUE:
Whether there is illegal dismissal in this case

HELD:
No. There was no dismissal in this case. As found by the Labor Arbiter, there was no
evidence that respondents were dismissed nor were they prevented from returning to
their work. It was only respondents’ unsubstantiated conclusion that they were dismissed.
As a matter of fact, respondents could not name the particular person who effected their
dismissal and under what particular circumstances. The rule is that one who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that
respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the
evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the
employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here
because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners. In this case, petitioners
were able to show that they never dismissed respondents.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 747
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Hence, as between respondents’ general allegation of having been orally dismissed
from the service vis-a-vis those of petitioners which were found to be substantiated by the
sworn statement of foreman Wenifredo, we are persuaded by the latter. Absent any
showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioners had dismissed respondents,
the latters’ claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained. Indeed, a cursory examination
of the records reveal no illegal dismissal to speak of.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 748
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED vs. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG
LEGENDA (KML-INDEPENDENT)
G.R. No. 169754, February 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally
attacked in a petition for certification election.

FACTS:
KML filed a Petition for Certification Election. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor
organization of the rank and file employees of Legend International Resorts Limited
(LEGEND). LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate
labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and supervisory
employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. KML argued that even if 41 of its
members are indeed supervisory employees and therefore excluded from its
membership, the certification election could still proceed because the required number of
the total rank and file employees necessary for certification purposes is still sustained.
KML also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union could not be collaterally attacked in
the certification election proceedings but only through a separate and independent action
for cancellation of union registration. Finally, as to the alleged acts of misrepresentation,
KML asserted that LEGEND failed to substantiate its claim. Med-Arbiter concluded that
KML is not a legitimate labor organization. Office of the Secretary of DOLE rendered its
Decision granting KML’s appeal thereby reversing and setting aside the Med-Arbiter’s
Decision. The Office of the Secretary of DOLE held that KML’s legitimacy as a union
could not be collaterally attacked.

Court of Appeals rendered its Decision finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a
petition for certification election

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in
a petition for certification election.

The Court agree with the ruling of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE that the
legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
certification election proceeding. This is in consonance with our ruling in Laguna
Autoparts Manufacturing Corporation v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment that "such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only
through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 749
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

This is categorically prescribed by Section 5, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of
Book V, which states as follows:

SEC. 5. Effect of registration. – The labor organization or worker’s association
shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral
attack but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in
accordance with these Rules.

Hence, to raise the issue of the respondent union’s legal personality is not proper
in this case. The pronouncement of the Labor Relations Division Chief, that the
respondent union acquired a legal personality x x x cannot be challenged in a petition for
certification election.

The discussion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment on this point is also
enlightening, thus:

. . . Section 5, Rule V of D.O. 9 is instructive on the matter. It provides that the legal
personality of a union cannot be the subject of collateral attack in a petition for certification
election, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation of union
registration. This has been the rule since NUBE v. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274
(1981). What applies in this case is the principle that once a union acquires a legitimate
status as a labor organization, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is
cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.

Equally important is Section 11, Paragraph II, Rule IX of D.O. 9, which provides for
the dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack of legal personality of
a labor organization only in the following instances: (1) appellant is not listed by the
Regional Office or the BLR in its registry of legitimate labor organizations; or (2)
appellant’s legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality. Since appellant
is listed in the registry of legitimate labor organizations, and its legitimacy has not been
revoked or cancelled with finality, the granting of its petition for certification election is
proper. "[T]he legal personality of a legitimate labor organization x x x cannot be subject
to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. x x x The Implementing Rules
stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of
registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral
attack. In may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in
accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 750
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

IMELDA PANTOLLANO (for herself as surviving spouse and in behalf of her 4
children Honeyvette, Tierra Bryn, KienneDionnes, Sherra Veda Mae, then all
minors, with deceased seaman VEDASTO PANTOLLANO)
vs.
KORPHIL SHIPMANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 169575: March 30, 2011

DOCTRINE:The heirs of a missing seaman may file their claim for death compensation
benefits within the three-year period fixed by law from the time the seaman has been
presumed dead.

FACTS:
KorphilShipmanagement and Manning Corporation (Korphil) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of seafarers for its foreign principals, hired
Vedasto C. Pantollano (Vedasto) as 4th Engineer on board the vessel M/V Couper under
a Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) approved contractof employment.
Vedasto was seen by MessmanNolito L. Tarnate (MessmanNolito) to be in deep
thought, counting other vessels passing by and talking to himself. At about 8:15 A.M., the
Chief Engineer of the vessel reported to the Master of the vessel, Mr. Kim Jong Chul,
that Vedasto did not show up for his duty. The Master of the vessel thus ordered all
personnel on standby. The vessel then altered its course to search for Vedasto. Some
crew members were tasked to search the vessel while others were assigned to focus
their search on the open sea to locate and rescue Vedasto. Assistance from other
vessels was also requested. Thesearch and rescue operation lasted for about six hours,
but Vedasto was not found. On August 3, 1994, a Report was issued by the Master of
M/V Couper declaring that Vedasto was missing. Since then, Vedasto was never seen
again.
For this reason, Imelda, wife of Vedasto, filed a complaint before the NLRC where
she sought to recover death benefits, damages and attorneys fees.
The LA rendered a decision holding that the legal heirs of Vedasto are entitled to
the payment of death benefits and attorneys fees. On appeal to the NLRC, the LA
decision was affirmed. Aggrieved, a petition for certiorari was filed before the CA where
the NLRC decision was reversed. Upon denial of Imelda's motion for reconsideration, the
present petition is filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Vedasto are entitled to the benefits

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 751
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

HELD:
A person missing under the circumstances as those of Vedasto may not legally be
considered as dead until the lapse of the period fixed by law on presumption of death,
and consequently Imelda cannot yet be considered as a widow entitled to compensation
under the law.

On August 2, 1994, when Vedasto was reported missing, Imelda cannot as yet file
her claim for death benefits as it is still premature. The provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code therefore become relevant. With the known facts, namely, that Vedasto was
lost or missing while M/V Couper was navigating the open sea, there is no doubt that he
could have been in danger of death. Paragraph (3) of Article 391 of the Civil Code will
then be applicable in this case. Thus, Vedasto can only be presumed dead after the
lapse of four years from August 2, 1994 when he was declared missing. But of course,
evidence must be shown that Vedasto has not been heard of for four years or thereafter.
This is the case here.
Vedasto is presumed legally dead only on August 2, 1998. It is only at this time
that the rights of his heirs to file their claim for death benefits accrued.
Having already established that Imeldas cause of action accrued on August 2,
1998, it follows that her claim filed on May 29, 2000 was timely. It was filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor
Code. Hence, Imelda and her children are entitled to the payment of said compensation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 752
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

2011 DOCTRINE: A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under the Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors. however. FACTS: Teresa Favila was married to FloranteFavila on January 17. Florante II. The SSS. Martinez. Cabañgon. No. FAVILA G. Francisco. Valiente. same forecloses any inquiry as to whether the spouse is indeed a dependent deriving support from the member. Valois . 1997. and (2) dependency for support. Sandoval. Sy. Asensi.R. There was no leg al separation or annulment of marriage that could have disqualified her from claiming the death benefits. which is affect ed by factors such as separation de facto of the spouses. Marquez. Lumberio. CA found Teresa's petition with merit. He likewise designated each one of his children as beneficiaries when he begot them. 1970. and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for support. SSC ruled t hat Teresa is disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to marital infidelity. Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS. Tecson. marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse under the law. Reyes. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. but only until his emancipation at age 21. Lastimosa. to wit: (1) that he/she is the legitimate spouse. When Florante died on February 1. Gloria. De Mesa. TERESA G. 1970. Catindig. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Corporal. Page 753 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Florante designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form on June 30. Rañigo. Corpuz. his pension benefits under the SSS were given t o their only minor child at that time. 170195 March 28. It gave weight to the fact that she is a primary beneficiary because she is the lawful surviving spouse of Florante and i n addition. Palad. Tabugan. Santos. Inguillo. denied the claim. Castillo. It opined that once a spouse is designated by an SSS m ember as his/her beneficiary. ISSUE: Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as t o be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante? Albano. Rodriguez. she was designated by Florante as such beneficiary. SSC further held that Teresa did not timely contest her non-entitlement to the award of benefits. The ruling of SSC held that death benefits are dependent on 2 factors: (1) legality of the marital relationship. Coronel. It was only when Florante II’s pension was stopped that she filed her claim. Espina.

" As Teresa had been separated from Florante for 17 years prior to his death. absent any showing to the contrary. Lumberio. Catindig. someone else for support. Inguillo. Rañigo. Gloria. Dependent is defined under under paragraph (e) as one who is dependent upon t he member for support. Teresa failed to present any proof to show that at the time of her husband’s death. Corpuz. Asensi. Ramirez. Santos. the Court defined "dependent" as "one who derives his or her main support from another [or] relying on. Valiente. Reyes. Martinez. Alcazaren. power or aid of some one else. or to perform anything without the will. Coronel. Francisco. she was not dependent on her husband for any support. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. Court ruled in Aguas that "a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the husband. hence. Rodriguez. Teresa Favila was declared to be not a dependent spouse and therefore not entitled to death benefits. De Mesa. or subject to. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. Sy. Sandoval. Tecson. Page 754 Echiverri. not able to exist o r sustain oneself. In Re: Application for Survivors Benefits of Manlavi. she is not a dependent. Lastimosa. Palad. Corporal. financial or otherwise. Marquez. Valois . he/she must not be a legit imate spouse but also a dependent as provided by Section 8 (e) and (k) of RA 116 1. For a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary. HELD: No. Castillo. Espina. Tabugan. Albano.

Rodriguez. The LA rendered a decision finding that there was illegal dismissal. Loressa had access to all computer programs and marketing computer data. She was given 24 hours to explain her side. Loressa denied the allegations. 169260 March 23. Sanden discovered that the marketing delivery receipt transactions computer files were missing. Lumberio. Alcazaren. 2011 DOCTRINE: An employer has the discretion to dismiss an employee for loss of trust and confidence but the former may not use the same to cloak an illegal dismissal. Loressa filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LORESSA P. Reynaldo B. On appeal. Gloria. Valois . Espina. Loressa filed a petition for certiorari before the CA where the NLRC decision was reversed and set aside. Castillo. Valiente. SANDEN AIRCON PHILIPPINES and ANTONIO ANG vs. Asensi. Martinez. Atty. Sandoval. Loressa received a Notice of Disciplinary Action from Sanden notifying Loressa that management is terminating Loressas employment effective upon receipt of the said communication. Corpuz. Aggrieved. For this reason. sent a letter to Loressa charging her with data sabotage and absences without leave (AWOL). FACTS: Sanden employed Loressa P. Marquez. Page 755 Echiverri. Inguillo. she was promoted as Data Custodian and Coordinator. Reyes. a technical investigation was conducted. ROSALES G. this petition. No. The reason cited by Sanden was the loss of trust on her capability to continue as its Coordinator and Data Custodian. Tecson. Rañigo. Santos. Coronel. Hence. Sy. ISSUE: Whether or not Loressa was illegally dismissed HELD: As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence. As such. De Mesa. On the basis of the investigation. including the Delivery Receipt Transaction files of Sanden. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. On December 26. 1996. the NLRC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected.R. Tabugan. Ramirez. Palad. Corporal. Lastimosa. Albano. Rosales (Loressa) as Management Information System (MIS) Department Secretary. Hence. Catindig. Francisco.

the guilt of complainant-appellee was based on mere allegations not supported by documentary evidence nor any factual basis. who had immediate access to Sandens confidential files. Cabañgon. Loressa was able to provide documentary evidence to show that Sandens computer system was experiencing some problems even before May 16. The entries as reported by the System Administrator clearly show that the problem of missing data already existed as early as 1995. nowhere in the records can be found evidence that directly point to complainant as having committed acts of sabotage. during the administrative investigation. Sy. As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter. must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Gloria. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. we agree that Loressa. when Loressa was still an MIS Secretary and was not yet tasked to back up the Marketing Delivery Receipt Transaction files. Marquez. Rodriguez. Asensi. held a position of trust and confidence as Coordinator and Data Custodian of the MIS Department. Sandoval. Valois . Albano. Castillo. Alcazaren. Santos. Martinez. On the other hand. Palad. Inguillo. 1997. Reyes. Lumberio. Catindig. to be a valid cause for dismissal. Loss of trust and confidence. The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Espina. Tecson. Page 756 Echiverri. Rañigo. Corpuz. Also. De Mesa. Tabugan. Francisco. Coronel. papers and documents. Corporal. Lastimosa. Valiente. In this case. The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO . Valois . Valiente.R. Santos. respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law. 169717 March 16. De la Cruz. Marquez. Espina. and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union. Palad. Corpuz. ISSUES: 1. De Mesa. Rodriguez.UNION PRESIDENT vs. Page 757 Echiverri. Gloria. Tecson. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. National Capital Region. supposedly. Reyes. Cabañgon. The Med-Arbiter agreed with the respondent company. Whether or not the mingling of supervisory employees with rank and file employees nullifies the legal personality of the union Albano. Though the DOLE disagreed with the Med-Arbiter on its findings regarding the documentation requirements and the inclusion of supervisory employees in the union. Tabugan. Inguillo. Corporal. Another union. DOCTRINE: The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for proper registration. On April 14. Asensi. Castillo. 1999. Ramirez. it ruled that the petitioner union did not file its petition on time. Lastimosa. Rañigo. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS [SMCC-SUPER]. No. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION G. Martinez. Catindig. 2011. Sy. 1999. Alcazaren. FACTS: On February 19. Coronel. had filed a petition for certification election and its petition has been decided with finality. The CA upheld the findings of the Med-Arbiter.SamahangManggagawasa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. Lumberio. Sandoval. Whether or not the unions charter certificate needed to be certified under oath 2. Francisco.

given the altered milieu. abandoned the view inToyotaandDunlopand reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization. Cabañgon. Inc. 9. the Court. Page 758 Echiverri. Asensi. Palad. it had the right to file the subject petition for certification election. Gloria. In accordance with this ruling. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration. Valois . and its principal office. HELD: First issue: Section 1. the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. 9. No. Castillo. Tabugan. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Espina. Santos. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition for certification election. it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. their addresses. Rodriguez. Coronel. v. series of 1997 does require that a charter certificate be under oath. Thus. Series of 1997. No. Reyes. Tecson. Consequently. Golf Club. false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code. Sandoval. Corporal. it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate. Alcazaren. since it does not make sense to have the local/chapters officers certify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the preparation of. Martinez. in San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v.O. Valiente. and (3) its constitution and by-laws the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records. petitioner unions charter certificate need not be executed under oath. Francisco. However. Inguillo. Marquez. Corpuz. unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation. which was decided under the auspices of D. (2) the names of its officers. we ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. as amended by D. Lastimosa. Second issue: In Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered.O. De Mesa. Lumberio. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW). Albano. Sy. Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V. Catindig. As a result. petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were supervisory employees.

Sandoval. and held that Harpoon president Rosit should be solidarily liable with the company. Catindig. 167751 March 02. 2001. He continued reporting for work. Refusing to sign a quitclaim. He thereafter tried to claim his separation pay and commissions. Whether or not Francisco was illegally dismissed 2. ROSIT VS. The CA affirmed the NLRC. FERNAN H. the employer presented none despite the burden to prove clearly its cause. De Mesa. Tecson. Asensi. Palad. HARPOON MARINE SERVICES. No. then filed a case before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal.000 for each vessel he repaired. When Francisco continued to be absent. Reyes. On June 15. Inguillo.R. 2001. Valiente. Francisco. ISSUES: 1. Francisco demanded payment of his commissions. Rosit merely met with Francisco to warn him regarding his habitual absences and tardiness. With regard to the commissions claimed. denied payment of his commissions. Sy. Francisco was then terminated on July 30. Castillo. through its president Rosit. Coronel. Whether or not he was entitled to his commissions Albano. with a regular salary. INC. Lastimosa. Francisco averred that Harpoon dismissed him from work but promised to pay his separation pay and accrued commissions. but Harpoon. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Francisco was legally dismissed and that due process was served through the several memoranda sent to him. Page 759 Echiverri. which could hardly be called habitual and therefore cannot be a ground for termination. Espina. It also ruled that commissions were due Francisco. Rodriguez. Harpoon averred that Francisco was only a regular employee. Ramirez. arguing that he was paid P10. De la Cruz. 2001. Harpoon averred that on June 15. In the case before us. Alcazaren. however. and gave credence to the vouchers. 2011 DOCTRINE:Satisfactory evidence of a valid or just cause of dismissal is indispensably required in order to protect a laborer's right to security of tenure. FACTS: Harpoon Marine Services hired Francisco as a Yard Supervisor. Rañigo. Corporal. held that Francisco was illegally dismissed. 2001. Harpoon sent him memoranda informing him of his absences. Corpuz. and that the supposed "commissions" were merely additional money recognizing Franciscos efforts. He supported his claim for commissions with two vouchers evincing payments for vessel repairs. Martinez. Santos. Marquez. Cabañgon. FRANCISCO G. for his timecard for June 2001 only showed three absences. Valois . Tabugan. Gloria. It upheld the Labor Arbiter with regard to the commissions. The NLRC. which were filed with the DOLE on August 15. but was barred from entering the premises. AND JOSE LIDO T. Lumberio.

De Mesa. are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. Second issue: The SC held that Francisco was not entitled to the commissions. Alcazaren. Corpuz. Verily. As held in the case ofMAM Realty Development Corporation v. Tabugan. however. Lastimosa. They did not state the purpose for which the amounts were paid. "obligations incurred by [corporate officers]. Moreso. Franciscos timecard only showed three consecutive absences and no record of tardiness.Harpoon failed to present evidence that they sent these notices to respondents last known address for the purpose of warning him that his continued failure to report would be construed as abandonment of work. Here. the CA imposed personal liability on Rosit based on bad faith. Rodriguez. The argument that Francisco abandoned his work and went AWOL also does not hold water. Santos. Espina. The check vouchers contained very scant details and did not state that they were paid for the construction or repair of a vessel. cited circumstances when solidary liabilities may be imposed. Valois . Harpoon failed to prove that it was respondent who voluntarily refused to report back for work by his defiance and refusal to accept the memoranda and the notices of absences sent to him. Moreover. Third issue: The SC disagrees with the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in according solidary liability on Rosit and Harpoon for the illegal dismissal. even though there was no proof that Rosit acted with bad faith or outside of his authority as company president. and nothing more. Reyes. Palad. At most. Here. Martinez. The vouchers patent vagueness makes them unreliable as a basis for Franciscos claim of commissions. Castillo. Corporal. Catindig. The Court. Rañigo. Sandoval. As stated by the NLRC. the list of vessels presented with the vouchers does not validate Franciscos monetary claim for it only contains a list of vessels. that there is absence of failure to report to work for no justifiable reason. Inguillo. an absence of three days does not constitute habitual absence justifying a termination from work. Valiente. and no other evidence was presented before the Labor Arbiter to prove such "habitual" tardiness/absence. Coronel. and that there is intent to sever the employee-employer relationship. Cabañgon. Gloria. Ramirez. they should not be generally held jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation. Marquez. the reasons for Franciscos three-day absence were not contested by Harpoon before the Labor Arbiter. which hardly constitutes gross or habitual absence/tardiness. 3. Entitlement to commissions cannot be proved by vouchers which are silent as to the purpose for which they are issued. Tecson. since Harpoon failed to prove that the two elements of work abandonment existed: namely. National Labor Relations Commission. Sy. acting as such corporate agents. Asensi." As such. Francisco. Whether Rosit is solidarily liable with Harpoon HELD: First issue: The SC held that the termination was illegal. Page 760 Echiverri. his acts merely showed the absence of a just or valid cause in terminating the employment of Francisco. Albano. Lumberio. De la Cruz. as when the officer acted in bad faith or gross negligence in handling corporate affairs.

Gloria. Albano. KEPPEL MONTE BANK. Tabugan. sent a Memorandum to Roberto recommending the filing of a criminal case for estafa against Jorge. He further suggested that Keppel look into the inside job angle of the approval of the VISA cards and that all key officers and staff should be probed for possible involvement. the cause of loss of trust and confidence must be related to the performance of the employee’s duties.R. All in all. Sandoval. Carrying the same rank. all the accounts under these approved applications became past due. James upon knowing the status of the accounts referred by Jorge. Page 761 Echiverri. Castillo. Valois . Espina. JAMES BEN JERUSALEM vs. Inguillo. 169564. HOE ENG HOCK. De la Cruz. all of which were subsequently approved. Santos. Corpuz. 2011 DOCTINE: For breach of trust and confidence to become a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. Coronel. Valiente. Martinez. Catindig. James even warned Keppel that immediate action should be taken while Jorge is still in the country. Corporal. He summarized in the said Memorandum the events that transpired during the meeting with Jorge and reiterated his suggestion for Keppel to file a case against Jorge. Reyes. Alcazaren. The bank subsequently re-organized the VISA Credit Card Department and reduced it to a mere unit. He further recommended that a coordination with the other banks where Jorge has deposits should be made promptly so that they can ask said banks to freeze Jorge’s accounts. Rañigo. April 6. Ramirez. Lumberio. Francisco. Palad.Marciana sent a letterto Jorge asking the latter to assist the bank in the collection of his referred VISA accounts. As it turned out. He was assigned as Head of the newly created VISA Credit Card Department. Cabañgon. Tecson. James sent a Memorandum to Keppel. Marquez. FACTS: James Ben L. James immediately handed over the envelope with accomplished application forms to the VISA Credit Card Unit. James was reassigned as Head of the Marketing and Operations of the Jewelry Department. No. Jerusalem (James) was employed by Keppel Monte Bank (Keppel) as Assistant Vice-President. the VISA credit card applications referred by Jorge which James forwarded to the VISA Credit Card Unit numbered 67. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. James received from Jorge Javier (Jorge) a sealed envelope said to be containing VISA Card application forms. SUNNY YAP and JOSEFINA PICART G. Sy. De Mesa. Asensi.

Valiente. Palad. in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal. Page 762 Echiverri.Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence. But. Rañigo. On August 18. the act complained of must be work-related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.Unlike in other cases where the complainant has the burden of proof to discharge its allegations. the burden of establishing facts as bases for an employer’s loss of confidence in an employee facts which reasonably generate belief by the employer that the employee was connected with some misconduct and the nature of his participation therein is such as to render him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his position is on the employer. Gloria. He explained that he can only endorse the applications referred by Jorge to the VISA Credit Card Unit because he was already transferred to Jewelry Department. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Valois . Lastimosa. As the Albano. From the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC it is clear that James did nothing wrong when he handed over to Marciana the envelope containing the applications of persons under the referred accounts of Jorge who were later found to be fictitious. Castillo. Asensi. Later on. De Mesa. Marquez. Catindig. Lumberio. Tecson. Sy. Espina. ISSUE: Whether or not Keppel legally terminated James’ employment on the ground of willful breach of trust and confidence.As provided for in Article 282. He pointed out that he had no participation in the processing of the VISA card applications since he was no longer connected with the VISA Credit Card Unit at the time of such transactions.James submitted his written explanation to Sunny. Martinez. Cabañgon. Corporal. Sunny Yap (Sunny). Reyes. Santos. Tabugan. as Head. Francisco. an employer may terminate an employee’s employment for fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him. 2000. the Manager for Human Resources Department. Alcazaren. Josefina Picart. Corpuz. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Inguillo. James received a Notice to Explain from Keppel’s Vice President for Operations. HELD: The Court ruled that Keppel failed in discharging the burden of proof that the dismissal of Jerusalem is for a just cause. handed to James a Notice of Terminationinforming the latter that he was found guilty of breach of trust and confidence for knowingly and maliciously referring. endorsing and vouching for VISA card applicants who later turned out to be impostors resulting in financial loss to Keppel. Coronel. why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for referring/endorsing fictitious VISA card applicants.

records now stand. Tabugan. Tecson. Albano. Corporal. Sandoval. Gloria. Martinez. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Espina. Francisco. Asensi. Cabañgon. Santos. Palad. James was no longer connected with the VISA Credit Card Unit when the 67 applications for VISA card were approved. Ramirez. Catindig. Valiente. Inguillo. Marquez. Sy. Coronel. De Mesa. Valois . Lumberio. Alcazaren. Corpuz. Reyes. Page 763 Echiverri. Rodriguez. Castillo.

Page 764 Echiverri. Moreover. Tecson. Francisco. June 27. Rañigo. respondents claimed that they were merely exercising their management prerogative to transfer employees for the purpose of advancing the schools interests. De la Cruz. Espina. Catindig.200. Petitioner alleged that his proposed transfer to Abra constitutes a demotion in rank and diminution in pay and would cause personal inconvenience and hardship. Martinez. Alcazaren. 174158.However. No. Corporal. Inguillo. Palad. Abra branch as Head for Education/Instructor due to an urgent need for an experienced officer and computer instructor thereat. petitioner filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal against respondents. Valiente. Petitioner was informed through a letter that he would be receiving. Cabañgon. petitioner declined to accept his transfer to Abra citing the deteriorating health condition of his father and the absence of additional remuneration to defray expenses for board and lodging which constitutes implicit diminution of his salary. Asensi. De Mesa. Lumberio. For their part. he later learned through a Memorandumfrom the administrator of Abra branch that he will be re-assigned merely as an instructor. Gloria. Ilocos Sur where the school had a tie-up program. 2003. in addition to his monthly salary. He argued that although he was being transferred to Abra branch supposedly with the same position he was then holding in Laoag branch as Head for Education. Castillo. respondents transferred him to University of Northern Philippines (UNP) in Vigan. Marquez.00 allowance for board and lodging during his stint as instructor in UNP-Vigan. Santos. Petitioner received a Memorandumtransferring him to Data Center College Bangued. Valois . Tabugan. FACTS: Petitioner was employed as an Instructor in Data Center College Laoag City branch. Coronel. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Corpuz. 2011 DOCTRINE:Our labor laws are enacted not solely for the purpose of protecting the working class but also the management by equally recognizing its right to conduct its own legitimate business affairs. Reyes. Sandoval. the elimination of his allowance for board and lodging will result to an indirect reduction of his salary which is prohibited by labor laws. DATE CENTER COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. In a Memorandum.R. thereby relegating him from an administrative officer to a rank-and-file employee. WILLIAN ENDELISEO BARROGA vs. Sy. a P1. They claimed that petitioner’s appointment as instructor carries a proviso of possible re-assignments Albano. On November 10. They argued that petitioner’s refusal to be transferred to Abra constitutes insubordination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of Data Center College constitutes constructive dismissal on the part of the petitioner. Corporal. Valois . In any event. Valiente. HELD: No. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Rañigo.It is also important to stress at this point that respondents have shown that it was experiencing some financial constraints. there is no conclusive proof that petitioner’s basic salary will be reduced as it was not shown that such allowance is part of petitioner’s basic salary.The Court ruled that there was no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner’s re-assignment amounted to constructive dismissal. Corpuz. insensibility or disdain by an employer which becomes unbearable for the employee to continue his employment. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both relied on the condition laid down in petitioner’s employment contract that respondents have the prerogative to assign petitioner in any of its branches or tie-up schools as the necessity demands. Castillo. Hence. Lastimosa. Respondents argued that petitioner’s designation as Head for Education in Laoag branch was merely temporary and that he would still occupy his original plantilla item as instructor at his proposed assignment in Abra branch. Martinez. Catindig. there will be no violation of the rule against diminution of pay enunciated under Article 100 of the Labor Code. Palad. Reyes. Santos. Francisco. Inguillo. Page 765 Echiverri. The rule against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period which is consistent and deliberate. Tabugan. Constructive dismissal is quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible. Gloria. Sandoval. Marquez. Sy. Moreover. Rodriguez. Espina. It exists when there is a clear act of discrimination. Coronel. Tecson. Cabañgon. it is management prerogative for employers to transfer employees on just and valid grounds such as genuine business necessity. Asensi. to any branch or tie-up schools as the schools necessity demands. Lumberio. Petitioner failed to present any other evidence that respondents committed to provide the additional allowance or that they were consistently granting such benefit as to have ripened into a practice which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. De Mesa. or because of a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. Albano. unreasonable or unlikely.

Since petitioner failed to provide the NLRC with sufficient basis to determine its incapacity to post the required appeal bond. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Petitioner filed before the NLRC its Memorandum on Appeal as well as a Motion to Reduce Bond. it is imperative for the petitioner to show veritable proof that it is entitled to the same. Whether the NLRC can reduced the bond. Alcazaren. In its Motion to Reduce Bond. Espina. Francisco.R. June 22. 3. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Valiente. UNIVERSITY PLANS INCORPORATED vs. However. From the said SEC Orders. petitioner alleged that it was under receivership and that it cannot dispose of its assets at such a short notice. it is unmistakable that petitioner was under receivership. HELD: Yes. The CA held that the NLRC in meritorious cases and upon motion by the appellant may reduce the amount of the bond. Gloria. Inguillo. 2. Whether or not the petitioner is under receivership. Sandoval. in order for the NLRC to exercise this discretion. Corpuz. FACTS: Respondents filed before the Labor Arbiter complaints for illegal dismissal. it is quite understandable that because of petitioner’s financial state. 170416. 2011 DOCTRINE: The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is not precluded from conducting a preliminary determination of the merit or lack of merit of a motion to reduce bond. Palad. And from the tenor and contents of said Orders. it is possible that petitioner has no liquid asset which it could use to post the required amount of bond. The NLRC denied petitioners Motion to Reduce Bond and directed it to post an additional appeal bond. it denied the petition. Ramirez. Valois . Also. Santos. De Mesa. Castillo. Tecson. and actual damages against petitioner University Plans Incorporated. Reyes. SOLANO G. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to reduction of its bond. it cannot raise the amount of more than P3 million within a period of 10 days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters judgment. Lumberio. No. moral and exemplary damages. Coronel. Rodriguez. Page 766 Echiverri. Hence. Sy. Asensi. Lastimosa. In this Albano. overriding commissions. illegal deductions. Martinez. Corporal. Catindig. Marquez. ISSUES: 1. the CA opined that the NLRCs denial of petitioners Motion to Reduce Bond was justified. The Court ruled that the petitioner is under receivership and as such it is entitled to reduction of appeal bond. unfair labor practice.

Palad. to us. Under Section 6. without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. Page 767 Echiverri. Reyes. Martinez. all in the interest of due process. Ramirez. This. Lastimosa. the bond may be reduced albeit only on meritorious grounds and upon posting of a partial bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. Valois . It only bears stressing that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Tabugan. Tecson. is an utter disregard of the provision of the Labor Code and of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure allowing the reduction of bond in meritorious cases. Santos. Francisco. While the NLRC tried to correct this error in its March 21. On the contrary. Suffice it to state that while said Rules allows the Commission to reduce the amount of the bond. The NLRC is no precluded from conducting preliminary determination of the merit or lack of merit of a motion to reduce a bond. Rule VI of the NLRCs Revised Rulesof Procedure. Coronel. Marquez. Sy. Castillo. Alcazaren. but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds. we still find the hasty denial of the motion to reduce bond not proper. petitioner must post an additional bond of more than P3 million. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Corporal. Valiente. Rañigo. Albano. the exercise of the authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant. Catindig. Sandoval. Rodriguez. 2003 Resolution by further explaining that it was not persuaded by petitioners alleged incapability of posting the required amount of bond for failure to submit financial statement. Asensi. Cabañgon. the NLRC ignored petitioners allegations and instead remained adamant that since the amount of bond is fixed by law. Inguillo. Lumberio. the Labor Code explicitly mandates it to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively. Espina. list of sources of income and other details with respect to the alleged receivership. De Mesa. Gloria. case.

Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Francisco. As a consequence. 168382. Alcazaren. ALPAP went on strike. the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Corpuz. Asensi. that the NLRC rather than the DOLE Secretary has jurisdiction over the motions as said motions partake of a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims. Marquez. INC. 1997 Order. Inguillo. 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as shown in a logbook signed by each of them. Tecson. No. Sy. and that all money claims are deemed suspended in view of the fact that PAL is under receivership. Albano. 1998. Gloria. (PAL) and ALPAP. Sandoval. Inc. 2011 DOCTRINE:A judgment that has attained finality is immutable and could thus no longer be modified. . Valiente. Martinez. This constrained the DOLE to issue a return-to-work order on June 7. Lumberio. Santos. Corporal. even though some were on official leave or abroad at the time of the strike. Cabañgon. the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Upon PAL’s petition and considering that its continued operation is impressed with public interest.R. PAL argued that the motions cannot legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary has no authority to reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court relative to NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Espina. ALPAP filed a notice of strike against respondent PAL with the DOLE. ALPAP contended that there is a need to conduct a proceeding in order to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike since not only the striking workers were dismissed by PAL but all of ALPAP’s officers and members. FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine Airlines. Page 768 Echiverri. Tabugan. that the requested proceeding is no longer necessary as the CA or this Court did not order the remand of the case to the DOLE Secretary for such determination. However. Rañigo. PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order. DOLE Secretary reiterated the prohibition contained in the December 23. Coronel. Catindig. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. G. Castillo. Reyes. Valois . De Mesa. however. De la Cruz. Despite such reminder to the parties. Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice. June 6. Palad. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. it was only on June 26.

however. Cabañgon. Corporal. Martinez. Sy.R. Albano. Lumberio. it insists. thus can no longer be modified in any respect. HELD: No. Sandoval. Francisco. the June 1." In the instant case. Espina. Palad. Tomas and Imson and affirmed by the CA. the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-work order are deemed to have lost their employment. Tabugan. Santos. Gloria. This omission. 1999 DOLE Resolution did not make such determination. Valiente. 1999 DOLE Resolution. True. 2002. Coronel. Inguillo. Asensi. Castillo. such proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court. ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members and officers actually participated in the illegal strike because. SP No. which declared the strike of June 5. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. 54880. Rodriguez. which ruling was affirmed by this Court and which became final and executory on August 29. Page 769 Echiverri. Catindig. as correctly ruled by Sto. Corpuz. Rañigo. it becomes immutable and unalterable. cannot prevent an effective execution of the decision. an appeal was taken by ALPAP.From the June 1. Valois . De Mesa. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOLE Secretary commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to act on ALPAP’s motions and merely noted the same. the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as "nothing further can be done except to execute it. Tecson. This was dismissed by the CA in CA-G. Subject to certain recognized exceptions. Ramirez. However. Reyes. Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality. Lastimosa. 1998 as illegal and pronounced all ALPAP officers and members who participated therein to have lost their employment status.

Tecson. NLRC set aside the decision of the LA. Page 770 Echiverri. The Labor Arbiter held that Mapili was illegally dismissed and that he had no intention to defraud the PRBI by his failure to issue a ticket to the wife of a co-employee as the same was done out of gratitude and under the wrong impression that she is entitled to such privilege. Mapili filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against PRBLI./ NATIVIDAD NISCE G. while the second involved a former employee of PRBI who misrepresented himself to be a current employee. Lastimosa. De Mesa. This was Mapili’s third time committing the said violation. Inc. Nische is the president of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. Rañigo. Pangasinan. A Bus Conductor is a position imbued with trust and confidence because it involves handling of money and failure to collect the proper fare from the riding public constitutes a grave offense which justifies his dismissal. Castillo. Tabugan. Inguillo. De la Cruz. While on duty en route from Manila to Alaminos. Sandoval. 2011 DOCTRINE: Termination of Employment. Corporal. Santos. Francisco. Valiente.R. Corpuz. Palad. PRBLI hired Jerry Mapili as a bus conductor. Albano. Cabañgon. PRBI argued that Mapiili’s act of offering free rides out of gratitude to the wife of his co-employee and that it was his third offense. 2002. On February 19. Coronel. the lady passenger. Alcazaren. 2001. the Labor Arbiter opined that Mapili’s actuations merited a less punitive penalty such as a suspension of 30 days which he already served during his suspension. Ramirez. FACTS: Natividad P. justified his termination considering that his position is imbued with trust and confidence. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. The NLRC found out that the non-issuance of a ticket to a passenger and failure to collect money due to the company was a deliberate and intentional act of Mapili which prejudiced the company’s interest. Mapili was preventively suspended and was directed to appear in an administrative investigation where he was given an opportunity to present and explain his side. Also. Asensi. JULY 27. Upon order of the filed inspector. He further argued that his two previous violations of the same company regulation cannot be considered in the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. also a driver of PRBI was issued a passenger ticket. Marquez. he argued that he was already penalized for the previous violations and to consider them anew would be tantamount to penalizing him twice for the same offense. Mapili’s contention was that his employment was terminated without cause and due process. Gloria. Mapili was terminated from employment for committing a serious irregularity by extending free rides to passengers in violation of company rules. Furthermore. 172506. INC (PRBLI). Sy. Rodriguez. Reyes. who happened to be the wife of Julio Ricardo. Martinez. NO. Lumberio. Espina. On November 9. The first involved a police officer supposedly on official duty. He argued that the infraction was only trivial. JERRY MAPILI vs. Valois . Catindig. Mapili was caught by PRBLI’s filed inspector extending a free ride to a lady passenger. It was done without malice and resulted from his honest belief that immediate family members of PRBLI’s employees are entitled to free ride.

Albano. Valiente. Tabugan. serious and a just cause for dismissal. Lastimosa. may still be used as justification for an employee’s dismissal. Palad. Petitioner’s position is imbued with trust and confidence because it involves handling of money and failure to collect the proper fare from the riding public constitutes grave offense which justifies his dismissal. willful. petitioner’s series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct. Rodriguez. Marquez. Sandoval. Corpuz. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Page 771 Echiverri. Gloria. Asensi. De la Cruz. Castillo. Corporal. Lumberio. Catindig. Mapili’s violation of company rules was intentional. these offenses. Tecson. Cabañgon. Sy. As a bus conductor whose duties primarily include the collection of transportation fares which is the lifeblood of the PRBLI. ISSUE: WON Mapili was illegally dismissed? HELD: No. Santos. Francisco. While a penalty may no longer be imposed on offenses for which Mapili was already been punished. Valois . among other offenses. Coronel. Martinez. Espina. Reyes. Rañigo. Moreover. De Mesa. petitioner should have exercised the required diligence in the performance thereof and his habitual failure to exercise the same cannot be taken for granted. Inguillo.

Catindig. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Valiente. Reyes. the base figure to be used in the computation of back wages is pegged at the wage rate at the time of the employee’s dismissal unqualified by deductions. that is. Espina. Uy together with the Union thus filed a case for illegal dismissal. Gloria. FACTS: Zenaida Uy a bank teller in BPI Escolta branch was terminated on the grounds of gross disrespect/discourtesy towards an officer. “unqualified by any wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by co-workers who were not dismissed. The CA affirmed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator but with modifications. Nos. Jurisprudence dictates that such award of back wages is without qualifications and deductions. Ramirez. without loss of seniority right and other benefits. the CA ordered BPI to pay Uy her separation pay. In Uy’s computation. insubordination and absence without leave. Sandoval. After the decision became final and executory. Valois . instead of full back wages. she based the amount of her back wages on the current wage level and included all the increases in wages and benefits under the CBA that were granted during the entire period of her illegal dismissal. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS vs. BPI filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO with the CA. Coronel. Santos. Asensi. Palad. 2011 DOCTRINE: Award of back wages is without qualifications and deductions. Inguillo. Corpuz. Castillo. increases and/or modifications. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision finding Uy’s dismissal as illegal and ordering BPI to immediately reinstate Uy and to pay her full back wages. September 21. Martinez. Corporal. Page 772 Echiverri. Sy. De Mesa. Lumberio. ISSUES: Whether or not the basis for the award of backwages is the current rate? HELD: The CA was correct in not including salary increases and CBA benefits. the CA fixes Uy’s back wages to three years. Albano. Cabañgon. It claimed that the basis for the computation of back wages should be the employee’s wage rate at the time of dismissal. Uy and the Union filed with the Voluntary Arbitrator a motion for issuance of writ of execution. De la Cruz. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION and ZENAIDA UY G. Further. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Uy and the Union and granted the motion for writ of execution. Rañigo. Instead of reinstatement. BPI averred that the VA erred in computing back wages based on the current rate. including all her other benefits under the CBA.” It is likewise settled that the base figure to be used in the computation of back wages is pegged at the wage rate at the time of the employee’s dismissal unqualified by deductions. It reached the SC. 178699/178735. increases and/or modifications. or to substantially equivalent one. Lastimosa. Marquez. Tecson. BPI disputed Uy’s and the Union’s computation arguing that it contains items which are not included in the term “back wages” and that no proof was presented to show that Uy was receiving all the listed items therein before her termination. Rodriguez. Francisco. where the SC ordered BPI to pay Uy her full backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal until her actual reinstatement and to reinstate Uy to her former position.R.

Francisco. Coronel. Catindig. Reyes. Santos. Alcazaren. Valois . Inguillo. Lumberio. Martinez. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Marquez. Rañigo. Valiente. The CA also correctly deleted the award of CBA benefits as they were all not proven to have been granted to Uy at the time of her dismissal from service. Tecson. Asensi. Page 773 Echiverri. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Palad. Sy. Espina. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Sandoval. Corporal. Castillo. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Albano. Gloria.

we likewise rule that it does not matter that the company-designated physician assessed petitioner as fit to work. Rodriguez. Nicomedes G. permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work. Before. 2001. from October 9. or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. 2002. CARMELITO VALENZONA vs. On the other hand. Mapapala at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center who diagnosed him with Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease. attorney's fees and moral damages. Lumberio. Unconvinced. however. Tecson. Francisco. on April 18. Considering the circumstances prevailing in the instant case. Lastimosa. an Internist-Cardiologist at the Philippine Heart Center who diagnosed him with Ischemic heart disease. Guanlao. Albano. petitioner. same went unheeded. Martinez. on April 27.e. Cruz issued a certification declaring petitioner as fit to work. On April 18. through Atty. Marquez. 2001 until April 25. the company-designated physician who diagnosed his illness as hypertension. his embarkation on May 23. Thereafter. Hypertensive cardiovascular disease and congestive heart failure and also declared him unfit to work in any capacity. Valois . Cruz continuously treated petitioner for six months. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to permanent disability benefits. Catindig. De la Cruz. petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of disability benefits. 2002. FACTS: On May 5. Inguillo. Valiente. Dr. Asensi. Corpuz. It does not mean absolute helplessness. he was unable to work for more than 120 days as he was only certified fit to work on April 25. respondent Sejin Lines Company Limited. wrote a letter to respondents demanding payment of the balance of his sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits. Rodrigo F. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Reyes. a certain Dr. 2002. high blood pressure. Alcazaren. A day after his repatriation to the Philippines on October 8. Coronel. De Mesa. i. 2002.R. hired petitioner as 2nd Assistant Engineer aboard its vessel M/V Morelos for a duration of nine months. petitioner's disability is considered permanent and total. 2011 DOCTRINE: Permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days. HELD: YES. petitioner was examined by Dr. regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body. Hence. FAIR SHIPPING CORP. petitioner consulted Dr. 2002. G. sickness allowance. Espina. Palad. or on April 25. What determines petitioner’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days. 2001. 176884. No. petitioner consulted another doctor. Rañigo. 2001 he was declared medically fit to work. Santos. Tabugan. It is undisputed that from the time petitioner was repatriated on October 8. However. Sandoval. Considering his prolonged sickness. Castillo. Anastacio P. The petitioner was diagnosed then with hypertensive crisis. Page 774 Echiverri. or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform. Gloria..Consequently. respondent Fair Shipping Corporation. Cruz). for and on behalf of its principal. Dr. 2002. Marcelo. October 19. Sy. 2001. Cruz (Dr. Corporal.

Taking into account her long and untainted service. De Mesa. it was unintentional and same cannot serve as sufficient basis to conclude that there was misappropriation of company funds. Catindig. Inguillo. Santos. Tabugan. Martinez. Corpuz. and. that subsequent marital woes coupled with her worries for her ailing child distracted her into forgetting Changs payment. MERALCO considered as misappropriation or withholding of company funds her failure to immediately remit said payment in violation of its Code on Employee Discipline. Since. Beltran thus filed an illegal dismissal case. Corporal. Cabañgon. Francisco. 1997 pending completion of an investigation. Rañigo. Beltran was terminated effective March 13. Gloria.164. January 30. Valiente. In line with this. Beltran accepted P15. which the latter received from customer Andy Chang (Chang). Coronel. reversed the decision. 2012 DOCTRINE: As the law regards workers with compassion. 173774. This was done to show that it was an accommodation. an employer’s right to discipline them should be tempered with compassion as well. 1996. she reported at MERALCOs Taguig branch where she worked until 8:30 p. Sandoval. Valois . 1997. Espina. Page 775 Echiverri. that on September 30. 1996. The Labor Arbiter regarded the penalty of dismissal as not commensurate to the degree of infraction committed as there was no adequate proof of misappropriation on the part of Beltran. Ramirez. Chang’s payment was only remitted on January 13. she was holding the position of Senior Branch Clerk at MERALCOs Pasig branch. Marquez. 1997. 1997. De la Cruz. While rendering overtime work on September 28. No. Asensi. Palad. LUISA BELTRAN G. Rodriguez. 87964 which she dated September 30. MA. Unfortunately. The NLRC. ratiocinating that Beltran withheld company funds for almost 4 months and family problems is not an excuse. Lastimosa. The CA instead agreed with Albano. If there was delay in Beltrans remittance of Changs payment. Lumberio. a Monday. At the time material to this case. 1996.. the money. Beltran nevertheless explained the circumstances which caused the delay of the turn-over of Changs payment. or refuse to hand in.m. instead of September 28. Alcazaren. she had a huge fight with her husband which led to their separation. The Labor Arbiter thus gave compassionate consideration for the neglect to remit the money promptly.48 from Collection Route Supervisor Berlin Marcos (Marcos). FACTS: Beltran was employed by MERALCO on December 16. The cash payment was being made in lieu of a returned check earlier issued as payment for Changs electric bill. Castillo. Beltran was at first hesitant as it was not part of her regular duties to accept payments from customers but was later on persuaded by Marcos persistence. In fact. Sy. Hence. forfeiture only of salary was imposed for her neglect in remitting the funds at once. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal is justified only when there are sufficient grounds as supported by substantial evidence. an accepted practice in the office.R. 1987. Reyes. Beltran received the payment and issued Auxiliary Receipt No. The CA reversed the NLRC decision. Beltran was placed under preventive suspension effective January 20. Beltran did not even attempt to deny possession of. stating that it is excusable for Beltran to commit lapses in her work due to serious family difficulties. She recounted that on the day following her receipt of the money. She thereafter placed the money and the original auxiliary receipt and other documents pertinent to the returned check underneath her other files inside the drawer of her table. a Saturday. Tecson.

MERALCOs sanction of dismissal will not be commensurate to Beltran’s inadvertence not only because there was no clear showing of bad faith and malice but also in consideration of her untainted record of long and dedicated service to MERALCO Albano. It should be emphasized at this point that the burden of proving the legality of an employee’s dismissal lies with the employer. that is. Coronel. Tabugan. Under the circumstances. Unsubstantiated suspicions. De Mesa. Corporal. the burden still lies on MERALCO to provide clear and convincing facts upon which the alleged loss of confidence is to be made to rest. True. Catindig. De la Cruz. Martinez. Palad. Francisco. Rodriguez. the reasons Beltran proffered for her delay in remitting the cash payment are mere allegations without any concrete proof. knowingly and purposely. Tecson. we emphasize that as the employer. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of Beltran despite the undisputed finding that she is guilty of withholding company funds. and conclusions of employers do not provide legal justification for dismissing employees. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Asensi. Ramirez. Nonetheless. Valiente. Corpuz. HELD: NO. Santos. Cabañgon. Rañigo. And even if Beltran delayed handing over the funds to the company. The NLRC thus erred in concluding that Beltran made use of the money from the mere fact that she took a leave of absence after having been reminded of the unremitted funds. Castillo. Espina. accusations. Gloria. MERALCO cannot claim or conclude that Beltran misappropriated the money based on mere suspicion. Lumberio. Page 776 Echiverri. Mere conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Sandoval. Reyes. Sy. the findings of the Labor Arbiter that there were no serious grounds to warrant Beltrans dismissal. Inguillo. To begin with. Marquez. without any justifiable excuse. which is done intentionally. Moreover. MERALCO still has the burden of proof to show clearly that such act of negligence is sufficient to justify termination from employment. we find that Beltran’s delay does not clearly and convincingly establish a willful breach on her part. Valois .

Subsequently. however. SCII has the burden of proving that it has paid these benefits to its employees. In support thereof. Canoy and Pigcaulan. Sandoval. SECURITY & CREDIT INVESTIGATION and/or RENE AMBY REYES G. service incentive leave benefit and 13th month pay. in support of their claim. Lastimosa. As employer. express provision of the law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he rendered service for more than a year already. However. Alcazaren. These complaints were later on consolidated as they involved the same causes of action. No. holiday. Ramirez. 173648. Reyes. that their holiday pay were already included in the computation of their monthly salaries. Coronel. Sy. January 16. Valiente. In addition. Corpuz. under Presidential Decree No. Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if he does not work. Castillo. Espina. service incentive leave and 13th month pays. Palad. FACTS: Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned to SCIIs different clients. pertinent files or similar documents reflecting that the specific claims have been paid. he should be paid his 13th month pay. Gloria. They likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the corresponding periods served. and. 851. it is on the employer that the burden of proving payment of these claims rests. however. ISSUE: Whether or not Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay. respondents contended that Canoys and Pigcaulans monetary claims should only be limited to the past three years of employment pursuant to the rule on prescription of claims. SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. With respect to 13th month pay. Rañigo. Respondents. Furthermore. Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime. To Albano. SCII presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to show that Canoy and Pigcaulan received their salaries as well as benefits which it claimed are already integrated in the employees monthly salaries. Cabañgon. Corporal. HELD: YES. rest day. Rather. Tabugan. 2012 DOCTRINE: It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which he is entitled by law. that they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic salary whenever they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on holidays. copies of payroll listings and lists of employees who received their 13th month pay for the periods December 1997 to November 1998 and December 1998 to November 1999 were presented. Martinez. Marquez. De Mesa. Lumberio. ABDULJAHID PIGCAULAN vs. Asensi.R. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. submitted their respective daily time records reflecting the number of hours served and their wages for the same. Santos. Valois . Tecson. the documents presented do not prove SCIIs allegation. Page 777 Echiverri. Likewise. that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for security guards. Catindig. Under the Labor Code. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of records. Francisco. Inguillo. that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999. maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and other benefits under the law.

Gloria. Martinez. Reyes. Lastimosa. Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday pay. De la Cruz. Espina. Even when the plaintiff alleges non-payment. Lumberio. Sy. Valois . Palad. It is a rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Ramirez. Coronel. Rañigo. Inguillo. repeat. service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000 Albano. Marquez. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Tecson. Since. Sandoval. rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. SCII failed to provide convincing proof that it has already settled the claims. Asensi. Castillo. Tabugan. Santos. De Mesa. being the employer. the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on SCII. Alcazaren. still the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment. Catindig. Corporal. Valiente. Francisco. Page 778 Echiverri. Corpuz.

Espina. Lastimosa. with a corresponding decrease in duties and responsibilities. No. Tabugan. in a memorandum dated February 16.R. Ramirez. This so-called management prerogative. Upon service of the memo. service incentive leave pay. Valois .We agree with the CA in ruling that the transfer of respondents amounted to a demotion. refused to sign the same and likewise refused to perform their new assignments by not reporting for work. Reyes. Tecson. unreasonable or unlikely. De la Cruz. 2012 DOCTRINE: Management has wide latitude to conduct its own affairs in accordance with the necessities of its business. Respondents did not heed both memoranda. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. however. respondents filed separate complaints against petitioners for underpayment of wages. Francisco. however. the transfer of an employee may constitute constructive dismissal As the transfer proves unbearable to respondents as to foreclose any choice on their part except to forego continued employment. Rañigo. same amounts to constructive dismissal for which reinstatement without loss of seniority rights. Gloria. The change in the nature of their work undeniably resulted to a demeaning and humiliating work condition. HENRY ARNAIZ. Demotion involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank. Asensi. HELD: NO. Inguillo. and usually accompanied by a decrease in salary. February 15. One cannot deny the disparity between the duties and functions of a chief baker to that of a utility/security personnel tasked to clean and manage the orderliness of the outside premises of the bakeshop. inclusive of allowances. De Mesa. Reyes reassigned respondents as utility/security personnel tasked to clean the outside vicinity of his bakeshops and to maintain peace and order in the area. 2000. when a clear discrimination. full backwages. FACTS: Reyes hired respondents as chief bakers in his three franchise branches of Julies Bakeshop in Sibalom and San Jose. or when continued employment is rendered impossible. payment of premium pay for holiday and rest day. Alcazaren. Respondents were even prohibited from entering the bakeshop. Santos. On January 26. Although there was no diminution in pay. These complaints were later on consolidated. Corpuz. cost of living allowance (COLA) and attorneys fees. Corporal. 2000. Page 779 Echiverri. there was undoubtedly a demotion in titular rank. Cabañgon. Martinez. should be exercised in accordance with justice and fair play. Castillo. Rodriguez. 173774. 2000 was also sent to respondents. Palad. In a letter-memorandum dated March 13. Antique. 2000. computed from the time their compensation was withheld up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Coronel. A second letter-memorandum of the same tenor dated March 28. Sandoval. Marquez. respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not management prerogative was reasonably exercised. should be granted. insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. Reyes directed respondents to report back for work and to explain why they failed to assume their duties as utility/security personnel. 13th month pay. Lumberio. When there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay. Sy. EDGAR NAPAL AND JONATHAN TOLORES G. Albano. Valiente. Subsequently. JULIE’S BAKESHOP and/or EDGAR REYES vs. Catindig.

Tejada informed Atencio and Safemark that JARL was terminating Atencio’s management and supervision works for the Caltex project. Corporal. The Labor Arbiter found just cause for Atencio’s Removal but found the dismissal ineffectual because of petitioners’ failure to observe the twin requirements of due process. Pursuant to his blanket authority. The NLRC gave emphasis to two letters adduced in evidence. CA also reversed the NLRC with respect to the issue of the unpaid salaries and 13th month pay. Atencio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The CA held that Atencio’s dismissal was ineffectual for the employer’s failure to observe the procedural requirements for a proper termination of employment. Coronel. that his employment as JARL’s chief operating manager was separate from their subcontracting agreement. De la Cruz. Tabugan. JARL assured Atencio and Safemark that it will pay for the rendered services. Sandoval. Lastimosa. April 1. he was barred from entering the said premises. however. and equipment to undertake the Caltex project. Catindig. Rodriguez. Santos. Valois . Espina. Valiente. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Further. Ramirez. his employer JARL had an existing contract with Caltex. the employer has the burden of proving its observance of the two-notice requirement and its accordance to the employee of a real opportunity to be heard. Tecson. The first is Atencio’s letter to JARL wherein Atencio acknowledges his mistakes and apologizes for them and JARL’s earlier letter which clearly informed Atencio of its decision to terminate his employment as its chief operating manager. 2012 DOCTRINE: In dismissing an employee from service. he threatened JARL and Tejadathat he will report their unethical conduct with the Philippine Accreditation Board for possible sanctions. Sy. hired Atencio as its chief operating manager. Corpuz. Castillo. Martinez. he is the recommending authority with respect to the award of subcontracts and purchase orders. Francisco. Atencio allegedly continued reporting for work to the Caltex project site until. FACTS: JARL. According to Atencio. Page 780 Echiverri. Gloria. Thus. Alcazaren. During Atencio’s tenure as chief operating manager. NO. and 13th month pay with the NLRC against JARL and Tejada. ISSUE: Albano. Atencio construed such as a termination of the subcontract between his company and JARL. Palad. nonpayment of salaries. The contract with Caltex prohibited JARL from subcontracting the project. Asensi. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. 175969. Believing. Inguillo. De Mesa. Lumberio. sometime in June 1999. ATENCIO G. through Tejada. Tejada allegedly gave Atencio full authority as JARL’s chief operating manager to hire other subcontractors if necessary.R. Marquez. whose primary function was to direct and manage JARL’s construction projects in accordance with its company policies and contracts. as chief operating manager. Further. Reyes. he discovered during his employment that JARL did not have the proper facilities. Atencio hired DDK Steel Construction and Building Multi-Technology (DDK Steel) for the electrical installations of the Caltex project. personnel. JARL CONSTRUCTION vs.

clearly discusses an entirely different topic – which is the removal of his construction company from the Caltex project. Cabañgon. Marquez. and which allegedly constitutes Atencio’s explanation. Logically. and not the termination of Atencio’s employment. He took responsibility for the misunderstanding between them and apologized. Since JARL admits that the said company actually rendered services for JARL on its Caltex project. Santos. Sy. Sandoval. As for the letter which allegedly constitutes the notice of termination of Atencio’s employment as JARL’s chief operating manager. the Court agrees with the CA’s appreciation that the said letter involves the termination of the subcontracting agreement between JARL and Atencio’s company. the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners’ evidence does not support their contention of payment. Palad. Rañigo. Asensi. In the letter. he did not also explain himself as regards the said charges. Lumberio. Whether the receipts issued by Safemark evidencing JARL’s payment for "Professional Services" suffice as proof of payment of salaries and 13th month pay HELD: No. Catindig. There is nothing on the face of the receipts to support the conclusion that Atencio (and not his company) received it as payment for his service as a JARL employee Albano.The Court agrees with the shared conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the appellate court that petitioners’ evidence fails to prove their contention that they afforded Atencio with due process. Martinez. Page 781 Echiverri. Reyes. De la Cruz. Whether petitioners were able to prove their substantial compliance with the procedural due process requirements 2. Corpuz. With respect to the issue of unpaid salaries and 13 th month pay. Rodriguez. Atencio states that he was wrong for assuming that there was a subcontracting agreement between his firm and JARL. Espina. Tecson. Tabugan. Alcazaren. which allegedly proves Atencio’s knowledge of the charges against him. Valiente. which JARL mentioned before the Labor Arbiter as the causes for his dismissal. The letter. Gloria. the payment can only be assumed as covering for the said services. Castillo. Coronel. De Mesa. Nowhere in the said letter does Atencio refer to the charges. Ramirez. Valois . Lastimosa. 1. Inguillo. Francisco. Corporal.

Page 782 Echiverri. November 5. Tabugan. Asensi. damages. Armando Moralda (Moralda) that some of its personnel. one of petitioner’s accredited suppliers. Martinez. The labor arbiter likewise considered the testimony of Moralda as hearsay and the testimony of Lobitaa as self-serving and doubtful. and attorney’s fees. 176671. 2005. Sandoval. all that is required is for the employer to show substantial evidence to justify termination of the employee.R. Maria Virginia Ongkiko-Eala. To ascertain the veracity of the information given by Moralda. doing business under the name and style Precision Process.100. De la Cruz. he could not have entered into any irregular arrangement with suppliers. Marquez. Rodriguez. the top management of petitioner conducted an investigation during which Jerome Lobitaa (Lobitaa). Santos. Reyes. 2003. On January 5. he ruled that there was no justifiable ground to support the validity of respondent’s dismissal. Having been implicated in the irregularities. Rañigo. were receiving commissions or kickbacks from suppliers. It ruled that Albano. Valois . Sometime in September 2003. At the time of his termination. respondents received the Notice of Termination dated March19. Labor Arbiter Jose G. including respondent who was then the manager of petitioner’s Power Plant Department. On July 11. ZALDY E. 2006. De Mesa.0701-04 against petitioner and its Vice President for Human Resources. Hence. Cabañgon. Gutierrez rendered judgment in favor of respondent. NO. on November 3. APO CEMENT CORPORATION vs. Lumberio. 2012 DOCTRINE: In labor cases. Castillo. Tecson. respondent. received a show cause letter with Notice of Preventive Suspension from Plant Director Ariel Mendoza. docketed as RAB Case No. 2005. the CA reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter. FACTS: On June 16.00. Inguillo. service incentive leave. 2003. Moralda and Lobitaa executed separate affidavits to substantiate their claims. Espina. VII-03. 13th month pay. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Palad. On November 15. respondent submitted his written explanation denying the accusations hurled against him. Alcazaren. petitioner received information from one of its employees. V-000248-2005. The labor arbiter opined that since respondent was not involved in the canvassing and purchasing of supplies. Catindig. Corporal. respondent filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch VII of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Cebu City a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for non-payment of salaries. came forward to corroborate the statement of Moralda. Aggrieved. the NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter. To further afford respondent ample opportunity to defend himself. Coronel. 1998. It ruled that respondent’s personal and direct involvement in the irregularities complained of renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his position. Sy. respondent Zaldy E. petitioner conducted a series of administrative investigation hearings during which respondent was able to face his accusers. petitioner filed an appeal with the NLRC docketed as NLRC Case No. On March 22. 2004 informing him of his dismissal from employment effective immediately on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. On March 31. Baptisma was employed by petitioner APO Cement operating a cement manufacturing plant in Tinaan. June 20. Atty. Naga City. BAPTISMA G. 2004. Corpuz. Gloria. respondent was a Power Plant Manager earning a monthly salary of Php 71. Respondent elevated the matter to the CA. Francisco. Valiente.

Francisco. Maria Ongkiko-Eala to pay the monetary award in favor of (respondent) was SET ASIDE. this petition for review on certoriari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) year. Ramirez. Reyes. (Petitioner) APO Cement was ORDERED to pay (respondent) his separation pay. Lumberio. Inguillo. Tabugan. The testimony of Lobitaa constitute substantial evidence to prove that respondent. Espina. Valiente. Palad. Sandoval. Jurisprudence consistently holds that for managerial employees the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. De la Cruz. Catindig. which is a clear violation of Section 2. Asensi. Sy. we agree with the NLRC that the termination on the ground of loss of trust and confidence was justified. Unlike the labor and the CA. Alcazaren. ISSUE: Simply put. Castillo. Corporal. Gloria. Tecson. Hence. Rañigo. Rodriguez. as the then Power Plant Manager. petitioner failed to prove the existence of a just cause to warrant the termination of respondent as the alleged loss of trust and confidence was not based on established facts. Albano. Santos. It. Martinez. In reconsideration. we find the testimony of Lobitaa credible and truthful. Page 783 Echiverri. Valois . the CA pat on its finding that there was no basis for petitioner’s loss of trust and confidence on respondent. Cabañgon. at the rate of one (1) month salary for every year of his employment. Corpuz. modified the petition x x x directing Atty. As we then sees it. Coronel. in lieu of the order to reinstate the latter to his former position. the crux of the controversy is whether there was just cause for the dismissal of respondent.04 of petitioner’s Company Rules and Regulations. accepted commissions and kickbacks from suppliers. respondent termination was for a just and valid cause. however. Marquez. computed from the first day of employment up to the finality of his decision. De Mesa. Lastimosa. HELD: In this case.

Corpuz. All other claims were DISMISSED for lack of merit. policy development / structure. Castillo. Corporal. project plan. INC. This caused her to miss certain directives coming from her superiors and likewise. For her part. attorney’s fees and other company benefits against respondents and its officers. Espina. respondents through Sauceda and Edles. Gloria. This led petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Corp.R. It directed the respondent corporation to reinstate complainant/petitioner to her position and pay her full backwages and benefits. The decision appealed from was MODIFIED. namely. denied. In the employment contract. Coronel. 174896. and such other works as may be assigned by her immediate superior. Sauceda. Asensi. Ma. Ramirez. On August 20. Cabañgon. In a decision dated October 21. 13th month pay. G. (PLTHC) hired petitioner as Corporate Human Resources (CHR) Director for Manufacturing for its subsidiary/affiliate company L&T International Group Phil. 2001. Catindig. FACTS: In February 2000. PLTHC’s Corporate Director for Human Resources. Santos. CORPORATION / L&T INTERNATIONAL GROUP PHILIPPINES. Inc. recruitment. it abhors oppression to an employer who cannot be compelled to retain an employee whose continued employment would be patently inimical to its interest. Rodriguez. She denied uttering negative comments about the HR2 Program and instead claimed to have intimated her support for it. the Executive Vice President of PLTHC. and Willie Tan (Tan). Palad. Tabugan. Petitioner filed her written response thereto. PHILIPPINE LUEN THAI HOLDING. however. 2012 DOCTRINE: The law is fair and just to both labor and management. 2002. Respondents thus filed with the CA a Petition for Certoriari with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Albano. (L&T). Marquez. De la Cruz.000. Rañigo. Respondents appealed to the NLRC. Francisco. NO. Reyes. Lastimosa. She explained that her alleged failure to perform management directives could be attributed to the lack of effective communication with her superiors due to malfunctioning email system. payment of separation pay. Thus. 2003. She further denied causing disharmony in her division. Edles (Edles). audit / compliance. Valois . it declared the dismissal of complainant legal but ordered respondents to pay complainant the sum of Php 240. Lumberio. Page 784 Echiverri. the NLRC found merit in respondents appeal. Tecson. while the Constitution accords an employee security of tenure. dismissed petitioner from service for loss of confidence on her ability to promote the interests of the company. Lorelie T. July 11. The motion was. benefits. moral and exemplary damages. Frank Sauceda (Sauceda). Edles. petitioner received a Prerequisite Notice from Sauceda and the Corporate Legal Counsel of PLTHC. FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES-RAYEL vs. De Mesa. petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Motion for Reconsideration of the awards. Martinez. Inguillo. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings.00 representing three months as expressed in complainant’s contract of employment. Sandoval. Sy. for her superiors to overlook the reports she was submitting. the Labor Arbiter declared petitioner to have been illegally dismissed by respondent corporation. Valiente. petitioner was tasked to perform functions in relation administration. On September 6. In a Termination Notice dated September 12. Alcazaren. giving her 48 hours from receipt to submit a written reply to the Memorandum on alleged unsatisfactory performance rating. 2001.

Coronel. Corpuz. Subsequently. On July 18. Sy. As distinguished from a rank and file personnel. Lastimosa. Santos. this court pronounced that an employee may be afforded ample opportunity to be heard by means of any method. Sandoval. Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The court found no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the CA that petitioner was validly dismissed. Asensi. Albano. Catindig. Tabugan. ISSUES: 1. Ramirez. Francisco. Inguillo. Tecson. petitioner was clearly afforded her right to due process. Respondents were ordered to pay petitioner the amount corresponding to three months salary pursuant to the termination provision of the employment contract. 2006. Valiente. It has been held in a plethora of cases that due process requirement is met when there is simply an opportunity to be heard and to explain one’s side even if no hearing is conducted. HELD: The petition was devoid of merit. Alcazaren. mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has breached the trust of the employer justifies dismissal. Loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt as the law requires only that there be at least some basis to justify it. conference or some other fair. Petitioner’s written response to the prerequisite notice provided her with an avenue to explain and defend her side and thus served the purpose of due process. Palad. Jurisprudence provides that an employer has a distinct prerogative and wider latitude of discretion dismissing a managerial personnel who performs functions which by their nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Whether or not respondents deprived petitioner of her right to due process when respondents dismissed her. Neither can there be any denial of due process due to the absence of a hearing or investigation at the company level. Corporal. Valois . Page 785 Echiverri. Lumberio. The CA found sufficient evidence to support the dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The NLRC resolution dated March 23. Reyes. 2. 2. verbal or written. whether in a hearing. De Mesa. In the case of Perez v. 1. There exists a valid ground for petitioner’s termination from employment. Espina. As she was served with notice apprising her of the charges against her and also a subsequent notice informing her of the management’s decision to terminate her services after respondents found her written response to the first notice unsatisfactory. Marquez. De la Cruz. 2004 was REVERSED. Gloria. Philippine Telegraph Company. Castillo. just and reasonable way. 2. Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed from her employment by respondents. the CA rendered a decision finding merit in the petition. Rañigo. Martinez. the CA denied respondents’ prayer for TRO.

Marquez. Respondent filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 2007. However. During the pendency of the appeal. Tabugan. Martinez. Standing alone. 178477. Castillo.. De Mesa. Rañigo. The contract was for a period of nine months with a monthly salary of US$499.A. Espina. GAYARES. Cabañgon. HEIRS OF RAMON B. sickness allowance.00 Prior to embarkation on March 12. Sandoval. Albano. Inguillo.K. Coronel. On December 18. the NLRC rendered its Decision deleting the award of disability benefits but affirming the awards of sickness allowance and 10% thereof as attorney’s fees. July 16. 1998. Ramirez. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering respondents to pay Gayares disability benefits. 2007 a copy of the November 30. On March 13. Reyes. Santos. Whether was there any proof that Gayares’ employment contributed or even aggravated his illness. Gayares died and was substituted by his heirs. 2006. Lumberio. G. Ramon B. 1998 he was repatriated to the Philippines for medical reasons. FACTS: In February 1998. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 30. Petitioners received on January 3. On February 10. However. 2006 NLRC Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration.. According to the Labor Arbiter. 2000. S.A. Lastimosa. Valois . The NLRC also opined that Gayares could not have contacted the illness during the term of his employment contract. 1998. 2012 DOCTRINE: Heavy pressure of works is not considered compelling reason to justify a request for an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. represented by Emelinda Gayares and Rhayan Gayares in their capacity as legal heirs of the late Ramon Gayares vs. damages and attorney’s fees against herein respondents. CO. S. Kuwait Oil Tanker Co. petitioners opted to file a Motion for Extension of Time which was received by the CA on March 05. Sy. Valiente. Gayares underwent medical examination and was found “fit to work” by the examining physician. Alcazaren. as an Able Seaman aboard its vessel M/T A1 Awdah. Francisco. Tecson. Page 786 Echiverri. and attorney’s fees. Gayares’ disability of “blephasrospasm with oramandibular dystonia” was contracted during his employment and not pre-existing as contended by respondent considering that he was diagnosed “fit to work” by the company physician.K. Rodriguez. On February 24. Catindig... herein petitioners. on April 22. it having manifested a mere 22 days after embarkation and considering that the said disease is hereditary. Gayares filed a complaint for disability/medical benefits. Palad. 2006. Asensi. Corporal. Gayares (Gayares) was hired by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation in behalf of its principal. Gloria. “Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Corpuz.R NO. PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION and KUWAIT OIL TANKER. instead filing a Petition for Certiorari. illness allowance. it is no sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule”. De la Cruz.

De la Cruz. Reyes. th discretion to grant or deny said request lies solely in the court. It is thus. Martinez. Castillo. More important. Ramirez. Corporal. Sandoval. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trials is timely filed. the petition shall be filed within the 60-day reglementary period. Lumberio. whether such motion is required or not. Albano. Rule 65 of Rules of Court provides: “Section 4: When and where petition filed – the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment. HELD: Section 4. Catindig. the CA issued a Resolution which denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time and dismissed the case. Tabugan. in asking for additional time. Alcazaren. this Petition for Review on Certiorari. Inguillo. petitioner’s counsel merely referred to “heavy pressure of work”. It is settled jurisprudence that heavy pressure of work is not considered compelling reason to justify a request for an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. order or resolution. Page 787 Echiverri. Sy. Espina. Rodriguez. Tecson. Gloria. 2007. Santos. Francisco. Hence. nothing more. Coronel. the sixty (60) day period shall be counted frim notice of the denial of said motion. Cabañgon. Rañigo. Heavy workload x x x ought to be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated by affidavits of merit. Valiente. As an exception. ISSUE: Whether heavy workload can be considered “compelling reason to justify a request for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. Hence. explicit from the foregoing that as a general rule. Corpuz. an extension of time may be granted but only for a compelling reason and only for 15 days. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Palad. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. Marquez. the party requesting such extension must not expect that his request will be granted as he has no inherent right to the same. Valois . In the instant case. Asensi.

Inguillo. 2002. state the basis of the transfer but instead advised Cagalawan to just comply with the order and not to question management’s legitimate prerogative to reassign him. Said memorandum stated that the transfer was done “in the exigency of the service. Castillo. This liberal policy. who filed an illegal dismissal case against MORESCO II. Lumberio. He also averred that his transfer to the Gingoog sub-office is inconvenient and prejudicial to him as it would entail additional travel expenses to and from work. September 5. Tabugan. In reply. Alcazaren. however. Asensi. Marquez. Sy. Tecson. belated submission of evidence may only be allowed if the delay is adequately justified and the evidence is clearly material to establish the party’s cause. strict adherence with the technical rules is not required. He emphasized though that his action was not an act of disloyalty to MORESCO II. 2001. Valois . Lastimosa. De Mesa. In a Memorandum11 dated May 9. On July 1. Rodriguez.9 On July 17. 2002. Cabañgon. he was designated as Acting Head of the disconnection crew in Area III sub-office of MORESCO II in Balingasag. In a letter dated May 15. FACTS: MORESCO II. MORESCO II General Manager Amado B. Reyes. Valiente. Page 788 Echiverri. Francisco. however. Misamis Oriental (Gingoog sub-office) as a member of the disconnection crew. Sandoval. Albano. Espina. 2002. On March 1. contrary to what was being accused of him. Santos. respectively. Ke-e explained that Cagalawan’s transfer was not a demotion since he was holding the position of Disconnection Head only by mere designation and not by appointment. Cagalawan assailed his transfer claiming he was effectively demoted from his position as head of the disconnection crew to a mere member thereof. Palad. He likewise sought clarification on what kind of exigency exists as to justify his transfer and why he was the one chosen to be transferred. G. De la Cruz. MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE (MORESCO II) VS VIRGILIO CAGALAWAN. Cagalawan eventually stopped reporting for work. 2012 DOCTRINE: In labor cases. 2002. Ke-e and Danilo Subrado (Subrado). a rural electric cooperative. should still conform with the rudiments of equitable principles of law. in their capacities as General Manager and Board Chairman. hired Cagalawan as a Disconnection Lineman on a probationary basis. Ramirez. Nonetheless. Martinez. In a Memorandum dated May 16. Coronel. Corpuz. Rañigo. he filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against MORESCO II and its officers. 1994 Cagalawan was appointed to the same post this time on a permanent basis. Corporal. Ke-e did not. 175170. Ke-e (Ke-e) transferred Cagalawan to Area I sub-office in Gingoog City.R. For instance. Misamis Oriental (Balingasag sub-office). Catindig. 2002 but reserved his right to contest the legality of such transfer. Gloria. Cagalawan still reported for work at Gingoog sub-office on May 27. No. Cagalawan claimed that he was transferred because he executed an Affidavit in support of his co-employee Jessie Rances.

It then found said evidence credible in showing that Cagalawan’s transfer to Gingoog sub-office was required in the exigency of the cooperative’s business interest. affidavits and other documents. addressed to Ke-e. Sy. Espina. It held that what MORESCO II presented on appeal was not just an additional evidence but its entire evidence after the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision adverse to it. The NLRC. Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure which prohibits the parties from making new allegations or cause of action not included in the complaint or position paper. set aside and vacated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Cagalawan’s complaint against MORESCO II. MORESCO II then averred that as against this letter of Engr. 2002 from Gingoog sub-office Area Manager. Catindig. MORESCO II invoked the liberal application of the rules and prayed for the NLRC to admit its evidence on appeal. Rañigo. Ramirez. Marquez. Santos. De la Cruz. Palad. Francisco. impelled by a vindictive motive after he executed an Affidavit in favor of a colleague and against MORESCO II. Tecson. citing Section 3. Valiente. Gloria. Corpuz. The NLRC admitted MORESCO II’s evidence even if submitted only on appeal in the interest of substantial justice. Canada). Engr. Cabañgon. Canada requested for two additional disconnection linemen in order to attain the collection quota allocated in his area. MORESCO II’s belated submission of evidence despite the opportunities given it cannot be countenanced as such practice “defeats speedy administration of justice” and “smacks of unfairness. the certification issued by Ortiz should be considered as incompetent since the latter is a mere disconnection crew. To substantiate this. Reyes. Canada who is a managerial employee. it submitted a letter dated May 8. 2004. MORESCO II explained that the transfer was in response to the request of the area manager in Gingoog sub-office for additional personnel in his assigned area. Lastimosa. Martinez. It also ruled that the transfer did not entail a demotion in rank and diminution of pay as to constitute constructive dismissal and thus upheld the right of MORESCO II to transfer Cagalawan in the exercise of its sound business judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the letter presented by MORESCO II can be admitted as evidence on appeal with the NLRC. To the CA. Asensi. Alcazaren. Canada (Engr. Valois . Engr. Lumberio. Inguillo. the Labor Arbiter found no sufficient reason for his transfer and that the same was calculated to rid him of his employment. Albano. Coronel. In said letter. The CA found the NLRC to have gravely abused its discretion in admitting MORESCO II’s evidence. Ronel B. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Castillo. MORESCO II denied that Cagalawan’s transfer was done in retaliation for executing an affidavit in favor of a co-worker. Tabugan. through a Resolution dated February 27. Corporal. Sandoval. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring that Cagalawan’s transfer constituted illegal constructive dismissal. Aside from finding merit in Cagalawan’s uncontroverted allegation that the transfer became grossly inconvenient for him. Page 789 Echiverri.

standing alone. Canada. Santos. De Mesa. Unfortunately. However. such that if there is a showing that the transfer was unnecessary or inconvenient and prejudicial to the employee. Inguillo. Alcazaren. Canada’s letter is nothing more than a mere request for additional personnel to augment the number of disconnection crew assigned in the area. it is. MORESCO II could have at least presented financial documents or any other concrete documentary evidence showing that the collection quota of the Gingoogsuboffice has not been met or could not be reached. the letter-request was dated May 8. Valiente. It should have also submitted such other documents which would show the lack of sufficient personnel in the area. Rañigo. the only evidence adduced by MORESCO II to support the legitimacy of the transfer was the letter-request of Engr. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Rodriguez. are not precluded from receiving evidence submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them. Notably. provided that the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of salary. Gloria. Catindig. HELD: No. Asensi. MORESCO II could have easily presented the letter in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter for serious examination. For one. Engr. Marquez. Only after an adverse decision was rendered did it present its defense and rebut the evidence of Cagalawan by alleging that his transfer was made in response to the letter-request of the area manager of the Gingoog sub-office asking for additional personnel to meet its collection quota. Sy. Why it was not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question which lends credence to Cagalawan’s theory that it may have just been fabricated for the purpose of appeal. Espina. Corpuz. it cannot be upheld. Page 790 Echiverri. any delay in the submission of evidence should be adequately explained and should adequately prove the allegations sought to be proven. 2002 or a day before the memorandum for Cagalawan’s transfer was issued. But this prerogative should be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and with due regard to the basic elements of justice and fair play. specially so when the same is not a newly discovered evidence. While it mentioned that the area’s collection efficiency should be improved and that there is a shortage of personnel therein. this piece of evidence cannot in itself sufficiently establish that the Gingoog sub-office was indeed suffering from losses due to collection deficiency so as to justify the assignment of additional personnel in the area. Tabugan. Castillo. MORESCO II’s belated submission of evidence cannot be permitted. The rule is that it is within the ambit of the employer’s prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business. However. benefits and other privileges. the belated submission of the said letter request without any valid explanation casts doubt on its credibility. the area Albano. Valois . Sandoval. This Court has always considered the management’s prerogative to transfer its employees in pursuit of its legitimate interests. Reyes. MORESCO II did not cite any reason why it had failed to file its position paper or present its cause before the Labor Arbiter despite sufficient notice and time given to do so. Cabañgon. Tecson. Francisco. however. Corporal. Coronel. self-serving and thus cannot be considered as competent evidence to prove the accuracy of the allegations therein. Martinez. such as the NLRC. To our mind. Labor tribunals. Ramirez. Palad. De la Cruz.

Martinez. Corporal. De la Cruz. This is consistent with the rule that an employer’s cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. Coronel. there was also failure on its part to sufficiently support its allegation that the transfer of Cagalawan was for a legitimate purpose. not only was the delay in the submission of MORESCO II’s evidence not explained. described as more than a mere scintilla. Lastimosa. MORESCO II’s plea that its evidence be admitted in the interest of justice does not deserve any merit. Page 791 Echiverri. Valois . Rañigo. Reyes. Marquez. and not merely apparent. Francisco. Santos. Corpuz. Gloria. Catindig. Clearly. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence. Sandoval. Sy. Alcazaren. Castillo. “The evidence must be real and substantial. Cabañgon. manager’s letter provides no more than bare allegations which deserve not even the slightest credit. Valiente. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Thus. Albano. Tabugan. Asensi. Espina. Inguillo. the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. Tecson. Palad.” MORESCO II has miserably failed to discharge the onus of proving the validity of Cagalawan’s transfer. De Mesa. This being the case. MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of Ortiz’s certification in order to give more credit to its own evidence. Ramirez. When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee.

Asensi. However. Manila. Valiente. De Mesa. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY G. a deliberate abandonment of work calculated to paralyze its operations. Coronel. September 17. De la Cruz. Displeased with Secretary Laguesma’s ruling.R. Albano. Waiver. Rodriguez. FACTS: Solidbank Union (Union) was a legitimate labor organization and the duly certified sole bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Solidbank. and not absolute. Rañigo. Solidbank dismissed all 199 employees. 2012 DOCTRINE: In any event. Solidbank perceived the same to be an illegal strike. Solidbank placed the concerned employees under preventive suspension status. Inguillo. 2000. Solidbank informed the employees that the bank was willing to take back those who would report for work on April 6. the parties reached an impasse. however. 2000 (a Monday) and trooped to his office in Intramuros. however. it re-admitted 70 employees. Other rank and file employees in the provincial branches of Solidbank also absented themselves from work that day. On varying dates. About 513 of the striking employees obliged with the second memorandum. 2000. SOLIDBANK UNION VS. then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Espina. Valois . No. Francisco. identity of the parties is required for res judicata to lie. Solidbank also filed its Motion for Reconsideration. not only to accompany their lawyer in filing the Union’s Motion for Reconsideration but also to stage a brief public demonstration. On April 17. In another memorandum. Marquez. On November 17. Sandoval. and Quitclaim25 in favor of Solidbank. 1999. bringing down the number of dismissed employees to 129. Martinez. Corpuz. Alcazaren. Gloria. With respect to the mass demonstration conducted by its employees. Laguesma (Secretary Laguesma) assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the parties from holding a strike or lockout or any activity which might exacerbate the situation. 153799. Solidbank issued a memorandum informing all the participants in the mass demonstration that they had put their jobs at risk. Reyes. Eventually. Page 792 Echiverri. Santos. Castillo. Corporal. Palad. “There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. some 21 employees executed a Release. Lastimosa. another memorandum was issued requiring them to explain within 24 hours from notice thereof why they should not be dismissed from employment. Catindig. it is well-settled that only substantial. Thus. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Tabugan. the Union and Solidbank negotiated for a new economic package for the remaining two years of the 1997-2001 collective bargaining agreement (CBA). on January 18. With regard to the 199 employees who did not comply with the aforesaid memorandum. about 712 union members and officers skipped work in the morning of April 3. Pending receipt of explanations. 2000. Ramirez. Sy. Thus. Tecson.

No. It also dismissed the complaint with respect to complainant Jose A. Page 793 Echiverri. Senior Vice-President DiwataCastanos (Castanos). Castillo. Gloria. Inguillo. De Mesa. and that Solidbank was guilty of unfair labor practice for using union membership as one of the bases for recalling or terminating employment. The petition is denied. the complainants assailed the Resolutions dated January 14. Corporal. and First Metro. Alcazaren. Corpuz. 2000 assumption order. Reyes. the surviving corporation was renamed First Metro Investment Corporation. Martinez. However. Labor Arbiter Flores rendered his Decision declaring the disputed April 3. with Solidbank as the surviving entity and First Metro ceasing to exist as a corporation. Sandoval. Meanwhile. hence. he awarded full backwages and attorney’s fees in favor of the employees. together with its members who were dismissed by Solidbank (hereinafter collectively referred to as complainants). Espina. filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Solidbank. Catindig. 2002117 of the CA’s Fourth Division granting Metrobank’s request for injunctive reliefs. 2002116 and February 20. Cabañgon. It should be recalled that in G. The Union. 2000 incident not a strike but a mere expression of the employees’ displeasure over the Secretary’s ruling. Subsequently. Rañigo. which ceased operations on August 31. The NLRC’s Second Division rendered its Decision finding the dismissal of the complainants valid. Sy. Asensi.R. Accordingly. and the decision of the CA is affirmed. Hence. however. Tecson. Rodriguez. Palad. The NLRC Second Division likewise ruled that Solidbank did not interfere with complainants’ right to self-organization and. Waiver and Quitclaim. Marquez. 153799. Vistan (Vistan). On May 8. Valiente. HELD: YES. 2000 was a strike within the contemplation of Article 212(o) of the Labor Code and in violation of the Secretary of Labor’s January 18. ISSUE: Whether or not the res judicata applies in the case. Secretary Laguesma issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Solidbank and the Union. De la Cruz. Tabugan. Lastimosa. They claimed that the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision is immediately executory. Metrobank bought all banking-related assets and liabilities of Solidbank (renamed First Metro). that the 24-hour deadline imposed by Solidbank within which the employees should submit their written explanation was not sufficient to give them reasonable opportunity to refute the charges against them. Albano. First Metro and Solidbank entered into a merger agreement. its President and Chief Executive Officer Deogracias N. Coronel. Santos. It opined that the mass action held on April 3. Valois . the NLRC Second Division still awarded separation benefits in favor of the complainants on equitable grounds. did not commit unfair labor practice. Francisco. 2000. Lumberio. Ramirez. as well as with respect to the 21 individual complainants who already executed Release. Notably. Antenor for violating the rule against forum shopping. 2000.

R. And while some of the parties herein are not included in G. Castillo. Valois . Alcazaren. Coronel. Marquez. Sandoval. it is well-settled that only substantial. Corpuz. The November 15. subject matter and causes of action.R. Sy. Nos. Asensi. Catindig. 159460 and 159461 became final and executory on May 20. Santos. It is a decision based on the merits of the case and rendered by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction after the parties invoked its jurisdiction. 159460 and 159461 are also impleaded as parties in these consolidated cases. Nos. Rañigo. 2011. Ramirez.R. There is also. Said Decision pronouncing the monetary awards to which the parties herein are entitled became final and executory on May 20. 159460 and 159461 already adjudicated the respective rights and liabilities of the parties. Valiente. Tecson. 159460 and 159461. The Decision of this Court in G. identity of the parties. it is no longer susceptible to any modification. Rodriguez. identity of the parties is required for res judicata to lie. Inguillo. the same are only few. Lastimosa. this Court cannot alter or modify said Decision. Espina. they are entitled to backwages from the time the Labor Arbiter promulgated his Decision until it was reversed by the NLRC. 2010 Decision of this Court in G. Francisco. Palad. Cabañgon. between the two sets of consolidated cases. Albano. Under the rule on immutability of judgment. Nos. Page 794 Echiverri. Corporal.R. Gloria. De la Cruz. Nos. “There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. The parties in G. De Mesa. Lumberio. and not absolute. It is a well-established rule that once a judgment has become final and executory. 2011. In any event. Reyes. Tabugan. Martinez.

To support these allegations. Sandoval. Pressured into resigning prior to the branch’s closure as they might be denied separation pay. Reyes. respondents submitted together with the said Position Paper. the employees who voluntarily resigned and executed quitclaims are barred from instituting an action or claim against their employer. Coronel. Ramirez. November 21. 13th month pay. Alcazaren. They claimed that they were led to believe that MOL’s Cebu branch would be downsized into a mere skeletal force due to alleged low productivity and profitability volume. petitioners were constrained to resign. Petitioners were then given their separation pay and the monetary value of leave credits. They likewise posited that petitioners are guilty of laches by estoppel considering that they filed their complaints only after the lapse of 15 months from their severance from employment. 2002 while Auza and Jeanjaquet submitted their resignation letters on October 30. separation benefits were paid to them for which quitclaims were duly executed. Valiente. JR. In their Position Paper. George Dolorfino. It also employed Otarra as its Accounts Officer on November 1. 1997. On October 1. Tecson. FACTS: Respondent MOL is a common carrier engaged in transporting cargoes to and from the different parts of the world. Cabañgon. On October 14. Espina. documentary evidence.R. Afterwhich. it employed Auza and Jeanjaquet as Cebu’s Branch Manager and Administrative Assistant. Marquez. Sy. Inguillo. Valois . In February 2004 or almost 15 months after their severance from employment. Petitioners filed a verified Position Paper signed by the said counsel. 1997. Hence. In fact. 175481. Rodriguez. Although we are committed to protect the working class. 2002.” which documents were signed by each of them acknowledging receipt of such benefits. 2012 DOCTRINE: Justice is in every case for the deserving. Tabugan.. MOL cooperative shares and unused dental/optical benefits as shown in documents entitled “Remaining Entitlement Computation. DIONISIO F. No. it behooves us to uphold the rights of management too if only to serve the interest of fair play. Francisco. Catindig. Martinez. Castillo. petitioners filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against respondents and MOL’s Manager for Corporate Services. affidavit of witnesses and a formal offer of exhibits. Rañigo. As applied in this case. respondents alleged that petitioners were not dismissed but voluntarily resigned from employment. G. they executed Release and Quitclaims10 and then issued Separation Clearances. Page 795 Echiverri. Palad. Corporal. Asensi. to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. AUZA. 2002. vs MOL PHILIPPINES INC. De Mesa. Gloria. 2002 to take effect on November 30. Albano. Lumberio. De la Cruz. petitioners are effectively barred from instituting any action or claim in connection with their employment. Lastimosa. respectively. Santos. They averred in said pleading that their consent to resign was not voluntarily given but was instead obtained through mistake and fraud. Otarra tendered her resignation letter effective November 15. Corpuz.

and is heavily losing money. Cañete’s receipt on August 9. It held that the 10day period given to petitioners for filing their Position Paper should be reckoned from Atty. Ramirez. 2004 the May 26. The CA rendered its Decision annulling and setting aside the Decision of the NLRC. Espina. This is because after they were duped to resign. hence. Auza was stripped of his authority to sign checks for the branch’s expenditures. Tabugan. and more telephone lines were installed. 2004 of the July 29. The NLRC concluded that petitioners were illegally dismissed and thus granted them the relief of reinstatement. The NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that petitioners’ Position Paper was filed late. Lumberio. Inguillo. way beyond the said 10-day period. and attorney’s fees. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Valiente. Cabañgon. 2004 Order requiring the parties to file position papers within 10 days from receipt thereof. they discovered that the planned downsizing of the Cebu branch was a mere malicious scheme to oust them and to accommodate Tiutan’s own people. Gloria. said pleading must be stricken off the records. petitioners were only able to file their Position Paper on August 11. For Tiutan’s bad faith in pressuring both Auza and Otarra to resign. Consequently. of petitioners’ Position Paper on August 11. However. Coronel. his and Otarra’s assigned company cars. Boiser. These were done to them despite the fact that the Cebu branch had consistently surpassed the performance goal set by the Manila office as shown by documentary evidence submitted. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. And for being filed late. De la Cruz. In this case. The filing. Sy. Palad. Albano. 2004. Marquez. De Mesa. Reyes. 2004 is well within the allowed period. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed. Page 796 Echiverri. therefore. full backwages computed in accordance with the computation presented by petitioners in their Supplemental Position Paper. Catindig. 2004 Order of the Labor Arbiter. additional employees were hired by the management as their replacement. Martinez. It opined that petitioners were aware of the consequences of their acts in voluntarily resigning and executing quitclaims. petitioners’ counsel of record. Corpuz. manned by incompetent employees. Santos. Alcazaren. representation expenses were cutoff. Sandoval. Tecson. they moved to a bigger office. moral and exemplary damages were likewise awarded to the two. Corporal. Castillo. Later. Aside from Tiutan’s incessant imputations that the Cebu branch is overstaffed. The CA did not find any element of coercion and force in petitioners’ separation from employment but rather upheld the voluntary execution of their resignation letters as gleaned from the tenor thereof. Valois . the Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaints without prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Section 3. cellphones and landline phones were recalled. Atty. Petitioners further averred that their separation from employment amounts to constructive dismissal due to the shabby treatment they received from Tiutan at the time they were being compelled to quit employment. Asensi. and travel and hotel expenses were drastically reduced. Francisco. received on June 22. Rañigo. there was no basis in dismissing the Complaints for failure to prosecute.

that the law will step in to bail out the employee. on their own volition. the Cebu Performance Reports submitted which showed outstanding company performance only pertained to the year 1999 and the first quarter of year 2000.” The overt act of relinquishment should be coupled with an intent to relinquish. president of their Homeowner’s Association and an active member of his community. unsuspecting or gullible person. Tecson. we uphold the validity of the quitclaims signed by petitioners in exchange for the separation benefits they received from respondents. were not retained. decided to resign from their positions after being informed of the management’s decision that the Cebu branch would eventually be manned by a mere skeletal force. Page 797 Echiverri. “It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person. “Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office. in fact. Valois . Alcazaren. Otarra. voluntary agreements entered into and represented by a reasonable settlement are binding on the parties which may not be later disowned simply because of a change of mind. Although quitclaims are generally against public policy. Catindig. Castillo. On the other hand. What they presented was adocument entitled “1999 Performance Standards”. No other financial documents were submitted to show that such progress continued until year 2002. De Mesa. Valiente. that the law will step in to bail out the employee. Santos. which intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation. Lastimosa. or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable. Auza was the Local Chairman of International Shipping Lines Association for five years. Inguillo. there was a substantial reduction of workforce as all of the Cebu branch staff and personnel. or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable. Tabugan. petitioners were fully aware and had. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. petitioners’ assertions that the Cebu branch was performing well are not at all substantiated.” Hence. acknowledged that Cebu branch has been incurring losses and was already unprofitable to operate. except one. Coronel. was officer of various church organizations and a college professor at the University of the Visayas. Albano.” Hence. Espina. De la Cruz. Marquez. In addition. It appears that petitioners. Asensi. Sy. we uphold the validity of the quitclaims signed by petitioners in exchange for the separation benefits they received from respondents. Reyes. Their standing in society depicts how highly educated and intelligent persons they are as to know fully well the consequences of their acts in executing and signing letters of resignation and quitclaims. As proven by the email correspondences presented. Corpuz. HELD: Petitioners voluntarily resigned from employment. Corporal. Lumberio. Note that there was evidence produced to prove that indeed the Cebu branch’s productivity had deteriorated as shown in a Profit and Loss Statement for the years 2001 and 2002. Ramirez. it is well to note that Auza and Otarra are managerial employees and not ordinary workers who cannot be easily coerced or intimidated into signing something against their will. which only provides for performance objectives but tells nothing about the branch’s progress. Sandoval. Gloria. Likewise. Palad. Martinez. on the other hand. Rañigo. Also. Francisco. As borne out by the records.

Sy. the said Committee Resolution had already become final and conclusive between the parties for failure of Octavio to elevate the same to the proper forum.500. Francisco. Lumberio. the grant of across-the board salary increase for those who were regularized starting January 1. Palad. 2001. It is settled that "when parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed. we have held time and again that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. 2013 DOCTRINE: When parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed. Castillo. No. On May 31. Cabañgon. Rañigo. CARLOS L. De Mesa. Tecson. Espina. Catindig. it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Fajardo wrote the PLDT Human Resource Head to inform management of the GUTS members’ claim for entitlement to the across-the-board salary increases. when the Union-Management Grievance Committee came up with the Committee Resolution. Acting thereon and on similar grievances from other GUTS members. 175492 February 27. Valiente. FACTS: PLDT and Gabay ng UnyonsaTelekominaksyon ng mgaSuperbisor (GUTS) entered into a CBA covering the period January 1. Hence. Tabugan. PLDT claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide Octavio’s claims. 2000. 2001 and P2. PLDT and GUTS entered into another CBA covering the period January 1. Asensi. 2002 to December 31. 2002 and the exclusion thereto of those who were regularized on January 1. Valois . PLDT countered that the issues advanced by Octavio had already been resolved by the Union-Management Grievance Committee when it denied his claims through the Committee Resolution. Reyes. HELD: YES. Sandoval. In fact. In addition. Moreover.R. do not constitute an act of unfair labor practice as would result in any discrimination or encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. Octavio wrote the President of GUTS. OCTAVIO vs. Adolfo Fajardo (Fajardo). Santos. Inguillo. Ramirez. PLDT hired Octavio as Sales System Analyst I on a probationary status.00 effective January 1.000. 1999 to December 31. He became a member of GUTS. Octavio filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for payment of said salary increases. Martinez. they considered the same as the most practicable and reasonable solution for both management and union. Marquez. 2004 (CBA of 2002-2004). Page 798 Echiverri.00 effective January 1. 2001 (CBA of 1999-2001). Lastimosa. 2002. Gloria. ISSUE: Whether or notthe decision of the Grievance Committee is binding. if a remedy Albano. Corpuz. Claiming that he was not given the salary increases of P2. At any rate. Alcazaren. The committee denied the claims of Octavio. De la Cruz. Coronel. On October 1." Moreover. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY G. Corporal. Rodriguez. 2002.

Octavio’s failure to assail the validity and enforceability of the Committee Resolution makes the same binding upon him. or grievance machinery. Alcazaren. On this score alone. by raising the same before a Board of Arbitrators. and. The premature invocation of the court’s judicial intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. Lumberio. Castillo. Sy. Corporal. he departed from the grievance procedure mandated in the CBA and denied the Board of Arbitrators the opportunity to pass upon a matter over which it has jurisdiction. Francisco. De la Cruz. Clearly. Espina. Rañigo. as well as to the CA. Catindig. Coronel. Martinez. that is. within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction. Hence. Albano. Tecson. Sandoval. Asensi. Santos. it will decide the same correctly. finally. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Marquez. Inguillo. Octavio is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Tabugan. and as correctly held by the CA." By failing to question the Committee Resolution through the proper procedure prescribed in the CBA. Valois . is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter. must therefore fail. De Mesa. Valiente. Cabañgon. Gloria. Palad. Octavio’s recourse to the labor tribunals below. Page 799 Echiverri. Reyes." "The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body. Ramirez. to this Court.

Castillo. TANGGA-AN vs. G. 8042. Marquez. A plain reading of Sec. Catindig. Tangga-an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. Rañigo. Valiente. LA said he is entitled not to four months which is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract. LLC. “Kure”. On February 2002. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC.. Ramirez. or equivalent to four months. HELD: NO. De Mesa. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to 3months back salaries. De la Cruz. Sy. Inc. inclusive of vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8. (PTC) for and in behalf of its foreign employer.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the amount of US$700. Palad. Lastimosa.” To follow the thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some.000. whichever is less. 180636 March 13. This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and Albano. vs. leave pay. Sandoval.600) pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. he was to be employed for a period of six months as chief engineer of the vessel the S.e. Tecson. involving Section 10 of Republic Act No.00 a month. Alcazaren.500. As regards petitioner’s claim for back salaries. whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term. Martinez. Santos. attorney’s fees and interest. that an illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) months salary only. vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a month or US$2. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency. Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract. but only to three months. FACTS: Under the employment contract entered by Tangga-an with Philippine Transmarine Carriers. Gloria. 2013 DOCTRINE: An illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) months salary only. Corpuz. No. This is evident from the wording “for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the wording “salaries x xx for three months. Rodriguez. Espina. NLRC. Tangga-an was deployed but was dismissed on April 2002. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker. exemplary and moral damages. comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. Inc. Tabugan. Coronel. Cabañgon.00. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. Lumberio. Asensi. Corporal.200 x 3 months = US$24. Inguillo. Reyes. Valois . i. Universe Tankship Delaware. Francisco. Page 800 Echiverri.R.S. He was to be paid a basic salary of US$5. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005..

Lumberio. Francisco. Alcazaren. Santos. Rodriguez.200 x 4 months). Lastimosa.800 (or US$5. Coronel. Martinez. Inguillo. Castillo. plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases. Valois . Palad. Marquez. De la Cruz. Page 801 Echiverri.500 + US$700 = US$8. Corpuz. De Mesa. Rañigo. to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working.” As we have time and again held. “Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. Ramirez. Tecson. Reyes. Espina. benefit package. Cabañgon. Sandoval.” Albano. Catindig.000 + US$2. Valiente. Asensi. Gloria. petitioner is entitled to back salaries of US$32. Corporal. “it is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages. Thus. Sy. Tabugan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the covered employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said hospital expenses HELD: NO.R. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Asensi.To allow reimbursement of amounts paid under other insurance policies shall constitute double recovery which is not sanctioned by law. It follows that MMPC’s liability is limited. it does not include the amounts paid by other health insurance providers. SP No. 2006 Decisionand December 5. Castillo. Page 802 Echiverri. Ramirez. that is. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (MMPSEU) vs MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES G. Sandoval. No. excluding the amounts paid by dependents’ other health insurance providers.R. Palad. Corporal. Catindig. Valiente. This condition is obviously intended to thwart not only fraudulent claims but also double claims for the same loss of the dependents of covered employees. Martinez. Lumberio. Reyes. Inguillo. upon hospitalization of the covered employees’ dependents. 2002 Decision and declared respondent Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) to be under no legal obligation to pay its covered employees’ dependents’ hospitalization expenses which were already shouldered by other health insurance companies. Espina. While the company refused to pay the portion of the hospital expenses already shouldered by the dependents’ own health insurance. Accordingly. covered employees pay part of the hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary deduction while the company. petitioner Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) assails the March 31. Tecson. By this Petition for Review on Certiorari. Coronel. 75630. Sy. Albano. De Mesa. Rañigo. that is. Marquez. Valois . 2013 DOCTRINE: The conditions set forth in the CBA provision indicate an intention to limit MMPC’s liability only to actual expenses incurred by the employees’ dependents. Gloria. Santos. De la Cruz. 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. the union insists that the covered employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said hospital expenses. The conflict arose when a portion of the hospitalization expenses of the covered employees’ dependents were paid/shouldered by the dependent’s own health insurance. which reversed and set aside the Voluntary Arbitrator’s December 3. Rodriguez. Corpuz. The condition that payment should be direct to the hospital and doctor implies that MMPC is only liable to pay medical expenses actually shouldered by the employees’ dependents. Lastimosa. 175773 : June 17. shall pay the hospitalization expenses incurred for the same. Cabañgon. Francisco. FACTS: The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the parties in this case provides that the company shoulder the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of covered employees subject to certain limitations and restrictions.

Martinez. the covered employees will not receive more than what is due them. Page 803 Echiverri. Being in the nature of a non-life insurance contract and essentially a contract of indemnity. Alcazaren. It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between the parties and as such. neither is MMPC under any obligation to give more than what is due under the CBA. Valois . To constitute unjust enrichment. The CBA has provided for MMPC’s limited liability which extends only up to the amount to be paid to the hospital and doctor by the employees’ dependents. Inguillo. MMPC will unjustly profit from the premiums the employees contribute through monthly salary deductions. A claim for unjust enrichment fails when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. As aptly ruled by the CA. As there is no ambiguity. MMPSEU insists that MMPC is also liable for the amounts covered under other insurance policies. Francisco. MMPSEU cannot rely on the rule that a contract of insurance is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. ordinary and popular sense. This contention is unmeritorious. the CBA provision obligates MMPC to indemnify the covered employees’ medical expenses incurred by their dependents but only up to the extent of the expenses actually incurred. Corporal. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Asensi. Rañigo. Sandoval. Valiente. excluding those paid by other insurers. Coronel. De Mesa. Corpuz. Lastimosa. to grant the claims of MMPSEU will permit possible abuse by employees. Moreover. the terms must be taken in their plain. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Neither can it rely on the theory that any doubt must be resolved in favor of labor. Espina. Cabañgon. Gloria. Sy. Indeed. the rights and obligations of the parties must be determined in accordance with the general principles of insurance law. Reyes. Santos. Catindig. Lumberio. Castillo. Tecson. otherwise. since the subject CBA provision is an insurance contract. Consequently. Albano. Palad. The terms of the subject provision are clear and provide no room for any other interpretation. Marquez. it should be strictly construed for the purpose of limiting the amount of the employer’s liability. This is consistent with the principle of indemnity which proscribes the insured from recovering greater than the loss. to profit from a loss will lead to unjust enrichment and therefore should not be countenanced. it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. Consequently.

Five days later. For not wearing proper uniform while on duty. Reyes. Later on NPC was no longer interested in petitioner’s services and thus requested for his replacement.” The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear. Tabugan. On the same month. Lastimosa. Santos. Corporal. petitioner requested to issue a certification in connection with his intended retirement effective that month which was issued.” Albano. 179326 : June 31. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Rañigo. Alcazaren. 2013 DOCTRINE: In illegal dismissal cases. HELD: Yes. “while the employer bears the burden x xx to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. positive and convincing. relying on the word “terminated” as used in the said certification. Palad. Corpuz. Francisco. Espina. Martinez. it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove his claim of dismissal. While it is true that he was not allowed to report for work after the period of his suspension expired. Catindig. Valiente. Petitioner relies on the word “terminated” as used in the Certification issued him and argued that the same is a clear indication that he was dismissed from service. Ramirez. aside from this single document. Sandoval. Thus. in this case. petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal. Castillo. the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service. Valois . illegal suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against respondents. positive and convincing. LUCIANO CANEDO vs.R. petitioner was suspended for a month. “while the employer bears the burden x xx to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. Cabañgon. Sy. Asensi. Marquez. Tecson.” The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear. Lumberio. In illegal dismissal cases. No. Gloria. FACTS: Respondent agency hired petitioner as security guard and assigned him at the NPC. Page 804 Echiverri. And as correctly argued by respondents. De la Cruz. petitioner proffered no other evidence showing that he was dismissed from employment. Coronel. petitioner from that point onward is not considered dismissed but merely on a floating status. Petitioner cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss. G. Here. the same was due to NPC’s request for his replacement as NPC was no longer interested in his services. the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service. ISSUE: Whether or not CA an employee allegedly dismissed has to prove his claim of dismissal. Inguillo. “Such a ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for security guards employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties. KAMPILAN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY INC.

Hence. Moreover and as aptly observed by the NLRC. Catindig. Corpuz. Espina. In this case. Page 805 Echiverri. Valois . Santos. Tecson. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Martinez. Marquez. Reyes. Gloria. Albano. it was in fact petitioner who intended to terminate his relationship with respondents through his planned retirement. Countering such status. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Coronel. Castillo. Inguillo. Alcazaren. A floating status can ripen into constructive dismissal only when it goes beyond the six-month maximum period allowed by law. Cabañgon. he is still not given any new duties. Rañigo. petitioner filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal even before the lapse of the six-month period. Rodriguez. Palad. petitioner contends that even at present. Asensi. Tabugan. Lumberio. Valiente. his claim of illegal dismissal lacks basis. Sy. This is further bolstered by his prayer in his Complaint where he sought for separation pay and not for reinstatement. De Mesa. Corporal. Francisco.

” “The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. Tabugan. Alcazaren. tearing of the DTR of the employees by the employer constitute constructive dismissal. unreasonable or unlikely. and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. Francisco. De la Cruz. Tecson. Marquez. a heated argument between San Joaquin and petitioner's wife Rosa took place. ISSUE: Whether tearing of DTRs of the employees by the employerconstitutes constructive dismissal. 2013 DOCTRINE: The employer's act of tearing to pieces the employee's time card may be considered an outright . Santos. Espina. He learned that the DTR of Fernandez also suffered the same fate after they testified in Court. De Mesa. After that. VICENTE ANG vs. Upon reporting for work two days later. Sandoval.”Constructive dismissal may likewise exist if an “act of clear discrimination. No. Inguillo. Fernandez was suspended for a week for insubordination but the act of insubordination was not specified by petitioner in his memorandum to the latter. or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. “Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible. A daily time record is primarily intended to prevent Albano. Moreover. Corporal. JR.” "The CA is correct in its pronouncement that respondents were constructively dismissed from work. Coronel. Ramirez.not only symbolic . taking into account the policy of “no work. hostile. One day. In a hearing relative to 41 criminal cases filed by his former employee. Ang discontinued and severed his relationship with respondents. Catindig. Page 806 Echiverri. AND DIOSDADO FERNANDEZ G. the latter began to treat them with hostility and antagonism.termination of the parties' employment relationship. by destroying respondents’ time cards. Reyes. as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. Rañigo. in view of the former's refusal to obey her her instruction to transfer the monobloc chairs in her restaurant. Asensi. he found out that his DTR was torn into pieces by petitioner. insensibility. Cabañgon. no pay”. CEFERINO SAN JOAQUIN.” “Constructive dismissal exists when the employee involuntarily resigns due to the harsh.” It is a “dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. Lumberio. Gloria..R. August 07. Respondents filed complaints for illegal constructive dismissal. Valiente. FACTS: San Joaquin and Fernandez (respondents) were employed by Vicente Ang (petitioner) in his business as helper and driver respectively. Valois . HELD: Yes. Rodriguez. 185549. the respondents testified against the petitioner. Lastimosa. Palad. Castillo. Corpuz. Martinez. The purpose of a time record is to show an employee’s attendance in office for work and to be paid accordingly. Sy.

Corporal. Valois . when Ang tore the respondents’ time cards to pieces. Lastimosa. and in the absence of an employment agreement. Lumberio. Thus. Martinez. which could result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. Espina. Coronel. Alcazaren. Tabugan. De Mesa. Catindig. Ramirez. The act may be considered an outright – not only symbolic – termination of the parties’ employment relationship. it is a mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll. Sy. he virtually removed them from Virose’s payroll and erased all vestiges of respondents’ employment. Valiente. Rodriguez.it constitutes evidence of employment. Asensi. Cabañgon. Page 807 Echiverri. Inguillo. Rañigo. Reyes. respondents were effectively dismissed from work. Santos. Sandoval. Corpuz. Palad. as respondents put it in their Position Paper. the “last straw that finally broke the camel’s back”. Gloria. Tecson. damage or loss to the employer. De la Cruz. Marquez. Francisco." Albano. Castillo.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent had become a permanent employee upon serving for 3 years.. MOFADAVs. CSR. Tabugan. Citing paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1970 Manual). respondent had become a permanent employee upon serving for 3 years. Sandoval. De Mesa." not three school years. Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. 2013 DOCTRINE: Cases dealing with employment on probationary status of teaching personnel are not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is supplemented. Palad. OP (Mofada). Corporal.we had occasion to rule that cases dealing with employment on probationary status of teaching personnel are not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is supplemented. Martinez. Lastimosa. 170388. Catindig. On April 5. the probationary period for academic personnel Albano. decided not to renew respondent’s services. with respect to the period of probation. Coronel. Page 808 Echiverri. Inguillo. Zenaida S. he should be extended permanent employment." On the other hand. Rañigo. Alcazaren. through petitioner Sr. Probationary Period. Reyes. AMA Computer College-Paraque City. Cabañgon. Mofada. And since respondent served for only three school years of 10 months each or 30 months. Francisco. Lumberio. Santos. No. Gloria. ZENAIDA S. Valois . 1995. Sy. HELD: Yes. Tecson. Valiente. COLEGIO DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO AND SR. 1995. In Mercado v.Accordingly. Corpuz. FACTS: ColegiodelSantisimo Rosario (petitioner) hired Emmanuel Rojo (respondent) as a high school teacher on probationary basis for the school years 1992-1995. De la Cruz. EMMANUEL ROJO G. Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements.R. respondent asserted that "full. Petitioners also claimed that the "3 years" mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual refer to "36 months. Marquez. Castillo. September 04.time teachers who have rendered 3 consecutive years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent. He alleged that since he had served three consecutive school years which is the maximum number of terms allowed for probationary employment. With regard to the probationary period. Espina. by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (the Manual). by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (the Manual). Rodriguez. Inc. Asensi. petitioners argued that respondent knew that his Teachers Contract for school year 1994-1995 with CSR would expire on March 31. respondent was not dismissed but his probationary contract merely expired and was not renewed. Section 92 of the 1992 Manual provides Section 92. Ramirez. with respect to the period of probation. then he had not yet served the "three years" or 36 months mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual.

Page 809 Echiverri. Cabañgon. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Corporal. six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level. Reyes. glaringly absent from petitioner's evidence are the reasonable standards that respondent was expected to meet that could have served as proper guidelines for purposes of evaluating his performance. However. Asensi. Albano. the same must have also been communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period. they shall be deemed regular employees. We are. Marquez. Sandoval. for teachers on probationary employment. Lastimosa. shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels. Tabugan. Even assuming that respondent failed to meet the standards set forth by CSR and made known to the former at the time he was engaged as a teacher on probationary status. Gloria. Coronel. Ramirez. Catindig. Rañigo. Francisco. should the teachers not have been apprised of such reasonable standards at the time specified above. Tecson. for all intents and purposes. Valois ." which provides- x xx The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. Lumberio. still. it is incumbent upon the school to have not only set reasonable standards to be followed by said teachers in determining qualification for regular employment. Curiously. however. this scheme "of fixed-term contract is a system that operates during the probationary period and for this reason is subject to Article 281 of the Labor Code. In this case. Inguillo. as no evidence were adduced to show the reasonable standards with which respondents performance was to be assessed or that he was informed thereof. However. despite the absence of standards. in a quandary as to what could have been the basis of such evaluation. De Mesa.Neither was it mentioned that the same were ever conveyed to respondent. Martinez. As such. at the start of the period when they were to be applied. Espina. illegal. Sy. Corollarily. or at the very least. Corpuz. in which case a fixed term contract is not specifically used for the fixed term it offers. his dismissal is. Rodriguez. none of the supposed performance evaluations were presented. and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. De la Cruz. Mofada mentioned the existence of alleged performance evaluations in respondent's case. Santos. Palad. the termination was flawed for failure to give the required notice to respondent. Notably too. Valiente. Alcazaren. These flaws violated respondent's right to due process. Nowhere in the Teacher's Contract could such standards be found. Castillo.

a computation of the wage increase. Cabañgon. Respondent union filed a petition for certiorari against the public respondent before the Court of Appeals (CA). Valiente. particularly on wages and other economic benefits. Coronel. ISSUE: Whether or not the unaudited financial statements of petitioner can serve as the basis for public respondent’s computation of wage increase. ASIA BREWERY. Inc. 171594-96.vs. The Secretary of Labor (public respondent) assumed jurisdiction over the issue after determining that that the business of petitioner is indispensable to the national interest. INC. Palad. Corporal. We ruled that such financial statements are mere self-serving declarations and inadmissible in evidence even if the employees did not object to their presentation before the Labor Arbiter. It opined that the computation of the wage increase was invalid as the same was based merely on the unaudited financial statements of the petitioner which had no probative value. De Mesa. Asensi. the employer failed to prove the Albano. Similarly. in Uichico v. In Restaurante Las Conchas v. held a strike. Tabugan. Espina. National Labor Relations Commission. (petitioner). Nos. public respondent issued an arbitral award which included. Inguillo.R. Rañigo. Subsequently. Sy. Reyes. the parties were still unable to reconcile their differences on their respective positions on most items. Llego. after going through the process to legitimately stage a strike. The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC). Lumberio.several employees filed a case for illegal dismissal after the employer closed its restaurant business. Page 810 Echiverri. Rodriguez.the services of several employees were terminated on the ground of retrenchment due to alleged serious business losses suffered by the employer. Alcazaren. Catindig. The CA rendered a decision remanding the computation of the wage increase to the public respondent. certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all regular rank and file employees of Asia Brewery . Martinez. TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA (TPMA) G. the financial statements of the employer must be properly audited by an external and independent auditor in order to be admissible in evidence for purposes of determining the proper wage award. Tecson. Santos. We ruled that by submitting unaudited financial statements. Respondent union and petitioner corporation had been negotiating for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the years 2003-2006 since the old CBA expired last July 2003. Sandoval. September 18. Lastimosa. among others. The employer sought to justify the closure through unaudited financial statements showing the alleged losses of the business. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Castillo. HELD: No. the unaudited financial statements of petitioner cannot serve as the basis for public respondent’s computation of wage increase. Valois . After about 18 sessions or negotiations. 2013 DOCTRINE: In cases of compulsory arbitration before the Secretary of labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the labor Code. FACTS: Tunay Na Pagkakaisa ng mgaManggagawasa Asia (respondent union) is a legitimate labor organization. Gloria. Respondent union declared a deadlock and. Corpuz. Francisco. Marquez.

Corpuz. However. this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. Tecson. Valois . Albano. Valiente. to prove its alleged losses. Inc. Rañigo. Palad. Castillo. Rodriguez. Martinez. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Cabañgon. we see no reason why this rule should not equally apply to the determination of the proper level of wage award in cases where the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction in a labor dispute pursuant to Article 263(g)of the Labor Code. Inguillo. Ramirez. Inc. Espina. De Mesa. For sure. the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. Francisco. this is not the kind of sufficient and convincing evidence necessary to discharge the burden of proof required of petitioners to establish the alleged losses suffered by Crispa. Corporal. Marquez. Catindig. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC. The Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa. Lumberio. x xx While the above-cited cases involve proof necessary to establish losses in cases of business closure or retrenchment. De la Cruz. Asensi. in the years immediately preceding 1990 that would justify the retrenchment of respondent employees. Santos. alleged business losses. Lastimosa. Page 811 Echiverri. Sandoval. Reyes. Gloria. Coronel. Sy. without the accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor. viz:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary x xx It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.

Reyes. MERCEDITAS N. Tabugan. December 4. Palad. Inc. GO. Arbiter Anni issued a Writ of Execution ordering the collection of the P2. These may involve instances where 1) the [W]rit of [E]xecution varies the judgment. Lastimosa. Sy. Rañigo. Albano. Lumberio. PERLITA B. ISSUE: Whether there is substantial evidence to hold respondents liable for grave misconduct. De la Cruz. Francisco. ANNI G. in which case corrective measures are called for. Araullo against his former employer Club Filipino. Ramirez. Petitioner filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman against the respondent Commissioners and Arbiter Anni. The criminal aspect was docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0410-H. claiming that Arbiter Anni improvidently issued the writ without resolving the pending incidents and issues and in violation of the NLRC rules of procedure in that it was issued without the required order approving the computation and without giving notice of such approval to the parties. Valois . FACTS: A case for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the recovery of salaries. there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable 2) or unjust. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. NOGRALES.R. Club Filipino moved to quash the Writ of Execution. De Mesa. ARDEN S. Espina. HON. No. Santos.338. Cabañgon. GUTIERREZ. 3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution. HON. Tecson. Page 812 Echiverri. 194169. During execution proceedings. Marquez. ROMEO L. Corpuz. ARAULLO vs. for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. as well as execution fees in the amount of P23. HON. Valiente. Alcazaren. judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals.25 award as computed by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit. Sandoval. ROMEO R. Rodriguez. Asensi.152. it was later dismissed by the Ombudsman via an undated Resolution. errors may be committed such that the rights of a party may be prejudiced. Catindig.380. the administrative case docketed as OMB-C-A-09-0437-H was based on a charge of grave misconduct. 2013 DOCTRINE: A public officer who acts pursuant to the dictates of law and within the limits of allowable discretion can hardly be considered guilty of misconduct. On the other hand. (Club Filipino) with the Quezon City NCR Office of the NLRC. and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code. and damages filed by herein petitioner Romeo R. Corporal. Coronel. Martinez. Gloria. HON. and HON. GERARDO C. Castillo. HELD: No. Inguillo. VELASCO. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.00. benefits.

Tabugan. Catindig. force or efficacy for any purpose. as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings. Valois . it may simply be ignored. De Mesa. There is no doubt that Arbiter Anni's July 29. 2008 hearing is therefore not improper. and there was a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. Ramirez. Corporal. it is irregular and defective. and there was no need to further hear Club Filipino's motion to quash the writ. Asensi. respondents chose to act with extreme caution and took an academic and literal approach in construing and applying the NLRC Rules. because the NLRC Rules precisely require that the computation must be approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard. Page 813 Echiverri. there was as yet no order approving the computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit. no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter. 2008 Order quashing the writ ahead of the scheduled August 20. Santos. Francisco. When the writ was issued. Reyes. so that none of the parties would be unjustly enriched. Martinez. For example. Inguillo. Castillo. Lastimosa. Finally. x x x It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order. one of the corrective measures that may be taken is the quashing of the Writ of Execution. Valiente. or even as an implied denial of Club Filipino's Motion to Recompute. or x x x the [W]rit of [E]xecution [was] improvidently issued. Sandoval. it appears that petitioner owed Club Filipino a substantial amount of money which the latter sought to deduct from the judgment award by way of compensation. the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for 5) interpretation thereof. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution. to the extent allowable by law. if this is true. it is non-existent. or x x x the judgment debt has 6) been paid or otherwise satisfied. or [was] issued against the wrong party. In such event. or the writ was issued without authority. Lumberio. In contemplation of law. Marquez. De la Cruz. the pending motion to recompute was not touched upon in the Writ of Execution. Palad. Besides. Albano. Rañigo. Arbiter Anni's issuance of the August 12." The Court cannot blame the respondents for not treating the Writ of Execution as an implicit approval of the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit's computation. Tecson. given petitioner's threats of exacting criminal and administrative liability if he did not have his way. "A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. Rodriguez. or x x x is defective in substance. then the necessary adjustment in the award may be made to allow Club Filipino to recover what petitioner owes it. 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court. Alcazaren. Corpuz. 2008 Writ of Execution was procedurally irregular. Sy. Espina. Since the Writ of Execution was issued in contravention of the law. Coronel. Cabañgon. Gloria.

Tecson. Thus. De la Cruz. Ramirez. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Palad. Coronel. Reyes. the Court's policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of sound discretion and judgment stands. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Sandoval. Castillo. Inguillo. Gloria. Corporal. Martinez. Espina. Catindig. Asensi. Lumberio. Tabugan. Marquez. Page 814 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Albano. Francisco. As a matter of fact. Cabañgon. Valois . the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in exonerating them from the administrative charge of grave misconduct. Finding no irregularity in the acts of respondents. Corpuz. Sy. Valiente. Santos. its disposition is correct in every respect.

Martinez.Whether or not respondent is entitled to disability benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers despite the fact that he was declared fit to work. De Mesa. January 13. CHAN and/or CHUO-KAIUN COMPANY. Santos. Palad. Valiente. Chuo-Kaiun Company Limited (CKCL) — since 1998 under seven employment contracts. 2004. ALPHA SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION/JUNEL M. De la Cruz. 2004. in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability. Tabugan. Reyes. Tecson. Espina. FACTS: Respondent Eleosis V. 2004. Corporal. or. China. LIMITED vs. Ramirez. Cruz (Dr. Inguillo. Page 815 Echiverri. Lastimosa. 192034. Respondent was thus repatriated on October 12. Marquez. respondent suffered an attack of severe pain in his loin area below the ribs radiating to his groin. Japan.||| The Labor Arbiter granted permanent total disability benefits and attorney's fees to respondent. Catindig. ISSUE: . CA reversed decision of NLRC and reinstated the decision of LA. the doctor found him suffering from urinary tract infection and renal colic. and was given antibiotics.R. 2014 DOCTRINE: An employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician. Coronel.||| NLRC rendered its Decision granting petitioners' appeal and reversing the Labor Arbiter's decision. respondent was once more hired by petitioners as Chief Cook on board CKCL's vessel. 2005. Francisco. Nicomedes G. Corpuz. Calo worked for petitioners — Alpha Ship Management Corporation. When respondent's condition did not improve. Sy. Rodriguez. No. On July 13. On checkup. Chan and their foreign principal. He was declared "unfit for work" and advised to be sent home and undergo further detailed examination and treatment. Junel M. 2004 and was referred by petitioners to Dr. Valois . On February 17. but denied his claim for moral and exemplary damages. he consulted another doctor in Chile sometime in August 2004. Alcazaren. Lumberio. Sandoval. 2005. respondent suffered back pain on the lower part of his lumbar region and urinated with solid particles. the company-designated physician. CALO G. Cabañgon. Respondent commenced his duties as Chief Cook aboard MV Iris on March 5. ELEOSIS V. Rañigo. Asensi. respondent was diagnosed with suspected renal and/or ureter calculus. and was found to have kidney problems and urinary tract infection but was declared fit for work on a "light duty" basis. 2004. illness allowance. MV Iris. Castillo. On September 19.or 240-day treatment period. upon the lapse of the 120. on October 18. while MV Iris was in Shanghai. Gloria. while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period. reimbursement of medical expenses. Respondent underwent surgery for his nephrolithiasis on August 31. Cruz). At the Honmoku Hospital in Yokohama. damages and attorney's fees. and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability.||| HELD: Albano. respondent filed against the petitioners a Complaint for the recovery of total permanent disability benefits.

in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability.Permanent total disability. Marquez. Coronel. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Castillo. or for a continuous period of over one year — or for more than the statutory 120-day or even 240-day period. Dr. Sandoval. It was only on July 18. respondent had been under medical treatment and unable to engage in gainful employment for more than 240 days. 2006 that respondent was declared fit to work by Dr. Corpuz. Gloria. thus. Tecson. Page 816 Echiverri. (c)The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1)Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days. only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 are considered total and permanent. De la Cruz. from the above. Lastimosa. for by then. under Rule X. Valois . Rañigo. Catindig. Reyes. Martinez. the POEA Standard Employment Contract. 2004 and underwent treatment by the company-designated physician." Respondent was repatriated on October 12. respondent's medical condition remained unresolved. Lumberio. however. illness or death. Dr. Hammonia Maritime Services. Cabañgon. The 120-day period may be extended up to 240 days. It may likewise be true that under respondent's POEA Standard Employment Contract. it can be said that an employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician. The CA is therefore correct in declaring that respondent suffered permanent total disability. Palad. This is true "regardless of whether the employee loses the use of any part of his body. Cruz. . Ramirez. while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period. Espina. or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of fitness or permanent disability. Such declaration. is not the sole basis for determining their rights in the event of work-related injury. until October 14. and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability. stating that a temporary total disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the period allowed. which respondent holds. Rodriguez. except as otherwise provided for in the Rules. During said treatment period. — . Corporal. 192. Inc. Cruz. Sy. Francisco. 2005. Santos. became irrelevant. Albano. Asensi. Valiente. upon the lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period. . Cruz did not arrive at a definite assessment of respondent's fitness or disability. the conclusive presumption that the respondent is totally and permanently disabled thus arose. It is settled that the above provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation on disabilities apply to seafarers. Pursuant to the doctrine in Kestrel. or. Thus. Yes. De Mesa. Inguillo. Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code provides that: Art. Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation and pursuant to the pronouncement in Vergara v.

Alcazaren.00 covering the October 15. During this time. Asensi. 2003 delivery. Asanza herself confirmed that she did not make any payment in cash or check of ₱8. ISSUE: w/n petitioner’s dismissal was with just cause HELD: No. Hence. JONAS MICHAEL R. Valois . the position of Dealer Development Coordinator was abolished so he was designated as an Account Specialist. Garza received several memoranda from his immediate supervisor. Lastimosa. Due to changes in Coca-Cola’s structure. When the case was appealed. Valiente. Reyes. Rañigo. Coronel. Macatangay directing him to explain alleged past cash shortages and misappropriation of company funds. the petition.The irregularity attributed to petitioner with regard to the Asanza account should fail. Petitioner asked for the investigation to be rescheduled for his wife has just given birth. Martinez. Garza is a regular employee of Coca-Cola. NLRC also ruled in favor of Garze but held that reinstatement was no longer possible due to strained relations. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Garza and ordered reinstatement. Corpuz. Instead of a rescheduling. there was nothing to embezzle or remit because no payment thereon has as yet been made by the customer Asanza. Sandoval. petitioner could not be charged with embezzlement/failure to remit for the simple reason that as regards such October 15. Francisco. FACTS: Jonas Michael R. Marquez. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES. 2014 DOCTRINE: Unsubstantiated accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an employee. Although petitioner may be faulted for this act Albano. Lumberio. Later.R.160. 180972 January 20. a Notice of Termination was sent to Garza. Ramirez. To be sure. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Petitioner sought verbal clarification from Macatangay and said that he could not submit a written explanation unless the charges against him are specified. Corporal. No. he was placed under preventive suspension and investigation of the case was set. INC. De Mesa. CA held that the dismissal was proper because one account showed non-remittance. He was promoted as a Dealer Development Coordinator and likewise designated as Acting District Sales Supervisor. Cabañgon. Santos. Petitioner the filed for illegal dismissal. Sy. Account Specialists are obliged to remit all cash sales and credit cash collections. Page 817 Echiverri. Tabugan.00. Petitioner was an employee of good standing with an unblemished record. petitioner was tasked mainly with booking customers’ orders and collecting on their accounts.653. Espina. Catindig. Palad. As Account Specialist. This being the case. The Management after carefully evaluating the records of the investigation held that he has embezzled company funds amounting to Php105. Gloria. and CHRISTINE BANAL/CALIXTO MANAIG G. Tecson. 2003 delivery for which petitioner is being held to account. The unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof. Castillo. Macatangay issued another memorandum. GARZA vs. De la Cruz. Instead of furnishing details.

Martinez. Page 818 Echiverri. Alcazaren. 2002 Inter-Office Memorandum. Reyes. 2002 Inter-Office Memorandum which punished embezzlement and failure/delay in remitting collections. Lumberio. De Mesa. Valois . Palad. Tabugan. Sy. Coronel. Marquez. Without receiving anything from her. Valiente. for the same reason. Espina. Castillo. As earlier stated. Gloria. – issuing an official receipt without receiving the corresponding payment – he could not be accused of embezzlement or failure to remit as defined and punished under CCBPI’s November 18. the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for valid cause. and thus CCBPI had no basis to charge him for violation of the November 18. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Francisco. Ramirez. Corporal. Certainly. Albano. Asensi.1âwphi1Unsubstantiated accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an employee. petitioner could not have encashed check payments because they were issued in the name of CCBPI. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. there was nothing for petitioner to embezzle or remit. Cabañgon. Corpuz. it was impossible for him to embezzle/not remit the other customers’ cash and check payments. Inguillo. Catindig. The unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof. Santos. Sandoval. but likewise due to the sworn avowals of these customers that all their check payments have been issued in CCBPI’s name and have been duly debited from their accounts. he could not have engaged in kiting operations. not only because of the existence of the abovementioned policy. because he received no cash or check from Asanza. Tecson.

Cavite. Corpuz. reported to GASLI’s Office and Crewing Manager. ISSUE: w/n the respondents were terminated for just causes HELD: Albano. Reyes. DANILO ARGUELLES. Cabañgon. Santos. Sy. the petition. De la Cruz. As to the respondents. Catindig. One of the vessel’s Oilers. Abis revealed that after about four to five voyages a week. the saved fuel oil is siphoned and sold to other vessels out at sea usually at nighttime. Coronel. a substantial volume of fuel oil is unconsumed and stored in the vessel’s fuel tanks. (GASLI) transports LPG from Petron Corporation’s refinery in Limay. Lumberio. The CA. conformed with the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that petitioners’ evidence was inadequate to support the charge of pilferage and justify respondents’ termination. Martinez. Tecson. Hence. No. Marquez. Gloria. Inguillo. Rodriguez. The LA held that all dismissals were illegal and ordered reinstatement. Palad. Gruta would misdeclare it as consumed fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports. Asensi. It referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. after finding a prima facie case. However. FACTS: Petitioner Grand Asian Shipping Lines. which. Valiente. petitioners decided to terminate respondents from employment. GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES. A formal complaint for qualified theft was filed with CIDG. filed the corresponding Information for Qualified Theft with RTC. Espina. In the NLRC. GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension. JOEL SALES. De Mesa. and JOSE AUSTRAL G. Elsa Montegrico an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondents aboard the vessel. Then. Bataan to Petron’s Plant in Ugong. Corporal. CRISTITO GRUTA. Page 819 Echiverri. JOVY NOBLE. Respondents and other dismissed crewmembers filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for illegal suspension and dismissal. PATRICIO FRESMILLO. Lastimosa. however. the Labor Arbiter ruled that the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against them did not justify their termination from employment. FRANCISCO and WILLIAM HOW vs. Valois . Tabugan. BENNY NILMAO. INC. Respondents would then divide among themselves the proceeds of the sale. Pasig and Petron’s Depot in Rosario. Francisco.. Rañigo. EMILIO DOMINICO. Sandoval. While plain accusations are not sufficient to justify the dismissal of rank and file employees. Inc. EDUARDO P. RENATO BATAYOLA. Castillo. Ramirez.R. Richard Abis. Alcazaren. 2014 DOCTRINE: The employer has broader discretion in dismissing managerial employees on the ground of loss of trust and confidence than those occupying ordinary ranks. WILFREDO GALVEZ. After conducting administrative hearings. it was ruled that petitioners presented sufficient evidence to show just causes for terminating complainants’ employment and compliance with due process. the mere existence of a basis for believing that managerial employees have breached the trust reposed on them by their employer would suffice to justify their dismissal. 178184 January 29. Several other employees and crewmembers of GASLI’s two other vessels were likewise suspended and terminated from employment. Meanwhile.

distinction should be made between managerial and rank and file employees. Gloria. Valiente. Rañigo. Emilio Dominico. Asensi. Rodriguez. and Jose Austral are declared to have been illegally dismissed. Reyes. Alcazaren. The mere filing of a formal charge. Lastimosa. Corporal. Renato Batayola. we find that petitioners failed to substantiate adequately the charges of pilferage against respondents. As for the ground. No. the ship captain and chief engineer. Cabañgon. Santos. Benny Nilmao. handling and care of company property and exercise authority over it. Martinez. Sy. as ground for valid dismissal. does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Espina. Marquez. Joel Sales was not dismissed from employment. The employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissalbefore shifting to the employer the burden of proving the validity of such dismissal. Coronel. Page 820 Echiverri. After examination of the evidence presented. and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. accusations. Corpuz. Their position requires the full trust and confidence of their employer for they are entrusted with the custody. the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Valois . There is some basis for the loss of confidence reposed on Galvez and Gruta. Inguillo. Tecson. De Mesa. loss of trust and confidence. "Unsubstantiated suspicions. Sandoval. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents’ termination. Tabugan. Francisco. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage. to our mind. Catindig. Lumberio. Ramirez. Respondents Danilo Arguelles. loss of trust and confidence. Castillo. With respect to rank-and-file personnel. which allegations remain uncorroborated. Palad. De la Cruz. requires proof of involvement in the alleged events while for managerial employees." The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage. Albano. however. Patricio Fresmillo. Jovy Noble.

Gloria. Tabugan. Espina. Lastimosa. The CA denied petitioners’ motion and. as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. and attorney’s fees. Amanda is the widow of seafarer Guillermo M. 191215 February 3. In said case we stated that the general rule. Cabañgon. Asensi. No. rule 65 of the rules of court. Rañigo. Inguillo. Alcazaren. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A. Palad. No. Lumberio. FACTS: This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits. No. INC. Vincent de Paul Colleges. the NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision. De la Cruz. unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case Albano.M. In Republic v. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES. damages and attorney’s fees filed by private respondent Amanda C. MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her deceased husband GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN) G. HELD: (1) Yes. COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. Rodriguez. is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. refund of medical expenses. gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its Resolution by submitting clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five days from notice thereof. as amended by A. the present Petition for Certiorari. ISSUES: (1) w/n CA committed a grave abuse of discretion when it noted the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing outright for having been filed beyond the mandatory and jurisdictional 60-day period required by section 4. 07-7-12-SC (2) w/n CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the recent jurisprudence which disallowed any motions for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari under rule 65. Tecson. St. De Mesa. Sy.M. Catindig. Coronel. as second engineer in the latter’s vessels. The private respondent was not able to timely file a petition for certiorari but CA entertained such in the interest of justice. ALTARES vs. Corpuz. 2014 DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. instead. unpaid salaries. Valiente. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A. INC. On appeal. The Labor Arbiter awarded death benefits. moral and exemplary damages. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon cancer during the term of the employment contract between him and Thenamaris. Court of Appeals. Ramirez. Francisco. we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. Castillo. No. Mendigorin against petitioner Thenamaris Philippines. Petitioner moved to dismiss due to the procedural infirmities. Sandoval. Reyes. Inc. sickness allowance.M. Valois . Mendigorin who was employed by Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and eventually.R. Page 821 Echiverri. THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES. Inc. reimbursement of medical expenses. Santos. Martinez. Marquez.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B. Corporal. Thus.

when the CA allowed petitioner to cure the deficiencies. Lumberio. Tabugan. (9) fraud. De Mesa. Martinez. she failed to fully comply such that she had to be given. (5) the merits of the case. De la Cruz. Marquez. Here. Private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright. Rodriguez. Valiente. (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules. this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. In contrast. there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. More importantly. (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case. In numerous cases. Page 822 Echiverri. Alcazaren. Ramirez. (12) importance of the issues involved. (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault. There are recognized exceptions to their strict observance. Francisco. Asensi. Reyes. Worse. (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances. Coronel. even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit relaxation of the rules. one last chance to submit the still lacking copies of the pertinent pleadings required of her by the CA. Corpuz. Sy. the CA’s resolution would have only been acceptable had private respondent shown respect for the rules by submitting a petition for certiorari which is sufficient in form. what private respondent filed was a petition plagued by several infirmities. the CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view of the fact that the Resolution of the NLRC denying private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory. (2) Yes. Corporal. Valois . Cabañgon. Santos. albeit undeservingly. Castillo.1âwphi1Thus. exceeding 15 days. Tecson. (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play. Palad. Gloria. (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default. Sandoval. and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Under exceptional cases. the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion. Inguillo. such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons. Rañigo. (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Lastimosa. Espina. accident. Albano. (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due process. Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character. Catindig.

Dr. On his own initiative. Respondent was thus repatriated and was immediately referred to the company-designated physician. Valois . Regarding the issue of compensability. Catindig. While aboard the vessel. Balasta was hired by petitioner Fil-Pride Shipping Company. Coronel. respondent underwent coronary angiogram at the St. it has been the Court’s consistent ruling that in disability compensation. Francisco. fatigue. damages and attorney’s fees. Tecson. however. Gloria. CA reinstated the LA’s ruling. Inguillo. the petition. vs. Ocean Eagle Ship Management Company. NLRC. He was scheduled for coronary artery bypass surgery. Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC). illness allowance. INC. Inc. DOLLOLASA and OCEAN EAGLE SIDPMANAGEMENT COMPANY. Santos. Page 823 Echiverri. PTE. when it becomes evident that the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period because. 2014 DOCTRINE: The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. FACTS: Edgar A. Corpuz. Valiente. CAPTAIN NICOLAS T. His illness was considered work aggravated/related. Respondent filed a claim for permanent disability benefits with petitioners but it was denied.LTD. Rodriguez. Palad.R. BALASTA G. for its foreign principal. Respondent filed against the petitioners a complaint with the labor arbiter for the recovery of disability benefits. Hence. Martinez. respondent experienced chest pains. Sandoval. Sy. The labor arbiter ordered respondents to pay him disability benefit and attorney’s fees. Cabañgon. Espina. De la Cruz. Reyes. Lastimosa. "it is not the injury which is compensated. He was declared unfit for duty and was recommended for repatriation. Tabugan. His medical report indicated that respondent was diagnosed with severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease. Castillo. ISSUE: w/n the respondent may receive disability compensation HELD: Yes. for instance. Ramirez. reversed such order and declared that respondent’s illness – atherosclerosis/coronary artery disease – was not work-connected. and shortness of breath. No. Marquez. De Mesa. Vicaldo issued a medical certificate which stated among others that he was already unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity. Lumberio. Alcazaren. PTE. Ltd. Dr. Luke’s Medical Center before the bypass surgery. If he fails to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved. On the other hand. FIL-PRIDE SIDPPING COMPANY. Corporal. an employee's disability becomes permanent and total even before the lapse of the statutory 240-day treatment period. the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. pursuant to Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code and Rule X. he underwent surgery and it evidently appears that he could not recover therefrom within the statutory period. On appeal. Rañigo. Cruz. EDGAR A. and was diagnosed as having myocardial ischemia and coronary heart disease. Asensi. China. but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning Albano. 193047 March 3. He was examined by a physician in Gangyou Hospital in Tianjin.. reimbursement of medical expenses.

2006 was unnecessary. Likewise. Francisco. Marquez. as well as other heart ailments were held to be compensable."Moreover. Martinez. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Tabugan. Catindig. 2005 to April 19. with Dr.If he fails to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved. respondent was thus deemed totally and permanently disabled pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X. petitioners failed to refute respondent’s allegations in his Position Paper that he was exposed to hazardous tasks and chemicals at work. cardiovascular disease. Albano. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Ramirez. The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. Santos. or on the last day of the statutory 240-day period. 2006. 2006. Tecson. Asensi. 2006 that respondent was permanently and totally disabled. Even then. Castillo. Nonetheless. Corpuz. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. unfit to return to work as seafarer and earn therefrom. Espina. Respondent would not have sufficiently recovered. Cruz before May 19. Palad. De la Cruz. Reyes. Corporal."Just the same. Cabañgon. Sy. Valiente. Rañigo. Gloria. the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. Section 2 of the AREC. pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X. "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-Adoes not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. in several cases. it is impossible to expect that by May 19. respondent would be declared fit to work when he recently underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Sandoval. coronary artery disease. Coronel. capacity. 2006 is less than the statutory 240-day – or 8-month – period. Section 2 of the AREC. The period September 18. Respondent would to all intents and purposes still be unfit for sea-duty. Cruz’s failure to issue a definite assessment of respondent’s condition on May 19. a definitive assessment by Dr. it became evident as early as April 19. Valois . In other words. Page 824 Echiverri. given his delicate post-operative condition. or the last day of the statutory 240-day period.

this petition. Espina. Palad.R. Castillo. for the first four months of the school year or Albano. Marquez. Coronel. 2005 contrary to law. 181806. De Lara wrote a letterto Atty. Martinez. through its President.De Lara questioned the guidelines for being violative of existing practices and the CBA. Tecson. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY -PHILIPPINES vs. Valiente. petitioner appealed the case to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Maglaya. Atty. Page 825 Echiverri. Francisco.Aggrieved. limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school year. if there is doubt in its interpretation. leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties. HELD: Yes. De la Cruz. DOCTRINE:When the provision of the CBA is clear. 16. Alcazaren. Itrendered a Decisiondeclaring the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August 16. respondent’s President. as this is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Lumberio. De Mesa. 2005. 2003 until May 31. 2008. petitioner. Gloria. Reyes. Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered employees are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every year and that after the second year of service. Corpuz. Inguillo.which was unacceptable to respondent. Hence. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES FACULTY and STAFF ASSOCIATION G. The CA rendered a Decisionfinding the rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator supportedby substantial evidence.the parties referred the matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator.On August 16. Rañigo. all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year. 2005 is contrary to the existing CBA. It also affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August 16. For example. Catindig. not later than August 30 of each year. No. Tabugan. Labor Management Committee (LMC) Meeting was held during which petitioner advised respondent to file a grievance complaint on the implementation of the vacation and sick leave policy. Ramirez. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same wasdenied by the CA. Valois . The respondentis a duly registered labor organizationacting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner. Maglaya informing him that respondent is not amenable to the unilateral changes made by petitioner. Cabañgon. On August 25. 2014. Sandoval. Sy. petitioner announced its plan of implementing a one-retirement policy. Rodriguez. the literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern. Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level. states that vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on a month-to-month basis. issued a Memorandumproviding guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation.In the same meeting. it should be resolved in favor of labor. FACTS: In December 2003. Cynthia L. Asensi. in effect. 2005 on the ground that these unilaterally amended the CBA without the consent of respondent. 2005. This. Corporal. petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines andRespondent Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and Staff Association the parties signed a 5-year CBAeffective June 1. Santos. March 12. However. The Memorandum dated August 16. Lastimosa. ISSUE: WON the Memorandum dated Aug. Guillermo T. however. 2005.

Rañigo. leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties. it should be resolved in favor of labor. if there is doubt in its interpretation. 2005imposes a limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA. Sy.Considering that the Memorandum dated August 16.However. Coronel. Martinez. Rodriguez. Page 826 Echiverri. Albano. Valiente. it may not be amiss to mention that when the provision of the CBA is clear. Reyes. De Mesa. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Santos. Sandoval. the literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern. Asensi. Cabañgon.as this is mandatedby no less than the Constitution. Valois . De la Cruz. Palad. Gloria. an employee is only entitled to five days vacation leave and five days sick leave. Corpuz. Catindig. Marquez. Francisco. Tecson. Corporal. In closing. Castillo. from June to September. Espina. we agree with the CA that it must be struck down. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Tabugan. Ramirez.

Gindang. no further renewal of the service contract was done.Petron filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of injunction before the CA. allowances. Hence . Alcazaren. October 16. Sandoval. Reyes. When Romualdo died in 1989. 2000. Lee. the employer-employee relationship which the Court finds to exist in this case is between petitioners as employees and Petron as their employer. packaging and other utility services in its Mandaue Bulk Plant. Valiente. The CA found no employer-employee relationship between the parties. investment. Lastimosa. LAURENTE vs. Catindig. Upon expiration thereof. The said court resolved to grant the injunction. Petitioners were among those recruited by Romualdo D. Martinez. Santos. Valois . The Labor Arbiter declared them to have been illegally dismissed. PETRON CORPORATION G. through Romeo D. Gindang (Romualdo). Gindang Contractor and RDG to work in the premises of the said bulk plant. Inguillo. Calesa. No. his son Romeo D. being the Albano. De Mesa. CHARLIE HINDANG. Marquez. Petron and RDG entered into a Contract for Servicesfor the period from June 1. De la Cruz. Corpuz. maintenance. As such. The NLRC ruled that petitioners are Petron’s regular employees because they are performing job assignments which are germane to its main business. Ramirez. TEODORO CALESA. HELD: No. Hindang. ISSUE: WON RDG is a legitimate contractor. damages and attorney’s fees against Petron and RDG. it is considered merely as an agent of Petron. Gindang Contractor. and EUGEMA L. Petitioner Laurente filed another Complaintfor illegal dismissal. EUTIQUIO GINDANG. tools and the like. unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital. 13th month pay. rest day. ALLAN SUNGAHID. damages and attorney’s fees against Petron and RDG on November 12. Tecson. This contract was extended on July 31. holiday pay. The said complaints were later consolidated. 2002. MORATO. Consequently. being the principal employer and RDG. Sungahid. AVELINO S. 2002 and further extended until September 30. 177592. MAXIMO LEE. FACTS: In 1968. Gindang Services (RDG). Espina. Francisco. Coronel. REX GABILAN. 2002. ALILIN. whereby RDG undertook to provide Petron with janitorial. Gloria. Cabañgon. Gindang (Romeo). 2002. premium pay for holiday. the Court finds that RDG is a labor-only contractor.R. JOSE G. Lumberio. underpayment of wages. tanker receiving. retirement benefits. petitioners Alilin. Petron therefore. Asensi.In sum. the contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor. underpayment of wages. Petron failed to discharge the burden of proving that RDG is a legitimate contractor. June 9. the presumption that RDG is a labor-only contractor stands. On June 1. DOCTRINE:Generally. which was owned and operated by Romualdo D. Castillo. 2000 to May 31. started recruiting laborers for fielding to Petron’s Mandaue Bulk Plant. Morato and Gabilan filed a Complaintfor illegal dismissal. nonpayment of overtime pay. separation pay. Corporal. Palad. Rañigo. 2002. Sy. 2014. Tabugan. took over the business and continued to provide manpower services to Petron. service incentive leave pay. Romualdo D. Page 827 Echiverri. Rodriguez.

Albano. Santos. De Mesa. Coronel. Martinez. Rañigo. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Tecson. Ramirez. Castillo. Sandoval. Gloria. Alcazaren. Page 828 Echiverri. Valois . Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Palad. are solidarily liable for petitioners’ illegal dismissal and monetary claims. Valiente. Espina. Lastimosa. Sy. Corpuz. Reyes. Francisco. Corporal. Lumberio. Catindig. Marquez. Tabugan. Asensi. labor-onlycontractor.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was dismissed for just cause.R. CELIZ. Reyes.00 each. BAQUIAL G. Lastimosa. Martinez. Palad. it was error for Libcap to schedule the investigation at its Iloilo office when it could very well have held it in Cagayan de Oro City. the only issue that remains to be tackled is the correctness of the award of nominal damages. FACTS: Lanny Jean B. De Mesa. 2014 DOCTRINE: The law and jurisprudence. inefficiency. but the dismissal was ineffectual as she was deprived of procedural due process. and MONDRAGON vs. Espina. Albano. allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing the employee. Santos. Lumberio. De la Cruz. on the other hand. Petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to financial assistance given that she is guilty of theft or embezzlement. While it is correct to conclude that there was valid cause for dismissal considering that respondent did not contest the NLRC or CA findings to such effect through an appropriate appeal or petition.437. Valiente. Sandoval. Marquez. Corpuz. on the other hand. Rañigo. She claimed she deposited with the bank two separate amounts of ₱1.. and is in the nature or takes the place of severance compensation. Both petitioners and respondent appealed to the NLRC which dismissed both their appeals and affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Cabañgon. Petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to financial assistance given that she is guilty of theft or embezzlement. Gloria. Inguillo. Tecson. On verification with PS Bank. Francisco. LIBCAP MARKETING CORP. Respondent filed a labor complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Alcazaren. Corporal. Baguial received a Notice of Terminationstating that she was terminated from employment for dishonesty. embezzlement. which defect should not be blamed on her but on the bank. its branch head confirmed that only a single deposit made. and for commission of acts inconsistent with Libcap’s work standards. Page 829 Echiverri. Catindig. allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing the employee. Coronel. Asensi. Sy.Financial assistance is granted as a measure of equity or social justice. No. The law and jurisprudence. The law and jurisprudence. on the other hand. Rodriguez. June 30. but that it appears that both separate deposits were covered by a single bank validation. Castillo. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. Ramirez. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to nominal damages due to illegal dismissal HELD: Yes. An audit showed that respondent made a double reporting of a single deposit. Baquial (respondent) was employed by Libcap as accounting clerk for Libcap’s Super Express branch in Cagayan de Oro City. Tabugan. Valois . 192011. and that there was no misposting or deposits to other accounts of the same amount made on such date.

On the other hand. De la Cruz. Tecson. Inguillo. Albano. Rodriguez. Corpuz. taking into consideration the relevant circumstances. Cabañgon. Martinez. It should not have considered the claimed unpaid overtime pay. Coronel. Sy. Marquez. Page 830 Echiverri.Financial assistance is granted as a measure of equity or social justice. Gloria. Palad. allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing the employee. Tabugan. Hence. Catindig. Castillo. Asensi.Nominal damages are awarded for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing a right and not for indemnifying a loss. Lastimosa. Espina. Santos. Valois . for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right. Sandoval. Ramirez. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. nominal damages "may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant."The amount of nominal damages to be awarded the employee is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. the CA should have limited the justification of the award of nominal damages to petitioners’ violation of respondent’s right to due process in effecting her termination. and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Rañigo. Corporal. De Mesa. and is in the nature or takes the place of severance compensation. Lumberio. Valiente. Francisco. Alcazaren. Reyes.

MATEO vs. Catindig. Amecos argue that their Complaint is one for recovery of a sum of money and damages based on the Civil Code. Castillo.The MeTC dismissed the case. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Martinez.65 representing her share in the SSS contributions and expenses for processing. the latter was never covered by and protected under the System. Respondent also averred that the regular courts do not have jurisdiction over the instant case as it arose out of their employer-employee relationship. Rodriguez. and ANTONIO F. Petitioners’ claims should have been referred to the labor tribunals. They argue that the employer-employee relationship between Amecos and respondent is merely incidental. Respondent filed her Answer with Motion to Dismissclaiming that she was formerly an employee of Amecos until her illegal dismissal. Ramirez. In this connection. Rañigo. INC. which arose from respondent’s misrepresentation that there was no need to enroll her with the SSS as she was concurrently employed by another and that she was self-employed as well. No. petitioners filed the instant Complaint for sum of money and damages against respondent. Marquez. Lumberio. exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relationship are under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters or the National Labor Relations Commission. Reyes.R. Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is applicable. Sy. Palad. Cabañgon. that Amecos deliberately failed to deduct and remit her SSS contributions. Since Amecos did not remit respondent’s full SSS contributions. De Mesa. Valois . Lastimosa. FACTS: Amecossent a demand letter to Eliza Lopez (respondent) for ₱27. Valiente. Coronel. and that petitioners filed the instant Complaint in retaliation to her filing of an illegal dismissal case. Santos. Tecson. Inguillo. but to no avail. Corpuz. Thus." Albano. certainly there is no sense in making her answerable for the required contributions during the period of her employment. July 2. Espina. Sandoval. but also damages governed by the Civil Code.claims for actual. The RTC affirmed the view taken by the MeTC that under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code. Page 831 Echiverri. that their cause of action is based on solutioindebitior unjust enrichment. Asensi.178055. Tabugan. it is noteworthy to state that "the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws. ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Code should apply or the Civil Code should apply HELD: This Court holds that as between the parties. Alcazaren. 2014 DOCTRINE: Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations. Francisco. moral. AMECOS INNOVATIONS. Corporal. Gloria. Said provision bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations. The observation that the matter of SSS contributions necessarily flowed from the employer-employee relationship between the parties – shared by the lower courts and the CA – is correct. If she was never covered by the System. De la Cruz. LOPEZ G.791.

without informing petitioner of the particulars of the charges or the results of the audit. there is evidently a case of illegal constructive dismissal. a Plan of Mergerwas executed between STI and STI College Makati (Inc.Petitioner Girly G. nor did she suffer a diminution in her salary and benefits. On appeal. Valiente. that she was denied the salary corresponding to the COO position. Santos.).. Jacob (Jacob) and Peter K. she was discriminated against and unfairly treated by respondents. Martinez. Petitioner received another Memorandumthis time stating that charges havealready been filed against her allegedly "based on the Audit Findings". Sandoval. Albano. the respondents argued that petitioner was merely "laterally transferred" to the School Compliance Group as Compliance Manager. Inguillo. Cabañgon. She then filed with NLRC a labor case against herein respondents. Tabugan. De Mesa. INC. while the employee who had to vacate the same is transferred against her will to a position which does not exist in the corporate structure. Castillo. Tecson. Lastimosa. Francisco. and that during her stint as COO of STI-Makati and up to her transfer and appointment as Compliance Manager. Coronel. Gloria. and was not demoted in rank. 2014 DOCTRINE: When another employee is soon after appointed to a position which the employer claims has been abolished. Sy. as the positions of STI-Makati COO and Compliance Manager are equivalent in rank under the STI structure. Lumberio. FACTS: Respondents Monico V. Palad.During petitioner’s stint as COO and School Administrator of STI-Makati. Asensi. ICO vs. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision. the former being the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the latter Senior Vice-President. a master’s degree holder with doctorate units earned. JACOB and FERNANDEZ G. Corpuz. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of the position of petitioner amounts to constructive dismissal HELD: Yes. Catindig. citing management’s decision to undertake an "organizational restructuring" in line with the merger of STI and STI-Makati. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. Valois .R. whereby the latter would be absorbed by STI. Alcazaren. was hired as Faculty Member by STI College Makati Inc. Page 832 Echiverri. Ico. Rodriguez. Fernandez (Fernandez) are STI officers. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Corporal. July 9. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE. A Memorandumwas issued by STI Human Resources Division Head cancelling her COO assignment at STI-Makati. No. De la Cruz. Marquez. Fabul and Briones alleging illegal constructive dismissal and illegal suspension. She concurrently served as STI-Makati School Administrator. Reyes. Rañigo. Espina. She was promoted to the position of Chief Operating Officer (COO) of STI-Makati. Ramirez. 185100. Ico then received a notice of termination signed by Jacob.

Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because ‘continued employment is rendered impossible.Since the position of STI-Makati COO was never abolished. Rañigo. constructive dismissal may. Martinez. Alcazaren. Coronel. Corporal. In cases of a transfer of an employee. Lastimosa. that if she pushed him further. while the employee who had to vacate the same is transferred against her will to a position which does not exist in the corporate structure. De la Cruz. Valois . Palad. Marquez. Corpuz. Asensi. she became the subject of an illegal constructive dismissal in the guise of a transfer. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof. the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or anact amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. Cabañgon. Espina. Valiente. Rodriguez. Santos. Fernandez threatened petitioner. Gloria. either through dismissal or forced resignation. inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. Evidently. Albano. Ramirez. Francisco. she could find herself without a job at STI even before her innocence or guilt could be established. Lumberio. De Mesa. Reyes. the rule is settled that the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable. it follows that petitioner should bereinstated to the very same position. It can be seen that petitioner’s fate in STI was a foregone conclusion. When another employee is soon after appointed to a position which the employer claims has been abolished. Tabugan. as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay’ and other benefits. exist if an act of clear discrimination. Castillo. Tecson. In other words. there is evidently a case of illegal constructive dismissal. Sandoval. Catindig. she would suffer the fate of a former employee who was separated fromSTI without the benefit of clearing his name. Inguillo. insensibility. She was threatened to accept her fate or else she would find herself without work. Page 833 Echiverri. Sy. likewise. unreasonable or unlikely.

as observed by the CA. De Mesa. Francisco. ALCANTARA G. He is even free to recruit his own sales personnel to assist him in pursuance of his sales target. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Albano. He alleged that he is a regular employee of Royale Homes since he is performing tasks that are necessary and desirable to its business’ and that petitioner gave him ₱1. Cabañgon. ROYALE HOMES MARKETING CORPORATION vs. Corpuz. Palad. He never received any salary. De la Cruz. July 28. Martinez.and that the acts of the executive officers of Royale Homes amounted to his dismissal from work without any valid or just cause and in gross disregard of the proper procedure for dismissing employees. Catindig. It argued that it engaged his services as an independent sales contractorfor a fixed term of one year only. Tecson. who was once connected with it as a sales agent. Inguillo. Moreover. Sy. He was also bound by the company code of ethics. the rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee relationship. Reyes. and even recruited some of its sales agents. Ramirez. Rodriguez. had formed a brokerage company that directly competed with its business. FACTS: Royale Homes appointed Alcantara as its Marketing Director for a fixed period of one year. Asensi. Royale Homes denied that Alcantara is its employee. Sandoval. Gloria. the last of which he held the position of Division 5 Vice-President-Sales. Royale Homes exercised some degree of control over Alcantara since his job. 2014 DOCTRINE: As long as the level of control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks. Lumberio. and periodic evaluations. He has decided to join his wife and pursue their own brokerage business. Page 834 Echiverri. Applying the four-fold and economic reality tests. Valiente.R. Coronel. the executive officers of Royale Homes told him that they were wondering why he still had the gall to come to office and sit at his table. Rañigo. is subject to company rules. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes with a fixed-term employment period. overtime pay or holiday pay from Royale Homes as hewas paid purely on commission basis.2 million for the services he rendered to it. They had no control on how Alcantara would accomplish his tasks and responsibilities as he was free to solicit sales at any time and by any manner which he may deem appropriateand necessary. The CA reversed the NLRC’s Decision. No. Santos. and b. the exclusivity clause of the contract has made Alcantara economically dependent on Royale Homes. Alcantara announced publicly and openly that he would leave the company and that he would no longer finish the unexpired term of his contract. The NLRC ruled that Alcantara is not an employee but a mere independent contractor of Royale Homes. Castillo. Royale Homes reappointed him for several consecutive years. They alleged that: a. 195190. Alcantara filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissalagainst Royale Homes. supporting the theory that he is an employee of said company. it held that Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes. regulations. Alcazaren. Valois . Tabugan. Marquez. Corporal. 13th month pay. Alcantara decided to leave the company after his wife. Espina. However.

Tabugan. Valois . A person who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules. Except for soliciting sales. Lumberio. Santos. and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee." He performed his tasks on his own account free from the control and direction of Royale Homes in all matters connected therewith. Corporal. All of these indicate an independent contractual relationship. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Francisco.Alcantarafailed to cite specificrules. or Pag-Ibig Fund. Sy. Rodriguez. then he. would have complained that he was being denied statutorily mandated benefits. Reyes. Valiente.Neither does the repeated hiring of Alcantara prove the existence of employer-employee relationship. Coronel. regulations. Cabañgon.Neither does the repeated hiring of Alcantara prove the existence of employer-employee relationship.5%. budget allocation. Whether or not Alcantara is an employee of Royal Homes HELD: No. No payslip or payroll was ever presented and there is no proof that Royale Homes deducted from his supposed salary withholding tax or that it registered him with the Social Security System. Marquez. Martinez. Rañigo. There is no proof that he received fixed monthly salary. the Court concludes that not every form of control is indicative of employer-employee relationship.As long as the level of control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks.A person who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules. Notably. except as to the results thereof. The absence of control over the means and methodsdisproves employer-employee relationship. the rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee relationship. The element of payment of wages is also absent in thiscase. Catindig. an experienced and professional broker. He had full control over the means and methods of accomplishing his tasks as he can "solicit sales at any time and by any manner which [he may] deem appropriate and necessary. and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee. Ramirez. Castillo. Palad. Gloria. Alcantara was not required to observe definite working hours. this case is replete with instances that negate the element of control and the existence of employer-employee relationship. Asensi. RoyaleHomes did not assign other tasks to him. sales incentive and other forms of company support. Tecson. De Mesa. if Alcantara indeed consideredhimself an employee of Royale Homes. Corpuz. On the other hand. Albano. The continuous rehiring of Alcantara simply signifies the renewal of his contract with Royale Homes. Applying the four-fold test in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Espina. Alcantara’s remunerations consist only of commission override of 0. Page 835 Echiverri. As provided in the contract.Besides. regulations or codes of ethics that supposedly imposed control on his means and methods of soliciting sales and dealing with prospective clients. Lastimosa. and highlights his satisfactory services warranting the renewal of such contract. regulations. Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Inguillo. Alcazaren.

LA dismissed the complaint. Lastimosa.Prior to embarkation. with a basic monthly salary of US$235. Valois . FACTS: On April 4. Page 836 Echiverri.00 as mandated in the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) 2000. Tabugan. 2003. Fernando G. NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC. he reported to the office of InterOrient and informed the company about the pain he experienced while he was on board. which may be extended for three more months upon mutual consent of the parties. De la Cruz. Gloria. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES. however.On May 9. Victor was tasked to get provisions from the cold storage which is kept at its coldest temperature to maintain freshness of the food stored therein. Sandoval. Inguillo. VICTOR M. Catindig. Coronel. 2014 DOCTRINE: The oft repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. contractual or legal basis. Cabañgon. he regularly informed InterOrient of his sickness. In its Position Paper. Castillo. Ramirez. Espina. He did. he was neither apprised of his rights to nor paid sickness allowance amounting to US$940. However. Purugganan from Citihealth Diagnostic Center on June 5. The following day. Palad.As 2nd Cook. Lumberio.00 and US$94. Tecson.Victor contended that during the course of his treatment. Marquez.for a period of nine months. Rañigo. sign a Receipt and Release where he acknowledged receipt of the full payment of his monetary entitlements under the employment contract. Santos. Valiente. Albano. Martinez. Sy. Victor averred that InterOrient merely advised him to consult a doctor without giving him any doctor’s referral. Ayuyao found Victor to be suffering from Community-Acquired Pneumonia 1 and Bronchial Asthma.00 fixed overtime pay per month.R. Rodriguez. InterOrient negated Victor’s claim for disability benefits averring that the same has no factual. INC. Ltd. Corpuz. Victor arrived in Manila. CREER III G. CA reversed the decision of NLRC. ISSUE/S: Whether InterOrient can be held accountable for Victor’s disease even if the same was diagnosed 11 months after he disembarked from the vessel upon the termination of his employment contract. 2001. 181921. Corporal. Asensi. HELD: The Petition is impressed with merit. Alcazaren. InterOrient hired Victor as Galley Boy on board the vessel M/V MYRTO owned by Calidero Shipping Company. September 17. 2002. Dr. Reyes. Francisco. a certain Dr. No.v. De Mesa. Victor was required to work 48 hours a week. But when he consulted another doctor. He would do this either immediately before or after his exposure to intense heat in the galley. Victor went through the requisite Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty. it was found out that he had far-advanced pulmonary tuberculosis.

all of the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. and that of the quasi-judicial bodies. Gloria. the Court is constrained to decide factual issues in exceptional cases. Palad. Castillo. Victor miserably failed to comply with these conditions. Tabugan. 4. Page 837 Echiverri. Corpuz. on the other as in this case. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the describe[d] risks. Inguillo. Santos. one of which is when there is conflict between the findings and position of the CA. he was not able to substantiate the same. Lumberio.We are not persuaded by Victor’s contention. Other than his self-serving allegation that he experienced pain while on board. Section 20(B)(6)29 of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions). The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. Reyes. Albano. It must be stressed that his repatriation was not due to any medical reasons but because his employment contract had already expired. As a rule. Rañigo. Rodriguez. this Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law may be raised in petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Valiente. both requirements are not present in this case. 2. Coronel. However. Victor’s illness is not compensable. Sandoval. Asensi. on one hand. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks describe herein. Cabañgon. that the work-related illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. and second. Lastimosa. Sy. 3. Tecson. SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable. Corporal. requires the concurrence of two elements: first. Catindig. Alcazaren. deemed incorporated in the POEA Contract. Martinez. Valois . There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Ramirez.or an illness to be compensable. that the illness must be work-related. Marquez. De Mesa. Espina. Francisco. De la Cruz.

Tecson. Rañigo. Tabugan. Reyes. JUANITO G. at the age of 45. Asensi. Valois . and/or MOL TANKSHIP MANAGEMENT (ASIA) PTE LTD. Ltd. absence of such will result in the permanent and total disability classification of an employee . He was repatriated on October 21. Inc. HELD: Having worked for petitioners since 1988 under employment contracts that were continuously renewed. Prior to his deployment. ISSUE: Whether Bengson’s illness – which petitioners claim and admit to be hypertensive cardio-vascular disease (HCVD) is an occupational disease. Coronel. Sy.R. Alcazaren. Palad. 2007. Cabañgon. Martinez. FACTS: Since the year 1986 Juanito G. On October 5. On August 7. [Bengson] had partial paralysis of the right hand and a minor partial paralysis of the right leg. Thereafter. [Bengson] boarded the ship and performed his assigned tasks. INC. 2007. [Bengson] suddenly experienced difficulty in breathing and numbness on half of his body. after doing his usual duties on board the vessel. for and in behalf of its foreign principal MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte. 198528 October 13. 2007.). While in the hospital. Francisco. Gloria. vs. Lumberio. No. 2007. as a Third Mate Officer on board the vessel "KN TRADER". (Magsaysay. he rested for a while. Albano. [Bengson] was brought to the Neurological Department of the Izola General Hospital in Slovenia where he was confined for three days. 2007. Inc. Marquez. Inc. 2007. On October 7. Thinking that it was caused by fatigue. 2014 DOCTRINE: The company-designated physician must issue a disability assessment. On November 4.. Valiente. Espina. Corporal. De la Cruz.. Bengson has been working as a seafarer for Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine. Santos. De Mesa. Respondent entered into his 22nd contract of employment with Magsaysay. Ramirez. it can be said that respondent spent much of his productive years with petitioners. BENGSON* G. Corpuz. he underwent and passed the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was found to be "fit for sea duty" on August 11. Dr. Inguillo. and he could not have contracted his illness elsewhere except while working for petitioners. his years of service certainly took a toll on his body. Agbayani issued an Initial Out-Patient Consult Report which stated that [Bengson’s] illness of "hematoma in the cranium" was not work-related. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Castillo. MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE. Sandoval. Page 838 Echiverri. Catindig.

FACTS: Angus was employed by Goodyear on November 16. Reyes. Francisco. Court of Appeals and University of the East v. ISSUE: Whether or not Angus can receive both Separation pay and retirement benefits. Martinez. Gloria. 185449 November 12. citing Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company v. Ramirez. MARINA L. In order to maintain the viability of its operations in the midst of economic reversals.R. Goodyear implemented cost-saving measures which included the streamlining of its workforce. 1966 and occupied the position of Secretary to the Manager of Quality and Technology. Coronel. Tabugan. Tecson. Lumberio. Castillo. National Labor Relations Commission. Marquez. 2014 DOCTRINE: Early retirement benefits and separation pay can be received by an employee in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Corporal. Asensi. Albano. Corpuz. the Court held that an employee is entitled to recover both separation pay and retirement benefits in the absence of a specific prohibition in the Retirement Plan or CBA. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. The company offered him to pay separation benefits but Angus was determined to received both early retirement pay and separation pay. Espina. Page 839 Echiverri. Angus was terminated from employment. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Valiente. In Aquino v. ANGUS G. Sy. Catindig. HELD: Yes. She filed a case against Goodyear in the Labor Arbiter. Minister of Labor. Rodriguez. Angus is entitled to both separation pay and early retirement benefit due to the absence of a specific provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of both. De Mesa. Inguillo. INC. Santos. Hon. RAMOS vs. No. and REMEGIO M. Palad. Which was affirmed by the NLRC but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. which rendered the decision that she cannot received both retirement benefits and separation pay. GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES. Valois .

184618 November 19. FACTS: On June 16. HELD: Respondent is entitled to back wages from the time he was relieved from duty up to the time he was reinstated and not from the time he submitted his resignation letter. Coronel.R. Castillo. Lastimosa. the owner/operator of El Tigre. Villareal was constrained to claim his security bond deposits from petitioners. Reyes. Sy. Asensi. Marquez. No. Ramirez. Villareal alleged that the tenor of his resignation letter was not acceptable to petitioners. The award of one does not bar the other. Peak Ventures. His repeated requests for a new posting during the months of June and July of 2002 were likewise declined. On May 14. At that time. Rodriguez. 1989. Santos. VILLAREAL G. however. Gloria. Alcazaren. Rañigo. Tecson. Lumberio. he was advised to first tender a letter of resignation before the samecould be released to him. Palad. 2002 since he cannot expect to be given any assignment for another one and a half months and that he can no longer afford the fare going to petitioners’ office. HEIRS OF NESTOR B. PEAK VENTURES CORPORATION and/or EL TIGRE SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY vs. He stated therein that he was constrained to resign effective July 31. hired Villareal as security guard and assigned him at East Greenhills Village. ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to backwages and or reinstatement. Albano. De Mesa. Catindig. 2002. Out of sheer necessity. De la Cruz. Espina. However. Page 840 Echiverri. Tabugan. Villareal submitted a letter of resignation. Corporal. and (b) back wages. Inguillo. Martinez. who required him to submit another one stating that his resignation is voluntary. 2014 DOCTRINE: An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin relief of (a) either reinstatement or separation pay. Valiente. Cabañgon. he was 42. Villareal was later informed by the management that he would no longer be given any assignment because of his age. Francisco. Corpuz. if reinstatement is no longer viable. Valois . he was relieved from duty without any apparent reason. Sandoval.

HELD: Yes. as amended. However. 626. Francisco. the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history. [respondent] submitted the medical certificates issued by her attending physicians. (d) funduscopy report. Tabugan. Rodriguez. 196102 November 26. Santos. Lastimosa. (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack. which should be proved. the Supreme Court approved [respondent’s] application for disability retirement. both of whom are Ophthalmologists at Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. 2002. Catindig. To bolster her claim. On September 30. FACTS: On March 7. CALUMPIANO G. (c) blood chemistry report. it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent’s disability. Castillo. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. heart. essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys. Martinez. Thus. Coronel. Cabañgon. (b) ECG report. The GSIS together with Employee compensation commission disallowed her benefits on account that there is no direct relation between her illness and her work. Albano. Valois . Alcazaren. Alfred I. Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Implementing Rules of P. AURELIA Y. Inguillo. and (e) C-T scan. 2014 DOCTRINE: It is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent’s disability. For cerebro-vascular accident. Tecson. resulting in permanent disability. Elmer Montes. De Mesa. Dr. of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event. Marquez. No.R. On the other hand. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. Gloria. Reyes. Corporal. [respondent] filed before the Supreme Court. Sandoval. their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. No. Page 841 Echiverri. provided that. shortly before her retirement. De la Cruz. Lim and Dr. ISSUE: Whether or not the illness of the employee is compensable. Sy. Palad. eyes and brain. Espina.D. although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases. Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. Valiente. Corpuz. Asensi. Lumberio. 2002. or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry. an application for disability retirement on account of her ailment[s]. She submitted them together with the results of her perimetry test. Rañigo. Ramirez. the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report.

ISSUE: The degree of evidence the claimant has to establish in order to be entitled with the benefits provided by law. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DELFIN DELA CRUZ. represented by his SPOUSE. Corporal. Sy. Catindig. vs. Lastimosa. Espina. Rodriguez. represented by MR.employment medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines (mandatory reporting requirement) so that his claim for disability and sickness allowance can prosper. Corpuz. they must establish that Delfin suffered or contracted his injury or illness which resulted in his disability during the term of the employment contract.” Absent a showing thereof. Page 842 Echiverri. any decision set forth will only be based on unsubstantiated allegations. The foregoing jurisprudential principle effectively shows that the burden of proving entitlement to disability benefits lies on petitioners. Palad. CARLOS C. G. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS. An examination of the records. Tabugan. Alcazaren.R. Gloria. even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Valois . No. The 1996 POEA-SEC clearly provides that a seafarer must submit himself to a post. FACTS: The LA rendered a Decision8 dated May 30. the Court cannot grant a claim for disability benefits without adequate substantiation for to do so will offend due process.. 196357. Marquez. Delfin is entitled to his claims. Santos. The LA opined that Delfin contracted his illness during the period of his employment with respondents and that such illness is a compensable occupational disease. Inguillo. Albano. 2015 DOCTRINE: Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his right to the benefits by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Rañigo.V. Coronel. Lumberio.. Hence. SALINAS and/or TECTO BELGIUM N. but there must be a written notice to the agency within the same period of three days for the seaman to be considered to have complied with the requirement. shows that petitioners failed to discharge such burden. INC. Martinez. 2005 in favor of Delfin. Francisco. even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Reyes. De la Cruz. CARMELITA DELA CRUZ. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Asensi. however. The court reiterates the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his right to the benefits by substantial evidence” or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Valiente. April 20. HELD: The only exception to this rule (1996 POEA-SEC) is when the seafarer is physically incapacitated to do so. Tecson. Castillo. Thus. Accordingly. Ramirez.

2015. he went back to the office to talk to Ong-Sitco. Ramirez. Palad. Rañigo. Espina. if only to bolster the claim that he was not dismissed. FACTS: Sanchez alleged that since 1994. he was employed as driver and aluminum installer in several companies owned and managed by Ong-Sitco. De la Cruz. These. Page 843 Echiverri. but the latter just ignored him. Ong-Sitco had been remitting his Social Security System (SSS) monthly contributions. Instead. He cannot be faulted from reasonably concluding that the memorandum-letters were merely made in order to give semblance of validity to Albano. suspended or warned and that for the past 15 years. Tabugan. Lumberio. Sanchez averred that he has no record of any work related offense for which he has been reprimanded. led Sanchez to file a case for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of benefits against petitioners ISSUE: Whether or not Sanchez is guilty of abandonment. Sanchez cannot be said to have unjustifiably refused to return to work. Santos. Oddly. Mere failure to report for work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment. Alcazaren. April 22. Termination of Employment. On December 28. Valiente. Sandoval. HELD: The Court is not convinced that Sanchez abandoned his work. Coronel. DOCTRINE: Labor Law. Corpuz. Martinez. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Since February 1996. LITEX GLASS AND ALUMINUM SUPPLY and/or RONALD ONG-SITCO. the last of which was with Litex. To constitute abandonment. Catindig. it is essential that an employee failed to report for work without any valid and justifiable reason and that he had a clear intention to sever the employment relationship by some overt act. he has been diligently serving his employer. Gloria. Ong-Sitco just ignored him and this. No. Mere failure to report for work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment. Valois . G.R. 2008. Due to the incident. Lastimosa. Castillo. vs. Asensi. Reyes. De Mesa. only shows his intention not to retain him. Francisco. DOMINADOR B. thus. SANCHEZ. 198465. Sy. He again returned on January 2. The same thing happened after he went back a week later. that the two memorandum-letters were sent to Sanchez after he filed a complaint against petitioners. Marquez. Abandonment. he did not warn Sanchez about his continued absence or ask him to return to work. He was thus surprised when on December 23. Clearly. Corporal. under the circumstances. but Ong-Sitco was again unwilling to talk to him. he never bothered to explain why during these instances. As mentioned. 2008. he decided to just leave the work premises with the hope that the animosity between him and his employer would eventually subside. 2009 to purportedly discuss his employment status. Sanchez reported back to Ong-Sitcoseveral time to ask about his employment status but was not entertained. as shown by the records. while Ong-Sitco did not deny this. Rodriguez. Ong-Sitco and his wife scolded and threw insulting words and invectives upon him and then ordered him to go on indefinite leave. Tecson. This is further bolstered by the fact.

Tecson. Palad. In addition and as aptly observed by the CA. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Francisco. Tabugan. Sy. Sanchez’s immediate filing of the complaint is proof of his desire to return to work. De la Cruz. Reyes. Corpuz. Gloria. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Espina. Catindig. Rañigo. Valiente. Page 844 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Martinez. Castillo. Coronel. Inguillo. Ramirez. It has been held that the filing of a complaint negates any intention of abandoning foregoing employment. Albano. Santos. his termination. Alcazaren. Asensi. Valois . Marquez. Corporal. Sandoval.

Sy. This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Corporal.R. Suffice it to say that money is not Albano. Rodriguez. No. on the other hand. Santos. Francisco. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Manila to apply for overseas employment. Sandoval. that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted. For their defense. April 22. Martinez. 198012. Coronel. Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants’ money. Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the law may. Valois . or fitters for a fee. Rañigo. Tabugan.” Estafa. appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them.00. ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y MEDINA G. Appellant Mateo. Malate.In their appeal before the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not proof of payment of money is an essential element of illegal recruitment. Gloria. DOCTRINE: Illegal Recruitment. welders. 2015. Appellants’ argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private complainants deserves no credence. Inguillo. and that their transactions with Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel documents. representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms. denied knowing any of the private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor’s Office. Page 845 Echiverri. par. HELD: No.000. Palad. Money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of “illegal recruitment” under the law includes the phrase “whether for profit or not. gave to them. the five private complainantsmet appellants on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon. Lumberio. Corpuz.00 to P25. De la Cruz.555. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. promised them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) FACTS: Sometime during the period from January to March 1998. in turn. for the same acts. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate car importer and not a recruiter. They contended that Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received money from him. Catindig. appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged. Valiente. that there is likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money he. De Mesa. Espina. Ramirez. Marquez. Reyes. Asensi. Tecson. Castillo. Alcazaren. be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315. After the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18. appellants proffered denials.

the former’s respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter’s involvement in the prohibited recruitment. Francisco. Gloria. Asensi. Alcazaren. even if there is no receipt for the money given by the privatecomplainants to appellants. material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of “illegal recruitment” under the law includes the phrase “whether for profit or not. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit. Lumberio. Tecson. Corpuz. De la Cruz. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. Sandoval. Palad. Coronel. be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315. for the same acts. Sy. Ramirez. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Reyes. Corporal. Santos. Catindig. De Mesa. Anent the charge for estafa. Valois . Castillo. Valiente. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Martinez. Page 846 Echiverri. Espina. “[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may. Inguillo. par. Rodriguez. Marquez.” Besides.” Albano. and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.

06-07-10588-99. the performance of which is necessary and desirable in its usual trade and business. Rodriguez. and CAMILO TE G. the complaints for illegal dismissal. Alcazaren. ADOLFO GESTUPA. On July 1. Petron is their true employer.On July 2. Tecson. De la Cruz. Tabugan. as well as for tanker assistance in the receiving and re-filling of its LPG products.. The three Complaints were consolidated in an Order11 dated October 25. a labor contracting business owned and operated by Caberte Sr. Petron exercised control and supervision over their work. warehousemen. No. However.. Santos. A finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employeremployee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor. Asensi. Respondents added that ABC is a mere labor-only contractor which had no substantial capital and investment. Martinez. most of them had already been working for Petron for years. entered into a Contract for Services and a Contract for LPG Assistance Services. Lastimosa. 1999. 1999 of the Labor Arbiter. respondents were hired to work at Petron’s Bacolod Bulk Plant in San Patricio. 1996 to February 28. Jr. June 15. Catindig. Despite such arrangement.ABC undertook to provide utility and maintenance services to Petron in its Bacolod Bulk Plant.. moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Petron. Develos. holiday pay. Negros Occidental as LPG/Gasul fillers. Caberte. underpayment of wages and nonpayment of allowances.. 1999. Bacolod City. if not indispensability of the activity to the business. Sandoval. it would designate such new contractor as their employer. Sr. utility workers and tanker receiving crew. overtime pay. Ponteras. service incentive leave pay.Under both service contracts. Petron no longer allowed them to enter and work in the premises of itsBacolod Bulk Plant. Gestupa. Valois . Marquez. Inguillo. On the other hand. 2015. Servicio. Valiente. Reyes. Petron asserted that ABC is an independent contractor which supplied the needed manpower for the maintenance of its bulk handling premises and offices. 06-07-10675-99 and RAB Case No. Corporal. ABC and Caberte. 182255. respondents Galorosa and Te separately filed similar Complaints10 docketed as NLRC RAB VI Case No. and the ‘labor-only’ contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal.For the periods from March 1. Palad. Cabañgon. Sy. DOCTRINE: The repeated and continuing need for the performance of the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity. JR. that among the workers Albano. Respondents averred that even before Petron engaged ABC as contractor in 1996. every time Petron engages a new contractor. maintenance crew. 1999. Hence. DANTE MARIANO. Page 847 Echiverri. Subsequently. 1999 and November 1. ANTONIO CABERTE. VIRGILIO GALOROSA. Blanco and Mariano filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint9 for illegal dismissal. Petron and ABC. ARCHIE PONTERAS. docketed as NLRC RAB VI Case No. Thus. the real employer. Gloria. ARNOLD BLANCO. Espina. Coronel. FACTS: On various dates from 1979 to 1998. De Mesa. 06-09-10785-99. 13th month pay. PETRON CORPORATION vs. respondents Caberte. 1996 to June 30. MICHAEL SERVICIO. Lumberio. Castillo. Corpuz. and had no control over the manner and method on how they accomplished their work. respectively. Rañigo.R. ARIEL DEVELOS. ARMZ CABERTE. Francisco. however. Ramirez.

” Albano. if not indispensability of the activity to the business. It is clear that Petron failed to discharge its burden of proving that ABC is not a labor-only contractor. and Servicio and Galorosa were tanker receiving crew and utility workers. Valiente. Develos. Marquez. Jr. Corporal. Petron is declared to be the true employer of respondents who are considered regular employees in view of the fact that they have been regularly performing activities which are necessary and desirable to the usual business of Petron for a number of years. Castillo. Rañigo. Sandoval. This “the repeated and continuing need for the performance of the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity. Inguillo. Catindig. Lumberio. and the ‘labor-only’ contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal. the work they rendered were directly related to Petron’s main business. Gestupa. the Court declares ABC as a mere laboronly contractor. Tabugan. Palad. Francisco. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Consequently. “A finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employeremployee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor. Cabañgon. vital as they are in the manufacture and distribution of petroleum products. Asensi. Ponteras. Caberte was an LPG operator supervisor. Rodriguez. Reyes.” Accordingly in this case. Te was a warehouseman and utility worker. who does not appear to be one of those assigned by ABC to work for it. HELD: Yes. and. the real employer. except Caberte. Espina. supplied by ABC were respondents. that it has no direct control and supervision over respondents who were tasked to perform work required by the service contracts it entered into with ABC. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship with the contractor and the respondents. Valois . De la Cruz. Tecson. Martinez. Albeit it was made to appear that they were under the different contractors that Petron engaged over the years. Sy. and as warranted by the facts. respondents have been regularly performing the same tasks within the premises of Petron. De Mesa. Besides. Blanco and Mariano were LPG fillers and maintenance crew. Gloria.. Corpuz. Santos. some of the respondents were already working for Petron even before it engaged ABC as a contractor in 1996. Undoubtedly. Page 848 Echiverri. that it cannot allow the continuous employment of respondents beyond the expiration of the contracts with ABC. Coronel. Lastimosa.

Rodriguez. has relaxed this stringent requirement whenever justified. 2015. ISSUES: Whether or not the filing of bond is mandatory and jurisdictional. Asensi.269. 2006. Rañigo. June 22. Valois . Inc. Before the Labor Arbiter. among other workers. Tecson. De Mesa. (Delfi) whereby the former undertook to conduct promotional activities for the latter’s confectionery products. It is thus clear from the foregoing that the filing of supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of Bond with the NLRC. As such. 195513. Albano. that their last day of work would be on January 30. The filing of supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) final and executory. ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION G. However. their contracts of employment were terminated upon the expiration of APMC’s Promotional Contract with Delfi. In a letter10 dated December 27. 2007. Gloria. Lumberio. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. Page 849 Echiverri.89 should be decreased. complainants prayed for the dismissal of respondents’ appeal based on insufficiency of the bond posted. Corpuz. Martinez. this Court. APMC employed workers. Whether or not the appeal to reduce bond is permissible and should be granted. Delfi notified APMC that their Promotional Contract will expire effective January 31. Ramirez. This thusresulted in the non-perfection of the appeal. 2007. Inguillo. respondents contended that the awards granted to complainants amounting to P6. Lastimosa. DOCTRINE: Supersedeas Bond. For this purpose. APMC entered into a Promotional Contract with Delfi Marketing. Coronel. Santos. 2007. Marquez. Valiente. Francisco. In their Opposition with Motion to Dismiss Appeal. three separate complaints11 for illegal dismissal and money claims against respondents were filed by petitioners and by other employees. 2007.856. On January 29. Sy. Castillo. HELD: Yes. BEDUYA VS. Tabugan. No. and consequently. Corporal. Catindig. including petitioners as merchandisers and assigned them to various retail outlets and supermarkets under fixed-term employment contracts. Thus. the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had become final and executor. Reyes. Anent their motion for reduction of appeal bond. Cabañgon. APMC informed petitioners.R. Espina. They maintained that complainants were contractual employees. The filing of a motion to reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled with the posting of areasonable amount of cash or surety bond suffice to suspend the running of the period within which to appeal. The last contracts of employment that petitioners signed were until January 30. in many cases. FACTS: In pursuance of its business. Palad.

the Court was propelled to relax the requirements relating to appeal bonds such as when there are valid issues raised in the appeal and in the absence of any valid claims against the employer. Valiente. Sy. on account thereof. Lastimosa. Albano. prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment and special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits. The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that the NLRC failed to establish its jurisdictional authority over respondents’ appeal. in meritorious cases. The Court may relax the rule under certain exceptional circumstances which include fundamental consideration of substantial justice. Sandoval. Asensi. Clearly. and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant. the NLRC was conferred with jurisdiction over respondents’ appeal thus placing the same within the power of the said labor tribunal to review. the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. Castillo. As discussed. De Mesa. Palad. Martinez. Indeed. Cabañgon. Again. Alcazaren. and the amount and the issue involved. Corporal. Rodriguez. Tecson. respondents in this case have substantially complied with these requirements and. Reyes. the filing of a motion to reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled with the posting of a reasonable amount of cash or surety bond suffice to suspend the running of the period within which to appeal. allows the reduction of the appeal bond subject to the conditions that: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds. Rañigo. the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. Valois . Marquez. Coronel. Page 850 Echiverri. specifically Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules ofProcedure of the NLRC. Tabugan. their appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s Decision was timely filed. Espina. Francisco. Ramirez. Santos. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Catindig. Gloria. Otherwise. Inguillo. the rules. Lumberio. Still.

Justo Cammayo (Dr. Dr. Cammayo). On July 16. Coronel. Page 851 Echiverri. Valiente.He was discharged from the hospital over the objection of his physician. Petitioners disclaimed Gazzingan’s entitlement to his claims by arguing that his medical condition is preexisting for which no compensation is warranted under the POEASEC. Santos. HEIRS OF ANDRES G. 2006. 2006. Hernan Fernandez Cuartas. On August 8. Catindig. 199568. The 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses which are not listed as an occupational disease. Tecson. Dr. Corpuz. the injury or illness must be work-related. DOCTRINE: Compensable Illness. INC.8 On August 3. Gloria. Colombia. It is the company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer The Supreme Court (SC) is inclined to rule that Gazzingan suffered from a permanent total disability as he was unable to return to his regular job for more than one hundred twenty (120) days. No. while M/V Gloria was docked at the port of Cartagena. In a medical certificate Dr. VS. shortness of breath and back pain. Lumberio. Rañigo. FACTS: In May 2006. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable. Lastimosa. diagnosed him to have Acute Type-B Dissection. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents illness qualifies as a compensable illness. Castillo. Banaga).Gazzingan filed a Complaint12 for nonpayment or under payment of salaries/wages. DOHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY. Palad. petitioners received a letter from its company-designated physician. The hospital’s cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon. Sy. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Tabugan. he was confined at the Cartagena de Indias Hospital due to chest pain. sickness allowance. Rodriguez. Marquez. x xx the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. Gazzingan experienced chest pains. Asensi.Upon arrival in Manila on August 5. 2006. disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses and attorney’s fees. De la Cruz. Espina. 2015. and second. Gazzingan was medically repatriated.R. Valois . Corporal. Gazzingan was brought directly to Manila Doctors Hospital for further medical evaluation under the care of Dr. June 17. First. De Mesa. Martinez. Cammayo’s final diagnosis of Gazzingan’s illness was Dissecting Aneurysm. Raymond C. Francisco. Reyes. HELD: Albano. Inguillo. Banaga (Dr. 2006. GAZZINGAN G. stating that Gazzingan is suffering from a non-work-related illness.

the former’s declaration is not conclusive and final upon the latter or the court. Lastimosa. Albano. Its inherent merit will still be weighed and duly considered. The grant of attorney’s fees is likewise affirmed for being justified in accordance with Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code since respondents were compelled to litigate to satisfy their claims for Gazzingan’s disability benefits. While the company-designated physician must declare the nature of a seafarer’s disability. Rañigo. Such assessment is arrived at after the seafarer submits himself to the company-designated physician for a postemployment medical examination within three days from his repatriation. Palad. his permanent total disability benefits should beUS$60. De Mesa. the award of US$1. Coronel. Valois . De la Cruz. Espina. however. “It is beyond cavil that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. He was constrained to seek further medical attention at his own expense and was continuously unable to work until his death.000.00. Tabugan. Thus.000. Anent the nature of disability caused by his work-related illness.300. As regards sickness allowance. Rodriguez. Sandoval. Reyes. It is significant to note. the Court notes that Gazzingan was no longer provided work after being diagnosed with aortic dissection/dissecting aneurysm. Francisco. Santos. that courts are not bound by the assessment of the company-designated physician. Martinez. Inguillo.00 for his incapacity to work for 120 days was proper. Marquez. Gloria. Tecson.00 or 120% of US$50. Ramirez. the Court isinclined to rule that Gazzingan suffered from a permanent total disability as he was unable to return to his regular job for more than one hundred twenty days. Sy.00. Page 852 Echiverri. Valiente.000. Cabañgon. Castillo. Corporal. Asensi.” It is the company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer. Alcazaren. Corpuz. The Labor Arbiter thus erred in fixing his disability benefits at US$50. Yes. Accordingly. Catindig. Lumberio. pursuant to the Schedule of Disability Allowances under the POEA-SEC.

Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the NLRC’s February 27. Ramirez. Francisco. Gloria. as this Court is not a trier of facts. VS. self-serving and intended to exonerate the declarants from liability for their negligence and failure to secure the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level both in the warehouse and in the Fabrication Unit. issues of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. Palad. as they are uniformand were executed on the same date and notarized by the same notary public. Corporal. In labor cases. In its Comment. 2015. However. Thereafter. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may raise issues of facts upon a petition for certiorari to the supreme court. JR. Coronel. Tabugan. 050647-06 be reinstated instead. in exceptional cases. 2005. In labor cases. On appeal NLRC affirmed the previous decision. issues of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. 198515. petitioner returned an aluminum level to the warehouse. Reyes. HELD: Yes. Page 853 Echiverri. and it was found that one aluminum level was issued to respondent’s Fabrication Unit. Valois . Inguillo. Catindig. Exceptions (See Ruling) FACTS: On July 9. Quezon City which was denied. Alcazaren. charging the latter with theft of the aluminum level issued to its Fabrication Unit and requiring him to submit a written explanation. Supreme Court. Lumberio. inferred Albano. Santos. CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION G. Espina. Castillo. petitioner essentially maintains in the Petition and Reply that the evidence does not support respondent’s claim that he is guilty of theft and that what he returned was the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level. Corpuz. Cabañgon. No. MALABUNGA. Tecson. Martinez. De la Cruz. Valiente.R. CA also affirmed the decision. Rañigo. Sandoval. or [2] when too much is concluded. Sy. 2004. Rodriguez. 2004. this Court may be urged to resolve factual issues: “[1] where there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below. Lastimosa. Asensi. 2005 up to February 13. On July 24.On July 11. and that the witnesses’ statements are doubtful. 2009 Decision in NLRC CA Case No. June 15. Petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal suspension before the NLRC NCR. that the witnesses’ statements are biased. De Mesa. DOCTRINE: Labor Law. respondent served a written Notice upon petitioner. as the Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts. 2004. and another to petitioner. thus making him a mere scapegoat. Marquez. an inventory of respondent’s tools and items at the company warehouse was made. Petitioner was suspended without pay from January 10. respondent maintains that petitioner raises issues of fact which are beyond the purview of a petition for review on certiorari. he returned to work.

Sy. Alcazaren. Valiente. or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties[. Lumberio. Tabugan. Reyes. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Francisco. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Martinez. there is a need to refer to the record. De Mesa. Sandoval. Corporal. Castillo. Page 854 Echiverri. Palad.” “When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA. Inguillo. Ramirez. Valois . Catindig. Corpuz. Asensi. Gloria. Espina.” Albano. Rañigo. Marquez.] or [3] where the [Labor Arbiter] and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. Santos. Coronel. Tecson.

notonly mandatory. Tecson. The Labor Arbiter found respondent’s dismissal to be valid. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.) In case of a judgment involving a monetary award. ISSUE: Whether the supersedeas bond is invalid considering that Mapfre failed to submit. Rodriguez. On the other hand. Corporal.* DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule that “the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is.R. In case of a surety bond. Reyes. it awarded her backwages from the date of her dismissal up to the date of the NLRC Decision and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to strained relations. No. Castillo. and failure to conformto the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewedfinal and unappealable. Gloria. Page 855 Echiverri. Asensi. (Refer to Article 223 of the Labor Code. Alcazaren. Espina. VALERIE ANNE H. Francisco. moral and exemplary damages. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Labor Arbiter Flores issued a Writ of Execution dated April 20. the applicable Section 6. she was also ordered to reimburse the amount spent by petitioners for her training NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. De la Cruz.” FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for reimbursement of training costs plus interest. unpaid wages. Finding respondent to have been illegally dismissed. 2010. it found the supersedeas bond posted by Petitioners Mapfre’s authority totransact business was limited only to Civil/Special cases and does not cover labor cases. BRAVOvs. Martinez. Catindig. At the same time. In the CA. Coronel. Lumberio. 199660. De Mesa. among others. Petitioners filed before the NLRC a Notice and Memorandum of Appeal. Lastimosa. Corpuz. respondent filed against petitioners a complaint for illegal dismissal. Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires that the same should be accompanied by original and certified true copies of the following: xxx Albano. and attorney’s fees. Inguillo. Valiente. exemplary damages. they posted a corresponding supersedeas bond issued by Mapfre Insular Insurance Corporation (Mapfre). U-BIX CORPORATION and EDILBERTO B. Sandoval. NLRC denied their appeal and held that the supersedeas bond posted by petitioners has no force and effect. 2015. but jurisdictional. HOLLERO G. Sy. backwages. Valois . However. Marquez. Palad. Rañigo. The two complaints were later on consolidated. Santos. Tabugan. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. any proof of security deposit or collateral HELD: The Court still finds that petitioners failed to comply with the bond requirement in perfecting their appeal. July 13.

Rañigo. Corporal. Catindig. Santos. Alcazaren. Valois . Espina. De la Cruz. Reyes. xxx Here. Tecson. According to them. Marquez. the president of petitioner UBix. Castillo. Corpuz. Mapfre finds it sufficient that the Indemnity Agreement attached to the Memorandum of Appeal was signed by petitioner Bravo. Lumberio. Page 856 Echiverri. De Mesa. They themselves admit this in their Petition by stating that they no longer attached a separate document of security deposit or collateral securing the bond because Mapfre did not find it necessary to require them to give a security deposit and/or collateral. Ramirez. Albano. Francisco. Rodriguez. Asensi. that a check shall not be considered as an acceptable security. Cabañgon. Coronel. Sy. provided. Sandoval. Inguillo. in his personal capacity. Lastimosa. Valiente. Martinez. Tabugan. petitioners did not submit any proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond. Gloria. c) proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond. Palad.

INC.750. Lumberio. Rañigo. For one. Sandoval. De la Cruz.R. Valois . Inc. the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. Centennial Marine Services and M/V Bonnie Smithwick (petitioners) to pay respondent Pastor Quiambao (Pastor) total and permanent disability benefits amounting to US$78. as provided under Department Order No.* DOCTRINE:“[T]he company designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. No. Petitioners also asserted that Pastor cannot claim permanent disability compensation based on his mere inability to work for more than 120 days because a seafarer is only entitled to full disability benefits if he has been assessed with Grade I disability. EDUARDO R. QUIAMBAO G. Shortly thereafter or during the first week of August 2006. Asensi. 2007 issued by the Seamen’s Hospital attesting to his unfitness for sea service due to workrelated total disability. Espina. 198096. the POEASEC. rendered him permanently unfit for sea duties. Series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment.” FACTS: Pastor boarded M/V Bonnie Smithwick on June 5. 4. they argued that Pastor has not satisfactorily established any of the conditions for compensability. Cabañgon. 2006. Francisco. Tecson. Ramirez. Gloria. Marquez. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved. Inguillo. For their part.PASTOR M. Martinez. Here. Valiente. CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE. Alcazaren. Palad. Pastor filed a complaint against petitioners for permanent disability compensation. 2015. Castillo. Santos. JABLA. Rodriguez.00 and attorney’s fees. he presented a medical certificate dated April 17. Corporal. Jabla. While admitting that osteoarthritis is considered as a workrelated disease under the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC). his work as a messman does not entail heavy physical labor as to have caused his illness. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision which ordered petitioners Centennial Transmarine. Page 857 Echiverri. Corpuz. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether Pastor suffers from a work-related and compensable illness HELD: A seaman’s entitlement to disability benefits is governed. petitioners countered that except for his bare allegations. and/or MR. Pastor had not proffered sufficient evidence to support his claim that his spinal disc degeneration or osteoarthritis is work related or was aggravated by his working conditions. July 8. Coronel. If no such assessment has been made. the seafarer is not entitled to disability compensation even if he was unable to perform his job for more than 120 days. De Mesa. and/or Mr. Eduardo M. Tabugan. Reyes. but by law (the Labor Code) and by contract (the POEASEC and the parties’ CBA). coupled by his worsening lumbar pain despite continuous treatment. he figured in an accident while carrying heavy food provisions. however. Catindig. CENTENNIAL MARITIME SERVICES & M/V BONNIE SMITHWICKvs. which contains the Standard Terms and Albano. This only means that his ailment is a pre-existing disease. Sy. Pastor claimed that the lapse of 120 days from the time of his repatriation without any disability grading being issued by the companydesignated physician. not only by medical findings. In support of this.

For its part. “Pursuant to the Section 20(B). It further ruled that Pastor was able to prove the conditions necessary for osteoarthritis to be considered as having arisen in the course of his employment either by direct causation or aggravation due to the nature of his work. Valois . washing. Martinez. it must be the result of a work related injury or a work related illness. bridge. pantries. the CA ultimately concluded that the illness was acquired by Pastor due to his work as a messman whose primary duties and responsibilities include cleaning accommodations. First. that the workrelated injury or illness must have [arisen] during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. Page 858 Echiverri. and second. salons and messrooms. Tecson. Castillo. alleys. Francisco. storerooms. Rañigo. Sy. Corpuz. Sandoval. engine room. De Mesa. Coronel. two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. Palad.” To recapitulate. Tabugan. Gloria. Albano. Lumberio. The NLRC affirmed this finding by holding that the accident he met while carrying heavy food provisions was the proximate cause of his injury. cleaning and preparing tables. galley. governs the employment contract between Pastor and petitioners. Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On board Ocean Going Vessels.” For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEASEC. paragraph 6. Marquez. etc. Corporal. Catindig. the Labor Arbiter ruled that Pastor’s illness is work related. serving food and restocking supplies in pantries. Reyes. Santos. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. that the injury or illness must be workrelated. Valiente. which are defined as “injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment” and as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32(A) of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Lastimosa. Ramirez. The Court is not inclined to depart from the aforementioned findings of the Labor Arbiter. Inguillo. Espina. Asensi. the NLRC and the CA. collecting and laundering dirty linen. Alcazaren. Cabañgon.

appointing her as clerk for assignment with SSS Daeteffective May 27. 2001. Inguillo. Tabugan. and injustice. Palad. FACTS: Respondent Debbie Ubaña filed a civil case for damages against the DBP Service Corporation. to recover the proper salary due her as SSS Processor. Martinez. Gloria. Marquez. De la Cruz. Albano. she was instead referred to DBP Service Corporation for “transitory employment. 2001. Tecson.* DOCTRINE:In legitimate job contracting. Asensi.45 daily wage. From December 16.622. 2002. and the SSS Retirees Association. and 21. The petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA seeking reversal of the Order made by RTC reinstating the civil case before the court. she was assigned to the Membership Section as Data Encoder. 2015.R. Cabañgon. no employer-employee relation exists between the principal and the job contractor’s employees. 200114. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Respondent applied for employment with the petitioner. Petitioner may not hide under its service contracts to deprive respondent of what is justly due her. Coronel. Ramirez. Corpuz. respondent is thus justified in filing a case against petitioner. Page 859 Echiverri. Santos. G. Lastimosa. August 24. The principal is responsible to the job contractor’s employees only for the proper payment of wages. Rañigo. it is indeed unfair and unjust that as Processor who has worked with petitioner for six long years. anxiety.00 daily. she was paid only P5. the latter being responsible to the former only for the proper payment of wages. or P229. Catindig. De Mesa. based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment by SSS. the agony of dissatisfaction. Alcazaren. An MR was filed and was granted. Valois . she was forced to resign on August 26. she was transferred to the SSS Retirees Association as Processor at the Membership Section until her resignation on August 26. Castillo. She filed before the RTC for damages. However. 1999 to May 15. petitioner Social Security System (SSS). SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs.” She took the pre-employment examination given by DBP Service Corporation and passed the same. Francisco. Valiente. was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.038. No. Sy. after passing the examinations and accomplishing all the requirements for employment. Reyes. ISSUE: Whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the principal relief sought in the complaint. 2002 as she could no longer stand being exploited. particularly Articles 19. however.00. or P846.DEBBIE UBAÑA. A six-month Service Contract Agreement by DBP Service Corporation. Espina. Corporal. demoralization. HELD: There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract between respondent and petitioner. Lumberio. At first glance. while a regular SSS employee with the same designation and who performs identical functions is paid amonthly salary of P18.00 monthly. 1996. 20. On December 16. She asserted that she dedicated six years of her precious time faithfully serving SSS that defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil service laws and regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human Relations.

Valiente. Ramirez. As a vital government entity charged with ensuring social security. Inguillo. Corporal. Santos. Cabañgon. For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply. Tecson. If it cannot guarantee the security of those who work for it. Rañigo. De la Cruz. Asensi. Martinez. Rodriguez. Page 860 Echiverri. Albano. Gloria. Alcazaren. Sy. Palad. De Mesa. there must be an employer-employee relation between the parties thereto. Sandoval. Reyes. Tabugan. Marquez. Francisco. it should lead in setting the example by treating everyone with justice and fairness. Valois . it isdoubtful that it caneven discharge its directive to promote the social security of its members in line with the fundamental mandate to promote social justice and to insure the wellbeing and economic security of the Filipino people. Lastimosa. Castillo. Coronel. Espina. Lumberio. and in order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over a dispute. Corpuz. Catindig.

Nicomedes G. GRACE MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION AND/OR CAPT. or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. September 09. on the other hand. regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. respondent Aron S. Marquez. HELD: Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days. 201536. respondent was diagnosed with "nummular eczema" on his arms. phosphates. cleaned the area on board and was in charge of general cabin sanitation. complexing and bleaching agents.R. JIMMY BOADO v. De Mesa. Alarcon was hired by petitioner Grace Marine Shipping Corporation (Grace Marine Shipping) for its foreign principal. Lumberio. Francisco. Ramirez. legs and scalp by the company-designated dermatopathologist."6 On August 27. body. means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for. 2007. 2015 DOCTRINE:Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days. He was assigned as Messman onboard the vessel "M/V Sunny Napier II. Rañigo. ISSUE: Whether or not complainant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Albano. 2007." respondent developed a skin condition. Palad. Universal Marine Corporation. Cruz (Dr. FACTS: In 2006. He was examined by a physician in New Zealand. acids. Respondent was repatriated on August 29. Tabugan. 2007 and was immediately referred to the company-designated physician. Lastimosa. Martinez. A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled. Sy. or accustomed to perform. Castillo. Valois . while aboard "M/V Sunny Napier II. Dr. and was diagnosed as having "infected fungal dermatitis. No. As Messman. means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for. Total disability. or totally paralyzed. Total disability. Catindig. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. respondent maintained messroom sanitation. A total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. or accustomed to perform. He used cleaning agents such as surfactants. Inguillo. enzymes and other strong chemical substances. Gloria. ALARCON G. Cabañgon. Valiente. Espina. Rodriguez. washed clothes and dishes. Page 861 Echiverri. Corporal. Reyes. Cruz). or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. Coronel. Tecson. Santos. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. on the other hand. respondent was diagnosed by another doctor as having "eczema squamosum" and declared unfit for duty. Corpuz. alkalines. 2007. Sandoval. On August 30. On August 6.ARON S. Asensi.

Castillo. no profit-minded employer will hire him considering the repulsive physical manifestation of the disease. A total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. Tabugan. Sandoval. Sy. Asensi. 34 while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period. Dr. Alcazaren. or. De Mesa. or that a declaration of fitness to work or that his condition has been resolved or cured has been issued. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Valiente. This is true regardless of whether the employee loses the use of any part of his body or if the injury or disability is classified as Grade 1 under the POEA-SEC. Its inevitable impact [on] the respondent's chances of being hired and capacity to continue working as a seaman cannot be ignored. "[A]n employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician. De la Cruz. Catindig. Coronel. in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability. Martinez. Santos. or totally paralyzed. lack of long-term cure and the vulnerability of the patient to cardiovascular diseases and some cancers. Despite the declaration in the medical reports that psoriasis is not contagious. He is unfit to continue his duties as messman. It is undisputed that from the time the respondent was medically repatriated on October 7. Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation Commission. Corporal. Palad. Lastimosa. Marquez.32 (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw Adopting the pronouncement in Maersk in its entirety and applying it to the present case."35 Albano. Francisco. Inguillo. Page 862 Echiverri. as his illness prevents him from performing his functions as such. His permanent disability thus effectively became total in nature entitling him to permanent total disability benefits as correctly awarded by the LA and the CA. are work-connected and thus compensable. Ramirez. Reyes. Gloria. Alegre's certification was issued only after 259 days with the respondent needing further medical treatments thus rendering him unable to pursue his customary work. Tecson. In fact.2005 he was unable to work for more than 120 days. Cabañgon. it does not appear that petitioners took him back to work for their principal. its chronic nature. A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. Espina. which have not been cured. Up to this point. Valois . x xx. Corpuz. upon the lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period under Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code 33 and Rule X. the Court finds that respondent's psoriasis and nummular eczema. and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability. Rañigo.

Without prior notice to respondent. Inguillo. Martinez. 2015 DOCTRINE:The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion. Lastimosa. Lumberio. Espina. respondent was assigned to the Washington Mutual account. petitioner clearly acted in bad faith and with discrimination. respondent was informed that she could not be certified to handle calls for Bank of America due to her failure to complete the training. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without Albano. This being the case. On the third day of training (August 1). Thus. insensibility and disdain.8 On July 3. 202090. FACTS: On February 22. Valois . Reyes. the transfer amounted to constructive dismissal. not to mention contrary to experience. Catindig. Coronel. logic. Corpuz. and assigned her to its Capital One account. where she was awarded with a certificate for being the "Top Converter/Seller (Second Place)" for the month of April 2007. On February 21. Sandoval. 2007 on the very same day of her transfer. When she reported for training the next day. INC. De la Cruz. From then on. Sales as its Customer Service Representative (CSR) or Telephone Service Representative (TSR). Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. petitioner scheduled her for training from July 30 to August 6.MARIPHIL L. Corporal. and good business sense. the transfer was effected as a form of punishment for her raising a valid grievance related to her work. 2007. Valiente. Rañigo. Francisco. Alcazaren. Furthermore. Tecson. SALES G. Palad. Cabañgon. 2007. Page 863 Echiverri. HELD: In causing respondent's transfer. respondent was placed on "floating status" and was not given any work assignment. respondent was unable to attend. said transfer was obviously unreasonable.) v. September 09. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Respondent was then transferred to the Bank of America account on July 30. INC. it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. Sy. (NOW KNOWN AS SYKES MARKETING SERVICES.petitioner's Vice President . Asensi. No. 2007.R. De Mesa. ICT MAJRKETING SERVICES. petitioner hired respondent Mariphil L. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was constructively dismissed. Gloria. Tabugan. no action appears to have been taken on her complaint.complaining about supposed irregularities in the handling of funds entrusted to petitioner by Washington Mutual which were intended for distribution to outstanding Washington Mutual CSRs and TSRs as prizes and incentives. 2006. Santos. respondent wrote to Glen Odom (Odom) . However. bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Castillo. Marquez.

Catindig. it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. Cabañgon. Castillo.a security guard who was brave enough to complain about his employer's failure to remit its employees' Social Security System premiums . Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. the prerogative of the management to transfer its employees must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof. Page 864 Echiverri. Inc. The employer's privilege to transfer its employees to different workstations cannot be used as a subterfuge to rid itself of an undesirable worker. privileges and other benefits.. Valois .was "tossed around" and finally placed on floating status for no valid reason. Santos. Lastimosa. Francisco. Espina. Sandoval. Martinez. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Likewise. Tecson. Reyes. constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination. Palad. nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries. as an offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Corpuz. True. grave abuse of discretion. Jr. In particular. Corporal. Tabugan. Be that as it may. Gonzalvo. Lumberio. which has been defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible. De Mesa. inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. Gloria. Asensi. the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable. Marquez. Sy. Valiente. insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The instant case can be compared to the situation in Veterans Security Agency. Thus. Ramirez. v. the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal. Rodriguez. The exercise of the prerogative should not defeat an employee's right to security of tenure. it is the inherent prerogative of an employer to transfer and reassign its employees to meet the requirements of its business.46 where the employee concerned . Coronel. Rañigo. bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. unreasonable or unlikely. Albano. Alcazaren.

Espina. Page 865 Echiverri. He was thereafter assigned/posted to respondent agency's several clients. Coronel. He then reported continuously but was repeatedly advised to wait for a new posting. Lumberio. He submitted an explanation9 on the charge. Asensi. INC. Alcazaren. 2003. On May 5. Pasig Branch and was replaced by Security Guard Roel Juan pursuant to a rotation policy being implemented by respondent agency. informed of the lack of available assignment. Francisco. Rañigo. He was thus surprised when on March 9. petitioner was hired as security guard by respondent agency owned by respondent Santiago and managed by respondent Bona. the last of which was at National Bookstore . AND/OR RICARDO BONA AND SEVERO** SANTIAGO G. Valois . Sy. however. No.. 2015 DOCTRINE: This Court is not unmindful of the rule that the employer has the burden of proving that the employee's termination was for a valid or authorized cause. Corpuz. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Petitioner alleged that on October 30. 2003 requiring him to explain his unjustified refusal to accept the posts offered to him and his AWOL.1990. petitioner was relieved from his post at the National Bookstore . Reyes. 2002. it is incumbent upon the employee to prove by substantial evidence the fact that he was indeed illegally dismissed from employment. Ramirez. He was. Lastimosa. However.PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY. Valiente. Cabañgon. CARIQUE v.6 On October 28.Rosario. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Taguig on March 11. These events led him to file an illegal dismissal case against respondents. SM Bicutan. Albano. shortly after his relief. but no assignment at all was given to him. Tecson. Pasig Branch. FACTS: On November 8. he reported to respondent agency's office and inquired about his next assignment. Palad. he received a memorandum8 from respondent agency requiring him to explain his Absence Without Leave (AWOL) since November 30. De Mesa. Inguillo. September 16.R. petitioner refused to acknowledge receipt of the said memorandum. he again returned. Gloria. Contending that the SSDs attached to the memorandum were fabricated by respondent agency in order to evade liability. 2002. but was compelled to acknowledge receipt of a memorandum 10 dated April 30. before the employer is tasked to discharge this burden. 2003. GERARDO A. Corporal. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed considering the fact that he failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that he was indeed illegally dismissed from employment. 2003 and at East Asia Diesel Power Corporation and Country Space Condominium on March 17. Martinez. 197484. 2002. 2003. Catindig. Santos. Attached to the memorandum were three Special Security Detail (SSD) which required him to report for assignment at the National Bookstore. Marquez. Castillo.Rosario.

If anything. was considered on floating status or on temporary off-detail which is not an unusual occurrence for security guards given that their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties. Espina. Here. This Court is not unmindful of the rule that the employer has the burden of proving that the employee's termination was for a valid or authorized cause. We find no cogent reason to depart from the factual finding of both the NLRC and the CA that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. Palad. This critical affirmative fact must be proved by the party alleging the same with substantial evidence as required by the nature of this case. Sy. Coronel. Asensi. Martinez. Lumberio. Inguillo. Marquez. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Cabañgon. The SSDs and the affidavits executed by Duty Officer Basal and by Investigator General Amor attest to this incontrovertible fact. De Mesa. Tabugan. we find that petitioner anchored his claims on unfounded and unproven allegations. De la Cruz. it is incumbent upon the employee to prove by substantial evidence the fact that he was indeed illegally dismissed from employment. Santos. Corporal. Corpuz. before the employer is tasked to discharge this burden. Rañigo. Page 866 Echiverri. and that as correctly found by the CA. Gloria. Tecson.26 Placing petitioner on floating or off-detail status for not more than six months is not prohibited by law and did not amount to dismissal. The evidence on record clearly shows that respondents did offer petitioner new assignments. either factually or constructively. from that point on. Castillo. Reyes. the evidence on record showed that petitioner was relieved from his last assignment because of the implementation of a rotation policy by respondent agency which was requested by its clients. Alcazaren.23 Illegal dismissal must be established by positive and overt acts clearly indicative of a manifest intention to dismiss. Francisco. petitioner. Valiente. No positive or direct evidence was adduced to show that he was indeed illegally dismissed from employment.24 Mere allegation is neither proof nor evidence. Albano. Ramirez. Catindig. However. HELD: The Petition is without merit. Valois .

MAERSK-FILIPINAS MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWEVG. Marquez. 2007. No. Raymundo (Dr. ISSUE: Whose disability assessment should prevail in a maritime disability claim . Ramirez. Lumberio. respondent consulted an independent physician. Alcazaren.R. Jaleco was hired by petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing. Page 867 Echiverri." Nonetheless. Asensi. 2006. as Able Bodied Seaman on board the vessel "M/T Else Maersk. Gloria. damages. nonpayment of salaries/wages and other benefits. Tabugan. Corpuz. respondent complained of intermittent pain on the left buttock radiating to the. Cabañgon. 201945. Alegre). He found respondent to be suffering from "paralumbar spasm and limitation of movement due to pain. INC. Natalio Alegre II (Dr. Sandoval. Instead. lower back and left groin. Raymundo) . and attorney's fees against petitioners and Maersk General Manager Jerome P. FACTS: On December 4. Rañigo. When examined in Singapore on April 13. 2007 and was immediately referred to the company-designated physician. No attempt to secure the opinion of a third physician was made by the parties. Inguillo.the fit-to-work assessment of the company-designated physician or the contrary opinion of the seafarer's chosen physicians that he is no longer fit to work? HELD: Albano. Sy. Castillo." Respondent boarded "M/T Else Maersk" on January 16. 2015 DOCTRINE: There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. disability claims. Sometime in February 2007. Reyes. Palad.an orthopedic surgeon of the Philippine Orthopedic Institute . Dr. A./A. Inc. JALECO G.P.P. Corporal. 2007.ROMMEL RENE O. without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.. Moller A/S (Moller). who examined him on May 2 and 3. Alan Leonardo R. on behalf of its foreign principal and co-petitioner herein. INC. Catindig. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions. v. Lastimosa. MOLLER A/S. Valois . De la Cruz. De Mesa. September 21. Espina. 2008. respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Santos. respondent Rommel Rene O. Rodriguez. Martinez. his lumbosacral spine x-ray generated normal results but he was diagnosed as having "suspected prolapsed intervertebral disc. Coronel. Valiente.who issued his own Medical Report. Tecson. Francisco. Respondent was repatriated on May 1. 2007 and commenced his work. (Maersk). Dr. he was declared fit to sail. On April 28. medical expenses. delos Angeles (delos Angeles) before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Velasquez. The petitioners could not have possibly caused the non-referral to a third doctor because they were not aware that Dumadag secured separate independent opinions regarding his disability. v. and other cases similarly resolved. Thus. Cabañgon. Corporal. as in Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. Asensi. De Mesa. the Court said: "The POEA Contract. De la Cruz. the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands. the company-designated physician. has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance." Dumadag. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. particularly in relation to this case. Valois . Tabugan. Gloria. xxxx The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag's contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. Catindig. cited by the CA. Sy. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division) and similar other cases. x xx xxxx Whatever his reasons might have been. its provisions bind both of them. lest it encourage a similar defiance. Valiente. pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. Lumberio. Martinez. Inc. Santos. Corpuz. the complaint should have been dismissed. Sandoval. Castillo. Espina. Coronel. The two instruments are the law between them. it appears to us. Page 868 Echiverri. Rañigo. Albano. v. Marquez. is the law between them and as such. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions. Dumadag's disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. or sustained the opinion of the seafarer's chosen physician as in HFS Philippines.whether the Court's ruling in a particular case upheld the assessment of the company-designated physician. The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. Rodriguez. for without a binding third opinion. issued her fit-to-work certification for him. Ramirez. They are bound by their terms and conditions. without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination. The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC. Dacanay. Tecson. Palad. Lastimosa. Inguillo. Alcazaren. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties' level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court. however. Francisco. We stress in this respect that we have yet to come across a case where the parties referred conflicting assessments of a seafarer's disability to a third doctor since the procedure was introduced by the POEA-SEC in 2000 . of which the parties are both signatories. pursuant to the POEA-SEC and the CBA. Reyes. Filar.

Sandoval. Page 869 Echiverri. Catindig. Espina. Valiente. Inc. Castillo. Martinez. De la Cruz. Reyes. Rañigo. De Mesa. Alcazaren. Inguillo. Marquez. Santos.. Corpuz. Corporal. Lim with respect to Santiago's disability. the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Albano. Ramirez. Dacanay's fit-to-work certification must be upheld. Valois . Lastimosa. Tecson. Asensi. x xx [T]his Court is left without choice but to uphold the certification made by Dr. Francisco. Sy. Dr. Pacbasin Ship Management. especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor. Coronel. Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim. Rodriguez. In Santiago v. Tabugan. Gloria. Lumberio. Palad. Cabañgon.

Palad. b) probable previous silent inferior myocardial infarct. Whether or not the respondent’s condition is compensable. Echo. who issued a Medical Certificate 21 declaring that respondent is unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity. that he requires maintenance medication to control his hypertension to prevent cardiovascular complications such as worsening coronary artery disease. De la Cruz. LTD. Santos. xxx f) needs CXR. Sy. De Mesa. Whether or not the seaman’s medical condition must be deemed a total and permanent disability. Efren R. Upon examination by the ship's doctor Lana Strydom on March 12. 2008. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION. Alcazaren. G. Corpuz. three-vessel involvement. Valiente. Vicaldo (Dr. AND/OR MR. On March 22. Corporal. No. MANESE v. Tabugan. Vicaldo). Rañigo. 2009. Martinez. Coronel. ISSUES: 1. On September 25. g) needs cardiologist specialist consultation. stroke and renal insufficiency. Asensi. h) needs another seafarer's fitness to work at sea medical before next contract. Dr. c) left ventricular hypertrophy. MAZAREDO. Tecson. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES. Stress Test and Angiogram. the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. 2015 DOCTRINE: Under Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code50 and Rule X.51 the company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. respondent sought the opinion of an independent physician. Sandoval. 2. Castillo." respondent experienced back pain. 201359. the following diagnosis was issued: "a) uncontrolled hypertension on medication." the recommendation was for him to undergo coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG12). Cabañgon. respondent was medically repatriated and immediately referred to the company-designated physician. Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. if he fails to do so and the seaman's medical condition remains unresolved. Ramirez. FACTS: Magsaysay was assigned as Upholsterer onboard the vessel MY "Tahitian Princess" and was deployed on July 5. Respondent underwent a series of examinations10 such as electrocardiogram (ECG). Inguillo. Espina. d) tachycardia (95-107). September 23. 2009. he was found to be suffering from "coronary artery disease. Page 870 Echiverri.2009. and that respondent is not expected to land gainful employment given his medical background. Rodriguez. 2009. Francisco. Reyes. Albano. EDUARDO U. 2009. Catindig.11 On May 30. Marquez. On February 4. Valois . and coronary arteriography. Gloria. 2D Echo. while aboard M/V "Tahitian Princess.R. Lumberio.VIRGILIO L. Lastimosa.

if he fails to do so and the seaman's medical condition remains unresolved. Sandoval. respondent underwent percutaneous coronary intervention or angioplasty . Alcazaren. Corporal.on July 6. On May 30. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Reyes. Francisco." and recommended to undergo CABG. Palad. Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. he was found to be suffering from "coronary artery disease. there is no question that respondent's condition — "coronary artery disease. On July 6. Martinez. the company-designated physician issued a Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory Report recommending the administration of dual antiplatelets. Indeed. Marquez. coronary artery disease. During his employment as seafarer.an outpatient procedure .51 the company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. Inguillo. it appears mat respondent's treatment was discontinued."48 Moreover. Under Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code50 and Rule X. HELD: 1. Espina. Gloria. 2009. Sy. he likewise stated that the medical management of respondent's condition should be "maximized. there is no such declaration of fitness or disability issued by the company-designated physician. Lastimosa. the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. 2.47 It likewise remains undisputed that given his 12 years of employment with petitioners and the conditions he was subjected to as a seafarer. 2009 Medical Report issued by the company-designated physician which declared that respondent's condition was not work-connected and not compensable. Valiente. Asensi. or bypass surgery. as well as other heart ailments. up to this stage of the proceedings. "any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body. As correctly held by the CA. respondent's illness can be attributed to his work. Rañigo. are compensable. three-vessel involvement. De Mesa. It has consistently been held that cardiovascular disease. and he may have been required to perform overtime work. Coronel. and no assessment of respondent's fitness to work or disability was made. respondent was consistently exposed to varying temperatures and harsh weather conditions as the ship crossed ocean boundaries. Respondent was repatriated on March 22. Castillo. Valois . there is a reasonable connection between respondent's work and the development and exacerbation of his heart ailment. 2009. However. On the issue of compensability. Catindig. 2009. Indeed. the record of the case is Albano. even as he had to contend with the perils of the sea while at work. However. 2009 and was examined and treated by the company-designated physician. as seafarer. Cabañgon. Corpuz. respondent was constantly plagued by homesickness and emotional strain as he is separated from his family. Tabugan. Santos." Thereafter. Lumberio. Tecson. because he did not have the resources to pay for the more expensive bypass surgery. Page 871 Echiverri. instead of the recommended bypass surgery. three-vessel involvement" — is a covered illness. Rodriguez. Petitioners argue that there is a March 27.

he has not been cured. Bengson52 and Alpha Ship Management Corporation v. Valiente.000. Francisco. Corpuz. Palad. Inguillo. upon the lapse of the statutory 120.that an employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician.00. the last medical report issued by the company-designated physician on July 6. the attending physician recommended that medical management of respondent's condition should be maximized. Martinez. Rodriguez. Corporal. 2009 indicates that respondent's condition has not been resolved. Asensi. Santos. or. Lastimosa. Coronel. bereft of such report. Ramirez. and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability . Marquez. Lumberio. Reyes. Castillo. Inc. Gloria. Page 872 Echiverri. Valois . v. meaning that his treatment must continue and the medical care to be given to him must be augmented. Tecson. applying the doctrine enunciated in Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine. Espina. Thus. while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period. Rañigo.respondent is thus deemed totally and permanently disabled and entitled to the corresponding benefit under the POEA SEC in the amount US$60. On the contrary. Albano. Sandoval. De la Cruz. and petitioners did not renew his contract. in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability. Sy. De Mesa. Cab53 . Catindig.or 240-day treatment period. Tabugan. and instead. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Respondent's condition remains unresolved even up to this day. nor was respondent able to work for other employers on account of his condition.

Valiente. NEW FILIPINO MARITIME AGENCIES. for and on behalf of St. Lumberio. Rañigo. INC. the NLRC gave probative weight to the suicide note. Castillo. Espina. Coronel. DATAYAN III G. Datayan (respondent).2007.11 On May 11. then his heir is not entitled to his Albano. LTD. Taiyo Nippon Kisen Co.. Paul Maritime Corp. Tabugan. Sy. Ramirez.m. November 11.m. Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP). may.Prior to his deployment. Valois .15 He declared that there was no evidence that Simon committed suicide and maintained that his death was a result of negligence and reckless instruction of the Master. AND ANGELINA T. he filed a complaint12 for death benefits and attorney's fees against NFMA. De la Cruz. he declared that Simon jumped overboard. the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) among All Japan Seamen's Union. Simon's father. Page 873 Echiverri. to establish that Simon committed suicide. After a few weeks.VINCENT H. A futile search-and-rescue operation ensued. Santos. the death of a seafarer during the term of his employment makes his employer liable for death benefits. the Master authorized the conduct of an emergency fire drill in which the crew participated. No. TAIYO NIPPON KISEN CO. On December 30. 2009.On appeal. however.R. The LA held that Simon's suicide was established by the evidence on record.. the NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. Gloria. and during which the water temperature was expected to cause hypothermia. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. D ATAYAN -HEIR OF SIMON VINCENT H. The employer.. Francisco. Martinez. (NFMA). Ltd. Respondent also stated that the fire drill was conducted at 12:40 a. Vincent H..26Like the LA. and the International Mariners Management Association of Japan. Sandoval. FACTS: New Filipino Maritime Agencies.. being the heir of Simon. RIVERA v. Cabañgon.13 and Angelina T. Catindig. It held that considering that the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act. where there was heavy concentration of fishing boats in the area. the Master's Report. employed Simon Vincent Datayan II (Simon) as deck cadet on board the vessel Corona Infinity. 202859. Palad.. 2015 DOCTRINE:As a rule.m. be exempt from liability if it can successfully establish that the seafarer's death was due to a cause attributable to his own willful act. Tecson. Simon was declared missing and was presumed dead. Asensi. unless they could prove that Simon's death was due to causes not legally compensable. At about 1:25 a. Inc. Inguillo. Corporal. Rivera (petitioners). Simon underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duties. Marquez. at 12:40 a. Respondent averred that because Simon died during the term of his employment. He asserted that petitioners were presumed to be at fault or had acted negligently. Alcazaren. Reyes. De Mesa.. along with other pieces of documentary evidence adduced. (SPMC). must be applied in the grant of death benefits and burial assistance in his favor. alleged that he went to NFMA to claim death benefits but his claim was unheeded. Corpuz.

Asensi. In this respect. Tecson. Lumberio. DATAYAN II WAS STANDING [SIC] ON THE FAIRLEAD PORT QUARTER AND AT THAT POINT HE (WIPER) SAW TORCH LIGHT PASS HIS (DECK CADET) FACE AND CAUGHT HIS (DECK CADET) ATTENTION THEN WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO JUMP. HELD: As claimant for death benefits. to wit: x xx WE CONDUCTED EMERGENCY FIRE DRILL AT NIGHT TIME 0040LT 30th DECEMBER 2007/ 1540TC 29th DECEMBER 2007. ISSUE: Whether or not Simon’s death is compensable. Martinez. Marquez. death benefits. Ramirez. OCLEASA xxx SAW DECK CADET SIMON VINCENT H. Rañigo. Francisco. That Simon's death was a result of his willful act is a matter of defense. Gloria. respondent has discharged his burden. Valois . The Court finds that petitioners discharged their burden to prove that Simon committed suicide. KNOWING THAT HE WAS SLIGHTED I ORDER TO LOOK FOR HIM IN WHICH THE CREW COMPLIED. Corporal. Tabugan. Cabañgon. If such is the case. his death is compensable. Coronel. ONE OF THE CREW WIPER RAYMOND C. petitioners have the burden to prove this circumstance by substantial evidence. Sy. De la Cruz. Castillo. Subsequently. IN ORDER TO RETURN I ORDERED HARD STARBOARD TO Albano. Rodriguez. BUT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS NOT CLEAR ENOUGH. Inguillo. THEN WIPER WENT TO SHIP'S OFFICE AND DIAL 0 FOR PUBLIC ADDRESS AND SHOUT MANOVERBOARD PORTSIDE. Sandoval. Catindig.38 Thus. Palad. It is beyond question that Simon died during the term of his contract. The next question is whether Simon's death was due to his deliberate act. De Mesa. Corpuz. the CA ruled in favor of the respondent stating that Simon committed suicide and hence. then respondent is not entitled to death benefits. HE (WIPER) CALLED HIS NAME BUT HE (DECK CADET) JUMPED OVERBOARD. Alcazaren. Valiente. I STRONGLY MENTIONED ABOUT HIS (SIMON'S) BEHAVIOUR ON BOARD THE SHIP TO MOTIVATE HIM AND TO IMPROVE HIS PERFORMANCE SINCE HE IS A DECK CADET AND ABOUT TO BE PROMOTED AS ORDINARY SEAMAN x xx xxx AFTER THE MEETING [I] OBSERVED THAT HE WAS NOT AROUND IN THE MESSHALL. AFTER THE DRILL AT ABOUT 0055LT WE CONDUCTED MEETING AT CREW MESSHALL FOR MASTER'S EVALUATION AND AT THE SAME TIME SAFETY MEETING DURING EVALUATION. The Master's Report39 clearly described the situation on the vessel prior to. during and after the time that Simon went overboard. respondent has the burden to prove by substantial evidence that his son's death is work-related and that it transpired during the term of his employment contract. Santos. Reyes. Espina. SO WHEN I REACH THE BRIDGE I ASKED SECOND OFFICER WHICH SIDE HE FELL OVERBOARD BUT SECOND OFFICER ALSO NOT SURE [SIC] WHICH SIDE HE FELL. Page 874 Echiverri. Lastimosa.

Sy. Castillo. Alcazaren. Reyes. Ramirez. Corpuz. Lumberio. Page 875 Echiverri. Tecson. Palad. Francisco. Lastimosa. TURN ON ALL DECK LIGHTS AND POSTED LOOKOUTS x xx At the same time. Gloria. Tabugan. Sandoval. Asensi. Inguillo. De Mesa. Cabañgon. the incident was reported to the Japan Coast Guard and to petitioners' local agents in the Philippines. The Yokohama Coastguard Patrol also conducted search-and-rescue but to no avail. Marquez. De la Cruz. Catindig. Coronel. Rañigo. Espina. Valiente. Santos. Rodriguez. MANEUVER WILLIAMSON TURN AND RETURN TO RECIPROCAL COURSE AND DROP LIFEBOUY WITH BOUYANT SMOKE SIGNAL AND SELF IGNITING LIGHT. Albano. Corporal. Martinez. Valois . the Statement of Facts41 submitted by petitioners indicated that after the vessel retraced its course to where Simon fell.

December 07. Beja alleged that his knee injury resulted from an accident he sustained on board the vessel when a drainage pipe fell on his knee. EMMANUEL L.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary He claimed for compensation in the amount of US$137. and whose ability to work as a seafarer is reduced as a result thereof. Lumberio. Francisco. De Mesa. 2007 and was advised to be medically repatriated. be governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws. according to him.7 However. 2015 DOCTRINE: The determination of entitlement to disability benefits must. Sy. Marquez. Reyes. moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. which he immediately reported to the Master of the vessel. REGIO v. No. 2007. while in Spain. Beja experienced pain and swelling of his right knee. Beja underwent the pre-employment medical examination.00 in accordance with the degree of disability and rate of compensation indicated in the said CBA. Alcazaren. be entitled to compensation. Espina. including.R. Tecson. Asensi. or on May 15. Valois . Rodriguez. Santos. Corpuz. BEJA G. This. Corporal. sickness allowance. consequently. for and on behalf of its foreign principal. shall in addition to sick pay. Meantime. the pain in his right knee recurred and persisted. In November 2007. ISSUE: Albano.ARMANDO M. He underwent arthrocentesis of the right knee. Tabugan. Castillo. He claimed that from the time of his repatriation on November 22. was referred to an orthopedic surgeon and was advised to take a rest. 203115. his knee has not recovered which rendered him incapable of returning to his customary work as seafarer. Ramirez. Gloria.500. FACTS: Beja was hired by Island Overseas Transport Corp. Rañigo. where he was declared fit for work. for a period of nine months as Second Assistant Engineer for the vessel M/V Atsuta. accidents occurring while travelling to or from the ship. 2007. Valiente. Catindig. 2008. He was brought to a physician on November 19. Cabañgon. Beja filed a complaint 11 against petitioners for permanent total disability benefits. Page 876 Echiverri. On November 10. Lastimosa.1: A seafarer who surfers permanent disability as a result of an accident whilst in the employment of the Company regardless of fault. Martinez. according to the provisions of this Agreement. Inguillo. but excluding permanent disability due to willful acts. Palad. De la Cruz. clearly entitles him to permanent total disability benefits pursuant to AMOSUP-JSU Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides: Article 28. while undergoing therapy. ISLAND OVERSEAS TRANSPORT CORPORATION/PINE CREST SHIPPING CORPORATION/CAPT. he was brought to a hospital in Italy and was diagnosed to have Arthrosynovitis. Coronel. Sandoval. petitioner Pine Crest Shipping Corporation. medical expenses.

Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that: Art. Asensi. Lumberio. Cabañgon. the NLRC's conclusion that the tear and injury on Beja's knee was caused by an accident on board had no factual basis but was anchored merely on speculation. Lastimosa.37 Thus. Rañigo. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment. Reyes. Tecson. the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. Sy. Book IV of the Labor Code. . De Mesa. Martinez. Valois .36 Thus. Corporal. however. except as otherwise provided for in the Rules. De la Cruz. Section 20 B (3) of the POEA-SEC. Beja is entitled to a total and permanent disability compensation of US$60. we find the CBA inapplicable. Permanent total disability. Espina. Santos. Castillo. Coronel. the determination of Beja's entitlement to disability benefits must. the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. HELD: The Court also takes notice of the fact that Beja's medical condition cannot be solely attributable to accidents.00 under the POEA-SEC. Ramirez. The Court cannot. Whether or not the POEA-SEC prevails over the rate of compensation provided in the CBA. Valiente. which states: Sec. 2.x xx (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days. The Rule referred to in this Labor Code provision is Section 2. Albano. Gloria. Tabugan. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. Palad. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. His injury could have possibly been caused by other factors such as chronic wear and tear35 and aging. Period of Entitlement — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. Francisco. However. rest its rulings on mere speculation and presumption. Page 877 Echiverri. be governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws.000. Inguillo. Marquez. 192. Catindig. meanwhile provides that: 3. Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II. consequently. Corpuz.

Sy. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Martinez. Sandoval. Castillo. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. Catindig. Coronel. Santos. Page 878 Echiverri. Ramirez. Palad. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Inguillo. Espina. For this purpose. Rañigo. Corpuz. Corporal. Cabañgon. Asensi. Lastimosa. Albano. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Tecson. Reyes. Valois . The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. Tabugan. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment. Marquez. Francisco. De Mesa. in which case. Gloria. Valiente. the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so.

1 MANAGER v. Lumberio. Sy. They added that Vicmar employed more than 200 regular employees and more than 400 "extra" workers. De Mesa. They also asserted that Vicmar did not comply with the twin notice requirement in dismissing employees. December 09. there is substantial evidence to prove that respondents were regular employees such that their separation from work without valid cause amounted to illegal dismissal. Corporal. whether such service is continuous or broken. Espina. Rañigo. No. such as Philhealth. Gloria. holiday pay. grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ISSUE: Did the CA err in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the ELAs' Decisions dismissing the complaint? HELD: In labor cases. Tecson. 2015 DOCTRINE: In labor cases. 13 th month pay. Sandoval. grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Castillo. De la Cruz. Catindig. Coronel. its manager. Marquez. Ramirez. Cabañgon. and consolidated Complaints for illegal dismissal and money claims filed by CamiloElarcosa et al. its owner and JuanitoPagcaliwagan (Pagcaliwagan). Asensi. Reyes. Tabugan. Corpuz. Valiente. Inguillo. Palad. unless the employment is one for a specific project or undertaking or where the work is seasonal and for the duration of a season. Page 879 Echiverri. VICMAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND/OR ROBERT KUA. Albano. RuelCabanday and JonardAbugho (respondents) against Vicmar Development Corporation (Vicmar) and/or Robert Kua (Kua). 202215. Martinez. AND ENGR.R. Social Security System. Santos. Respondents claimed that they were illegally dismissed after "vicmar learned that they instituted the subject Complaint through the simple expedience of not being scheduled for work. FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims filed by Ruben Panes. rest day and night shift differential. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. with respect to the activity for which he is employed and his employment continues as long as such activity exists. Valois . or 2) has rendered at least 1 year of service. Respondents declared that Vicmar paid them minimum wage and a small amount for overtime but it did not give them benefits as required by law. OWNER.CAMILO ELARCOSA. JUANITO C. G. et al. Even those persons associated with them were dismissed. Lastimosa. Francisco. Section 280 of the Labor Code defines a regular employee as one who is 1) engaged to perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. PAGCALIWAGAN.

The Court is not convinced as we find no proof of Iladan's allegations. that he had been dismissed from employment. De la Cruz. De Mesa. AND DEBBIE LAO G. Castillo.000. Santos. that he had been dismissed from employment. Alcazaren. by substantial evidence.00. as well as payment of damages and attorney's fee for the litigation of her cause. Ramirez. Tabugan. 2009. Iladan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. to discharge this burden. Lastimosa. La Suerte hired Iladan to work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a period of two years with a monthly salary of HK$3. or on November 23. by substantial evidence.580. Tecson. Valois . 203882. barely eight days into her job. FACTS: La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for overseas employment. the employer has the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was legal. Iladan executed a handwritten resignation letter. payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract. No. Lumberio. Palad. refund of placement fee. the Labor Arbiter's and NLRC's evaluation of evidence and factual findings. Iladan signed an Affidavit of Release.In illegal dismissal cases. Corporal. On August 6.000. Rañigo. Coronel. Inguillo. Francisco. Sandoval. against respondents. Page 880 Echiverri.. ISSUE: whether Iladan's resignation and her execution of the Affidavit of Release. Reyes.LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY. Thereafter.00 financial assistance given by Domestic Services. Corpuz. the employee must first prove. Valiente. January 11. It is a settled jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to prove that his resignation is not voluntary. Sy. The CA did not err in finding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision. However. ILADAN v. She avers that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are entitled to great weight and should be accorded respect and finality. INC. Martinez. Espina. Rodriguez.00. as well as moral and exemplary damages. the employer has the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was legal. Asensi. to discharge this burden. She argues that a writ of certiorari may not be used to correct. Catindig. the employee must first prove. Cabañgon. Iladan contends that the CA failed to prove any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC and thus had no basis in reversing the NLRC resolutions which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Albano. 2009. LORELEI O. Marquez. in consideration of P35. Waiver and Quitclaim. was Iladan illegally dismissed? HELD: The Petition is without merit. Iladan claimed to have been illegally dismissed and entitled to backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract.R. reimbursement of the placement fee in the amount of P90. 2016 DOCTRINE: In illegal dismissal cases. However. Gloria. Waiver and Quitclaim and the Agreement were all voluntarily made.

Sandoval. Gloria. 1989. Corporal. This was prompted by a cooperative report stating that too many SILs were being granted. Rañigo. Valois . JOSEPHINE DOCTOR. 2016 DOCTRINE: An employee's willful and repeated disregard of a resolution issued by a cooperative's board of directors (BOD) declaring a moratorium on the approval and release of loans. 2003. INC. Sy. De la Cruz. Catindig. AND WILLIAM BAO-ANGAN v. Tabugan. Asensi. the TAMPCO BOD issued Board Action (BA) No. In 2002. while petitioner William. on October 26. Tecson. MAGDALENA DUCLAN G. Santos. BA No. the employer may terminate the services of its employee for the latter's serious misconduct or willful disobedience of its or its representative's lawful orders.In June 2003. Bao-Angan is TAMPCO Chief Executive Officer. Valiente. Espina. it is Albano. Inc. This prompted the BOD to issue. TABUK MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. March 14. Cabañgon. Page 881 Echiverri. Alcazaren. constitutes willful disobedience which justifies the penalty of dismissal under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Ramirez. HELD: The Court grants the Petition. thus placing the resources of the cooperative and ultimately the hard-earned savings of its members in a precarious state.Respondent Magdalena Duclan was employed as TAMPCO Cashier on August 15. (TAMPCO). 28 which limited the grant of SILs to P5 million and instructed management to collect outstanding loans and thus reduce the amount of loans granted to allowable levels. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Castillo. Palad. the highest single individual borrowing reached a staggering P14 million. ISSUE: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THEREBY AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER. SILs were granted to Falgui and Kotoken over and above the ceiling set. Kalinga. No. Corpuz. FACTS: Petitioner Tabuk Multi-Purpose Cooperative.However. (TAMPCO) is a duly registered cooperative based in Tabuk City. 55 completely halting the grant of SILs pending collection of outstanding loans. And for willful disobedience to constitute a ground. Lumberio. Francisco. which thus adversely affected the cooperative's ability to grant regular loans to other members of the cooperative. 203005.R. Rodriguez. despite said board action. TAMPCO introduced Special Investment Loans (SILs) to its members and prospective borrowers. It is engaged in the business of obtaining investments from its members which are lent out to qualified member-borrowers. Petitioner Josephine Doctor is TAMPCO Chairperson and member of the cooperative's BOD. Among those who availed themselves of the SILs were Brenda Falgui (Falgui) and Juliet Kotoken (Kotoken). Martinez. Inguillo. Reyes. De Mesa. Coronel. Lastimosa. Marquez.

It is implied that in every act of willful disobedience. Santos. Palad. willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Ramirez. and (3) connected with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. Rañigo. the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer. De Mesa. to be a just cause for termination. A willful or intentional disobedience of such rule. Disobedience. order or instruction justifies dismissal only where such rule. Tecson. lawful. Valois . Castillo. Coronel. (2) sufficiently known to the employee. Francisco. Catindig. and (b) the order the employee violated must have been reasonable. Gloria. hi any case. Inguillo. The persistent refusal of the employee to obey the employer's lawful order amounts to willful disobedience. Asensi. Reyes. Tabugan. Martinez. Rodriguez. Corporal. De la Cruz. Lumberio. made known to the employee. Lastimosa. orders and instructions of the employer. and must pertain to the duties that he had been engaged to discharge. must be willful or intentional. Espina. Sandoval. Corpuz. Albano. Valiente. required that: "(a) the conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional. Marquez. the conduct of the employee that is a valid ground for dismissal under the Labor Code constitutes harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his employer. Page 882 Echiverri. Indeed. Sy. Willfulness must be attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. order or instruction is (1) reasonable and lawful. "one of the fundamental duties of an employee is to obey all reasonable rules.

Tabugan. DOEHLE-PHILMAN1 MANNING AGENCY INC. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. 2008. Respondent stated that on June 1. Ramirez. Luminardo M. This Court does not review factual issues as only questions of law can be raised in a Rule 45 Petition. HENRY C. Castillo. Inguillo. respondent underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty.. declared him not fit to work. Tecson. he boarded the vessel and assumed his duties as oiler. Gloria. Essentially. he experienced heartache and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-kilogram machine. respondent’s personal doctor. Espina. 2008. Alcazaren. he was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam where he was informed of having a hole in his heart that needed medical attention. Dohle Ltd. Rodriguez. FACTS: On May 30. such rule admits of exceptions including a situation where the factual findings of the tribunals or courts below are conflicting. ISSUE: Is the CA correct in setting aside the NLRC Resolutions denying respondent’s claim for permanent and total disability benefits? HELD: The Court finds merit in the Petition. MANOLO T. Palad. on the other. Before deployment. HARO G. we deem it necessary to make our own determination and evaluation of the evidence on record. thereafter. No. Asensi.00 and other benefits. however. and existing Jurisprudence. However. Albano. Sy. Here. Coronel. Ramos (Dr. Valois . in November 2008. Dr. GACUTAN vs.. Rañigo. 206522 DOCTRINE: The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. De Mesa.R. and the CA. Francisco. Corpuz. We should always be mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving. respondent reported to Doehle-Philman which in turn referred him to Clinico-Med. De la Cruz. the applicable law.After his repatriation on December 6. Martinez. Page 883 Echiverri. hired respondent as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA CGM Providenciafor a period of nine months with basic monthly salary of US$547. Respondent claimed that he was confined for two days in UST Hospital and that a heart operation was recommended to him. Lastimosa. Ramos). in behalf of its foreign principal. Corporal. petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits on the sole basis that he was unable to work for more than 120 days. Marquez. Doehle-Philman. there being contrary findings of fact by the LA and NLRC. Cabañgon. Sandoval. to be dispensed with in the light of established facts. Catindig. 2009.On April 24. Valiente. on one hand. He nevertheless admitted that he has not yet undergone any surgery. Santos. DOHLE (IOM) LIMITED AND CAPT. Reyes. Lumberio. 2008.

Alcazaren. De Mesa. provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. Sy. Valiente. Ramirez. Espina. Rañigo. De la Cruz. To emphasize. Santos. Albano. Cabañgon. Gloria. Page 884 Echiverri. Asensi. Corporal. Palad. Martinez. Inguillo. the injury or illness 1) must be work-related and 2) must have arisen during the term of the employment contract. Sandoval. Corpuz. Valois . Coronel. The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC). Lastimosa. Tecson. Reyes. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Castillo. Marquez. particularly Section 20(B) thereof. Lumberio. Catindig. Francisco. to be compensable.

The next day. Espina. 2008. Laceste (Dr. RODEL A. De la Cruz. Agbayani declared that respondent's illness was work-related. respondent successfully underwent provocative discogram and percutaneous nucleoplasty. Agbayani reported that respondent's condition had not improved despite various treatments since April 2008. Valois . 204769. Marquez. Rodriguez. in behalf of its foreign principal.On June 1.198. Santos. He had shown improvement but still complained of slight but tolerable pain upon trunk flexion. 2016 DOCTRINE: The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the fitness of the seafarer to work or to determine the degree of his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation. v.. 2008. Dr."On December 11. Martinez. Respondent' MRI scan revealed that he was afflicted with "Mild L4-5 disc bulge but with no evidence of a focal disc herniation. Dr. he reiterated that respondent's condition was work-related. Francisco. after almost one year from respondent's repatriation. Tabugan. CSCS BMTERNATIONAL NV AND/OR MARLON* RONO. respondent underwent another MRI scan revealing that he was suffering from mild degenerative changes in the lumbar spine which remained unchanged when compared to his July 7. He was repatriated on June 19." Respondent had undergone 13 physical therapy (PT) sessions. Agbayani declared that despite more than 20 PT sessions. employed respondent Rodel A. 2008. Asensi. Lumberio. respondent boarded the vessel. Sy.66. Ramirez. FACTS: Magsaysay Maritime Corp. Corporal. Agbayani diagnosed respondent and gave him an interim disability rating of Grade 8 for "Moderate rigidity of two thirds loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. Dr. If after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer remains incapacitated and the company-designated physician has not yet declared him fit to work or determined his degree of disability. Dr. the company-designated doctor who noted that there was no limitation on respondent's motion but the latter still complained of pain. He noted that respondent would be referred to the Pain Management Clinic. Laceste). Valiente. Inguillo. Agbayani).Then respondent received sickness allowance for 120 days (from June 18. 2008 to October 15. Nevertheless.On November 4. Agbayani gave respondent a disability rating of Grade 8 for "moderate rigidity or two third loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. and was immediately referred to Dr. On April 23. while lifting heavy objects in the course of performing his duties. Alcazaren.” Then Dr. respondent showed little signs of improvement and possible surgical intervention was being considered. 2008) amounting to €1. Lastimosa. No. as the case may be. Benigno A. Respondent's employment was for eight months (with three months extension upon mutual consent of the parties)." Albano. Tecson. 2009. Sandoval. Catindig. June 06. 2008. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP. Cruz as housekeeping cleaner on board the vessel Costa Fortuna. spondylolisthesis nor spinal canal stenosis. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Page 885 Echiverri. respondent experienced low back pain.R.On March 10. (MMC). 2008 MRI scan. Reyes. the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled. 2008. Agbayani (Dr. Palad. respondent's MRI scan showed that there was "small central disc protrusion with disc desiccation changes at L4-L5 level" but there were no compression deformities. Coronel. Gloria. Corpuz. John Joseph O. Castillo. Pain Management Specialist. On January 27. 2009. CSCS International NV (CSCS). Later Dr. declared that respondent's "discogenic pain over the L4-5 area has improved by at least 85% to a pain score of 0-1/10. Rañigo. CRUZ G.

Catindig.00 and upheld the company-designated physician's Grade 8 disability rating on the ground that it was supported by medical findings and was arrived at after close monitoring and treatment of respondent. herein Albano. opined that it would be impossible for respondent to work as a seaman and recommended a disability rating of Grade 3. as such. He stressed that before his embarkation lie was declared fit to work. sickness allowance. our patient falls under 'Moderate rigidity of two thirds loss of motion or lifting power' . Moreover. HELD: Yes. Maine Marine Philippines.180. The LA gave credence to the fact that respondent was medically repatriated and that his "lumbar disc disease (disc desiccation) L4-L5 with mild disc herniation lumbar" was work-related. The CA nullified the NLRC’s decision and decreed that while it is a rule that the company-designated physician is tasked to determine the degree of disability of a seafarer. as confirmed by the company-designated doctor himself. Respondent's physician-of-choice. ISSUE: Whether not respondent is entitled to disability compensation. Dario A. company-designated doctor assessed respondent's disability as Grade 8 only on June 1. Reyes. Santos. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Accordingly. Tecson.Grade (8) eight. This is because after its issuance. The NLRC found respondent entitled to partial and permanent disability compensation of Grade 8 amounting to US$16. 2008. and to continue therapy and medication. Corpuz. Castillo. Similarly. Valiente. Tabugan.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment and 10% thereof as attorney's fees. Valois . Martinez. Lastimosa. De Mesa. it does not fully assess respondent's condition and cannot provide sufficient basis for the award of disability benefits in his favor.00 based on the Grade 3 disability rating given by respondent's physician-of-choice. respondent was still required to return for re-evaluation. Francisco. Corporal. Inguillo. Ramirez. the Court did not give credence to the disability assessment given by the company-designated doctor as the same was merely interim and not definite. De la Cruz. Gloria. 2009.795. Marquez.Respondent argued that he is entitled to disability benefits because of the reasonable connection between his work and his illness. this declaration is an initial determination of respondent's condition for the time being. Page 886 Echiverri. Espina. Carcedo (seafarer therein) still continued to require medical attention. The LA rendered his Decision ordering MMC and CSCS to jointly and severally pay respondent disability compensation amounting to US$39. Alcazaren. Dr. Venancio P. damages and attorney's fees. Rañigo. the LA awarded disability benefits to respondent amounting to US$39. in Carcedo v. Notably. or almost a year after his repatriation on June 19. as such. Asensi.180. Sy. Cabañgon. Garduce. 2008 Report provides: "Interim Disability Grade: If a disability grading will be made today. it can be logically inferred that he acquired his illness while aboard the vessel and by reason of its harsh working environment. Sandoval. Palad. Coronel. He added that he is entitled to disability benefits as he already suffered loss and impairment in his earning capacity. the September 5."Being an interim disability grade. Consequently. respondent filed a Complaint for permanent and total disability benefits. It is only an initial prognosis of the health status of respondent because after its issuance. Inc.

Francisco. Ramirez. 2009. Asensi. the company-designated doctor's interim assessment on September 5. Sy.2008 is a mere initial finding on respondent's condition. Coronel. the opinions of the company-designated physician and of respondent's personal doctor are rendered irrelevant. Thus. the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled. in his complaint respondent prayed for total permanent disability benefits. Tabugan. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Unfortunately. Valiente. on the other hand. On the other hand. As such. almost a year from respondent's repatriation. In case the company-designated doctor failed to issue a declaration within the given periods. Lastimosa. Lumberio. it is undisputed that respondent required medical treatment even after the lapse of 120 days from repatriation. his disability rating given on June 1.00. To recapitulate. Corpuz. Here. De Mesa. Notably. petitioners' contention . Corporal. Rañigo. Agbayani should have made his definite assessment on respondent's condition within the aforesaid 240-day period. Rodriguez. The Court gave emphasis to the finding of the CA that Dr. Dr. The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or to determine his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation.000. 2008. The 120-day period applies if the duration of the seafarer's treatment does not exceed 120 days. 2009 was issued beyond the 240-day period.that the disability compensation in favor of respondent must be based on the disability grading given by the company-designated doctor . By operation of law. respondent is already deemed totally and permanently disabled. Sandoval. Gloria. Moreover. Also. Martinez. Castillo. respondent is deemed permanently and totally disabled and is thus entitled to full disability compensation. Page 887 Echiverri. Santos. Catindig. almost one year from the latter's repatriation. Agbayani failed to timely issue a declaration as he only issued an assessment on respondent's disability on June 1. which entitles him to full disability benefits amounting to US$60. Dr. Agbayani in fact issued his disability rating on June 1. As stated. Tecson. Espina. Marquez. Reyes. the 240-day period applies in case the seafarer requires further medical treatment after the lapse of the initial 120-day period. Valois . by reason of the lapse of the 240-day period.is untenable. Palad. 2009. the medical opinion of his doctor-of-choice was issued only after the filing of the complaint. after the lapse of said period. Albano. De la Cruz. respondent needed further treatment and physical therapy even after the Interim Disability Grade was given by the company-designated doctor on September 5. Inguillo.

However. Palad. 2008. By piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Reyes. Rañigo. 2008. as advised by Teves. Rodriguez. In her reply. Marquez. EMERTIA G. De Mesa. 2008. Corpuz. an inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat the voluntariness of her actions. petitioner admitted having resigned from Mexicali but averred that her resignation was a condition for her promotion as store manager at Mexicali's Alabang Town Center branch. the employee is not afforded any option. again. Sandoval. Ramirez. "In termination cases. Mexicali's training officer. When she refused to sign the letter. Cabañgon. MALIXI vs. no employment contract and ID were issued to her. Espina. she was compelled by Teves to sign an end-of-contract letter by reason of a criminal complaint for sexual harassment she filed on December 3. Sy. Tabugan. Gloria. Corporal. The NLRC ruled that the Appeal Memorandum was filed only on October 26.personally went to the branch and was informed by Luna that it was her last day of work. Jay Teves. Valois . Francisco. Castillo. a franchisee of Mexicali located in Alabang Town Center which is a separate and distinct corporation. Coronel.000. Mexicali's administrative officer. however. Page 888 Echiverri. which is a joint venture between Mexicali and Calexico Food Corporation. she opted to resign on account of a promotion and increased pay. Respondents averred that petitioner has resigned from Mexicali in October 2008 but rather he was an employee of Calexico. Catindig.00 with service charge. John Pontero. It should be emphasized that petitioner had an option to decline the offer for her transfer. De la Cruz. She then submitted a resignation letter dated October 15.R. The Labor Arbiter declared petitioner to have been illegally dismissed by respondents. Tecson. Martinez. Asensi. receiving a daily wage of P382. the Labor Arbiter ruled that Mexicali and Calexico are one and the same with interlocking board of directors. the employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer FACTS: Petitioner alleged on her complaint for illegal dismissal against respondentsthat on August 12. due to her satisfactory performance. 205061. 2009.Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Issuance of TRO/Injunction explaining that the Appeal Memorandum filed by them contained a typographical error. informed her of the management's intention to transfer and appoint her as store manager at a newly opened branch in Alabang Town Center. Lumberio. Alcazaren. in December 2008. 2009 despite respondents' receipt of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on October 13. The NLRC granted respondents' motion and reinstated the appeal. Ding Luna. Lastimosa.Then respondents filed an Appeal Memorandum with Prayer for Injunction with the NLRC which dismissed the appeal for having been filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. On October 17. 2016 DOCTRINE: Expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation of regret in leaving the company negates the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign. she started working as the store manager of Mexicali in Alabang Town Center although. June 08. Santos. Inguillo. In October 2008. she was hired by the latter as a team leader assigned at the delivery service. 2008 against Mexicali's operations manager. In the same vein. No. MEXICALI PHILIPPINES AND/OR FRANCESCA MABANTA G. It partly granted it by sustaining Albano. free meal and side tip. Valiente. She was apprised that her monthly salary as the new store manager would be P15.00 with no employment contract and identification card (ID).

receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period." This procedure is in line with the established rule that if a party has appeared by counsel. Martinez. Rodriguez. Inguillo. II. nevertheless. is the last day to file the appeal. service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. ordered Mexicali. Calexico being the true employer of petitioner at the time of her dismissal. service upon him shall be made upon his counsel. ISSUES: I.Petitionerclaims that she was induced into resigning considering the higher position and attractive salary package. Valois . being the employer of Teves and Luna who caused petitioner's termination from her employment with Calexico. Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Asensi. to reinstate petitioner to her job at Calexico but without paying her any backwages. As mentioned. resolutions. The NLRC. No. No. Section 9. Valiente. 2009. Alcazaren. it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari of the petitioner. The Court finds that there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents as to hold the latter liable for illegal dismissal. Santos." Accordingly. Tabugan. Castillo. II. Before the CA. Sandoval. No employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Mexicali at the time of alleged dismissal.Section 6.From the receipt of the Labor Arbiter's Decision by respondent's counsel on October 15. Consequently. when a party to a suit appears by counsel. Corpuz. De Mesa. Reyes. Marquez. Lumberio. or orders by the counsel or representative of record. Cabañgon. respondents' appeal was timely filed. while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law. the 10thday falls on October 25. Corporal. Petitioner's contention that the reckoning period should be the date respondents actually received the Decision on October 13. Lastimosa. Whether the CA erred in sustaining the NLRC’s decision reinstating the respondent’s appeal despite being filed out of time. Rule III of the NLRC Rules provides that "attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure x x x. Tecson."The purpose of the rule is to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the prosecution of a party's case. Espina. Notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client. hence. Petitioner voluntarily resigned from Mexicali. Whether the CA committed a reversible error in holding that there was no illegal dismissal. 2009 which is a Sunday. Francisco. the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions. Gloria. The appeal before the NLRC was filed on time. 2009. 2009. Monday. Albano. Rule III of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules) expressly mandates that "(f)or purposes of appeal. the 10-day period for filing an appeal with the NLRC should be counted from the receipt by respondents' counsel of a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on October 15. Ramirez. Page 889 Echiverri. HELD: I. petitioner voluntarily resigned from Mexicali to transfer to Calexico in consideration of a higher pay and upon doing so severed her employment ties with Mexicali. Rañigo. Sy.Therefore." Thus. Coronel. Catindig. respondents' contention that Mexicali and Calexico are separate and distinct entities. October 26. De la Cruz. 2009 is bereft of any legal basis. Palad.

Francisco. Sy. In the same vein. by her educational background could not have been coerced. It should be emphasized that petitioner had an option to decline the offer for her transfer. Espina. however. Albano. "In termination cases. and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. she avers that her resignation cannot effectively sever her employment ties with Mexicali. as aptly observed by the CA. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office. Tecson. moreover. The SC disagreed." Here. who. Upon petitioner's resignation. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. Ramirez. petitioner ceased to be an employee of Mexicali and chose to be employed at Calexico. Valois . Gloria. she expressed her gratitude and appreciation for the two months of her employment with Mexicali and intimated that she regrets having to leave the company. the employee is not afforded any option. petitioner tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her transfer to Calexico for a higher position and pay. she opted to resign on account of a promotion and increased pay. Valiente. however. Rañigo. Palad. Coronel. Marquez. in fact. with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Lastimosa. an inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat the voluntariness of her actions. claims that Mexicali and Calexico are one and the same and that Mexicali was still her employer upon her transfer to Calexico since she was hired and dismissed by Mexicali's officers and that Mexicali exercised the power of control over her work performance."Clearly. Alcazaren. intended to sever his or her employment. petitioner is a managerial employee. Catindig. "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Martinez. forced or induced into resigning from her work. Rodriguez. In the said letter. De Mesa. the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she. Clearly. Asensi. Castillo. the employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer x x x. Corpuz. Santos. Corporal. Further. Reyes. Inguillo. De la Cruz. this does not hold true for petitioner in the instant case. Tabugan. Sandoval. Petitioner. Page 890 Echiverri. expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation of regret in leaving the company negate the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign.

A. Inc. It is also settled that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer. 206936 August 3. Espina. Corporal. Section 8 (j) 3 of R. Sy. Corpuz.6 and compel the latter to remit unpaid Social Security System (SSS) premium contributions. Sandoval. as amended. arguing that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that Belizar was employed by it until 1978. Cabañgon. and. 2004. Lumberio. Alcazaren.99. and the procedure of hiring but the nature of the activities performed by the employee. the unremitted SS contributions corresponding to the petitioner’s employment from November 1966 to December 1978 in the amount of P1. Francisco. 1161. Valiente. The Commission ruled that petitioner s liable to pay the SSS. while leaving its employees and government to enjoy the least desirable outcome.R. Catindig. PICOP RESOURCES.373. the SSC found no sufficient evidence to warrant such a finding as both the testimonial and documentary evidence on record preponderates as to show that he was first employed by the respondent only in November 1966. The SSS intervened in the case. FACTS: On October 28. No. only exempts from SS coverage employment which is purely casual in nature and not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer. Coronel. and not all.10. vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and MATEO A BELIZAR G. Castillo. is also the date he was reported to the SSS for coverage by the respondent. Martinez. respondent Mateo A. De Mesa. of choosing the course of action most beneficial to it. Asensi. 110724. Gloria. the length of performance and its continued existence x x x. Belizar filed SSC Case No. 11-15788-04 before the Social Security Commission (SSC). incidentally. And the primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activities performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. in order that he may collect his SSS retirement benefits. and in giving more Albano. Tecson. then the purpose of the law would be defeated. No. found thatBelizar was continuously employed as a preventive maintenance mechanic by petitioner from 1966 to 1978. De la Cruz. SP No. INC. petitioner sought reversal of the above SSC dispositions. It was never the intention of RA 9903 to give the employer the option of remitting and settling only some of its delinquencies. Page 891 Echiverri. Santos. after proceedings. Before the CA and docketed as CA-G. Tabugan. Inguillo. and damages The SSS is directed to immediately process and pay the petitioner’s retirement benefit upon filing of the appropriate claim. of paying the lowest outstanding delinquencies and ignoring the most burdensome.R. Rañigo. Reyes. Ramirez.068. 2016 DOCTRINE: The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Lastimosa. Marquez. to establish his actual period of employment with herein petitioner PICOP Resources. and to some extent. As per the SSC. which. Rodriguez. Palad. Valois . If this were so. Despite the respondent’s claim that he was employed starting 1965. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. t is paramount to clarify that not all casual employment are exempt from SS coverage. the 3% per month penalty imposed thereon for late payment in the amount P17.

De la Cruz. or the total adjudged unremitted/delinquent SSS contributions corresponding to Belizar’s employment from November 1966 to December 1978. – Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS). the employer must pay "all contributions due and payable" to the SSS. may within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act: (a) remit said contributions. In petitioner’s case. (PRI) with SSS ER No. further. De Mesa. Reyes. Castillo. 2013 Certification issued by the SSS Bislig City Branch bears this out: This is to certify that Picop Resources. including those with pending cases either before the Social Security Commission. Alcazaren. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. and chosen courses of action in the case are inconsistent with the concept of condonation mandated by RA 9903. Condonation of Penalty. Corporal. all such pending cases filed against the employer shall be withdrawn without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions or defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved proposal. Valois . In order to avail of the benefits under the said law. Tecson. Inguillo. subject to the implementing rules and regulations which the Social Security Commission may prescribe: Provided. 09-1512165-0 had not filed an Application for Condonation of Penalty Program under R. Sy. its other adjudged liabilities for penalties and damages should be eliminated and condoned as well. Cabañgon. weight to Belizar’s testimonial evidence instead of its documentary evidence. Albano.10. Francisco. . Rañigo. Palad.373. Espina. and not merely a portion thereof. Santos. courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving collection of contributions and/or penalties. 9903 (RA 9903).While petitioner appealed before the CA. and that SSS’s opposition. That upon approval and payment in full or in installments of contributions due and payable to the SSS. HELD: No. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail of the provisions of RA 9903. The February 28. Ramirez. No. petitioner maintained that with its availment of the condonation program under RA 9903 and payment of delinquent and unpaid SSS contributions relative to Belizar’s account within the period allowed by the law and applicable circulars.A. Coronel. Inc. This was supposedly done in availment of Republic Act No. provides: Section 2. RA 9903. Tabugan. Sandoval. Before the SC. Rodriguez. petitioner remitted to the SSS Davao City Branch Office the amount of ₱1. Page 892 Echiverri. it paid only the delinquent contributions corresponding to Belizar’s account. Asensi. or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009. Catindig. Valiente. that since it is now undergoing rehabilitation. Martinez. Lastimosa. RA 9903 should be applied liberally in its case to allow it to fully recover. Gloria. That the delinquent employer submits the corresponding collection lists together with the remittance or proposal to pay installments: Provided. or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009. or (b) submit a proposal to pay the same in installments. Lumberio. Corpuz. intervention.

it cannot avail of the benefits under RA 9903. 2010 for the principal amount of its premium delinquency covering the period from January 1967 to December 1978 in favor of Mateo Belizar in compliance with the resolution of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No. Sy. De Mesa. To repeat. "Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the government’s part. Corporal. the same would be denied considering that the availment of the condonation of penalty program under R. 2009 Resolution. Inguillo. Mateo Belizar. Francisco.’ This is to certify further that PRI had paid Php1. This it failed to do. the employer must a) "remit within the period of the Program the full amount of the delinquent contributions through any SSS Branch with tellering facility or authorized collection agents of the SSS e." It was never the intention of RA 9903 to give the employer the option of remitting and settling only some of its delinquencies." or b) "submit a proposal x within the period of the Program to pay the delinquent contributions in installment to the SSS Branch having jurisdiction over its place of business or household address. For this reason." It would appear from the February 28. Had the PRI applied for condonation of penalties under R. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. If this were so. Gloria. then the purpose of the law would be defeated. Asensi. of choosing the course of action most beneficial to it. it must show that it is qualified to avail of its provisions. 2013 Certification issued by the SSS Bislig City Branch that petitioner failed to pay the full amount of its delinquent contributions. remain unpaid up to present. and for this reason. nor did it submit a proposal to pay the same in installments. petitioner has not placed itself under the coverage of RA 9903. 11-15788-04. payment centers. 11-15788-04 entitled ‘Mateo Belizar vs PRI. Series of 2010. Rañigo. Espina. Reyes.10 on May 24. No. of paying the lowest outstanding delinquencies and ignoring the most burdensome. Valois . banks. while leaving its employees and government to enjoy the least desirable outcome. Sandoval. In order to be covered by the program.g. Albano. 9903 should be for all employees of the delinquent employer.373. Corpuz. their terms are strictly construed against the applicants. Lumberio. The penalties and damages. 2013 SSS Certification is that petitioner did not settle its delinquencies in full. 9903 involving only one employee. Tecson. Well into the present proceedings. De la Cruz. Valiente. 2010-004. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Alcazaren. which provides for the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9903.A. SSS Circular No. Marquez. 9903 or Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 in connection with SSC Case No. however. Page 893 Echiverri. states that "any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of" the condonation program under the law. Catindig.A. Palad. similar to tax amnesty laws. Therefore. Martinez. petitioner has failed to disprove such fact. "The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Tabugan. " If petitioner desires to be covered under RA 9903. Santos. it may not escape payment of its adjudged liabilities under the SSC's February 4. and not all. the clear implication of the February 28. Castillo. Coronel.

Cabañgon. it must therefore answer for its adjudged liabilities as determined by the SSC in its February 4. Page 894 Echiverri. Albano. Marquez. Since this Court has declared that petitioner did not qualify for availment of the provisions of RA 9903. Alcazaren. Corporal. Coronel. these issues have become unessential and irrelevant. Sandoval. Espina. Palad. Valiente. Having gone into the very heart of the case and resolved the main issue that needed to be addressed. Rañigo. Castillo. Reyes. Santos. 2009 Resolution. Valois . on the other hand. Sy. Tecson. the Court finds no need to dwell on the other matters raised by the parties. Catindig. Francisco. Martinez. De la Cruz. Lumberio. De Mesa. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Asensi. Gloria. Tabugan. The resolution thereof cannot alter the inevitable outcome. Ramirez. Inguillo.

On the other hand.R. Lumberio. Valiente. In a notarized letter dated June 6. Tabugan. Coronel. ROGELIO F. former GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. The names of the fictitious CGM employees. Reyes. when he City Government of Manila issued a certification. Garcia found Manalo guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of Albano. 2007 with Serious Dishonesty. September 21. Also. 2006. with a conscious indifference to the consequences. Tecson. He alleged that he had been with the GSIS for 31 years and denied that he was the reason for the anomalous creation of membership records and electronic policies. Rañigo. Marquez. I had checked the specimen signatures of the then endorsing officer and when all the documents were in order. or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act. Computer Operator IV. not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally. Palad. Manalo explained that the “said policy contracts were issued by me because when I processed the applications. Rodriguez. MANALO G. gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Inguillo. As far as I am concerned. 2016 DOCTRINE: “Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence ‘refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care. Valois . In a Decision. In a Memorandum dated May 29. Manalo. Page 895 Echiverri. I caused to be issued (sic) the contract. the prosecution showed that the access/operator code “A6HT” and terminal ID “A8GJ” issued to appellant Manalo were used to create membership records and policy contracts for separated or fictitious employees of CGM which resulted in the grant of several spurious loans. I was just doing my job as stated in the charter of commitment…and doing it in good faith…” Manalo was formally charged on August 29. Catindig.’ It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. Martinez. Castillo. Manalo was directed to submit an explanation under oath why he should not be charged administratively for his role in the creation of spurious membership records and policy contracts. Sandoval.” FACTS: In 2004. No. De Mesa. Santos. Alcazaren. Sy. an audit examination found that on several occasions in July 2004. Espina. Corporal. In cases involving public officials. Francisco. Manalo was the only witness for his defense. 2006. Rogelio F. insofar as other persons may be affected. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. specimen signatures of the individuals who purportedly endorsed the membership applications were not found in the list of authorized endorsing officials and have never been employed of the City Government of Manila. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. Asensi. Grave Misconduct and Gross Neglect of Duty. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was assigned as membership processor at the Membership Department I (Manila) where his main duty was to process membership applications and was assigned computer access/operator code “A6HT” and terminal ID “A8GJ. Corpuz. Gloria. Lastimosa. Manalo’s operator code and terminal ID was used in creating the membership records and policies of fictitious and terminated employees of the City Government of Manila (CGM) which granted loans because of their membership records and policies. 208979. During the hearing of the case. Ramirez.”Sometime in 2005. do not belong to any of the employees of the said agency.

The GSIS found respondent guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct. Marquez. or betray. disposition to defraud. forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service. No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of corruption. Tabugan. deceive. Rañigo. Sy. probity or integrity in principle. or flagrant disregard of established rules. Castillo. Martinez. unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. the elements of corruption. eligibility. deceive. or clear intent to violate the law.165. Coronel. the former foundthat petitioner’s misconduct cannot be characterized as grave. Francisco. Tecson. or failure to discharge the duties of the office. and not trifling. important. or flagrant disregard of established rule. Misconduct. Reyes. Finally. Gloria. Corpuz. or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. Section 46(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. clear intent to violate the law. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct. cheat. HELD: For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the creation of 17 anomalous policy records which were in turn used to defraud GSIS of P621. The CA issued the assailed Decision which partially granted respondent’s petition and ruled that while the latter committed misconduct in his duties as computer operator/membership processor.00. momentous. weighty. Valois . To warrant dismissal from the service. or by conscious indifference to the consequences. Santos. Respondent filed a Petition for Review before the CA contesting the CSC’s findings and insisting he is innocent. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in partially granting the respondent’s petition on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support the existence of the elements of corruption or clear intent to violate the law. must be manifest in the former. De Mesa. lack of integrity. Albano. Inguillo. serious. unworthiness. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care. that must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave. Lastimosa. more particularly. the misconduct must be grave. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful. Asensi. intentional neglect. or defraud. Espina. Corporal. Cabañgon. Palad. De la Cruz. Sandoval. lack of fairness and straightforwardness. As compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. on the other hand. Rodriguez. Catindig. lack of honesty. respondent is guilty not of grave misconduct or dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie. Valiente. but gross neglect of duty which is punished with dismissal under Rule 10. Page 896 Echiverri. The Civil Service Commissionaffirmed respondent’s dismissal from the GSIS. is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. Lumberio.

De Mesa. Asensi. Coronel. Sandoval. Catindig. and Serious Dishonesty are grave offenses which merit the penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense. Tabugan. Under the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected. Needless to say. Marquez. by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act. De la Cruz. Page 897 Echiverri. Corporal. Gross Neglect of Duty. Francisco. Valiente. Reyes. Martinez. Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence that is characterized by glaring want of care. Inguillo. Tecson. Rodriguez. there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. In cases involving public officials. (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality. and (d) bar from taking civil service examination. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. except accrued leave credits. including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Gloria. Alcazaren. Palad. Albano. if any. Valois . Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect as both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to the latter's business. Espina. Corollary thereto. Castillo. Rañigo. Corpuz. these constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as they violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. Grave Misconduct. Cabañgon. (b) forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. Sy. such penalty carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility. not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally. Ramirez. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Santos.

Valiente. MOUNTAIN SUITE BUSINESS APARTELLE. The National Labor Relations Commission issued its Resolution finding Laarne's dismissal illegal. 2005 in the presence of Sales Manager of Pepsi. 2005 when the establishments became fully operational. 2006 on the ground of loss of trust and confidence which prompted her to file an Amended Complaint for illegal dismissal. the Manager of the Restobar and the Apartelle. Leo Y. Catindig. Reyes. On January 12. She insisted that Leo authorized her to sign the contract with Pepsi on October 24. and the Mountain Suite Business Apartelle (Apartelle) with a salary of P15. Corpuz. 2008 NLRC Resolution which was granted and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. the Apartelle. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. and/or Amelia Y. Tabugan. 2005. Corporal. et. De Mesa. Inguillo.00. No. Leo. FACTS: On 2 January 2002.000. Sy. Bensing. The Court of Appeals reiterated that she was illegally dismissed. LUA AND AMELIA LUA vs. It also appointed her as Administrative Officer/Human Resource Head of Leo's Restaurant and Bar Cafe (Restobar). Castillo.000. Marquez. Kimwa Construction & Development Corporation (Kimwa) employed Laarne C. moved for a reconsideration of the November 28. ISSUE: Whether or not there is valid dismissal of Laarne C. Lua. non-payment of 13th month pay. Rodriguez. and attorney's fees against Kimwa. She is further requested in another Memorandum to answer the following charges: (1) she committed dishonesty when she charged to the Restobar's account 50% of the food she ordered therefrom without approval of its Owner or Manager. or caprices of the employer. Lua. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on mere suspicion. It must be pursuant to a breach done willfully. LEO Y. Gloria. Palad. 2006. Martinez. BENSING G. Cabañgon. to pay her separation pay amounting to P15. Lastimosa. Bensing as liaison officer. illegal suspension. she stated that she did not receive personal benefits arising from the contract. Jovenal Ablanque which she he signed the contract the following day. Albano. separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. moral and exemplary damages. Rañigo. Francisco.00 per month on July 4. Lumberio. LEO'S RESTAURANT AND BAR CAF&EACUTE. She further stated that Restobar received only 10 and additional 20 cases of Pepsi drinks which Pepsi’s Settlement and Credit Manager Jerome T. issued a Memorandum requesting her to temporarily report at Kimwa's Main Office starting December 30. Coronel. Al. LAARNE C. In her Explanation. Kimwa. the Restobar. Alcazaren. Page 898 Echiverri. Leo terminated her effective January 15. but Kimwa. 2016 DOCTRINE: Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal is never intended for abuse by reason of its subjective nature. (2) she violated her duties when she did not inform Leo of the signing of the Pepsi contract. Valois . The said appointment took effect on October 18. Tecson.R. Sandoval. Ramirez. et al. Santos. De la Cruz. and (3) she failed to account for 47 soft drinks cases that Pepsi gave the Restobar. Espina. Asensi. 208535 October 19. whims. knowingly and purposely without any valid excuse. 2005. Eslabon certified in a letter.

Cabañgon. To temper such right to dismiss. Lumberio.al. two requisites must concur: (a) the concerned employee must be holding a position of trust. knowingly and purposely without any valid excuse. Santos. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be pursuant to a breach done willfully. Rañigo. De Mesa. Laarne C. Tabugan. which include willful breach of trust and confidence reposed on him or her by the employer. Marquez. "loss of confidence should not be simulated. In fine. Palad. it is the employer who has the burden to show that the dismissal of the employee is for a just cause. Inguillo. Sandoval. and to reconcile it with the employee's security of tenure. failed to prove that their loss of trust on her was founded on clearly established facts. Moreover. HELD: An employer has the right to dismiss an employee for just causes. Valiente. Albano. Asensi. Bensing is shown to occupy a position of trust as her managerial work was directly related to management policies. Castillo. Rodriguez. Page 899 Echiverri. Corpuz. Reyes. Nonetheless. Tecson. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal is never intended for abuse by reason of its subjective nature. Martinez. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper. Gloria. Catindig. and only after observance of due process of law. Corporal. Sy. and. Francisco. the second requirement is wanting since Kimwa. Alcazaren. and generally required exercise of discretion and independent judgment. It must be genuine. (b) the loss of trust must be based on willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts. illegal. Lastimosa." As far as the first requisite is concerned. not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on mere suspicion. to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. et. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Espina. Such determination of just cause must also be made with fairness. whims. Coronel. in good faith. or unjustified. or caprices of the employer. Valois .

Labor Arbiter Jose G. or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. particularly when the following conditions are applicable: 1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person. Gloria. Ltd. 2005. Palad. In this case. It ruled that there is work connection between the complainant's aggravation of his illness and his work. Alcazaren. the amount must constitute a reasonable settlement equivalent to the full measure of their legal rights. Mykonos. food allowance. he underwent a pre-employment medical examination on March 22. He was declared fit for duty and required to take maintenance medication. Hernandez has been working continuously for Mykonos Shipping Co. Inguillo. INC. one important factor that must be taken into account is the consideration accepted by respondents. Sy. In a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Martinez.00. Castillo. The National Labor Relations Commission granted the appeal of Juan. When his contract expired. he was once more engaged to work as Chief Cook aboard the vessel M/V Nikomarin. Thereafter. Juan signed a Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment (All Without Prejudice to the Pending Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals). but the latter refused to pay. HERNANDEZ vs. the Quitclaims signed by the respondents do not appear to have been made for valuable consideration FACTS: Juan B. 2016 DOCTRINE: As a rule. and long service bonus. AND ELEAZAR DIAZ G. Crossworld Marine Services. Crossworld and Eleazar paid the P2. De la Cruz.. LTD.. This latest employment was for a period of nine months. damages. leave pay. MYKONOS SHIPPING CO. Coronel. 2012. he filed a claim for disability benefits. plus fixed overtime pay. they deferred his employment on account of his state of health. Corporal. he was repatriated on December 19. the said court annulled and set aside the NLRC decision. and Affidavit . Marquez. Sandoval. De Vera dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Corpuz. under different employment contracts covering the latter's several oceangoing vessels. Lastimosa. he consulted two separate physicians who turned out the same diagnosis and declared him unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as seaman. and attorney's fees against them before the Labor Arbiter. quitclaims and waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor and frowned upon as contrary to public policy. Page 900 Echiverri. Catindig. Tabugan. JUAN B. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES.766.. Santos. and Eleazar Diaz - Crossworld's President/Chief Executive Officer . Receipt of Payment. He demanded compensation by way of disability benefits and medical expenses from them.. Under a new contract. They are thus ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of a worker's legal rights. In 2011. 209098 November 14. On 8 April 2011. Espina. Rodriguez. with a monthly salary ofUS$587. Francisco. On 7 October 2008. 2010 wherein he was found to be suffering from hypertension and diabetes mellitus.00 judgment award on July 17. Valois .702.R. In return. however. Lumberio. (Mykonos). De Mesa. He later filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that the Petition for Certiorari has been rendered moot and academic by their satisfaction of the Albano. Rañigo. No. (Crossworld). Valiente. Reyes. his service was extended for an additional five months.which were duly filed with the NLRC and CA. To determine whether the Quitclaims signed by respondents are valid. 2009. medical expenses. Asensi. Cabañgon.since November 14. allowances. Inc. Tecson. Ramirez.

Coronel.. . Crossworld Marine Services. Albano. "the execution of the documents cannot be tolerated as it amounts to a deceptive scheme to unconditionally absolve employers from every liability. Corporal. Rodriguez. Ramirez. and Eleazar Diaz to Juan B.. judgment in full. Corpuz. v. To determine whether the Quitclaims signed by respondents are valid.. Francisco. To borrow from a fairly recent ruling of the Court. Rañigo. dangling the check as bait. they had to find a way to tie Juan B. Crossworld Marine Services. NLRC. Lumberio.. the Quitclaims signed by the Mykonos Shipping Co. or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. and Eleazar could have simply paid the judgment award without attaching conditions that have far-reaching consequences other than those intended by a simple compliance with what was required under the circumstances . Asensi. Inguillo. one important factor that must be taken into account is the consideration accepted by respondents. Tecson. Cabañgon. Inc. Espina. Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers legal rights. Gloria. In this case. Ltd. The CA denied the same so a Petition for Certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court.. Inc. and Eleazar Diaz do not appear to have been made for valuable consideration Mykonos. the mandatory execution proceedings following a favorable judgment allowed under the Labor Code. Catindig. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Martinez. De la Cruz. HELD: In More Maritime Agencies. Sandoval. Palad. De Mesa. Inc.. Valiente. the amount must constitute a reasonable settlement equivalent to the full measure of their legal rights. so to speak. Santos. Reyes. ISSUE: Whether or not the voluntary payment of the judgment award by Mykonos Shipping Co. Hernandez resulted in the full and final satisfaction of the judgment. Marquez. Hernandez’s hands permanently. But they did not. Castillo. Page 901 Echiverri. Sy. Valois . Ltd. Crossworld. particularly when the following conditions are applicable: 1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person. the Court ruled that: The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled.that is.

Valois . respectively. Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of lipids [cholesterol triglycerides. Page 902 Echiverri. Martinez. Inc. Thus. Jesus B. No. Villamor is entitled to his claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. the Court affirmed the claimant's entitlement to compensation as both essential hypertension and stroke are considered occupational diseases. he filed before SSS Pasig City Branch. (VVCCI). Corporal. The Court ruled that: Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. De Mesa. Baul whether the claimant who was diagnosed with essential hypertension later suffered a stroke. Alcazaren. Infarct Hypertension. or both] carried by lipoproteins in the blood). HELD: In Government Service Insurance System v. as amended. Espina.626. No. was employed by Valle Verde Country Club. Tabugan. Coronel.D.D. Sy. of Annex 'A' of the Implementing Rules of P. Valiente. Inguillo. Palad. Corpuz. Castillo. Tecson. due to dizziness associated with numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G. Upon further evaluation by SSS-Medical Operations Department. claims for sickness benefits under the SSS law and the EC TTD benefits under the EC law for his CVD or stroke.626. Reyes. SSS Pasig Branch granted his claim for sickness benefits under the SSS law. VILLAMOR vs. Manila. he was discharged from the said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1. he was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. Santos. as amended. On 3 November 2006. On 9 March 2007. Ramirez. Francisco. it denied the claim for lack of a causal relationship between his job as clerk and illness. Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal Ganglia. Villamor with Social Security System No. Lastimosa. Thus. Cabañgon. Catindig. 03-4047063-3. it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute. JESUS B.R. After more than a week of confinement. Rodriguez. The open-ended Table of Occupational Albano. 626. It also noted that his smoking history. Sandoval. as amended. ISSUE: Whether or not Jesus B. Lumberio. Both his appeal and motion for reconsideration was denied by the Employees' Compensation Commission which the Court of Appeals affirmed. 19 and 29. Rañigo. FACTS: In 1978. 2016 DOCTRINE: Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. No. Marquez. Asensi. 204422 November 21. respectively. and poor compliance with anti-hypertensive medication increased his risk of developing his illness. De la Cruz. Gloria. it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. but denied his claim for EC TTD benefits on the ground that there is no causal relationship between his illness and his working conditions. alcoholic beverage drinking habit. of Annex 'A' of the Implementing Rules of P. 19 and 29.

Chest X-Ray Result. Valois . However. Palad. smoking and drinking are undeniably among these causes. Lastimosa. paralysis of the left side of his body. (c) blood chemistry report. by themselves. As to the findings of respondents SSS and ECC that he is a chronic smoker and drinker. Catindig. we fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinking on compensability issues. Ramirez. He was also able to show that his work and position in the union caused him physical and mental strain as he had to deal with the demands of various types of people. Martinez. Lumberio. In Government Service Insurance System v. (d) funduscopy report. to be non-compensable. However. Castillo. eyes and brain. even on diseases that are listed as occupational in character. Francisco. For this reason. Coronel. (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack. Tecson. caused cerebral infarctions. Santos. Corporal. Sandoval. which affected his brain. there is a probability that his work and position in the union increased his risk of suffering a stroke. The ruling raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking. are factors that can bar compensability. provided that. and (e) c-T scan. both are qualified occupational diseases. Gloria. the Court finds that it should not bar him claim for compensation. they are not the sole causes of CAD and hypertension and. a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Corpuz. Diseases requires no proof of causation. and Electrocardiogram Result. In short. Villamor is entitled to compensation for his illness. De Mesa. Inguillo. of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event. Asensi. not under the circumstances of the present case. the Court finds that Jesus B. In general. heart. Cabañgon. Tabugan. the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history. Rodriguez. Rañigo. although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases. and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. and loss of muscular coordination. otherwise listed as occupational. Espina. as evidenced by his medical reports: Cranial CT Scan. the Court said that: We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castro's ailments. Taking the cue from the Baul case. To be sure. or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry. essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys. their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report. Page 903 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Sy. Reyes. Valiente. Just like in Baul. Albano. difficulty in speaking. at least. resulting in permanent disability. For cerebro-vascular accident. whether or not such findings are true. (b) ECG report. he was diagnosed with hypertension and stroke. Thus. Alcazaren. the causes of CAD and hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied. Laboratory or Blood Chemistry Result. On the other hand. which should be proved. De Castro. Marquez.

Espina. On 28 July 2010. BERNARDINO G. regarding a message she posted on her Facebook account referring to company concerns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and insulting statements against a co-worker. Bantegui. Catindig. Martinez. 2004 up to March 2006. Marquez. Loss of confidence must not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper. INC. GRANDEA vs. A Memorandum was served to her the next day requiring her to submit a written explanation and attend an administrative hearing on August 2. JR. Coronel. Castillo. 2010 to August 6. wrote a reply-letter arguing that she was already constructively dismissed even prior to her receipt of the Notice to Explain when certain security procedures were directed exclusively against her. all network and internet connections in the Accounting Department were removed and disabled. it must be substantial and founded on clearly established facts. 2010. The Labor Arbiter ruled that she was not constructively dismissed. She was preventively suspended for seven days effective July 29. SIMBILLO G. Sy. she filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal. 13th month pay. De la Cruz. Simbillo worked at Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines. 2010. 2016 DOCTRINE: For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal. Reyes. not a mere afterthought. Corporal. In April 2008. Grandea. Interadent sought a company-wide implementation of security measures such as body frisking and bag/personal items inspection of all employees upon ingress and egress of office. Page 904 Echiverri. illegal or unjustified. FACTS: Rebecca F. Tabugan. because she failed to prove her claim of discrimination. No. to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. she was rehired as Accounting Manager and subsequently promote to Finance and Accounting manager on April 16. REBECCA F. Tecson. Jr. On the other hand. Interadent issued a Second Notice informing her termination from service effective August 25. Francisco.R. 207315 November 23. Valiente. 2010. illegal suspension. 2010. INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PHILIPPINES. disconnection of all USB ports and prohibition of cellular phone usage due to an alleged leakage of security information uncovered by the external auditors. Rebecca through her counsel. On 23 July 2010. Inguillo. On 24 August 2010. Rodriguez. She asserts that her dismissal was without just cause or compliance with procedural due process since the alleged loss of trust and confidence was based on self-serving allegations and mere speculation. Corpuz. non-payment of service incentive leave pay. AND SONIA J. Palad. upon the directive of Bernardino G. 2010. claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Interadent. She was also elected by the Board of Director as Treasurer on March 31. 2010 on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Bernardino and Sonia J. Lumberio. BANTEGUI. Valois . She filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was granted. Such ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. Inc. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Albano. Lastimosa. Her suspension was extended up to August 25. it must be genuine. De Mesa. Interdadent insisted that she was terminated for a valid and just cause and with compliance with procedural due process.. Sandoval. Asensi. Alcazaren.. Rebecca’s e-mail account was likewise suspended. (Interadent) as a rank-and-file employee from May 2. On 9 August 2010. Santos. On the following day. Rañigo. Gloria.

Martinez. Because of its subjective nature. In this case. Coronel. Sandoval. Inguillo. Castillo. it must be genuine. Asensi. Valiente. Corpuz. If indeed Rebecca has been found guilty for not being trustworthy due to an incident that happened in July 2009 as alleged by them. Rañigo. she should not have been promoted to a higher position as Finance and Accounting Manager in April 2010 and elected as Treasurer in March 2010. Their contention that her second offense of divulging confidential company information merits her termination deserves scant consideration. However. Lastimosa. Simbillo was her Facebook post which supposedly suggests that Interadent was being "feasted on" by the BIR and also contains insulting statements against a co-worker and hence has compromised the reputation of the company. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Francisco. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal. According to them. Simbillo is valid. there was no concrete proof that she had a past infraction involving disclosure of confidential information of the company. this Court has been very scrutinizing in cases of dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence because the same can easily be concocted by an abusive employer. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. the act alleged to have caused the loss of trust and confidence of Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines. Moreover. Loss of confidence must not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper. Albano. Page 905 Echiverri. Alcazaren. Espina. No company information or corporate record was divulged by Rebecca.40 which is an indication of her high performance rating. she was given salary and merit increases for the period covering June 2009-May 2010. it must be substantial and founded on clearly established facts. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Rebecca F. Otherwise stated. Tecson. Valois . Catindig. not a mere afterthought. in Rebecca F. we agree with the CA's observation that the Facebook entry did not contain any corporate record or any confidential information. Santos. Ramirez. there was really no actual leakage of information. Sy. illegal or unjustified. Corporal. Gloria. to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. there was disclosure of confidential information that gives the impression that Interadent is under investigation by the BIR for irregular transactions. Marquez. Tabugan. Lumberio. HELD: It bears emphasizing that the right of an employer to dismiss its employees on the ground of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily. Other than Interadent’s self-serving allegations. Palad. Reyes.

failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory FACTS: Gem Zeñarosa hired Feliciano Z. Gem asked Feliciano to sign a piece of paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from him. failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. Francisco. service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against Turks Shawarma/Gem Zeñarosa on April 15. Turks and Gem denied their dismissal. No. FELICIANO Z. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied so he filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed." The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional. Castillo. De la Cruz. The motion to reduce bond was denied stating financial difficulties may not be invoked as a valid ground to reduce bond. Corpuz. had an altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana while at work. PAJARON AND LARRY A. Ramirez. He was immediately dismissed from service by Gem. Marquez. TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA vs. and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention. Palad. Alcazaren. Corporal.R. on the other hand. Catindig. The Labor Arbiter found credible Feliciano and Larry's version and held them constructively and illegally dismissed. Larry. CARBONILLA G. Page 906 Echiverri. Martinez. Rodriguez. holiday premium. Cabañgon. Both complaints were consolidated. This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal "is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case. 2010. They averred that they actually abandoned their work. Turks and Gem appeal was thus dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. Pajaron in May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Valiente. He was also asked by Gem to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his debt amounting to P7. Sandoval. Asensi. Gem himself filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC.00. HELD: "It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement. On 9 April 2010. Coronel.27. Carbonilla in April 2007 as head crew for Turks Shawarma. De Mesa. He refused to sign the paper so Gem fired him from work. Lastimosa. the Albano. 2017 DOCTRINE: The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional. Inguillo. 207156 January 16. rest day premium. ISSUE: Whether or not the payment of bond is necessary in the perfection of appeal. Reyes. Valois . Espina. Sy. holiday pay. non-payment of overtime pay.000. Rañigo. Tabugan.000. Lumberio. Santos.00 is not reasonable in relation to the award which totalled to P197. Gloria. The partial bond in the amount of P15.936. Tecson. Both claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal so they filed their respective complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal. Due to alleged non-availability of counsel.

appellant must pay only a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. Martinez. Applying this parameter. Tecson." However. Lastimosa. De la Cruz." In the case of McBurnie v. Lumberio. under Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure.000. the appellant has the option to post either a cash or surety bond.000. Palad. De Mesa. Turks Shawarma and Gem Zeñarosa filed a Motion to Reduce Bond together with their Notice of Appeal and posted a cash bond ofP15. the Court. The NLRC correctly held that the supposed ground cited in the motion is not well-taken tor there was no evidence to prove Gem's claim that the payment of the full amount of the award would greatly affect his business due to financial setbacks. Besides.936.00 partial bond posted by Gem is not considered reasonable in relation to the total monetary award of P197. Valois . Corpuz. the P15. Catindig. The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to reduce bond as such motion was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable grounds and the amount tendered is not reasonable in relation to the award. Francisco. Tabugan. Sy. Castillo. Marquez. Rodriguez. Asensi. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. subject to the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds.00 within the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. Espina. Reyes. monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal and is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the employees. Valiente. Compliance with these two conditions will stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. Ramirez. Albano. Coronel. the reduction of the appeal bond is allowed.27. Rañigo. Sandoval. Only after the posting of this required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect an appeal be suspended. In the latter case. Page 907 Echiverri. Thus. "the law does not require outright payment of the total monetary award. Ganzon. Corporal. and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant. the Court has set a provisional percentage of 10% of the monetary award (exclusive of damages and attorney's fees) as reasonable amount of bond that an appellant should post pending resolution by the NLRC of a motion for a bond's reduction. Gloria. in special and justified circumstances. has relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on technical considerations to give way to equity and justice. In the case at bar. Santos. Inguillo.

Tecson. Sy. The latter ruled against Sta.3 Million. Lumberio. In a memorandum. Rodriguez. Ana that the filing of criminal cases by MJCI resulted to their lost of trust and confidence. As a result. and must not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. INC. ANA vs. 2017 DOCTRINE: In this regard. Lastimosa. G. Santos. Ana guilty of conspiring to defraud.R. It is a cardinal rule that loss of trust and confidence should be genuine. After an investigation of which she was notified. Martinez. Sta. there must be actual breach of duty on the part of the employee to justify his or her dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence HELD: Albano. Valiente. Francisco. Ramirez. Coronel. In fine. STA. and the latter's participation makes him or her totally unworthy of the trust demanded by the position. Manila. it must arise from dishonest or deceitful conduct. The Special Disciplinary Committee formally charged Sta. she was further informed of her suspension for 30 days without pay. Corpuz. or has been routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. ISSUE: Whether Sta. Gloria. Alcazaren. Marquez. Sandoval. and cause irreparable damage to MJCI. Because horse racing was not on a daily basis. Corporal. 208459February 15. During the audit. Catindig. and not simulated. While proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. there was an unaccounted check remittances amounting to 44. Ana and the filing of criminal cases for qualified theft and other appropriate charges. Palad. and c) such loss of trust relates to the employee's performance of duties. De Mesa. a domestic corporation with legislative franchise to operate horse race betting. Sta. Asensi. SDC recommended the dismissal of Sta. That she committed gross inexcusable negligence for failure to perform her duties and protect the interest of MJCI. the Treasury Department discovered that she was illegally appropriating funds and lending it out to employees. MJCI immediately issue Notice of Termination. Ana as outlet teller of its off-track betting station in Tayuman. Sta. Ana filed before the Labor Arbiter illegal dismissal. Page 908 Echiverri. MJCI required its employees to report if they have obtained a loan. NLRC and Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of lower court. De la Cruz. Tabugan. Valois . Inguillo. During the hearing conducted by SDC and submission of affidavits. loss of trust must have some basis or such reasonable ground for one to believe that the employee committed the infraction. Reyes. they found Sta. to legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust. Ana's work schedule was reduced. Espina. hired Julieta B. Castillo. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB. No. Ana with Dishonesty and Other Fraudulent Acts. Cabañgon. Rañigo. the employer must establish that a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence. FACTS: MJCI. illegally take funds. JULIETA B. b) the employee committed a wilful breach of trust based on clearly established facts.

Palad. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Ana was illegally dismissed from work. Complementary to such right is the burden of the employer to prove that the employee's dismissal is for a just cause. Cabañgon. Later. In this case. Marquez. Sandoval. Santos. Gloria. Martinez. Coronel. and the latter's participation makes him or her totally unworthy of the trust demanded by the position. Valiente. Reyes. it must arise from dishonest or deceitful conduct. No. Rodriguez. Ana derived capital from the bank loans she obtained secured by real estate mortgage on her property and from the income of her fishing business. The High Court reversed the ruling of the lower court. Sta. Sta. Albano. De Mesa. her fishing vessels were sold and the proceeds thereof were infused as additional capital in her lending business. and not simulated. Simply put. loss of trust must have some basis or such reasonable ground for one to believe that the employee committed the infraction. Espina. Francisco. It is a cardinal rule that loss of trust and confidence should be genuine. Asensi. Page 909 Echiverri. Corporal. Valois . Ana's business and the alleged stolen funds of MJCI. The employer has to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was breach of the trust given. and. and the employer afforded the latter due process before termination. Tabugan. Castillo. Therefore. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Corpuz. she had funds derived from sources other than her monthly salary. Catindig. which include willful breach of trust and confidence. It is settled that the employer has the right to dismiss an employee for just causes. and must not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. While proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Tecson. Sy. Ramirez. Lumberio. Inguillo. there was no direct linkage shown between Sta.

he employed him as building maintenance or electrician with a salary of ₱500. thereafter he was no longer admitted back to work. which constitutes neglect of duty. Reyes. He was assigned at Marswin 's warehouse in Valenzuela. Cabañgon. illegal. FACTS: Brown filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. there was no showing that Brown committed abandonment. Castillo. However. Albano. De Mesa. where there is no clear and valid cause for termination. Here. the failure of the employer to discharge such burden would mean that the dismissal is unjustified and thus. Brown alleged that in 2009. Brown further averred that on May 28. he was no longer admitted back to work. that the dismissal was legal. 206891 15 MARCH 2017 DOCTRINE: In dismissal cases. INC. NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in reversing the ruling of the NLRC HELD: No. Alcazaren. No. Francisco. Resultantly. Thereafter. represented by BERNADETTE S. In order for the employer to discharge its burden to prove that the employee committed abandonment. the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee was not terminated. Sandoval. and is a just cause for dismissal. Catindig. Palad. Tabugan. non-payment of salary and 13th month pay as well as damages against its employer. his employer informed him that it was already his last day of work. and was tasked to maintain its sanitation and make necessary electrical repairs thereon. AZUCENA G. The Labor Arbiter declared that Brown was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement. Rodriguez. and was told that it was already his last day of work. Lastimosa. he insisted that he was terminated without due process of law. ERNESTO BROWNvsMARSWIN* MARKETING. Allegedly. This is because abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly presumed from indefinite acts. and 2) had a dear intention to discontinue his or her employment. Corpuz. 20l0. Asensi. he was made to sign a document that he did not understand and. Martinez. Espina. he reported at the Main Office of Marswin. and SANY** TAN. Sy. Instead. The employer cannot simply discharge such burden by its plain assertion that it did not dismiss the employee. 2010. Ramirez. Gloria. CA decreed that this case did not involve the dismissal of an employee on the ground of abandonment. or if dismissed. evidenced proved that he was illegally dismissed from work. and it is highly absurd if the employer will escape liability by its mere claim that the employee abandoned his or her work. Valois . the law treats it as a case of illegal dismissal. Page 910 Echiverri.. Inguillo. Rañigo. Clearly. Thus. De la Cruz. Marquez. Tecson. Brown contends that on May 28.00 per day. Santos.R. In fine. Lumberio. Corporal. Coronel. the employer must prove that the employee 1) failed to report for work or had been absent without valid reason. The second requirement must be manifested by overt ads and is more determinative in concluding that the employee is guilty of abandonment. there being no evidence proving that Brown was actually dismissed. Valiente.

or when after the lapse of the said period. Dr. Corpuz. TSM SIDPPING PHILS. Coronel. 2010. No. Corporal. within the 240-day period. Espina. Catindig. Dr. Reyes. Valiente. Alcazaren. Respondent asked for a permanent total disability benefit before the Labor Arbiter. Gloria. and/or DAlVIPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN A/S. PATIÑO G. NLRC reversed and ruled that an illness which lasted for more than 120 days does not necessarily mean that a seafarer is entitled to full disability benefits. Turkey. He was brought to a medical facility in Istanbul. Palad. Cruz. who assessed him to have permanent disability unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman. while working on board the vessel. rendered an interim assessment of respondent's disability under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration .Escutin). the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician. within the 240-day period. Page 911 Echiverri. Court of Appeals affirmed. Francisco. Cruz. where X-ray showed a fracture on his 5th metacarpal bone. Marquez. Respondent was also referred to an orthopedic surgeon who recommended surgical operation to correct the malunited fractured metacarpal bone. The Court ruled that respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability compensation. Lumberio. declares it to be so. Asensi. he fails to make such declaration. 2010. Rodriguez. Upon arrival in Manila on May 24. FACTS: Based on a contract of employment. Lastimosa. Ramirez. on August 17. Dr.Standard Employment Contract at Grade 10.. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the total and permanent disability benefit HELD: No. On appeal. Respondent underwent Open Reduction and Internal Fixation of the fractured 5th metacarpal bone at Manila Doctors Hospital. the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician. Martinez. Respondent is thus entitled to the amount corresponding to Grade 10 based on the certification issued by Dr. Inguillo. Cabañgon. INC. therapy. and/or CAPT. Tabugan. De Mesa. petitioners referred respondent to the company-designated physician. declares it to be so. 2010. On May 20. and follow-up examinations. respondent injured his right hand while securing a mooring rope. Tecson. The filing of his complaint is premature and in breach of his contractual obligation with the petitioners.NicanorEscutin (Dr. Labor Arbiter granted. Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter he was repatriated. Castillo. De la Cruz. Santos.On November 19.R. Rañigo. CASTILLO vs LOUIE L. respondent consulted Dr. Albano. and that the company-designated physician's partial disability grading is still binding and controlling.After extensive medical treatments. or loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the finger of one hand. To stress. respondent will work for 6 months for the vessel Nord Nightingale. Valois . Cruz for further treatment. Cruz's Grade 10 disability rating prevails for failure to properly dispute it in accordance with an agreed procedure. 210289 20 MARCH 2017 DOCTRINE: To stress. 2010. Sandoval. Sy.

Marquez. Clearly. Alcazaren. Francisco. De Mesa. Asensi. Valois . Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Cruz then rendered on September 29. Inguillo. respondent was issued a Grade 10 disability rating which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability under the POEA-SEC. 2010. this assessment was made within the 240-day period. Rañigo. Cruz. he fails to make such declaration. Counting from the date of repatriation on May 24. Reyes. before the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired. After the initial interim assessment of Dr. Martinez. De la Cruz. Catindig. 2010 a final assessment of Grade 10 upon reaching the maximum medical cure. Valiente. or when after the lapse of the said period. Gloria. Albano. Santos. Corpuz. Page 912 Echiverri. Corporal. respondent continued with his medical treatment. Sy. Castillo. Dr. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Lumberio. Coronel. Sandoval. 2010 up to September 29. Tabugan. Espina. Palad. Tecson.

qualify them as regular employees. Per respondents.R. In fact. De Mesa. Marquez. Lastimosa. Palad. The repeated and successive rehiring of respondents as project-based employees does not by and of itself. Espina. petitioners argued that respondents were its project-based employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for which they were hired had already been completed. NLRC and Court of appeals also find them as project employees. Castillo. helper among others. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Asensi. Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and ruled that they were project employees and was validly terminated. with its completion having been determined at the time of their engagement. if they were indeed project employees. The respondents were its employees occupying various positions such as welder. Danilo Oliveros G. Page 913 Echiverri. Francisco. Inguillo. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Case law states that length of service through rehiring is not the controlling in the employment tenure of project-based employees but. It was alleged also that petitioners made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period ranging from one to four months to make it appear that they were project-based employees. Tabugan. Sy. Catindig. HERMA SHIPYARD vs. Reyes. petitioners should have reported to the Department of Labor and Employment the completion of such project. Gloria. Martinez. Respondents alleged that they are Herma Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary and desirable in its business. pipe fitter. petitioners dismissed them from employment. For their defense. But petitioners have never submitted such report to the DOLE. Valois . whether the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking. The respondents filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch III a Complaint for illegal dismissalagainst petitioners. No. Tecson. Cabañgon. 208936 17 April 2017 DOCTRINE: A project employee under Article 294 of the Labor Code is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking. On various dates. Lumberio. Santos. Sandoval. the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents herein are project employees Albano. but in truth there was never a time when they ceased working for Herma Shipyard due to expiration of project-based employment contracts. De la Cruz. however. petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat their right to security of tenure. Valiente. as earlier mentioned. Corpuz. laborer. FACTS: Herma Shipyard a domestic corporation engaged in the business of shipbuilding and repair. leadman. Coronel. Corporal.

Castillo. Inguillo. Rañigo. Sandoval. it is clear that Herma Shipyard only hires workers when it has existing contracts for shipbuilding and repair. De la Cruz. Palad. Marquez. Espina. Valois . as distinguished from regular employees. Catindig. Page 914 Echiverri. Albano. Lumberio. and made known to them. Rodriguez. Martinez. Alcazaren. Asensi. De Mesa. Tecson. Coronel. Corporal. Tabugan. The services of project-based employees are co-terminous with the project and may be terminated upon the end or completion of the project or a phase thereof for which they were hired. Sy. If we consider the nature of Herma Shipyard's business. It is not engaged in the business of building vessels for sale which would require it to continuously construct vessels for its inventory and consequently hire a number of permanent employees. Cabañgon. the duration and scope of which was specified at. Valiente. HELD: Yes respondents are project employees. Ramirez. Corpuz. at the time of their engagement. Lastimosa. Reyes. Gloria. Santos. Francisco. The principal test in determining whether particular employees were engaged as project-based employees. is whether they were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking.

Lumberio. Palad. Marquez. Sandoval. Tabugan. Coronel. Martinez. Santos. Espina. Catindig. Asensi. CRIMINAL LAW Albano. Sy. Alcazaren. Valois . Corporal. Valiente. Page 915 Echiverri. Corpuz. Tecson. Castillo. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. De Mesa. Inguillo. Reyes. De la Cruz. Gloria. Rañigo. Ramirez. Francisco. Rodriguez.

Rodriguez. she felt pain in her private parts. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. went on top of her and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. On rebuttal. He testified that on 7 December 1999. Sy. Reyes. that after some time she narrated the incident to her mother who brought her to the hospital for medical examination and to the NBI to report the incident. Sandoval. Physical resistance is immaterial in a rape case when the victim is sufficiently intimidated by her assailant and she submits against her will because of fear for her personal safety. appellant put on his pants. the prosecution presented Roger Madolid who denied hiring Virgilio Jacob and appellant as workers in his rolling rice mill. Albano. Santos. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Rommel. He likewise undressed. that after the sexual assault. Lastimosa. Madeo forcibly pulled her inside the room. . appellant warned AAA not to reveal to anyone what happened or he would kill her and her family.Jovelyn left AAA alone with Madeowho summoned AAA to his room. Valois . it is not even impossible for a victim of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant. ordered AAA to lie down. Tabugan. Valiente. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. Through force. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.Rape is committed - 1. that thereafter. ANTON MADEO G. 2009 DOCTRINE: Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps a woman in a state of fear and humiliation. that AAA also put on her shorts and was told to go home. RogerMadolid who owned the rice mill and another person whose name he forgot. Madeo alleged that at the day of the said rape. her classmate. No. Jovelyn Fortuna (Jovelyn). When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. Catindig. he was working at the rolling rice mill together with Berting Jacob. Soon thereafter. his rolling rice mill was under repair at the Andrada Repair Shop in Nancamaliran. The same was affirmed by the Appellate Court. Urdaneta City. Etong. Rañigo. Francisco. Martinez. while she (victim – AAA) was on her way to her grandmother's house. invited her to the house of her uncle. b. After which. Lumberio. threat or intimidation. The RTC rendered judgment convicting Madeo of Simple Rape.R. 176070 | October 2. undressed her and thereafter touched her private parts. Inguillo. 266-A. De la Cruz. Palad. Tecson. Ramirez. Page 916 Echiverri. FACTS: On 7 December 1999 at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Thus. ISSUE: Whether or not Madeo is guilty of simple rape HELD: Yes ART. Rape. Alcazaren. In defense. Corpuz. c. When she did not comply. Gloria. Corporal. Castillo. When and How Committed. Madeo. Coronel. Asensi. Marquez. Espina.

even though none of the circumstances mentioned above is present. Coronel. Martinez. the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call an imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. he must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time. in our view. Tabugan. Inguillo. For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997." Said knowledge. d. Valiente. Rañigo. qualifies rape as a heinous offense. although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. no proof was presented that appellant indeed knew AAA's alleged mental deficiency. the penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Santos. i. Lastimosa. Asensi. Sandoval. Alcazaren. In view of the foregoing. Rodriguez. RPC. Francisco. it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of "(10) when the offender knew of the mental disability.. Corpuz. Lumberio. Castillo. we find that appellant was correctly found guilty of the crime of simple rape." still. which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Corporal. the conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. Page 917 Echiverri.e. Limio. For alibi to prosper. which is a negative assertion. Absent said circumstance. unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution. AAA positively identified appellant as the author of the crime. Tecson. In the instant case. threats or intimidation. Gloria. Marquez. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded appellant's denial and alibi. Albano. could not be sustained. In People v. Catindig. Sy. Valois . emotional disorder and/or physical handicap. Espina. we held that: By itself. Palad. De Mesa. Cabañgon. 266-B (10). now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. As regards appellant's alibi. Reyes. we find that he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. like that of the victim's. Although it was specifically alleged in the Information that appellant knew of AAA's "mental disability. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. De la Cruz. by having carnal knowledge of a woman committed through the use of force. Ramirez. It should be noted that affirmative testimony. is stronger than appellant's bare denial.

Valois . 174480 | December 18. Page 918 Echiverri. she was alone in the house of her grandparents. FACTS: On the morning of the said day when Maria. a relative by consanguinity within the 3rd civil degree. De Mesa. The Informations alleged that “Maria” was a 12-year old minor when she was ravished by her uncle. Coronel. Maria reported the rape incidents to her grandmother who is also the mother of the accused but her grandmother told her that she was lying. Inguillo. REYNALDO ALBALATE. No. The RTC rendered judgment finding Albalate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. 12 years of age. either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. Accused denied that he twice raped the victim because at about 8 in the morning and about 9 in the evening of that day. they had a fight and "Maria's" father chased and boxed him so he boxed the former. G. He explained that when they were young. Lumberio. Tecson. forcibly removed her dress and placed himself on top of her. Corporal. We also reiterate the guidelines set forth in People v. Palad. he once again did the same thing to her. Afterwards. viz: Albano. ISSUE: Whether or not the mere testimony of the victim as to her age is sufficient proof of her age HELD: No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Rodriguez. JR. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Albalate armed with an ice pick. Manalili. Tabanggay. One day. 2009 DOCTRINE:The bare testimony of the victim as to her age is insufficient proof of her age. Martinez. Cabañgon. Asensi. As we held in People v. We find this bare testimony insufficient proof of her age. Tabugan. Ramirez. Sy. Valiente. other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. Francisco. Marquez. Lastimosa. We also ruled in People v. the victim's father was angry with him because of the sharing of copras in their farm. Catindig. Sandoval. Espina. Affirmed by the CA. he inserted his penis in her private and warned her that if she will tell anybody what he had done to her. He also claimed that the parents of the victim were mad at him that is why they filed the instant cases against him. Castillo. Pruna in appreciating the age. Gloria. Corpuz. Reyes. “the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself”. was raped on two separate incidents by Albalate. On the evening of the same day. that there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim.R. the accused in order to exculpate himself from the crime charged in the two Informations interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Santos. he will kill her. On the other hand. The prosecution’s evidence as to the age of the victim constituted merely of the victim’s testimony.

Castillo. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old. Marquez. Sandoval. b. c. Page 919 Echiverri. Espina. Martinez. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old. Corporal. Corpuz. De Mesa. Santos. if clear and credible. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. 5. 4. authentic document or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. Rañigo. 3. Francisco. Reyes. Alcazaren. Cabañgon. Valiente. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. Coronel. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 2. the testimony. Gloria. 6. Tabugan. of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40. Ramirez. Valois . Albano. the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. Palad. Asensi. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. Inguillo. Sy. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. Catindig. Lastimosa. Tecson. De la Cruz. Lumberio. Rodriguez.

Castillo. never actually identified the same. Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Instead. Inguillo. Page 920 Echiverri. Valois . the appellate court rendered judgment affirming Cacaos conviction. Francisco. Asensi. Albano. and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand. Corporal. Tabugan. When arraigned on November 30. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. PO3 Celso Pang-ag and PO2 JonelMangapit both testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian. and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence HELD: Yes. Coronel. There was a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao. Palad. De Mesa. the evidence custodian. Rañigo. Martinez. 2010 DOCTRINE: There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Cacao pleaded not guilty. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag. Gloria. Corpuz. then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed. 2004. Marquez. 2005. Reyes. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. FACTS: On October 15. Thereafter trial on the merits followed. Santos. Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Lumberio. Catindig. Valiente. on one hand. discrepancies. Sy. Alcazaren. Sandoval. No. On November 25. The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta. Espina. he repeatedly and categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu. Tecson. necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. On July 27. January 22. SPO3 Loreto Ancheta. 2004. JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO vs. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item confiscated from Cacao. who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies. 180870.R. two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit and Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11. 2007. the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of the offense charged. For sure Mangapit.

Tecson. Valiente. Martinez. Reyes. Santos. Lumberio. Palad. Inguillo. Ramirez. Francisco. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential. marked and submitted for examination and later presented in court is not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence custodian. Marquez. Asensi. Alcazaren. It must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. Lastimosa. Any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from petitioner is rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical denial of the evidence custodian that he received the same from Mangapit. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. Sandoval. Valois . Albano. Rañigo. De Mesa. Catindig. Page 921 Echiverri. Tabugan. Coronel. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. Corporal. Cabañgon. Corpuz. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence custodian received. Castillo. Gloria. Espina. Sy.

The trial court held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from the appellant. Lumberio. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the qualifying phrase “which is a regulated drug”. Reyes. which are included in the crimes proved. Gloria. No. 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. which are included in the crimes proved. it is clear that the designations and allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Francisco. Martinez. De la Cruz. Asensi. Valiente. 2010 DOCTRINE: An offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. Rañigo. the offenses designated in the Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425. The CA held that the designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.R. Tecson. Ramirez. Corporal. Series of 1988. the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine. JOSELITO NOQUE y GOMEZ G. an offense charged is necessarily included in the Albano. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated HELD: No. Sandoval. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. Santos. the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court. January 15. Alcazaren. The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5. 2. As correctly observed by CA. De Mesa. which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. Rodriguez. Under these provisions. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Catindig. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Hence. Corpuz. the trial court ruled that the appellant can be convicted of the offenses charged. Coronel. Page 922 Echiverri.. Cabañgon. Palad. 175319. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of a regulated drug. Tabugan. which by means of chemical reaction could change into methamphetamine. Lastimosa. Thus. Castillo. Valois . Marquez. Espina. FACTS: Accused JoselitoNoque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto Murillo on January 30. Thus. can be applied by analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged. Inguillo. Sy.

Lumberio. Cabañgon. Marquez. so that even if a discrepancy exists. In other words. Coronel. Gloria. Francisco. Palad. Alcazaren. his right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime. offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. a minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense. Albano. this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. Reyes. Inguillo. De Mesa. Sandoval. Corpuz. Martinez. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. Espina. Sy. he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. Page 923 Echiverri. Santos. Rañigo. Catindig. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Asensi. Tecson. At any rate. Corporal. Castillo. Valois . nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty. Valiente. Ramirez.

Sonny Marbella @ Spike. Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley of shots causing Dionedas instantaneous death. 3) the taking was done with animolucrandi. Valiente. Rañigo. Inguillo. Castillo. was committed. Rodriguez. 2001. These items belong to Dioneda who was then taking a bath outside the house. Corporal. FACTS: It was early evening of April 30. Catindig. poked a gun at Florecita while the other two ransacked the house taking a wallet. 177361. The three then boarded Dionedasmotorcylcle and fled the area. Cabañgon. crash helmet and a . relying on the credible and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Dioneda. and several Does was filed under an Information. Francisco. Florecita. Lastimosa. when army officer. De la Cruz. Tabugan. NORBERTO BUTALON. Barangay Poblacion. rejected the defense interposed by the petitioners and accordingly rendered a Decision on September 2. Valois . wife of the victim. and her sister-in-law Nia. was brutally murdered and valuables taken from his house located at SitioBurabod. February 1. and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof. Florecita and Nia followed the three men when the latter went out. Julio D. Sy. De Mesa. Consequently. Bacon District. Santos. Bacon District. Page 924 Echiverri. Palad. Sandoval. Espina.R. ARMANDO VIDAR @ Ricky. Alcazaren. they saw the three men together with more or less 10 other persons surrounding Dioneda who was lying facing the ground. Sorsogon City. 2001. SONNYMARBELLA @ Spike and JOHN DOES and PETER DOES vs. Corpuz.45 caliber firearm with its magazine. The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. Ramirez. No. They were watching television when three armed men suddenly barged inside. ISSUE: Whether or not there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of robbery with homicide Albano. Poblacion. Despite Florecitas pleas not to kill her husband. Sorsogon City. Asensi. 2010 DOCTRINE: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with homicide. Norberto Butalon. CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed from Death to reclusion perpetua. Martinez. Tecson. 2) the property taken belongs to another. Sgt. At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of April 30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Gloria. One of them. a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide against herein petitioners Armando Vidar @ Ricky. namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with violence or intimidation against persons. Coronel. Marquez. 2004 finding all of them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. Lumberio. were inside the formers house at Burabod. Branch 52. the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense. later identified as Marbella. At the yard. Reyes.

Alibi and denial are inherently Albano. Lastimosa. the witnesses never wavered in their identification of petitioners. Asensi. was committed. as in this case. Page 925 Echiverri. For personal motive on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias. 3) the taking was done with animolucrandi. It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in avenging the crime to implicate persons other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished. They even testified that one of the petitioners even poked a gun at them while the others were ransacking the house. Alcazaren. Assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand. Relationship per se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that the witness is biased. Corporal. Tabugan. Rañigo. Francisco. it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses had an unobstructed view of the petitioner’s appearance who were not donning masks to hide their faces when the latter barged inside the house. The weight of testimony of witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way affected by their relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their part. Nothing in the records allows the presence of any distraction that would have disrupted the witness’ attention during the occurrence of the incident. Catindig. Ramirez. Tecson. giving the latter an opportunity to take a good look at petitioners. At the outset.Though a considerable length of time had elapsed. The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Espina. Martinez. its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof. 2) the property taken belongs to another. Marquez. Aside from their bare allegation. One thing which bolsters the prosecution witness’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to prevaricate against the petitioners. there was a frontal confrontation between petitioners and the witnesses. Palad. HELD: Yes. Valiente. their motive of putting the killers behind bars cannot be considered improper. De Mesa. Rodriguez. These prosecution witnesses are the most aggrieved parties. being the victim’s widow and sister. the presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with homicide. and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof. Inguillo. There is no indication that darkness prevailed inside the house so as to have an obscure view at the time. namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with violence or intimidation against persons. Reyes. Santos. Coronel. Lumberio. to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive. Sy. Thus even for a while. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Castillo. Gloria. They cannot forget their faces. a vantage point denied appellate courts and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. They were not actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against them. Sandoval. these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. Valois . petitioners miserably failed in this regard. Cabañgon. Where there is no evidence. the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense. Thus.

Lumberio. Page 926 Echiverri. And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. Palad. Valois . De la Cruz. Catindig. Inguillo. Sy. De Mesa. Francisco. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Tabugan. Coronel. Reyes. Corporal. Lastimosa. Asensi. Ramirez. Corpuz. Martinez. Espina. Cabañgon. Santos. Tecson. Marquez. Gloria. Albano. Valiente. Rodriguez. weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Castillo.

the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt—of paramount importance therefore in these cases is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. Espina. Cabañgon. Gloria. The failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case—there can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. appellant was informed of his constitutional rights and thereafter was arrested.00. Alcazaren. acted as the buyer while PO2 Labasano served as back-up. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 Labasano prepared a Certificate of Inventory. Asensi. She then prepared Chemistry Report No. (iii) the amount of the shabu sold. No. Inguillo.00 bills. Page 927 Echiverri. who was provided with two pieces of ₱50. After a brief exchange of the money and the stuff. Martinez. Catindig. Coronel. PO2 Labasano and PO1 Gondol conducted a buy-bust operation at Purok 4. c) Albano. De Mesa. frisked him and shabu was later shown to him. Marquez. Castillo. as testified to by PO2 Labasano. Sandoval. Palad. Santos. Rodriguez. appellant contends: a) that the testimonies of the police operatives contained material inconsistencies and contradictions as to (i) whether a surveillance was made prior to the buy-bust operation. 184546. He was brought to Tipanoy for a drug test and detained in jail for violation of the anti-drugs law. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters and presented before the investigator..m. a dangerous drug. Rañigo. the two saw appellant sitting outside the house. D-500-2003 on her finding on the tests. Forensic Chemist Carvajal received the written request for laboratory examination of one sachet containing white crystalline substance submitted to their office. Saray. PO1 Gondol. Upon reaching the target area. 2003 at about 3:30 a. Corpuz. b) there was no proper identification of the illegal drug. PO1 Gondol replied "I will buy "Piso". In support of his prayer for a reversal of the verdict of his conviction. PO2 Labasano inserted his hand into appellant’s pocket. De la Cruz. Appellant denied the charge against him. February 22. Valiente. She conducted the test and the result showed that it contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO1 Gondol approached appellant and the latter asked the former if he wanted to buy a narcotic substance. (ii) whether there was marked money used in the operation. Sy. Iligan City. Francisco. He claimed that while he was sleeping on a bench beside the road. The buy-bust money and the plastic sachet containing the stuff they recovered were turned over to the evidence custodian as related by PO1 Gondol. Valois . Reyes. 2010 DOCTRINE: In prosecutions involving narcotics. Tecson. Lastimosa. At the police headquarters. Lumberio. and to the Team Leader. FACTS: On August 12. Ramirez. meaning ₱100. and. the plastic sachet was sent to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory for examination. WILSON SUAN y JOLONGON G.R. Tabugan. Upon request. PO2 Labasano suddenly held his arm and handcuffed him. Corporal.

Francisco. the prosecution miserably failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. Martinez. However. the Memorandum prepared by the Provincial Chief.01 gram was seized from the appellant. Marquez. Asensi. Page 928 Echiverri. the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the substance recovered from the appellant. and. PO2 Labasano made no mention that he placed some markings on the sachet for purposes of future identification. Sandoval. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution witnesses were able to properly identify the dangerous drug taken from appellant. Santos. Tecson. Worse. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Gloria. and the transmittal letter prepared by the Regional Chief. We agree. d) the defense of alibi was not properly appreciated. However. the item allegedly seized from the appellant bore no markings. the prosecution witnesses failed to testify on matters regarding the possession of the illegal drug. Reyes. in the Memorandum of the Regional Chief of PNP. there is already doubt as to the identity of the substance being subjected for laboratory examination. Thus. the substance supposedly weighed 0. De la Cruz. Valiente. Inguillo. Palad. in the Albano. Lumberio. Tabugan. For while the drug may be admitted in evidence it does not necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight. As we have stated at the outset. we are no longer sure whether the item allegedly seized by PO2 Labasano from the appellant was the same item referred to by the Provincial Chief and then the Regional Chief of PNP to the Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination. the item being subjected for laboratory examination was already referred to as Exhibit A. De Mesa. Lastimosa. the item that was referred to the Forensic Chemist already had other markings. in the Certificate of Inventory prepared by PO2 Labasano. the prosecution dismally failed to prove the identity of the substance taken from appellant. It must be stressed that admissibility should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti. Records show that while the police officers were able to prove the factuality of the buy-bust operation. Catindig. when the Certificate of Inventory was prepared by P02 Labasano. Corpuz. From the foregoing. HELD: No. At this time. Espina. Castillo. Corporal. Coronel. Cabañgon. The Certificate of Inventory prepared by PO2 Labasano merely stated that a sachet of a substance weighing 0. Appellant submits that the shabu alleged to have been sold was not properly identified by the police officers thus rendering doubtful and open to suspicion if the shabu submitted for examination is indeed the same substance sold by him. Rodriguez. in the Request for Laboratory Examination/Urine Test prepared by the Provincial Chief of Police. Next. Valois . Sy.01 gram.

Chemistry Report No. D-500-2003 prepared by Forensic Chemist Carvajal, the
substance was indicated as weighing 0.1 gram.

Indeed there is absolutely nothing in the evidence on record that tends to show
identification of the drug. For sure, the difference particularly in the weight of the
substance is fatal to the case of the prosecution.

The prosecution failed to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated substance.

Not only did the prosecution fail to identify the substance that was allegedly seized
from the appellant; it also failed to establish that the chain of custody of the substance
was unbroken.

The testimonies of PO2 Labasano are contradictory. At first, he testified that the
substance recovered from the appellant was delivered to the crime laboratory but he did
not know who received the same. On cross-examination, however, he claimed that the
substance was delivered to their team leader, SPO2 Cañonero.

Notably, the prosecution failed to put on the witness stand SPO2 Cañonero or the
person from the crime laboratory who allegedly received the substance. Consequently,
there was a break in the chain of custody because no mention is made as regards what
happened to the substance from the time SPO2 Cañonero received it to the time the
transmittal letter was prepared by Police Chief Inspector Jesus Atchico Rebua addressed
to the Provincial Chief of Police, Lanao del Norte requesting for laboratory
examination/urine test. We do not know how or from whom Police Chief Inspector Jesus
Atchico Rebua received the substance.

There is no dispute that in the Chemistry Report it was established that the object
examined was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug. While the Forensic Chemist showed the contents of the sachet as the substance
she examined and confirmed to be shabu, nonetheless, it is not positively and
convincingly clear from her testimony that what was submitted for laboratory examination
and later presented in court as evidence was the same shabu actually recovered from the
appellant. The Forensic Chemist did not testify at all as to the identity of the person from
whom she received the specimen for examination.

Verily, there is a break in the chain of custody of the seized substance. The
standard operating procedure on the seizure and custody of the drug as mandated in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations was not
complied with. As we observed, the chain of custody of the drug from the time the same
was turned over to the Team Leader, as testified by PO2 Labasano or the Records
Custodian as related by PO1 Gondol, to the time of submission to the crime laboratory
was not clearly shown. There is no indication whether the Team Leader and the Records
Custodian were one and the same person. Neither was there reference to the person who
submitted it to the crime laboratory. The prosecution needs to establish that the Team

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 929
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Leader or Records Custodian indeed submitted such particular drug to the crime
laboratory for examination. The failure on the part of the Team Leader or Records
Custodian as the case may be, to testify on what he did with the drug while he was in
possession resulted in a break in the chain of custody of the drug. There is obviously a
missing link from the point when the drug was in his hands to the point when the same
was submitted for examination. The failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is
fatal to the prosecution’s case. Under no circumstance can we consider or even safely
assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug was properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug.

Jurisprudence abounds with cases where deviation from the standard procedure
in an anti-narcotics operation produces doubts as to the identity and origin of the drug
which inevitably results to the acquittal of the accused.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 930
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR VILLARINO y MABUTE

G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: In this special complex crime of rape with homicide, the unsolicited and
spontaneous confession of guilt by the appellant to the police officer is admissible in
evidence. The circumstantial evidence is also sufficient to sustain the conviction of the
appellant even if no spermatozoa was found in the victim’s body during an autopsy.

FACTS:

April 28, 1995, "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her
younger son "CCC" went to the house of their relative in Barangay "D" to attend the fiesta
to be held the next day.

On even date, from 7:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Jesus
Genoguin (SPO4 Genoguin) was in his house in Barangay "D" entertaining his guests,
one of whom was appellant. While personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04
Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant.
Appellant even allowed SPO4 Genoguin to put on the bracelet. Rodrigo Ojare and “BBB”
also noticed that he was wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt and jewelry

At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, "BBB" told "AAA" to go home
to Barangay "D1" to get a t-shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer
returned. While "BBB" was anxiously waiting for "AAA" in the house of her aunt
in Barangay "D", she received information that a dead child had been found
in Barangay "D1". She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s body as that
of her daughter, "AAA".

At around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Rodrigo, who was the barangay captain
of Barangay "D1" received information that a dead child was found in their barangay. He
instructed a barangay tanod to inform the police about the incident. Thereafter, Rodrigo
proceeded to the specified area together with other barangay tanods.

SPO4 Genoguin also went to the crime scene after being informed by his
commander. Upon arrival, he saw the corpse of a little girl behind a big boulder that was
about 10 meters away from the trail junction of the barangays. People had gathered
seven to 10 meters away from the dead body, but no one dared to approach.

"AAA’s" lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her body
was slanted downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the small
boulder. She was no longer wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from her
vagina. Wrapped around her right hand, which was positioned near her right ear, was a
white sando.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 931
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

"AAA’s" panty was found a meter away from her body, while her short pants was
about two meters farther. A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime
scene. Rodrigo and "BBB" identified these pieces of jewelry as those seen on the
appellant. They also identified the sando on "AAA’s" arm as the appellant’s. Thus, the
hunt for appellant began.

On the same day, the appellant was found in the house of Aurelia Susmena near
the seashore of Barangay "D1". He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to
be bodily carried to the motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in
Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made the appellant take off his clothes since they
were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed bloodstains.

Dr. Arleen P. Lim, Medical Officer III, testified that four of the five lacerated wounds
could have been caused by a hard irregular or blunt object, like a rock or stone. While the
fifth lacerated wound could have been the result of a strong force, as when the head is
forcibly banged. "AAA’s" hematoma was just above her buttocks. She further testified that
the ease with which two fingers entered "AAA’s" vaginal orifice could have been caused
by sexual intercourse. The lacerations in her vaginal wall could also have been the result
of sexual intercourse or by the forcible entry of an object into the vaginal canal, such as a
penis. Dr. Lim confirmed that the cause of death of "AAA" was cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to multiple lacerated wounds and skull fracture.

On May 19, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Branch 32 rendered a
Decision30 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
rape with homicide.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found the appellant guilty only of
homicide.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in convicting accused-appelleant of rape with
homicide solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

HELD:

No, the Trial Court did not errin convicting accused-appelleant of rape with homicide.

In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing "AAA" to
SPO4 Genoguin. He even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is
thrown into the sea. The appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.

When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and
no force or intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

made and not elicited through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding
that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not
applicable in the instant case.

At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the
complex crime of rape with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the
crime through circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the
culprit.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses which were replete with contradictions and improbabilities.
According to him, Rodrigo’s declaration that it was around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
April 29, 1995 when he was told of the discovery of a dead body contradicts "BBB’s"
testimony that she instructed the victim to go home to Barangay "D1" at around 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. Moreover, Rodrigo’s claim that the appellant, a
fisherman, always wore the pieces of jewelry in question while at work, is contrary to
human experience. Lastly, SPO4 Genoguin’s contention that he saw appellant wearing
the pieces of jewelry on separate occasions prior to the commission of the crime is
inconsistent with his subsequent testimony that he was not even sure of the ownership of
the said jewelry.

Appellant’s contentions are not worthy of credence.

Moreover, the time when Rodrigo was informed of the incident and the time stated
by "BBB" when she sent "AAA" on an errand to Barangay "D1", were mere
approximations, which cannot impair their credibility. An error in the estimation of time
does not discredit the testimony of a witness when time is not an essential element.

The inconsistencies indicated by the appellant are likewise inconsequential since
they do not detract from the fact that "BBB" sent "AAA" on an errand in Barangay "D1"
where her dead body was later discovered. Far from being badges of fraud and
fabrication, the discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses may be justifiably
considered as indicative of the truthfulness on material points of the facts testified to.
These minor deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed.

The credibility of SPO4 Genoguin is not adversely affected by his inability to
immediately identify the ownership of the jewelry found near the dead body of the victim
despite his testimony that he saw the appellant wearing the same jewelry on previous
occasions. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable leading people to act differently. There is simply no standard form of
behavioral response that can be expected from anyone when confronted with a startling
or frightful occurrence. SPO4 Genoguin, despite being a policeman since 1977, was
affected by the gruesome crime. His years in the police service did not prepare him to
witness the lifeless body of a 10-year old girl who had been brutally raped and murdered.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

In sum, the inconsistencies raised by the appellant are too inconsequential to
warrant a reversal of the trial court’s ruling. The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape
with homicide is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for
acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime
charged. As the contradictions alleged by the appellant had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape with homicide, they cannot be used as ground for his
acquittal.

The appellant imputes improper motive to witness Rodrigo who, allegedly, had an
axe to grind against him because Rodrigo’s fishing venture incurred huge losses after
appellant abandoned his job as a cook. Such imputation, however, deserves scant
consideration. Other than appellant’s self-serving allegation, there is no proof that his
sudden departure from work adversely affected the operations of the fishing
venture.1avvphi1

The CA ruled that the evidence adduced by the prosecution are sufficient to
produce a conviction for homicide but not for the crime of rape. In so ruling, the CA
ratiocinated that while there were lacerations in the vaginal orifice of the victim, the
absence of spermatozoa, however, belied that she was raped.

We disagree. The absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily result in the
conclusion that rape was not committed. Convictions for rape with homicide have been
sustained on purely circumstantial evidence. In those cases, the prosecution presented
other tell-tale signs of rape such as the laceration and description of the victim’s pieces of
clothing, especially her undergarments, the position of the body when found and the like.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

ERPASCUAL DIEGA y PAJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 174099

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERPASCUAL DIEGA y PAJARES

G.R. No. 173510, March 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime
charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in
light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even in the absence of an
eyewitness, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is
sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences were derived have been established; and (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

The victim, "AAA", was a 13-year old girl residing with her family in Rodriguez,
Rizal. She was a 1st year high school student and would usually leave her home at 4:00
o’clock in the morning and walk for about a kilometer to a terminal where she could take a
ride to school. The path towards the terminal passes a farm within a 50-hectare plantation
located at Upper Ciudad Real, Araneta, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, where the
appellant was employed as a stay-in security guard. "AAA" uses the same route on her
way home.

On March 17, 1995, "AAA" failed to return home at the usual time. Her parents
frantically searched for her, but it was only on the next day, March 18, 1995, between 9:00
and 10:00 o’clock in the morning, when the dead body of "AAA" was discovered inside the
plantation.

"AAA’s" corpse was covered with leaves. A wood vine was tied around her neck
and her head bore several wounds. Her school uniform was crumpled and her panty was
missing. The medico-legal examination conducted around 24 hours from "AAA’s" death
indicated that she died of "asphyxia by strangulation, hemorrhages as a result of
traumatic injuries, head and body". There were deep, fresh lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00
o’clock positions and a shallow fresh laceration at 7:00 o’clock position in her hymen
which "are compatible with recent loss of virginity." Moreover, the doctor who conducted
the examination on the cadaver of "AAA" saw several injuries in the middle left forearm,
suggesting that "AAA" used her hands to protect herself.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

The police investigation revealed that on March 17, 1995, between 1:00 and 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon, Juanito Manalo III (Juanito) was tending to the grazing carabaos
inside the plantation when he saw the appellant stooping down. The appellant stood up
clad only in his shorts and waved his pistol to call Juanito. As Juanito approached, he saw
that the appellant had a menacing look and noticed "AAA" lying unconscious on the
ground. The appellant then pointed his pistol to Juanito and ordered him to touch the body
of "AAA" and to tie a vine around her neck. Out of fear, Juanito obeyed and discovered
that "AAA" no longer had undergarments. He was permitted to leave, but only after the
appellant threatened to kill him and his family if he would reveal to anyone what he
witnessed. As Juanito fled from the scene, he was seen by Martin Gailan (Martin) and
Arnel Alminana (Arnel).

Initially the appellant voluntarily submitted himself to detention. However, he was
released to the custody of his former counsel after his waiver was withdrawn. Pending
trial, he absconded and remained at-large until his arrest in his hometown in Baybay
Gamay in Northern Samar.

On March 3, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the appellant of rape
with homicide.

The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review and the CA affirmed
with modification the trial court’s Decision.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
findings of the Regional Trial Court that circumstantial evidence are strong enough to
convict the accused and sentenced him to death.

HELD:

No, the appeal lacks merit.

In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, both rape and homicide must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime charged
herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the
well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even in the absence of an eyewitness,
as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

experience. It is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. In other words, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

Here, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the
culprit to the exclusion of all others.

Juanito’s presence at the crime scene at the time "AAA" was raped and killed does
not necessarily mean that he was the author of the crime. Juanito has sufficiently
explained in a clear and categorical manner his presence thereat. He testified on how he
unexpectedly found the appellant clad only in his shorts stooping down on the grassy
portion of the banana grove inside the farm. He recounted how the appellant told him to
approach the unconscious body of "AAA" and forced him under threat of death, to tie her
with a wood vine. He also narrated his flight after the appellant decided to let him go.
Juanito’s testimony deserves credence since it was unshaken by cross-examination and
unflawed by contradictions.

The credibility of Juanito is not adversely affected by his initial silence since he was
under constant threat by the appellant. After learning of the fate suffered by "AAA" at the
hands of the appellant, it was only natural for Juanito to take the threat against him and
his family seriously. The threat was real and present even after Juanito left. In fact,
appellant told Martin and Arnel that he would kill Juanito.

Moreover, it is not true that Juanito kept the matter to himself. He told his mother of
the crime he witnessed and even wrote a letter to her before leaving for the province to
avoid the appellant.

Motive has also been proven by the prosecution. "AAA’s" aunt testified that prior to
the commission of the crime, the appellant maliciously stared at and uttered remarks with
sexual overtones to "AAA" on several occasions. Her failure to relay these incidents to
"AAA’s" parents did not render her testimony unworthy of credence. While it may have
been best for the aunt to report the malicious acts of the appellant to the parents of "AAA",
there was no legal imperative to do so.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Appellant’s voluntary submission to a polygraph test even without the assistance
of counsel also deserves scant consideration. When he was taken to the polygraph
section of the police department, appellant was declared unfit for a polygraph test. Thus,
he was told to return on another day, but did not comply. Consequently, no polygraph
examination was ever conducted on the appellant.

Against the prosecution’s evidence, the appellant presents the defense of denial
and alibi. Denial is intrinsically a weak defense and must be supported by strong evidence
of non-culpability in order to be credible. Courts likewise view the defense of alibi with
suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it can be fabricated easily. For alibi to prevail, it must also be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the appellant to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the
appellant was somewhere else.

Thus, the appellant’s twin defenses of denial and alibi pale in the light of the array
of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. The positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence and evidentiary weight than the negative
averments of the appellant.

Lastly, the appellant’s contention that his arrest was attended with irregularity is
unworthy of credence. Records show that the "prepared statements" were given by the
witnesses after they answered the questions of the police authorities. His arrest,
therefore, was not based merely on statements prepared by the police authorities for the
prosecution witnesses.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

People of the Philippines v Richard Napalit y De Guzman

G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010

DOCTRINE:The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender
employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and
especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make.

FACTS:

An information was filed against herein appellant containing the following:

On or about the 16th day of October, 2001 in the City of Malabon, Philippines
Richard De Guzman and two John Does, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, while armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Joseph Genete, hitting him on the nape and back of the body, thereby[inflicting]
injuries which caused his death.

Appellant pleaded not guilty. Based on the testimonies of the witnesses, it was
established that the victim, Genete, with Guanzon and three other companions were
walking along Langaray Street, Malabon after a drinking spree. When they passed by the
group of De Guzman, the latter provoked the group to a fight and thereafter stabbed
Ganete with an ice pick at the back. Guanzon attempted to help Genete but was also
stabbed by a companion of the appellant.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court found the version of the prosecution more
credible. De Guzman was found guilty of the crime of murder. The trial court also found
the qualifying circumstance of treachery to have attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the conviction should not be
murder but for homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.

HELD:

Yes. The eyewitness account of Guanzon undoubtedly showed that the killing
was treacherous. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,depriving him of any real chance to defend himself.
Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to hisperson, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made itimpossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In the instant case, there is no doubt that
the victim wassurprised by the attack coming from the appellant. The victim was merely

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

walking along the street unsuspecting ofany harm that would befall his person. That
appellant shouted "ano, gusto n’yo, away?" immediately before stabbingthe victim could
not be deemed as sufficient warning to the latter of the impending attack on his person.
Recordsshow that after challenging the unsuspecting victim to a fight, appellant
immediately lunged at him and stabbed himat the back. Under the circumstances, the
victim was indisputably caught off guard by the sudden and deliberateattack coming from
the appellant, leaving him with no opportunity to raise any defense against the attack.
The modeof the attack adopted by the appellant rendered the victim unable and
unprepared to defend himself.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

People of the Philippines v Roldan Morales y Midarasa

G.R. No. 172873, March 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: A society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his
guilt. To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in issue.

FACTS:
Appellant was charged in two separate informations before the Regional Trial
Court with possession and sale of methyl amphetamine hydrochloride. He pleaded not
guilty during the arraignment. Appellant was arrested during a buy-bust operation.
However, during trial, he testified that there was no buy-bust operation conducted. And
that it was while he was sidelining as a parking attendant when two male persons in
civilian clothes suddenly approached him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as
policemen and poked their guns at them.He also alleges that the arresting officers did
not even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time
and place of the alleged buy-bust operation. He likewise denied having received the
buy-bust money and further testified that he personally knew PO3 Rivera prior to his
arrest , since is first cousin and PO3 Rivera has a quarrel prior to the incident.
Ruling on the case, the Regional Trial Court decided against the appellant, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Regional Trial Court was
affirmed in toto. Hence, a notice of appeal was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales is proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No.In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. On the other
hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was
freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case,
the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, PO1 Roy, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the
appellant. Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The
patent lack of adherence to the procedural mandate of R.A. No. 9165 is manifest in his
testimony. Thus, the procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized
items collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact
same items that were confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

People of the Philippines v Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, Neil Baluyot y
Tabisora, Richard Delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Monson, Edwin Soriano
y Dela Cruz, and Elmer Salvador y Javale

G.R. No. 172357, March 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to
warrant conviction.

FACTS:
On 22 May 1998, two informations were filed against appellants, charging them
with the crimes of murder and arbitrary detention. For the murder case, the information
alleges that the appellants, all being members of the Philippine National Police,
conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
their superior strength, unlawfully tie a plastic nylon cord around the neck of one
RomeleoQuintos, and hang him at the end portion of the detention cell, which cause his
instantaneous death. As for the arbitrary detention case, the information likewise alleges
that the appellants, unlawfully detained and restrained on RomeleoQuintos without his
consent and against his will.
During the trial, the records show that Quintosarrived that NAIA to fetch his
brother who was arriving from the United States. However, he was then after seen to be
arguing with a man who arrested him for expired license. Due to his refusal to be
arrested, he was brought to the Intelligence and Investigation Division of NAIA for
questioning.Quintos was then shoved into a cell already occupied by Noel Gabornes,
who had earlier been arrested for being an unauthorized porter. Gabornes was
transferred to another cell. Intrigued with what will be done to Quintos, he saw Baluyot
handing a plastic cord to Salvador. Thereafter he head Romeleo gasping and coughing.
He then saw the body being carried out of the cell.
After due proceedings, the Regional Trial Court found the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Quintos. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, which was
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the uncorroborated testimony of the lone eyewitness, is sufficient to
produce a judgment of conviction.

HELD:

Yes.Gabornes positively identified and categorically pointed to appellants as the
ones who conspired with one another to kill Romeleo. He narrated the incident in a clear
and convincing manner. Moreover, Gabornes’ testimony given before the National
Bureau of Investigation and the trial court was replete with details that only a person who
witnessed such gruesome crime could narrate. Even during cross-examination, he
remained steadfast in his account.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

DaniloAnsaldo v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 159381, March 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: For a complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public document to
prosper, all the elements of both the crimes of estafa and falsification of public document
must exist.

FACTS:

The case originated from an alleged falsification and forgery of a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage which was subsequently notarized and therefore a public and/or official
document by then and there misrepresenting that petitioner are the real spouses Nina
Ramirez and Mariano Ramirez; that after the said Deed of Real Esate Mortgage was
forged and falsified, it was presented to one Nora Herrera, who, believing in the
authenticity and genuiness of the same gave and delivered the mortgage consideration
in the amount of P300,000 to the said accused, who then feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of Spouses Ramirez in the amount of P500,000, the value of the property
in question.

After trial, petitioner was found guilty of falsification; the trial court noted that no
other person was in possession of the TCT prior to the falsification other than petitioner
and his wife. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
the decision of the RTC. The CA found petitioner guilty of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a public document. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court was correct in modifying the decision and
finding the accused guilty of complex crime thereby increasing the original sentence.

HELD:

No.For petitioner to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document committed inthe manner described in the Information, all
the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist.
To secure a conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the followingrequisites must concur:

(1) The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,
influence, qualifications,property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions

(2) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous
with thecommission of the fraud;

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(3) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which
induced the offendedparty to part with his money or property; and

(4) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

It is undisputed that petitioner committed estafa. He and his wife falsely
represented to Ramirez that they had theinfluence and capability to cause the
subdivision of the lot. In view of said false representation, Ramirez wasinduced to part
with the owner’s copy of her TCT on the condition that the same would be returned after
a month asevidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt.

However, as to the crime of forgery and falsification, the court cannot conclude
beyond reasonable doubt that it was Spouses Ansaldo who committed it. In the first
place, there was no witness presented to corroborate the testimony of Ramirez
regarding the mortgage.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Rose Quidet v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission
of the offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and
kept within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance
tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as wat is at stake is the accused’s
liberty.

FACTS:

The case originated from the stabbing of one Jimmy Tagarda which resulted to his
instantaneous death. Andrew Tagarda, Jimmy’s cousin also sustained stab wound
during the same incident. Thereafter, informations for homicide and frustrated homicide
were issued against petitioners.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment finding petitioner guilty of homicide
and all three others accused guilty of frustrated homicide. On appeal with the Court of
Appeals, the court modified the decision of the RTC changing the crime committed to
attempted homicide of Andrew Tagarda. The CA justified the modification in the basis
that the accused failed to inflict mortal wound on Andrew because the latter successfully
deflected the attack. Moreoever, Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have
healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner to have acted in
conspiracy with the other accused in the commission of the offenses charged is in
accordance with law and/or jurisprudence.

HELD:

No. The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
petitioner is criminally liable only for his individual acts. Conspiracy can be inferred from
and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point toa joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. However, in
determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and
simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will
or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants.
What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and
the same purpose. In the case at bar, it was revealed that after Andrew was stabbed by
Taban using a double-bladed knife, Taban subsequently stabbed Jimmy before fleeing
from the crime scene. Moments later, while Andrew was recovering, Tubo straddled
Jimmy and stabbed him twice with an icepick before he left. The stabbing incident
appears to have arisen from a purely accidental encounter between Taban’s and
Andrew’s groups with both having had a drinking session.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

People of the Philippines v Rogelio Asis y Lacson

G.R. No. 179935, April 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great weight and respect.

FACTS:

The case originated from a rape incident by a father upon his minor daughter. The
felonious sexual intercourse was performed twice, first in 1994, and the second in 1996.
In both cases, the father threatened to kill her if she refused to follow his orders to
remove her clothes, and lie down on the ground.During trial, the brother of the victim
testified that he witnessed the appellant raping his sister. But he did not reveal to anyone
what he saw because he was scared of his father who was always carrying a bolo.

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape. On appeal, the appellant questioned the credibility and minority of the
victim.However, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the child witness was credible.

HELD:

Yes.In rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to
the sound dicretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight
and respect, because the judge as the opportunity to observe them on the stand and
ascertain whether they are telling the truth or not. Moreover, an accused could justifiably
be convicted based solely on the credible testimony of the victim. As to the minority of
the victim, the same was satisfactorily established. The court found that the express
admission by the accused as regards the age of the victimwas sufficient to establish her
minority.

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Rono Seguritan y Jara v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded greatweight and
respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court
overlooked material and relevant matters that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the
factual findings of the court below.

FACTS:

Seguritan was charged with homicide for the assault and death of Lucrecio
Seguritan. During trial, it was revealed that petitioner Rono Seguritan was having a
drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan, MelchorPanis, and BaltazarPanis, in
Cagayan. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which Rono punched Lucrecio,
causing the latter to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block. Lucrecio lost
consciousness but was revived. Lucrecio then went home and slept. The following
morning, Lucrecio was found dead. On the contrary, the defense alleged that Lucrecio
dies of cardiac arrest.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision convicting the petitioner of
homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused of homicide.

HELD:

No.It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal
injury in his head. The court cannot find a reason to doubt the findings of the trial court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, that petitioner punched Lucrecio twice causing him to
fall to the ground. Melchor categorically testified that petitioner punched Lucrecio twice
and as a result, Lucrecio fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Moreover, Melchor’s
eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner
by which the latter fell from the bench and hit his head on the improvised stone is
consistent with the autopsy findings.

Lastly, petitioner cannot be held liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide due to the absence of intent to kill Lucrecio. When death resulted, even if there
was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and hold the aggressor responsible for all the resulting
consequences.

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ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO, EMILIO SUMILHIG, JR., and AGUSTIN BILLEDO, JR.,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. 160718, 12 May 2010

DOCTRINE: Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption of
official acts and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.

FACTS:
Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr.used a portion of his Countryside
Development Fundto purchase one unit of Toyota Tamaraw FX and six units of
Kawasaki motorcycles. All vehicles were registered in the name of the Municipality of
Bunawan and were turned over to the municipality through its mayor, herein petitioner
Anuncio C. Bustillo.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed Resolution No. 95-27 which
authorized the transfer without cost of the aforesaid vehicles to the San Francisco Water
District (SFWD). Pursuant thereto, Bustillo executeda Deed of Transfer relative to the
aforementioned vehicles in favor of the SFWD represented by its General Manager,
Elmer T. Luzon.
The aforementioned resolution was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur for being violative of Section 381 of the Local
Government Code. It also issued another resolution canceling and declaring the Deed of
Transfer as null and void for being highly irregular and grossly violative of the same
provision.
A complaint was filed charging Bustillo, Vice-Mayor Agustin Billedo, Jr., and the
Sangguniang Bayan members, with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Also included in
the complaint were the Board Secretary and General Manager of SFWD.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found probable cause to prosecute
the case. Consequently,an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
Bustillo, Billedo, and Sangguniang Bayan members for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
On June 15, 1999, the SFWD executed a Deed of Donation effecting the transfer
of the aforesaid vehicles in favor of the Municipality of Bunawan because according to
SFWD, the water projects funded by the CDF of Congressman Paredes were already
completed.
The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction made by Sandiganbayan was proper.

HELD:
No. The Sandiganbayan based its conviction of (Mayor) Bustillo, (Vice-Mayor)
Billedo and (Councilor) Sumilhig on the finding that they conspired to effect the transfer
of the vehicles to the prejudice of the Municipality of Bunawan in violation of the provision
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

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The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers
or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit
the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government
or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In this case, only the first element was proven. At the time material to this case, all
the petitioners are public officers, namely, Bustillo as Municipal Mayor, Billedo as Vice
Mayor, and Sumilhig as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

All the other elements were not present. It cannot be denied that the transfer of
the vehicles to SFWD was made in furtherance of the purpose for which the funds were
released which is "to help in the planning, monitoring and coordination of the
implementation of the waterworks projects located throughout the Province of Agusan
del Sur." The Deed of Donation expressly provided that the subject vehicles shall be
used for the same purpose for which they were purchased.

Moreover, the transfer was made to ensure the success of the implementation of
the CDF-funded waterworks projects of the province of Agusan del Sur. In the
Memorandum of Agreement dated February 10, 1993, SFWD was designated to
implement, control or supervise all the CDF-funded waterworks projects. Clearly, the
vehicles were donated to SFWD not because it was given any preference, unwarranted
benefits or undue advantage, but in recognition of its technical expertise.

We find no evidence on record which would show that petitioners were motivated
by bad faith when they transferred the vehicles to SFWD. Bustillo, as Mayor, is
authorized by law to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the local government unit.
Billedo, as Vice Mayor, acted as the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan and did
not even vote for the passage of Resolution No. 95-27. Said Resolution was
unanimously passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and Sumilhig was only one of those
who voted for its passage.

In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties which the records failed to rebut. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of
the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.

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ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 164443, 18 June 2010

DOCTRINE: A conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely
showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both
statements are sworn—the prosecution must additionally prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the
contradictory statement.

FACTS:
Eriberto Masangkay, his common-law wifeMagdalena Ricaros, Cesar Masangkay
and his wife Elizabeth, and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel
Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990.
Eriberto filed before SEC a petition for the involuntary dissolution of MFI for
violation of Section 6 of PD902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar, and
Elizabeth. The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and alleged,
among others, that a secretary’s certificate issued by Elizabeth was absolutely fictitious
and simulated because the alleged meeting of the Board of Directors, with regard to the
execution of a Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct, did not actually
materialize.
Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of
the Board held and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious
instrument, Cesar filed a complaint for perjury against Eriberto before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. An information was consequently filed before the court.
The MeTC rendered a judgment holding that the prosecution was able to prove
that themeeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced
by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for Eriberto's statement that the Deed of
Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that his participation in the approval and
execution of the document, as well as his avowals before the guardianship court
regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his previous statement. The
decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court.
The CA also affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the
prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in the petition for involuntary
dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eriberto's signatures on the two
allegedly fictitious documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of
Exchange and was present in the meeting. Having participated in these two matters,
Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and fictitious, as he claimed in his verified
petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his petition.The CA
rejected petitioner's argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that
they were material because petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition
for involuntary dissolution.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No. We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond
reasonable doubt.
For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law;
(2) it must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a
deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a
material matter.The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner
and they are indeed present in the instant case.It is the elements of deliberate falsehood
and materiality of the false statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution which are
contested.
On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the
subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any
fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to
the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.
The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he
relied upon in his petition for corporate dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors
which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify
corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these
statements are material to his petition for involuntary dissolution. The element of
materiality is therefore present.
The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.The
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of
petitioner's statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize."
In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place,
i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time
and conferred with each other.
To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the
alleged December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with
his statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According
to the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the
petitioner's statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not actually
materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or inconsistent
with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two statements
merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two statements is
actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally
possible that the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the
petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to his house for signature,

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but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the
prosecution's burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt that the first
statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in the petition for
dissolution) is the false one.
We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the
prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the
accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove
which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by
evidence other than the contradictory statement.
In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing
evidence other than the minutes, that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place.
It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private complainant Cesar,
who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is
therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness. The prosecution did not present the
testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have
testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any
explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any
evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were
physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up
with certain resolutions. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the notice for the
alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the
petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the
directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the
sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for
how could the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly
notified that such a meeting would be taking place?
The insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence is particularly glaring considering
that the petitioner had already explained the presence of his signature in the minutes of
the meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes
were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he
believed that the proposed exchange of the assets, which was the subject of the
minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also supported
the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.

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Article II of RA 9165. Corpuz. Asensi. Espina. De Mesa. Page 953 Echiverri. HELD: Yes. Valois . The elements necessary to establish a case for illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. ALDRIN BERDADERO y ARMAMENTO. Martinez. Valiente. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation was duly adduced in evidence. Santos. Inguillo. Thereafter. they proceeded to arrest the appellant. Albano. Reyes. On the other hand. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. He was instead brought to the police station. Tecson. G. Gloria. kicked the door open and handcuffed him. It was likewise established that the sale actually occurred and that two sachets of shabu were sold for the price of P500.R. Francisco. The appellant was positively identified by police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the seller of the shabu presented in the case. No. Corporal. Lumberio. Sy. His mother allowed them to enter and showed them the defective keys. He testified that two men came to his house and introduced themselves as locksmiths. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. the appellant claimed that he was a victim of frame-up. Castillo. The police officers organized a buy-bust operation whereinthe appellantallegedly handed to the informant two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in exchange for the marked money. the object and the consideration. Rodriguez. Marquez. Coronel. Lastimosa. the men left. 179710. De la Cruz. Catindig. The prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas testified that their confidential informant acted as the buyer of the shabu from the appellant. The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision convicting the appellant. 29 June 2010 DOCTRINE: Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Sandoval. FACTS: An Information was filed against appellant for violation of Section 5. Rañigo. He asked why he was being arrested but no explanation was forthcoming. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. Palad. The shabu sold by the appellant was also positively and categorically identified during trial. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Alcazaren. The prosecution states that they received a report from an informant that the appellant was selling shabu. After a while. Cabañgon. In the trial that ensued. but they returned 10 minutes later. the prosecution and the defense presented different accounts of the events that transpired prior to and during the appellant's arrest.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction was properly rendered. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Ramirez. Tabugan.

For this claim to prosper. Moreover. Coronel. the failure to present the appellant's mother to testify and corroborate his defense of frame-up renders the same as self-serving thus unworthy of any weight in evidence. Ramirez. Asensi. Corpuz. as affirmed by the CA. Santos. Lastimosa. held that the testimonies of PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas were unequivocal. Lumberio. Corporal. Reyes. Castillo. Like the defense of alibi. which would put their credibility in doubt. Cabañgon. De la Cruz. Inguillo. which the appellant failed to do. frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Rodriguez. Palad. The appellant's defense of frame-up must fail. Rañigo. We have previously ruled that frame-up is a banal defense of those accused in drug-related cases that is viewed with disfavor. The trial court in this case. Espina. and consistent in material respects with each other and with other testimonies and physical evidence. the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence. Tecson. The appellant also did not prove that the prosecution witnesses were maliciously motivated. Francisco. There was no proof proffered to overturn the presumption that the arresting police officers regularly performed their duties. Sandoval. Valiente. Page 954 Echiverri. Marquez. Catindig. Albano. Valois . Gloria. We find no cogent reason to overturn said findings. Tabugan. straightforward. Martinez. De Mesa. Sy. Alcazaren.

GELIG vs. she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her. Marquez. Page 955 Echiverri. Valois . 1981. as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. Reyes. Valiente. Alcazaren. Castillo. Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son. a medical certificate was issued. as amended. Lastimosa. Inguillo. because there was no person in authority (2) Whether or not Lydia should be held liable for the unintentional abortion Albano. was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case. Accordingly. thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. to have suffered incomplete abortion. Likewise. No. Santos. instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter. Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. De la Cruz. The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of the incident. 1981. Coronel.” FACTS: Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries. Martinez. were public school teachers at the Nailon Elementary School. De Mesa. Cebu. Rodriguez. 2002. Sy. On August 28. Tecson. Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area".The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. Micarsos (Gemma). Gloria. Corpuz. Tabugan.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Corporal. Francisco. Roseller. Lydia’s son. Sandoval. Palad. she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed. 173150 July 28.R. Lydia filed an appeal. in Nailon. belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code. to her surprise. However. Ramirez. Bogo. Asensi. Thus. LYDIA C. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling out Direct Assault. the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. On October 11. Cabañgon. Catindig. However. As a result of Lydia’s violent assault. Rañigo. at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning. Lumberio. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when. 2010 DOCTRINE: “a public school teacher. On July 17. Espina.

HELD:

No. There was in fact Direct Assault

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against
public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form
of assault. Its elements are:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by
reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or
his agent in the exercise of his duties.

5. That there is no public uprising.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the
performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising
and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to

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which she was assigned. Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of
persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be
consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that
Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in
authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a
private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated
her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to
pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, but Lydia refused and
instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person.
Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a
wall divider while she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma.

(2) No. It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital
for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981
incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from
the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal
pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her
testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other
factors.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIZER BEDUYA and RIC BEDUYA
G.R. No. 175315 August 9, 2010

DOCTRINE: "Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."

"The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim."

FACTS:

On May 6, 2002, at around 11:45 p.m., Roy Bughao (Bughao) was carrying a
torch on his way home from the birthday celebration of his cousin when Elizer and Ric
suddenly appeared. Ric went around him while his brother Elizer pointed a knife. He
drew back and swung the torch at them and shouted, "Why do you hurt me, what is my
fault?"The Beduya brothers did not reply and continued their assault. Bughao then
scrambled for safety and ran towards the yard of victim Dominador S. Acope, Sr. (Acope,
Sr.) and hid in a dark area.The victim went outside while his son peeped through the
window. The victim saw Bughao who readily identified himself and said that Elizer
pointed a knife at him. As the Beduya brothers entered the yard of the victim’s house,
Bughao hid himself. While in hiding, he saw the Beduya brothers approach the victim
after they were advised to go home since it was already late. The Beduya brothers did
not heed the advice and instead Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed him. The
victim retaliated by striking them with a piece of wood he got hold of. Elizer and Ric ran
away.

The incident was also reported to their Barangay Captain, who responded by
going to the residence of the victim. Upon arrival, he saw the victim lying on the ground
and bleeding from a stab wound. The victim told him that, "I will die because of this. x x x
I was boxed by Ric and I was stabbed by Elizer." He also told the Barangay Captain that
he had no previous quarrel with the Beduya brothers.The Barangay Captain took the
victim to the Jimenez Medicare Hospital but was later advised to proceed to the MHARS
General Hospital in Ozamis City, where the police officer took the statement of the victim
and Acope, Jr. On the next day, May 8, 2002, the victim died due to "septic and
hypovolemic shock secondary to stabbed wound."

The accused were found guilty of the crime of Murder.

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ISSUES:

Whether or not the trial court properly applied the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength.

HELD:

No abuse of Superior Strength as a Qualifying Circumstance in the Crime of
Murder

Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, provided that any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code is present. Abuse of superior strength is one of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned therein that qualifies the killing of the victim to
murder.

In this case, the trial and appellate courts commonly concluded that there was
intent to kill on the part of the appellants and that they employed abuse of superior
strength to ensure the execution and success of the crime. The appellate court even
adopted the trial court’s finding and conclusion that as Ric punched the victim in the
shoulder and appellant Elizer delivered the fatal stab wound, this combined assault
"gave them the advantage over the victim who must have been taken by surprise.
Although the victim struck at accused with a piece of wood, he did so only after he had
been stabbed, causing the two accused to run away."

This reasoning is erroneous.

"Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by
him in the commission of the crime.""The fact that there were two persons who attacked
the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the
victim." The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage,
or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage."To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked."The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in
age, size and strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them
(Elizer) armed with a knife, assaulted the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of
them armed with a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior
strength. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this

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circumstance. Neither did the prosecution present proof to show that the victim suffered
from an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance can be inferred. In fact,
there is evidence that the victim was able to get hold of a piece of wood and deliver
retaliatory blows against the knife-wielder, Elizer.

In view of the foregoing, we are compelled to rule out the presence of abuse of
superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, appellants’ guilt must be limited
to the crime of homicide.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. EDGAR CONCILLADO
G.R. No. 181204, (November 28, 2011)

DOCTRINE:
Wellsettled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once
the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted
especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order.

FACTS:
In the early moning of August 24, 2002, Diosdado Pido was shot, stabbed and
hacked in Barangay Guinciaman, San Miguel, Leyte. Having sustained a total of 26
wounds, he instantly succumbed to death. Blamed for his untimely demise were Edgar
Concillado, Erlito Concillado and Dolores Concillado. Thus, on November 5, 2002, an
Information was filed charging them with murder. On March 12, 2004, the RTC of
Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, rendered its Decision finding all three accused guilty as
charged. However, the CA rendered its Decision acquitting Erlito and Dolores of the crime
charged and finding Edgar guilty only of homicide. As regards Edgar who admitted the
killing, the CA was not convinced of his self-defense theory. However, for lack of evidence
to establish the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA
convicted Edgar only of the crime of homicide.

ISSUE:
WON there was complete self-defense on the part of the accused.

HELD:
NO.
Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once
the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted
especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order. In this case, Edgar admits responsibility for the
death of Diosdado but desires to avoid criminal responsibility therefor by claiming that he
was only acting in self-preservation and that it was in fact Diosdado who was the unlawful
aggressor. It is therefore incumbent upon Edgar to prove that he deserves an acquittal.
For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be properly appreciated, the following
elements must concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. The most important among all the elements is x x x unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete." "There can be no self-defense

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unless there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for
otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel." "Unlawful aggression is an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." We subscribe to
the findings of both the trial court and the CA that there is no unlawful aggression on the
part of Diosdado. According to the trial court, "[t]he distance of the accused from the
fence while he was urinating was about 1½ meters, while the victim was outside and
in-between them was a bamboo fence about four feet high. With the height of the fence
and his distance from the fence, there is an impossibility of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. It also concluded that the victim could not have entered the yard of the
accused. The dead body of Diosdado was found lying on the road about eight meters
from the house of Edgar. However, no traces of blood could be found in the yard of the
accused. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that the disparity of the injuries
sustained belies all pretensions of self-defense. Diosdado suffered a total of 26 incised,
stab and bullet wounds. On the other hand, Edgar suffered only three superficial
wounds. "As has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds
sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense." Moreover, during his
cross-examination, Edgar admitted that he continued to inflict injuries on Diosdado
notwithstanding the fact that he was already lying lifeless on the ground. There being
no unlawful aggression to speak of, Edgar's theory of self defense has no leg to
stand on. Having miserably failed to discharge his burden of proof, we therefore find
Edgar criminally responsible for the death of Diosdado.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMINIANO BARCELA
G.R. No. 179948, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the four well-established principles
x x x: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (3) [considering] the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (4) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the primordial consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the private complainants testimony.

FACTS:
On January 4, 2004, AAA, then 11 years old, was at the residence of her parents in
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, tending to her younger siblings. Her father, the appellant, arrived at
around five o’clock in the afternoon from the Bicol Medical Center, where his pregnant wife and
mother of AAA was left behind to take care of their two children who were confined thereat. After
eating dinner prepared by appellant, AAA and her siblings went to sleep at around six to seven
o’clock in the evening while appellant attended to his youngest child who was suffering from an
asthma attack. At around nine o’clock in the evening, AAA was awakened due to a pain in her
vagina. She then noticed that she was naked with her hands tied above her head. Her feet were
spread apart and tied to the bamboo poles of their house. While in this exposed position,
appellant was on top of her, inserting his penis into her vagina and making a push and pull
movement. While she was being violated by appellant, AAA cried in pain. Thereafter, appellant
untied her, used a lighter to illuminate himself and the ice pick poked at her, and told her to go
back to sleep. The following morning, AAA just lay in bed and continued crying. Appellant told
her to wake up and wash her bloodstained panty. She got up, but instead of obeying appellant,
she burned said underwear together with her mat to rid herself of any reminder of the horrible
fate she suffered in the hands of her father. AAA told her mother about the appellants beastly
sexual aggression on January 21, 2004. The following day, January 22, 2004, the mother of
AAA took her to the Bicol Medical Center for a medical examination conducted by Dr. Augusto
M. Quilon, Jr. who issued a medical certificate confirming that AAA had old hymenal lacerations
at two and seven o’clock positions. When asked to clarify, Dr. Quilon explained that it takes
about two weeks for a laceration to heal. In this case, since the rape took place on January 4,
2004, the lacerations were already considered old and healed by the time AAA was examined
on January 22, 2004, or 17 days after the rape. The RTC rendered its decision finding the
accused guilty of qualified rape and which was affirmed by the CA

ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of qualified rape

HELD:
YES. In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the four well-established principles
x x x: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (3) [considering] the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the

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complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (4) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the primordial consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the private complainants testimony. In this case,
the trial court gave complete credence to AAAs testimony. She positively identified the appellant
as her sexual aggressor and never wavered in her declaration on the details of the horrible
experience she suffered in the hands of her father. On January 4, 2004, she was just 11 years
old when her father undressed her, and tied her hands and feet while she was asleep. He was
already having carnal knowledge of her when she was awakened due to the excruciating pain
caused by the penetration of her own fathers penis into her vagina. This incident occurred in the
evening in the privacy of their family home. [T]he findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
witnesses [will not be disturbed on appeal] considering that [the trial court] is in a better position
to observe their candor and [conduct] on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, [due to] its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially
under cross-examination. Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the case.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIPE NACHOR
G.R. No. 177779, (December 14, 2010)

DOCTRINE: In determining the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

FACTS:
AAA was born on September 11, 1986, and lived with her parents and four siblings. She
was 14 years old when in the morning of May 9, 2001, she was left alone with her father, the
appellant. While she was cooking at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, the appellant suddenly
poked a bolo at her neck, pulled her wrist and dragged her towards the room which she shared
with her brother and sisters. Gripped with fear, she struggled and attempted to escape but the
appellants strength was too much for her. Her shouts for help were futile since the house of their
nearest neighbor was about a hundred meters away and separated by trees and hilly terrain
from their house. While inside the room, the appellant, with a bolo still in his hand, forced AAA to
lie down on the bed. When she obeyed, the appellant removed her shorts and
panty. Thereafter, he took off his shorts and underwear and started kissing her neck and
breasts. He proceeded to mount AAA, inserted his penis inside her vagina and executed a
pumping motion. During this ordeal, AAA continued to struggle, but her attempt to resist the
appellants lewd desires was unsuccessful. She instead experienced intense pain and cried.
After the appellant satisfied his lust, he again poked his bolo at AAA and threatened to kill her,
her mother and siblings if she would report the incident to anyone. The appellant then stood up,
put on his clothes and departed. AAA kept the incident to herself out of fear. AAA was again
raped by the appellant in the first week of June, 2001 when her mother and siblings were not
around. A few months later, the abdomen of AAA started to bulge. Having been threatened by
the appellant, she refused to divulge any information. The mother of AAA therefore sought the
assistance of one of her wedding sponsors to whom AAA finally revealed the sexual abuse she
experienced in the hands of her father. After this revelation was relayed to her mother, AAA was
immediately taken to the Regional Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
where she declared in an interview that her father sired the child she was carrying. She was then
taken to the National Bureau of Investigation for a medico-legal examination. The results
confirmed that AAA was pregnant. On December 27, 2001, AAA gave birth to a baby boy she
named BBB. The RTC rendered a decision convicting the accused which was also affirmed by
the CA.

ISSUE:

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WON the accused is guilty of rape.

HELD:
YES. In determining the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Guided by these legal precepts, we find the testimony of AAA, who was 14 years old when the
two incidents of rape occurred, credible and untainted by any hint of falsehood or
prevarication. We agree with the observations of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, that the
testimony of AAA on both occasions of her rape is worthy of credence. Her statements under
oath are sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for having carnal knowledge of her by
means of force and intimidation on May 9, 2001 and the first week of June, 2001. AAA positively
identified the appellant as her abuser. She never wavered in her testimony and maintained even
on cross-examination that the appellant was her rapist. On the issue of credibility of witnesses,
the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence x x
x. Having the [advantage of directly observing the] deportment and manner of testifying [of the
witness], the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly. In this case, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA. The evaluation of the testimony of AAA has been appreciated properly and
the evidence is overwhelming to convict the appellant of the crime charged.

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AZUCENA B. CORPUZ vs. ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 149261, December 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: It is a rule too firmly established that the "determination of probable cause
for the filing of an Information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains
at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of
Justice." "Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that the full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation."

FACTS:
The controversy has its root in an affidavit-complaint[4] filed with the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati City by Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. del Rosario accusing herein
petitioner Assistant Solicitor General Azucena B. Corpuz for Libel. In said complaint,
respondent claimed that petitioner's June 13, 1997 memorandum was maliciously issued
without any good intention but to discredit and cause dishonor to his good name as a
government employee. He insisted that the import of the memorandum affected his
credibility and the performance of his official functions as Assistant Solicitor General
among others.
Prosecutor Ata issued a Resolution stating that the evidence has sufficiently
established a probable cause to indict respondent with the crime of libel, and accordingly.
Petitioner's appeal from the prosecutor's resolution was not given due course. The DOJ
Secretaiy considered the appeal as a second motion for reconsideration and resolved to
deny the appeal with finality. Petitioner then elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari
before the CA contending that the public prosecutors gravely abused their discretion in
finding a prima facie case of libel against her and exceeded their jurisdiction when her
appeal from the resolution of the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City was not given due
course. Court of Appeals found that the petitioner failed to clearly show exceptional
circumstances to justify her resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor the CA correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Assistant City Prosecutor in concluding that her findings have prima
facie established the elements of libel despite their not being in accordance with law and
jurisprudence on the matter.

HELD:
No. The contentions of petitioner are devoid of merit.

"Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been

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committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof." A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspect. It "need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." A
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable
cause justifying the filing of criminal information against the respondent since the
determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. Judicial
review is allowed only where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Court find that in arriving at their unanimous
conclusion that probable cause for libel exists, the prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice had clearly determined and carefully deliberated on the factual and legal
antecedents of the case. The resolution of the prosecutor as sustained by the Secretary
of Justice and the CA shows that it squarely addressed and took into consideration all the
arguments and evidence submitted. The evidence before the prosecutor served as basis
in arriving at her findings of fact.

As defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of libel has the following
elements:
1. imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance;

2.the imputation must be malicious;

3. it must be given publicity; and

4. the victim must be identifiable.

As extant from the resolution of the prosecutor, the presence of these elements was
duly established during the preliminary investigation stage clearly showing prima facie a
well-founded belief that a crime of libel has been committed and that petitioner probably
committed it. It must be stressed that an accusation is not synonymous with guilt. That is
why a trial has to follow, precisely to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER,
ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC* AGACER
G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011

DOCTRINE: Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is
therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the
criminal act of another. In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.

FACTS:
Cesario was clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice
seedlings. While Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged
from a nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario
moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working.
However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesario’s rice seedlings. This
prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. At this point,
Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat
again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to
come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the
group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without warning,
shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took
aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants
fled towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm
was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesario’s fallen body.
Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a
tricycle.
The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence sufficient to prove
appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in
inflicting upon Cesario, in a treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill Cesario.

HELD:
No. The appeal is unmeritorious. Conspiracy was sufficiently established.
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." In conspiracy, it is not necessary to
adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It "may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest." Proof of
a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that
the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.

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Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to
commit the crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario,
the acts of all appellants before, during and after the incident establish the existence of
conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the
same time from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario
by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at the time of the incident.
Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a
bow and arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and
Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie
immediately shot Cesario at close range while the latter was approaching the group of
appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and
Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything
to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants
departed from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in
design, intent and execution. They "performed specific acts with closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design" to ensure the
death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts’ finding that appellants conspired to
commit the crime of murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants’ assertion that each of them can only be
made liable for his own acts deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants
delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person
may be convicted for the criminal act of another. In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed
the act of all.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RODRIGuez LUCERO y PAW-AS alias "Kikit,"
G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010

DOCTRINE: The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as
long as the attack is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or
to defend himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest
provocation from an unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.

FACTS:

Maceda went out of his house to get "kasla," a medicinal herb for his sick child.
After getting the herb, he went to a waiting shed located about 10 meters away from his
house as he saw a certain Linda Basalo thereat waiting for a ride. While at the waiting
shed, the victim Edgar Aydaon passed by. But after a while, the victim returned and
helped Basalo load the vegetables in the jeepney.

After the jeepney left, appellant arrived and called out the victim. Appellant pleaded that
he be allowed by the victim to go with him as the appellant was allegedly being pursued
by a certain Pandeta. The victim acceded to the request and even invited appellant to
sleep in his house. However, after walking a distance of about 10 meters, appellant
suddenly hacked the victim at the left side of his head causing the victim to fall to the
ground. In spite of the fact that the victim was already lying on the ground, appellant
further stabbed him on his waist. Thereafter, appellant left the premises. The defense
presented appellant as its lone witness who could only offer denial and alibi. He claimed
that he was at his farm located at Nyholm, Agusan del Sur. He alleged that he had no prior
disagreement with the victim or any of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, he could not
understand why he was being implicated in the crime.

The trial court found appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The trial court
however found that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present.
The trial court found the inconsistencies in the testimony of Maceda only minor and trivial
as they did not touch on the elements of the crime. The CA affirmed with modifications the
Decision of the trial court. The appellate court also affirmed the findings of the trial court
that treachery attended the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in giving full weight and credence to the
inconsistent testimony of Maceda and disregarding the defense interposed by the
appellant

HELD:

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No. The defense basically assails the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Maceda.
As it did before the CA, the defense claims that credence should not have been given to
the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Maceda as it bore several inconsistencies.

The Court find this contention untenable. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court
accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more
so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case. Besides, upon our review of the
records of this case, we find that both the trial court and the CA did not overlook or
misunderstand any substance or fact which would have materially affected the outcome
of this case.

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies referred to by the defense indeed refer to
minor details which are very inconsequential to the outcome of the case. According to
the defense, "Maceda first testified that when the victim was about to leave, appellant
came out and mauled the victim. However, he contradicted himself when he further
testified that when [appellant] came out, the latter conversed with the victim and it was
only after the victim and the appellant reached the distance of ten (10) meters that he
saw the appellant [hack] the victim."

This contention was satisfactorily debunked by the prosecution. We thus agree
that whether the appellant immediately mauled the victim or he mauled him only after
walking a distance of 10 meters does not deviate from the fact that appellant did indeed
maul and hack the victim. Moreover, the prosecution correctly argued that "appellant
quoted x x x Maceda’s testimony separately and took it out of context." The records
show that after making a general statement that appellant came out and mauled the
victim, Maceda further explained when pressed for details that appellant hacked the
victim after they conversed and walked the distance of about 10 meters.

Finally, the Court agree with both the trial court and the CA that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. Records show that appellant lulled the victim into
believing that he was being pursued by somebody. Believing in the tale being spun by
the appellant, the victim even offered appellant the security and protection of his house.
However, appellant reciprocated the victim’s trust and hospitality by suddenly hacking
him on the head and stabbing him on the waist. "The settled rule is that treachery can
exist even if the attack is frontal, as long as the attack is sudden and unexpected, giving
the victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MANUEL "AWIL" POJO
G.R. No. 183709, December 6, 2010

DOCTRINE: Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.
Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has
been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it
would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime
scene.

FACTS:

"AAA" testified that appellant is the common-law husband of her mother. On October
20, 2003, at about three o’clock in the afternoon, her mother sent her to bring food to the
appellant who was working at the camote plantation of a certain Tuason. While thereat,
appellant made her lie on the ground which he covered with banana leaves. After
ordering "AAA" to remove her shorts and panty, he also removed his undergarments and
inserted his penis into the vagina of "AAA." However, appellant’s penis failed to
completely penetrate "AAA’s" vagina but merely touched the same. However, "AAA" still
felt pain in her private organ. After a while, appellant stood up and ordered "AAA" to go
home. "AAA" however noticed a whitish substance coming out of appellant’s private part.
Appellant denied raping her.

The trial court lent credence to the version of the prosecution. It noted that rape was
consummated although there was no complete penetration considering the categorical
statement of "AAA" that she felt the penis of the appellant touch her private part. "AAA"
was only 10 years old when the rape incident transpired; and only 12 years old when
placed on the witness stand. According to the trial court, "AAA" could not have concocted
the rape incident if it did not actually transpire. Being a minor, she lacked the
sophistication to fabricate the crime of rape against the appellant. The appellate court
affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court. Likewise, the appellate court held that
appellant’s alibi does not inspire belief as he failed to present any independent evidence
to establish his whereabouts

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alibi of the appellant should be given weight and credence

HELD:

No. Both the trial court and the appellate court correctly disregarded appellant’s alibi.
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to

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support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.
Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has
been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it
would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

LYZAH SY FRANCO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171328, February 16, 2011

DOCTRINE: In the prosecution for the crime of estafa committed under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, there must be evidence of false
representation or false pretense on the part of the accused to prove reasonable doubt. In
this case, the employee’s act of soliciting a client despite previous knowledge of several
complaints against his or her employer for failure to deliver the motor vehicle that was the
subject of the agreement, is tantamount to misrepresentation.

FACTS:
Lourdes G. Antonio testified that petitioners swindled her. Lourdes was interested in
the offer of Franco since she and her husband were actually looking for a used car for
their taxicab operation. She therefore contacted Franco to take up her offer. Franco and
Lourdes went to a showroom; Lourdes immediately chose a blue Mazda 323 car. Franco
went to the house of Lourdes and presented a sales proposal, where she can buy the car
through a down payment and installments. The car, however, was not delivered as
promised. When the car was still undelivered, Lourdes sought the aid of "Hoy Gising."
Franco denied involvement in the alleged conspiracy to commit estafa against Lourdes.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b). The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of estafa

HELD:
Yes. The conviction of Franco and Besario for conspiring to commit estafa against
Lourdes must therefore stand. The prosecution satisfactorily established their
participation in the scheme to defraud Lourdes, their acts were not isolated from but
related to a plot to deceive her. The prosecution likewise proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the well-planned swindling scheme of Franco and Besario resulted to estafa.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. "Conspiracy must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the
felony subject of the agreement of the parties. [It] may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators
[prior to], during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose."
Evidently, petitioners’ actions were in relation to the attainment of a common
objective. They had vital roles in the nefarious scheme to sell a vehicle that they knew
would never be delivered, but for which they obtained a substantial sum of money from
Lourdes.

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Having established the existence of a conspiracy between Franco and Besario,
the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove that the acts of the petitioners
constituted estafa.
Estafa by Means of Deceit
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when
committed as follows:
xxxx

2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

(a) by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.

"The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there must be
a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or
property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage."

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SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172678 March 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party
not liable to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership over the same.

FACTS:
In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac,
Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials
conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion
anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five boats
and a long fishing net already spread over the water. The team boarded the vessel and
apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of threeFilipinos and three
Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion. TheProvincial
Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed the charges except those against the 17 Chinese
fishermen.

This was after it was found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the
illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea
Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor concluded that the crew,
unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of
uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their lives and property which hindered them
from asserting their authority over these Chinese nationals.With the crew of F/V Sea Lion
now exculpated, F/V Sea Lion was thus, recommended to be released to the petitioner
upon proper showing of evidence of its ownership of the aforesaid vessel.
Petitioner,however, failed to act in accordance with said Resolutions.The Seventeen (17)
accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals for the crime of
Violation of Section 88, sub-par. (3) of R.A. 8550 and sentenced them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS TO SIX (6) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS AND SEVEN (7)
DAYS. The Fishing VesselF/V Sea Lion I as well as the fishing paraphernalia and
equipments used by the accused in committing the crime was ordered confiscated in
favor of the government.The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to delete from
said Sentences the confiscation of F/VSea Lion but was denied by RTC and CA, thus
this petitioner was filed.Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it
because it is the registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members
were not among those accused of and convicted invoking Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code. The OSG contends that even if Article 45 of theRevised Penal Code is applicable,
still the present petition must fail due to petitioner's failure to present its third-party claim
at the earliest opportunity.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid.

HELD:
YES. Evidently, the remedial relief pursued by the petitioner was infirm and
improper. Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership
was not cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial
court. At that point, evidence should have been adduced to support the petitioner's claim
(so that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been
prayed for, rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.)

Given the absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the
failure to comply with the additional Article 45 requirement, the court's order to confiscate
the F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87 of R.A. No. 8550 cannot be incorrect to the point
of being an act in grave abuse of discretion.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORANTE RELANES alias "DANTE,"
G.R. No. 175831 April 12, 2011

DOCTRINE: In rape cases, if the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted solely on that basis" for "rape is generally unwitnessed and
oftentimes, the victim is left to testify for herself.

FACTS:
Private complainant AAA was only eight years old when her father, the accused
herein raped her on the first week of Aug. 2002 and on Jan. 9, 2003. The victim got
pregnant as a result of the abuses where the accused threatened to kill her and her
family if she would tell anyone. AAAgave a testimony and described how she was
abused. Accused denied the rape incident on Jan. 2003 but eventually admitted on
having sexual intercourse with AAA on Aug. 2002. During the course of the trial, he
pleaded forgiveness to his wife, daughter and other members of his family. He was
convicted for each count of rape with a penalty of death. Judgment was affirmed by CA
hence, the automatic review.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred gravely in giving full weight and credence to
the incredible statement of AAA;
2. Whether or not the plea for forgiveness by the accused can be considered as
an attempt to compromise and is therefore admissible in evidence as an admission of
guilt

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: NO. The defense of the accused of denial and alibi should be
dismissed outright in light of his positive identification of AAA. It is an established rule
that denial and alibi, being negative self-serving defences, cannot prevail over the
positive allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive identification of the
accused as her assailant.

2. SECOND ISSUE: Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he
committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to
an attempt to compromise. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those

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Valiente. Gloria. Palad. Martinez. Under the circumstances. De la Cruz. Francisco. an offer to compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Rañigo. Lumberio. Reyes. Coronel. Alcazaren. Catindig. Ramirez. involving quasi-offenses as those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions. De Mesa. Corporal. Espina. Albano. Sandoval. Inguillo. Tecson. Cabañgon. Castillo. Marquez. Corpuz. Asensi. Penalty of death reduced to reclusion perpetua. Santos. Valois . Sy.Judgment of CA was affirmed. Page 980 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. his plea for forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt. Tabugan.

Sy. Marquez. When she regained consciousness at around 11:00 o’clock p. AAA told her cousin about what happened. AAA passed by a bakery where Olesco was working. Valiente.. AAA explained that she was able to report the incident to the barangay officials two days after it happened since when she woke up in the morning of October 18. Olesco denied the accusations against him and put up Sweetheartdefense as his defense. the barangay officials referred the matter to the police. AAA found herself naked beside Olesco inside a room located near the bakery. After two (2) days. Alcazaren. Reyes. HELD: The sweetheart theory or sweetheart defense is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience. 2001. For the Court to even consider giving credence to such defense. De la Cruz. When she arrived home. Tabugan. 2001. Coronel. Ramirez. it must be proven by compelling Albano.R. accused told her to go home. Her whole body ached. Valois . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening. Thereafter. She dressed up immediately and went home running. Santos. Inguillo. Rodriguez. FACTS: On October 17. 174861 April 11. AAA then slapped the accused three times and asked him why he raped her. tummy and her private part. Rañigo. Catindig. Thereafter. The barangay officials asked her the whereabouts of the accused which she did not know then as she saw the accused only once and knows him only by face. An investigation was subsequently conducted. Page 981 Echiverri. and. and she could not stand asher whole body ached. that she consented to the alleged sexual relations.m. Lumberio. AAA reported the incident to the barangay. Corpuz. 2011 DOCTRINE: In rape. because this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust. Olesco answered that he would kill her should she report the incident to the police. No. that the accused and the victim were lovers. Martinez. Corporal. De Mesa. especially her cheeks. After a while. Francisco. Cabañgon. the sweetheart defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first. Palad. Lastimosa.m. REYNALDO OLESCO Y ANDAYANG G. second. somebody pulled her and covered her mouth with a hanky which caused her to be unconscious. The second is as important as the first. it was already 9:00 o’clock a. Gloria. Castillo. Asensi. Tecson. Espina. ISSUE: Whether AAA voluntarily perfomed sexual intercourse with the accused. Sandoval.

Lastimosa. Catindig. Valois . Being sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act. having failed to satisfactorily establish that AAA voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse with him. and photographs. Martinez. Lumberio. Independent proof is required -. Santos. Albano. evidence. Valiente. Asensi. as in the instant case. Tabugan. Reyes. Ramirez.[28] Thus. Tecson. Corpuz. mementos. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Coronel. Sandoval. Page 982 Echiverri. Palad. De la Cruz. Marquez. and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge of rape. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Inguillo. Corporal. Espina. the said act constitutes rape on the part of the appellant. Castillo. Cabañgon.such as tokens. Rañigo. the claim is inconsequential since it is well-settled that being sweethearts does not negate the commission of rape because such fact does not give appellant license to have sexual intercourse against her will. Francisco. Sy. Gloria. There is none presented here by the defense. In any event.

she was forced to remove her pants and panty because of fear. Page 983 Echiverri. HELD: No. Coronel. Rañigo. Gloria. Sy. Catindig. Ramirez. He pulled her towards the house. appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts. Asensi. Valois .The Court finds "AAA" candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her Albano. Once inside. Tecson. Palad. Reyes. appellant finally let her go after threatening to kill her if she reports the incident to her parents. All of a sudden. Corpuz. Marquez. Sandoval. "AAA's" uncle. Castillo. Martinez. De la Cruz. Pointing the knife at the left portion of her abdomen. "AAA" decided not to disclose what transpired because of fear. No. 2011 DOCTRINE:The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. 16 years of age at the time she testified that she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass at "BBB". Lumberio. he claimed that it was voluntary and without the use of force since they were lovers. CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO G. 176740. Lastimosa. Francisco. "CCC". Alcazaren. Inguillo. appellant presented witnesses who both corroborated his sweetheart defense. Nevertheless. a young barrio lass. To support his claim that "AAA" was his girlfriend. Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. June 22.R. Espina. Instead. Valiente. "DDD". Pleading that she be allowed to go home. Version of the Defense Appellant does not deny having had sexual intercourse with "AAA". Corporal. ISSUE: Whether or not the sexual congress between Dumayag and private complainant was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary and consensual. Tabugan. De Mesa. Cabañgon. "EEE" learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual intercourse with her. Appellant also removed his pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed. Rodriguez. FACTS: Version of the Prosecution "AAA". Santos. appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

"It is a common judicial experience that rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby. A `sweetheart defense. De Mesa.' to be credible. Ramirez. Neither is it improbable for appellant to employ such criminal design in the presence of his (appellant) own family especially when overcome by lust. Castillo. should not be judged by the norms of behaviour expected of mature persons. Valiente. The failure of "AAA" to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from natural human conduct. like "AAA". Corporal. Sandoval. Gloria. Marquez. Francisco. Rodriguez. not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Alcazaren. Lumberio. even if it were true that appellant and "AAA" were sweethearts. the courts below did not err in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed through force and intimidation. gifts. pictures. Sy. Espina. "The failure of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon her and the latter submits herself. Inguillo. Coronel. Asensi. Definitely. De la Cruz. Tabugan. will. Valois . Besides. testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. Palad. Moreover. There is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped. being then a minor and subjected to a threat to her life. It bears to stress that "as a rule. Tecson. a man cannot demand sexual gratification froma fiancé and worse. Catindig. mementos] and the like. Cabañgon. Martinez. employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Page 984 Echiverri. The fact that there is no evidence of resistance on the part of "AAA" does not cloud her credibility." Thus. against her will. Reyes. to the rapist’s assault because of fear for life and physical safety. "AAA". could be easily intimidated and cowed into silence even by the mildest threat against their lives. Rañigo. this fact does not necessarily negate rape. the reason for "AAA's" failure to shout or cry for help is because she was overcame by fear. It bears emphasis that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. Corpuz. Santos. Lastimosa. should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes.With the credibility of "AAA" having been firmly established. It has been held that minors. Love is not a license of lust. Albano.

De Mesa. she started living with "DDD" and appellant when she was still small. particularly during her summer vacation at "BBB". "AAA" was not in "BBB" but in "EEE" attending school. Reyes. Palad. The first rape happened during the first week. Santos. The last witness for the defense was the appellant himself. 175834. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Lumberio. According to "AAA". Valiente. ISSUE: Whether or not the court must give credence to the testimonies of “AAA” as to its chronological consistency of narrating the incident of rape. Marquez. Rañigo. Catindig. Espina. Sandoval. who is the aunt of "AAA". ROSAURO ASETRE Y DURAN G. his live-in partner. Appellant even threatened "AAA" that she and "DDD" would be killed if she would report the incident. De la Cruz. Appellant took off her clothesthen inserted his penis into her vagina. Lastimosa. and his helpers. FACTS: The prosecution established that appellant was the common-law husband of "DDD". June 08. Martinez. Coronel. Castillo. 2001. VS. Corporal. The first witness for the defense was Rosita Clarin (Clarin) who testified that appellant was her neighbor for four years.R. He denied having raped "AAA". PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ramirez. Page 985 Echiverri. 2011 DOCTRINE: Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim create a reasonable doubt in court as to whether appellant did in fact rape the victim. Tabugan. Francisco. He averred that at that time. or until March 23. HELD: The appeal is partially meritorious. Clarin asserted that at the time the alleged rapes were committed.The Court have thoroughly reviewed the records of the case and we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution showed Albano. hence appellant could not have raped her. Rodriguez. he was at "BBB" together with "DDD". Clarin averred that "AAA" arrived at "BBB" only one day after the latest alleged rape was committed. Valois . appellant sexually molested "AAA" three more times. "AAA" was not in "BBB" but in "EEE" attending school. appellant raped her four times. Corpuz. No. Sy. Gloria. He claimed that from the first week up to the third week of March 2001. APPELLEE. Asensi. Inguillo. Thereafter. Tecson.

The Informations charged appellant with having raped "AAA" on the first week. De Mesa. Corporal. These inconsistencies create a reasonable doubt in court as to whether appellant did in fact rape "AAA" during those occasions. Gloria. Albano. Coronel. Lumberio. Rañigo. Francisco. and third week. Palad. Martinez. Asensi. De la Cruz. appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will. She never wavered in her narration that through threats and intimidation. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Rodriguez. Espina. Inguillo. Cabañgon. the Court could not agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the inconsistencies in the testimony of "AAA" regarding the first three rape incidents are inconsequential. second week. Santos. that appellant is guilty of only one count of rape. Tecson. Sy. Castillo. the testimony of "AAA" with regard to the first three incidents particularly on the dates when and the places where the offenses were supposedly committed contains disturbing discrepancies. and not four counts. Thus. as argued by the defense. Corpuz. 2001. Catindig. Valiente. Sandoval. of March 2001. Reyes. Page 986 Echiverri. However. Marquez. Valois . 2001 incident was candid and consistent. and on March 23. Lastimosa. "AAA's" testimony as regards the March 23. Tabugan. In contrast.

RTC convicted Bingky and Danny to reclusion perpetua. based from the trial there was no mention at all that the victim was among the four persons who allegedly attacked Danny and Bingky. likewise. he claims that he did it in self defense. Reyes.R. De Mesa. Danny stabbed the victim while Bingky stood nearby. Asensi. The convictions of the Appellants are proper. Danny pulled out a knife and thrust it towards one of the men. Castillo. Danny and Bingky met four men who mauled Bingky. Sandoval. However. Before Lester can utter a word of warning. In the case at bar. Inguillo. Lumberio. that conspiracy attended the killing of the victim and that appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Catindig. This is because judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. NO. it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has admitted the killing. Tabugan. the burden of proof is shifted to him. Alcazaren. Appellants pray for the reversal of their conviction alleging that the prosecutor failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Danny asserts that his reaction was arising from a prior act of aggression and provocation by the victim and his companions. once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as a defense. Palad. When Bingky was able to run away. ISSUE: WON the conviction of Danny and Bingky is proper. which caused the victim’s death. He cannot relay on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak. However. When Lester and the victim was chatting. came to buy cigarettes and candies. Espina. BINGKY CAMPOS AND DANNY “BOY” ACABO G. Lastimosa. Martinez. Ramirez. his uncle. Tecson. FACTS: Lester Huck Baldivino was tending his sari-sari store when the victim Romeo Abad. HELD: Yes. Danny narrated that while on their way to the house of their uncle. 176061. Albano. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Francisco. As for his defense. 2011 DOCTRINE: Once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as a defense. Rodriguez. there is nothing in the trial which evinces unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Marquez. the burden of proof is shifted to him. Danny then ran away to escape. However. they approached Danny and kicked him. Coronel. Corporal. Cabañgon. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Lester heard footsteps and immediately saw Danny Boy and Bingky running towards the victim. Sy. The Appellee. Rañigo. July 4. Danny categorically admits that he stabbed the victim. Gloria. argues that Danny failed to prove his plea of self-defense. Santos. Valiente. Page 987 Echiverri. Valois . They claim that the stabbing of the victim was done in self-defense and that the mere presence of Bingky at the scene of the crime does not prove the existence of conspiracy.

Martinez. 175289. Any right that an accused may have in questioning the non-inclusion of another person in the Information should be raised in a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint against said individual. De la Cruz. Sandoval. and actively participating in the trial. but such infirmities do not constitute denial of due process on the part of Villarin. Francisco. HELD: Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. Ramirez. No.R. It is submitted that the complaint did not include Villarin as respondent. Boyatac and Baillo filed a motion for reinvestigation. August 31. 2011 DOCTRINE: An accused. Reyes. CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYDA vs. Palad. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Espina. Page 988 Echiverri. Asensi. Castillo. Alcazaren. De Mesa. Coronel. The motion was denied by the Ombudsman. FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City against Latayda. Corpuz. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. They alleged that the Affidavit on which the information was based never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not Villarin was denied due process when he was not afforded to participate in the preliminary investigation and Whether or not the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the complaint is proper. Sy. Gloria. (Respondents are Barangay Captain and Kagawads) Villarin. Camilo Sudaria. They argue that the denial of the motion by the Ombudsman deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation. Valiente. On appeal. an information was filed against Villarin. Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted Albano. or other forest products without license. Cabañgon. Corporal. Inguillo. is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. while the accusations against Boyatac and Baillo were not based on personal knowledge of the affiants. Baillo and Boyatac. Latayda. Lumberio. However. As Villarin was indicated in the Information despite his not being including in the criminal complaint that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. Catindig. Marquez. The RTC directed the petitioners to file their motion with the Ombudsman which filed the information. Tecson. They also questioned the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information. by entering his plea. Rodriguez. Marlon Bailloo. Valois . the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. and Cipriano Boyatac for violation of gathering and/or collecting timer. Rañigo. Santos. RTC found petitioners guilty. the Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information not only against the aforementioned persons but also against Villarin and also recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria. Thus.

De la Cruz. Coronel. Espina. However. prior to the filing of the criminal case. Corpuz. Sandoval. Marquez. It was only after judgment against him that he once again assailed the lack of preliminary investigation in the motion for reconsideration. entered a plea of not guilty and actively participated in the trial. By entering his plea. he never raised this issue again. the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. Valois . Ramirez. Lumberio. The non-inclusion of Sudaria in the information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria. Here it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his motion for reinvestigation. Inguillo. actively participating in the trial. Lastimosa. Santos. Cabañgon. Palad. Reyes. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. Francisco. Corporal. De Mesa. Valiente. he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. However after the denial of the motion. Sy. whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as principal. Alcazaren. They were also given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to convince the prosecutor of their innocence. Rodriguez. Catindig. Albano. Martinez. Rañigo. Gloria. Asensi. Tabugan. Page 989 Echiverri. Moreover. Tecson. He accepted the verdict. Castillo.

Appellant asserts that in Galfo's sworn statement before the police officers. Reyes. 1991. Rodriguez. Coronel. Salcedo. Inguillo. According to the trial court. 179195. Espina. FACTS: In the afternoon of May 12. Corpuz. Page 990 Echiverri. Instead. two of which were fatal and were inflicted at the back. the victim suffered eight stab wounds. he did not identify him as the assailant that Galfo described him only through his outfit without any mention at all of his features or identifying marks notwithstanding that he (Galfo) was familiar with him. Cabañgon. These honest inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than destroy the witness’s credibility. According to Dr. Aside from his positive identification by Galfo. Appellant next posits that Galfo's behavior after the stabbing incident is not in accord with the normal course of things. one of whom suddenly stabbed Magan at the back. No. The trial court found the testimony of Galfo that he personally saw appellant stab Magan at the back as credible because he was positioned only five arms length away from the victim. Corporal.R. Appellant thus concludes that all these circumstances create doubt as to whether he was indeed the assailant. Valiente. Sandoval. Martinez. Elmo Galfo (Galfo) and the victim. While running. Tecson. Galfo noticed two persons following them. Santos. the Provincial Health Officer of Guimaras. Rañigo. October 03. Galfo positively identified Angelino Yanson. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Carlito Magan (Magan). The trial court also appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering the suddenness and the surreptitiousness of the attack on the victim. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. Appellant finds it strikingly odd Albano. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. rushed towards him thus prompting him to run away for safety. Francisco. Galfo tried to approach the victim but appellant and his companion. Valois . however. Alcazaren. ANGELINO YANSON G. Catindig. Marquez. After a while. the discrepancies only erase suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. Asensi. Thus. Ramirez. Tabugan. Lastimosa. were drinking whisky in the store of a certain Lorna Tamson (Tamson). De Mesa. Edgardo Jabasa. Sy. Lumberio. it would be highly improbable for Galfo to look back and witness the stabbing by Salcedo while running at a fast pace. Castillo. Palad. The discrepancies in the witness’s testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence in its material whole. it exonerated Salcedo of any participation in the crime The CA affirmed the trial court's finding that it was indeed appellant who stabbed Magan. Gloria. as the person who stabbed Magan. However. he managed to look back and saw appellant and Salcedo stab the victim some more. they were joined by appellant and Salcedo. the CA also found appellant's defense of alibi to be weak and undeserving of belief because he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. They finished drinking at around 8:45 in the evening after which Galfo and Magan walked home together After traversing a distance of about half a kilometer. 2011 DOCTRINE: The alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment. it did not lend credence to Galfo's testimony that he also saw Salcedo stab the victim. De la Cruz.

These honest inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than destroy the witness’s credibility. or unusual for Galfo to take a rest for 30 minutes at his house after having witnessed the stabbing incident. Martinez. Corpuz. Inguillo. Instead. Some may react violently while others may exhibit nonchalance or even boredom. Rodriguez. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Cabañgon. Rañigo. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange. Sy. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that people react differently when confronted with a frightful occurrence. Castillo. De la Cruz. Asensi. The settled rule is that witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. Different people react differently to a given situation. Santos. startling or frightful experience Albano. he could not fathom why the victim's family would not immediately come to the rescue of their fallen kin after they have been informed about the incident. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Coronel. Reyes. Francisco. Valois . the discrepancies only erase suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. Lumberio. Tecson. Corporal. Catindig. Page 991 Echiverri. HELD: NO. Valiente. Sandoval. Tabugan. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the findings of the trial court. The discrepancies in the witness’s testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence in its material whole. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. Alcazaren. Palad. Gloria. De Mesa. Also. Marquez. The alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment. Ramirez. Espina. Lastimosa.

Information for parricide and slight physical injuries were thus filed and consolidated. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child. NOEL T. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree. Page 992 Echiverri. HELD: NO. Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. is thus clear. Camarines Sur Albano. Reyes. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. Martinez. Sandoval. Rodriguez. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. committed a felony. Inguillo.R. Corporal. looked for them the next day. Maria Litan Sales (Maria). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. Palad. Asensi. De la Cruz. Salvador Betito. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head. a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac. Marquez. No. there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries. 2002. Sy. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son. Alcazaren. left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Penafrancia without the permission of their parents. 177218. she told appellant that their son was already dead. Noemar. appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. the left cheek. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. Catindig. When the beating finally stopped. However. he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them. brothers Noemar and Junior. who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Lastimosa. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead. Rañigo. Ramirez. Corpuz. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts. Valiente. 2002. Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. respectively. Here. Coronel. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life. it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming findings of the trial court. Cabañgon. Espina. Castillo. October 03. a furious appellant confronted them. However. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. Gloria. 2011 DOCTRINE: A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. appellant brought his son back to their house. Tecson. Shortly thereafter. Tabugan.While Dr. He left and returned with one. appellant refused to believe her. When their mother. she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. Francisco. In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit. They did not return home that night. Santos. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. SALES G. Lumberio. His body was never examined by a doctor. When the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the evening of September 20. De Mesa. FACTS: On September 19. he expired. and legs of Junior. then nine and eight years old. The trial court found appellant guilty of the crime beyond reasonable doubt but considered voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as mitigating circumstances. Valois . Afraid of their fathers rage.

Interestingly. Palad. Castillo. Ramirez. Catindig. even if appellant presented his wife. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. Page 993 Echiverri. the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. Rañigo. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. to lend credence to his contention. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Marquez. Francisco. Alcazaren. Espina. Corpuz. Coronel. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. De Mesa. Sy. Santos. It is worth emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also. Inguillo. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. the latters testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Valois . Lumberio. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism. Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence. Tecson. Maria. Valiente. Cabañgon. Reyes. Tabugan. Martinez. Asensi. Gloria. Corporal. Albano. issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest.

Blamed for his untimely demise were Edgar Concillado (Edgar). According to the CA. The CA acquitted Erlito and Dolores of the crime charged and found Edgar guilty only of homicide. of August 24. they parted ways. HELD: NO. The court a quo ruled that the nature. When the accused miserably fails to discharge his burden. Leyte. to attend the fiesta. it was unnatural for Lorenzo to just stare and not bother to hide or take cover while the frenzied attack on Diosdado was ongoing. At around 12:30 a. EDGAR CONCILLADO G. Diosdado. Coronel. His conviction must be sustained. The trial court held that there was conspiracy among the accused because they waited in ambush for the victim. Tecson. Corporal. Martinez. As regards Edgar who admitted the killing. Lastimosa. Leyte. Diosdado Pido (Diosdado) was shot. the burden of proof is shifted to him. Santos. once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as a defense. Tabugan. Edgar and Dolores approached the victim and simultaneously stabbed him using small bolos about 10 inches in length. the CA was not convinced of his self-defense theory. it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has Albano. When Diosdado fell to the ground. Inguillo. Espina. Dolores and Erlito then left the crime scene. Asensi. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. simultaneously delivered hacking and stabbing blows on him. Palad. Gloria. 2002. No. for lack of evidence to establish the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Castillo. De la Cruz. location and number of wounds sustained by the victim belied the allegation of Edgar that he merely acted in self-defense and that the victim was the unlawful aggressor. they went home to Barangay Guinciaman aboard a motorcycle. and after shooting him. Lumberio. Catindig. Valois . Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Rodriguez. Edgar. FACTS: In the early moning of August 24. Having sustained a total of 26 wounds. Sandoval. 2011 DOCTRINE: When an accused admits the commission of the crime but claims the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Shortly thereafter and from a distance of about 10 meters. Reyes. Ramirez. he and the victim. 2002. crossed the nearby river and proceeded to the rice field. Alcazaren. Page 994 Echiverri. He cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak. he does not deserve an acquittal. San Miguel. Neither did it lend credence to Edgars asseveration that he was hacked while urinating near the fence by the victim. he instantly succumbed to death. De Mesa. Erlito Concillado (Erlito) and Dolores Concillado (Dolores). However. as in the instant case. 181204. Cabañgon.m. stabbed and hacked in Barangay Guinciaman. the CA convicted Edgar only of the crime of homicide ISSUE: Whether or not the allegation of self-defense is tenable. the burden of proof is shifted to him. Erlito joined the fray and delivered hacking blows on the victim using a long bolo. 2002. Marquez. Francisco. Valiente. Lorenzo saw Edgar shoot Diosdado using a surit-surit (homemade gun). Sy. Corpuz. went to Barangay Malaguinabut. November 28. San Miguel. The RTC also found that the plan to kill Diosdado was not hatched on the spur of a moment thus it appreciated the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Rañigo. Lorenzo Vias (Lorenzo) recalled that on August 23. Upon reaching Barangay Guinciaman. Thereafter. However.R.

Santos. there is an impossibility of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Alcazaren. Diosdado suffered a total of 26 incised. Edgar suffered only three superficial wounds. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that the disparity of the injuries sustained belies all pretensions of self-defense. Sy. Lumberio. This is because a judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. De Mesa. There being no unlawful aggression to speak of. Reyes. Lastimosa. the distance of the accused from the fence while he was urinating was about 1 meters. Castillo. stab and bullet wounds. Catindig. Moreover. during his cross-examination. Martinez. we therefore find Edgar criminally responsible for the death of Diosdado. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault. Inguillo. Asensi. Albano. There can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused. Tecson. number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense. Corpuz. Espina. no traces of blood could be found in the yard of the accused. Rodriguez. With the height of the fence and his distance from the fence. Ramirez. Palad. Gloria. De la Cruz. Edgar’s theory of self-defense has no leg to stand on. It also concluded that the victim could not have entered the yard of the accused. Marquez. However. Edgar admitted that he continued to inflict injuries on Diosdado notwithstanding the fact that he was already lying lifeless on the ground. Page 995 Echiverri. According to the trial court. Valois . Having miserably failed to discharge his burden of proof. or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury. As has been repeatedly ruled. Sandoval. Francisco. while the victim was outside and in-between them was a bamboo fence about four feet high. Corporal. the nature. Valiente. admitted the killing. Cabañgon. there is nothing to prevent or repel. Coronel. Tabugan. On the other hand. upon a person. Rañigo. for otherwise. The dead body of Diosdado was found lying on the road about eight meters from the house of Edgar.

Santos. signaled Cesario to come closer. Page 996 Echiverri. Tabugan. in a treacherous manner. Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and. at around 9:00 a. It also did not consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing was not presented in evidence. According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Espina. Martinez. this present appeal. he was clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. multiple gunshot wounds. Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in inflicting upon Cesario.R. FRANKLIN AGACER AND ERIK AGACER G. Tecson. Sandoval. Rañigo. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to show clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing. without warning. Castillo. Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat again. December 14. Alcazaren. Thereafter. Sy. Palad. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence. while standing side by side with Eric. De la Cruz. EDDIE AGACER. Cagayan. shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis).m. The appellants pleaded not guilty invoking self-defense and defense of relatives. Catindig. Cesario moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. ELYNOR AGACER. Visibly intimidated.. Thereafter. Inguillo. Rafael Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section of the same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay. Corporal. Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle. it was at that moment while Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. On April 2. a short firearm was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. the trial court did not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its elements as clearly as the criminal act itself. As Cesario fell. Almost simultaneously. appellants fled towards the irrigation canal. this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads self-defense by way of justification. Lumberio. Eric and Eddie are his nephews. The trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No. Elynor took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the findings of the lower court. Hence. Gloria. where another gunshot rang. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the group. However. Florencio. Albano. FACTS: Florencio was Cesarios nephew and is the father of Franklin while the brothers Elynor. Rodriguez. Asensi. Francisco. 2011 DOCTRINE: While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Marquez. De Mesa. Reyes. his brother Andy. Valois . Valiente. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. 177751. Santa Ana. Coronel. Lastimosa. 1998. At this point. FLORENCIO AGACER. Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings. However. Ramirez.

This corroborates the testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. Another basis for appellants conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that the cause of Cesarios death was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the infero-lateral portion of the anterior chest. HELD: NO. Catindig. Corporal. Gloria. Page 997 Echiverri. De la Cruz. Santos. Asensi. Rodriguez. Palad. Tabugan. Sandoval. On the other hand. that there was indeed a struggle between them. Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful aggression of Cesario. Lastimosa. He failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or limb. Like in the case of self-defense. Aside from his unreliable and self-serving claim. Corpuz. Tecson. In the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Valois . Lumberio. interestingly. unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. Inguillo. there is no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a firearm during their struggle or. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to show clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Reyes. Martinez. there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario. De Mesa. Ramirez. the separate testimonies of prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden negate Florencios claim of unlawful aggression. Rañigo. Sy. if at all. he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence. Alcazaren. These dovetailing findings of the medico-legal expert and the eyewitness accounts of Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence than the unsubstantiated claim of self-defense of Florencio. Hence. Espina. this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads self-defense by way of justification. Valiente. Florencios reliance on this justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing. right side. who. Here. In so doing. Cabañgon. Francisco. Castillo. Coronel. unlawful aggression is also an indispensable element in defense of relative. gave contradictory testimony Albano. As discussed. Marquez.

Sy.The arrival of Baginda Palao’s group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their work and observe what was happening. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and a certain “Nito” were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoon’s auto repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod. Catindig. homemade gun. Alcazaren. shot from behind Batoon’s right thigh with a . Rodriguez. PENDATUM AMPUAN G. causing the two of them to grapple for the same. Gloria. Renandang Mamaruncas. Valiente. these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao. is that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. As these two wrestled for control of the gun. 1996. Espina. though subject to certain recognized exceptions. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was serving it against Batoon. RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS. Cabañgon. Richard Batoon. homemade pistol. who was also standing behind Baudelio Batoon.45 cal.Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile. but he escaped. 179497. Ramirez. Francisco. Inguillo. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene. Reyes. Baudelio Batoon. Asensi. Lastimosa. Dr. who was behind Baudelio Batoon. At the repair shop. the trial court’s assessment must be respected. Inspector Mijares’ group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were doing and to drop their firearms. Mamaruncas.45 caliber pistol at him. Martinez.” FACTS: Around noontime on February 1. Sandoval. followed up by shooting Batoon’s left arm pit with a . while SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. January 25. while his two (2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. Palad. they saw three (3) men in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground. might affect the result of the case. Corporal. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palao’s gun. Hence.Based on the necropsy examination of the victim’s body.R. Coronel. “unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which. and Ampuan were then captured by the policemen. Castillo. Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan. Tabugan. Lumberio. The latter fired back. who managed to get inside the car. Iligan City. Rañigo. Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of Albano. Baraas.Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victim’s stomach and pointing a . Marquez.Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan.Meanwhile. Santos. Pendatum Ampuan. stunned and unable to do anything. while Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car.Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were eventually placed under detention. Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house. Corpuz. Baudelio Batoon was brought to the hospital by his wife. at the same time announcing that they (Mijares’ group) were policemen. as they would settle the matter after he finishes tuning-up an engine he had been working on. but he was pronounced dead on arrival.The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues.38 cal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Tecson. De Mesa. Iligan City PNP Mobile Force Company proceeded to the source of the gunshots. if considered.45 cal. From their vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished him off with a single . Valois . De la Cruz. 2012 DOCTRINE: The well-known rule. During the exchange of gunfire. Page 998 Echiverri. No.

“The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details. In fact. The inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense. it even signifies that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. Alcazaren. Castillo. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted beyond reasonable doubt despite inconsistencies in witnesses’ statements and whose credibility is being assailed. What matters is that there is no inconsistency in Gepayo’s complete and vivid narration as far as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the principal assailants are concerned. Espina. Cabañgon. Baudelio Batoon (i. Rañigo. Gloria. Lumberio. Tabugan. Francisco. Albano. Valois . De la Cruz. De Mesa. Valiente. Sandoval. Tecson. left armpit and back) were inflicted at close range due to the presence. Reyes.. Inguillo. Rodriguez. of gunpowder burns. Martinez. or at least traces. Coronel. Ramirez. Santos. Corpuz. Page 999 Echiverri.e. Sy. at the right thigh. they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. Palad. Lastimosa. Asensi. Catindig. HELD: YES. Corporal. Marquez.

Elena. Page 1000 Echiverri. Albano. At that moment. the above-named accused. A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and Adriano and a warrant was issued for their arrest which was. Two years later. NO. While thereat. Tabugan. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their drinkinng spree to which Wilfredo obliged. Alcazaren. Jesus shouted “I am wounded. locally known as sundang. Elena. confederating together and mutually helping one another. with treachery and abuse of superior strength. he went to the store of Susan to buy salt. De Mesa. Upon reaching his house. with which both accused have provided themselves for the purpose. at around noontime. as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. and stab one Jesus Cabujat with the use of long bolos. returned unserved since they could no longer be located. 175980. the duo stood on a dark portion of the road. CABRILLAS AND CABTALAN G. Two years after the incident. Benny entered a plea of “not guilty. Valiente. in Barangay Laygayon. Espina. Samar. at nighttime which was purposely sought. assault. attack. Philippines. please help me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano. Later on. They held Jesus by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. 2012 DOCTRINE: Minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Lastimosa. 2001. Ramirez. Inguillo. Coronel. Sandoval. Jesus stopped and turned towards a grassy area to urinate when suddenly. Marquez. 1999. Wilfredo noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos. Asensi. unlawfully and feloniously. Lumberio. and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the house of Jesus’ daughter. Municipality of Pinabacdao. tucked on their waists. did then and there willfully. Wilfredo left them and walked home. Gloria. Corporal. however. Sy.. Sensing that something wrong would happen. he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn walking towards the house of Jonalyn’s mother. with deliberate intent to kill. Francisco. thereby inflicting upon the victim multiple stab wounds. During his arraignment. Verification of the Prosecution. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Benny was arrested in Las Pinas City by virtue of an alias warrant of arrest. or on July 31. conspiring. Benny was arrested in Las Pinas City while to date. February 15. Rañigo. Adriano remains at large. He also heard the two talking about their plan to assault someone that same night. Castillo. 1999 at around 7:00 p. Province of Samar. FACTS: The Information against Benny and his co-accused Adriano contains the following accusatory allegations: That on or about the 11th day of July 1999. Prosecution witness Wilfredo narrated that on July 11. Cabañgon.R.” Jesus then fell to the ground while Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene. In the course of their drinking spree. Valois . Tecson. Benny and Adriano escaped by ferryboat to Catbalogan.” Trial thereafter ensued. Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding place.m. It appears that on July 13. Palad. Martinez. Reyes. which is just about two arms length away from his house. Corpuz. Santos. which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death. Catindig. Thereafter.

Inguillo. Page 1001 Echiverri. as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime? HELD No. De Mesa. Tecson. Corpuz. Valois . Coronel. still disputes the credibility of these witnesses by pointing out that Wilfredo’s testimony that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from that of Jonalyn who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison. The Court. Alcazaren. it is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. Besides. De la Cruz. however. The CA Affirmed the decision of the trial court. Palad. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses usually remains undisturbed. Tabugan. Valiente. Gloria. Martinez. Cabañgon. Marquez. Benny. Francisco. ISSUE: Are minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters affect the credibility of witnesses. Jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were fabricated and rehearsed. however. Asensi. The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that the testimonies of eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve credence as both narrated in a straight forward manner the details of Benny and Adriano’s attack upon Jesus. Lumberio. Sandoval. Lastimosa. Castillo. Catindig. Sy. Espina. Reyes. However. Rañigo. it was only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. it did not anymore consider the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength as qualifying circumstance of treachery already absorbed it. Corporal. Rodriguez. Ramirez. The materiality of the assailants’ exact position during their attack on the victim is a trivial and insignificant detail which cannot defeat the witnesses’ positive identification of Benny as one of the assailants. Albano. The Trial court rendered a decision convicting Benny of the crime of murder. finds this inconsistency to pertain merely to the manner the fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. Santos. In fact.

she felt a liquid-like substance discharged from Victor’s penis. After nine months. AAA felt pain. AAA was more or less six months pregnant. Ramirez. The CA found no compelling rearm to depart from the RTC ruling. she finally told her mother BBB that Victor raped her. After Victor had satisfied his bestial desire. Victor ordered AAA to stand against the wall with her hands in both sides and forcefully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. though innocent. covered her mouth and threatened her by saying don’t even tell anybody otherwise “I will kill your parents.000 to P50. Martinez. De Mesa. VICTOR RONDINA vs. removed the towel from his waist as well as his brief. Espina. accused Victor Rondina armed with a knife entered their toilet. convincing and satisfactory as to hold the latter guilty beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape. Marquez. Corpuz. Victor interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Ormoc City. is credible. whether AAA’s claim that she was raped by Victor vis-vis the latter’s denial and alibi. it was discovered that aside from having healed hymenal lacerations. When BBB had AAA examined by physician. Castillo. Sandoval. However. The RTC declared itself convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Catindig. Cabañgon.000 to the offended party as indemnity. Santos. Rañigo. 2012 DOCTRINE: An accusation of rape can be made with facility.R NO. Corporal. Lumberio. Sy. to disprove. Macabug. He then poked a knife on AAA’s neck. ISSUE: With the two conflicting version of the prosecution and the defense. After a while. Gloria. Valiente. He averred that he could not have raped AAA at 4:00pm of July 15. 179059 JUNE 13. AAA gave birth to a baby girl. Reyes. Inguillo.000 as moral damages and cost. 1998 because during that time. Palad. AAA was not able to shout. FACTS: On 15th day of July 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. also to acknowledge the offspring CCC and to give support. Francisco. it affirmed the trial courts judgment in all other respects in a Decision dated July 24. Page 1002 Echiverri. Thus.” When AAA could no longer keep silent of her misfortunate.” Because her mouth was covered. that is. Rodriguez. HELD: Albano. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. P50. Asensi. 2007. Hence. Tabugan. Victor was charged with crime of rape. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. he was in a cockpit with Alex Oliveros and Ruben Bertulfo in Brgy. CCC. it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused. while AAA was inside their toilet located outside their house. Valois . it reduced the award of civil indemnity from P75. to pay P75. the RTC declared the issue to be one of credibility. your siblings including yourself.000. sentencing him to suffer to suffer imprisonment of 40 years reclusion perpetua. Tecson. he uttered “do not tell your mother or else I will kill you. Alcazaren. Coronel.

Gloria. and comradesin-arms and not by credible persons. especially the rape victim. It order for the defense of alibi to prosper. Corpuz. Sandoval. friends. Victor’s weak alibi cannot thus overcome AAA’s positive identification of him as her rapist. Valois . Lastimosa. the Decision of the CA dated July 24. and second. Corporal. Lumberio. denial and alibi are practically worthless against the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. De la Cruz. Henceforth. Francisco. De Mesa. Castillo. Coronel. Tabugan. Valiente. Albano. Alcazaren. it was physically impossible for him to be a t the crime scene at the time of its commission. Espina. Moreover and most importantly. Reyes. Santos. Inguillo. Asensi. Rodriguez. the appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was committed. Cabañgon. Marquez. Rañigo. It has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives. Ramirez. Page 1003 Echiverri. 2007 was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with regards to his civil liability. Palad. Martinez. Tecson. Sy. two requisites must concur: first. Catindig.

Palad.D Aigle was charged with Estafa before the RTC. De la Cruz. upon demand. petitioner Andre L. Gloria. These revealed that several of SPI. Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPI’s properties and reviewed its financial statements. Catindig. he was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC Manufacturing Corporation (TAC). Because of this. Corpuz. 2012 DOCTRINE: The failure to account upon demand.000. Lastimosa. he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own benefit. vouchers. is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Rañigo. Alcazaren.R NO. He also interviewed some SPI’s employees. 174181. Albano.00. while still under the management. It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to SPI. Espina. the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision. Sandoval. G. De Mesa. Rodriguez. the properties entrusted to his care. this petition before the SC. Corporal. computer boxes and motor drives was recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin. Martinez. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ramirez. such as wire materials. Petitioner seasonably appealed to the CA. and unpaid one-month salary of Php 80. FACTS: June 05.665. electronic and computer boxes. Tabugan. Valois .000. In defense. After trial the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner for the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). committed as follows: Sometime in November 1996. June 27. (SPI) received from said Samfit Philippines personal properties with a total value of Php 681. Page 1004 Echiverri. an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire bending machine similar to that being used by SPI. petitioner who was then the Managing Director and President of Samfit Philippines. He was divested of his duties and responsibilities as SPI’s Managing Director. petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. Lumberio. Further investigation revealed that some of SPI’s wire bending machines. Castillo. while he admitted that SPI’s electronic transformer. care and custody of petitioner went missing and was left unaccounted for. he reasoned out that he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise his right of lien over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI. 2006. collectibles amounting to Php 980. 1997. for funds or property held in trust. computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. Tecson. Inc. Asensi. Due to alleged conflict of interest.D AIGLE vs. Santos. Inguillo.00. electronic transformer. Marquez. 1997 through SPI counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to turnover to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. In a Decision dated March 31.35 for his management care and custody. Cabañgon. At that time. Ignoring the demand. claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of this machine. custody and management is sufficient evidence of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. Valiente. Hence. On January 14. Sy. Finally. Coronel. machine spare parts. ANDRE L. Reyes. books of accounts and other pertinent documents. Francisco.

Page 1005 Echiverri. Gloria. Albano. petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing under wires for brassier. 2. With regards to the element of misappropriation or conversion. SPI’s properties was received by the petitioner in trust. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. Thus. Rodriguez. for funds or property held in trust. and 4. Cabañgon. Coronel. Marquez. Valiente. From petitioner’s own assertions the existence of the first and fourth of the aforementioned element is very clear. However. petitioner acquired not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. Martinez. Francisco. petitioner deliberately ignored the same. or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or return of or return the same. Lastimosa. Reyes. Inguillo. Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article 315. Alcazaren. Tecson. Asensi. Espina. Sy. Palad. The failure to account upon demand. Petitioner was given absolute option in how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. paragraph 1(b) of the RPC: 1. 3.665. He received them for a particular purpose that is.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter. De la Cruz. Corporal. goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission. is circumstantial evidence or misappropriation. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioner’s alleged dismissal therefrom. Castillo. for the fabrication of bending machines and spare parts for SPI. or for administration. Rañigo. Ramirez. De Mesa. after the conduct of an audit in December 1996. Tabugan. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. All the elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. Lastly. it is obvious that petitioner failure to return SPI’s properties valued at Php 191. HELD: The prosecution’s evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime charged. That there is misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt. As borne out of the records. Based on SPI’s record. Sandoval. The money. Catindig. petitioner failed to properly account therefor. Valois . Santos. Corpuz. Lumberio. the equipment subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the fabrication of bending machines. the prosecution was able to prove this through circumstantial evidence.

PO3 Regalado Adriatico and CE Ronald Tangcoy. Barangay San Isidro. Section 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs). and Section 12 in relation to Section 14 (illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) of Article II. he handed to PO1 Soquiña five plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.14 Inside the house. appellant was charged together with Ricardo Duque Fundales (Ricardo). Parañaque City for the buy-bust operation. Inguillo. was charged with violations of Section 5 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs. the Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Task Force of Parañaque City Police. the parties agreed to terminate the pre-trial and set the case for trial on the merits. Gloria. During arraignment. Rañigo. Chulo Duque Fundales (Chulo). Castillo. Palad. Tabugan. the police Albano. The team remained inside their vehicles about 20 meters away from the target area. Valdez thus formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Ariel Ilagan. Lastimosa. Page 1006 Echiverri. Coronel. The group then proceeded to 008 Jordan Street. Sandoval. Rodriguez. 2012 DOCTRINE: “Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of [dangerous] drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. JericoCabangon Hugo (Jerico). P/Supt. and Joel Manuel Gomez (Joel). Espina. Lumberio. 9165. 184606. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CALEXTO FUNDALES. Catindig. De la Cruz. De Mesa.00 marked money to the appellant. the team of back-up police officers proceeded to appellant’s house to apprehend him. Version of the Prosecution On the evening of December 2. Asensi. Ramirez. After PO1 Soquiña handed the P500. Santos. Corporal. Marquez. The group arrived in the vicinity of the target area at around 9:00 p. 2003. Hence. Valois . Martinez. the latter then went inside his house and when he reappeared. Thereafter. and the consideration. the appellant and his co-accused pleaded not guilty. Sitio Nazareth. and the informant proceeded to the house of the appellant. Francisco. Alcazaren. who was designated as the poseur-buyer. the object. September 5. Reyes.R. Valdez). Police Superintendent Alfredo Valdez (P/Supt. No. Corpuz. PO1 CesarieSoquiña (PO1 Soquiña). Valiente. JR. Tecson. PO1 Soquiña. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto.m.” FACTS: Appellant – CalextoFundales Jr.00. Sy.. PO1 Soquiña then lit a cigarette which was the pre-arranged signal to inform the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been consummated. PO1 Emmanuel Salvaloza. RA No. The informant then introduced PO1 Soquiña to the appellant as the person interested in buying shabu worth P500. received an information from a confidential informant about the illegal drug trade operations conducted by the Fundales brothers. In the charge for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. Cabañgon. G.

eight persons suddenly entered his house without warning and permission. Inguillo. Joel. Ramirez. Valiente. Clearly. “Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of [dangerous] drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. officers saw Jerico. Castillo. Valois . and the consideration.. Cabañgon. According to the appellant. Catindig. and Joel who appeared to be engaged in a pot session hence they were also arrested along with the appellant. They were then brought to the Coastal Police Station and detained there for two days. Asensi. Sandoval. Chulo. appellant was at home with Ricardo. 9165. Lumberio. Page 1007 Echiverri. Gloria. PO1 Soquiña caught appellant in flagrante delicto selling and delivering the prohibited substance during a buybust operation. Palad. Tecson. De Mesa. the above-mentioned elements are present in this case. there was no indication that the men were police officers since they were all in civilian clothing. Espina. HELD: YES. Lastimosa. the laboratory report has no probative value since the forensic chemist did not attest to the report’s authenticity.00 marked money. He argues that the prosecution’s failure to present the forensic chemist during trial was fatal to its cause. Alcazaren. In view of this. Rañigo. appellant being the seller and PO1 Soquiña as the poseur-buyer. Sy. Ricardo.m. ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5.” The identity of the buyer and the seller were both established by the prosecution. Appellant insists that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. and Jerico repairing a washing machine. sumama kayo saamin”. Santos. Corporal. Francisco. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons who had custody of the Albano. 2003. Chulo. Rodriguez. the object. Corpuz. Coronel. De la Cruz. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto. Aside from their weapons and handcuffs. It is of no moment that Forensic Chemical Officer Mangalip was not presented as witness. Once inside. He also personally handed to appellant the marked money as payment for the same. “Walanggagalaw. Reyes. Marquez. The object of the transaction was the five sachets of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and the consideration was the P500. Martinez. The Court is convinced that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the burden of establishing the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. he points out that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti. Version of the Defense On December 2. As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. the men shouted. Both such object and consideration have also been sufficiently established by testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. Article II of RA No. At around 4:30 p. Tabugan.

we are inclined to uphold the former. Gloria. and the unsubstantiated denial of the appellant on the other. illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the prosecution. appellant has not offered any evidence to support this claim. their testimonies must be respected and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties must be upheld. other than his own self-serving testimony. Santos. Palad. Page 1008 Echiverri. Inguillo. Appellant’s contention does not deserve serious consideration. Lastimosa. Rañigo. The appellant. Ramirez. Cabañgon.” Appellant’s denial is unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence. Sandoval. It is well settled that the testimonies of the police officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Between the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers on one hand. Lumberio. Marquez. Corporal.” What is important is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are properly preserved as it had been so in this case. Appellant himself testified that he never had any personal encounter with the police prior to his arrest. Rodriguez. “Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Corpuz. Asensi. Coronel. Castillo. Catindig. offers mere denial as his defense. However. Espina. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Albano. Valiente. Reyes.” In this case. Alcazaren. We have held that “[a] bare denial is an inherently weak defense x xx. Tecson. thus negating any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. He claims that he was merely fixing a washing machine at the time of the arrest and that the alleged buy-bust operation was fictitious. Sy. Tabugan. on the other hand. PO1 Soquiña narrated in a straightforward manner the circumstances leading to the sale of shabu. He positively and categorically identified appellant as the seller of the drugs. Francisco. “It is the prosecution which has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses. Martinez. Valois . Absent any clear showing that the arresting officers had ill motive to falsely testify against the appellant.

if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Cabañgon. Palad. Valiente. Reyes. When he went home at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. his version of the incident is as follows: [Appellant] tilled the land beside the hut where he and his family slept from 7:00 o’clock in the morning until 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 24 April 2002. Castillo. Santos. Alcazaren. appellant denied the charges hurled against him. 183097. Lastimosa. unlawfully and feloniously. ANTONIO VENTURINA G. Corpuz. She left without asking his permission but later returned home. 2002. Page 1009 Echiverri. Tabugan. then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial. He also grounded her for a week. No. Due to his chest pains. he returned to work. Philippines. the accusatory portions of which are similarly worded as follows: That on or about the 24th day of April.” a minor 16 yrs. Tecson. Albano. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Asensi. “AAA. ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 2012 DOCTRINE: Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true. undergo medical examination. Espina. September 12. He only regained consciousness at 4:00 o’clock in the early morning of the following day. Rañigo. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision by reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Francisco. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of his daughter. FACTS: Appellant was charged with two counts of rape in the Informations. of age against her will and without her consent. Catindig. Sandoval. The RTC rendered its consolidated Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to death by lethal injection in both cases. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Marquez. “[n]o young girl x xx would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father. the above-named accused being the father of “AAA.” province of Bulacan. in the municipality of “XXX. As summarized by the Public Attorney’s Office. He had forbidden the private complainant to mingle with her friends who were known to be drug users as they might influence her. De Mesa. Thereafter. Valois . the accused fell on the wooden bed as he passed by [AAA].R. Martinez. He went home at 8:00 o’clock in the morning and took his snack. Corporal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.” did then and there willfully. In his defense. As has been repeatedly ruled. Sy. Lumberio. [AAA] was not there. Gloria. Coronel.

Tecson. Rañigo. At the center of appellant’s defense of denial is his assertion that the accusation against him was a mere concoction. According to him.” is in order. Cabañgon. Coronel. Valiente. Lastimosa. Sy. is convinced that “AAA” truthfully narrated her ordeal. the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh conclusive to this Court. Gloria. And in almost all rape cases. HELD: YES! In the appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and the defense. Reyes. Ramirez. In this regard. the credibility of the victim’s testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the participants therein can testify to its occurrence. Absent therefore any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessments and conclusions of the trial court especially if such findings have been affirmed by the appellate court. Valois . De Mesa. We are. Sandoval. however. “AAA” filed the case because she resented being disciplined by him. Corporal. Santos. then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial. Rodriguez.” Once found credible. Francisco. “AAA’s” testimony pointing to her father as the person who raped her must stand. Lumberio. a restatement of a consistent ruling. Alcazaren. the settled rule is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court. inclined to believe that it was appellant instead who concocted his defense. Catindig. Page 1010 Echiverri. Palad. Corpuz. if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.” Thus. the victim’s lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true. like the courts below. As has been repeatedly ruled. “[n]o young girl x xx would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father. Asensi. Espina. for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. Inguillo. Tabugan. Albano. Martinez. This Court. that “testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit. undergo medical examination. De la Cruz. Marquez. “[The victim’s] testimony is most vital and must be received with the utmost caution. Castillo. taking into consideration that the parties are close blood relatives.

During their confrontation. one of whom is “AAA” x xx. Valois . After trial. Tecson. Tabugan. Rodriguez.” to help him pasture their cows at the land of her grandfather and while there accused [forcibly] brought her beneath [sic] a banana plantation then willfully. Rañigo. Martinez. De Mesa. married. De la Cruz. in its Decision of September 28. November 12. the above-named accused with lewd designs ordered his own daughter “AAA. Reyes.R. “AAA” was then living with her grandparents at the time the alleged incident occurred. ONYONG was indicted for raping his own daughter. the RTC was firmly convinced that “AAA” was telling the truth about her defilement and that it was appellant. Sy. Catindig.” a minor. her own father. upheld the RTC’s judgment of conviction after likewise being morally convinced that appellant consummated his debauched design over his daughter through intimidation. Coronel. Castillo. the said case was amicably settled. Espina. he and his wife sent “AAA” to the house of his parents-in-law because she [had] been raped by a certain “GGG.” municipality of “DDD. and a resident of “CCC. the RTC declared appellant guilty of three counts of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of death for each count of rape with damages. However. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Marquez. [appellant] could not think of any reason. Asensi. [He] warned her not to see her boyfriend again. Palad. Version of the prosecution: ONYONG is 47 years old. threat and force. force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with [sic] his own daughter “AAA. 15 years old against her will and consent. Cabañgon. 2001. Gloria. He remembered that when he scolded her. Santos. Corporal. unlawfully and feloniously did then and there through threat. “mere denial. Francisco.” province of Misamis Occidental. h[e] slapped her. In the first place.” Misamis Occidental. 2007. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Sometime in 1998. Lumberio. has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim. Sandoval. 183827. Valiente. Alcazaren. it reduced the penalty Albano. The CA. Eventually. Corpuz. Ramirez. “AAA. Inguillo. As far as the instant case is concerned. considering the proscription on the imposition of the death penalty.” That on or about January 2. why her own daughter.” FACTS: In three separate Informations.” [Municipality] of “DDD. Thus. He knew that her daughter harbored ill feelings toward him.” wherein a complaint [had] been filed before the barangay. 2012 DOCTRINE: As often stressed. he was then armed with a scythe. who abused her. in its Decision16 of October 17. Page 1011 Echiverri. No. he reprimanded “AAA” for seeing [her] boyfriend “HHH”. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. He has four x xx children. ENERIO ENDING ONYONG G. 2001 at about 3:00 in the afternoon at barangay “CCC. whom he loves so dearly would file charges of rape against him. [He] recounted though that sometime in 1999 during a town fiesta in Oroquieta City. Lastimosa.

Valiente. Francisco. Here. Appellant himself admitted that the distance between his residence and that of “AAA’s” grandparents is only approximately 7½ kilometers and which can be traversed by riding a pedicab in less than 30 minutes. Inguillo. Corpuz. Catindig. Ramirez. Martinez. Reyes. appellant was positively identified by “AAA” as the perpetrator of the crimes without showingany dubious reason or fiendish motive on her part to falsely charge him. Valois . HELD: Yes. imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. The fact that “AAA” was living with her grandparents did not preclude the possibility that appellant was present at the crime scenes during their commission. Tabugan. went on top of her. Corporal. Marquez. Cabañgon. The Court. finds that “AAA” was without doubt telling the truth when she declared that her father raped her on three separate occasions. especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own father. hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a rape victim. Espina. Gloria. “Motives such as resentment. Page 1012 Echiverri. appellant must establish that he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.” It is a jurisprudentially conceded rule that “[i]t is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame. Appellant’s denial and alibi deserve no merit. Sandoval. Lumberio. Sy. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. particularly his denial. Moreover. Lastimosa. appellant’s testimony. but increased the amounts of moral and exemplary damages awarded to “AAA. Coronel. appellant removed her clothes. Palad.” In this case. “[m]ere denial. has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim. Alcazaren. in the copra drier. De Mesa. As often stressed. was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Rañigo. for his alibi to prosper. Tecson. Appellant failed to establish these elements. Castillo. The defense of appellant is anchored on denial and alibi which do not impress belief. The contention of appellant that “AAA” was motivated by hatred because he prevented her from having a boyfriend is unconvincing. Asensi. Santos. There is nothing novel in such a contrived defense. De la Cruz. She was consistent in her narration on how she was abused by her father in their own house. and even in a nearby pasture land. it was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the situs of the crimes during the dates when the separate acts of rape were committed. After she was forced to lie down. appellant’s attempt Albano. Also. inserted his penis into her vagina and threatened her with death if she would report the incidents. it has been invariably ruled that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Rodriguez.” ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape. In other words. Hence. like the courts below. the court did not erred in declaring the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Asensi. Sy. Martinez. Santos. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Espina. De la Cruz. Gloria. Valiente. Corporal. De Mesa. Corpuz. to discredit the testimony of “AAA” deserves no merit. Sandoval. the [Court] generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better position to decide the question. Inguillo. Albano. Coronel. Palad. Rañigo. Ramirez. having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during trial.” Here. Catindig. Page 1013 Echiverri. Castillo. Marquez. Valois . Lumberio. “[W]hen credibility is in issue. Lastimosa. Francisco. Tecson. Rodriguez. there is nothing from the records that would impel this Court to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the CA. Reyes.

Asensi. Valois . Ramirez. Lumberio. At that point. The pain persisted until “AAA’s” vagina started to bleed. Version of the Defense Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of “AAA’s” alleged rape but denied committing the same. Instead. Tecson. Reyes. This whole incident was witnessed by “AAA’s” brother.8 It also held that his wife could not have Albano. Coronel. Castillo. stood up. as charged in the Information. De Mesa. Santos. According to appellant. No. Sy. 179031. “AAA” and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father (appellant) brought home for merienda. 2000. Catindig. It ruled that the lack of tenacious resistance on the part of “AAA” is immaterial considering that appellant’s moralascendancy and influence over her substitute for violence and intimidation. Palad. took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Lastimosa. Inguillo. After eating. Thereafter. Francisco. depending on the evidence adduced during trial. Rañigo. “AAA” went to the bedroom to rest. “AAA” felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful.R. he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife. Sandoval. whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in their community. Martinez. “BBB”. appellant apologized to his daughter. Valiente. Page 1014 Echiverri. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for treatment.” Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. Corporal. Gloria. 2012 DOCTRINE: Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified. appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of “AAA”. and left the room. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ G. Marquez. The trial court rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against “AAA”. notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. “AAA” was taken into the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Subsequently. Version of the Prosecution On February 26. Tabugan. FACTS: Benjamin Soria was charged of the crime of rape against his daughter. he was the only one sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home. Espina. the indictment is sufficient. his daughter of minor age. Her mother was alsoimmediately informed of her ordeal. De la Cruz. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness. Corpuz. Rodriguez. November 12. he could not have molested “AAA” because he treated her well. In fact. Cabañgon. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault. Alcazaren.

it nevertheless noted the prosecution’s failure to present her birth certificate as competent proof of her minority. Corporal. otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. Valois . Palad. 2) By any person who. Coronel.000. Tecson. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of “AAA” and her positive identification of appellant as her rapist. Alcazaren. De Mesa. While the appellate court was convinced that appellant raped “AAA”.00 to P50. Rape under paragraph 1 of the above-cited article is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. 8353. When and How Committed. and rejected the latter’s defense of denial. threat or intimidation. – Rape is committed – 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force. it would not be natural for her to use her child as a tool to exact revenge especially if it will result in her embarrassment and stigma. Sandoval. Sy. Santos. or through sexual assault. Lumberio. Espina. Valiente. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape through sexual intercourse. Asensi. Republic Act No. The perpetrator. Marquez. instigated the filing of the rape case since as the mother of “AAA”. Inguillo. Castillo. Francisco. Ramirez. d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. under any of the Albano. HELD: It is rape through sexual assault. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Rañigo. De la Cruz. Catindig. Thus. The CA found partial merit in the appeal. Gloria. It also amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads: Article 266-A. Thus. Corpuz. Rape. rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.00. Reyes. Tabugan. classified the crime of rape as a crime against persons. the CA concluded that the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and accordingly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua and reduced the civil indemnity awarded from P75.000. or any instrument or object. into the genital or anal orifice of another person. even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. Page 1015 Echiverri. Martinez. Rodriguez. under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof. c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. Lastimosa. shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice. rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. Cabañgon. On the other hand.

It is evident from the testimony of “AAA” that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and entered her organ since she was pinned down by the latter’s weight. Tecson. Lastimosa. Coronel. To require “AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. De la Cruz. Valiente. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. Catindig. also “gender-free rape”. Sy. commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice. and not merely stroked the external surface thereof. Castillo. It is also called “instrument or object rape”. it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of “AAA’s” brother. Albano. In the instant case. there is no doubt that appellant raped “AAA” by sexual assault. or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Martinez. We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. it might create problems later on in the application of the law if the victim is blind or otherwise unconscious. Tabugan. her father having positioned himself on top of her while she was lying on her back. Hence. It would be akin to requiring “AAA” to establish something that is not even required by law. Cabañgon. it is essential to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of “AAA”. Corpuz. Lumberio. Inguillo. De Mesa. “AAA” has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. “AAA” stated that she only knew that it was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her brother “BBB”. which declaration was hearsay due to “BBB’s” failure to testify. Page 1016 Echiverri. Rañigo. it was clearly established that appellant committed an act of sexual assault on “AAA” by inserting an instrument or object into her genital. Corporal. Gloria. Francisco. Marquez. Based on the foregoing. Asensi. the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and intimidation. Espina. Clearly. [Moreover. Alcazaren. Thus. Rodriguez. Valois . Ramirez. attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1. In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A. to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. Reyes. There must be proof that his penis touched the labia of “AAA” or slid into her female organ. Sandoval. Palad. it was an error on the part of the RTC and the CA to conclude that appellant raped “AAA” through sexual intercourse. “BBB”. Santos.] Moreover.

In contrast. Martinez. November 21. Sy. Asensi. Espina. Palad. Valiente. the trial court held that the version of the prosecution was more credible. Sandoval. Thus. 2012 DOCTRINE: In the prosecution of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Catindig. (5) the presentation of the confidential informant is not required. Gloria. Francisco. Insp. Coronel. ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting appellants of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. and (8) the minor discrepancy in the weight of the shabu can be attributed to the weighing scale used by the police officers. Corporal. Marquez. (6) the use of thin layer chromatography to ascertain the purity of the shabu is not necessary. Rodriguez. the CA ruled that: (1) the purported inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are trivial and/or reconcilable.R. the prosecution must prove that the chain of custody rule was complied with. the version of the prosecution showed a logical. Ramirez. De Mesa. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BERNABE ANESLAG y ANDRADE G. (2) the police operatives in the buy-bust operation did not need to secure a search warrant because the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto. The trial court found the testimonies of the appellants to be conflicting and a case of finger-pointing. The six packs were tested positive for shabu as per the laboratory examination by the forensic chemist. Alcazaren. consistent and smooth flow of events leading to the arrest of appellants. Castillo. The buyers were SPO2 Salo and the civilian asset while the sellers were appellants Bernabe and Jocelyn in the presence of Mae and Menda. 185386. with respect to Mae and Menda. Tabugan. the trial court rendered a judgment of acquittal because it was not sufficiently established that the two were in conspiracy with the appellants. After appellant Bernabe received the boodle money. Cabañgon. Albano. Bernido. likewise. P/Sr. Santos. (3) the use of fluorescent powder and fingerprinting are not indispensable in buy-bust operations. respectively. Page 1017 Echiverri. Mae Elarmo (Mae). No. Inguillo. Valois . appellant BernabeAneslag (Bernabe) and appellant Jocelyn Concepcion (Jocelyn) with the RTC of Iligan City. Rañigo. not indispensable in buy-bust operations. In affirming the conviction of the appellants. Lastimosa. appellant Jocelyn delivered the shabu contained in a red bag to SPO2 Salo. (7) the case passes the chain of custody test because from the time of seizure up to the time of laboratory examination the shabu was in the possession of SPO2 Salo. However. The object of the transaction was six packs of shabu. Tecson. Reyes. Lumberio. Reasonable doubt existed owing to the fact that Mae and Menda appeared to be merely a messenger and a companion. (4) the presentation of the marked money is. De la Cruz. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish all the essential elements of the crime charged. of appellant Bernabe. Corpuz. FACTS: An Information for illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu) was filed against MendaAneslag (Menda).

we find that the chain of custody rule was complied with. he identified the subject shabu packs and the markings that he had previously made thereon. Coronel. and thereafter delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory of Cagayan de Oro City where the said packs were received by PNCO PO3 Paltinca who. Insp.. Thus. Bernido corroborated the testimony of SPO2 Salo.A. Francisco. Based on the foregoing. forwarded the same to P/Sr. The prosecution’s evidence sufficiently established an unbroken link in the chain of custody which precluded the alteration. Cabañgon. Bernido identified the shabu packs in court as well as the separate markings she made thereon. Corporal. two big packs and four smaller packs). During his testimony. SPO2 Salo was in sole possession thereof. GS-3. Inguillo. The chain of custody rule was dulycomplied with. Mary LeocyJabonillo Mag-abo (P/Sr. was unavailable because she had to undergo training in Makati City. Relative to the markings the latter made on the packs of shabu (i. and GS-1. the subject shabu packs were turned over to SPO2 Salo. In the case at bar. De Mesa. Insp. Ramirez.e. Palad. while the procedure under Section 21(1). the forensic chemist from the PNP Crime Laboratory of Iligan City who conducted the examination on the subject shabu packs. Insp. Castillo. Reyes. Insp. Rañigo. Valiente. 9165 was not strictly complied with. the examiner assigned to this case. rather than destroy. Page 1018 Echiverri. Consequently. Valois . Subsequently. We have examined the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and we find that the alleged inconsistencies are minor or trivial which serve to strengthen. we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized shabu was duly preserved consistent with the chain of custody rule. as evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt. Anent the matter of who was holding the red bag containing the shabu before it was confiscated by the police operatives. Bernido. Tabugan. Mag-abo). Lastimosa. No. De la Cruz. Asensi. in turn. Alcazaren. Lumberio. GS-2. Article II of R. Tecson. P/Sr. Marquez.. she further testified that the six packs tested positive for shabu. GRS-1 and GRS-2 for the bigger packs. Espina. The chemistry report21 and testimony of P/Sr. Corpuz. the trial court found more credible the Albano. Martinez. Sandoval. As correctly observed by the appellate court. the trial court issued an order for the conduct of another examination on the subject shabu packs by a forensic chemist in Cagayan de Oro City in order to expedite the proceedings. P/Sr. Santos. HELD: THE COURT affirmed the decision of the CA.e. Catindig. the credibility of the said witnesses as they erase doubts that the said testimonies had been coached or rehearsed. Sy. Insp. when this case was called for hearing. from the time of the arrest of the appellants and the confiscation of the subject shabu packs until their turnover for laboratory examination. substitution or tampering of the subject shabu packs. Rodriguez. Gloria. and GS-4 for the smaller packs)22 as well as the number and size of the shabu packs (i.

Valiente. Valois . Tabugan. Coronel. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires that the police must apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. along with the other members of the backup team. Reyes. anent appellants’ contention that the police operatives should have first secured a search warrant. the conviction of the appellants was proper. who then entered the room and arrested the appellants. More important.. All in all. The same holds true for the conduct of finger print examination on the money used in the buy-bust operation. and (2) the delivery of the drug sold and its payment. as in this case. on this matter is hearsay. Corpuz. Santos. in a buy-bust operation. De Mesa. Lastly. Room 65 of Patria Pension) at the time of the surveillance. the object and consideration. Castillo. Tecson. SPO2 Englatiera’s testimony. What is crucial is that the prosecution proves. the delivery of the prohibited drugs to the poseur-buyer and the presentation of the confiscated drugs before the court. testimony of SPO2 Salo that the said bag was given to him (SPO2 Salo) by appellant Jocelyn after he paid for the shabu with boodle money. Sy. Inguillo. Cabañgon. SPO2 Englatiera arrived only after the prearranged signal (as to the completion of the sale of the shabu) was given to him. Lastimosa. Rañigo. Ramirez. Palad. Martinez. Marquez. are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. we agree with the observation of the trial court that it would have been impracticable to secure such a search warrant because appellants were not residing in the agreed meeting place (i. Catindig. Francisco. Hence. Corporal. in the course of the operation. Alcazaren.e. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Espina. De la Cruz. Gloria. the police operatives are not required to secure a search warrant because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers. Sandoval. The surveillance was conducted for the mere purpose of determining the respective roles and positions of the police operatives in anticipation of the buying transaction which was to happen there three days later. We cannot fault the trial court for making this finding because SPO2 Salo was the one present during the buying transaction. Page 1019 Echiverri. therefore. Albano. Asensi. we find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime of illegal of shabu(I) the identity of the buyer and seller.

Article II of RA No. De la Cruz. Tabugan. Castillo. 11. it was dismissed and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thinking that appellant was carrying a bomb. and. a dangerous drug. Palad. On appeal. the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object. According to the prosecution. the man suddenly ran away so S/G Sahid pursued him. 11. (2) such possession is not authorized by law. which is identified to be a prohibited drug. Lastimosa. GEORGE EYAM Y WATANG GR No. Francisco. Sembrano. Ramirez. a man in front of him was frisked by Sahid. Reyes. However. Lumberio. Sy. RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Unable to pursue the man. De Mesa. Sahid ordered him to empty his pocket. The defense interposed. Valois . HELD: Yes. did then and there willfully. Security Guard Sahidwas doing routinary inspection of people entering the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. Valiente. not being lawfully authorized to possess and/or use dangerous drugs and without any license or proper prescription. and. that while appellant was at the entrance of the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. In People v. Coronel.80) gram[s]. Corporal. Page 1020 Echiverri. When it was appellant's turn to be inspected. Article II of RA No. 2012 DOCTRINE: “For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs. Espina. PEOPLE vs. which is identified to be a prohibited drug. Appellant brought out a plastic sachetand when asked what it contained. Rodriguez. in violation of the aforesaid law.Sahid patted appellant's back pocket and felt something bulky. the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object. Inguillo.we ruled that "[f]or illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs. Gloria. 9165. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. Alcazaren. The guard recovered something wrapped in a newspaper from the man's right pocket. (3) the accused freely and consciously Albano. among others. Asensi. (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. Tecson. Marquez. The Court is convinced of appellant's commission of the crime charged." FACTS: Information was filed charging the appellant with violation of Sec. accused was pointed as the man’s companion and even asked money from him in exchange for his release. Rañigo. custody and control one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing forty seven point eighty (47. 184056 Nov 26. Sandoval. replied "shabu". Cabañgon. Santos. Corpuz. (2) such possession is not authorized by law. ISSUES: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the violation of Sec. Catindig. Thatthe above-named accused. but to no avail. Martinez. 9165 or otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Cabañgon. Coronel. Sy. Tecson." All the foregoing elements were duly established by the prosecution in this case. Corporal. Francisco. De la Cruz. Asensi. Inguillo. Martinez. Valois . He failed to show that he was authorized to possess the same. Palad. Page 1021 Echiverri. Castillo. Marquez. Corpuz. De Mesa. Santos. possessed the drug. Reyes. Appellant was caught in possession of “shabu”. a dangerous drug. Albano. Espina. Sandoval. Tabugan. Rañigo. Catindig. Lumberio. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. Gloria. there is already a prima facie evidence of knowledge. Ramirez. which he failed to rebut. Lastly. Lastimosa. by his mere possession of the drug. Valiente.

Salazar. Coronel. Page 1022 Echiverri. On appeal. Santos. He also asserts that the alleged buy-bust operation is tainted with infirmity due to the absence of a prior surveillance or investigation.R. After qualitative examination. Francisco. Garcia. ISSUE: Whether or not the buy-bust operation is valid HELD: Yes. buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. Palad. Inguillo. Valois . Tabugan. Gloria. Asensi.000. Tecson. Lumberio. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Castillo. In this regard. Catindig. 2012 DOCTRINE: As long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug dealer are not violated.00 in exchange for his liberty. Appellant denied being a drug pusher and claimed complete ignorance as to why he was being implicated in the said crimes. the police officers demanded from him P10. Valiente. Espina. Sy. He averred that he was repairing the floor of his mothers house when two police officers in civilian clothes went inside the house. As long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug dealer are not violated. Rañigo. Martinez. Ramirez. 184181 November 26. There is no prescribed method on how the operation is to be conducted. De Mesa.At the precinct. police authorities are given a wide latitude in employing their own ways of trapping or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. As ruled in People v. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. And if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Thus. Sandoval. the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is no text book method of conducting the same. Appellant was accordingly charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu in two separate Informations. FACTS: The Station of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID) in Manila conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving an information from a civilian informer that a certain alias “kalbo” (appellant) is involved in the sale of illegal drugs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. No. the regularity of the operation will always be upheld. Appellant points out that it is contrary to human nature that the seller would say nothing to the buyer who is a complete stranger to him. the CA concurred with the RTC’s findings and conclusions. buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. the regularity of the operation will always be upheld. the forensic chemist found the items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA G. Lastimosa." Albano. in People v. we ruled that "if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. Reyes. A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. ransacked the closet and without any reason handcuffed and brought him to the precinct. Corporal. Marquez. Corpuz. a dangerous drug.

Tecson. Ramirez. In conspiracy. ELYNOR AGACER. It may be shown through circumstantial evidence. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices. they surprised Cesario by immediately surrounding him. or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design. while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit the crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario. EDDIE AGACER. Santos. Marquez. Corpuz. Sy. Coronel. it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. De la Cruz. or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design. Cabañgon. Second. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Espina. Franklin. Francisco. Cesario was preparing his farm for the coming planting season. Castillo. concerted action. 2011 DOCTRINE: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Franklin and Eric threw stones. Third. When the victim fell. deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. Asensi. Corporal. Catindig. Elynor attempted to struck an arrow and Eddie pulled out a gun and shot the victim. the accused immediately fled the crime scene on board a tractor and a tricycle. Fourth. Rodriguez. No. FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC AGACER G. FACTS: The victim. Valois . 177751 December 14. Eric and Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices. Florencio. all of them emerged at the same time from a banana plantation beside the rice field. Reyes. Inguillo. Lumberio. Eddie and ElynorAgacer. Tabugan. Florencio was armed with a bolo. Page 1023 Echiverri. In conspiracy. De Mesa. Lastimosa. concerted action. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a conspiracy HELD: Yes. Fifth. Martinez. Elynor had a bow and arrow. all of them were armed at the time of the incident. deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. Cesario was surrounded and attacked by the accused. Gloria. the acts of all appellants before. Eddie immediately shot Cesario Albano. Sandoval. Cesario. Palad. Eric. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. FLORENCIO AGACER. Rañigo. was a 55-year old rice field farmer of Cagayan. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack. It may be shown through circumstantial evidence. Franklin set fire on the rice straw to keep Cesario from retreating. during and after the incident establish the existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. Valiente. Alcazaren.R. Here. First. and community of interest. and community of interest. However.

Gloria. They performed specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design to ensure the death of Cesario. Seventh. De la Cruz. Santos. Sixth. Castillo. Corpuz. Palad. We thus uphold the lower courts’ finding that appellants conspired to commit the crime of murder against Cesario. Albano. Ramirez. Sy. but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault. Coronel. intent and execution. Tecson. all appellants departed from the scene of the crime together. Reyes. Lumberio. Marquez. Inguillo. Asensi. Tabugan. at close range while the latter was approaching the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Rodriguez. Martinez. Lastimosa. Espina. Sandoval. Corporal. Alcazaren. after Cesario was shot. Florencio. Valiente. Francisco. Catindig. Valois . Undoubtedly. the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design. Cabañgon. Eric and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario. Page 1024 Echiverri. Rañigo. De Mesa. Franklin.

and this we find to be the case here. 2013 DOCTRINE: In any event. Moreover. Asensi. Martinez. Lastimosa. Espina. this Court has already ruled that a medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate are merely corroborative in character and are not indispensable for conviction in rape cases. Anda. 189355 January 23. Coronel. Castillo. Lumberio. Sandoval. "AAA". Domingo. She was cowed by appellant's threats. in their own house to her damage and prejudice. it bears stressing that not all victims can be expected to act conformably with the usual expectation of everyone or in the manner suggested by the accused. Palad. Corpuz. Rodriguez. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape HELD: Yes. Alcazaren. Reyes. The fact that "AAA" was acting in a manner outside the normal behavior will not result in appellant's exoneration. CA affirmed with modifications the RTC Decision in that amount of civil indemnity was reduced and ordered to further pay “AAA” moral damages. Page 1025 Echiverri. the above-named accused by means of force. Rañigo. FACTS: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape before the RTC of Alaminos City. it has been established that the place of the incident is "AAA's" Albano. Francisco." Neither can the absence of bodily injury negate the commission of rape. Inguillo. "Further. Catindig. Gloria. did then and there wil[l]fully. he was tried upon an Information which alleges: “That sometime in November. Marquez. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.] old minor.” The RTC declared appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Valois . well-settled is the rule that prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is not necessary in rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape. On appeal. The court disagrees with the contentions of the appellant. ROLANDO CABUNGAN GR No. What is important is that the testimony of the private complainant about the incident is clear. Santos. 2002 in Siapar. On a plea of guilty. Tecson. In People v. Sy. Valiente. Besides. PEOPLE vs. unlawfully and felon[i]ously have carnal knowledge of his step-daughter (daughter of his wife or common-law wife). Tabugan." This is exactly the situation in this case. De Mesa. we held that "it is not uncommon that a rape victim conceal for some time the assault against her person on account of fear of the threats posed by her assailant. threats and intimidation. Cabañgon.a fifteen (15) [yr. De la Cruz. "AAA's" delay in filing the Complaint is not without a valid reason. Pangasinan. Pangasinan. Corporal. Ramirez. which hindered her from immediately reporting her painful ordeal to the authorities. unequivocal and credible.

"AAA's" actuations can hardly be considered contrary to normal human conduct. Castillo. Lastimosa. Reyes. She also has no other place to go home to since the place of her brother in Solano. Coronel. Francisco. Gloria. Marquez. Martinez. Albano. Rañigo. Valiente. Corpuz. Tecson. Valois . Tabugan. Cabañgon. Sy. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Santos. Nueva Vizcaya is too far away. own house where she has the right to stay and go home to after staying in a boarding house during the weekdays. Lumberio. Page 1026 Echiverri. Sandoval. Inguillo. Asensi. Thus. Espina. Catindig. Ramirez. De Mesa. Alcazaren. Palad. Corporal.

The items were both received by P/S Insp. Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Rañigo. No. Villano (PO3 Villano) to the Camarines Sur Crime Laboratory. Espina. like alibi. one roll aluminum foil and cash money amounting to P3. He claims that while denial. Sy. Rodriguez. it is not always false and bereft of merit where the evidence for the prosecution is even weaker. Camarines Sur. has been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.840. Corpuz. Francisco. Marquez. Clemen (PI Clemen) conducted chemical examination of the specimens and per her Chemistry Report Nos. transmitted them to the Regional Office. Reyes. Police operatives found inside the house of appellant four transparent plastic sachets suspected to contain shabu.m. Cristina Nobleza (PSI Nobleza) who. Valiente. Palad. is generally considered a weak defense.00. Martinez. Catindig. Santos. of July 21. like alibi. D-120-019 and D-128-01. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JAIME FERNANDEZ G. After receiving the same. 49 pieces of rolled suspected dried marijuana leaves. in turn. ISSUE: Whether or notthe defenses of denial and frame-up were properly rejected by the lower courts. HELD: YES. Asensi. has been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Valois . De Mesa. Corporal. After seizing these items. 188841 March 6. Inguillo. respectively. Ramirez. Tecson. an inventory was conducted in the presence of Barangay Chairman Cesar Dolfo and Barangay Kagawad Pedro Ballebar. This is true but not in all cases and certainly not in this case. Pictures of the seized items were also taken by the police photographer while SPO1 NiloPornillos (SPO1 Pornillos) marked and brought the seized items to their office. they yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. one tin can containing dried marijuana leaves. It bears to stress that "the defense of denial or frame-up." Here. 2001. Page 1027 Echiverri. Coronel. They interposed denial and frame-up as their defenses. Lastimosa. The suspected marijuana leaves were later brought by SPO1 Pornillos and the suspected shabu by PO3 Jamie S. Bula. like alibi. De la Cruz. Josephine M.R." FACTS: At about 10:00 p. Castillo. Lumberio. Ma. combined elements of the Bula Police and the Camarines Sur Provincial Intelligence Forces implemented a search warrant at the residence of appellant in SagradaFamilia. the lower courts properly rejected this defense not only because the prosecution’s evidence against appellant is so overwhelming but also because he miserably failed to substantiate such defense with clear and convincing evidence. Cabañgon. Appellants defenses hinge primarily on denial and frame-up. Appellant and Erick pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Alcazaren. Albano. 2013 DOCTRINE: It bears to stress that "the defense of denial or frame-up. Sandoval. Gloria. Tabugan.

Castillo. Article II of the same law docketed as Criminal Case No. is actually committing. FACTS: On October 14. all the appellants and the other accused pleaded not guilty and put up the defense of denial.” A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation. together with co-accused Melody Apelo (Apelo). Samuel Sherwin Latario (Latario). The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec.R. MARCELINO COLLADO et al G. (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Rañigo. 2004. Gloria. or is attempting to commit a crime. There must be a showing of clear and convincing evidence to successfully rebut this presumption. Lastimosa. 2013 DOCTRINE: Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to police officers. Sandoval. and. Valiente. Michael Angelo Sumulong (Sumulong). For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid. Martinez. MarwinAbache (Abache). appellants Mark Cipriano (Cipriano). Sy. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must be upheld in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overturn the same. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. 185719 : June 17. Article II of RA 9165. 2004. Tecson. Valois . Espina. 13781-D and 13782-D. two requisites must concur: “(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. Marcelino was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11. Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. Upon arraignment on November 4. RA 9165 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. were charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 14. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Corporal. 13783-D. On the other hand. Santos. Francisco. Corpuz. De la Cruz. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Palad. This is precisely what happened in the present case. Cabañgon. appellants MarcelinoCollado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra) were charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den. Inguillo. 13784-D. and Jay Madarang (Madarang). Catindig. Albano. Tabugan. Coronel. No. De Mesa. Reynaldo Ranada (Ranada). Lumberio. there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes. Ramirez. Page 1028 Echiverri. Asensi. HELD: NO. Rodriguez. Thus. ISSUE: Whether or not there are irregularities attended the arrest and detention as well as the procedure in handling the specimen allegedly seized from the accused. 5(a). Reyes. Marquez. dive or resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Article II. docketed as Criminal Case No. Alcazaren.

“a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant. “[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Lumberio. De Mesa. Palad. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. Martinez. Sy. Page 1029 Echiverri. Lastimosa. admits of exceptions. Alcazaren. Espina. Under Section 13. Catindig. otherwise. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Coronel. Cabañgon. one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Santos. Ramirez. Tecson. Castillo. appellants’ claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail. Moreover. Tabugan. Corporal. Rañigo. Asensi. the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground. Inguillo. it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Francisco. however. Albano. assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants. they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Rodriguez. Marquez. Gloria. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule. By this omission. The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Corpuz.” The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Valiente. Hence. Valois .” This proscription. Reyes. it is true that under the Constitution. any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them.

Catindig. the above principles are subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness. Orais. Inguillo. Corporal. Espina. But of course. and unappealable. Petitioners contended that her actions were in line with DAO 22 which authorized her to do it although she admitted that the DAO 22 is susceptible to graft and corruption. and unappealable. "it follows that the [Court of Appeals] has no appellate jurisdiction to review. rectify or reverse" the order or decision of the Ombudsman. fraud or error of law. Docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0184-D. Asensi. Veterinary Quarantine Officer-Seaport. Page 1030 Echiverri. Castillo. the Court of Appeals (CA) had no appellate jurisdiction to review. ISSUE: Whether or not decisions of the Ombudsman in cases absolving the respondent of the charge are deemed final and unappealable HELD: YES. where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand. and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand. Francisco. AMELIA ALMIRANTE G. petitioner Frederick James C. Indeed. Indeed. 2013 DOCTRINE: Where the respondent is absolved of the charge. Santos. executory. Reyes. The Court agrees with the CA that the instant Petition presents no opportunity to depart from past pronouncements – consistent with law and the rules of procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman – that where the respondent is absolved of the charge. executory. filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint4for corruption and grave misconduct against his superior. Rañigo. or a fine equivalent to one month salary. Rodriguez. the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final. Coronel. 181195 : June 10. the Court went so far as to declare that in such cases. Marquez. Ramirez. Region VII Office of the Department of Agriculture (DA). Lastimosa. Veterinary Quarantine Inspector-Seaport of the Veterinary Quarantine Service-Seaport. the Court went so far as to declare that in such cases. herein respondent Dr. Sy. as there is no transparency and the money collected is not subject to audit. No. Valiente. Amelia C. De Mesa. Almirante. in one case. or in case of conviction. Tabugan. FREDERICK JAMES ORAIS vs. Gloria. Sandoval. Alcazaren. DR. Cabañgon. Valois . suspension of not more than one month. Corpuz. Tecson. Lumberio. suspension of not more than one month." Albano. the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the case and held that respondent’s act were in accordance with law and the regulations of her office. or a fine equivalent to one month salary. petitioner accused respondent of committing anomalies. De la Cruz. Palad. Martinez. or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion. or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion. rectify or reverse the order or decision of the Ombudsman FACTS: In 2003. in one case.R. the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final.

and lodging expenses present an opportunity for graft and corruption and. then charges should just as well be filed against all who are covered by the said practice and procedure. First of all. They are all part of the system covered by DAO 22. Martinez. Marquez. The Court notes that the sole basis of the instant Petition rests on the Office of the Ombudsman’s observation in its Decision that the practice and procedure for payment and reimbursement of overtime services. Valois . Santos. Alcazaren. Sy. Coronel. transportation. there is no reason to apply the abovestated exception. Lumberio. Valiente. this argument is flawed. Lastimosa. that the issuance of mere acknowledgment receipts by respondent warrants the filing of charges against her. Tabugan. Reyes. Francisco. De Mesa. However. meal. Castillo. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Tecson. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Gloria. which petitioner claims to be a defective system. Catindig. Page 1031 Echiverri. Rañigo. Ramirez. Sandoval. Espina. if petitioner’s argument is allowed. including the petitioner. Albano. Corporal. Asensi. Palad.

kill him. Page 1032 Echiverri. 190340. Whether or not Marissa’s denial and alibi is tenable. De la Cruz. Sy. it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. Valiente. Espina. Rogelio also alleges that he only started hacking Abacco when he successfully disarmed the latter. Castillo. Gloria. Corporal. 2013 DOCTRINE: When the accused admits that he is the author of the death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense. "The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admits that he is the author of the death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense. The prosecution alleges. Asensi. Inguillo. he only did it for self-defense alleging that Abacco was armed with a bolo when he came to his house. De Mesa. Marquez. Santos.R. Reyes. Tabugan. to defend himself. Palad. Francisco. However. Sandoval. Valois . Lumberio. Marissa. ISSUES: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense may lie in favor of Rogelio. July 24. Rogelio admits that he killed Abacco albeit in self-defense. Rodriguez. She must demonstrate that she was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. Abacco suddenly hacked him with his bolo and. Rañigo. the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot lie in favor of Rogelio. Abacco kept throwing stones at their roof. that Abacco went to the house of the accused to tell them to stop throwing stones at the latter’s house. For the defense of alibi to prosper. the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential Albano. through its witnesses. it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. According to Rogelio." FACTS: Rogelio Ramos and Marissa Ramos (accused) were charged with the crime of murder for the death of Ronald Abacco (Abacco). Tecson. Martinez. Rogelio repleatedly hacked Abacco with a samurai sword until the latter was dead while Marissa kept on shouting “kill him. Coronel. Alcazaren. claims that she wasn’t there during the incident as she was seeking help from the KagawadTavora because prior to such incident. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. ROGELIO RAMOS and MARISSA INTERO RAMOS G.” On the other hand. Lastimosa."With this admission. upon opening the gate of accused’s house. he grabbed the samurai sword inside the house. HELD: No. Cabañgon. Corpuz. "the accused must prove (a) that she was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime. Ramirez. Catindig. accused Rogelio claims that while he indeed killed Abacco. and (b) that it was physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime" during its commission. No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. on the other hand.

Palad. Inguillo. De la Cruz. Marquez. Tecson. "the accused must prove (a) that she was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime. Corporal. Albano. Ramirez. elements of self-defense are present. Lumberio. On this score. Valiente. the eye witnesses stating that Abacco went to Rogelio’s house unarmed. Sy. Coronel. Castillo. Santos. For the defense of alibi to prosper. Gloria. she was also positively identified by the witnesses during the trial. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Tabugan. the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Valois . "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. Rodriguez. She must demonstrate that she was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Alcazaren. Martinez. (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Francisco. Espina. De Mesa. Catindig. Asensi. the multiple and fatal injuries that Abacco sustained and the minor wound Rogelio sustained that required no special attention and could even have been self-inflicted all points to the fact that it was indeed Rogelio who was the unlawful aggressor. the following requisites must be present: (1) unlawful aggression. No. Corpuz. Rañigo. Marissa’s denial and alibi is not tenable. Reyes. Page 1033 Echiverri. To successfully invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense." Not only was it not impossible for Marissato be at their house because the house of KagawadTavora was only 400 meters away. Sandoval. Among other things. and (b) that it was physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime" during its commission.

AAA told FFF that accused raped her but swore her to secrecy. FFF later returned to the boarding house upon the request of GGG to fetch AAA. "[F]or the charge of rape to prosper. No. Inguillo. When AAA opened the door FFF noticed that the former was fixing her shorts and asked her if anything had happened. FFF and her brother went to JojieSuansing’s (accused) boarding house to get an electric fan and transformer. Rodriguez. the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman. Santos. aside from discovering old hymen lacerations. Valois . Espina. AAA’s aunt. FACTS: Sometime in April 8. JOJIE SUANSING G. Tecson. Reyes. and. 189822. Page 1034 Echiverri. 2013 DOCTRINE: Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape since she is incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Gloria. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. Although with impaired adaptive skills. (2) through force or intimidation. Marquez. and the latter’s mental retardation. Martinez. Tabugan. After appellant handed the items to them he told FFF and her brother to leave AAA with him. Under these circumstances. HELD: Yes. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found "AAA" qualified to testify. AAA’s psychiatric evaluation revealed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of 9-12 years old. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. the victim. or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. her testimony was credible as shown from her "intelligent and coherent answers to questions propounded to her by the prosecution." that "AAA" or "FFF" was not ill-motivated to falsely accuse appellant of such crime. Corporal." that appellant was aware that "AAA" is a mental retardate. De la Cruz. Catindig. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of the crime of rape despite the lack of the elements of force." From these requisites. the defense and the Court. Lumberio. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of rape stating that it found convincing evidence that "AAA" is a mental retardate. 2001. all that needs to be proved for a successful prosecution are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist and his victim. or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Sandoval. Asensi. Lastimosa. Francisco. Valiente. that in spite of her mental inadequacy. Ramirez. the accused can be convicted of the crime of rape despite the lack of the elements of force.R. Upon appeal by the accused. A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a Albano. Upon arriving at the boarding house FFF noticed that the door was locked and called out to AAA to go home so that she won’t be scolded by EEE. EEE then reported the incident to the police. Sy. Castillo. violence and intimidation. violence and intimidation. Rañigo. De Mesa. it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation. the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. Subsequently EEE learned about the rape and confronted AAA. Coronel. that appellant raped "AAA. September 2. Corpuz. Palad. On examination. AAA. that proof of force or intimidation was unnecessary as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.

Coronel. Francisco.] without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act. Reyes. Tecson. Corpuz. Page 1035 Echiverri. Asensi. Santos. Tabugan." Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latter’s mental retardation need to be proved. Gloria. Marquez. De la Cruz. Catindig. Castillo. Ramirez. Corporal. Sandoval. For this reason. Valiente. Alcazaren. Valois . Sy. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Albano. sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape[. Palad. bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. Lumberio. De Mesa. Espina. Martinez.

Lastimosa. no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. No. SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG G. Coronel. Lumberio. September 18. Reyes positioned himself so that he could hear the conversation between the deceased and his fellow police officers. 2013 DOCTRINE: Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Gloria. the circumstantial evidence against Alawig is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to the prosecution. But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Reyes went inside the deceased’s house and subsequently answered a call from the deceased. Ramirez. De Mesa. the deceased and Macgregor Reyes (Reyes) went to the market afterwhich the latter left the deceased at his house. Valois .Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. in the early morning of November 30. Indeed. Corporal. he saw several police officers. to wit: Albano. Reyes. FACTS: Alfredo Alawig (Alawig) is one of the many accused of murder for the death of Miel de Ocampofe (deceased). enter the deceased house. ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence against Alawig is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Later that day Reyes learned that the deceased had died. Sy. the prosecution’s key witness. including Alawig. 1996. Tabugan. Palad. The RTC also considered the killing of the victim as attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Santos. sumundoka ng taonatutulongsa akin. Marquez. Reyes heard that the deceased was being summoned by PonicanoMirapales to help in an operation regarding illegal drugs.” Before Reyes could say anything the telephone conversation was cut off. akopalaangtratrabahuin. Corpuz. HELD: Yes. Alcazaren. Asensi. Rodriguez. Espina. Valiente. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Tulunganmoako. Rañigo. Martinez.R. Francisco. Tecson. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 187731. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly synthesized the circumstances constituting circumstantial evidence as culled from the entire testimony of Reyes. When the deceased and the other police officers left. Inguillo. Castillo. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The deceased told him “Pare walapalakamingtratrabahuin. Cabañgon. Page 1036 Echiverri." In this case. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Alawig guilty of murder qualified by treachery. When Reyes went back to the deceased’s house at noon. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Catindig.

the line at the other end of the telephone wassuddenly cut x xx.m. Reyes learned from his friend that the victim was already dead.38 caliber pistol. Lastimosa. (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven. Rañigo. Sy. De la Cruz. Reyes saw appellant and the late PO3 x xxVentinilla enter the house of the victim after the latter’s friend Tomas Beroy. "Pare walapalakamingtatrabahuhin. the Chief of Police of Police Kababayan Center I. and the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the victim after a paraffin test which belies appellant’s claim that he was shot by the victim or that the latter exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla. Marquez. Tabugan. Catindig. 1. and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. to join a team of police which will apprehend a big person x xx involved in illegal drugs in Malanday. Lumberio. Valois . Valenzuela. Palad. Gloria. opened the door upon the instruction of the victim. Espina. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Reyes saw appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla carrying an armalite rifle and [a] . Alcazaren. Marulas. 1996.38 caliber or 9 mm pistol dovetails with the testimony of Reyes that he saw appellant carrying a . Santos."But before Reyes could respond. A few minutes thereafter. Asensi. 2."All the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in this case.38 caliber short firearm which was later found to have been recently fired. 3. Corpuz. Reyes heard appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla tell the victim that he was being instructed by SPO4 x xxMiraples. Reyes. of November 30. 1996. Page 1037 Echiverri. Tulunganmoakosumundoka ng taonatutulongsaakin. akopalaangtatrabahuhin. Around x xx noon of November 30. Because of the alleged instruction of the victim’s superior. Later in the afternoon. and 6. Albano. Valiente. "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance. Corporal. The prosecution likewise presented corroborating evidence which constitute an unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that appellant is guilty of killing the victim. For instance. De Mesa. Tecson. Sandoval. Castillo. Martinez. the presence of gunpowder nitrates on appellant after a paraffin test.the firearm used in the killing which could either be a . 5. Rodriguez. Francisco. Reyes received a telephone call from the victim who nervously told him. Valenzuela. Doña Ata Subdivision Station. Reyes saw the victim leave his house together with appellant and PO3 Ventinilla around 1:00 p. 4. Coronel.

Dr. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her maternal uncle's house. Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost four months from the time of the rape would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa. But "AAA's" mother did not believe her. Her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched her." After "CCC" died. Castillo. On March 19. De Mesa. Santos. then thirteen (13) years old. Sy. Inguillo. she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. particularly if she is a minor. Ramirez. the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests during puberty. According to Dr.R. "BBB" cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial. Lumberio. October 9. Asensi. since when a girl. Reyes. Palad. Valois . courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired. Martinez. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA||| G. appellant took off "AAA's" shorts and panty and spread her legs." Sometime in December 2002. "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. In 2002. 2003. appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom inside their house. Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her family and appellant in Quezon Province. 2013 DOCTRINE: Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit. says that she has been raped. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girl's vagina. "AAA's" maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished. appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to anyone. Espina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist. Marquez. When the offended party is of tender age and immature. Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain. "AAA'' calls appellant "Papa. Page 1038 Echiverri. Coronel. Arnulfo Imperial. "AAA". Sandoval. Imperial. On the absence of spermatozoa on the victim's genitals. Unable to endure the torment. Tecson. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Once inside. Albano. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Corpuz. For fear that she might be raped again. Tabugan. Rañigo. De la Cruz. Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather. Alcazaren. Gloria. No. Rodriguez. Valiente. Corporal. FACTS: "AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC. 191362. considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Catindig. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Dr. "AAA" was brought to Doña Marta Memorial District Hospital in Atimonan. At that time. After satiating his lust. Francisco.

says that she has been raped. Santos. Lastimosa. Marquez. since when a girl. Page 1039 Echiverri. We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of qualified rape. Catindig.|| Albano. Cabañgon. Asensi. appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape. Castillo. Rodriguez. Valois . Gloria. CA affirmed. considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Coronel. RTC found accused Marciano Cial is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Rañigo. it would not be amiss to point out that "AAA" was only 13 years of age when she testified in court. As a general rule. ISSUE: Whether of not Marciano Cial is guilty of the crime of rape? HELD: Yes. Tabugan. the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. When the offended party is of tender age and immature. We rule otherwise. De Mesa. Martinez. De la Cruz. Espina. the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit. she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. Considering her tender age. ||| Besides. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. AAA could not have invented a horrible story. As such. In this case. Francisco. We find no cogent reason to depart from this rule. Alcazaren. Tecson. the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime. Lumberio. Reyes. this Court accords great respect to the factual findings of the RTC. Corpuz. Sy. Sandoval. particularly if she is a minor. courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired. According to both courts. Corporal. Palad. especially when affirmed by the CA. Ramirez.| Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself. Inguillo. Valiente.

we find that the trial court meticulously studied the case and properly weighed the evidence presented by the parties. Sy. Cagayan de Oro City could be traversed from Gingoog City within two hours. Corpuz.|| Albano. hitting on the chest. appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. with the use of a Batangas knife. Bryan Pascua (Pascua). 2013 DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. Alcazaren. On the contrary. Lapasan. Palad. As observed by the CA. Marquez. Appellant's alibi. Philippines. “Bogarts”. Tabugan. the latter thereby inflicting mortal wounds which caused his immediate death. November 11. De la Cruz. "Bogarts. with treachery and with intent to kill. unlawfully and feloniously stab one Armand Labando. with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to proved accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt HELD: No. Lumberio. Martinez. Jr. deserves no credence at all especially when measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness. it is not physically impossible for appellant to commit the crime in Cagayan de Oro City and still go home to Gingoog City after its commission.||| The RTC rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty of Murder for killing the victim Armand Labando.k. nobody corroborated appellant's alibi other than his wife who is obviously biased in his favor thus making her testimony self-serving. Catindig. De Mesa.a. at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Sto. Sandoval.||| Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. Cagayan de Oro City. we find no reason to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it has overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or change the outcome of the case. Santos. Espina. Besides. Cabañgon. Valiente. Corporal.R. ANDY ZULIETA a. being inherently weak. 192183. FACTS: On June 13. ||| CA affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC. Francisco. Moreover. Asensi. hence. Tecson. 2006. Andy Zulieta a. Inguillo. did then and there wilfully. Reyes.a. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Valois . Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Gloria. Coronel. Niño. Ramirez. Rañigo. pointing to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In this case. Page 1040 Echiverri. No."||| G. Castillo.k.

Tabugan. Catindig. It happened twice. Palad." Thus. No." FACTS: Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom he has three daughters. 8353. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Doney committed the crimes attributed to him. 2002. This time. After praying. The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. Martinez. RTC ruled in favor of “AAA”. "AAA" and her father. Alcazaren. When he was done. De la Cruz. A physical examination done upon "AAA" revealed that she was in a non-virgin physical state but that there are no signs of any form of trauma. Valiente. Inguillo. 181473. of the said date. were thus the only ones left in the family residence in San Mateo. the appellant. November 11. of the following day and while her mother and sisters were still in Caloocan City. On August 21. "AAA" was awakened when appellant lowered her shorts and panty. "AAA" felt pain but could do nothing but cry.m. "AAA" who was teary-eyed did not answer. "AAA's" class adviser called her. Sandoval. there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. Rape. Later. 266-A." who at the time material to this case was only 12 years old.when "AAA" went to school the following day. Page 1041 Echiverri. It also amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads: Art. she was asked by her religion teacher if her father did something bad to her. Francisco. CA affirmed. Lumberio. Sy. At around 9:00 p. Espina. Lastimosa. De Mesa. They ate in the canteen and thereafter proceeded to the adoration chapel to pray. Cabañgon. When and How Committed." After more than a month . the teacher asked "AAA" the same question propounded by the religion teacher. Rañigo. "AAA" was lying in her bed in the family room when appellant fondled her breasts and touched her arms. A psychiatric evaluation likewise revealed that "AAA" was suffering from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder with Depressed Mood. the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of her auntie in Caloocan City. Valois . Coronel. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Appellant spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Gloria.Three Informations were filed against appellant for Qualified Rape. Asensi. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Ramirez. Corporal. "AAA" and her mother went to the police station and reported the incidents of her defilement. "AAA" replied that her father did something bad to her twice but did not reveal the details surrounding the same. appellant put her shorts and panty back on and again threatened "AAA. Castillo.m. Their eldest child is "AAA. Rizal. 2013 DOCTRINE: "Where a victim's testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration. Sexual Abuse. reclassified the crime of rape as a crime against persons.R. DONEY GADUYON y TAPISPISAN G. HELD: No. Reyes. Tecson. Santos. "AAA" answered "Yes. Marquez. — Rape is committed — Albano. otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted it again into "AAA's" vagina. At around 11:00 p. "AAA's" mother then came and asked her daughter if appellant did something bad to her. Qualified Object Rape.

Asensi. Corpuz. Reyes. In rape under paragraph 1 or rape through sexual intercourse. Inguillo. to sexual abuse by means of lascivious conduct through intimidation or influence. when he mashed her breasts and stroked her arms on August 21. De la Cruz. Through force. d. under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1. threat or intimidation. Alcazaren. threat and intimidation on August 22. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. her statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict appellant for the crimes alleged in the Informations. Ramirez." a minor at 12 years of age. even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2002. Coronel. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Thus. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. This finding is consistent with her declaration that appellant inserted his penis and finger into her vagina. 2002. Cabañgon. It is also called "instrument or object rape". Martinez. Corporal. De Mesa." Albano. there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. Catindig. There must be evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator's penis touched the labia of the victim or slid into her female organ. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. Moreover. Valiente. Rodriguez. The perpetrator. By any person who. Castillo. He also subjected "AAA. or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Appellant also committed rape by sexual assault when he inserted his finger into the genitalia of "AAA" on October 9." Our examination of the testimony of "AAA" reveals that there was carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse through force. under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof. or the narrower "homosexual rape. Valois . "Where a victim's testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration. also "gender-free rape". 1. Tecson. into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Indeed. or any instrument or object. "AAA's" testimony is corroborated by the result of her medical examination which showed the presence of a deep healed laceration in her private part. Espina. Marquez. She did not waver on the material points of her testimony and maintained the same even on cross-examination. We agree with the observation of the lower courts that the testimony of "AAA" is worthy of credence. Lumberio. Tabugan. rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or through sexual assault. Lastimosa. rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. b. to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. 2002. c. Gloria. and not merely stroked the external surface thereof. On the other hand. Page 1042 Echiverri. Santos. She positively identified appellant as her abuser. Sy. 2. This is also referred to as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice. Francisco. Sandoval. Palad. Rañigo. carnal knowledge is the crucial element which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice.

someone knocked at the door. "AAA" immediately went out and sought assistance from her sister-in-law. When the responding police officers arrived. around 12 midnight. 191756. Asensi. as affirmed by the CA. Sy. Gloria. 2002 issued by Dra. More importantly. Per request for a medico legal examination prepared by P/Sr. Valiente. and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent Albano. standing alone. RTC found Jonas Guillen guilty of rape. Page 1043 Echiverri. November 25. HELD: Yes. "AAA" was brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for physical examination. appellant. Rodriguez. FACTS: On May 20. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that rape may be committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force. Catindig. In any case. Santos. Inguillo. conducted medical and genital examinations on "AAA". entered the room and suddenly poked a balisong on her neck. appellant stood up and casually left the room.R. The trial court's Decision convicting appellant of rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. Manila. "AAA's" sister-in-law contacted the police. Lumberio. CA affirmed. In this case. Amador Serrano Pabustan of the Western Police District. Sandoval. Palad. After the rape was consummated. finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape. appellant Jonas Guillen y Atienza. was immediately arrested. When "AAA" opened the door. Ramirez. Coronel. Lastimosa. Castillo. 2013 DOCTRINE: Alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when measured up against the positive identification made by the victim pointing to appellant as the malefactor. and that there was "evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination. we agree with the Decision of the trial court. Valois . Dra. At that time "AAA" was playing cards while waiting for her common-law husband to arrive. Marquez. Espina. removed his clothes. ISSUE: Whether or not Jonas is guilty of the crime of rape. Supt. NBI medico-legal officer. Tabugan." positive for spermatozoa. Rañigo. Annabelle Soliman. threats or intimidation. JONAS GUILLEN y ATIENZA||| G. Momentarily. De la Cruz. who was readily identified by "AAA" since he was her neighbor. Corpuz. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. "AAA" categorically testified that appellant forcibly undressed her. Cabañgon. No. Soliman shows that private complainant's hymen had "deep healed laceration at 7 o'clock position. Alcazaren. is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Preliminary Report dated May 20. poked a knife at her neck. Reyes. Tecson. "AAA" was inside her room on the second floor of a two-storey house located at Sampaloc. it was based on the testimony of "AAA" which. Martinez." and inserted his penis inside her private parts. who was her neighbor. Appellant then turned off the lights. De Mesa. Francisco. 2002. Corporal. placed himself on top of "AAA. After being told of the incident.

Rañigo. Palad. Page 1044 Echiverri. People react differently when confronted with a shocking or startling situation. Gloria. "AAA" lost no time in seeking the help of her sister-in-law and in reporting the incident to the police authorities. All the elements of rape having been established beyond reasonable doubt. Anent appellant's contention that "AAA's" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape. Tecson. Francisco. Cabañgon. Rodriguez. the failure of "AAA" to shout for help should not be taken against her. Likewise. Coronel. Ramirez. Some may show aggressive resistance while others may opt to remain passive. immediately after appellant left. and against her will. he failed to submit any proof to show that it is physically impossible for him to be at Sampaloc. Moreover. Lastimosa. However. Besides. Espina. Appellant could only offer alibi and denial as his defenses. Hymenal laceration. Tabugan. the fact of rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the testimony of "AAA" alone. Sy. Reyes. In fact. Santos. appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Corpuz. both the trial court and the CA properly found appellant guilty as charged and correctly imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Valois . the police authorities were able to apprehend appellant because "AAA" immediately reported the incident to them. is not an element of the crime of rape. Inguillo. Such threat of immediate danger to her life cowed "AAA" to submit to the carnal desires of the appellant. all the elements of the crime of rape were duly established from the testimony of "AAA". as implied by the defense. appellant's alibi crumbles in the face of his apprehension near the scene of the crime immediately after "AAA" reported the incident to the police authorities. whether fresh or healed. Marquez. Lumberio. Castillo. As we mentioned before. alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when measured up against the positive identification made by the victim pointing to appellant as the malefactor. Catindig. De Mesa. Quezon City when the rape incident happened. It would be recalled that appellant poked a knife at "AAA's" neck. Corporal. Thus. "AAA" positively identified appellant as her assailant. Asensi. Aside from claiming that he was at Galas. ||| Albano. However. we find the same irrelevant and immaterial. De la Cruz. Valiente. Alcazaren. Manila where and when the rape happened. Besides. or as voluntarily engaging in an illicit relationship with the appellant. Sandoval. Even a medical examination is not necessary as it is merely corroborative. The failure of "AAA" to shout for help and seek assistance should not be construed as consent. Martinez.

Lastimosa. 189840. Appellant pocketed the remaining plastic sachets together with the marked money. PO1 Marmonejo. Valiente. Corporal. PO3 Ruiz was designated as poseur-buyer and was provided with two 100-peso bills marked money. De la Cruz. (PO3 Ruiz). The next day. Sandoval. on the other hand. Page 1045 Echiverri. Asensi. Marquez. Appellant asked PO3 Ruiz how much he wanted to buy and he replied. 2005. he immediately formed a team composed of police officers and personnel of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) to conduct a buy-bust operation against appellant. No. The members of the entrapment team were PO3 Esterio M. Reyes. PO3 Ruiz. P200. Rañigo. The two other plastic sachets and marked money were recovered from appellant after PO3 Ruiz ordered him to empty his pockets. PO1 Honorio Marmonejo (PO1 Marmonejo). Corpuz. Thus. Ruiz. Coronel.00. PO3 Ruiz then took off his cap — the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated. Leo Sese. Santos. The items seized from him were turned over to the duty investigator who prepared a request for laboratory examination and then sent to the crime laboratory. Palad. the buy-bust team returned to Malvar Street and found appellant talking to three men. Ramirez. Castillo. Tecson. approached appellant. P/Supt. The confidential informant introduced PO3 Ruiz to appellant and told him that PO3 Ruiz wanted to buy shabu. Espina. Miguel Castillo. The results revealed that the contents of the plastic sachets are positive for shabu. De Mesa. which issued a Certificate of Coordination. The other buy-bust team members then rushed to the scene to assist PO3 Ruiz in apprehending appellant. PO3 Ruiz then marked the plastic sachets — "EMR" for the one appellant sold to him and "EMR-1" and "EMR-2" for the other two sachets confiscated from appellant. Jr. The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the events that transpired prior to and during the buy-bust operation. It rendered Jay Montevirgen Albano. coordinated the operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).R. The buy-bust team then proceeded to the subject area but could not locate appellant. FACTS: On July 18. Inguillo. Martinez. Alcazaren. He complied and gave the marked money to appellant as payment. Marietto Valerio (P/Supt. July 19. Gloria. Sy. PO1 Percival Mendoza. accompanied by the confidential informant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Valois . Makati City. 2013 DOCTRINE: Failure to physically inventory and photograph the shabu seized from an accused in the manner prescribed by law do not invalidate his arrest or render said drug inadmissible in evidence if its integrity and evidentiary value remain intact. Lumberio. Eugenio Dizer. JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA G.Barangay Captain Rodolfo Doromal. Catindig. Cabañgon. Francisco. Appellant was taken to the police headquarters where he was booked and the incident recorded in the police blotter. Appellant pulled out from his pocket three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and told PO3 Ruiz to choose one. Valerio) of the Makati City Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force received a report from a confidential informant that appellant was selling shabu in Malvar Street. After these men departed. It could still be utilized in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. December 11. 2005. Barangay South Cembo. Rodriguez. Tabugan. and Anthony Villanueva.

CA affirmed. . Article II of RA 9165. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence. 21 Here. the following elements must be proved: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Tecson.00 buy-bust money. There is also no imputation by appellant of any evil motives on the part of the buy-bust team to falsely testify against him. Upon receipt of the P200. marked the seized items in front of appellant. 5 and Sec. appellant handed to PO3 Ruiz the sachet containing 0. PO3 Ruiz. Valiente. Martinez. Valois . Lastimosa. Page 1046 Echiverri. and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. the barangay captain and other members of the buy-bust team.04 gram of white crystalline substance which later tested positive for shabu. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. Lumberio. Appellant's defense of denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. Francisco. Sy. . 11. Marquez. the absence of evidence that the buy-bust team made an inventory and took photographs of the drugs seized from appellant was not fatal since the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu. Coronel. ||ISSUE: Whether or not there is non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under RA No.||| The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. He then delivered the seized items to the duty investigator. Asensi. Reyes. Art. . positively identified appellant as the person he caught in flagrante delicto selling a white crystalline substance believed to be shabu in the entrapment operation conducted by the police and MADAC operatives. the poseur-buyer and apprehending officer. (2) such possession is not authorized by law. Ramirez. the poseur-buyer. Sandoval. Article II of the same law. Palad. PO3 Ruiz. HELD: No. which is identified as a prohibited drug. the following elements must concur: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object. Santos. Alcazaren. RA 9165. There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved. under Section 5. Cabañgon. Corporal. "The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction . Inguillo. the seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Castillo. II. 9165. Their testimonies and actuations therefore enjoy the presumption of regularity. Catindig. all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. the object and the consideration. Tabugan. Espina. in prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11. In this case. Gloria. immediately after the consummation of the drug transaction. On the other hand. Rodriguez. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Sec. De la Cruz. De Mesa. who in turn sent the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on Albano. Rañigo. Corpuz.

Clearly. Gloria. Sy. Catindig. Francisco. Lastimosa. De Mesa. Espina. Lumberio. PO3 Ruiz was able to identify the said markings and explain how they were made. Asensi. The illegal drugs that were confiscated from appellant. subjected to qualitative examination at the crime laboratory. Albano. Page 1047 Echiverri. taken to the police headquarters. Corpuz. Rañigo. Corporal. there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation. Valiente. Valois . the same day. and finally introduced in evidence against appellant were the same illegal drugs that were confiscated from him when he was caught in flagrante delicto selling and possessing the same. Castillo. De la Cruz. Sandoval. Reyes. Alcazaren. Santos. Coronel. Inguillo. Ramirez. Rodriguez. Martinez. Marquez. handling. During trial. custody and examination of the shabu. Palad. Tecson. Tabugan. Cabañgon.

Martinez. misunderstood. He then positioned himself beside "AAA" who was still inside the tricycle and told the latter to undress. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. After "BBB" alighted. 8353 in relation to Republic Act No. Rañigo. Together. Coronel." A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the case at bench is not an exception. De la Cruz. Sandoval. or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which. Thus. the first time he saw "AAA" was when he was made to stand in a police line-up with several detainees for identification. Davao del Norte. In fact. Like the lower courts. While pointing a knife on "AAA. a teacher. "AAA. convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. they went to the Davao Regional Hospital where she was subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. "The legal aphorism is that factual findings of the trial court. Marquez. Both RTC and CA ruled that accused was guilty. Ramirez. 194612 January 27. 8369. would alter the outcome of the case. he was at their home in Uraya Subdivision. Valois . Francisco. Asensi. its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses. Hence. Lastimosa. appellant alighted and urinated nearby. Mankilam. The following day. Once satiated. He is also happily married to Lyn. we find the narration of "AAA" to be Albano. "AAA" disclosed her ordeal to her mother.00 pesos and allowed her to go home. Catindig. Page 1048 Echiverri. misconstrued. Palad. Sy. Alcazaren. After warning "AAA" not to make any movement. Rodriguez. the victim is left to testify for herself. unless it ignored. appellant forced his penis inside her vagina and made a pumping motion. Inguillo. If a victim's testimony is straightforward. FLORO MANIGO y MACALUA G. appellant told "AAA" to dress up. the victim's credibility becomes the primordial consideration. in resolving rape cases. Castillo. par. it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. FACTS: Floro Manigo alias Jun was charged of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. Gloria. and her classmate "BBB" went home together and rode the same tricycle. and its assessment of their probative weight are given great respect if not conclusive effect. Espina. Tagum City. Santos. Corporal. if considered. Lumberio. Corpuz." appellant took off her panties and his own clothes. When they stopped." a 13 year-old minor. De Mesa. of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. Jun filed this final review of conviction. appellant gave "AAA" ₱40. Cabañgon. Valiente.R. the tricycle took a different route and went to a banana plantation. and is not a tricycle driver but engaged in a lucrative business of money lending. No. Reyes. "AAA" noticed a tattoo on appellant’s right upper hand. 1 in relation to the 2nd par. ISSUE: w/n “AAA” is credible and her testimony deserves full faith and credence HELD: Yes. Jun denied the crime and said that on the day of the incident. They then left the place and when they reached Makulay Restaurant. 2014 DOCTRINE: Rape is generally unwitnessed and oftentimes. Tabugan. unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency. Tecson.

positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. Asensi. candid. Valois . Sy. candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician. A rape victim’s account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape if it is straightforward. there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. Ramirez. Moreover. Page 1049 Echiverri. frank and straightforward. Tecson. Albano. Alcazaren. Martinez. Cabañgon. Perez. "AAA’s" claim of rape is supported by the medical findings of Dr. Reyes." And as often stressed. Corporal. Rodriguez. Gloria. "Where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration. Sandoval. Lumberio. Coronel. Lastimosa. Valiente. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Rañigo. another prosecution witness. Appellant miserably failed in this regard. as in the present case. for his defense of alibi to prosper. Palad. Tabugan. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and "must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Marquez. Castillo.1âThere is nothing therein that appears to be unnatural or illogical. Francisco. Catindig. appellant must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must also satisfactorily establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Santos. Also. The defenses of denial and alibi proffered by appellant were correctly rejected by the courts below in view of "AAA’s" positive testimony and unflawed identification of appellant as the culprit. Espina. Inguillo. De Mesa.

Moreover. accused denied the allegation of rape against him. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 196435 January 29. Gloria. It was in the house of the accused that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette. courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what Albano. 2014 DOCTRINE: The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect absent a showing that it overlooked. Reyes. The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that "AAA’s" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match. When the offended party is of tender age and immature. Marquez. Dr. On the other hand. she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. De Mesa. Coronel. Tecson. particularly if she is a minor. Rodriguez. "inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility. "The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. FACTS: Joel Crisostomo was charged of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape. did not lessen her credibility. ISSUE: w/n inconsistencies and contradictions on the testimony are enough to set aside the verdict of conviction imposed upon the accused HELD: No." Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit. Hence. Valois . Accused presented his brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that Joel was asleep during the day. rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts. misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. Martinez. since when a girl. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination. Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA" testified that the victim indeed had 2 third degree burns in the perianal region. Joel lived nearby. Espina. Ramirez. into another person’s genital or anal orifice. Lumberio. JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR G. Corporal. Francisco. Asensi. Corpuz. Reyes testified that it was possible that the said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victim’s skin. Palad. Catindig. Sy. especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. Dr. Inguillo. The RTC and CA ruled for the conviction of the accused.R. says that she has been raped. Alcazaren. Dr. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her. Such "uncertainty" is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. the appeal to SC. The father of "AAA" had a vulcanizing shop where accused was employed. De la Cruz. Valiente. Santos. Cabañgon." In any event. Lastimosa. No. inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then 6 year old girl. Sandoval. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused Joel worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer. or any instrument or object. Page 1050 Echiverri. Tabugan. Castillo. Rañigo.

Tabugan. AAA could not have invented a horrible story. Reyes. Corporal. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Asensi. Catindig. Corpuz. Lumberio. Tecson. Inguillo. considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Page 1051 Echiverri. Ramirez. Rañigo. Marquez. Espina. Valois . Martinez. Palad. transpired. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Albano. Considering her tender age. Castillo. Rodriguez. Francisco. Santos. Gloria. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Valiente. Cabañgon. Coronel. Sy.

Valois . In such position. Eladio Jr. Tabugan. Gloria. in conspiracy with the other John Does. and his son. No. Alcazaren. Catindig. Francisco. Castillo. 2014 DOCTRINE: There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against the person. stabbed the victim several times. without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Page 1052 Echiverri. The victim was attacked by appellant from behind with a blow to his head with a wooden pole. Eladio Jr. there is no opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble resistance. In fact. Balangkayan. Tecson. Sandoval. Rañigo. The body of the victim was recovered and post-mortem examinations revealed that he suffered multiple stab wounds which caused his death. without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. Palad. he was just on his way home together with his son Eladio Jr. Sr. was about 10 meters ahead of his father. Valiente.. Corpuz. Inguillo. Barangay Cabay. Albano. the latter was waylaid by appellant and his unidentified companions. Cabañgon. went to the house of his sister and informed her of the death of their father. WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED G. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Eastern Samar. FACTS: Wilfredo Gunda alias Fred was charged with the crime of murder. Hence.. The victim was unarmed and had no inkling of the impending attack on his person. ISSUE: w/n the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder HELD: Yes. His cohorts then held the victim’s arms rendering him helpless and immobile. Undoubtedly. Martinez. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Two prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim. the victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death. Coronel. and with the help of his conspirators. Asensi. was able to outrun them and was able to reach their house. RTC found the accused guilty. Rodriguez. De Mesa. were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon. employing means. Based on the above narrations. Suddenly. De la Cruz. Corporal. employing means. Marquez. 195525 February 5. Eladio Globio. The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon appellant stabbed him several times. They then reported the incident to the police authorities who eventually arrested the appellant. Eladio Jr. Reyes. treachery qualified the killing to murder. Lumberio.R. According to the postmortem findings. Fortunately. Espina. Santos. There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against the person. there is no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA. There is also no doubt in our mind that the attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court that indeed. when Eladio Jr. it was appellant. who killed the victim. The victim. In the morning of the following day. methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. the appeal. Sy.

and forced him to board their vehicle. He denied knowing Dory Ann and the arresting officers and claimed that he saw her for the first time during the inquest and the arresting officers when they arrested him. the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. Tecson. Article II of Republic Act No. RTC and CA both ruled that the Glenn is guilty. Pag-asa. Cabañgon. and DORY ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO G. Castillo. in turn. PO2 Soriano was designated as poseur-buyer while PO2 Richard Vecida. appellant heavily relies on the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately photograph and conduct a physical inventory of the seized items in his presence. aimed their guns at him. Corpuz. Rañigo. No. 2014 DOCTRINE: In a buy-bust operation. "What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. ISSUE: w/n non-compliance with Section 21. Martinez. 190621 February 10. the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved. Catindig. FACTS: Through the report of a confidential informant. There is no evidence that PO2 Soriano lost possession and control of the seized shabu from the time it was recovered from the appellant until its turnover to the police station. Inguillo. Lumberio. Coronel. Alcazaren. Rodriguez. gave him a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Quezon City when a patrol car suddenly stopped in front of his house. Valois . Gloria. He marked the seized item Albano.R. Asensi. Quezon City. a police team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. In this case. 9165 is fatal HELD: No. De Vera would serve as his backup. In his testimony. Tabugan. the appeal. Sandoval. PO1 Alvin Pineda and P/C Insp. Sy. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved. De la Cruz. Francisco. Valiente. Ramirez. Three policemen alighted. Lastimosa. Espina. In arguing for his acquittal. Corporal." The links in the chain of custody must be established. Palad. Hence. Marquez. Reyes. PO2 Soriano handed to Glenn the buy-bust money consisting of two 100-peso bills and the latter. PO2 Soriano then immediately arrested appellant and recovered from his right hand pocket the buy bust money. Page 1053 Echiverri. Santos. De Mesa. The police car then proceeded to Police Station 2 in Baler. During the operation. Glenn claimed that he was parking his tricycle outside his residence at Brgy. PO1 Alexander Pancho.

Marquez. Corporal. Sy. Corpuz. immediately upon arrival at the police station. Castillo. Inguillo. Coronel. Martinez. Gloria. Rañigo. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Sandoval. Francisco. Valiente. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Espina. the investigating officer. These facts were admitted by Glenn. De Mesa. Lastimosa. He turned it over to PO1 Calatay. Reyes. Catindig. Page 1054 Echiverri. Asensi. who prepared the letter request for the laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachets. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Valois . Tecson. Albano. Santos. De la Cruz. Palad.

Castillo. Sandoval. this Court encountered a similar situation wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be resolved. Tecson. It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. Gloria. Ramirez. Rodriguez. accused-appellant’s demise on August 16. and as to pecuniary penalties. Rañigo. grounded as it is on the criminal case. When Amistoso died. Francisco. In compliance with the directive. 179031 February 24. Therefore. Cabañgon. Valiente. however. Martinez. Albano. Inguillo. the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished. Lumberio. his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. Santos. Reyes. Asensi. Coronel. ISSUE: w/n criminal and civil liability of the accused is extinguished HELD: Yes. FACTS: Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault by the Supreme Court. As to the personal penalties. Lastimosa. the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections about the death of accused-appellant. 2012. Subsequently. 2012 Decision of this Court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on August 16. Clearly. No. his appeal before this Court was still pending resolution. Catindig. Amistoso’s death which happened before promulgation of judgment rendered the decision irrelevant and ineffectual. Amistoso. the Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate. Sy. as well as his civil liability ex delicto. 2014 DOCTRINE: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. the same must be set aside and the case against accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed. Consequently. Valois . when accused-appellant died. Espina. De Mesa. 1 The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Page 1055 Echiverri. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Corpuz. Corporal.R. De la Cruz. BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ G. 2012 or before its finality on December 20. the November 14. Tabugan. In People v. Palad. liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. 2012 transpired before the promulgation of this Court’s Decision on November 14. Likewise. 2012. Marquez. Alcazaren. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that the criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict.

Aggrieved. the RTC finds Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against “AAA”. Inguillo. that on or about the 29th day of July 2002. Corporal.”When arraigned on December 17. but affirmed the trial court’s decision with modifications. Valois . Lastimosa. Gloria. Sandoval. Contrary to accused-appellant’s assertions. DOCTRINE: For alibi to prosper. The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mentalretardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability. the said accused by means of force and intimidation. Ramirez. municipality of Viga. it must not only be shown that appellant was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime scene. Asensi. mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility. appellant entered a plea of not guilty. appellant attempted to show that he was at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape incident. Palad. even in her mental condition. As correctly observed by the trial court. Page 1056 Echiverri. Valiente. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. Catindig. Tecson. in barangay Ogbong. For alibi to prosper. 2004. However. Rodriguez. appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In this case. ISSUE: WON the appellant’s alibi may be considered. March 24. Philippines. Reyes. within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. 2008. Rañigo. “AAA” was a very credible witness. No. Martinez. Alcazaren. Sy. Coronel. this appeal. 2014. De Mesa. Castillo. Cabañgon. Appellant argues that the testimony of “AAA” deserves no credence because she was incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental disability. as found by the trial court. in the afternoon. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have considered his alibi must likewise fail. JERRY OBOGNE G. Corpuz. it must not only be shown that appellant was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime scene. HELD: No. 199740. Tabugan. Francisco. Santos. Marquez. the distance between barangay Ananong and barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be traversed in one hour or even less. De la Cruz.Hence. “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental condition. willfully. Lumberio. In this case. to the damage and prejudice of the said “AAA. Albano. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.”a 12-year old mentally retarded person.On March 13. unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge of “AAA. FACTS: Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information. Espina. province of Catanduanes.R.

198059. Lumberio. Lastimosa. As testified by the appellant.R. he was at the public market of Don Carlos. it [was not] impossible for him to be at the crime scene. as a defense.”He argues that “AAA” was “under pressure by her mother” or was coached as the latter was embracing “AAA” while “AAA” was on the witness stand. Hence. Coronel. Aggrieved. FACTS: Appellant Antonio Lujeco y Macanoquit was charged with the crime of rapecommitted on June 29. HELD: No. De la Cruz. he was at the public market of Don Carlos. should not be disregarded. Sandoval. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. It has been held. ANTONIO LUJECO y MACANOQUIT alias “TONYO. 2003. Sy. DOCTRINE: It has been held. Valiente. Catindig. Francisco. Tabugan. Albano. it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. April 7. as a defense. Espina.”a seven-year old minor. Castillo. Reyes. Alcazaren. In his Supplemental Brief. the Court finds the same wanting in merit. the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay rendered a Decisionfinding appellant guilty of statutory rape. appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its Decisionaffirming in full the Decision of the trial court. Valois . Inguillo. Bukidnon.Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 27. Corporal. It should be noted that for alibi to prosper. Marquez. Corpuz. is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. Rodriguez.After trial. appellant claims that thetrial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the testimony of “AAA. Rañigo. 2014. Palad. Tecson. Martinez. viz. this appeal. Asensi. De Mesa. Undoubtedly.: As regards appellant’s contention that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the fact that during the time that the alleged rape was committed. time and again. Ramirez. Santos. Cabañgon. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.” G. No. The SC agreed with the ruling of the appellate court. 2002 against “AAA. time and again. although concededly a weak defense. that alibi. that alibi. is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. Page 1057 Echiverri. Gloria. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellant. Appellant claims that his alibi.

Ryan Gain. Edwin Ramirez and Ricky Litada. Marquez. Corpuz. FACTS: On September 29. render him immobile. 2014. Lalog angrily talked to Gain. Lumberio. Alcazaren. while Lalog stabbed Gain. Martinez. appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. Later. and then stab him at the back several times. The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan. Sy. Santos. Roosevelt Concepcion. Rañigo. namely Erwin Lalog. but Mercado intervened and apologized to the group of Lalog. Inguillo. and RICKY LITADA G. Valois . ISSUE: WON Mercado’s testimonies should have been given credence by the court. in its Decision.” Mercado was walking ahead of Gain by six (6) arms length. What is important is the fact that Mercado unwaveringly testified that he saw appellants gang up on the victim. During their arraignment. HELD: Yes. when they were blocked by four (4) persons. Concepcion. Tecson. Espina. Rodriguez. this appeal. and Litada with the crime of murder. appellants pleaded not guilty. Municipality of Pinamalayan. 1999 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Palad. Gain and Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as the “RAINBOW. Catindig. Roswel immediately fled the scene. Tabugan. ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION. Oriental Mindoro. Page 1058 Echiverri. Fearing for his life. Castillo. Whether the victim was stabbed at the “rainbow” or near the “rainbow” is inconsequential. Roswel Mercado. he saw Gain being ganged upon by the group of the accused-appellants held both the hands of Gain. No. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. Aggrieved. Reyes. Rex Rey and Jayson Manzo were strolling at the Municipal Park of Poblacion.” The Court does not agree with the appellant’s claim. However. An Informationwas filed charging appellants Lalog. 196753. Ramirez. Ramirez. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Gloria. Cabañgon. Coronel. EDWIN RAMIREZ. Corporal. Oriental Mindoro found appellants guilty as charged. Appellants claim that Mercado’s testimony should nothave been given credence by the trial court and the appellate court as there were inconsistencies. DOCTRINE: There being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Lastimosa. ERWIN LALOG.the appellate court affirmed in full the Decision of the trial court. Asensi. appellants are not eligible for parole.Hence. They allege that Mercado initially testified that appellants attacked the victim at the place known in the locality as the “rainbow” but later recanted and stated that the stabbing occurred on the ground near the “rainbow. De la Cruz. April 21. Valiente. Francisco.R. De Mesa. Sandoval. However. when he looked back. Albano.

FACTS: COA Auditor Florence L. It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. Rañigo. ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. a former mayor of the municipality.166680.00 prepared for petitioner. Valois . De la Cruz. Corpuz. (2) That said public officer commitsthe prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions. Valiente. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila. Marquez. Tecson. Catindig. Santos. Ifugao. 2014 DOCTRINE: The acquittal of petitioner in the anti. because there is a variance between the elements of the two offenses charged. Sandoval. Palad. Castillo. [we have] consistently held thatthe same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges. but convicted of the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.736.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista."Further. Alcazaren. Corporal.00 during his incumbency as municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista. petitioner cannot safely assume that his innocence in one case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence. To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e)of RA 3019. ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of a public officer from a special penal law also applies to a criminal case arising from the Revised Penal Code HELD: No. However. Albano. Cabañgon. Lastimosa.736. Inguillo. he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of ₱101. Gloria. Asensi. Informations for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. Ifugao. July 7. instead of motorcycles. Martinez. Lumberio.R. she came across a disbursement voucherfor ₱101. Rodriguez. No. "However.graft case is not a bar to his conviction for failure to render an account in the violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting Lumauig for violation of RA 3019. Francisco. Page 1059 Echiverri. Tabugan. the following elements must be present: (1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former. Reyes. Espina. as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. 3019 and of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Codehave been filed against petitioner for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a purpose other than for which it was obtained. Coronel. During the courseof her examination of the records and related documents of the municipality. Ramirez. Sy. De Mesa. He claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality.

(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor. De Mesa. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an account. Castillo. Rodriguez. Inguillo. the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom. (2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property. Martinez. Sy. Tecson. The central aspect of petitioner’s next argument is that he was not reminded of his unliquidated cash advances. Francisco. The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would certainly differ in each case. (4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits. Page 1060 Echiverri. Sandoval. Ramirez. Espina.The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction for failure to render an account in the present case. Corpuz. whether the government or a private party. and. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218 does not require the COA orthe provincial auditor to first make a demand before the public officer should render an account. Alcazaren. Gloria. (3) That he or she causes undue injury toany party. Rañigo. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. advantage or preference to such parties. Valiente. Lastimosa. Albano. Valois . Marquez. De la Cruz. Asensi. Lumberio. (4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered. Palad. Corporal. petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him in the present case given the differences between the elements of the two offenses. Reyes. Catindig. and (5) That the public officer has acted withmanifest partiality. Tabugan. Santos. On the other hand. Cabañgon. Coronel. Hence.

197046. Lastimosa. Sandoval.Appellant fled from the scene of the crime without seeking help for his wife. It appears that George killed his wife with a single gunshot fired at close range at her chest. Espina. Tabugan. De la Cruz.Indeed. In the crime of parricide. PEOPLE vs. Reyes. or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Rañigo. Appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines and is thus “assumed to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm. Second. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant.R. a gunshot was heard emanating from the bedroom of George Zapata and his wife Queeny. Third. Inguillo. Gloria. Tecson. or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Valiente. if the shooting was accidental. Ramirez. Marquez. Corporal. GEORGE ZAPATA G. Lumberio. Valois . Corpuz. 2014 DOCTRINE: In the crime of parricide. Asensi. the gun is equipped with several safety measures. Albano." FACTS: George Zapata was having a drinking spree with his brother Manny Zapata and his cousin Edwin Bautista in their family home. appellant apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not insidea locked draweror cabinet.Appellant would not have become alarmed by the arrival of the police authorities. Sy. only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established: "(1) the death of the deceased. only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established: "(1) the death of the deceased. Catindig. Martinez. De Mesa. the gun was loaded."All these elements have been proven beyond doubt. (2) that he or she was killed by the accused. he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her blood. He alleged that he wanted toshow his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to retrieve the gun from the cabinet. Palad. Santos. Coronel. In his attempt tocatch the gun. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant.”In this case. No. he is guilty. The RTC found Zapata guilty of Parricide. Castillo. Instead he fled from the crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding wife. July 21. Francisco. Interestingly. Page 1061 Echiverri. After several hours of continuous alcohol splurge or at around 7 o’clock in the evening. appellant would have immediately sought help from his relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide HELD: Yes. all these safety measures werenot in place at the time of the shooting making appellant’s claim of accident highly unbelievable. Alcazaren. He claimed that the shooting of his wife was accidental. (2) that he or she was killed by the accused.Instead. he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting his wife in the process.

that appellant threatened to kill her mother and grandmother if she would not succumb to his desire. Francisco. Santos. Martinez. that she resided in the house of her grandmother since she was nine years old. Both the trial court and the CA correctly disregarded the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the appellant for being self-serving and uncorroborated. 2014 DOCTRINE: Rape may be committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through threat or intimidation. Ramirez. Rape may be committedby a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through threat or intimidation. and that her mother and grandmother reported the incident to the police authorities resulting in the arrest of the appellant. Reyes." every time appellant will have sexual intercoursewith her. Sandoval. De la Cruz.Thus. Cabañgon. Page 1062 Echiverri. De Mesa. Palad. The accused-appellant alleged that he did not rape"AAA". gifts. Valiente. The RTC held that he is guilty. Albano. The CA affirmed the decision. Tabugan. Rañigo. he would issue threats that he would kill her.It is also on record that "AAA" vehemently denied her alleged love relationship with the appellant. she told them that appellant raped her several times. Corporal. Castillo. No evidence such as love letters. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is correctly charged with the crime of rape HELD: Yes. No. Espina.that he and "AAA" had a relationship when the former was 14 years of age. FACTS: "AAA" testified thataccused-appellant (Stanley Bunagan) is the husband of her grandmother. Rodriguez. Coronel. Tecson. PEOPLE vs. 196786. Marquez. was offered to show the existence of such relationship. etc. Asensi.Besides. BUNAGAN G. Catindig. thatthe last rape incident happened when she was 16 years old. Valois . that "AAA" got pregnant and that he is the father of "AAA’s" child. such claim is totally absurd and preposterous. Going by the testimony of the appellant that his love relationship with "AAA" started sometime in 1997. Corpuz.R. "AAA" would havebeen only 12 years of age while appellant would be about 46 years old. pictures. appellant started raping her.According to "AAA. July 23. her mother and grandmother. Inguillo. Lumberio. Sy. Gloria. that when she was already 13 years of age. that whenher mother and grandmother confronted her about her pregnancy. both the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of the crime of rape. Alcazaren. that after the last rape incident. and that he was charged with rape when his live-in partner discovered "AAA’s" pregnancy. she got pregnant. that her grandmother leaves the house to work while appellant is unemployed and just stays at the house. Lastimosa.

Appellants’ conviction was based on their positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. JOJO SUMILHIG. Francisco. On appeal. Alcazaren. Carding. Castillo.. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Espina. Page 1063 Echiverri. Valiente. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Corporal. Sandoval. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence. Lumberio. Rañigo. appellants should be convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Martinez. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during trial. they heard gun bursts and saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family were having dinner. Gloria. Valois . or inferred from the acts of the Albano. 1998. the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. ERIC ENOC.R. deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. Inguillo.Jojo. and Pasot had their alibis thus.m. Kimlawis. "At last. Corpuz. Jerry Masaglang. Davao del Sur. and CIO LIMAMA. Asensi. There was conspiracy among the accused. However. Coronel. Santos. Palad. G. WARLITO MONTEBON. PASOT SALOLI. De la Cruz. Catindig. Kiblawan. together with Eugenio Santander and his son Mario. HELD: The appeal has no merit. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Suddenly. Marquez. Tecson. Sy. Tabugan. Lastimosa. Jerry and Mario recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused. I have retaliated!". De Mesa. Reyes. it found merit in appellants’ argument that the crime committed could not have been a complex crime since the death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and distinct acts of shooting. The RTC convicted the appellants of the complex crime of double murder and double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. 2014 DOCTRINE: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Jojo shouted. FACTS: The prosecution established that on October 31. at around 6:30 p. were in the living room of Eugenio’s house in Sitio Overland. Ramirez. it is impossible for them to commit the crime charged. ISSUE/S: GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY. RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG. No. 178115 July 28. The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Before the gunmen dispersed.

they were all armed with firearms. Page 1064 Echiverri. Rañigo. Sy. This is considering that the victims were unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hail of bullets from their firearms fired at close range. Martinez. Lastimosa. Lumberio. they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Gloria. Undoubtedly. they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Corpuz. Alcazaren. when they were within close range of the intended victims. Reyes. intent and execution. Albano. "[t]he suddenness of the attack. Inguillo. First. De Mesa. and community of interest. methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution. De la Cruz. Marquez. accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design. Palad. without the slightest forewarning thereof. Espina. Tecson. without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. Treachery attended the commission of the crime. Third. Indeed. their acts before. during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design. Santos. Rodriguez. concerted action. Ramirez. Here. Tabugan. Second. Corporal. Valiente. placed the victims in such a position that they could not have defended themselves from the aggression. Fourth. Francisco. Castillo. Sandoval. Asensi. there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy among them. Catindig. Cabañgon. Valois . Coronel. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person. employing means. Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons. they ceased firing at the same time and fled together.

as the statutory receiver of OCBC. These manager's checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Marquez. Thus. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge. Thereafter. Tecson. the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. Rañigo. A pre-trial was conducted. The presiding judge granted the private respondents' Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch. 2014 DOCTRINE: The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution. Lumberio. Inc. because not only the rights of the accused – but those of the offended party and the public interest as well – are involved. thereafter. After the presentation of all of the prosecution's evidence. Alcazaren. Inguillo. FACTS: On October 14. the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO Albano. Lastimosa. PDIC. the accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. in the resolution of demurrers. Once granted. Inc. Go with OCBC and. judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection. Corpuz. Tabugan. the Monetary Board of the BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution No. Francisco. Inc. Sandoval. were released in the form of manager's checks in the name of Philippine Recycler's and Zeta International. Martinez. Catindig. Gloria. trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. De Mesa. Inc. and Asia Textile Mills. and Asia Textile Mills. Valiente. 1998. DELA ROSA.The RTC judge finding the private respondents' Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious. No. Page 1065 Echiverri. Santos. GO. OSG appealed to the CA. and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand. Castillo. Rodriguez. The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy's. AIDA C. PDIC filed a complaint for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans of Timmy's. Palad. and FELECITAS D. Ramirez. NECOMEDES G. were automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier. Reyes. dismissing the Criminal Case.R. effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance with its mandate under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653. De la Cruz. Coronel. Inc. 1999. Espina. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). On September 24. Cabañgon. Corporal. Asensi. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Valois . drawing on their experience. JOSE C. Sy. 191015 August 6. the law and jurisprudence. denied their appeal.

Albano. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. when the accused files a demurrer. The court. Inguillo. HELD: The Court grants the Petition. To be considered sufficient therefore. in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer. Francisco. De la Cruz. Tabugan. De Mesa. Corporal. weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER. Tecson. whether true or not. is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. Martinez. Demurrer to the evidenceis an objection by one of the parties in an action. EVIDENCE. Coronel. the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Thus. the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Asensi. Cabañgon. Valiente. Valois . Corpuz. Santos. Palad. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Catindig. Castillo. Gloria. Rañigo. Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character. Espina. Marquez. to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law. to make out a case or sustain the issue. Ramirez. Lumberio. Reyes. Sy. Page 1066 Echiverri.

as amended. Palad. Francisco. PEOPLE v. Page 1067 Echiverri. Marquez. Coronel. Article II of RA 9165. Alcazaren. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution's evidence established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Martinez. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SAME. 2003. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in its Decision ISSUE/S: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED. there were already reports that appellant and her husband are engaged in selling shabu.A.APPELLANT GUILTY WITH VIOLATION OF SECTION 5. Albano. Appellant arrived at the Visitor's Inn. 181541. The buy bust operation ensued. Brgy. P/Insp. De la Cruz. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE AND BY RELYING ON THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTY. Gloria. Inguillo. Corpuz. Valiente. 2014 DOCTRINE: Apply the law without compassion against those who engage in illegal drug trade. Rabulan thus ordered a surveillance of the area where the transaction would take place and coordinated the matter with Arbitria. Lumberio. Santos. Tecson. an Informationcharging appellant with violation of Section 5. De Mesa. 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Sandoval. Corporal. Catindig." as amended. Sorsogon to deliver and sell an unspecified quantity of shabu. Tabugan. while the latter took the buy-bust money. ARTICLE II OF R. Ramirez. the RTC rendered a Decisionconvicting appellant for violation of Section 5. FACTS: On August 4. Appellant averred that there was no buy-bust operation conducted against her and that she was just a victim of a frame-up. Rodriguez. otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Punta Waling-Waling. Reyes. He subsequently formed a buy-bust team and requested Tarog to participate in the operation. Sy. was filed in the RTC of Sorsogon City. Castillo. Rabulan. the Barangay Chairperson of Brgy. Aug 18. MARISSA MARCELO GR No. PO2 Salvatierra took the shabu from Tarog and handed it to P/Insp. Espina. Prior thereto. Punta Waling-Waling. Valois . ImrieTarog informed P/Insp. Article II of RA 9165. Rabulan that appellant would arrive at his rented unit in Visitor's Inn. Asensi. Rañigo. Donsol.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Corpuz. We emphasize that the prosecution proved that appellant was apprehended after she exchanged the shabu in her possession for the marked money of the poseur-buyer. Coronel. it must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Palad. the following elements must concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Lastimosa. Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu. Tecson. For this defense to prosper. Catindig. Appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Reyes. Albano. Page 1068 Echiverri. Espina. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. Rodriguez. and the consideration. There was no Evidence of Denial and Frame-up. De Mesa. On the other hand. Appellant's argument that her warrantless arrest was not valid is untenable. Alcazaren. Gloria. Inguillo. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. Rañigo. Lumberio. Castillo. the object. Tabugan. Valiente. frame-up is viewed with disfavor since it can easily be fabricated and is a common ploy in prosecution for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Asensi. Martinez. Sandoval. Having been caught in flagrante delicto. HELD: The appeal is unmeritorious. Corporal. Sy. Marquez. Cabañgon. Santos. There must also be evidence that the police officers were inspired by improper motive. the police officers were not only authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant. A Warrant of Arrest was not Necessary. Valois . Francisco. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses.

Ramirez. Marquez. the buy-bust team coordinated with the police authorities stationed in the Municipality of Rosales and held a final briefing before proceeding to appellant’s abode. FACTS: On August 6. Espina. Tabugan. Santos. there was failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti. The next day. Sy. Inguillo. ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT RTC AND CA ERRED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED. Alcazaren. Hence. Palad. De Mesa. Sandoval. Valiente. SPO2 Rabago thus immediately formed a team to conduct an entrapment operation where PO3 Velasquez was to act as poseur-buyer and SPO1 Ferrer as back-up. Francisco. Because of this. in turn. Lastimosa. 2005. Upon arrival thereat. opened it and showed the contents thereof to PO3 Velasquez. After informing appellant of his rights. ordered the former to conduct a surveillance to verify the information. REYNALDO BATURI G. 2014 DOCTRINE: Failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule is not Fatal. who. who. Rañigo. the Special Enforcement Team Leader of the PDEA. Reyes. De la Cruz. Martinez.R No. Corporal. Lumberio. Version of the Defense Appellant denied selling shabu and claimed that he was a victim of frame up by the PDEA. while PO3 Velasquez seized the carton containing the sachets of white crystalline granules. Gloria. Rosales. Cabañgon. Castillo. Coronel. 2005.Carmen East. in turn. gave the boodle money. SPO1 Ferrer immediately showed up and recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. In CA appellant pointed out that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure governing the handling. Albano. D-121-2005-U stating that the white crystalline substance was positive for shabu. P/Insp. PO3 Velasquez and the confidential informant approached appellant who was sitting in front of his house while SPO1 Ferrer positioned himself about 15 meters away from them. custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. Pangasinan. Valois . 189812 September 1. Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu are present. When PO3 Velasquez informed appellant that he already had the payment. The RTC convicted appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. Rodriguez. PO3 Velasquez received and relayed the information to SP02 Pedro Rabago. Page 1069 Echiverri. August 7. Roderos issued Chemistry Report No. HELD: The appeal is unmeritorious. it denied the appeal. Catindig. the police officers arrested and took him to the PDEA office for further investigation. a confidential informant reported to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office in Dagupan City the illegal drug activities of appellant in Brgy. Asensi. appellant took out a carton. Tecson. Corpuz.

the object and the consideration. Francisco. De la Cruz. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Rañigo. Albano. Espina. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Catindig. and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing. Sy. Lastimosa. who acted as poseur-buyer. appellant’s defense of denial becomes unavailing. The failure of the police officers to comply strictly with the chain of custody rule is not fatal. Valois . Palad. Ramirez. positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu and categorically testified that the shabu was received by him. Rodriguez. deserving no weight in law. Lumberio. The Court is not persuaded by appellant’s averment that the prosecution failed to establish that the shabu allegedly seized from him was the same shabu submitted for laboratory examination. PO3 Velasquez. In this case. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. It will not render the arrest of appellant illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. in a legitimate buy-bust operation. Asensi. Corpuz. Tecson. Reyes. Castillo. Gloria. straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters. Page 1070 Echiverri. In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu. Sandoval. Martinez. A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving. the following elements must concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Valiente. Corporal. It has been consistently held that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a prosecution witness. Inguillo. Alcazaren. In view of the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses. Santos. Marquez. the prosecution successfully established all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. and the payment therefor by appellant. De Mesa. Coronel. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.

Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. FACTS: On January 28. the accused cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.R. Thus. when appellant appealed the RTC’s Albano. Ronnie Torres (accused) and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Jaime M. Only appellant was arrested. he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court. Santos. Espina. De Mesa. Valiente. Rañigo. Page 1071 Echiverri. Reynaldo. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. Alcazaren. The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for murder. De la Cruz. Lumberio. and RONNIE TORRES. Lastimosa. Catindig. HELD: The appeal is unmeritorious. REYNALDO TORRES. Castillo. Francisco. he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. During arraignment. ISSUE/S: The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double jeopardy. 2014 DOCTRINE: When appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder. Asensi. The RTC held that appellant could not have committed robbery. BOBBY TORRES AND ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA. In other words. Corpuz. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court. Marquez. an Amended lnformation was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo Jay. Espino (Accused-Appellant). 2004. Martinez. JAY TORRES. In an appeal by an accused. An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties. Tabugan. Corporal. he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy. Reyes. Valois . Sandoval. Palad. We cannot give credence to appellant’s contentions. Ramirez. he is liable of murder. G. After the termination of the pre-trial conference. BOBBY TORRES ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA. appellant entered a plea of "not guilty". which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. CA modified the RTC decision. Coronel. Cabañgon. Inguillo. No. Tecson. Rodriguez. Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide as charged in the Amended Information. finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of murder. The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established. whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. Appellant denied any participation in the crime. 189850 September 22. Sy. Gloria. trial ensued.

Inguillo. Marquez. Valois . Espina. judgment of conviction for murder. Asensi. Cabañgon. appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder. Albano. Sy. Martinez. Thus. Tecson. Lastimosa. Corpuz. Rañigo. Corporal. Catindig. De la Cruz. Ramirez. Valiente. Alcazaren. he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Reyes. Francisco. Tabugan. Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. De Mesa. Coronel. Page 1072 Echiverri. Lumberio. Palad. Rodriguez. Castillo. Santos. Sandoval. Gloria.

JOSE C. Martinez. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Francisco. Marquez. Alcazaren. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. for estafa through falsification of commercial documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in 1997. Reyes. Inc. Inc. the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed Informations against the private respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Castillo. Sy. – were approved. Coronel. Inc. Corpuz.00– were encashed. Gloria. Rodriguez. Santos. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Inc. 2014 DOCTRINE: Estafa could be committed by falsification of commercial document. Filed a complaint for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of after finding probable cause. Palad. ISSUE: Whether or not Estafa could be committed by falsification of commercial document. Ramirez. 00810-00108-0 of Go which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila. the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution No. Asensi. NECOMEDES G. fictitious loans in favor of two entities Timmy’s. Valois . Sandoval. FACTS: On October 14. Espina. and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No. and FELECITAS D. Catindig. De la Cruz.819. Lastimosa. No. Tabugan. and Asia Textile Mills. assigning the supposed loan proceeds to the two payees. GO. 1998. Inguillo. after which two manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different entities – Philippine Recycler’s Inc. Inc.475. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. these two manager’s checks – together with several others totaling ₱120. were automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier. Corporal. and Asia Textile Mills. and Asia Textile Mills. Valiente. and Zeta International – without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s. HELD: Yes. Tecson. Lumberio. 191015 August 6. Albano. Inc. De Mesa. Inc. DELA ROSA. AIDA C.R. Thereafter. thereafter. Page 1073 Echiverri. were released in the form of manager’s checks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International.The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s. Go with OCBC and.

191260 November 24. Marquez. No. still. Albano. Alarmed. PO2 Tejero recovered from appellant the buy-bust money. Rañigo. After having been introduced by the informant to the appellant as a potential buyer of shabu worth ₱500. Sy.00. presumption of regularity should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence. appellant took from his right pocket a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and handed the same to PO2 Tejero. Page 1074 Echiverri. Ramirez. PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. Gloria. he must be able to present a viable defense. the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome [the] presumption of regularity. Francisco. Valois .MELCHOR D. Corporal. unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy bust team were inspired by any improper motive. For the claim of frame-up to prosper. Valiente. Asensi. De Mesa. PO2 Tejero then executed the pre-arranged signal by lighting a cigarette. Corpuz. PO2 Tejero marked the plastic sachet thereof with "MDB-1. Tecson. called appellant who thereupon came out of his house and approached them. 2014 DOCTRINE: Direct account of law enforcement officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. Castillo. Martinez. Coronel. Inguillo. De la Cruz. HELD: No. what appellant interposed is merely denial and a claim of frame-up." ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of innocence overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of the police officers. Palad. PO3 Orias and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. appellant went inside his house but was caught by the police officers.R. PO2 Tejero gave appellant the marked money. Catindig. Lumberio. Lastimosa. Here. Anent the white crystalline substance he bought from appellant. FACTS: At about 4:30 p.m. After he was placed under arrest. of the same day. BRITA G. Tabugan. In return. Thereupon. the buy-bust team went to the house of appellant. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Reyes. Cabañgon. together with PO2 Tejero. The informant. Espina. Santos.

Gloria. and were proved by the prosecution’s evidence. Espina. Catindig. Alcazaren. HELD: No. Martinez. did then and there. not being authorized by law to sell. are: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Tabugan. Santos. gleaned from a plain reading of the implementing rules. Castillo. its identity. transport. an Information for Violation of Section Article II of RA 9165 was filed against Gandawali and Pagalad That on or about the 30th day of June 2003. DATSGANDAWALI y GAPAS and NOL PAGALAD y ANAS G. zero point twenty four (0. the most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti in evidence. Sandoval. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Francisco. De Mesa. strict compliance of the requisites under Section 21 of RA 9165 may be disregarded. Marquez. deliver. Inguillo. Philippines. Albano. the said accused. Lastimosa. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present the money used in a buy bust operation amounts to the acquittal of the accused. Lumberio.24) gram of white crystalline substance containing methyl amphetamine hydrochloride. Sy.R. conspiring together. The integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellants were duly proven by the prosecution to have been properly preserved. a dangerous drug. Cabañgon. willfully and unlawfully sell. These were done. Valiente. Page 1075 Echiverri. dispense. Corpuz. Appellants’ contention that the consideration of the sale was not established since the buy-bust money was not presented as evidence is unavailing. Appellants persistently argue that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the identity of the substance seized and the preservation of its integrity Thus. in Quezon City. Corporal. No."It is sufficient to show that the illicit transaction did take place. transport. Reyes. confederating with and mutually helping each other. Valois . dispense. 2003. De la Cruz. Rodriguez. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment there of. distribute or act as broker in the said transaction. Palad. Ramirez. the object and consideration of the sale. Tecson. neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation. 2014 DOCTRINE: The essential requirements for a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Rañigo. deliver. 193385 December 1. As long as the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved. quantity and quality remained untarnished. FACTS: On July 3. Asensi. or distribute any dangerous drug. Coronel.

Santos. Marquez. one "AAA." to her damage and prejudice. She thus approached appellant hesitantly. Martinez. Cabañgon. No. Tabugan. Espina. Rañigo. 2001. Inguillo. FACTS: That on or about the 30th day of June. Valois . Palad. HELD: No. Reyes. 190349 December 10. Francisco. Lumberio. Indeed. the inconsistencies in "AAA’s" statements are trivial matters that do not involve the essential elements of the crime. Tecson. "AAA" tried to run away. Philippines. but appellant threatened to shoot her with a slingshot. Ramirez. It has been held that inconsistencies on matters of minor details do not detract from the actual fact of rape. Asensi. 2014 DOCTRINE: The inconsistencies in statements are trivial matters that do not involve the essential elements of the crime. appellant suddenly grabbed "AAA’s" hand and dragged her to the second floor of a newly-constructed commercial building facing the public market. Albano. Castillo. Sy. Alcazaren." an 11-year old lass. The defense of the prosecution is based on the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the victim. Corpuz. De la Cruz. Biliran Province.R. who was then carrying a nightstick beamed his flashlight towards her. When already near him. [take] off her panty and his short pants and [succeed] in having carnal knowledge [of] the said "AAA. Lastimosa. Valiente. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Gloria. De Mesa. Page 1076 Echiverri. ISSUE: Whether or not the inconsistency of the testimony is enough to acquit the suspect. closed its windows and slept thereat but was awakened when herein accused. FRANCASIO DELFIN G. in the evening. The alleged inconsistencies on matters relating to the amount that was given to AAA after she was raped and as to whether it was a stone or a slingshot that was used by appellant to force AAA to go near him concern only minor and collateral matters. unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation [go] inside the vehicle and there. While the version of the prosecution: When she went outside the public market. in the Municipality of Naval. did then and there willfully. Corporal. Catindig. after watching a billiard game in front of the new municipal building of said municipality went to a jeep parked near the back of said building. Sandoval. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Rodriguez. appellant summoned her. such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. It has been held that where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime. Coronel.

and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Sandoval. Republic Act No.05 gram) and Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs. Coronel. appellant handed to Serrano a heat-sealed sachet containing white crystalline substance. Tecson. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a break in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs. the prosecution satisfactorily established the following elements: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. The facts of the case showed that on April 8. Reyes. After making the pre-arranged signal.BMANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL G. Guadalupe Viejo. appellant was apprehended and when bodily frisked. Serrano gave appellant the ₱300 marked money and in exchange. Francisco. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. Alcazaren. Accused-appellant alleged that the buy-bust team did not observe the proper procedure governing the handling. Rodriguez. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. 2008. Lastimosa. 0. Lumberio.R. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. For the violation of Section 5. 2015 DOCTRINE: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. Castillo. De Mesa. Ramirez. Sy. Makati City. No. 200797 January 12. Espina. Cabañgon.74 gram). the Makati police officers and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operatives conducted an entrapment/buy-bust operation on appellant who was reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade in Brgy. as amended by RA 9346. Valiente. After a careful review of the records of the case. HELD: None. he contended that there was a gap in the chain of custody as it was unclear what happened to the specimen after it was delivered to the crime laboratory and examined by the forensic chemist or how it was brought to the court. Martinez. Rañigo. 19 heat-sealed sachets were recovered from his possession. Catindig. the Court finds the appeal to be lacking in merit. In particular. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. Marquez. De la Cruz. Laboratory examination revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive results for shabu. Page 1077 Echiverri. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Inguillo. Asensi. Corporal. Albano. Article II of RA 9165. Santos. the object and the consideration. Tabugan. Corpuz. 0. Valois . custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. Palad. FACTS: Appellant Manolito Opiana y Tanael was charged with the crimes of violations of Section 5 (sale of illegal drugs. Branch 65 and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5 and 11. Both the RTC of Makati City. both of Article II. Gloria.

Tabugan. The son of the victim. The victim managed to run but was overtaken by appellant who then stabbed him with a bolo. The records belie appellant’s contention that there was no direct proof identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime. Palad.. Corporal. 200333 January 21. Catindig. Rañigo. Corpuz. Castillo. Lastimosa. FACTS: Appellant Domingo Dilla y Paular was charged with the crime of murder for the death of his brother. Pepito Dilla y Paular (Pepito).R. ISSUE: Whether or not direct proof is required to convict the accused. Coronel. and Renegado established without a shadow of doubt that it was appellant who mercilessly killed his brother. Jr. Francisco. Inguillo. Reyes. it was shown that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of July 22. Albano. Asensi. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Pepito. Santos. Rodriguez. Pepito. Pepito was working on his farm when appellant suddenly appeared and shot the victim with a gun hitting him on his left thigh. testimonial evidence provided by the witnesses are sufficient to provide proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lumberio. Himaao. 2015 DOCTRINE: Direct proof needed to convict an accused is not required. Martinez. direct proof is not required. Alcazaren. Ramirez. Cabañgon. Pepito Jr. Valiente. HELD: No. De la Cruz. Gloria. Accused interpose the defense that there was no direct proof that he killed his brother. Espina. DOMINGO DILLA y PAULAR G. Valois . Tecson. and Mary Jane Renegado (Renegado). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. the Court findsthe appeal to be lacking in merit. 2003. Marquez. Sy. Camarines Sur. at Sitio Ilaud. witnessed the incident and testified on the same. Page 1078 Echiverri. Pili. De Mesa. No. Sandoval.

After trial. Inguillo. a qualifying circumstance listed under Article 248 and notably. Valiente. Alcazaren. (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Tomas Dimacuha GR No. Page 1079 Echiverri. Sy. appellants entered separate pleas of not guilty. Valois . That appellants killed Agon was established through the prosecution witnesses composed of Vitan and two other self-confessed former members of "Black Shark". The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed. (2) the accused killed him or her. were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of NicanorMorfeAgon (Agon). Cabañgon. Francisco. Rañigo. Tabugan. All the elements of the crime of murder being present in this case. Catindig. and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. Castillo. (2) the accused killed him or her. 191060. Espina. De la Cruz. Their testimonies pointed to appellants as among those who planned and executed the killing of Agon. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC. alleged in the Information. together with the accused who remain at-large. De Mesa. Finally. ArnelBalocon and Romulo Gasta. Santos. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Coronel. February 2. Marquez. the RTC and the CA thus correctly ruled in finding appellants guilty of the said crime. People of the Philippines vs. Tecson. Palad. Also. the fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery. Gloria. Corpuz. the following must exist: (1) a person was killed. Lastimosa. and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. HELD: Yes. the RTC of Batangas City. During the arraignment. the killing of Agon was neither parricide nor infanticide. Martinez. Albano. Ramirez. rendered a Decision finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not appellants are guilty of the crime charged. (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Lumberio. Asensi. Reyes. FACTS: Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero). These requisites have been established by the prosecution. Corporal. 2015 DOCTRINE: In order to convict an accused for the crime of murder.

Lastimosa. Asensi. Valiente. The absence of markings creates an uncertainty that the two sachets seized during the buy-bust operation were part of the five sachets submitted to the police crime laboratory. there must be evidence of the following elements: “(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller. De Mesa. Catindig. Marquez. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. No.” The evidence of corpus delicti must also be established beyond doubt. De la Cruz. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. There was also no testimony from the police officers that they conducted a physical inventory and took photographs of the sachets of shabu confiscated from appellant pursuant to Section 21(1)27 of Article II of RA 9165. 192785. Reyes. This being the case. Jomer Butial G. the shabu “constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under [RA 9165]. Coronel. Tecson.” “The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Cabañgon. The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses and convicted appellant of the offense charged. He likewise points to the failure of the police officers to properly observe the procedure outlined in Section 21. In a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs. Gloria. He posits that his arrest was illegal since he was not arrested in flagrante delicto. Ramirez. FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5. Castillo. Rañigo. Sy. Corpuz. HELD: There is merit in appellant’s contention that not all elements of the offense of illegal sale of shabu were proven and that there were unexplained gaps and irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized items. Article II. RA 9165 and argues that the same constitutes a break in the chain of custody.” In the instant case. Republic Act [No. In this appeal. Espina. Page 1080 Echiverri. Martinez. Tabugan. Lumberio. February 04. the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. ISSUE: Whether or not there were irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized items. the prosecution failed to show that the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti have been preserved. Palad. People of the Philippines v. Valois . In this case.” Appellant also contends that the prosecution was unable to prove all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs. Sandoval. appellant questions his warrantless arrest. Albano. The police officers did not have personal knowledge that he was committing a crime as they were hiding behind houses seven meters away from the place where the alleged transaction took place and did not actually see the whole incident. Corporal. the object. Rodriguez. and the consideration.] 9165. the sachets allegedly seized from him cannot be used in evidence against him being “fruits of a poisonous tree. Alcazaren. Santos. 2015 DOCTRINE: The prosecution’s evidence must establish that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from appellant. Inguillo.R. Francisco.

Palad. 190348. Catindig. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Rañigo. 2015 DOCTRINE: The elements therefore of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress. Appellant argues that if he indeed raped “AAA. The surrounding circumstances leading to the alleged three incidents of rape were all the same which is highly unusual and contrary to common experience. Gloria. “AAA” was justified in thinking that appellant would make good his threat considering that he has a gun which he even poked at “AAA” everytime he would warn her against telling others of the rape. her own father. Castillo. Thus. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Also. Sandoval. categorical and steadfast. No. February 09. FACTS: Appellant was charged and convicted with qualified rape defined and penalized under paragraph (1) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Alcazaren. straightforward. Corporal. (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape. the evidence on record established that “AAA” was just 16 years old when appellant. Martinez. ”AAA’s” testimony on her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was found by the lower courts to be positive. appellant argues that the charges against him should not have been given credence because “AAA’s” narration of the events leading to the alleged rape were vague and highly improbable. In this appeal.R. it cannot be reasonably expected that “AAA” would hastily report the rape to her grandmother or to the authorities considering that appellant threatened to kill her and her grandmother should she divulge the incident. People of the Philippines v. Francisco. Indeed. Espina. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that both the trial court and the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish all the elements of qualified rape. Reyes. Rodriguez. (2) with a woman. all the elements of qualified rape are present in this case. De la Cruz. Asensi. Appellant further argues that the prosecution failed to prove the attendance of intimidation in the commission of the crimes. failure to immediately disclose the rape does not warrant the conclusion that the victim was not raped especially in this case where a minor was threatened at gunpoint. Inguillo. Tabugan.” then the latter should have avoided returning to his house at SitioBaco after the alleged first incident of rape. According to appellant. Appellant also contends that “AAA’s” conduct after the alleged rape incidents is questionable. Clearly. Valois . Marquez. Appellant likewise posits that the prosecution failed to rebut his allegation that “AAA” was mad at him because he chastised her due to her improper ways. (3) done by force and without consent. Santos. (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate. illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Albano. De Mesa. Corpuz. Sy. Moreover. Coronel. this could have been the reason why “AAA” pressed charges against him. Valiente. in relation to paragraph (1) of Article 266-B thereof. Tecson. Page 1081 Echiverri. had carnal knowledge of her. Appellant also suggests that the normal thing to do on the part of “AAA” was to report the rape to her grandmother which she failed to do. NiloColentava G. it sees no reason to depart from the findings of the lower courts.

Sandoval. Sy.357 gun at her before raping her. pointed his . Asensi. To recall. Verily. “AAA” had unequivocally stated in her testimony that appellant. Espina. the element of intimidation was sufficiently established. Rañigo. the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter substitutes for violence and intimidation. Francisco. Lastimosa. Inguillo. Reyes.” All told. Tabugan. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Coronel. Alcazaren. even assuming that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of intimidation. Martinez. Albano. Page 1082 Echiverri. Ramirez. Rodriguez. thus. of which this Court is unconvinced. Palad. the same would not alter the outcome of this case. This. De la Cruz. At any rate. Lumberio. “Settled is the rule that in incestuous rape. Corpuz. Corporal. During the succeeding rape incidents. Catindig. during the first incident. the Court affirms the lower court’s conviction of appellant for three counts of qualified rape. Valois . brings the Court to appellant’s contention that intimidation was not established in this case. Tecson. appellant used the same gun to threaten her should she reveal her defilement to her grandmother or to anyone. Santos. Valiente. Marquez. Castillo. Gloria.

Francisco.00. HELD: The Court is satisfied that the prosecution discharged its burden in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Valiente. Gloria. No. Corporal. Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. Aside from being weak and uncorroborated. Palad. the Department of Justice (DOJ) and any elected public official who shall sign copies of the inventory pursuant to RA 9165. which occurs the moment the buyer exchanges his money for the drugs of the seller. Tabugan. another police officer and member of the buy-bust team. Rañigo. Lumberio. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to discharge the burden of proof relative to the illegal sale of shabu. Ramirez. the police officer who acted as buyer. Gloria Nepomuceno Y Pedraza G. Sandoval. and. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant for illegal sale of shabu in but acquitting her for illegal use of the same due to insufficiency of evidence. Against the evidence of the prosecution. Thus. FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (Sale of Dangerous Drugs) and 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs). Santos. PO1 Santos. Martinez. Appellant insists that the warrantless arrest. search and seizure carried out by the police officers against her were illegal since they merely suspected that she committed a crime. the object and consideration. Catindig. People of the Philippines v. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Asensi. Page 1083 Echiverri. February 09. and violation of Section 15. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Tecson. Sy. such defenses are viewed with disfavor since they can easily be concocted and are common and standard ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Rodriguez. 194999. Cabañgon. testified on the buy-bust operation against appellant and positively identified her as the seller of the seized shabu that was sold to him for P100. Reyes. She continues to argue that the evidence allegedly recovered from her has no evidentiary value for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph the seized shabu in the presence of a representative from media. Albano. PO2 Barrameda.” This offense merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction. Inguillo. Coronel. While they had not seen appellant prior to the buy-bust operation. Espina. 2015 DOCTRINE: A cursory reading of the implementing rules that the crucial factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items since they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. which are: “(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Valois .R. Castillo. (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. corroborated the testimony of PO2 Barrameda. denial and frame-up crumble. Appellant thus interposed this appeal reiterating that her positive identification by the police officers cannot be relied upon since the police officers were not familiar with her appearance. Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. her defenses of alibi. De Mesa. Corpuz. Marquez. the CI readily identified and introduced her to PO2 Barrameda. there was no assurance that she was the person reported by the CI to be engaged in an illegal drug activity.

Sandoval. Martinez. integrity and probative value were preserved and kept intact by the police officers. Gloria. it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item has been preserved and remained intact. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Asensi. Marquez. De Mesa. Francisco. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Corpuz. Page 1084 Echiverri. Corporal. Catindig. Valiente. Santos. there is no doubt that the sachet marked “GPN” submitted for laboratory examination and found positive for shabu was the same one sold to the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation and the very same item presented during the trial as the corpus delicti. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. while it is admitted that there was no physical inventory and photographing of the seized drug as mandated by law. Coronel. Ramirez. Considering this sequence of events. Castillo. Lumberio. Reyes. Valois . Tecson. Rañigo. The crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized drug subject matter of the case from its confiscation from appellant up to its presentation as evidence was duly accounted for and shown to have not been broken. Sy. Albano. Also. Its identity. Palad. Espina. No irregularity was shown to have attended the chain of custody of the shabu. It was established that after the seizure of the small plastic sachet. PO2 Barrameda immediately marked it with the initials “GPN” while PO1 Santos confiscated the buy-bust money from appellant’s possession.

HELD: The Court ruled that the links in the chain have been duly proven.A. Sandoval. 195850. which he delivered. Tecson. Valois . 9165). Palad. Reyes. Albano. According to him. Page 1085 Echiverri. the poseur-buyer. 91653 (R. Valiente. Sy. Cabañgon. surrendered them to the desk officer who placed the appropriate markings thereon. Martinez. physical inventory and taking of photographs of the items confiscated. The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sections 5 and 11. Marquez. [Thereupon]. De Mesa. Corporal. Gloria. During the conduct of the buy-bust operation. Asensi. No. to the PNP Crime Laboratory on September 9. Subsequently. forensic chemist P/INSP ARBAN duly received the request for laboratory examination and the confiscated items and conducted the qualitative examination thereon. Inguillo.R. February 16. Catindig. together with the seized plastic sachets. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. De la Cruz. the police officer on duty. which yielded positive results. the seized items were turned over to PO1 ESTRELLES. and the second one was recovered from the latter during the routinary frisk conducted by PO2 SALONGA. Appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime. Espina. 2015 DOCTRINE: The requirements under [R. Moreover. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. He maintains that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the requirements of R. He thereafter gave the plastic sachets to SPO3 CONCEPCION. Ramirez. 2003. in turn. Article II of Republic Act No. FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) and 11 (possession of dangerous drugs). People of the Philippines vs. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Article II of R. this raises serious doubts as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence. Tabugan.A.A. where SPO3 CONCEPCION. Rañigo. Lumberio. Castillo. Francisco.A. Alcazaren. Coronel. Abola Bio Y Panayangan G. who kept the same in his custody until they reached the police station. 9165 in handling the seized evidence.PO2 SALONGA.] 9165 and its implementing rules are not inflexible. was able to confiscate two (2) plastic sachets of shabu from accused-appellant: the first one was sold to him in exchange for the buy-bust money. appellant claims that he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings in violation of his fundamental right to due process. It ruled that the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established. Rodriguez. particularly with respect to the immediate marking. Corpuz. who prepared the request for laboratory examination on the specimens. ISSUE: Whether or not there were irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized items. Santos. Lastimosa. 9165.

Rañigo. Espina.’ Albano. Valiente. What is essential is ‘the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. Palad. Valois . Page 1086 Echiverri. Santos. Coronel. hence. Cabañgon. The requirements under [R. Corpuz. Catindig. Sandoval. Tabugan. Corporal. De la Cruz.A. Rodriguez. Castillo. Lastimosa. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Sy. there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Reyes. Martinez.] 9165 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Gloria. Inguillo. Asensi. Marquez. Ramirez.A.] 9165 and its implementing rules are not inflexible. Alcazaren. It must be stressed that non-compliance with Sec. Francisco. the prosecution in this case was able to establish the integrity and the evidentiary value of the shabu seized from accused-appellant. Tecson. De Mesa.21 of [R. Lumberio. Thus.

coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Marquez. Tabugan. Albano. the testimony of the poseur-buyer was not indispensable or necessary. 91653 (R. De Mesa. 193855. 9165). FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) Article II of Republic Act No. Gloria. Rañigo. Appellant was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu to the poseur buyer. as affirmed by the CA. Corporal. 2015 DOCTRINE: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place.The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Lastly. People of the Philippines vs. the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. Valois . Moreover. Tecson.A. Rodriguez. appellant’s argument that the buy-bust operation is fatally flawed for failure of the police officers to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration. Lastimosa. Reyes. the object. No. In this appeal. there is no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. Cabañgon.00.R. Coronel. and the consideration. Castillo. Asensi. coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime. Palad. it is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA. Valiente. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Virgilio Largo Perondo G. it would have been cumulative merely. All told. as defined and penalized under Section 5. Coordination with the PDEA is not a crucial requisite of a proper buy-bust operation. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place. Corpuz. 9165 and imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500.A. Martinez. Catindig.A. Sy. Espina. De la Cruz. Santos. HELD: In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu.000. Ramirez. Sandoval. the following elements must concur: “(1) [the] identity of the buyer and the seller. Page 1087 Echiverri. Inguillo. 9165. Francisco. The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 Article II of R. ISSUE: Whether or not all the elements of the offense of Illegal Sale of Shabu were proven in this case. Article II of R. In this case. that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu. Lumberio. Alcazaren. February 18. or corroborative at best.

No. Santos. and as correctly pointed out by appellant. 2015 DOCTRINE: The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.A. HELD: In this case. these considerations disqualify the arresting officers from enjoying the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. 9165). Sy. People of the Philippines vs. Aside from the fact that the marking of the seized items was not done immediately after seizure in the presence of the persons mentioned by the said law. and his detention for more than 24 hours. Cabañgon.R. Valiente. Reyes. Alfredo Santos Reyes G. However. Lastimosa. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision and ruled that the prosecution’s evidence duly established the consummation of the illegal sale of shabu and that the seizure. 9165. Corpuz. custody and examination of the seized drug were well-documented and undertaken in an uninterrupted manner. SPO1 Acosta positively identified appellant as the person he transacted with and who handed to him the two sachets of shabu presented in court. Marquez. Martinez. FACTS: Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (R. Rañigo. appellant argues that the prosecution was unable to establish the elements of the illegal sale of shabu by failing to identify him as the seller of the shabu and to prove that payment was given in consideration thereof. Tecson. Hence. the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of establishing the element of consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu. handling. Francisco.A. the failure to provide him with a counsel immediately after his arrest. Page 1088 Echiverri. not even a single photograph of the seized items was taken and submitted by the apprehending officers. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Gloria. Sandoval. According to appellant. Coronel. more credence should have instead been given to his defense of denial. Inguillo. February 18. Without the monetary consideration. Catindig. Lumberio. The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Appellant likewise calls attention to the absence of marked money in the buy-bust operation. Adopting the same issues he raised in the CA. Albano. Asensi. the proper crime to be charged is illegal delivery of dangerous drugs. 194606. ISSUE: Whether or not all elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were proven and the receipt of appellant of payment for the purported sale of shabu was established in this case. SPO1 Acosta practically admitted in his testimony the lack of consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu delivered to him by appellant. Tabugan. De la Cruz. Corporal. Ramirez. Castillo. He also asserts that there is no proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu was preserved in accordance with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of R. Valois . Palad. De Mesa. Espina.

Palad. Page 1089 Echiverri. Sy. and by any means. the element of receipt of payment for the thing sold is absent in this case. Appellant likewise knowingly and voluntarily made the delivery. (2) such delivery" is not authorized by law. Corporal. Marquez. Valois . and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery with or without consideration. Espina. Santos. Article II of R. Catindig. there was a prior arrangement between SPO1 Acosta and appellant to meet. he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu under Section 5. Clearly. Appellant had no authority under the law to deliver the shabu since he was working as a carpenter at the time of his arrest. Castillo. De Mesa. Appellant responded by taking out from his pocket the shabu and handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta without receiving any payment therefor. Appellant is guilty instead of illegal delivery of shabu. Valiente.A. However. Francisco. Coronel. the offense of illegal sale of shabu against appellant cannot stand. Gloria. To establish the guilt of an accused for the illegal delivery of a dangerous drug. Tecson. Martinez. Cabañgon. SPO1 Acosta introduced himself and asked appellant for the shabu. Corpuz. personally or otherwise. De la Cruz. Tabugan. Asensi. Lumberio. During the scheduled meeting. In this case. Sandoval. Hence. there must be evidence that "(1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another. Rañigo. On the basis therefore of the charges against appellant and the evidence presented by the prosecution. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. 9165 Albano. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Inguillo. Reyes.

PO1 Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the consummated transaction and arrested appellant. Martinez. PSI Abalos organized a buy-bust team. the team proceeded to and arrived at the target area. PO1 Gunda and the informant walked towards a store along an alley while the others strategically positioned themselves some five to seven meters away. Valois . He further avers that (1) there was no inflagrante delicto arrest as he was not committing any crime at the time he was apprehended. Article II of RA 9165 for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride. Francisco. Tabugan. March 16. Rañigo. People of the Philippines vs. later identified as the appellant. Asensi. PO1 Gunda was designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus given two 100-peso bills as marked money while the rest of the team would act as back-ups. Corpuz. Page 1090 Echiverri. Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a certain “PaengPutol”. and contrary to his contention. Cabañgon. 198024.00. Lastimosa. Appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling an illegal drug in a buy-bust operation. specifically with respect to its inventory and taking of photograph. Rafael David Cunanan G. Thereafter. PO1 Gunda was introduced to appellant as a drug user who wanted to buy shabu worth P200. De Mesa. Tecson. The transaction made in the buy-bust operation involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug. Gloria. Reyes. it was not inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in public. Alcazaren. Lumberio. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item have been preserved. FACTS: Accused-appellant Cunanan was charged with violation of Section 5. appellant entered a narrow alley and came back with a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Gunda. Marquez. Rodriguez.R. Ramirez. and (3) the apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines on the proper custody of the seized dangerous drug. Santos. Palad. Appellant denies the charge and interposes the defenses of denial and frame-up or extortion. ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD: YES. 2015 DOCTRINE: Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 will not necessarily render the item seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Thereupon. Catindig. was engaging in selling illegal drugs. Coronel. No. This was sufficiently shown by the prosecution through its establishment of the following elements of the Albano. Corporal. Castillo. Sandoval. (2) it was inconceivable for him to openly sell illegal drugs as PO1 Gunda himself testified that at the time of the alleged sale transaction there were many people around the target area. Inguillo. After receiving the marked money from PO1 Gunda. Espina. Sy. Valiente. The RTC and the CA found her guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged. De la Cruz.

the plastic sachet sold by appellant was marked at the place where it was confiscated. From this sequence of events. hence. Santos.” Undoubtedly. appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu in a buy-bust operation. Albano. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Inguillo. object and consideration. Asensi. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item have been preserved. appellant’s contention is untenable. Thereafter. his conviction is affirmed. Sy. appellant’s defense of denial and frame-up or extortion fails to convince. De Mesa. the marked plastic sachet was presented and identified by PO1 Gunda as the same item sold to him by appellant. appellant and the seized drug were brought to the police station. Its integrity and evidentiary value were shown not to have been compromised notwithstanding the fact that the inventory and photograph thereof which PO1 Gunda claimed to have been made were not offered in evidence. Valois . Palad. Gloria. During trial. Marquez. Tecson. Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 will not necessarily render the item seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Alcazaren. Appellant’s violation of Section 5 Article II of RA 9165 was duly established beyond reasonable doubt. a request for laboratory examination of a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with the marking. records reveal that after the consummation of the sale and the consequent arrest of appellant. Ramirez. And as stipulated by the parties. Anent the contention of the officers’ non-compliance with the guidelines on the proper custody of the seized item. Ultimately. Sandoval. Page 1091 Echiverri. Rañigo. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Reyes. Lumberio. Francisco. particularly with respect to the inventory and taking of its photograph. Catindig. Martinez. Castillo. the prosecution was able to show an unbroken link in the chain of custody of the subject item which is the proof of the corpus delicti. Espina. offense: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Valiente. Corpuz. Corporal. Here. Coronel. De la Cruz. Cabañgon.

Reyes. While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house. 200942. at around 10 o’clock in the evening. Coronel. identified one of the assailants as herein appellant. The prosecution established that on April 2. appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Alibi. However. Albano. De Mesa. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from the appellant. Corporal. Martinez. However. he saw appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pickup of the victim. Lastimosa. Moreover. the manager of Stanfilco-Dole. it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his extrajudicial confession. Valiente. Palad. Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law. admitting to the killing of Buensuceso. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Sandoval. FACTS: Appellant JorieWahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of murder for the death of JoseBuensuceso which the same pleaded not guilty. Phils. he was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. Marquez. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS G. Espina. Tecson. During trial. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots. June 16. HELD: Neither. Page 1092 Echiverri. Sy. Gloria. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. Appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Castillo. Buensuceso. ISSUE: Whether or not the appelant’s alibi is established for acquittal or parole. No. Ramirez. Francisco. he narrated that at the time of the killing. it must be stated that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. In any event. Asensi. 2003. Tabugan. who was then opening the gate. he was at Landing Casisang. Lumberio.R. when it was appellant’s turn to testify. The guard on duty. Santos. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and was holding a gun. Rañigo. 2015 DOCTRINE: Criminal Law. Corpuz. inMalaybalay City. Valois . The RTC and the CA thus properly found appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Alcazaren. the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case.Hence. Inguillo. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. was on his way back to the company staff house onboard his Isuzu pickup after attending a despedida for one of his employees. Rodriguez. David Azucena (Azucena). Catindig. inadmissible.

Valois . and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value. (2) the knowledge of the maker. Sy. Francisco. Coronel. Marquez. Considering that the demand letter was dated November 30. drawing. Martinez. they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or closed account. arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof. 1993. however. By Albano. Corpuz. Inguillo. See filed on December 23. HELD: In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22. or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. Reyes. However. he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. the following essential elements must be present: “(1) the making. Moreover. Valiente. Page 1093 Echiverri. Asensi. 1993). 1993 prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. Castillo. it is presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand letter (November 30. Espina. Tabugan. Thus. 1993 a Complaintfor violations of BP 22.” In the instant case. Catindig. Alcazaren. Hence. Sandoval.R. the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s actual receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed thereon. Lumberio. De Mesa. the reckoning of the crucial fiveday period was established. Santos. Despite demands. On different dates from 1992 until 1993. July 13. Chua failed to make good the checks. drawer. without any valid cause. No. what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts. ROBERT CHUA vs. See claimed that when he deposited the checks. Chua asserts that the absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30. 196853. Palad. and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. Rañigo. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. the lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. Rodriguez. On the other hand. the second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind.” “Of the three (3) elements. Accused-appellant argues that there is no proof that he received the same considering that there is no date on his signature appearing on the document. FACTS: Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were longtime friends and neighbors. ISSUE: Whether the accused should be criminally liable for BP 22. De la Cruz. Gloria. 2015 DOCTRINE: It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check — the prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. Corporal. which. Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Tecson. ordered the bank to stop payment.

Sandoval. Albano. Asensi. Sy. De la Cruz. reason of such stipulation. they all held that Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter. Corpuz. Ramirez. there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter dated November 30. Marquez. Valois . from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. 1993 demand letter. Castillo. In addition. However. De Mesa. Lastimosa. all that the prosecution did was to present it without. Cabañgon. Page 1094 Echiverri. Inguillo. Santos. adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. Francisco. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. Palad. Lumberio. The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof. Given Chua’s denial. Similarly in the present case. Martinez. Corporal. however. Catindig. Espina. it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30. Coronel. Rodriguez. Valiente. Reyes. 1993. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Gloria. Rañigo. Tecson.

the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Page 1095 Echiverri. patyon ta na long kakaron. Valois . Espina. In its prosecution. it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. Lumberio. No. 2004 at 2:00 A. appellant boxed her on the stomach near the epigastric region or "kuto-kuto. and her three (3) children were sleeping inside the room of their house xxx when she was awakened by the presence of a man wearing black clothes and a mask. Coronel. (What if you will have me blottered tomorrow? What if you will report? I might as well kill you now. Sy. FACTS: On February 9. Santos. 207633. patyongtamongtanan." rendering her unconscious. Catindig. Gloria. Ramirez. Reyes. Corporal. Rung mosumbongka. Rañigo. Martinez. Corpuz. When the private complainant regained consciousness at around 3:00 A. private complainant recognized him as her neighbor and appellant JohnlieLagangga.R.M. Valiente. Rodriguez. ISSUE: Whether or not prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Tabugan. Cabañgon. if you will report. appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with "AAA" but claimed it to be a consensual congress. she saw appellant standing outside the room. Marquez. December 09. Francisco. hasigmosumbongka. convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Lastimosa.. private complainant (AAA). which prompted her to shout "Oy! Johnlieikaw man diayna! (So." After covering her mouth. If the testimony of the victim is credible. He threatened her.. saying: "Basigipablaterkonimougma. Johnlie it was you). 2015 DOCTRINE: Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy. In his defense. Inguillo.M. the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. her private part smelled differently and that "there was the presence of mucous and probably a secretion of the male organ. HELD: Albano. then I will kill all of you.)" Private complainant then noticed that her panty was gone. De Mesa. therefore. Palad." concluding that she was used that night.JOHNLIE LAGANGGA Y DUMPA G. Mistaking him for a dog. she simply shooed him away until she suddenly felt a knife being poked at her neck. Castillo. The man took off his makeshift mask that was made from a t-shirt and because of the light from the kerosene lamp. Asensi. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Tecson. De la Cruz.

10 In the present case. the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Francisco. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor. De Mesa. Page 1096 Echiverri. Corporal. Lumberio. Thus: Here. In its prosecution. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. "AAA's" positive identification of appellant as the one who threatened her by poking a knife at her and her testimony that he boxed her on the abdomen rendering her unconscious and upon regaining consciousness noticed that her undergarment was removed. Ramirez. Coronel. by his dastardly act. Lastimosa. Tecson. Valois . when the credibility of the witness is in issue. The testimony of a married rape victim is given full weight and credence because no married woman with a husband and children would place herself on x xx public trial for rape where she would be subjected to suspicion. as [a] rule. Sy. Martinez. Gloria. malicious imputations. and close scrutiny of her personal life. Sandoval. Rodriguez."8 "If the testimony of the victim is credible. morbid curiosity. ruined her and her family. not even in her cross examination. Rañigo. The appeal is barren of merit. Valiente. Often. the argument of appellant as premised. The testimony of a witness who has no motive or reason to falsify or perjure oneself should be given credence. it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. De la Cruz. the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Reyes. The CA was convinced of the veracity of "AAA's" testimony. admit in public that she had been raped. misunderstood or misappreciated a certain fact or circumstance of weight which. Marquez. Tabugan. boils down to the issue of credibility. Asensi. She expressed her anger and bitterness towards appellant who."9 Essentially. are clear and consistent. if properly considered. did it appear that she was impelled by improper motive. A virtuous woman will not. Catindig. Palad. the RTC found "AAA's" account of her painful ordeal credible and sincere and gave it full probative weight.11 Albano. unless she is telling the truth. the trial court's assessment is accorded great weight unless it is shown that it overlooked. Espina. not to speak of a humiliation and scandal she and her family would suffer. therefore. private complainant narrated a realistic account of her ordeal in a simple yet clear-cut manner. as she thereby blemishes her honor and compromises her future. Corpuz. would alter the result of the case. "Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy. Castillo. Santos. convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Nowhere in the course of her testimony. if she was merely concocting her charge and would not be able to prove it in court. Inguillo.

the said accused. Jr. Albano. 'as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Francisco. Castillo. Corporal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. De Mesa.K. Sy. Lumberio. with deliberate intent and without authority of law. HELD: The appeal is well-taken.R. conscientious and honest-to-goodness justice by conducting a thorough examination of the entire records of the case based on the settled principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review on all questions including those riot raised by the parties. Punta Princesa. Tabugan.A. we stress again that generally. Coronel. one "Droga". did then and there sell.On the afternoon of November 4. Marquez. Espenido. Sandoval. are entitled to great weight. Rodriguez. 2005. As such. Philippines. Valois . went to Police Station 10. Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R. a dangerous drug. the dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu. Corpuz. FACTS: That on or about the 4th day of November. Catindig. locally known as "SHABU". illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 2005 he was eating bread when SPO2 Nuñez barged inside his house.FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA A. deliver or give away to a poseur buyer the following:cwhite crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride. Rañigo. Lastimosa. a civilian informant. Trial then followed. the trial court's findings of fact. handcuffed him and brought him to the police precinct.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrAppellant put in a negative plea. Santos. Reyes. January 11. Valiente. he also denied that he was arrested in a buy-bust operation. in the City of Cebu. No. 198450. Espina. what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. at about 6:30 p. 2016 DOCTRINE: Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. De la Cruz. it must likewise pay homage to a higher duty which is to dispense real. While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect and unbroken. Prefatorily. Asensi. and will not be disturbed on appeal. Palad. Inguillo.. 2005. FERNANDO RANCHE ABANA G. ISSUE: the non-compliance by the police officers with the prescribed procedure under Section 21. (SPO1 Espenido) that the appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug trade. He claimed that on that evening of November 4. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Tecson.m. Gloria. Alcazaren. Page 1097 Echiverri. Martinez. The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller. especially when affirmed by the CA. Article II of RA 9165 and lastly.13 Even as this Court must defer to this salutary rule. in reality it is not.

Santos. Asensi. Reyes. Lastimosa. assault and use personal violence upon one Corazon Claudio y Nadera by then and there stabbing the latter with a knife on the different parts of her body. and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene during its commission. to wit: evident premeditation and treachery. intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery. Francisco. Ramirez. Rodriguez. But. De la Cruz. Espina. ISSUE: SHOULD THE APPELLANT BE ACQUITTED BECAUSE HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT? HELD: After a careful review of the records. Sandoval. Inguillo. Coronel. Tabugan. unlawfully and feloniously. Both courts correctly found appellant guilty of murder. Corporal. in the City of Manila Philippines. Alcazaren. by some convincing act or action. In fact. De Mesa. 2002. Valiente. to allow appellant time or opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of his act. had indeed clung to his determination to kill the victim. Castillo.R. Martinez. Marquez. we find no reason to depart from the uniform findings of the RTC and the CA. nor that appellant. Cabañgon. Tecson.It bears stressing that the Information for murder instituted in this case alleged only two aggravating/qualifying circumstances in support thereof. 207389 DOCTRINE: For the defense of alibi to prosper. Albano. Corpuz. Rañigo. as correctly found by both the RTC and the CA – with which finding we are in full accord – the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation did not attend the killing of the deceased Corazon because there is no evidence at all that the killing was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the decision to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. did then and there [willfully]. Lumberio. Valois . thereby inflicting upon the said Corazon Claudio y Nadera mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death. Gloria. the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS G. Catindig. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Page 1098 Echiverri. attack. let alone that sufficient time had indeed lapsed or transpired between the decision to kill and its actual execution. FACTS: That on or about March 27. Palad. the said accused. the prosecution here has adduced no evidence at all to show that sufficient time had lapsed before appellant decided or determined to commit the crime. Sy. No.

Dr.5 He told her not to shout or else he would kill her.At the police station. As a result. Albano. Cebu City on her way home from work when she saw two men with familiar faces near a lamp post by the CAP Building. Sy. After her medical examination. "AAA" became frightened. Giron removed "AAA's" pants and underwear while Gabuya touched her breasts. Coronel. she noticed that when she walked fast. holding her. Francisco. Catindig.R. the State in this case had satisfactorily established the following essential elements of that felony: "a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons.6 Gabuya and Giron then dragged her to a vacant lot along Visitacion Street. Marilee Solana found traces of spermatozoa in "AAA's" private parts. Valois . "AAA" tried to get Giron off her body but was no match to his strength. Valiente." FACTS: Ronald Bacalan Gabuya and Ryanneal Meneses Giron were charged with the crime of robbery with rape for robbing "AAA" by taking her personal belongings through violence and intimidation and thereafter taking turns raping her. Gabuya and Giron were then arrested. She noticed that the two men were following her. Giron also removed his short pants and brief. These two took all of her belongings which consisted of a bag"AAA" was then pushed to the ground. "AAA" was not alarmed as she continued on her way. Giron then swapped places with Gabuya. Lastimosa. the men who were following her picked up speed. paragraph 1 of the RPC. Palad. The police officers eventually caught the appellants in an alley at the back portion of the CAP building. Asensi. Tecson. 209038. After being informed of their Constitutional rights. around 12:20 in the early morning. Page 1099 Echiverri. Giron. Sandoval.. However. Corpuz. Ramirez. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 2002. likewise claimed that he was asleep in his house in Sambag II. Gabuya went on top of "AAA. De la Cruz. went on top of "AAA" inserted his penis into her private parts while Gabuya was over "AAA's" head. and then forcibly copulated with her. With respect to the allegation of rape. too. Dr. Martinez. threatening to kill her if she shouts for help. Gabuya and Giron interposed the defense of denial and alibi. "AAA" was walking along Visitacion Street." inserted his penis into the latter's private parts. while his right hand was pointing a knife at her.m. c) the taking is done with animo lucrandi. Gloria. Cabañgon. De Mesa. Corporal. Marquez. Lumberio. Reyes. Inguillo. b) the property taken belongs to another. "AAA" positively identified Gabuya and Giron as the persons who robbed and violated her. Espina. Santos. Indeed. No. Gabuya claimed that on March 18. Cebu City. and d) the robbery is accompanied by rape. Castillo. "AAA" went to the Fuente Osmena Police Station where she reported the robbery with rape. Tabugan. 2016 DOCTRINE:The Court found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape under Article 294. Gabuya quickly pointed a knife at her neck and held her left shoulder. June 08.On March 18. At this point. Alcazaren. Maniwang examined "AAA" and found that the wounds on the victim's body are consistent with possible struggle in a robbery with rape case.At first. RONALD BACALAN GABUYA AND RYANNEAL MENESES GIRON G. she saw that they were already very close behind her. Cebu City at the date and time the robbery and rape were committed. Rañigo. When she turned around to see the men who were following her. 2002. at around 12:20 a. he was asleep in his house in Sambag II. Rodriguez.

Tecson. Palad. Reyes. paragraph 1. De Mesa. Albano. the State in this case had satisfactorily established the following essential elements of that felony: "a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons. Rañigo. paragraph 1 of the RPC. and the CA correctly found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape under Article 294. The CA denied the accused’s’ petition. and that in any event the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime of robbery with rape. Sy. They argued that because they were not assisted by counsel at the time of their arrest and during the police line-up. The amount of civil damages awarded by the CA. De la Cruz. the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Although the trial court imposed the death penalty. as indeed she had seen these appellants a number of times prior to the incident. should be modified. Corpuz. Castillo. Valiente. that assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification of these appellants by "AAA" was defective. paragraph 1 of the RPC. however. Tabugan. Branch 24. Cabañgon. Martinez. Gloria. Sandoval. Francisco. it follows that their out-of-court identification by "AAA" was inadmissible against them. b) the property taken belongs to another. Valois . Ramirez. The RTC of Cebu Citygave judgment finding both Gabuya and Giron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape as defined and penalized under Article 294. Indeed. Santos. and d) the robbery is accompanied by rape. Marquez. Rodriguez. HELD: Both the RTC of Cebu City. the CA correctly modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of the crime charged.Both appellants elevated their case to the CA. The CA ruled that "AAA's" identification of the appellants was convincing and credible because she was familiar with them. Espina. Lastimosa. when robbery is accompanied by rape. Asensi." Under Article 294. Alcazaren. Corporal. Lumberio.The CA gave short shrift to the appellants' argument. this defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification of these appellants by "AAA" in open court. without eligibility for parole. c) the taking is done with animo lucrandi. pursuant to RA 9346. Coronel. Inguillo. Page 1100 Echiverri. Catindig.

he directed his secretary. Valiente. and (c) That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding. Inguillo." At first. Reyes. Lumberio. When they got there. Pascual waived her right to present countervailing evidence in her defense. a part-time businessman from Bacolod City and an acquaintance of Wee. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. and despite repeated demands. Santos. On the other hand. Pascual still did not deliver on her promise. Tecson. De Mesa. and because Montero also told her (Tiongco) that she (Tiongco) might as well make use of the opportunity to conclude the business for that day since that was her purpose in being there after all. Ramirez. Tiongco gave the ₱130. or notary public. and after some time Pascual came out with a photocopy of BIR Receipt No. an employee at the City Assessor’s Office of Las Piñas City. Wee to the BIR when. Tabugan. ESTHER PASCUAL vs. Tiongco informed Wee that she had paid the capital gains tax through Pascual. Martinez. Pascual then hastened to assure Tiongco that the certificate of title to Wees’ property would be issued in three months’ time. 2005. who was referred to her by Montero. they converted and misappropriated the money for their own personal benefit. saying that she even had to go on leave from work for two days just to accommodate her (Tiongco). Because Pascual was insisting on getting possession of the money. Marquez. Rodriguez. Coronel. 2016 DOCTRINE: Falsification of public document carries with it the following elements: (a) That the offender is a public officer. Gloria. Pascual told Tiongco that the original of this BIR receipt was left inside her "contact" at the BIR.Pascual and a lady companion then went inside the BIR office with the money. Leonor Tiongco. Pascual then asked for the money so she could "facilitate payment of the taxes. Sometime in 2003. Alcazaren. employee. Asensi.00 to Pascual and made her sign a voucher dated June 26. 2145148. but was later acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence in a Decision rendered on March 31. Pascual was arraigned on January 10.000. According to Tiongco. De la Cruz. Tiongco was apprehensive about giving the money to Pascual. the Wee spouses discovered that the photocopy of BIR Receipt No. in truth and in fact. 2145148 was fake. 2008. she entered a negative plea to the crime charged. Since Wee was based in Bacolod City. Corpuz. Page 1101 Echiverri. Sy. Worse. Pascual personally offered to facilitate the payment through her alleged "connections" or "contacts" at the BIR office. 2003. Montero was arraigned on April 11. Pascual. Palad. 204873 July 27.000. Lastimosa. Castillo. (b) That he takes advantage of his official position. 2007. FACTS: Esther Pascual and Remegio Montero were indicted for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document for colluding and making it appear that they had facilitated the payment of the capital gains tax of private complainant Ernesto Y. Sandoval. Montero told her to prepare ₱130. Cabañgon. Francisco. and Montero went to the BIR office located inside the Metropolis Mall in Las Piñas City. Catindig.00 as payment for the capital gains tax. but Pascual replied in the negative. Rañigo. Valois . Corporal. No. Tiongco. Tiongco asked if she could meet Pascual’s "connection" or "contact" at the BIR. Espina. private complainant Ernesto Wee and his wife Susana Wee purchased a real property in Las Piñas City. to go to Manila to process the transfer of title to the said property and to pay the capital gains tax thereon.R. Albano. But the three months came and went.

Corpuz. Francisco. De la Cruz. a specie of concealment or distortion of the truth for the purpose of misleading. Reyes. In this instance. Sy. Page 1102 Echiverri. Valois . employee. Rodriguez. (4) [and] that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the judgment of the RTC and in giving full weight and credence to the State’s account of the indictment against the accused. Espina. Tecson. Albano. and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person." Here. rendered judgment finding Pascual guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document. or notary public. Castillo. incensed (she told Tiongco that she was wasting her time for not having the cash). Concomitantly. Pascual defrauded Tiongco by pretending that she had "connections" or "contacts" within the BIR to whom she could allegedly directly pay the capital gains tax at a reduced amount and also with whose help and assistance the transfer certificate of title to the property purchased could be expedited. she ‘transacted’ inside the BIR in plain view of Tiongco and thereafter presented her with a photocopy of the BIR receipt that later turned out to be forged. Lastimosa. The deceit by which the charade was accomplished is unmistakable. Before the CA. at one point. Deceit as used in this instance is defined as any act or devise intended to deceive. (2) that he takes advantage of his official position. she would sound urgent (she was allegedly absent from work for two days to accommodate Tiongco) and. Santos." It was established that the accused won over Tiongco by appearing to have expertly facilitated transfers of title in the past while accelerating the payment of taxes along the way. To this end. for it to prosper. Tabugan. De Mesa. Valiente. Palad. the State was also able to establish the following elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document: "(1) that the offender is a public officer. Rañigo. Sandoval. in their first meeting. Coronel. When Tiongco appeared apprehensive. Marquez. or by means of deceit. Ramirez. the following elements must concur: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence. Pascual impressed upon Tiongco that she is a person of some power and influence because she was an employee of the Las Piñas City Assessor’s Office and thus had "connections" or "contacts" within the BIR and the City Registry of Deeds. Gloria. To allay Tiongco’s fears. and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third person. Cabañgon. In fact. the accused consistently appeared resolute in her purpose especially when it was time for her to pay the capital gains tax. Moreover. Corporal. Asensi. Catindig. Branch 201. it affirmed the decision of the RTC. (3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding. HELD: The State was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of estafa. Inguillo. Martinez. Alcazaren. The RTC of Las Piñas City. to wit: "(1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit. she assured Tiongco that she knew people from the BIR to whom they could directly pay the capital gains tax for less. Lumberio.

Page 1103 Echiverri. Santos. Marquez. of course. Alcazaren. Palad. Cabañgon. This constitutes as the other half of the offense. Sy. This. Gloria. Lumberio. Espina. Inguillo. More importantly. while the capital gains tax remained unpaid. De Mesa.000. Rañigo. Ramirez.00 supposedly necessary for the payment of taxes. Corpuz. Reyes. Martinez. Rodriguez. Coronel. was pure farce because the title of the property was not transferred to the private respondent’s spouse as intended. De la Cruz. Corporal. Sandoval. Tecson. Tabugan. In the present instance. Albano. The accused guaranteed that the money will go as intended because she has done it many times before and her transactions turned out well. Asensi. the accused made certain that Tiongco would fall prey to her artifice by presenting herself as someone with extensive connections in the BIR and the Registry of Deeds being herself an employee of the Assessor’s Office whose function is the appraisal and assessment of real properties essentially for taxation purposes. Lastimosa. She did not relent until Tiongco prepared the amount of ₱130. Valois . Francisco. Castillo. it was discovered later that the BIR receipt furnished by the accused was a falsified document per testimony of the assistant district revenue officer of BIR-Las Piñas. Catindig. Valiente.

At first. After consuming about four bottles of Red Horse Grande. implausible and uncorroborated testimony of "AAA." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force. FACTS: Marcelino Caga was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of "AAA"3 after having a drinking spree with her and her boyfriendArraigned thereon. Valiente. While still intoxicated and asleep. Castillo. She yelled at Randy exclaiming. as the evidence at bar shows. Francisco. De la Cruz. "AAA" then became hysterical. rejected this posture. Manila. Tecson. SPOI Saturnina testified that she received a complaint for rape lodged by "AAA" against Caga. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. or intimidation because.R. Marquez. Coronel. Martinez. "AAA" and Randy decided to spend the night at Caga's house since they were both very intoxicated. went to Caga's residence for a drinking spree. Sy. She tried to push him away as she had menstruation at that time. Espina. Ramirez. a tiny glimmer of light coming from the window revealed that it was Caga who had copulated with her while she was in a drunken stupor. "Bakit mo ako pinabayaan?""AAA" immediately reported the incident at the Barangay Hall and the Police Station in Pandacan. Randy Bomita. Inguillo. Reyes. and thereafter submitted herself to a medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital. During trial. threat. Tabugan. Barangay Kagawad Aquino testified that "AAA" appeared at the Barangay Hall where she declared that Caga had raped her. Caga was already asleep on a foam cushion on the floor when "AAA" and Randy slept beside him. Asensi. he accompanied "AAA'' to the Police Station in Pandacan. Corporal. Cabañgon. Page 1104 Echiverri. After this. "AAA" and her boyfriend.When she ("AAA") slowly opened her eyes. On September 17. Rodriguez. and that she conducted an investigation into the complaint for rape. Lastimosa. Gloria. Catindig. Alcazaren. The RTC of Manilafound Caga guilty of rape punishable under Article 266-A. De Mesa. Rañigo. Palad. She also kicked Randy who was still asleep on the floor. All the while. but failed to stop him. 2006. Sandoval. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. "AAA" thought that it was her boyfriend Randy who was having coitus with her. MARCELINO CAGA y FABRE G. "AAA" felt someone kiss her vagina. "AAA" positively identified Caga in open court as the person who raped her. she thought it was her boyfriend Randy who did it. Corpuz. Appellant appealed to the CA contending that the RTC gravely erred in finding him guilty based only on the incredible. 2016 DOCTRINE: The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. Santos. She identified "AAA:s" sworn statement and the booking sheet she prepared relative to Caga's arrest and detention. Albano. Caga succeeded in mounting her and in penetrating her private parts with his penis. Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman. Valois . No. ISSUE: Whether the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape." The CA however. Lumberio. She started hitting and slapping Caga and accused him of violating her. 206878 August 22.

Reyes. Tabugan. Albano. Page 1105 Echiverri. threat or intimidation is not necessary. Palad. By using force. as the evidence at bar shows. Lastimosa. Tecson. or intimidation. Rodriguez. Cabañgon. Sandoval. Lumberio. even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. Alcazaren. for the simple reason that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse. threat. Valois . Catindig. Asensi. In the case at bench. Espina.a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution's evidence during the trial. Corpuz. Castillo. Santos. De Mesa. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious’ 3. Valiente. Marquez. This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was asleep and still under the influence of alcohol. Sy. Ramirez. Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman . and 4. Inguillo. De la Cruz. HELD: Yes. Francisco. Under Article 266-A of the RPC. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. rape is committed by having carnal knowledge ofa woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. Rañigo. Gloria." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force. Coronel. threat. physical force. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. Corporal. or intimidation because. Martinez.

at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Dr. Not long after this.' David heard the now deceased Ferrarie Tan. conducted the post-mortem examination on the corpse of Ferrarie. who was then wearing a nurse's uniform. despite his broken face. 2009. She identified her son Ferrarie at the Universal Funeral Parlor. Corpuz. Manila. complementing this Article 3 is Article 4 of the same RPC. Salen. The two threatened to shoot and blow up the brains of anyone who resisted them (''pasabugin ang ulo namin"). Tabugan. Coronel. Sandoval. Santos. Ferrarie's ribs were fractured and his lungs macerated. and two lacerated wounds at the lower lip and on the chin. Catindig. which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred (1) by any person committing a felony. abrasions from the right and left side of the following: nose. Carolyn Tan was the mother of the victim. although the felonious act he committed might have been different from that which he intended. Alcazaren. According to Dr. FACTS: Stanley Buenamer and his co-accused Jerome Lambada were indicted for the felony of robbery with homicide for staging a robbery inside a passenger FX taxi and causing the death of one of the passengers therein. Francisco." These two articles of the RPC must thus apply with implacable force against appellant. Dr. Valiente. lacerated wound on Ferrarie's forehead. the Medico-Legal Officer of the Manila Police District Crime Laboratory. David quickly got off the FX and shouted for help.R. Cabañgon. a Sony PSP.Peter PaulDe Jesus was an MTPB traffic enforcer on duty along Espania Boulevard when the incident took place. Manila. De Mesa. De Jesus testified that he responded to David's call for help. Corporal. 206227August 31. Castillo. a hold-up was announced by Buenamer and Lambada. Lumberio. Salen testified that he found a 10 x 3 cm. When the FX stopped at an intersection along Maceda Street and Espana Boulevard in Sampaloc. and that he was only a student. and from the victim's abdomen. the passengers of their personal effects. thighs. when along Espana Boulevard. Diana David was on board a passenger FX taxi on her way home from Quezon City to Sampaloc. Nevertheless. and hence must be deemed to have incurred criminal liability. Rañigo. Martinez. Marquez.STANLEY BUENAMER STANLEY BUENAMER y MANDANE G. David saw the lifeless Ferrarie lying along Espania Boulevard in Sampaloc. De la Cruz. as indeed they divested. he must be called to account for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act. Reyes. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Asensi. On October 20. although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. and at once chased after Buenamer. Gloria. Lastimosa. Page 1106 Echiverri. feet. Romeo Salen. No. The accused waived their right to present their defense. the armed robbers proceeded to divest. Palad. Espina. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. chest. including David's own Nokia cellphone and coin purse. Tecson. Valois . Ramirez. Sy. Traffic enforcers and bystanders heard her shout and plea for assistance. and Lambada who were trying to flee from the scene of the crime. Albano. knees. 2016 DOCTRINE: The legal postulate enshrined under Article 3 of the RPC decrees that every person shall be held responsible for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act And. crying and pleading to robbers that he had already given to them his cellphone.

De la Cruz. lost his grip on the estribo (or the handle bar) of the moving vehicle. and fell off that vehicle. Buenamer appealed to the CA. we are satisfied that in this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of robbery with homicide. By taking the personal belongings and valuables of the passengers. a passenger of the FX taxi in which the two robbers staged the heinous felony. Espina. Valois . Sandoval. employing force. Buenamer insisted that when he hit or boxed Ferrarie on the arm. (3) The taking is with animo lucrandi. Tecson. Corpuz. Whether or not CA erred in not appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed HELD: I. Coronel. Rodriguez. Reyes. Quezon City. In point of fact. ISSUE: I. Castillo. De Mesa. (2) The property taken belongs to another. Tabugan. was herself a victim of the robbery that was staged by the malefactors that afternoon of October 20. Marquez. Indeed. declared a hold-up on board the moving vehicle. Yes. then armed with firearms. Corporal. there can be no question that Buenamer did commit robbery with homicide. Gloria. violence. the prosecution succeeded in showing that the primary aim or objective of the malefactors Buenamer and Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi. in consequence of such a blow. David testified that she saw the faces of these two malefactors when these two boarded the FX taxi at the Pantranco terminal in Quezon Avenue. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Lumberio. Santos. Martinez. and intimidation. David positively identified Buenamer as the very perpetrator of the crime together with his co-accused Lambada. Asensi. The CA affirmed the RTC. Palad. II. Albano. Prosecution witness David. while threatening the passengers that they would blow off their heads (''pasabugin ang ulo namin") should the passengers resist the robbery. or on the occasion thereof. Francisco. Traffic enforcer Mendez saw Buenamer box or strike Ferrarie who. arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since his' identity as the alleged perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established and that the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(3) of the RPC should/have been appreciated in his favor because he had no intention to commit so gravel a wrong as that he committed. Inguillo. to wit: (1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons. Cabañgon. Valiente. The RTC rendered judgment finding Buenamer guilty of robbery with homicide and Lambada guilty merely of simple robbery. All the elements mentioned above are present in this case. he had no intention of killing him at all. Rañigo. that Buenamer and Lambada. after which these two divested the passengers of their personal belongings. Sy. 2009 along Espana Boulevard in Sampaloc. and (4) By reason of the robbery. and motivated moreover by animus lucrandi or intent to gain or profit. Catindig. Whether or not both the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide. homicide is committed. Manila. Page 1107 Echiverri. and at once ran over by the vehicles right rear tire. and thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from the passenger jeepney resulting to his death. Ramirez.

there can be no doubt that all the elements of robbery with homicide are present in this case. and numerous abrasions in various parts of his body that ultimately led to his death. II. Corpuz. Reyes. No. in People v. Sy. the mode of attack employed. Francisco. Catindig. Valois . and the injury sustained by the victim. Palad. Rodriguez. Marquez. "This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal act" . De la Cruz. Alcazaren. In the face of these actual. Rañigo. Jr. Asensi.. De Mesa. Gonzalez. Tabugan. we explained. incontrovertible facts. Espina.. Lumberio. Corporal. amongst others. Lastimosa. Page 1108 Echiverri. Coronel. resulting in Ferrarie’s sustaining lacerated wounds. Gloria. Tecson. this mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed.an intention that must comport. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used. with the weapon’s used by the: offender and the mode of attack adopted by the latter. Martinez. Inguillo. x x x Albano. Valiente. Ramirez. vis-a-vis the injuries sustained by his victim. Cabañgon. Thus. Sandoval. Castillo. Santos.

Alcazaren. Corpuz. Francisco. Lumberio. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Martinez. Corporal. FACTS: On January 23. Laguna and reported to SPO1 Melchor dela Peña about the drug pushing activity of appellant. Catindig. Castillo." corresponding to the initials of appellant. Thereat. appellant was no longer inside the house. De Mesa. Tabugan. while SPO1 Dela Peña. De la Cruz. PO1 Signap marked the sachet subject of the sale with "MB. a dangerous drug. Gloria. Tecson. Valois . Appellant denied the accusation against him claiming that in the evening of January 23. Espina. After preparing the request for laboratory examination of the suspected specimen. MENARDO BOMBASI Y VERGARA G. 2006 at about 9:00 p. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. Reyes. the specimen submitted and examined contains methamphetamine hydrochloride.. Valiente. Palad. However. SPO1 Ame and SPO1 Arnel Gonzales acted as perimeter security. when they returned. the object and consideration of the sale and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor but also it is equally essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. 211608. SPO1 Dela Peña relayed the information to their chief who ordered PO1 Jifford Signap and SPO1 Alejandro Ame to conduct surveillance within the area. After the surveillance the chief called a briefing and formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Signap as the poseur-buyer. Lastimosa. an asset-informant came to the office of the San Pedro Police Station.m. 2016 DOCTRINE: For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs like shabu. in turn. Inguillo. SPO1 Ame brought the specimen to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. the prosecution is bound not only to establish the following elements: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller. Marquez. an essential requirement in a drug-related case. Rañigo. After the exchange. 2006. Cabañgon. they arrested two persons inside from whom two plastic sachets of shabu were recovered. and that the identity of said drug be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. Santos. The team accompanied by the informant immediately proceeded to the house of appellant. No. PO1 Signap gave the two 100-peso bills to appellant who. PO1 Signap went out of the house to call his back-up. Sy. Per Chemistry Report No. D-023-06. Instead. The RTC found accused guilty as charged. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Albano.R. Ramirez. appellant appealed to the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC against appellant. From this judgment. September 07. he was at home with his wife watching television when he saw policemen pass by their house and arrest Ariel Aranda and Sergio Bagtas. handed to the former a small plastic sachet containing substance suspected to be shabu. Asensi. The appellate court held that the elements for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 5. the informant introduced PO1 Signap to appellant as a prospective buyer of shabu. Article II of RA 9165 were satisfied. Page 1109 Echiverri. Coronel.

the poseur-buyer who marked the seized illegal drug. In fact it was not presented or shown to the witness for the intended identification. Corpuz. It is evident that the identity of the corpus delicti has not been properly preserved and established by the prosecution. the object and consideration of the sale and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor but also it is equally essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Valois . Sandoval. Francisco. this is the same substance with the corresponding marking that was examined by PCI Tria and eventually offered in court as evidence which undoubtedly is not the same substance marked by the poseur-buyer. Tabugan. We therefore find that the prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Lumberio. Based on the testimony of PO1 Signap. Castillo. the Court inescapably note the prosecution's failure to give even a simple indication that the substance that was being presented in court was identified to be the same substance sold by appellant.B. per written request. Lastimosa. Martinez. Rañigo. Page 1110 Echiverri. To recapitulate. Alcazaren. when the same substance was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Catindig. Tecson. Still on the matter of identifying the illicit substance. Sy. Palad." However. Espina. Santos. Reyes. the specimen submitted bore a different marking "MB-B. Valiente. for a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs like shabu. and that the identity of said drug be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. Gloria. This requirement is found wanting in this case. Cabañgon. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Coronel. Worse. Albano. Corporal. there was no explanation given on the discrepancy in the markings. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. Asensi. HELD: Yes." Precisely. Inguillo. Recall that PO1 Signap categorically testified that he marked the seized substance placed in a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with appellant's initial "M. Ramirez. De Mesa. the prosecution is bound not only to establish the following elements: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller. Marquez. we further note the glaring inconsistency which the lower courts wittingly overlooked.

Escobido II. Pursuant to search warrants accordingly issued by the said court on August 1. Quezon City. 12119 was issued. DOCTRINE: A member of the Board of Directors of a corporation. Asensi. Antonio admitted that he was the General Manager of ACCS but denied that the company was engaged in illegal trading and underfilling.Inspection and evaluation of the said filled LPG cylinders showed that they were underfilled by 0.e. Lumberio. vapor compressor. P/Supt Esguerra filed with the Department of Justice Complaints-Affidavits against them for illegal trading of petroleum products and for underfilling of LPG cylinders under Section 2(a) and 2(c). Sy. De Mesa. LPG cylinder.7 kg. LPG cylinder for refilling that costs Php954. booklets of various receipts. Reyes.. one Shellane 11 kg. 2016 . 2006. Lastimosa. Page 1111 Echiverri. P/Supt. 2006. Adarlo. as amended. SHIELA M. Del Rosario. Rañigo. Esguerra filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila applications for search warrant against the officers of ACCS namely: Antonio G. 202639 November 09. Del Rosario. Francisco.9 kg. LPG cylinders. Coronel. De la Cruz. and one Totalgaz 11 kg. Valois . Sandoval.7 kg. CRISTINA L. P/Supt. Cristina L. represented by Atty. Having reasonable grounds to believe that ACCS was in violation of BP 33. MA. and Shiela M. wrote the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. Valiente. be held liable for corporation's probable violation of BP 33. The others corroborated the statements of Antonio that (1) they were merely Albano. 12120 was issued for said refilling. 882 G. LPG cylinder and one empty Shellane 11 kg. Cabañgon. i. Genesis M. ESCOBIDO. DEL ROSARIO. Ma. Francisco M. four of which were filled.00. Marquez. Inguillo. Corpuz. FACTS: On 8 June 2006. Quezon City. General Manager or Managing Partner. scales. AND RESTY P. Catindig. LPG cylinder and one Superkalan Gaz 2. PO2 Joseph R. Corporal. Ramirez.18. ACCS Control No. ACCS Control Receipt No. Celso E.00. Federated LPG Dealers Association. Palad. FEDERATED LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION vs. by mere reason of such membership. it is imperative that it first be shown that he/she falls under the catch-all "such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs. Gloria.R. Tabugan. If one is not the President. Rodriguez. LPG cylinder for refilling which costs Php590. cylinder. ESCOBIDO II. Martinez. CELSO E. of BP 33. Esguerra. CAPILI G. Anti-Fraud and Commercial Crimes Division (CIDG-AFCCD for brevity) informing the latter of its confirmation that ACCS Ideal Gas Corporation (ACCS) has unauthorized refilled branded LPG cylinders in its refilling plant at 882 G. v-belt. Espina. Araneta Avenue. Escobido. a hose with filling head. two Superkalan 3. No. This resulted in the seizure of an electric motor." before he/she can be prosecuted. to 0.5 kg. 2006 at No. Alcazaren. Santos. Faeldonia and a team of paralegal investigators observed that various vehicles and individuals carrying branded LPG cylinders have been going in and out of ACCS refilling plant during their surveillance so they conducted a test-buy operation on July 15. They subsequently brought one empty Totalgaz 11 kg. Castillo. a search and seizure operation was conducted on August 3. Araneta Avenue. Tecson. On 14 December 2006. cannot. They first brought one empty Petron Gasul 11 kg. respectively. All refilled branded LPG Cylinders did not have any LPG valve seals so they proceeded to the CIDG-AFCCD Headquarters and made the proper identification markings on the branded LPG cylinders. and 73 LPG cylinders of various brands and sizes.

Here. 2010. it is only Antonio G. Del Rosario. Francisco. Valiente. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. Lumberio. 2009. Corporal. Capili as members of the Board of Directors of ACCS can be criminally prosecuted for Antonio G. be held liable for corporation's probable violation of BP 33. it becomes incumbent upon petitioner to show that respondents were officers charged with the management of the business affairs. If one is not the President. P/Supt. cannot. or Managing Partner of ACCS. incorporators/stockholders of ACCS who have no active participation in the operation. and Resty P. as amended – can be prosecuted for ACCS' perceived violations of the said law. it is imperative that it first be shown that he/she falls under the catch-all "such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs. a member of the Board of Directors of a corporation. Del Rosario's alleged violation/s of BP 33 as amended. Palad. Del Rosario. General Manager or Managing Partner. and Resty P. However. Therefore. Escobido II. Castillo. Catindig. there is no dispute that neither of the respondents was the President. Espina. Santos. Sy. General Manager. Rañigo. Tecson. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil. filed a Petition for Review before the Secretary of Justice who upheld the said issuances and dismissed the Petition in a Resolution dated September 4. Celso E. Escobido II. Capili were members of the Board of Directors based on the AOI of ACCS. by mere reason of such membership. Inguillo. Del Rosario. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Ma. Valois . There is no allegation whatsoever that they were in-charge of the management of the corporation's business affairs. Page 1112 Echiverri. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 6. Escobido. and control of the business. 2012 so a Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court. Sandoval. and (3) ACCS did not commit any violation of BP 33 as amended. Albano. management. Alcazaren. Esguerra. HELD: (1) As clearly enunciated in Ty v. Shiela M. Ramirez. 2008. Cristina L. now joined by Federated LPG Dealers Association. Hence. Celso E. Dayog charging Antonio for illegal trading and dismissing the other complaints. Asensi." before he/she can be prosecuted. Reyes. Tabugan. who undisputedly was the General Manager – a position among those expressly mentioned as criminally liable under paragraph 4. Section 3 of BP 33. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated June 23. Cristina L. Rodriguez. Lastimosa. it must be stressed. Coronel. (2) ACCS was only engaged in the distribution of LPG products and not in the refilling of LPG cylinders. (2) Whether or not the offenses of illegal trading of petroleum products under Section 2(a) and underfilling under Section 2(c) of BP 33 as amended are distinct offenses. Gloria. the Complaint-Affidavit attached to the records merely states that Ma. Escobido. In a Joint Resolution dated June 25. Shiela M. Marquez. Martinez. that the matter of being an officer charged with the management of the business affairs is a factual issue which must be alleged and supported by evidence. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R Zuño approved the finding of probable cause by Senior State Prosecutor Edwin S. However. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. De Mesa. Corpuz.

Espina. Page 1113 Echiverri. (2) Illegal trading and underfilling are among the eight acts prohibited under Section 2 of BP 33. aside from the act of refilling. transfer. the act of refilling does not in itself constitute illegal trading through unauthorized refilling or that of underfilling. the acts penalized by both offenses are essentially different. By definition. Coronel. Valois . Under paragraph 1(c) of Section 3 of the said law. Corporal. Catindig. Reyes. Albano. the offender must have refilled the LPG cylinder below the authorized limits in the sale of petroleum products. Tabugan. De la Cruz. the offense of underfilling is not limited to the act of refilling below the authorized limits. it is necessary that apart from the act of refilling. Cabañgon. Palad. Valiente. Tecson. Lastimosa. on the other hand. under paragraph 3 of the same section refers to a sale. Rañigo. Ramirez. De Mesa. Gloria. Castillo. Alcazaren. the offenses of illegal trading through unauthorized refilling and underfilling are separate and distinct offenses. Sandoval. the offender must have no authority to refill from the concerned government agency or the company or firm owning the LPG cylinder refilled for the act to be considered illegal trading through unauthorized refilling. Lumberio. Moreover. Martinez. Thus. Whereas in underfilling. as amended. Corpuz. Asensi. Santos. The concurrence of an additional requisite different in each one is necessary to constitute each offense. Inguillo. or refilling of another company's or firm's cylinder without such company's or firm's written authorization. Francisco. Possession of an underfilled LPG cylinder another way of committing the offense. Underfilling or underdelivery. Sy. Marquez. Rodriguez. While it may be said that an act could be common to both of them. illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products is committed by refilling LPG cylinders without authority from the Bureau of Energy Utilization. As therefore correctly argued by petitioner. delivery or filling of petroleum products of a quantity that is actually below the quantity indicated or registered on the metering device of a container.

commit sexual abuse upon the person of AAA by then and there making her drink liquor which made her dizzy and drunk. Reyes. JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC y MARQUEZ G. FACTS: On or about 29 September 2008. the verdict must be one of acquittal of the accused. Page 1114 Echiverri. Lumberio. in the City of Manila said accused conspiring and confederating with one whose true name. Rodriguez. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish the required quantum of evidence. Corpuz. unlawfully and feloniously. He claimed that on that fateful night. real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other. RTC ruled on the conviction of the accused. Gloria. bringing her to a room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Coronel. Santos. Castillo. 212193 February 15. depriving her of reason or otherwise unconsciousness. the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Ramirez. Lastimosa. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Cabañgon.R. The burden of proof rests on the State. Sy. Thus. Albano. Tabugan. did then and there wilfully. Inguillo. with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation. It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation. Alcazaren. HELD: Yes. Catindig. 2017 DOCTRINE: When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime. Corporal. Espina. the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal. Valiente. De la Cruz. he was having a drinking session with his cousin. against her will. Asensi. Sandoval. Appellant denied raping AAA. On appeal it was affirmed. Marquez. Tecson. Valois .She also underwent a medical examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation for rape. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the acquittal of the accused. Martinez. Francisco. Palad. De Mesa. Rañigo. No.

Page 1115 Echiverri. Alcazaren. Appellant insisted that he never sold shabu to the police officers who arrested him. (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime. and (3) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21. Asensi. RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5 and 11. Reyes. Thereafter. De Mesa. a bicycle-driven vehicle with a sidecar. RA 9165 were not complied with. as soon as they are seized from the accused. Francisco. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. He also asserted that all these police officers took away from him was his money and that he had never met the said police officers prior to his arrest. the High Court acquitted the accused. When he was about 160 meters away from the Muslim cemetery in Barangay Talabaan. The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Tecson. on August 25. he was brought to Culianan Police Station where he was detained for two days. Palad. 208093 20 FEBRUARY 2017 DOCTRINE: The obligations of the prosecution in a criminal case: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys. (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs. SALIM RADANG G. 2003. Martinez. Sy. Lastimosa. Coronel. Valiente. After buying the cellphone load. Cabañgon. Valois . Corpuz. Espina. Rañigo. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.R. Corporal. Albano. HELD: Yes. the object of the sale and its consideration. Article II of RA 9165 for selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride or also known as shabu. Marquez. Sandoval. Gloria. What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused. just as he denied having shabu in his possession when he was arrested on August 25. he denied selling shabu to SPO1 Santiago. Rodriguez. He denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone from him. Article II of RA 9165 which the CA affirmed the decision. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Lumberio. if possible. According to appellant. Castillo. Santos. the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. Article II of RA 9165. FACTS: Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and II. The police officers conducted a search on his person but did not find any dangerous drugs. It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked. 2003. he went back to his house on board a sikad-sikad. Accused denied both charges. Catindig. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused when his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Ramirez. he went to a store to buy cellphone load so that he could call his wife. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5. Tabugan. No. He said that the first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was presented before the trial court. he was arrested by five persons in civilian attire who introduced themselves as police officers.

Tecson. Catindig. [2] such possession was not authorized by law. it was possible that the seized item subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case. Santos. Gloria. should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. Palad. Inguillo. Page 1116 Echiverri. Francisco. Lastimosa. Sy. Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody. Albano. the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. Valois . Martinez. On the other hand. for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. Coronel. Marking. De la Cruz. Corporal. Rañigo. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied. which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur. Ramirez. Tabugan. Marquez. Reyes. Sandoval. Cabañgon. The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. Espina. In short. Lumberio. Further. Asensi. the following elements must be established: [1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs. Valiente. Alcazaren. De Mesa. This is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug. because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. the first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Also. planting or contamination of evidence. thereby forestalling switching.buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs. the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings. Castillo.

Asensi. the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. decent woman taking up nursing would concoct a rape story against a man who is accusing her of a petty crime which she denies. AAA stated that the crime happened approximately 30 minutes while the appellant was on top of him. Gajardo suspected ‘AAA’ and ‘BBB’ for stealing items from his store that was near the boarding house. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to after any resistance at all. It ls settled that not all victims react the same way. Martinez. AAA also recounted that the accused inserted his penis to her vagina and was scared from his actions. As long as the force or intimidation is present. 213390 25 MARCH 2014 DOCTRINE: In rape. Rodriguez. De Mesa. AAA expressed that the appellant made her lie down and forced and “raped” her. Francisco. Based from the proceedings that Pros. The girls denied the suspected action and were directed at the appellant’s house. Actions such as sitting on his lap. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. Moreover. caressing her back and unhooking her bra. while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. AAA tried to leave the room but with the accused forceful manner to she wasn’t not able to. Santos. De la Cruz. Sandoval. A woman who claims rape exposes herself to the spectacle of a public trial Albano. AAA tried to escape from the accused forceful grasps but he was too strong for her. Peralta had examined. the appellant insisted AAA about the accused action and threatened them that they will be forwarded to the police for theft. resistance is not an element of rape. Coronel. Gloria.R. whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. Also. Catindig. Castillo. Page 1117 Echiverri. Corporal. some may faint. Inguillo. RTC and Court of Appeals both convicted Gajardo. Ramirez. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of crime of rape HELD: Yes. Valiente. Tecson. No. Corpuz. Palad. AAA stated that she felt pain when the accused inserted his penis into her. People of the Philippines Vs. Espina. some may be shocked into insensibility. Some victims may cry out. Jessie Gabriel y Gajardo G. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Valois . The appellant started directing AAA to some actions that she didn’t like as expressed. it is highly improbable that a young. FACTS: On 17 of February 2010 in a boarding house located at Dagupan Philippines. Alcazaren. When AAA was at the appellant’s room. The High Court has affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. Lumberio. Sy. the appellant. Lastimosa. Reyes. Marquez. The court has decided that the appellant was guilty as charged and were then taken to higher court for further consideration. Rañigo. AAA explained the actions that the appellant made at the time of the crime.

Sandoval. Therefore. Sy. the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important point to consider. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of her lone testimony. Tecson. Corporal. If the victim’s testimony meets the test of credibility. Palad. Rodriguez. it has been repeatedly ruled that no young and decent woman in her right mind would concoct a story of defloration. in a prosecution for rape. Valois . Page 1118 Echiverri. it is usually the victim alone who can testify on the forced sexual intercourse. Francisco. Thus. Albano. where she would recount the sordid details of her ordeal. Corpuz. De Mesa. Reyes. Catindig. Ramirez. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Marquez. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Tabugan. Valiente. Asensi. and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Santos. Espina. Coronel. Gloria. Martinez. allow an examination of her private parts. Lumberio. Castillo. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy.

Asensi. Rodriguez. Valois . Albano. it is vital that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as reference. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Gloria. 206590 27 MARCH 2017 DOCTRINE: Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage. A surveillance was conducted prior to several reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. prior to implementing the search warrant. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu. Page 1119 Echiverri. Lumberio. De Mesa. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. Sy. Corporal. from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping. On appeal. Catindig. Marquez. Francisco. the decision was affirmed. and (2) immediately upon confiscation. Tecson. De la Cruz. SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu. Reyes. deliver and dispense one piece of small heat sealed sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. In the chain of custody. Lastimosa. On March 24.00 marked money for the operation. Her house was searched and drug paraphernalia were found. primordial importance must be given to the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the successful confirmatory test-buy. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was innocent of the acquitted charged HELD: Yes. PI Barber decided to conduct a confirmatory test-buy designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him ₱200. to presentation in court for destruction. Tabugan. Cabañgon. marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. Rañigo. 2004. Espina. Ramirez. The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended violator. Martinez. Sandoval. Valiente. Corpuz." In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu. 2004the accused who acted without the necessary permit or authority whatsoever. Also. Coronel. It is the starting point in the custodial link. MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES G. Castillo. unlawfully and criminally sell. However. Alcazaren. did then and there willfully. The High Court ruled for the acquittal of the accused. Palad. FACTS: On 24 March. Santos.R. Inguillo.

Corpuz. Marquez. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody. De la Cruz. the author of the markings on said items was never identified. this contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures. the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. Lastimosa. the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said house. Inguillo. Rodriguez. Ramirez. Martinez. Here. Espina. Catindig. In this case. Lumberio. Valois . Valiente. Albano. Palad. Castillo. Alcazaren. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. Page 1120 Echiverri. However. no evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant. Coronel. Corporal. Sandoval. Gloria. Sy. Moreover. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings. De Mesa. Santos. Tecson. While P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station. While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station. Reyes. the police officers secured a search warrant prior to their operation. Asensi. Francisco. And that the presumption of the regularity in the performance of their duty cannot be upheld. Tabugan. Cabañgon. None of the police officers admitted placing the markings. Rañigo.

Warlito Julian the victim in Criminal Case No. or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. The Supreme Court ruled that appellant commenced the commission of murder through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce murder by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. Fearing the worst.R. Catindig. methods. he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face. Valois . Ramirez. Cabañgon. he was with his three year old daughter. Bryan also saw two men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from the appellant. of December 6. When the armed man inched closer to the house. Albano. PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES vs TIRSO SIBBU G. 2004. or knowing Bryan and Benny personally. ISSUE: Whether or not. Private Complainant testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 p. Sy. he never left the house of his in-laws because he was taking care of his sick son. llocosNorte when he saw from a distance of about five meters a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. or possessing camouflage clothing. Reyes. FACTS: Accused Sibbu Benny and others were charged for murder and attempted murder. Asensi. Espina. Valiente. Inguillo. Page 1121 Echiverri. 2004. De Mesa. Appellant-accused denied having any misunderstanding with the Julian family. Bryan shouted a warning to his family. De la Cruz. Rañigo. Lumberio. Elizabeth. He claimed to have heard the explosions but thought that those were so of firecrackers since it was nearing Christmas. Rodriguez. Coronel. Tecson. RTC found accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA with modifications on the penalty. without risk to him arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Castillo. Trisha May Julian. Ofelia and Warlito. 11724 in the azotea of his parents’ house in Baranga. Francisco. He testified that on December 6. Corpuz. Marquez. Martinez. Marcos. Sandoval. Tabugan.m. accused should be convicted for the crime of attempted murder HELD: Yes. Accused denied the charges against him. No. Corporal. Lastimosa. Appellant simply missed his target. his mother Ofelia Julian and his father. Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Gloria. 214757 29 March 2017 DOCTRINE: Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person. Bryan recognized the armed man as the accused. Santos. employing means. Alcazaren. Palad. Accused then fired upon them killing Trisha.

Reyes.The law provides that in lieu of the death penalty. Warlito. Marquez. Francisco. Lastimosa. Valiente. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Espina. Appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery and one count of attempted murder. Coronel. Rañigo. Appellant is therefore guilty of attempted murder. De Mesa. Catindig. Corporal. Albano. Ofelia and Trisha had to bear the brunt of appellant’s firearm. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Since two aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the crime of murder. Gloria. Asensi. Sy. Unfortunately. Page 1122 Echiverri. Castillo. Corpuz. Lumberio. Tecson. De la Cruz. Cabañgon. appellant should be sentenced to death. Valois . Ramirez. he failed to perform all the acts of execution to kill Bryan. Martinez. Palad. the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed with no eligibility for parole. Santos. Inguillo.

Ramirez. Espina. Rañigo. COMMERCIAL LAW Albano. Corporal. Marquez. Lumberio. Reyes. Valiente. Martinez. De la Cruz. Gloria. Rodriguez. Castillo. Tecson. Santos. Catindig. Corpuz. De Mesa. Sandoval. Inguillo. Valois . Tabugan. Palad. Sy. Page 1123 Echiverri. Coronel. Lastimosa. Alcazaren. Francisco. Cabañgon. Asensi.

although not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier. Named Shin Yang Brokerage Corp. Tabugan. The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of MOF and that Shin Yang cannot disclaim being a party to the contract of affreighment because its name would not be included in the bill of lading had there been no prior agreement to that effect. De la Cruz. Inguillo. Martinez. Catindig. documentation fee and terminal handling charges from Shin Yang. However. becomes a party to the contract by reason of either a) the Albano. Sandoval. MOF Company. Castillo. Ramirez. Santos. Valiente. The bill of lading covering the shipment which was prepared by the carrier Hanjin Shipping Co. repeatedly demanded payment of ocean freight. Hanjin’s exclusive general agent in the Philippines. INC. it failed and refused to pay contending that it did not cause the importation of goods and that it is only the Consolidator of the said shipment and that the ultimate consignee did not endorse in its favor the original bill of lading nad it was prepared without its consent.. Espina. MOF COMPANY. When the shipment arrived in Manila. Francisco.R. The same ruling was affirmed by the RTC ISSUE: Whether or not a consignee. Corpuz. However. who is not a signatory to the bill of lading. shipped to Manila secondhand cars and other articles on board the vessel Hanjin Busan. the latter can be bound by the stipulations of the bill of lading when a) there is a relation of agency between the shipper or consignor and the consignee or b) when the consignee demands fulfillment of the stipulation of the bill of lading which was drawn up in its favor. Gloria. 172822 | December 18. is bound by the stipulations thereof. MOF then files a case for sum of money alleging that Shin Yang caused the importation of goods and assured it that ocean freight and other charges would be paid upon arrival of goods in Manila yet Shin Yang unjustly breached its obligation to pay. as the consignee and indicated that payment was on a “Freight Collect” basis. Cabañgon. Valois . Tecson. A consignee. Lastimosa. No. Asensi. vs SHIN YANG BROKERAGE CORPORATION G. Rodriguez. Reyes. FACTS: Halla Trading Co. Page 1124 Echiverri. Sy. Lumberio. Palad. Ltd. Marquez. Corporal... Inc. HELD: The bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. De Mesa. Alcazaren. 2009 DOCTRINE: While the bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. Whether or not respondent who was not an agent of the shipper and who did not make any demand for the fulfillment of the stipulations of the bill of lading drawn in its favor is liable to pay the corresponding freight and handling charges. Coronel. a company based in Korea. Rañigo. the latter can be bound by the stipulations of the bill of lading when a) there is a relation of agency between the shipper or consignor and the consignee or b) when the consignee demands fulfillment of the stipulation of the bill of lading which was drawn up in its favor.

or that it exercised any act that would bind it as a named consignee. Santos. Shin Yang consistently denied in all of its pleadings that it authorized Halla Trading. Tabugan. It did not even present any witness in support of its allegation that it was Shin Yang which furnished all the details indicated in the bill of lading and that Shin Yang consented to shoulder the shipment costs. demands before the carrier the fulfillment of the stipulation made by the consignor/shipper in the consignee's favor. it being insistent that Shin Yang asserted itself as the consignee and the one that caused the shipment of the goods to the Philippines. Valois . Coronel. There is also nothing in the records which would indicate that Shin Yang was an agent of Halla Trading Co. a third person. with full knowledge of its contents or c) availment of the stipulation pour autrui. or that it got hold of the bill of lading covering the shipment or that it demanded the release of the cargo. b) the unequivocal acceptance of the bill of lading delivered to the consignee. Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts it. since. Here. Reyes. specifically the delivery of the goods/cargoes shipped. Tecson. Alcazaren. Sy. Valiente. Marquez. Rañigo. Lastimosa. i.. De Mesa. Co. Francisco. De la Cruz. proves that the carrier acknowledged receipt of the subject cargo from the shipper and that the consignee named is to shoulder the freightage. Ramirez. Gloria. Lumberio. MOF has the burden to controvert all these denials. Cabañgon. Thus. Corporal. Castillo. Palad. the CA correctly dismissed the suit for failure of petitioner to establish its cause against respondent. Albano. Corpuz. to ship the goods on its behalf. Rodriguez. not upon him who denies. Inguillo. which. at most. when the consignee. the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. by the nature of things. MOF has not adduced any other credible evidence to strengthen its cause of action. or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Other than presenting the bill of lading. In civil cases. which means evidence which is of greater weight. Martinez. Catindig. Asensi. Espina.e. In the instant case. Thus. he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of it. Page 1125 Echiverri. Sandoval. relationship of agency between the consignee and the shipper/ consignor. MOF failed to meet the required quantum of proof.

United Kingdom or Rome. suzerainty. by way of special appearance through counsel. Sy. Italy. or before the court of the place of destination. Coronel. Valois . suzerainty. mandate or authority of another Power. Tabugan. 2010 DOCTRINE: It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. Martinez. allegedly transpired when petitioner boarded respondent’s flight 548 from London. Palad. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. should adhere to the provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen. the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before the court where the carrier is domiciled. which prompted petitioner to file a case for damages. De Mesa. Francisco. according to the contract made by the parties. United Kingdom to Rome. a signatory to the Warsaw Convention. Italy. or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party. 2005. Catindig. The tortuous conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways. or 4. Cabañgon. FACTS: On April 28. 171092. even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. Valiente. Marquez. Rañigo. the place of departure and the place of destination. have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. 2005. mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention.” ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines. if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has beenmade.R. 3. Sandoval. March 15. or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty. Gloria. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business. Page 1126 Echiverri. Tecson. Asensi. Inguillo. Corpuz. BRITISH AIRWAYS G. the court of the place of destination. petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. 2. Reyes. Castillo. On May 30. Santos. Alcazaren. whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment. Ramirez. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. Article 28(1) of which provides: “An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff. filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Lumberio. For the purposes of this Convention the expression “international carriage” means any carriage in which. Albano. are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties. No. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London. Espina. Corporal. Rodriguez. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. respondent. either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business.

has the force and effect of law in this country. 19. President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 1951. 1955. Corpuz. through its Resolution No. Palad. Tabugan. Sy. Martinez. Northwest Orient Airlines. and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9. Rodriguez. Inguillo. Santos. Gloria. Marquez. Alcazaren. Page 1127 Echiverri. Corporal. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13. as such. Cabañgon. Reyes. On September 23. Albano. Tecson. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. It took effect on February 13. Sandoval. Castillo. declaring our formal adherence thereto. 210 SCRA 256 (1992). Coronel. 1933. Espina. Catindig. Rañigo.” The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and. on May 16. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate. Valois . 1950. “to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9. Valiente. De Mesa. 1950. Francisco. 201. we held that: The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. Asensi. it is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. HELD: Yes. Lumberio. 1950. In Santos III v. otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. Ramirez.

Upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9. Castillo. Valiente. and hardening of the contents. caking. 171406. vs..000. Whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores. Francisco. MALAYAN INSURANCE. Santos. as insurer.. unloaded the 60. 2. Espina. Coronel.000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping. a total of 2. The stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. 2. Reyes. RN-0001-21430. Asensi. Martinez. Rañigo. Alcazaren. FACTS: Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I 60. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Sy. INC. and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party. a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services. pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. with an invoice value of US$456. Palad. Marquez. Inc. Tabugan. Manila. Lumberio. was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company. INC.702 bags were found to be in bad order condition. Rodriguez.881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage. De la Cruz. De Mesa. South Harbor. Gloria. paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643. After all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee. 1995. 2011 DOCTRINE: Once the insurer pays the insured.Respondent. CO.The shipment. ASIAN TERMINALS. Page 1128 Echiverri. ISSUES: 1. Cabañgon. No. Inguillo. under Marine Risk Note No.April 4. Albano.R.25. Valois . equity demands reimbursement as no one should benefit at the expense of another.00. Whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s cause of action. Ramirez. Inc. Catindig.600. G. Corporal. Tecson. Corpuz.000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila. When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28. the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals.

nor did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or policy. a perusal of petitioners Answer and Pre-Trial Briefshows that petitioner never questioned respondents right to subrogation. Factual finding of Court of Appeals. Thus. Tecson. the trial courts finding that the damage to the cargoes was due to the improper handling thereof by ATIs stevedores cannot be said to be without substantial support from the records. Francisco. Asensi. Sandoval. or any provision thereof. Castillo.Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that: SECTION 1.702 damaged bags. 1. affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date and was completed on November 26. The presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. De la Cruz. respondent had no reason to present the insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial. Catindig. Valois . A court shall take judicial notice. Coronel. Marquez. Palad. HELD: The Court ruled that the petition is bereft of merit. Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability. Page 1129 Echiverri. Tabugan. Sy. Martinez. Lastimosa. Ramirez. Rodriguez. when mandatory. while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes. Espina. 1998. reflecting a figure of 2. Corpuz. was prepared and signed on November 28. Lumberio. without the introduction of evidence. of the existence and territorial extent Albano. Inguillo. Corporal. is binding and conclusive before the Supreme Court. Cabañgon. Judicial notice. Santos. Alcazaren. Gloria. Valiente. 3. 2. De Mesa. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot avail judicial notice. 3. 1998 by ATIs BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative of the shipping company. Rañigo. both the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court found that the negligence of petitioner is the proximate cause of the damage goods evidenced by the testimony of one of the witnesses which testified that “Considering that the shipment arrived on November 21. Although petitioner objected to the admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondents formal offer of evidence on the ground that respondent failed to present the insurance contract or policy. Since there was no issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy. Reyes.

Tecson. De la Cruz. the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge. Palad. Alcazaren. As such. 2. Marquez. Page 1130 Echiverri. the official acts of the legislative. Espina. Inguillo. The PPA. Rañigo. Ramirez. the measure of time. Corpuz. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. forms of government and symbols of nationality. Francisco. the law of nations. Catindig. Corporal. Gloria. Albano. Lumberio. Sandoval. when discretionary. Asensi. or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Reyes. the political constitution and history of the Philippines. which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. their political history. Judicial notice. Valois . the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. Valiente. Castillo. Sy. Santos. De Mesa. as amended. Tabugan. Rodriguez. Martinez. Coronel. of states. is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Lastimosa. the laws of nature. executive and judicial departments of the Philippines. judicial notice cannot be applied.Obviously. 857. Cabañgon. and the geographical divisions. SEC. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of.

exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Uy promptly withdrew the proceeds of the checks. Interco refused to pay the entire accrued interest of Php 767. as the son-in-law of Interco majority stockholder. Equitable Bank acceded to Uy’s demands in the assumption that Uy. Inc. Sales Invoice No. b. 1993. He demanded the deposit of the checks in his personal account in Equitable Bank Account No. Albano. NO. Valiente. PARDO G. Espina. 65842 dated April 11. It reiterated its demand on January 14.R. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION. The records do not identify the signatory for these three checks. Gloria. or explain how Jose Isidro Uy. plus a portion of the accrued interests.234. Sandoval. not SSPI.976. De Mesa. Ramirez. Francisco. The records only disclose that Uy presented each crossed check to Equitable Bank on the day of its issuance and claimed that he had good title thereto.345. Alcazaren. (SSPI) sold welding electrodes to Interco. Cabañgon. respondent Special Steel Products.845. Marquez. Santos. Interco finally paid the value of the three checks to SSPI. 65042 dated February 14. Rodriguez. it was determined that Uy. 03474-0.64 on the ground that it was not responsible for the delay. The bank also relied on Uy’s status as a valued client. Thus. Rañigo. Purchasing Officer. It is gross negligence for a bank to ignore this rule solely on the basis of a third party’s oral representation of having a good title thereto. received the proceeds of the three checks that were payable to SSPI. Thus. SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS.34. 1991. Tecson. 65843 dated April 11. Castillo. Sy. 18841-2 and Account No. June 13. Palad. SSPI denied receipt of these checks. SSPI and its President. INC. Each check was crossed with the notation account payee only and was drawn against Equitable Bank.80. In payment for the above welding electrodes. c. as evidenced by the following invoices: a. Coronel. alias Jolly Uy (Uy). Inguillo. Lumberio. 1991 for Php 313.84. Tabugan.412. Nevertheless. Catindig. 1991 for Php 345.98. Martinez. Page 1131 Echiverri. 1991 for Php 325. Corporal. Sales Invoice No. SSPI reminded Interco of the unpaid welding electrodes amounting to Php 985. Lastimosa. Equitable Bank accepted the checks for deposit in Uy’s personal accounts and stamped ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENT AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENT GUARANTEED on their dorsal portions. In October 1991. Pardo (Pardo). 1992. In his personal capacity. July 16. FACTS: In 1991. Asensi. came into possession of these checks. 1991 and July 29. and AUGUSTO L. Pardo claimed Php 3 million as moral damages. Sales Invoice No. 2012 DOCTRINE: A crossed check with the notation account payee can only be deposited in the named payee’s account. Interco replied that it had already issued three checks payable to SSPI and drawn against Equitable Bank. Interco issued three checks payable to the order of SSPI on July 10. Corpuz. Augusto L. was acting pursuant to Interco’s orders. 1991. Reyes. 175350. Valois . De la Cruz. filed a complaint for damage with application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Uy and Equitable Bank. on June 30. vs.

040. Meanwhile. On May 4. The bank counter-claimed that SSPI is liable to it in damages for the wrongful and malicious attachment of Equitable Bank’s personal properties. The sheriff served and implemented the writ against the personal properties of both defendants. 4. as actual damages. the cross claim filed by defendant EBC against defendant Jose Isidro Uy and the cross claim filed by defendant Jose Isidro Uy against EBC were DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal basis. Lastimosa. Lumberio. De la Cruz. upon the filing of a bond for Php 500. and. Uy did not present any evidence but adopted Equitable Bank’s evidence as his own. Francisco. The appellate court found no merit in Equitable Bank’s appeal.00 as exemplary damages. Equitable Bank further argued that it is not liable to SSPI because it accepted the three checks in good faith. Asensi. b. Marquez. The trial court granted plaintiff’s application. Espina. Sandoval. Only Equitable Bank appealed to the CA.00. Uy answered that the checks were negotiated to him. Castillo. 2. Reyes. may be the basis for the award for moral damages. Whether SSPI can recover. in the form of unobtained interest income to SSPI.000. Since Equitable Bank and SSPI did not enter into any contract. d. Santos. the stipulated 36% per annum interest from Equitable Bank. the trial court eventually discharged the attachment against it. however. c.000. Upon Equiatble Bank’s motion and filing of a counter-bond. Costs of suit. Pardo. Whether the attachment of Equitable Bank’s personal properties was wrongful. Pardo and against Equitable Banking Corp. It maintained that interest income is due only when it is expressly stipulated in writing. Tabugan. Coronel. It issued the writ of preliminary attachment on September 20. which cause sleepless nights. Defendant EBC’s counterclaim was DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal basis. Inguillo. Palad. 1993. It likewise affirmed the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of SSPI. ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the following: a. Gloria. Albano. Catindig. Alcazaren. Whether speculative fears and imagined scenarios. Page 1132 Echiverri. Valois . Likewise. Php 200. Php 500.000. 3. Sy. ISSUES: 1. It also found factual and legal basis to affirm the trial courts of moral damages in favor of Pardo. Ramirez. 1998. During trial. and Jose Isidoro Uy. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling that SSPI had a cause of action for quasi-delict against Equitable Bank. e. Valiente.000. Martinez. Rañigo.000. the RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs SSPI and Augusto L. and. Whether SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable Bank for quasi-delict. Tecson. De Mesa. Pho 437. Rodriguez. Equitable Bank is not liable for damages. Cabañgon.35 as actual damages. Corporal.00 as attorney’s fees. Equitable Bank then argued for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.00 as moral damages to Augusto L. Corpuz. Php 3. that he is a holder for value of the checks and that he has a good title thereto. alias Jolly Uy.

Rodriguez. Inguillo. We find that the award of Php 50.000. The affidavit and the allegations of the complaint are bereft of specific and definite allegations of fraud against Equitable Bank that would justify the attachment of its properties. fall under the second category of actual damages. Interest payments. Lumberio.000. De la Cruz. EBC did not observe the required degree of diligence expected of a banking institution under the existing factual circumstances. which deprived SSPI of the use thereof. this being an award for damages based on quasi-delict and not for a loan or forbearance of money. Reyes. SSPI asserts cause of action based in quasi-delict. Corporal. Lastimosa. SSPI should recover interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum. plaintiff may be held liable for damages. A quasi-delict is an act or omission. Page 1133 Echiverri. Disallowing Equitable Bank’s cross claim against Uy is tantamount to allowing Uy to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Equitable Bank. the court allows Equitable Bank’s cross claim against Uy.204. In order to lift the wrongful attachment of Equitable Bank properties. Ramirez. Rañigo. Asensi. Tabugan. Gloria. Martinez. Francisco.000. Marquez. Catindig. The Court. 4. which encompass the value of the loss sustained by the plaintiff. and is entitled to recover actual damages. Cabañgon.00 excessive. Equitable Bank failed to prove that it sustained damage to its goodwill and business credit in consequence of the alleged wrongful attachment. Equitable Bank is solidarily liable with Uy to compensate SSPI for the damages it suffered. Alcazaren. which SSPI claims. it is clear the defendants’ actions deprived SSPI of the present use of its money for a period of two years. The court has gone over the records and found that Equitable Bank has duly proved its claims for. Valiente. De Mesa. Espina. Sy. SSPI is therefore entitled to obtain from the fortfeasors the profits that it failed to obtain from July 1991 to June 1993. which causes damage to another. SSPI cannot invoke the contractual stipulation in interest payment against Equitable Bank because it is neither a party to the contract. Among the compensable damages are actual damages. However. Castillo. Tecson. 2.00 as moral damages is reasonable under the circumstances. there being fault or negligence. finds the award of Php 3. nor an assignee or an heir to the contracting parties. Corpuz. For its role in the conversion of the checks. Coronel.26 in premiums for a counterbond. however. For this reason. The courts below correctly ruled that SSPI has a cause of action for quasidelict against Equitable Bank. Nevertheless. There was no proof of Equitable Bank’s contention that respondent’s action caused it public embarrassment and a bank run Albano. Valois . 3. Sandoval. It is clear that Equitable Bank did not profit in Uy’s scheme. HELD: 1. For such wrongful preliminary attachment. the bank was compelled to pay the total amount of Php 30. Santos. Moral damages are given not to punish the defendant but only to give the plaintiff the means to assuage his sufferings with diversions and recreation. and the profits that the plaintiff failed to obtain. Equitable Bank should be allowed to recover from Uy whatever amounts Equitable bank may be made to pay under the judgment. Palad. Quasi-delicts exist even without a contractual relation between the parties.

2004. has jurisdiction over it. injunction. Inc. CA held that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to entertain an intra-corporate disputewhen a corporation is already dissolved. acting as the newly appointed president. the corporation has been dissolved for that purpose. They contended. prevented Antonio to take possession of the farm. AGUIRRES II and FIDEL N. respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the jurisdictionof Manila RTC. The GIS provided for a substantialchange in the composition of BOD. Francisco Bacobo. inspection of corporate books and records. Lumberio. Tabugan. 170770 January 9. Lastimosa. BOCOBO.Aggrieved. and damages was filed. 2003 for failure to comply with the reportorialrequirements. Cabañgon. AGUIRRE vs. affectingthe trial court's jurisdiction to hear the intra-corporate dispute. Asensi. NATHANIEL D. So long as these two-criteria are satisfied. Nathaniel. De la Cruz. Coronel.. The RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Corpuz. Catindig.Questioning the validity of the alleged stockholders meeting. Alcazaren. and that. appointed Antonio. Vitaliano wrote a letter tothe "real" BOD. No. Francisco. Rodriguez. and damages against the respondents. FACTS: On October 5. Albano. in his individual capacity and onbehalf of FQB+7. 2013 DOCTRINE: To be considered as an intra-corporate dispute. Vitaliano discovered a new General InformationSheet (GIS) of FQB+7 in the SEC records. injunction. a complaint for intra-corporate dispute. and (2) the nature of the question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties' rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory rules of the corporation ("nature of the controversy test"). Tecson. VITALIANO N. with the power of administration over the corporation's farm. Marquez. Espina. Corporal.Believing that respondents are usurping the management powers of the "real" BOD. Castillo. Sandoval. Martinez. the case: (1) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations ("relationship test"). as director. It was stated therein an annual meeting held onSeptember 2002 has elected a new set of BOD. thesaid complaint for intra-corporate dispute. Palad. that FQB+7's Certificate of Registration wasalready revoked by SEC on September 29. the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC. Page 1134 Echiverri. which was filed by Nathaniel and Priscila asheirs of the corporate president. naming Nathaniel and PriscilaasDirectors. Sy. Fidel Aguirre. Rañigo. Gloria. However. FQB+7. He further asked for the rectification of the erroneous entries in the GIS. inspection of corporate books andrecords. PRISCILA BOCOBO and ANTONIO DE VILLA G.The complaint alleges that in April 2004. acting as a special commercial court. Vitaliano (as subscriber) filed. Reyes. Valiente. Ramirez.and for the inspection of corporate books and records. since its juridical personality is lost as a result thereof. Santos. the BOD did not granthis request. inter alia. Inguillo. Valois . De Mesa. INC. as thecorporation's attorney-in-fact.R.

To be considered as an intra-corporate dispute. Santos. Corporal. Valiente. Martinez. Rañigo. Marquez. Tabugan. In so doing. Rodriguez. Sy. Palad. It preserves a corporate actor's cause of action andremedy against another corporate actor. Since. So long as these two-criteria are satisfied. Valois . and acorporation's right to remove usurpers and strangers from its affairs.Vitaliano's complaint seeks to determine and vindicate an alleged stockholder's right tothe return of his stockholdings and to participate in the election of directors. Cabañgon. Albano. directors or officers. Section 145 assures an aggrieved party that the corporation's dissolutionwill not impair. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Page 1135 Echiverri. Section 145 preserves the natureof the controversy between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute. Coronel. Francisco. Corpuz. Corporation's BOD is notrendered functus officio by its dissolution. Tecson. Inguillo. acting as a special commercial court. necessarily theremust be a board that will continue acting for and on behalf of the dissolved corporationfor that purpose. Espina. the case: (1) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations ("relationship test"). The nature of the case as intra-corporate dispute is not affected by the dissolution of thecorporation. and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over it. itsstockholders. Castillo. Sandoval. Reyes. De Mesa. Asensi. De la Cruz. Section 122 of the Corporation Codeallows a corporation to continue its existence for a limited purpose. his/her rights or remedies against the corporation. much less remove. ISSUE: Whether or not a corporate dissolution renders an existing intra-corporate dispute moot andacademic. Catindig. HELD: No. Gloria. Lumberio. Ramirez. has jurisdiction over it. the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC. and (2) the nature of the questionsubject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with theregulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties' rights and obligationsunder the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory rules of the corporation ("natureof the controversy test"). These issuescannot be mooted by the dissolution of the corporation.

175666. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Valois . Delia Sotero (Sotero) obtained a life insurance policy from Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation (petitioner) designating CresenciaAban (respondent). by requiring them to thoroughly investigate those they insure within two years from effectivity of the policy and while the insured is still alive. Corporal. July 29. MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. denied the claim stating. Corpuz. concealment or misrepresentation. petitioner. Rañigo. they will be obligated to honor claims on the policies they issue. 1996. when the insurance policy had been in force for more than two years and seven months. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the RTC. [t]he "incontestability clause" is a provision in law that after a policy of life insurance made payable on the death of the insured shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two (2) years from the date of its issue or of its last reinstatement. Asensi. among others. On April 10. ABAN G. 2013 DOCTRINE:The ultimate aim of Section 48 of the Insurance Code is to compel insurers to solicit business from or provide insurance coverage only to legitimate and bona fide clients. HELD: No. the insurer cannot prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by reason of fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent. the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. Rodriguez. after conducting its investigation. Marquez. If they do not. Espina. CRESENCIA P. concealment or misrepresentation. Tecson. Upon appeal. Francisco. Lumberio. Valiente. De la Cruz. Castillo. The main thesis of the petitioner was that since the policy was obtained through fraud. Page 1136 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Martinez. No. the contract is voidable under Art 1390 of the Civil Code. Inguillo. Reyes. Sotero died. The law assumes that they will do just that and not sit on their laurels. FACTS: On July 3 1993. the insurance policy cannot be annulled by virtue of the alleged fraud committed in obtaining the same.Petitioner filed a civil case for rescission and/or annulment of the policy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Palad. Dick and Harry. Catindig. indiscriminately soliciting and accepting insurance business from any Tom. Albano.R. regardless of fraud. her niece. Alcazaren. When respondent filed a claim for the insurance proceeds. De Mesa. The purpose of the law is to give protection to the insured or his beneficiary by limiting the rescinding of the contract of insurance on the ground of fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation to a period of only two (2) years from the issuance of the policy or its last reinstatement. Sy. Coronel. Ramirez. Santos. Sandoval. that the insurance policy was obtained fraudulently because it was allegedly respondent pretending to be Soreto who obtained the insurance policy . ISSUE: Whether or not the insurance policy can be avoided/anulled by virtue of the alleged fraud committed in obtaining the same. as her beneficiary. Gloria.

a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 835 was executed by Simplicio and Marta in favor of their brothers. who passed away sometime in 1969. AdelaidaValles (Adelaida).R.al. Rustico. Tecson. Rañigo. Felicisimo. Corporal. 1968. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Juan. Encarnacion. Cabañgon. On the other hand. It declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 28. were siblings. Simplicio died on April 20. Melquiades and Rustico. 177616 August 27. HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOAQUIN MANGUARDIA and SUSANA MANALO. Marta died in 1943 and was survived by her illegitimate daughter. The Deed ofAbsolute Sale ostensibly bore the signatureof Marta and the thumb marks of Simplicio and his wife. et. TERESITA VALLES et. Valois . Palad. Lastimosa. Catindig. 1957. On even date. Sy. Reyes.T-9409. Inguillo. and his children Graciano. SULPICIO VALLES. were still alive in 1968 and had signed/thumb marked the sale document. said deed was registered in the Registryof Deeds of Capiz. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of herein respondents. Coronel. all of Simplicio's children died single and childless. 1968 void ab initio because there was no proof that the vendors. Visitacion and Catalina. Valiente. Rosario. HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO VALLES and MARTA VALLES. and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAPIZ vs. De Mesa. all surnamed Valles. Cancellation of Certificates of Title. 2014 DOCTRINE: The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that standing. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Marquez. it affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Santos. Felicisimo was survived by his wife. Alcazaren. G. Recovery of Possession and Damages against the heirs of spouses Manguardia and the heirs of spouses Leonardo and Rebecca petitioners in the RTC of Roxas City. He was survived by his wife VillaricaOrdas. FACTS: The facts show that Marta. Marta and Simplicio. Simplicio and Marta were the registered owners of a property in Barrio Cudian. Castillo. Albano. all surnamed Valles.al. Martinez. With the exception of Felicisimo. EncarnacionOrdas. No. Corpuz. R0-4017. Simplicio’s daughter. Simplicio. the registered owners of Lot 835 are:a) Adelaida (Lot 835-A). Sulpicio. Adelaida. PresentacionCapapas. Francisco. and his children. the heirs of Simplicio and Marta commenced an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of Title and Deeds of Sale. 1999. Tabugan. On December 13. Ramirez. Page 1137 Echiverri. Asensi. Espina. Gloria. and Dominica. resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. represented by GRACIANO VALLES. and Marta’s daughter. Capiz and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.b) Spouses Manguardia (Lots 835-B and 835-C). With the subsequent sales of the property. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA. andc) Leonardo and Rebecca (Lot 835-D). RO-4017 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. It appears that on October 28. Teresita and Antonio (now deceased). Ivisan. Melquiades.

Since laches is an equitable doctrine. The Court’s "role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. 313 SCRA 209). The general rule that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens Certificate of Title without need of inquiring further cannot apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to [inquire] into the status of the title of the property in litigation (Voluntad vs. Page 1138 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Inguillo. when adopted and confirmed by the CA. Sy. Santos. Albano. Catindig. Espina. If circumstances exist that [require] a prudent man to investigate and he does not. Martinez. Sandoval. It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. De la Cruz. Reyes. Ramirez. and his mere refusal to believe that a defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value (Voluntad vs. HELD: The Petition lacks merit. Dizon. This Court has reiterated that it is not a trier of facts. it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. Laches cannot be used to perpetrate injustice. Alcazaren. Castillo. Petitioners have failed to discharge that burden. On the claim of laches. Coronel. this Court reiterates that laches is based upon equity and the public policy of discouraging stale claims. Well entrenched is the principle that factual findings of the trial court. supra). its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Marquez. Francisco. is not without well defined exceptions. Rañigo. It must be emphasized that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that standing. Lastimosa. De Mesa. Acquisitive prescription is not applicable in the case at bar. Asensi. a forgery. "Findings of fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts. Valiente. ISSUE/S: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE APPEAL OF PETITIONERS AND AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO PETITIONERS HEREIN BEING BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH. the assertion of laches to thwart the claim of respondents is foreclosed because the deed upon which petitioners base their claim is first and foremost. The good faith that is here essential is integral with the very status that must be proved. Corpuz." This rule. Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that their predecessors-in-interest were buyers in good faith. In discharging the burden. Tabugan. Tecson. however. are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. Valois . Dizon. Corporal. Palad. Thus. The Court finds no reason to depart from the factual findings of the lower courts. Gloria. he is deemed to have acted in mala fide. Rodriguez. Lumberio.

Salonga denied Rolando’s allegations. ROLANDO C. Inguillo.000. Sandoval. they claimed that the failure to pay the same was due to a fortuitous event.000. The lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount disallows a creditor from charging monetary interest. it is undisputed that the parties did not put down in writing their agreement. Alcazaren. regardless of who between the parties proposed the rate. the financial difficulties brought about by the economic crisis. ISSUE/S: The Court’s determination of whether to uphold the judgment of the CA that the principal loan is deemed paid is dependent on the validity of the monthly interest rate imposed. Thus. Rañigo. Ramirez. and b) the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing. two conditions must concur: a) express stipulation for the payment of interest. The collection of interest without any stipulation in writing is prohibited by law. L&J paid Rolando a total of ₱576. Castillo. that is. Lumberio. Santos. Cabañgon. Jurisprudence on the matter also holds that for interest to be due and payable. FACTS: On December 27. i. In their Answer. 183360 September 8. Under Article 1956 of the Civil Code. 2014 DOCTRINE: No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. The MeTC upheld the 6% monthly interest and favored the plaintiff. Francisco. And in determining such validity. L&J and Atty. Even if the payment of interest has been reduced in writing. Albano. Palad. While they acknowledged the loan as a corporate debt. Valois . carried a 6% monthly interest. Valiente.00.00 without any security to L&J. no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. a property developer with Atty. Salonga in his personal capacity before the MeTC. De Mesa. L & J DEVELOPMENT COMPANY G. Rodriguez. DE LA PAZ vs. De la Cruz. The loan. Espina. Reyes. Page 1139 Echiverri.000.. Rolando lent ₱350. Tecson. As L&J failed to pay despite repeated demands. No. Tabugan. Martinez. Here. Lastimosa. 2000. Asensi.R. no interest is due. with no specified maturity date. From December 2000 to August 2003. RTC affirmed the MeTC but the CA reversed the decision. Catindig. a 6% monthly interest rate on a loan is unconscionable. Marquez. Corpuz.e. Gloria. Esteban Salonga as its President and General Manager. HELD: The Petition is devoid of merit. ₱21.00 representing interest charges. Rolando filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against L&J and Atty. the Court must necessarily delve into matters regarding a) the form of the agreement of interest under the law and b) the alleged unconscionability of the interest rate. Corporal. Sy. Coronel.

Reyes. Sy. the Court must consider the circumstances of each case. Page 1140 Echiverri. Francisco. Castillo. Gloria. not all interest rates levied upon loans are permitted by the courts as they have the power to equitably reduce unreasonable interest rates. Sandoval. Rañigo. Corpuz. Valois . Catindig. While the Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts and who are expected to comply with their terms and obligations. Asensi. this rule is not absolute. Rodriguez. De la Cruz. In exercising this vested power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable. Tecson. What may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one case. Lastimosa. Valiente. usury has been legally non-existent in view of the suspension of the Usury Law by Central Bank Circular No. De Mesa. Indeed at present. Ramirez. Alcazaren. Coronel. Marquez.Even so. Inguillo. Lumberio. Stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and the Court is allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. Albano. 905 s. Corporal. 1982. Cabañgon. Martinez. Espina. Palad. may be just in another. Santos. Tabugan.

Lumberio. Tecson. the nature of TIDCORP's Petition in CA-G. the review of any order or decision of the rehabilitation court or on appeal therefrom shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court. Indeed. Incipiently.R. Espina. The RTC issued an Order approving WGC's rehabilitation plan. Rañigo. and milling of grains. Sandoval. Nation Granary. RBC filed its Oppositionto the Petition for Rehabilitation.R. Cabañgon. we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require. it must be said that the matter has been rendered irrelevant by this Court's November 26.66 billion from RBC and other banks and entities such as herein private respondent Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP). Martinez. ROBINSON’S BANK CORPORATION v. 104141 is such that the other creditors like RBC must be allowed to participate in the proceedings. Lastimosa. or WGC) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Payments. Just as the trial court allowed RBC and TIDCORP to participate in the proceedings below. Marquez. Rodriguez. the CA could have ordered RBC to file its comment in CA-G. transport and storage. Inc. WGC is engaged in the business of mechanized bulk handling. Reyes. Page 1141 Echiverri. warehousing. should have seen that the rights of RBC stand to be adversely affected by the remedies prayed for by TIDCORP. Thus. Actions and Proceedingsbefore the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. but was denied by the CA. Alcazaren. on its own. the CA should have likewise allowed RBC to participate in the Albano. Valiente. It incurred loans amounting to P2. De Mesa. drying. Santos. (now World Granary Corporation. ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPER REMEDY OF THE PETITIONER WAS TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW INSTEAD OF A MERE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION. the RTC gave due course to the Petition for Rehabilitation and directed the receiver to evaluate the rehabilitation plan submitted by WGC. Tabugan. unless otherwise provided. TIDCORP no longer reiterated the issue in its Memorandum. Francisco. 104141 and allowed to participate therein. Indeed. FACTS: In December 4. De la Cruz. SP No. Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. 2014 DOCTRINE: In the exercise of our superintending control over inferior courts. Inguillo. Castillo. Corporal. SAMUEL H. is beyond question that under Rule 3. 2006. Sy. TIDCORP thus filed a Petition for Review. 2012 Resolutionwhich gave due course to the Petition. HELD: The Court partially grants the Petition. on the procedural issue covering verification and the certification against forum-shopping. Gloria. 195289. the appellate court. They have an interest in the controversy where a final decree would necessarily affect their rights. SP No. Palad. Thus. Valois . Corpuz. Coronel. and thereafter submit his recommendations thereon. Ramirez. Catindig. Asensi. GAERLAN GR No. Sep 24.

Alcazaren. De la Cruz. Lumberio. RBC is already a party in the rehabilitation case. Inguillo. as admitted by TIDCORP. Marquez. Sy. Palad. Reyes. and that the instant Petition for Review is merely a continuation of the proceedings below. Santos. Martinez. Page 1142 Echiverri. proceedings before it. Rodriguez. Tecson. Catindig. Espina. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Asensi. Ramirez. De Mesa. Coronel. Corporal. Castillo. Valois . Lastimosa. This is only fair and logical considering that. Corpuz. Francisco. Gloria. Sandoval. Albano. Valiente. Rañigo.

Sandoval. Santos. Corporal. Palad. Page 1143 Echiverri. there is no truth to his claim that he did not smoke cigarettes within 12 months prior to the said application. Reyes. Ledesma) on December 28. Petitioner denied respondent Tan Kit’s claim on account of Norberto’s failure to fully and faithfully disclose in his insurance application certain material and relevant information about his health and smoking history. 183272 October 15. Marquez. Inc. The CA found that prior to his death. 2000. Rañigo. Sy. Consequently.00. Martinez.080. is ordered to reimburse to respondents Sandra Tan Kit and the Estate of the Deceased Norberto Tan Kit the sum of PHP13. HELD: Yes. and Dr. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the interest. 2000. FACTS: Respondent Tan Kit is the widow and designated beneficiary of Norberto Tan Kit (Norberto). De Mesa. Valois . Norberto had consulted two physicians. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Dr. 86923 is modified in that petitioner Sun Life of Canada (Philippines). Specifically. Castillo. the same shall earn interest of 6% per annum until fully paid.93 representing the premium paid by the insured within fifteen (15) days from date of finality of this Decision. Tabugan. Valiente. Rodriguez. Francisco. No. to whom he confided that he had stopped smoking only in 1999. Corpuz. Coronel. Norberto answered "No" to the question inquiring whether he had smoked cigarettes or cigars within the last 12 months prior to filling out said application. Tecson. If the amount is not reimbursed within said period. Lastimosa. 2001. De la Cruz. Inguillo. On February 19. Hence the Court of Appeals dismissed the claim of the Respondent and ordered the Insurance company to refund the premium with interest. SANDRA TAN KIT and The Estate of the Deceased NORBERTO TAN KIT G. Norberto died of disseminated gastric carcinoma. At the time therefore that he applied for insurance policy on October 28. Chua on August 19. SUN LIFE OF CANADA (PHILIPPINES). respondent Tan Kit filed a claim under the subject policy.000. vs. the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. John Ledesma (Dr.R. whose application for a life insurance policy. Lumberio. Such interest is not compensatory interest but interest if the insurer delays in refunding the premium. with face value of ₱300.R. Albano. 1999. Catindig. CV No. was granted by petitioner on October 28. Gloria. INC. 1999. Alcazaren. Espina. Asensi. 2014 DOCTRINE: The insurance company is liable to pay interest when there is unjustified refusal or withholding of payment of the claim by the insurer.

Tabugan. AHAC paid MSC the value of the missing bags of flour after finding the latter’s claim in order. The shipment was discharged in good and complete order condition and with safety seals in place to the custody of the arrastre operator. MSC sought insurance indemnity for the lost cargoes from AHAC. MPSI. No. INC. The arrastre operator was. MSC issued a subrogation receipt in favor of AHAC. At the compound’s exit. AHAC filed a Complaint6 for damages against MPSI before the RTC. Corpuz. Inc. 2015 DOCTRINE: Marina Port Services. and examined the shipment for tax evaluation in the presence of MSC’s broker and checker. Espina. De Mesa. Gloria. Castillo. Martinez. “This means that the shipper was solely responsible for the loading of the container. MPSI issued to ACS the corresponding gate passes for the vans indicating its turnover of the subject shipment to MSC. Hence.R. Cabañgon. Valois . AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION G. (MPSI) cannot just the same be held liable for the missing bags of flour since the consigned goods were shipped under “Shipper’s Load and Count” arrangement. the customs inspector closed the container vans and refastened them with safety wire seals while MSC’s broker padlocked the same. MPSI denied both claims of MSC. Inguillo. Corporal. took out five container vans for delivery to MSC. ISSUE: The core issue to be resolved in this casewhether MPSI is liable for the loss of the bags of flour. vs. Lumberio. MPSI then placed the said container vans in a backtoback arrangement at the delivery area of the harbor’s container yard where they were watched over by the security guards of MPSI and of the Philippine Ports Authority. Protection against pilferage of the shipment was the consignee’s lookout. As a result. Lastimosa.. Francisco. Rodriguez. Ramirez. it filed a formal claim for loss with MPSI. Valiente. Rañigo. However. Ltd. Asensi. agents of the Bureau of Customs officially broke the seals. August 12. Reyes. The shipment was insured against all risks by AHAC and consigned to MSC Distributor (MSC). MARINA PORT SERVICES. MSC discovered substantial shortages in the number of bags of flour delivered. Tecson. MSC’s representative. upon receipt of the container vans at its warehouse.. Santos. while the carrier was oblivious to the contents of the shipment. FACTS: Countercorp Trading PTE. Sandoval. HELD: MPSI cannot just the same be held liable for the missing bags of flour since the consigned goods were shipped under “Shipper’s Load and Count” arrangement. De la Cruz. Marquez. Palad. Page 1144 Echiverri. Thereafter. 201822. In turn. Alcazaren. Sy. After unloading and prior to hauling. opened the container vans. AD’s Customs Services (ACS). like Albano. shipped 10 container vans of soft wheat flour with seals intact on board the vessel M/V Uni Fortune. Coronel. Thereafter. Catindig.

Rañigo. Reyes. Inguillo. Cabañgon. Espina. the cargo was at the shipper’s load and count. Valiente. dutyboundtotake good care of the goods received from the vessel and to turn the same over to the party entitled to their possession. as earlier stated. Catindig. Sandoval. Coronel. Corporal. De Mesa. Martinez. subject to such qualifications as may have validly beenimposed in the contract between the parties. Lastimosa.”All told. Tecson. Tabugan. Sy. any ordinary depositary. Gloria. the Court holds that MPSI is not liable for the loss of the bags of flour. Santos. The arrastre operator was expected to deliver to the consignee only the container received from the carrier. Albano. Corpuz. Lumberio. Palad. Rodriguez. Castillo. Ramirez. Page 1145 Echiverri. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. The arrastre operator was not required to verify the contents of the container received and to compare them with those declared by the shipper because. Marquez. Asensi. Valois . Francisco.

48. Felipe accomplished the required medical questionnaire wherein he did not declare any illness or adverse medical condition. Felipe agreed to these conditions and on December 27. FELIPE Y. 1999 to June 23. Khu. April 18. Corporal. KHU. Lumberio. Marquez. Coronel. such right must be exercised previous to the commencement of an action on the contract. 1999. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY. Ramirez. Gloria. Sr. Francisco. De Mesa. Sy.00 as premium. HELD: We deny the Petition. Insular Life advised Felipe that his application for reinstatement may only be considered if he agreed to certain conditions such as payment of additional premium and the cancellation of the riders pertaining to premium waiver and accidental death benefits. 1999. Cabañgon. 1999. Felipe N. KHU G. 195176.On September 7. This took effect on June 22. Sandoval. Whenever a right to rescind a contract of insurance is given to the insurer by any provision of this chapter. JR. The Insurance Code pertinently provides that: Sec. Catindig. 1997. Alcazaren. 1997.On June 23. Lastimosa. AND FREDERICK Y. PAZ Y.R. Palad. Tecson. 2016 DOCTRINE:The date of last reinstatement mentioned in Section 48 of the Insurance Code pertains to the date that the insurer approved' the application for reinstatement. all the other information submitted by Felipe in his application for reinstatement was virtually identical to those mentioned in his original policy. Felipe applied for the reinstatement of his policy and paid P25. After a policy of life insurance made payable on the death of the insured shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years from the date of its Albano. Misamis Oriental. 2000.On October 12. However. in light of the ambiguity in the insurance documents to this case. this Court adopts the interpretation favorable to the insured in determining the date when the reinstatement was approved. Reyes. Insular Life thereafter issued him Policy Number A000015683 with a face value of PI million. Martinez. 1999 paid the agreed additional premium of P3.020.50. v. ISSUE: The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether Felipe's reinstated life insurance policy is already incontestable at the time of his death. Corpuz. Tabugan. Rañigo. Felipe's policy lapsed due to non-payment of the premium covering the period from June 22. KHU. Espina. LTD. (Felipe) applied for a life insurance policy with Insular Life under the latter's Diamond Jubilee Insurance Plan. Inguillo.. Except for the change in his occupation of being self-employed to being the Municipal Mayor of Binuangan. Asensi. Valiente. De la Cruz. Valois . Rodriguez. No. FACTS: On March 6. Santos. Castillo. Page 1146 Echiverri.054.

Lumberio. it is settled that the reinstatement of an insurance policy should be reckoned from the date when the same was approved by the insurer. Valois . Espina. Francisco. Ramirez.Thus. De la Cruz. Santos. Alcazaren. Corpuz. Rodriguez. Reyes. respondents contend that it was on June 22. Coronel. Catindig. 1999 that the reinstatement took effect. Insular Life claims that it approved the reinstatement only on December 27. Inguillo. Corporal. Marquez. 1999. Albano. issue or of its last reinstatement. Rañigo. the insurer cannot prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent. Palad.The resolution of this issue hinges on the following documents: 1) Letter of Acceptance. Page 1147 Echiverri. Asensi. Gloria. On the other hand. and 2) the Endorsement. Valiente. the parties differ as to when the reinstatement was actually approved. Tabugan. Tecson. In this case. Martinez. Sy. De Mesa. Castillo. Lastimosa. Sandoval. Cabañgon.

Palad. HELD: This Court must defer to the findings of fact of the RTC . His wife. Ramirez. De Mesa. Corpuz. Cabañgon. Marquez. The Death Certificate dated November 17. 2005. NASCVC. 2003 to Dr. 204736 November 28. BPI Family filed a Manifestation praying that either it be dropped from the case or that the case be dismissed with respect to it. Gumersindo Solidum Ybañez. It subsequently instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Insurance Contracts against Hermenegilda and the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family). Gumersindo Solidum Ybañez. Castillo. Rodriguez. Alcazaren. Sandoval. On 25 November 25. or cajoled into selling the insurance to the insured who purportedly with malice and deceit passed himself off Albano. because it no longer had any interest in the subject insurance policies as asssignee because the insured’s obligation had already been settled or paid. Gloria. Page 1148 Echiverri. Lastimosa. Reyes. SAM Nephropathy recurrent malignant pleural effusion. Inc. The RTC correctly held that the CDH's medical records that might have established the insured's purported misrepresentation/s or concealment/s was inadmissible for being hearsay. Inguillo. Inc. Valois . Hermenegilda Ybañez. No. Since no objection was interposed to this prayer by either Manulife or Hermenegilda. Valiente. was revocably designated as the beneficiary in said insurance policies. Crd Stage 4. Manulife had utterly failed to prove by convincing evidence that it had been beguiled. inveigled. 6066517-18 and 6300532-69 was issued by Manulife Philippines. on October 25. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 2002 and July 25. Espina. De la Cruz. Tecson. Corporal. Santos. Tabugan.that Manulife's Complaint for rescission of the insurance policies in question was totally bereft of factual and legal bases because it had utterly failed to prove that the insured had committed the alleged misrepresentation/s or concealment/s of material facts imputed against him. given the fact that Manulife failed to present the physician or any responsible official of the CDH who could confirm or attest to the due execution and authenticity of the alleged medical records. Sy. Upon investigation. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. 2005. She filed a Claimant's Statement-Death Claim on December 10. Manulife concluded that the insured misrepresented or concealed material facts at the time the subject insurance policies were applied for so it denied the death claims and refunded the premiums that the insured paid on the insurance policies. the RTC granted this prayer in its Order of November 25. can rescind of insurance contracts of Dr.R. ISSUE: Whether or not Manulife Philippines. secondary to Uric Acid Nephropathy. INC. Lumberio.. Catindig. Coronel. 2003. HERMENEGILDA YBAÑEZ G. Asensi. 2003 stated that the insured had "Hepatocellular CA. 2016 DOCTRINE: FACTS: Insurance Policy Nos.as affirmed or confirmed by the CA . Francisco. Martinez. MANULIFE PHILIPPINES. Rañigo. vs.

Gloria. and thus a fit and proper applicant for life insurance." For failure of Manulife to prove intent to defraud on the part of the insured. These documentary exhibits did not automatically validate or explain themselves. Palad. Of course. Catindig. Alcazaren. Misrepresentation as a defense of the insurer to avoid liability is an affirmative defense and the duty to establish such defense by satisfactory and convincing evidence rests upon the insurer. Sy. Rodriguez. In fact. Asensi. Lumberio. Corpuz. Valiente. Inguillo. it cannot validly sue for rescission of insurance contracts. Ramirez. she never testified in regard to the circumstances attending the execution of these documentary exhibits much less in regard to its contents. Sandoval. De la Cruz. without the testimonies of the actual participating parties thereto. as thoroughly sound and healthy. Valois . Victoriano merely perfunctorily identified the documentary exhibits adduced by Manulife. Espina. Manulife's sole witness gave no evidence at all relative to the particulars of the purported concealment or misrepresentation allegedly perpetrated by the insured. Cabañgon. Reyes. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Coronel. Rañigo. Tecson. Martinez. "The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to entitle the insurer to rescind the contract. Castillo. Santos. Francisco. De Mesa. Marquez. Corporal. the mere mechanical act of identifying these documentary exhibits. adds up to nothing. Page 1149 Echiverri. Albano.

bad faith. Tabugan. Added to this. Inguillo. INC. CHRISTOPHER SALVADOR. De la Cruz. Alcazaren. through the Supervisor NazarioFurio. 210032 25 APRIL 2017 DOCTRINE: Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed. they requested DMI to issue a formal notice regarding the matter but to no avail. informed them that DMI would cease its hauling operation for no reason. However. Catindig. petitioners filed a motion to quash the writ of execution. NLRC reversed the latter’s decision because DMI placed them on standby and no longer provided them work. spouses Smith revealed that they only lent their names to petitioners. Palad. and the same did not file any formal notice regarding it. and be held solidarily liable even after final judgment and on execution. including payment of the judgment awards in favor of respondents. During the execution stage. Page 1150 Echiverri. or malice in evading their obligation. On December 28. Thus. No. Cabañgon. Corpuz. provided that such persons deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation. upon respondents' request. Rodriguez. MASCARDO G. Rañigo. Later. FACTS: DMI is a domestic corporation engaged in the hauling liquefied petroleum gas wherein Lequin was employed as truck driver and other respondents as helpers. After such undertaking. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay for the judgment awards and the veil of corporate fiction be pierced HELD: Yes. The quashal was denied by the Labor Arbiter. Lastimosa. respondents argued that they were illegally dismissed as their termination was without cause and only on the pretext of closure. and they were included as incorporators just to assist the latter in forming DMI. Castillo.. Espina. Tecson. DUTCH MOVERS. Valois . Valiente. Sy. or resorted to fraud. Sandoval. Albano. spouses Smith immediately transferred their rights in DMI to petitioners. On appeal. De Mesa. petitioners used DMI as shield in evading legal liabilities. Here. 2004. and used the same in furthering their business interests. As such. Coronel. and responsible persons may be impleaded. LA Mangandog dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. in their Opposition to the Motion to Implead. Cesar Lee. Francisco. Lumberio. which proved that petitioners were the ones in control of DMI. DMI ceased its operation.R. Corporal. EDILBERTO LEQUIN. Marquez. Martinez. Santos. CESAR LEE and YOLANDA LEE vs. Asensi. the DOLE NCR issued a certificationrevealing that DMI did not file any notice of business closure. CA granted the quashal of the writ of execution insofar as it holds individual respondents Cesar Lee and Yolanda Lee liable for the judgment award against the complainants. Gloria. Reyes. REYNALDO SINGSING and RAFFY G. Ramirez. Respondents moved for the Motion for Writ of Execution.

De la Cruz." Albano. and as such. Castillo. Reyes. Alcazaren. While it is true that one's control does not by itself result in the disregard of corporate fiction. Corporal. Palad. Santos. Rañigo. Asensi. considering the irregularity in the incorporation of DMI. Martinez. The act of hiding behind the cloak of corporate fiction will not be allowed in such situation where it is used to evade one's obligations. Marquez. Corpuz. Tabugan. De Mesa. however. Sy. Inguillo. Tecson. Francisco. Lastimosa. Valois . Valiente. Sandoval. including evasion of legal duties to its employees. Espina. Coronel. Catindig. Gloria. Lumberio. Page 1151 Echiverri. the piercing of the corporate veil is warranted. then there is sufficient basis to hold that such corporation was used for an illegal purpose. which "equitable piercing doctrine was formulated to address and prevent. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Rodriguez.

Page 1152 Echiverri. Lumberio. Rañigo. Francisco. Reyes. De la Cruz. Inguillo. De Mesa. Coronel. Tecson. Valiente. Espina. Lastimosa. Valois . Ramirez. Martinez. Santos. Tabugan. Asensi. Castillo. Marquez. Corporal. Gloria. Rodriguez. Corpuz. Sandoval. Palad. Catindig. Sy. Cabañgon. Alcazaren. TAXATION LAW Albano.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of its members for taxable years 1999 and 2000. Sonia L. with attached Transcripts of Assessment and Audit Results/Assessment Notices. Flores. De Mesa.90. Valois . Gloria. Cruz: The power of taxation. Lilian B. On November 29. cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. Santos.489. 12. Coronel. Marquez. Espina. Inguillo. 182722. honorarium of the Board of Directors. respectively. Asensi. De la Cruz. to examine petitioner’s books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the taxable years 1999 and 2000. is not absolute and may be subordinated to the demands of social justice. Corporal. and the consequent delinquency interest of 20% per annum HELD: No.462. Letters of Demand. the States power to tax must give way to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. The fact that “similar Albano. 2001. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani A. although taxes are the lifeblood of the government. No. including their members. its General Manager vs. Tabugan. respectively. 2002. DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE [DCCCO].. and legal and professional services. 2002. inclusive of penalties. Reyes.644. deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the vital role they play in the attainment of economic development and social justice. Represented by Felicidad L. for the years 1999 and 2000 in the amounts of P1. Hefti. Rodriguez. authorizing BIR Officers of Revenue Region No. Castillo. Lumberio. FACTS: Petitioner Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative is a credit cooperative duly registered with and regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority. Rañigo.065.62 and P143. ordering petitioner to pay the deficiency withholding taxes. On November 27. petitioner received two Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes for taxable years 1999 and 2000 which were protested by petitioner. 2003. while indispensable. for the years 1999 and 2000. Corpuz. petitioner received from the BIR Regional Director. On April 24.R. Valiente. Sy. January 22. the Bureau of Internal Revenue Operations Group Deputy Commissioner. Sandoval. The BIR had earlier ruled without any qualification that since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks.30 and P1.867. Lastimosa. Ramirez. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. Cabañgon. issued Letters of Authority. 2010 DOCTRINE: Cooperatives. Alcazaren. On June 26.574. Page 1153 Echiverri. Martinez. Catindig. security and janitorial services. petitioner availed of the VAAP and paid the amounts of P105. Francisco.24 corresponding to the withholding taxes on the payments for the compensation. Palad. Tecson. Thus. Bacolod City. Ruiz.

1988. that since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks. Corporal. Coronel. Gloria. Petitioners invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. Lumberio. therefore. unless such interpretations are in a sharp conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other laws. Page 1154 Echiverri. Tabugan. It bears stressing that interpretations of administrative agencies in charge of enforcing a law are entitled to great weight and consideration by the courts. Cabañgon. Inguillo. In this case. BIR Ruling No. Lastimosa. the ruling clearly states. cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. which was issued by Assistant Commissioner James H. Sy. Reyes. Tecson. Sandoval. There is nothing in the ruling to suggest that it applies only when deposits are maintained in a bank. Marquez. do not apply to members of cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations. Martinez. Rañigo. 551-888 and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] are in perfect harmony with the Constitution and the laws they seek to implement. Castillo. is proper. respectively. Francisco. Espina. which was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006]. Accordingly. Valois . Corpuz. Catindig. Ramirez. Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1). 551-888. This is consistent with the preferential treatment accorded to members of cooperatives who are exempt in the same way as the cooperatives themselves. Rodriguez. arrangements” is preceded by banking terms means that that those subject to withholding must have deposit peculiarities. De Mesa. among which is the alleged exemption of interest income on members deposit from the 20% final withholding tax. This interpretation was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006]. Alcazaren. 551-888 that cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their members. Palad. the BIR declared in BIR Ruling No. The National Internal Revenue Code states that a final tax at the rate of twenty percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from the deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangement x xx for individuals under Section 24(B)(1) and for domestic corporations under Section 27(D)(1). Rather. Valiente. applies to the instant case. Santos. De la Cruz. without any qualification. the interpretation in BIR Ruling No. Albano. Roldan upon the request of the cooperatives for a confirmatory ruling on several issues. On November 16. Considering the members deposits with the cooperatives are not currency bank deposits nor deposit substitutes. Asensi.

Asensi. you may appeal this final decision within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. Viewed in the light of the foregoing. Inguillo. the BIR issued a formal assessment notice (FAN). Francisco. the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a preliminary assessment notice (PAN) to Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) demanding payment of P50 million in taxes. whether his action on a disputed assessment constitutes his final determination thereon in order for the taxpayer concerned to determine when his or her right to appeal to the tax court accrues. Cabañgon. ABC then appealed the FAN with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Marquez. Corpuz. Gloria.R. Albano. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is correct HELD: No. Sandoval. February 5. this case holds an exception. However. Corporal. De la Cruz. If you disagree. 175097. Castillo. The wordings of the FAN issued by the CIR made it appear that the FAN is actually the CIR’s final decision. No. Coronel. Palad. In July 2004. Espina. Valiente. in a clear and unequivocal language. otherwise said deficiency tax assessment shall become final. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that ABC did not exhaust all administrative remedies for failing to file a protest against the FAN. in a clear and unequivocal language. Rodriguez. Valois . The FAN included a formal demand as well as this phrase: xxx This is our final decision based on investigation. Lastimosa. It is true that a FAN is not appealable with the CTA. ABC then filed a protest in May 2004. De Mesa. Page 1155 Echiverri. 2010 DOCTRINE: We have time and again reminded the CIR to indicate. Santos. ALLIED BANKINGCORPORATION vs. We have time and again reminded the CIR to indicate. Reyes. ABC cannot therefore be faulted for filing an appeal with the CTA instead of filing a protest with the CIR. Ramirez. whether his action on a disputed assessment constitutes his final determination thereon in order for the taxpayer concerned to determine when his or her right to appeal to the tax court accrues. Martinez. Viewed in the light of the foregoing. Tecson. Sy. Lumberio. executory and demandable. It even advised ABC to file an appeal instead of filing a protest. COMMISSIONER OFINTERNAL REVENUE G. Catindig. Alcazaren. respondent is now estopped from claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a final decision. Rañigo. Tabugan. FACTS: In April 2004. respondent is now estopped from claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a final decision.

” and “shall likewise include. the BIR sent SM Prime and First Asia a Preliminary Assessment Notice for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for the taxable year 2000 (SM). is not the same as the showing or exhibition of motionpictures or films. The words. Hence. Gloria. Marquez. Cabañgon. Valiente. De Mesa. Reyes. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. No.” indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only. The CTA First Division ruled that there should only be one business tax applicable to theater and movie houses. Palad. Corpuz. Page 1156 Echiverri. ISSUE: Whether or not the cinema ticket sales are subject to VAT and thus included in the meaning of “Sale or Exchange of Services”? HELD: No. FACTS: In a number of CTA cases. Among those included in the enumeration is the“lease of motion picture films. Several amendments were made to expand the coverage of Value Added Tax but none pertain to cinema/theater operators or proprietors—at present. “including. Sy. Asensi. INC. Inguillo.” “similar services. films. the cinema ticket sales are not subject to VAT. Corporal. this petition. the 30% amusement tax. As pointed out by the CTA En Banc:“Exhibition” in Black’s Law Dictionary is Albano. 1999 (First Asia).” and “shall likewise include. Hence. Catindig. Section 108 of the NIRC of the 1997 reads: x x x A cursory reading of the foregoing provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the “sale or exchange of services” subject to VAT is not exhaustive. 2010 DOCTRINE: A cursory reading of Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 clearly shows that the enumeration of the “sale or exchange of services” subject to Value-Added Tax (VAT) is not exhaustive—the words. Valois . Espina. February 26. Castillo. “including. Francisco. 2002 (First Asia) and. Tecson. Martinez. however. Tabugan. SM and First Asia filed for protest but the BIR just denied them and sent them a Letter of Demand subsequently. Alcazaren. and FIRST ASIA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. only lessors or distributors of cinematographic films are subject to Value-Added Tax (VAT).” “similar services.” This. Lumberio. 2003 (First Asia). Sandoval. 183505. Ramirez. Rañigo. Santos. Coronel.R. 2000 (First Asia). De la Cruz. tapes and discs. All the Preliminary Assessment Notices were subjected to a Petition for Review filed by SM and First Asia to the CTA. SM PRIME HOLDINGS.” indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only. Lastimosa. the CIR is wrong in collecting VAT from the ticket sales. Rodriguez.

Valois . p. nonepertain to cinema/theater operators or proprietors. Three years later. Several amendments were made to expand the coverage of VAT. Rañigo. Francisco. p. 573). De la Cruz. Corporal. referred to as rent (Black’s Law Dictionary. Inguillo. While persons subject to amusement tax under the NIRC of 1997 are exempt fromthe coverage of VAT. Martinez. Palad. Tecson. it is incumbent upon the court to the determinewhether such activity falls under the phrase “similar services. Reyes. Albano. While the word “lease” isdefined as “a contract by which one owning such property grantsto another the right to possess. Lastimosa. 889). Atpresent. Page 1157 Echiverri. In 1994. RA7716 was amended by RA 8241. Lumberio. Tabugan. Shortly thereafter.x x x Since the activity of showing motion pictures. Castillo. Espina. use and enjoy it on specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulatedprice. defined as “To show or display. Catindig. x x x To produce anything in public so that it may betaken into possession” (6th ed. 6th ed. Alcazaren. RA7716 restructured the VAT system by widening its tax baseand enhancing its administration. only lessors or distributors of cinematographicfilms are subject to VAT. Rodriguez. Corpuz. However.. Cabañgon. Valiente. theNIRC of 1997 was signed into law.. De Mesa. Sandoval.” The intent of the legislature must therefore be ascertained. Santos. Asensi. Gloria. Ramirez. Sy. Marquez. Coronel. films or movies by cinema/theater operators or proprietors is not included in theenumeration.

A taxpayer claiming for a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax must comply with the following requisites: 1) The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date of payment of the tax. The CTA denied the bank’s claim for refund on the ground that it failed to show that the income derived from rentals and sale of real property from which the taxes were withheld were reflected in it 1994 Annual Income Tax Return. On 17 May 1996.682. Corporal. 2) It must be shown on the return that the income received was declared as part of the gross income.645. Martinez. 2010 DOCTRINE: Entitlement to a tax refund is for the taxpayer to prove and not for the government to disprove. On appeal with the Court of Appeals. thus respondent brought the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals via a Petition for Review. De Mesa. No. Coronel. on for its Corporate Banking Unit (CBU) and another for its Foreign Currency Deposit Unit (FCDU) for taxable year ending 31 December 1994.R. Castillo. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has proven its entitlement to the refund. Inguillo. respondent bank filed a claim for the refund of P13. which showed a total overpaid income tax in the amount of P17. Ramirez. Marquez. Gloria. Pursuant to the NIRC. The BIR did not act upon the complaint. A Motion for New Trial was filed based on excusable negligence which was denied by the CTA. Catindig. Lumberio. only P13. On 15 April 1996.024 was opted to be carried over to the next taxable year. Sy. Tabugan. Espina. the CTA decision was reversed. 173854. Respondent miserably failed to prove its entitlement to the refund.109 was sought to be refunded by respondent while the remaining P3. Far East Bank filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue two Corporate Annual Income Tax Returns. Page 1158 Echiverri. Cabañgon. Albano. The return for the CBU consolidated reflected a refundable income tax of P12. Francisco. Tecson.00. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Far East Bank and Trust Company (Now Bank of the Philippine Islands) G.443. Reyes.798. De la Cruz.133. and 3) The fact of withholding must be established by a copy of a statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of the tax withheld. Valiente. HELD: No. Rañigo. Out of this amount. Asensi. Valois . Lastimosa. FACTS: On 10 April 1995. Alcazaren. Santos.109 with the BIR. Sandoval. Palad.864. the said refundable amount was carried over and applied against Far East Bank’s income tax liability for the taxable year ending 31 December 1995. March 15. Corpuz. Rodriguez.645. respondent bank filed its 1995 Annual Income Tax Return.

Martinez. Sandoval. respondent was able to file the claim within the 2-year period. Francisco. as to the second requirement. respondent was unable to comply due to its failure to present all the Certificates of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source. Asensi. Reyes. Tabugan. Gloria. Tecson. De Mesa. Corpuz. Santos. Rodriguez. Castillo. Rañigo. Corporal. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Espina. Ramirez. However. Inguillo. Coronel. Palad. Catindig. Albano. De la Cruz. Lastimosa. Marquez. Valois . Alcazaren. As to the first requirement. Valiente. Page 1159 Echiverri. Sy.

TFS. Corpuz. Cabañgon.A. Coronel. Martinez. 166829. Corporal. petitioner offered to compromise and to settle the assessment for deficiency EWT with the BIR thereby leaving only the issue of VAT on pawnshops to be threshed out. De la Cruz. petitioner is no longer liable for VAT but it is subject to percentage tax on gross receipts Albano. TFS received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN for deficiency value added tax. with the full implementation of the VAT system on non-bank financial intermediaries starting January 1. Rañigo. No. 9282 removing the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decisions of Court of Tax Appeals division. Castillo. Gloria. HELD: a) Petitioner is not subject to the 10% VAT. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 2003. De Mesa. Echiverri. Valois . Sy. petitioner is liable for 10% VAT for said tax year. 2010 DOCTRINE: It is only in highly meritorious cases may the rules for perfecting an appeal be brushed aside in the interest of substantial justice. FACTS: TFS Incorporated is a domestic corporation engaged in the pawnshop business. As ruled in First Planters Pawnshop. Sandoval. CIR informed TFS that a Final Assessment Notice (FAN) was already issued and that petitioner had until 22 February 2002 to file a protest letter. Petitioner filed with a Petition for Review with the CA but thereafter corrected itself and filed instead with the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc pursuant to the enactment of Republic Act No. Rodriguez. Catindig. On 7 February 2002. the CTA rendered a decision upholding the assessment issued against petitioner. On 15 January 2002. Francisco. Palad. Reyes.R. Lumberio. And beginning 2004 up to the present. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied. Inc. Alcazaren. Valiente. b) Whether or not Court of Tax Appeals En Banc should have given due course to the petition for review and not strictly applied the technical Rules of Procedure to the detriment of justice. Thereafter. Tecson. TFS requested BIR through a letter to withdraw and set aside the assessments stating the same have no basis. Incorporated v Commissioner of Internal Revenue G. Ramirez. The CTA rules that pawnshops are subject to VAT under Section 108(A) of the NIRC as they are engaged in the sale of services for a fee. No. by virtue of R. Due to the inaction of the CIR. expanded withholding tax. Santos. and compromise penalty for the taxable year 1998. Lastimosa. Marquez. remuneration or consideration. 9238. Aggrieved. a Petition for Review was filed by TFS with the CTA. Page 1160 Espina. During trial. Asensi. A protest letter was filed by petitioner on 20 February 2002. April 19. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Tabugan. ISSUE: a) Whether or not petitioner is subject to the 10% VAT. The petition was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Inguillo. which was denied.

Lastimosa.from 0% to 5% as the case may be. TFS cannot be subjected to the 10% VAT. Francisco. Page 1161 Espina. Marquez. No. Corporal. Sandoval. Rañigo. b) Yes. Lumberio. Tecson. In the case at bar. Valiente. Reyes. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Cabañgon. this Court is constrained to disregard procedural rules because we cannot in conscience allow the government to collect deficiency VAT from petitioner considering that the government has no right at ll to collect or to receive the same. Castillo. Gloria. Santos. Alcazaren. Palad. strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage may nevertheless warrant the suspension of the rules. Albano. Asensi. Inguillo. Coronel. 9238. Corpuz. Ramirez. Tabugan. Sy.A. Valois . Echiverri. Since the assessment was made prior to the implementation of R. Catindig. Although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting an appeal is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. De la Cruz. Martinez.

Corporal. whether the payments made to Prism constitute "business profits" or royalties.008.822. Santos. Lumberio. 2010 DOCTRINE:The right of a withholding agent to claim a refund of erroneously or illegally withheld taxes comes with the responsibility to return the same to the principal taxpayer. The CTA 2nd Division upheld respondent’s right. Prism billed respondent in the amount of US$547. Gloria. Sy. And on September 24. Castillo.840. Valiente. SMART COMMUNICATION. respondent withheld the amount of US$136. Marquez. Echiverri. entered into three Agreements for Programming and Consultancy Services with Prism Transactive (M) Sdn.43. as a withholding agent. However.. not subject to taxunder the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty.45. Catindig. and for the installation and implementation of Smart Money and Mobile Banking Service SIM Applications (SIM Applications) and Private Text Platform (SIM Application)."and therefore. Alcazaren. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. Inc. it found respondent entitled only to a partial refund. respondent filed its Monthly Remittance Return of Final Income Taxes Withheld (BIR Form No.43. Ramirez. 179045-46 August 25. G. INC.R. Tecson. 2001. or within the two-year period to claim a refund. Asensi. Rodriguez. Martinez. Reyes. to file the claim for refund. Bhd. through the International Tax Affairs Division. Albano. Tabugan. Corpuz. respondent filed with the BIR. Under the agreements. the CTA2nd Division found the payment for the SDM Agreement a royalty subject to withholding tax. Prism was to provide programming and consultancy services for the installation of the Service Download Manager (SDM) and the Channel Manager (CM). Page 1162 Espina.61 or ₱7. On September 25. Palad. De la Cruz. De Mesa. Although it agreed with respondent that the payments for the CM and SIM Application Agreements are "business profits. an administrative claim for refund of the amount of ₱7. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Valois .840. Lastimosa. 1601-F)for the month of August 2001.955. Inguillo.008. Francisco. FACTS: Respondent Smart Communications. The CTA En Banc affirmed the rulling of the CTA 2nd Division ISSUES: (1) whether respondent has the right to file the claim for refund (2) if respondent has the right. Coronel. Thinking that these payments constitute royalties. (Prism). 2003. Nos. representing the 25% royalty tax under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty. Sandoval.

however. the person entitled to claim a tax refund is the taxpayer. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise. penalty. 204. Ramirez. Tecson. until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner. Martinez. even without a written claim therefor. 229. In any case. Alcazaren. Marquez. Rañigo. Cabañgon. Lastimosa. Asensi. redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. and Refund or Credit Taxes. Gloria. Santos. Page 1163 Espina. Withholding agent may file a claim for refund Sections 204(c) and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provide: Sec. Palad. or sum has been paid under protest or duress. or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Abate. in his discretion. Castillo. however. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided. – The Commissioner may – xxxx (C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority. and. no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing. Catindig. refund or credit any tax. Inguillo. where on the face of the return upon which payment was made. Corporal. Tabugan. in case the taxpayer does not file a claim for refund. such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. that a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund. but such suit or proceeding may be maintained. De Mesa. That the Commissioner may. whether or not such tax. the withholding agent may file the claim. xxxx Sec. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. Sy. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. Valiente. De la Cruz. Coronel. Corpuz. Valois . (2)Yes. Sandoval. refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser.HELD: (1)Yes. or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected. Reyes. The payments for the CM and the SIM Application Agreements constitute Albano. However. Echiverri. Francisco.

Inguillo. Echiverri. "No one. secret formula or process. Asensi. In other words. De Mesa. only the payment for the SDM program is a royalty subject to a 25% withholding tax. the government has no right to retain what does not belong to it. Tecson. an enterprise of a Contracting State is deemed to have a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State if it carries on supervisory activities in that other State for more than six months in connection with a construction. Rañigo. Hence. Cabañgon."business profits" Under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty. industrial. any copyright of literary. the "business profits" of an enterprise of a Contracting State is taxable only in that State. A refund of the erroneously withheld royalty taxes for the payments pertaining to the CM and SIM Application Agreements is therefore in order. Catindig. or scientific equipment. trade mark. Francisco. Gloria." Albano. Corporal. or the right to use. Ramirez. Prism has intellectual property right over the SDM program. (ii) the use of. cinematograph films. commercial. Under the same Treaty. Sy. Palad. it was established during the trial that Prism does not have a permanent establishment in the Philippines. The question is whether the payments made to Prism under the SDM. Valois . even if there is no fixed place of business. CM. Rodriguez. unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment.The term "permanent establishment" is defined as a fixed place of business where the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. In the instant case. Lumberio. or the right to use. De la Cruz. or for the use of. or the right to use. "business profits" derived from Prism’s dealings with respondent are not taxable. or tapes for radio or television broadcasting. Lastimosa. plan. or for information concerning industrial. artistic or scientific work. not even the State. any patent. should enrich oneself at the expense of another. Santos. Tabugan. Sandoval. Marquez. Martinez. Corpuz. out of the payments made to Prism." These are taxed at the rate of 25% of the gross amount. Valiente. Alcazaren. commercial or scientific experience. the term royalties is defined as payments of any kind received as consideration for: "(i) the use of. Indeed. but not over the CM and SIM Application programs as the proprietary rights of these programs belong to respondent. installation or assembly project which is being undertaken in that other State. Coronel. and SIM Application agreements are "business profits" and not royalties. Reyes.However. Page 1164 Espina. Castillo. design or model.

2004. respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. 2002 to September 30. Tabugan. Corpuz. Castillo. 184823. (October 6. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Palad. No.123. Valiente. the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in favor of respondent. As the CA aptly puts it. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. Page 1165 Espina. Lastimosa. HELD: YES. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation. The administrative claims for tax refund were filed within the two-year-period but the judicial claim was premature. Tecson. Santos. Gloria. Inguillo. respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA INC. the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting respondents claim for refund/credit. Cabañgon. Marquez. where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. has already been resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Martinez. Lumberio. We explained that: The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. Rañigo. Francisco. through the Department of Finance One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center. G. Valois . Ramirez. Corporal. Catindig. Alcazaren. De la Cruz. insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.82 with the petitioner CIR. 2008. On July 30. Reyes. 2008. however. 2010) DOCTRINE: Section 112 (A) of the NIRC clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. Coronel. and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes. FACTS: On September 30. after which.891. on January 4. [P]rescriptive period Albano. Trial ensued. Sy. The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period. 112 (A). 2002 in the total amount of P3. Sandoval. Rodriguez. ISSUE: WON respondents judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. Echiverri. On even date. De Mesa. Asensi.R.

Francisco. Lastimosa. 112. when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction. the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30. Obviously. from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]. or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above. the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. within which to grant or deny the claim. To be clear. 2004. within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period.commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued. For this reason. Echiverri. regardless when the input VAT was paid. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction was made. Reyes. notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim. Inguillo. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit. Albano. Palad. Rodriguez. Corporal. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR. However. De la Cruz. Catindig. appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. Castillo. In this case. Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days. Santos. Valois . Cabañgon. Rañigo. the taxpayer affected may. In proper cases. Tecson. we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. Sy. said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. However. Tabugan. Page 1166 Espina. In view of the foregoing. the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof. (D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. Thus. Thus. Gloria. Alcazaren. Sandoval. Ramirez. Valiente. which provides that: SEC. Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of input VAT. Martinez. Coronel. Corpuz. De Mesa. the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. we are constrained to deny respondents claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the NIRC. Asensi. we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. Marquez. Lumberio. if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit.

petitioner's amended ITR showed an overpayment. Rodriguez. However.318. Castillo. Ramirez. G.318. Instead of claiming the amount as a tax refund.00. FACTS: Petitioner filed with the BIR its Income Tax Return (ITR) for the first quarter of 1997. petitioner carried over the amount of P106. a net taxable income of P676. the carrying forward of any excess/overpaid income tax for a given taxable year is limited only up to the succeeding taxable year. On appeal. Sandoval.679. Notwithstanding the filing of the administrative claim for refund. Santos.495.447. Tecson. Gloria. 2011 DOCTRINE: Section 69 of the old National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) allows unutilized tax credits to be refunded as long as the claim is filed within the prescriptive period. Francisco. Catindig.00 to its income tax liability. Valiente. Page 1167 Espina.00. Martinez. Lastimosa. CTA rendered a Decision denying petitioner's claim for refund. Asensi.318.00. Alcazaren. For the taxable year 1998. Rañigo. It is an elementary rule in taxation that an automatic carry over of an excess income tax payment should only be made for the succeeding year. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. showing a gross income of P741.R. vs. No. Tabugan. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund of its excess income tax payments for the taxable year 1997 Albano. no longer holds true under Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC as the option to carry-over excess income tax payments to the succeeding taxable year is now irrevocable. Corporal. RESPONDENT. January 10.290. CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the CTA. 181298. Sy. Valois .00. a deduction of P65.447. petitioner filed with the BIR its second quarter ITR. I). It bears stressing that the applicable provision in the case at bar is Section 69 of the old Tax Code and not Section 76 of the 1997 Tax Code.447. Petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized excess income tax payments for the taxable year 1997 in the amount of P106.00.254. Palad. this Court found that the whole amount of P106.054.00 to the taxable year 1999 and applied a portion thereof to its 1999 Minimum Corporate Income Tax (MCIT) liability.447. Reyes. Lumberio. Cabañgon.318. declaring an overpayment of income taxes in the amount of P66. petitioner decided to apply it as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable year by marking the tax credit option box in its 1997 ITR. no taxes were paid for the second and third quarters of 1997.441.607. BELLE CORPORATION. Marquez. Petitioner even went further to the taxable year 1999 and applied the Prior Year's (1998) Excess Credit of P106.634. Echiverri. In view of the overpayment. PETITIONER. however. De Mesa. Inguillo. Corpuz. upon verification of Petitioner's 1999 Corporate Annual Income Tax Return (Exh.00 and an income tax due of P236. This. De la Cruz.226. Settled is the rule that under Section 69 of the old Tax Code. Coronel. True enough.381.00 representing its prior year's excess credit (subject of this claim) was carried forward to its 1999 income tax liability.

Under the new law. however. the carry-over of excess income tax payments is no longer limited to the succeeding taxable year. Cabañgon. since petitioner already carried over its 1997 excess income tax payments to the succeeding taxable year 1998. Accordingly. Reyes. however. Palad. Gloria. Castillo. Francisco. unutilized tax credits may be refunded as long as the claim is filed within the two-year prescriptive period. Echiverri. Asensi. as the case may be. under the new law. applications for refund of the unutilized excess income tax payments may no longer be allowed. Alcazaren. Under Section 69 of the old NIRC. Tabugan. such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for tax refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefor. both the CTA and the CA applied Section 69 of the old NIRC in denying the claim for refund. In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid. it becomes irrevocable. De la Cruz. The option to carry over excess income tax payments is irrevocable under Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC. it may no longer file a claim for refund of unutilized tax credits for taxable year 1997. unutilized excess income tax payments may no longer be refunded. In addition. the remedies are still the same. Thus. Sy. Corpuz. under Section 69 of the old NIRC. The law applicable is Section 76 of the NIRC. Lastimosa. Corporal. Final Adjustment Return. Unutilized excess income tax payments may now be carried over to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized. that the applicable provision should be Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC because at the time petitioner filed its 1997 final ITR. Hence.Every corporation liable to tax under Section 24 shall file a final adjustment return covering the total net income for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. Marquez. a corporation may either file a claim for refund or carry-over the excess payments to the succeeding taxable year. no longer applies as Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC now reads: Section 76. Availment of one remedy. Rañigo. But unlike Section 69 of the old NIRC. . Martinez. Rodriguez. This rule. Albano. Coronel. De Mesa. Tecson. or (b) Be refunded the excess amount paid. Ramirez. If the sum of the quarterly tax payments made during the said taxable year is not equal to the total tax due on the entire taxable net income of that year the corporation shall either: (a) Pay the excess tax still due. Page 1168 Espina. in case of overpayment of income taxes. the old NIRC was no longer in force.HELD: No. Sandoval. once the option to carry-over excess income tax payments to the succeeding years has been made. Santos. To repeat. Thus. Both the CTA and the CA erred in applying Section 69 [52] of the old NIRC. Catindig. precludes the other. in case of overpayment of income taxes. Inguillo. Valois . Once the option to carry over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made. the option to carry-over excess income tax payments is now irrevocable. however. We find. and the availment of one remedy still precludes the other. Lumberio. In the instant case. Valiente. the refundable amount shown on its final adjustment return may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years.

R. respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration contending that petitioner is not entitled to a credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on capital goods because it failed to show that the goods imported/purchased are indeed capital goods. Section 112 (A) of the NIRC lays down four requisites. Coronel. Valiente. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. vs. Reyes. Not satisfied with the Decision. posters. SILICON PHILIPPINES. Martinez. an application for credit/refund of unutilized input VAT for the period October 1. Rañigo. refer "to goods or properties with estimated useful life greater than one year and which are treated as depreciable assets under Section 29 (f). Palad. Corporal. Consequently. t-shirts." Considering that the items (training materials. the same cannot be considered as capital goods as defined above. 2011 DOCTRINE: The burden of proving entitlement to a refund lies with the claimant. Corpuz. January 17. Inguillo. Castillo. Tecson.50. CTA En Banc on its decision discussed Capital thegoods or properties.). Catindig. petitioner moved for reconsideration. Alcazaren. through the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). 7-95. 172378. (Formerly INTEL PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING. Gloria. Rodriguez. INC. No. Asensi. Cabañgon. Tabugan. Echiverri. De la Cruz. books and the like) purchased by petitioner as reflected in the summary were not duly proven to have been used. Page 1169 Espina. 2) the taxpayer must be engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated. petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA Division. Sy. In a claim for credit/refund of input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales. 1998 in the amount of ₱31. Valois . Francisco. Marquez. Due to the inaction of the respondent. CTA Division rendered a Decision partially granting petitioner’s claim for refund of unutilized input VAT on capital goods. FACTS: Petitioner filed with the respondent CIR..17 It claimed that it is not required to secure an ATP since it has a "Permit to Adopt Computerized Accounting Documents such as Sales Invoice and Official Receipts" from the BIR. Santos. to wit: 1) the taxpayer must be VAT-registered. INC.106-1(b) of Revenue Regulations No. Sandoval. ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA En Banc erred in denying petitioner’s claim for credit/ refund of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales HELD: No.902. 3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made. the same may not then be claimed as such. directly or indirectly in the production or sale of taxable goods or services. and Albano. as defined under Section 4. 1998 to December 31. Lumberio. De Mesa.507. Ramirez. banners. On its part. office supplies. used directly or indirectly in the production or sale of taxable goods or services. Lastimosa.

however. It has been settled in Intel Technology Philippines. and airway bills of lading for the fourth quarter of 1998. Rodriguez. Asensi. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the ATP need not be reflected or indicated in the invoices or receipts because there is no law or regulation requiring it. Under Section 112 (A) of the NIRC. Catindig. Failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the sales invoices is fatal to a claim for refund of input VAT. Gloria. Corpuz. 7-95 Albano. To prove that it is engaged in zero-rated sales. The CTA Division. Rañigo. Corporal. Tecson. De Mesa. except the transitional input tax. duly registered invoices or receipts evidencing zero-rated sales must be presented. failure to print the ATP on the invoices or receipts should not result in the outright denial of a claim or the invalidation of the invoices or receipts for purposes of claiming a refund. and that invoices or receipts are duly registered. what is important with respect to the BIR authority to print is that it has been secured or obtained by the taxpayer. Santos. the invoices or receipts would have no probative value for the purpose of refund. Francisco. Similarly. Reyes. The Court rules in the affirmative. since the ATP is not indicated in the invoices or receipts. Printing the ATP on the invoices or receipts is not required. a claimant must be engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated. Sy. to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against the output tax. Palad. v. However. in the absence of such law or regulation. Marquez. Echiverri. Inc. Coronel. Indeed. De la Cruz. Martinez. Lastimosa. Cabañgon. 4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such sales. Tabugan. certifications of inward remittance. This brings the Court to the question of whether a claimant for unutilized input VAT on zero-rated sales is required to present proof that it has secured an ATP from the BIR prior to the printing of its invoices or receipts. Inguillo. Page 1170 Espina. Capital goods are defined under Section 4. In the case of Intel. Thus. found the export sales invoices of no probative value in establishing petitioner’s zero-rated sales for the purpose of claiming credit/refund of input VAT because petitioner failed to show that it has an ATP from the BIR and to indicate the ATP and the word "zero-rated" in its export sales invoices. the only way to verify whether the invoices or receipts are duly registered is by requiring the claimant to present its ATP from the BIR. Valiente. To prove this. Lumberio. Alcazaren.106-1(b) of RR No. Castillo. Ramirez. we emphasized that: It bears reiterating that while the pertinent provisions of the Tax Code and the rules and regulations implementing them require entities engaged in business to secure a BIR authority to print invoices or receipts and to issue duly registered invoices or receipts. export declarations. failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the sales invoices or receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales. Without this proof. petitioner presented export sales invoices. it is not specifically required that the BIR authority to print be reflected or indicated therein. Valois . Sandoval.

Inguillo. office supplies. 2. the input taxes claimed must have been paid on capital goods. Tecson. Cabañgon. Corpuz.106-1 (b) of RR No. Section 4. Section 112 (B) of the NIRC requires that: 1. used directly or indirectly in the production or sale of taxable goods or services. Tabugan. Alcazaren.00 to ₱9. banners. the administrative claim for refund must have been filed within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the importation or purchase was made. Corollarily. A reduction in the refundable input VAT on capital goods from ₱15.898. books. Ramirez. Echiverri. Santos. Rañigo. the Court find no reason to deviate from the findings of the CTA that training materials. and 4. Sandoval. Catindig.To claim a refund of input VAT on capital goods. Asensi. Based on the foregoing definition. Lastimosa. Rodriguez.082. Lumberio. Reyes.867.170. 3. Martinez. Corporal. Valiente. the claimant must be a VAT registered person. De la Cruz. Palad. Page 1171 Espina. De Mesa. Valois . posters. Coronel. Albano. Sy. Marquez. and the other similar items reflected in petitioner’s Summary of Importation of Goods are not capital goods. Gloria.00 is therefore in order. 7-95 defines capital goods as follows: "Capital goods or properties" refer to goods or properties with estimated useful life greater that one year and which are treated as depreciable assets under Section 29 (f). Castillo. T-shirts. Francisco. the input taxes must not have been applied against any output tax liability.

Palad. Sy. that while petitioner may no longer file a claim for refund. Rodriguez. 2011 DOCTRINE: Once a taxpayer opted to carry-over its excess income tax payments.R. Cabañgon. Inguillo. HELD: We must clarify. Coronel. Section 76 provides that a taxpayer has the option to file a claim for refund or to carry-over its excess income tax payments. De Mesa. Catindig. however. BELLE CORPORATION VS. Valiente. Lumberio. The taxpayer. The taxpayer. De la Cruz. In the Decision. Tabugan. Reyes. Santos. Petitioner's claim for refund was denied because it has earlier opted to carry over its 1997 excess income tax payments by marking the tax credit option box in its 1997 income tax return. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to a tax credit of unutilized excess income tax payments for the taxable year 1997. it can no longer seek refund of the unutilized excess income tax payments. may apply the unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years until such has been fully applied pursuant to Section 76 of the NIRC. Martinez. Rañigo. Ramirez. Francisco. Marquez. Corporal. once a taxpayer opted to carry-over its excess income tax payments. however. 2011 be modified or clarified to indicate petitioner's entitlement to a tax credit of unutilized excess income tax payments for the taxable year 1997. Echiverri. No. may apply the unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years until such has been fully applied pursuant to Section 76 of the NIRC FACTS: For Resolution is the Motion for Clarification filed by petitioner Belle Corporation. Gloria. Tecson. it can no longer seek refund of the unutilized excess income tax payments. Lastimosa. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. 181298. Sandoval. Alcazaren. is irrevocable. Castillo. Page 1172 Espina. it properly carried over its 1997 excess income tax payments by applying Albano. Corpuz. Asensi. petitioner prays that the Decision dated January 10. Valois . the Court held that Section 76 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and not Section 69 of the old NIRC applies. Thus. March 02. In the Motion. The option to carry-over. however. however.

Martinez.210. Coronel.444. Echiverri. Alcazaren. Inguillo.185. Corporal.261. as of the taxable year 1999. Santos. Asensi.00 which may be carried over to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized. Lastimosa.00 and P14. Page 1173 Espina. Valois . Castillo. Palad. Tecson. Lumberio. respectively. Valiente.596. Rodriguez. Thus. Sandoval.portions thereof to its 1998 and 1999 Minimum Corporate Income Tax in the amounts of P25. Cabañgon. Rañigo. Catindig. Reyes. Sy. Ramirez. petitioner still has an unutilized excess income tax payments of P92. Pursuant to our ruling. Francisco. De Mesa. De la Cruz. Albano. Gloria. Corpuz.874. Marquez. petitioner may apply the unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized.00. Tabugan.

Tecson. Asensi. CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of its first division that petitioner’s SAP is a certificate of deposit bearing interest subject to DST. 2011 DOCTRINE: A document to be considered a certificate of deposit need not be in a specific form. Catindig. Rodriguez. HELD: Yes. A certificate of deposit is defined as “a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor. Gloria. Santos. Coronel. Petitioner filed with the CTA a Petition for Review. Purchase of Treasury Bills from the BSP. De la Cruz.38 Petitioner protested the assessment on the ground that the documents subject matters of the assessment are not subject to DST. NO. but cancelled and set aside the assessment on petitioner’s repurchase agreement and purchase of treasury bills. Lumberio. The fact that the SAP is evidenced by a passbook cannot remove its coverage from section 180 of the old NIRC. 982. Rañigo. ISSUE: WON CIR is correct in assessing the SAP as interest bearing deposit subject to DST. Francisco. Cabañgon. to the order of the depositor. Page 1174 Espina. July 27. Inguillo. Tabugan. Petitioner contends that its SAP is not subject to DST because it is not included in the list of documents under the old NIRC. its SAP is evidenced by a passbook and not by a deposit certificate. 734. Castillo. De Mesa. Sy. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. Sandoval. Corporal. PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. Petitioner insists that unlike a time deposit. Albano. Valois .R. Ramirez. FACTS: Petitioner received from the CIR a final Assessment Notice and a Demand Letter for deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax for taxable year 1995 on its repurchase agreement with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Valiente. CIR denied the protest. in the amount of P18. A document to be considered a certificate of deposit need not be in a specific form. Petitioner’s Savings Account Plus is subject to Documentary stamp Tax. Alcazaren. and on its Savings Account Plus product. Marquez. Palad. Lastimosa. Reyes. 180390. Martinez. Corpuz. whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. Echiverri. or to some other person or his order. DST is imposed on certificates of deposit bearing interest pursuant to Section 180 of the old NIRC. CTA first division affirmed the assessment for deficiency DST insofar as the SAP is concerned.

Valiente. subject to the filing of an inventory as prescribed by regulations. Coronel. 105. No. Castillo. Sandoval. Regarding RR 7-95. Inguillo. Petitioner contends that there is nothing in Section 105 of the old NIRC to support such conclusion. is invalid because it goes against the express provision of Section 105 of the old NIRC. Catindig. maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a transitional input tax credit because no taxes were paid in the acquisition of the Global City property. Reyes.200. September 4. which limited the 8% transitional input tax credit to the value of the improvements on the land. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to a refund of P359. Tecson. Gloria. as amended by RA 7716. 173425.256 is more than sufficient to cover its output VAT liability for the said period. COMMISSONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. Rañigo. respondents insist that it is valid because it was issued by the Secretary of Finance. Ramirez. (Emphasis supplied. we find petitioner entitled to the 8% transitional input tax credit provided in Section 105 of the old NIRC. Lumberio. be allowed input tax on his beginning inventory of goods. Petitioner assails the pronouncement of the CA that prior payment of taxes is required to avail of the 8% transitional input tax credit.) FACTS: Petitioner claims that it is entitled to recover the amount of P359. FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORP VS.47 erroneously paid as output VAT for the first quarter of 1997. Respondents.009. who is mandated by law to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the implementation of Section 105 of the old NIRC. Corpuz.652. materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value of such inventory or the actual value added tax paid on such goods. Lastimosa. 2012 DOCTRINE: Section 105 of the old NIRC reads: SEC. Valois .009. Marquez. Alcazaren.R. on the other hand. Tabugan. in relation to Section 10033 of the same Code. Palad. – A person who becomes liable to value-added tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall. whichever is higher. which shall be creditable against the output tax. Petitioner further argues that RR 7-95. Francisco. Martinez. Page 1175 Espina. Sy. De la Cruz. Transitional input tax credits. The fact that it acquired the Albano.698. materials and supplies.47 erroneously paid as output VAT for the first quarter of 1997 since its transitional input tax credit of P5. Echiverri. De Mesa. Corporal.652. Asensi. Rodriguez. Respondents assert that prior payment of taxes is inherent in the nature of a transitional input tax. Cabañgon. Santos. HELD: YES! In view of the foregoing.

Prior payment of taxes is not required for a taxpayer to avail of the 8% transitional input tax credit. As we have said in the earlier case of Fort Bonifacio. De Mesa. Moreover. Francisco. Lumberio. Obviously. Hence. materials and supplies. contrary to the view of Justice Carpio. Sy. Alcazaren. it would have specifically stated that the beginning inventory excludes goods. unlike a tax refund. as proposed in the Dissent is not only tantamount to judicial legislation but would also render nugatory the provision in Section 105 of the old NIRC that the transitional input tax credit shall be “8% of the value of [the beginning] inventory or the actual [VAT] paid on such goods. Reyes. Thus. Palad. Rodriguez. would have to exclude all goods. the provision on transitional input tax credit was enacted to benefit first time VAT taxpayers by mitigating the impact of VAT on the taxpayer. we declared that prior payment of taxes is not required in order to avail of a tax credit. Sandoval. Coronel. it is merely availing of the tax credit incentive given by law to first time VAT taxpayers. Tax credit. Otherwise. Catindig. De la Cruz. Corpuz. Contrary to the view of the CTA and the CA. would be an appropriation authorized by law. materials. Tax credit is not synonymous to tax refund. all that is required is for the taxpayer to file a beginning inventory with the BIR. Thus. and supplies would always be higher than the 8% (now 2%) of the beginning inventory which. the granting of a transitional input tax credit in favor of petitioner. Lastimosa. is an amount subtracted directly from one’s total tax liability. Tax refund is defined as the money that a taxpayer overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority. Albano. prior payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to avail of a tax credit. specifically Section 105 of the old NIRC. Echiverri. when petitioner realized that its transitional input tax credit was not applied in computing its output VAT for the 1st quarter of 1997. limiting the value of the beginning inventory only to goods. Central Luzon Drug Corp. where prior taxes were paid. was not the intention of the law. Corporal.. Ramirez. Asensi. In filing a claim for tax refund. and supplies where no taxes were paid.Global City property under a tax-free transaction makes no difference as prior payment of taxes is not a pre-requisite. Rañigo. prior payment of taxes is not required to avail of the transitional input tax credit because it is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Martinez. whichever is higher” because the actual VAT (now 12%) paid on the goods. Marquez. or an incentive to encourage investment. To require prior payment of taxes. It is any amount given to a taxpayer as a subsidy. there is nothing in the above quoted provision to indicate that prior payment of taxes is necessary for the availment of the 8% transitional input tax credit. Page 1176 Espina. following the view of Justice Carpio. it filed a claim for refund to recover the output VAT it erroneously or excessively paid for the 1st quarter of 1997. petitioner is simply applying its transitional input tax credit against the output VAT it has paid. on the other hand. in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gloria. Cabañgon. and supplies. materials. Castillo. a refund. Valois . Valiente. Clearly. materials. which would be paid out of the general fund of the government. and supplies where no taxes were paid. Santos. materials. In fact. Tabugan. In this case. Tecson. Inguillo.

Subsequently. 2013 DOCTRINE: The purpose of granting transitional input tax credit to be utilized as payment for output VAT is primarily to give recognition to the sales tax component of inventories which would qualify as input tax credit had such goods been acquired during the effectivity of the VAT Law of 1988. In reporting the said sale for VAT purposes (because the VAT had already been imposed in the interim). Corporal. Martinez. Lastimosa. the CIR has no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Tax Code without statutory authority or basis. Catindig. Castillo. Marquez. Page 1177 Espina. Rañigo. HELD: Yes. whether or not they previously paid taxes in the acquisition of their beginning inventory of goods. De la Cruz. materials and supplies. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER. Sy. 44. Valiente. Petitioner sold two parcels of land to Metro Pacific Corp. Sandoval. At the time of the said sale there was as yet no VAT imposed so Petitioner did not pay any VAT on its purchase. Rodriguez. Gloria. Alcazaren. 173425 January 22. Inguillo. TAGUIG and PATEROS. Asensi. Tecson. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE. On the scope of the basis for determining the available transitional input VAT. Albano. Valois . De Mesa. The amendments to the VAT law do not show any intention to make those in the real estate business subject to a different treatment from those engaged in the sale of other goods or properties or in any other commercial trade or business. Ramirez. REVENUE DISTRICT NO. Santos. Palad.R. Corpuz. Petitioner is entitled to claim transitional input VAT based on the value of not only the improvements but on the value of the entire real property and regardless of whether there was in fact actual payment on the purchase of the real property or not. FACTS: Petitioner was a real estate developer that bought from the national government a parcel of land that used to be the Fort Bonifacio military reservation. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner entitled to claim the transitional input VAT on its sale of real properties given its nature as a real estate dealer and if so (i) is the transitional input VAT applied only to the improvements on the real property or is it applied on the value of the entire real property and (ii) should there have been a previous tax payment for the transitional input VAT to be creditable. Lumberio. G. Francisco. Tabugan. Cabañgon. Reyes. The BIR disallowed the claim of presumptive input VAT and thereby assessed Petitioner for deficiency VAT. Coronel. Echiverri. Petitioner claimed transitional input VAT corresponding to its inventory of land. No. The transitional input tax credit operates to benefit newly VAT-registered persons. FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

no gain or loss shall be recognized by the absorbed corporations as transferors of all assets and liabilities. Lumberio. Catindig. No. entered into a Plan of Merger5 with Sugarland Beverage Corporation (SBC). A perusal of the subject provision would clearly show it pertains only to sale transactions where real property is conveyed to a purchaser for a consideration. As a result of the merger. the transfer of assets. Santos. Alcazaren. assigned. the BIR issued a ruling stating that pursuant to Section 40(C)(2)10 and (6)(b)11 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).* DOCTRINE: Tax laws must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.. LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS. De Mesa. Respondent requested for a confirmation of the taxfree nature of the said merger from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Indeed. Sy. On October 14. 2015. However. and Metro Bottled Water Corporation (MBWC). transferred or otherwise conveyed” is qualified by the word “sold” which means that documentary stamp tax under Section 196 is imposed on the transfer of realty by way of sale and does not apply to all conveyances of real property. Page 1178 Espina. Inc. the surviving corporation. July 15. The phrase “granted. Albano. respondent filed with petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative claim for tax refund or tax credit. Valiente. Inc. (GSMI). claiming that it is exempt from paying DST. De la Cruz. such as real properties. Inc. Echiverri.the Supreme Court already ruledthat Section 196 of the NIRC does not include the transferof real property from one corporation to another pursuantto a merger. shall be subject to DST imposed under Section 19613 of the NIRC. 2001. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.R. as correctly noted by the respondent. Rañigo. the fact that Section 196 refers to words “sold. Gloria. the assets and liabilities of the absorbed corporations were transferred to respondent. Francisco. Castillo. Ramirez. (SMCJI). Corporal. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Corpuz. INC. Respondent later changed its corporate name to Ginebra San Miguel. On September 26. ISSUE: whether the CTA En Banc erred in ruling that respondent is exempt frompayment of DST HELD: No. Palad. The transfer of real property to a surviving corporation pursuant to a merger is not subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST). 175188. Valois .” “purchaser” and “consideration” undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that only sales of real property are contemplated therein. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Inguillo. Coronel. Marquez. It allegedly erroneously paid on the occasion of the merger. Asensi. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEvs. Reyes. Tecson. Section 196 covers all transfers and conveyances of real property for a valuable consideration. (LTDI [now GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL]) G. Martinez. Tabugan. FACTS: Respondent La Tondeña Distillers. SMC Juice. 2001. On November 5. 2003.

2004.5 On April 22. including VAT. Valois . due to the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (OR). December 02. a taxpayer has 30 days within which to appeal the decision to the CTA. 2009. 2003. docketed as CTA Case No.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. Echiverri.279. the taxpayer may appeal the.6 In response to the Petition for Review. No. 4 On December 22. 196415.254. 196451 DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 112 (A)42 and (D)43 of the NIRC. Tecson. the CTA Division rendered a Decision 8 partially granting TPC's claim in the reduced amount of P7. 83 an administrative claim for refund or credit of its unutilized input Value Added Tax (VAT) for the taxable year 2002 in the total amount of P14. 2015 TOLEDO POWER COMPANY v.598. Cebu Electric Cooperative III (CEBECO). Francisco. Sandoval.013. The CIR. and Atlas Fertilizer Corporation (AFC).R. Lumberio. Martinez.9 Since NPC is exempt from the payment of all taxes. Albano. the CTA Division allowed TPC to claim a refund or credit of its unutilized input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales of electricity to NPC for the taxable year 2002. Gloria. Cabañgon. No. has 120 days from receipt of the complete documents within which to act on the administrative claim. Palad. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ACMDC). Catindig. FACTS: Toledo Power Corporation (TPC) is a general partnership principally engaged in the business of power generation and sale of electricity to the National Power Corporation (NPC). the CTA E Banc rendered a decision affirming the decision of the CTA Division ruling that that both the administrative and the judicial claims were timely filed. Page 1179 Espina. Lastimosa. Reyes. if the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR. Rodriguez. the CIR argued that TPC failed to prove its entitlement to a tax refund or credit. Sy.TOLEDO POWER COMPANY G. Castillo. TPC filed with the CTA a Petition for Review.R. a taxpayer has two (2) years from the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made within which to file with the CIR an administrative claim for refund or credit of unutilized input VAT attributable to such sales. Santos. Upon receipt of the decision. Coronel.29. Asensi. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) and the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC).COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. Marquez. Corpuz. Corporal. 6961 and raffled to the CTA First Division (CTA Division). De la Cruz. on the other hand. However. TPC filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Regional District Office (RDO) No. Tabugan. Alcazaren. On November 11. De Mesa. Rañigo. Inguillo. Subsequently. Ramirez. inaction to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period.27 under Republic Act No. Valiente.

both the administrative and the judicial claims were filed within the prescribed period provided in Section 112 of the NIRC. Inguillo. TPC appealed the inaction on April 22. 2004. There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC. However. the taxpayer may appeal the. 2010. The CIR. she cannot now raise the issue that TPC failed to submit the complete documents. Inc.44 we said that the 120+30-day period must be strictly observed except from the date of issuance of BIR Ruling No. Since the CIR did not act on its application within the 120-day period.46 The CIR. up to the date of promulgation of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. De la Cruz. The subject of RMO 53-98 states that it is a "Checklist of Documents to be Submitted by a Albano. De Mesa. Castillo. Corporal. Corpuz. Rañigo. Rodriguez. which allowed taxpayers to file a judicial claim without waiting for the end of the 120-day period. Tecson. 53-98 fatal to its claim. Page 1180 Espina. Team Sual Corporation (formerly Mirant Sual Corporation). Marquez. Gloria. Palad.47 we said that: The CIR's reliance on RMO 53-98 is misplaced. a taxpayer has two (2) years from the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made within which to file with the CIR an administrative claim for refund or credit of unutilized input VAT attributable to such sales. Also. however. Reyes. inaction to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period. DA-489-03 on December 10. has 120 days from receipt of the complete documents within which to act on the administrative claim. Valois . Sandoval. Lumberio. Martinez. if the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR. Neither do we find the alleged failure of TPC to submit all relevant documents set out in RMO No. Clearly. Sy. Tabugan. where we declared that compliance with the 120+30-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Alcazaren. Echiverri. a taxpayer has 30 days within which to appeal the decision to the CTA.45 on October 6. Aichi Forging Company of Asia. TPC applied for a claim for refund or credit of its unutilized input VAT for the taxable year 2002 on December 22. Valiente.ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative and the judicial claims were timely and validly filed. the administrative claim was not pro forma as TPC submitted documents to support its claim for refund and even manifested its willingness to submit additional documents if necessary. 2003. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. HELD: Pursuant to Section 112 (A)42 and (D)43 of the NIRC. In this case. Ramirez. 2003. Catindig. Lastimosa. Thus. San Roque Power Corporation. Francisco. Cabañgon. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Asensi. on the other hand. Upon receipt of the decision. Coronel. RR 3-88 or RMO 53-98 itself that requires submission of the complete documents enumerated in RMO 53-98 for a grant of a refund or credit of input VAT. Santos. never requested TPC to submit additional documents.

Gloria.. However. Alcazaren. if TSC indeed failed to submit the complete documents in support of its application. the CIR did not inform TSC of the document it failed to submit.. The CIR likewise raised the issue of TSC's alleged failure to submit the complete documents only in its motion for reconsideration of the CTA Special First Division's 4 March 2010 Decision. even up to the present petition." Moreover. Tecson.Taxpayer upon Audit of his Tax Liabilities . Valiente. and submitted the complete documents in support of its application for refund or credit of its input tax at the same time. Martinez. Marquez. Catindig. Francisco. Sy." In this case. Castillo. Even assuming that RMO 53-98 applies. TSC was applying for a grant of refund or credit of its input tax. Tabugan. Lumberio. Asensi. Valois . There was no allegation of an audit being conducted by the CIR. Echiverri. Rañigo.. Corpuz. De Mesa. De la Cruz. we affirm the CTA EB's finding that TSC filed its administrative claim on 21 December 2005. Palad. Albano. Cabañgon. Reyes. Accordingly. the CIR could have informed TSC of its failure. Inguillo. Lastimosa. Page 1181 Espina. (RMC) 42-03. Ramirez. Sandoval. Rodriguez. Coronel. Corporal. Santos. it specifically states that some documents are required to be submitted by the taxpayer "if applicable. consistent with Revenue Memorandum Circular No.

802.161. Martinez. It merely "received various consignments of raw materials. respectively. a domestic corporation dealing in home textiles. and certain unidentified John Does and/or Jane Does. that the SEC issued a certification that the MHI failed to file its General Information Sheet for the years 1998-2005 and financial statements for the period 1997-2002. Albano.716.40 for taxable year 2002. Asensi. Corpuz. Alcazaren. years 2001 and 2002 by as much as P428. was issued a license by the Garments and Textiles Export Board (GTEB) to operate a Customs Bonded Manufacturing Warehouse (CBMW) which operates by having imported raw materials stored at the warehouse. Respondentsasserted that the "MHI as an independent contractor and supplier of work. THELMA LEE AND SAMUEL LEE G. Tabugan. Ramirez. the rest it returned as excess raw materials. so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. and. Cabañgon. labor and other materials for the manufacture of garments and similar products like handbags. Page 1182 Espina. 257 and 267 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). GTEB issued a certification to the effect that MH had been inactive since 1997. Reyes. FACTS: The BIR. Valiente. Marquez. that it "processed them into finished products for its foreign customers. its President Thelma Lee (Thelma). Gloria.00. Catindig. These raw materials are duty-free provided that these are consumed for the manufacture of its final product. BIR issued a Letter of Authority (LOA) to the MHI advising it that BIR agents had been authorized to examine its books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for taxable years 1997 to 2002 and unverified prior years all these efforts proved futile because MHI could not be located at the address given in its Annual Income Tax Returns and other BIR records. Sandoval. Rañigo. Inc. (MHI). 255.368. INC. The investigation of the MHI's importations documents revealed that for the taxable years 2001 and 2002. Rodriguez. Francisco. It is alleged that the MHIwillfully under-declared the amount of its purchases and/or importations for taxable. and P34. and its Vice-President Samuel Lee (Samuel). Tecson. which are intended for export. De la Cruz. 2016 DOCTRINE: There is grave abuse of discretion when the determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner due to passion or personal hostility.408. 203057. Inguillo. Corporal. as the same would have a different treatment in terms of "tax incentives" than the regular importations. June 06.R. Lumberio. Valois . On January 14. This under-declaration resulted in estimated Deficiency Income Taxes in the amount of P43.561.00 and P554. both inclusive of interests and increments.975. No. MHI made several importations of PVC (or polyvinyl chloride) materials and other raw materials used in the manufacture of its end-products. with having violated Sections 254. Castillo. Lastimosa.84 for taxable year 2001. MHI. MANILA HOME TEXTILE.634. Echiverri. represented herein by the CIR filed is a criminal complaint for tax evasion and perjury against respondents Manila Home Textile. 2005. imported tax-free and that it did not declare as purchases the foregoing importations of raw materials because it did not buy them. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. Palad. Santos. Sy. Coronel. De Mesa.

murky and unsubstantiated claim of "consignment" with an alleged tax-free guaranty. not a shred or scintilla of which has been adduced in this case. respondents' argument in this case is the nebulous. respondents did not pay for the imported raw materials which were merely consigned to them to be used in the manufacture of finished products for re-export under CMT invoices. Francisco. Lumberio. Ramirez. Coronel. Annexes "A" to "M". De la Cruz. Page 1183 Espina. Corporal. which respondents obviously want or desire to avail of in this case. and hence duty-free. Alcazaren. The CA ruled that the private respondents were able to substantiate their claim that the amount they failed to include are not purchases/importations subject to tax but consignments exclusively used for the manufacture of its finished products for export. the DOJ Undersecretary. Corpuz. ISSUE: Whether or not all the Resolutions issued by the investigating prosecutor. Obviously." It must be borne in mind that tax exemption. Gloria. We hold that in this case respondents have utterly failed to make out even a prima facie for tax exemption in their favor. the records are however replete with strong circumstantial evidence inexorably leading to the same conclusion. it is easy to see that petitioner has clearly made out a prima facie case or shown probable cause to indict respondents for tax evasion under the pertinent sections of the NTRC. taxation is the rule and tax exemption the exception. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Cabañgon. HELD Yes. Tabugan. As to whether respondents are guilty of tax evasion and/or perjury under the pertinent provisions of the NIRC and other penal statutes is an issue Albano. we believe that by themselves the annexes appended to the records of this case. Sandoval. While it is true that no direct evidence was presented by [p]private [respondent to prove such fact. De Mesa. Indeed. By contrast. Valiente. Rañigo. Tecson. Marquez. we must hasten to add at this juncture that we are here only to determine probable cause. Reyes. however the intent to commit the prohibited act must be established. Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be misunderstood. as well as the Decision and the Resolution of the CA were all tainted with grave abuse of discretion. submitted in amplification of petitioner's affidavit-complaint do already provide viable support to petitioner's plea for the indictment of the said respondents for tax evasion. To repeat. Indeed. Rodriguez. Martinez. Lastimosa. Nevertheless. Echiverri. respondents have not been shown to have intended to deliberately understate the importation and/or purchases in their income tax returns for the years 2001 and 2002 considering that the raw materials were imported duty-free and as clearly explained. Inguillo. Asensi. Palad. Valois . respondents have not produced even a slip of paper purporting to prove that the raw materials valued at hundreds of millions of pesos were delivered to them on "consignment.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this motion was denied and appealed to the Secretary of Justice who dismissed it also. Castillo. are strictissimi juris.Viewed in this context. Sy. The investigating prosecutor ruled that the complaint be dismissed andthat criminal intent is irrelevant in a special law. Catindig. Santos.

Tecson. Echiverri. De la Cruz.that must be resolved during the trial of the criminal case/s where the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Martinez. Albano. Castillo. Francisco. Rañigo. Cabañgon. On top of these. Gloria. Lumberio. Valiente. Santos. Catindig. Palad. Ramirez. Reyes. Marquez. we must stress that our ailing in this ease should not be construed as an unbridled license for our tax officials to engage in fishing expeditions and witch-hunting. Page 1184 Espina. Alcazaren. They should not abuse their investigative powers and should exercise the same within the parameters and ambit of the law. Sandoval. By no means is this Court signaling mat it is opening the floodgates to inundate the courts of justice with frivolous and malicious tax suits. Corpuz. De Mesa. Corporal. Sy. Tabugan. Inguillo. Valois . Asensi. Lastimosa. Rodriguez. Coronel.

three Formal Letters of Demand with Assessment Notices for deficiency internal revenue taxes. these documents. Valiente. 2011. Asiatrust filed before the CTA a Petition for Review. Ramirez. 201530 19 APRIL 2017 DOCTRINE: An application for tax abatement is considered approved only upon the issuance of a termination letter. FACTS: On separate dates in February 2000. Since no termination letter has been issued by the BIR. However. Rodriguez. No. Cabañgon. do not prove that Asiatrust’s application for tax abatement has been approved. Asiatrustreceived from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Corpuz. Asiatrust’s allegation of double taxation must also fail. ASIA TRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK INC. the CIR approved Asiatrust’s Offer of Compromise of DST – regular assessments for the fiscal years ending June 30. De la Cruz. ISSUES: Whether or not CTA en banc committed error in affirming said tax assessment HELD: No. in case Asiatrust’s application for tax abatement is denied.R. Santos. there is no reason for the Court to consider as closed and terminated the tax assessment on Asiatrust’s final withholding tax for fiscal year ending June 30. Corporal. it presented a Certification issued by the BIR to prove that it availed of the Tax Abatement Program and paid the basic tax. It denied the CIR’s appeal for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision while it denied Asiatrust’s appeal for lack of merit. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. 1998. Inguillo. and only then will the deficiency tax assessment be considered closed and terminated. 1996. Valois . Catindig. An application for tax abatement is considered approved only upon the issuance of a termination letter. Page 1185 Espina. Palad. Alcazaren. It also attached copies of its BIR Tax Payment Deposit Slips and a letter issued by RDO Nacar. Marquez. Lumberio. Martinez. If at all. On November 16. Reyes. Rañigo. Asiatrust failed to present a termination letter from the BIR. Francisco. 1996 for having been issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period. Asensi. Coronel. Asiatrust’s application for tax abatement will be deemed approved only upon the issuance of a termination letter. For this reason. On April 19. 2005. which is not a ground to consider its deficiency tax assessment closed and terminated. Sy. De Mesa. The CTA Division declared void the tax assessments for fiscal year ending June 30. these documents only prove Asiatrust’s payment of basic taxes. and 1998. Tecson.Due to the inaction of the CIR on the protest. however. Gloria. 1997. Castillo.In this case. Asiatrust timely protested the assessment notices. Albano. Echiverri. Sandoval. vs. Instead. any payment made by it would be applied to its out ding tax liability. Lastimosa. Tabugan. the CTA En Banc denied both appeals.

Sy. Gloria. Lastimosa. Palad. Tabugan. Ramirez. Echiverri. Inguillo. Lumberio. Page 1186 Espina. Rodriguez. Tecson. Francisco. Castillo. De Mesa. Marquez. Santos. Valiente. Rañigo. Cabañgon. LEGAL ETHICS Albano. Asensi. Corporal. Sandoval. De la Cruz. Valois . Corpuz. Reyes. Coronel. Catindig. Alcazaren. Martinez.

Catindig. it was only on July 30. Page 1187 Espina. hence. JUDGE DANILO S. Sandoval. despite the lapse of more than six months from the time the appeal was filed. complainant argued that Judge Cruz incurred delay in disposing the case thus should be held administratively liable therefor. Valiente. CRUZ andCLERK OF COURT VGODOLFO R. Corpuz. Gloria. Castillo. Pasig City A. As regards Judge Cruz. or more than three years since the case was submitted for resolution. However. 2010 DOCTRINE: A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time. RTJ.08-2152. R-5740 while Clerk of Court Gundran is charged with failure to timely transmit the records of said case. Judge Cruz issued an Order giving the parties 15 days within which to file their respective memorandum after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. for dereliction of duty. Lumberio.of the Regional Trial Court. However. that a decision in the said case was rendered. ISSUE: Whether or not both Judge Cruz and Clerk of Court V Gundran are negligent HELD: Yes. Reyes. Corporal. Francisco.M. 2007 a notice of appeal and paid the corresponding appeal and docket fees. FACTS: The case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by complainant Luminza Delos Reyes against respondents Judge Danilo S. respondent Clerk of Court Gundran still failed to transmit the records to the appellate court in violation of Section 10. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Consequently. Alcazaren. we find him grossly inefficient in failing to decide LRC Case No. on April 9. Martinez. R-5740 pending before Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. LUMINZA DELOS REYES vs. Branch 152. Sy.Branch 152. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Ramirez. Lastimosa. Tecson. Santos. The parties complied. De la Cruz. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Rañigo. No. Echiverri. Cruz and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Judge Cruz is charged with delay in the disposition of LRC Case No. both of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. He should be mindful that failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to the speedy disposition of their cases. she timely filed on September 6. Specifically. GUNDRAN. Valois . Coronel. 2004. Asensi. Marquez. 2007. Albano. Palad. 2004 the case was deemed submitted for decision. Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in LRC Case No. She claimed that on March 25. January 18. Inguillo. R-5740 within 90 days from the time it was submitted for decision. Gundran. Complainant also alleged that after receipt of the adverse decision.

As such. Sy. Castillo. Echiverri. Albano. Cabañgon. Corporal. Rodriguez. Santos. Lumberio. Tecson. or about two weeks after the instant administrative complaint was filed. Asensi. Gloria. However. Page 1188 Espina. lower courts are given a period of 90 days only within which to decide or resolve a case from the time it is submitted for decision. 2008 or more than six months after complainant filed her appeal. Finally. respondent Clerk of Court Gundran relegated the performance of his job to another court employee without any justifiable reason. Rañigo. Alcazaren. Ramirez. the reasons for their non-transmittal. it has not escaped our notice that the records were eventually transmitted only on March 28. Martinez. A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time. R-5740. Palad. De Mesa. respondent should indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or transcripts not included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court. 2004 but the decision was rendered only on July 30. R-5740 was submitted for decision on April 9. 2007 or more than three years beyond the 90-day reglementary period. As regards respondent Clerk of Court Gundran. it is undisputed that LRC Case No. In this case. Inguillo. When the records cannot be completed. Lastimosa. Tabugan. Sandoval. Corpuz. Reyes. Valois . we find him guilty of simple neglect of duty for failure to timely transmit the records of LRC Case No. The duty to verify the correctness and completeness of the records of the case rests with the respondent. De la Cruz. Francisco. Marquez. Coronel. Valiente. in this case. Catindig. and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them available.

De Mesa. 5744-96. Corporal. 04-0488 and 04-0489 that the accused therein was no longer residing at her given address. Lastimosa. In her complaint. According to Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin. Rodriguez. undermined the integrity of the court processes and tarnished the trustworthiness of the court employees and of the judiciary. Palad. as regards Criminal Case No. 2006. Finally. Bulacan AM. two of the accused therein manifested during their scheduled arraignment that they are still residing at their given address contrary to the report of Dela Cruz. July 10. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty. Process Server. He claimed that the same was served to the parties concerned three days Albano. San Jose Del Monte. De la Cruz. both of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. dishonest and even more reprehensible. Dishonesty is a question of intention. 04-0483 and No. 2012 (Formerly OCA IPI No. during the scheduled pre-trial. Inguillo. No. Bulacan for Conduct Unbecoming of Court Personnel and Dishonesty. Coronel. Echiverri. FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin (Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin) against Process Server Nicomedes Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). Ramirez. 2006. Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin also alleged that notwithstanding receipt of three orders dated March 10. 05-0213. Castillo. Sandoval. Dela Cruz still failed to submit any explanation or compliance therein. Alcazaren. 05-0213. this was denied by the accused herself who declared in open court that she has not transferred residence. Martinez. Gloria. Tecson. In particular. undesirable. Rañigo. Corpuz. P-06-2241. 04-0483 and No. Dela Cruz stated in his return of service in Criminal Case Nos. during pre-trial. 04-0488 and 04-0489. Sy. 2005 but served the same to the parties only on March 23. Dela Cruz likewise indicated in his return of service that therein accused is no longer residing at his given address and that the houses thereat have already been demolished. Page 1189 Espina. According to Judge DalmacioJoaquin. San Jose Del Monte. Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin alleged that Dela Cruz submitted belated and false return of service of notice. Marquez. but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed. she claimed that Dela Cruz received the order dated November 25. 5744-96 on December 9. 2005 relative to Criminal Case No. Municipal Trial Court in Cities. the complainant manifested that the accused who is her neighbor still resides at his given address and that his house is still standing thereon. Asensi. In his comment. 2005 order relative to Criminal Case N0. Lumberio. and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. NICOMEDES DELA CRUZ. Santos. the aforesaid acts of Dela Cruz were unbecoming. Francisco. the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act. Dela Cruz denied the allegation that he deliberately delayed the service of the November 23. 06-2422-P) DOCTRINE: Dishonesty x x x is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Valois . consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent. Reyes. 04-0488 and 04-0489. relative to Criminal Case Nos. No. No. 05-0213 directing him to explain why no administrative action should be taken against him for submitting false returns. JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN vs. However. Catindig. Valiente. However. She also alleged that Dela Cruz submitted false returns relative to Criminal Case Nos. Tabugan. Cabañgon.

Dela Cruz denied submitting false returns. Alcazaren. No. The report of the Investigating Judge was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation. Cabañgon. as well as the fact that no prejudice was caused to the party-litigants in the abovementioned cases as they were all able to attend the scheduled hearings. Corpuz. 2008. in view of Dela Cruz’s resignation on June 10. Page 1190 Espina. Catindig. Lastimosa. Marquez. Bulacan for investigation and recommendation. Tecson. the court finds Dela Cruz guilty not of dishonesty but only of simple neglect of duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.0489. Albano. Ramirez. Castillo. Malolos. HELD: In sum. the matter was referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC. Reyes. For the above infractions. 05-0213. Valois . report and recommendation. the Investigating Judge recommended that Dela Cruz be suspended from employment for a period of one year. ISSUE: Whether or not Dela Cruz is guilty of dishonesty. Gloria. De Mesa. Sy. Considering his 24 years of service in the judiciary and his health condition. Rodriguez. However. De la Cruz. Palad. Inguillo. Martinez. Asensi. 04-0488 and 04. Coronel. Anent the returns relative to Criminal Case Nos. Tabugan. forfeiture of his salaries of three months should instead be imposed in lieu of suspension. In view of the factual issues presented. 04-0483. to be deducted from whatever benefits he may be entitled under existing laws. Francisco. Corporal.before the scheduled hearing. we deem it proper to impose upon Dela Cruz the penalty of suspension of three months. No. Rañigo. Sandoval. Santos. and other cases. Lumberio. Valiente. Echiverri.

To her. the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty. Tecson. Corporal. Asensi. Edwin M. Ramirez. Valois . Lumberio. Sandoval. Cabañgon. Lazaro and Atty. Sy. No. SO ORDERED. De la Cruz." is erroneous considering that there were no other pending cases to speak of at that time. Francisco. Espejo. Atty. Edwin M. 2011 as un-notarized was misplaced. Rañigo. Complainant next claims that this Court deviated from usual practice and procedure when it proceeded to resolve the disbarment Complaint after the separate Comments of the respondents have been filed without giving her the opportunity to file a Reply. Echiverri. Reyes. Marquez.” In her Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition. Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations. Michelle B. Lazaro. 2013 DOCTRINE: The disbarment Complaint against respondent therein was motupropio dismissed by this Court after finding "no sufficient justification for the exercise of its disciplinary power FACTS: For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition1 filed by complainant Jasper Junno F. Lastly. Corpuz. She also insists that the Courts observation that the withdrawal of pending cases should not have been limited "to the RTC case. Palad.C. She also maintains that the Court erroneously gave the impression that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo had already become final. Gloria. Joseph C. premises considered. This is equally true of Albano. Coronel. Rodica of our August 23. complainant argues that this Court unfairly ignored the supporting affidavits attached to the Complaint and that this Court should expressly declare whether it is lending credence to said affidavits or not and why. She also faults the Court for deciding the case without first declaring the same to have already been submitted for resolution. MANUEL LAZARO A. Inguillo. 2012 Resolution2the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE. Abel M. complainant asserts that this Courts reference to her Affidavit supposedly executed on July 21. Santos. 9259 March 13. this constitutes denial of due process. Tabugan. Martinez. Valiente. De Mesa. Almario. Castillo. ATTY. Tan is DISMISSED. JASPER RODICA vs. ISSUE: Whether or notthe complainant was denied due process HELD: NO. Complainants contention that she was denied due process because she was not allowed to file a Reply deserves scant consideration. Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Atty. Rodriguez. Atty. Complainant also prays for the inhibition of the justices who participated in this case in the belief that they have been biased against her. Lastimosa. Catindig. Alcazaren. Page 1191 Espina.

(Ret.) the Court. De Mesa. Martinez. Then. Santos. not all petitions or complaints reach reply or memorandum stage. Valiente. it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainants favor. in International Militia of People Against Corruption & Terrorism v. Lumberio. Echiverri. Depending on the merits of the case. And contrary to complainants mistaken notion. Jr." In this case. after finding the Complaint insufficient in form and substance. the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome. Coronel. The Motion to Inhibit is denied for lack of basis. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground x xx to inhibit. Francisco. It took the same stand in Battad v. Ramirez. especially when the charge is without basis. it is clearly wanting in merit. the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. Valois . after a judicious study of the records. In fact. Page 1192 Espina. Moreover. Chief Justice Davide. Castillo. Senator Defensor-Santiago. Palad." In this case. Sy. where the disbarment Complaint against respondent therein was motupropio dismissed by this Court after finding "no sufficient justification for the exercise of its disciplinary power. Tecson. Marquez. Reyes. the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Tabugan. Albano. Inguillo. Sandoval. Corpuz. The Court will outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face. Rodriguez. dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. and the respective Comments of the respondents. the Court can proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted for resolution. "An inhibition must be for just and valid reason. Alcazaren. complainant's imputation that her Complaint was decided by the magistrates of this Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Based on the Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto. De la Cruz. Likewise. Gloria.complainants argument that this Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for resolution. Thus. Asensi. Lastimosa. it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Cabañgon. Corporal. Rañigo. Catindig. the Court no longer required complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted.

Respondent received said amount. 7337 September 29. Corpuz. Valiente. Marquez. Alcazaren. Corporal. Rañigo. when in truth and in fact he is not. Sy. on top of the attorney's fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal.In sum. Lastimosa. however. ROLANDO VIRAY vs.C. respondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and Albano. Rule 16. but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. Cabañgon. 2014 DOCTRINE: The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship FACTS: Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed against Ester and Teodoro Lopez III. Tecson. De Mesa. a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney's fees. Asensi.03 thereof. De la Cruz. ATTY. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant. mandates that a lawyer shall deliver the funds of his client when due or upon demand. Page 1193 Espina.000. During the implementation of said writ. Santos. IBP recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of two (2) years suspension.00 from spouses Lopez. on the other hand. Specifically.000. Respondent admits that he received ₱95. Castillo. and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. No. HELD: The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand. Valois . Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to receive payments on his behalf.00 from spouses Lopez on installments. Lumberio. an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid decision. Subsequently.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Echiverri. Francisco. Tabugan. Martinez. Inguillo. Rule 16. Sandoval. EUGENIO T. SANICAS A. Reyes. Moreover. Palad. complainant discovered that respondent had already collected the total amount of ₱95. Gloria. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting. Coronel. He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award. Ramirez. Catindig. Rodriguez.

Alcazaren. Albano. Tecson. Corporal. Martinez. Marquez. Tabugan. Sandoval. demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness. Sy. Echiverri.upon demand violated the trust reposed in him. De Mesa. Rodriguez. Lumberio. Cabañgon. Asensi. Santos. Catindig. Lastimosa. Corpuz. Palad. Gloria. and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. Valiente. De la Cruz. Coronel. Valois . Francisco. Rañigo. Page 1194 Espina. Castillo. Inguillo. Ramirez. Reyes.

DAVIS A. This eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant. Martinez. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement. Tecson. It was only on August 26. act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. Francisco. Valiente. RIZ TINGALON L. Albano. Ramirez. DAGINGvs. FACTS: Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. Sandoval. She leased from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building space located at No. DARIA O. Alcazaren. act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 22 Otek St. Palad. Echiverri. De la Cruz. 9395 November 12. That complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the rollo of this case. Castillo. Rañigo. Marquez. Lumberio. Valois . Cabañgon. 2005 when respondent withdrew his appearance for Balageo. a lawyer may not. HELD: Yes. Baguio City where she operated the bar. Corporal. The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. Page 1195 Espina. ATTY. In fact. Catindig. 2005 with respondent's law firm. without being guilty of professional misconduct. Asensi.. Tabugan. the respondent and Atty. 2005. Inguillo. respondent filed on behalf of said Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July 11.C. Santos. Corpuz. Gloria. Sabling). 2014 DOCTRINE: A lawyer may not. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of representing clients who have conflicting interest. respondent represented and defended Balageo. Sy. De Mesa. Rodriguez. without being guilty of professional misconduct. who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement. Lastimosa. Reyes. Coronel. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty.

Catindig. FACTS: On this Complaint for Disbarment where complainant asserts that respondent’s actuations of (1) not appearing in the pretrial of the case. Sevilleno. vs. Rodriguez. Tabugan. Cabañgon. he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense. and despite knowledge of the expiration of the period for filing an appeal. Palad. Asensi. Coronel. Jr.C. 2015 DOCTRINE: Attorneys. Martinez. Rañigo. Marquez. 5116. always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. On the respondent’s defense.. Respondent needs lecturing that sympathy towards a client does not justify his act of stating in his motion forextension that he received the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision at a later date to make it appear that the filing of the said motion is well within the period for filing an appeal. again. if not. Echiverri. INC. Lumberio. Inc. Given his years of experience in the legal profession. (2) not availing of the legal remedies against the dismissal of the Complaint due to non suit. More importantly. and (3) failing to file a petition for review. It was only after 30 days that Pandili returned to him and begged that he file an appeal. Castillo. Alcazaren. Corporal. as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice. 452 SCRA 668 (2005). ISSUE: Whether or not the Lawyer’s actions is justified by sympathy for his client. Valois . competence and diligence. Alpon. Out of pity. 305 SCRA 519 (1999) and reiterated in Consolidated Farms. Sandoval. while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client. Corpuz. v. Page 1196 Espina. Sy. Tecson. April 13. respondent should be well aware that “[a] lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. ATTY. De la Cruz. Inguillo. A. Legal Ethics. Pandili allegedly took from respondent the case folder despite the latter’s warning that they only have 15 days to file a Petition for Review with the CA. Francisco. Atty. Valiente. No. Ramirez. disbarment. graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its processes. Reyes. De Mesa. Gloria. Albano. Santos. DAVAO IMPORT DISTRIBUTORS. respondent still filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Lastimosa. Thus. which merit disciplinary action.. JOHNNY LANDERO. constitute unprofessional behavior or misconduct and violations of Canon 12 of the CPR. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. Code of Professional Responsibility. every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication. for fear that he would be terminated by complainant. HELD: No.The Supreme Court (SC) has already held in People v.

Sy. Rañigo. any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct. Corpuz. Asensi. Inguillo. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. Valois . Reyes. competence and diligence. Corporal. Valiente. Gloria. Castillo. Albano. Marquez. Palad. Page 1197 Espina. Sandoval. Francisco. pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him. Alcazaren. Lumberio. Martinez. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. Catindig. Cabañgon.Thus.” Canon 18 of the CPR requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication. Echiverri. De Mesa. Santos. Tabugan. Tecson. Rodriguez. Coronel. Ramirez.

Page 1198 Espina. Rodriguez. PATROCINIA H. Gloria. No. 080666M. by bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under C. Tabugan. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13. Tecson.R. respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC. Asensi. Corporal. his other actions belie his claim of good faith.R. Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under C.G. he again appealed to the Supreme Court under G. they should not forget that they are also officers of the court.A. Cabañgon. R. 167413. Francisco. From hereon. Respondent filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Albano. 8084. Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of the case. De la Cruz.02 of Canon 10 and Rule12. CV No. No. Respondent filed several Motion. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals under C. S. Coronel. Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory. Apart from this. Andres C. Ramirez. Rañigo. Echiverri. bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed. In order to delay the case. Still. ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be meted with suspension for the abuse of judicial process (or in his point of view exhausting the remedies) HELD: Yes. SALABAOvs.P. Palad. De Mesa. Santos. No. Lumberio. Catindig. After respondent filed his Answer we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Villaruel. Sandoval. But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client. ANDRES C. Martinez. report and recommendation She narrates as follows: In 2002. Salabao (complainant) against Atty. Branch 162. Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility(CPR). 101992 which was however dismissed.R. Sy. FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Lastimosa. Corpuz. A. 65147 issued its resolution in her favor. Reyes. Quezon.G.C. Jr. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153. DOCTRINE: While the Supreme Court agrees that lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients. VILLARUEL. Taguig City. there was not stopping the Respondent. When rebuffed. it is clear that respondent’s intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.A. Castillo. 97564.03 and Rule 10. Valois .P. No. Marquez. Alcazaren. JR. No. Branch 64 under Civil Case No.ATTY. R.A. 2015. the Regional Trial Court. 2004 but Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under G. Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented before the Court of Appeals. Undeterred. S. (respondent) for abuse of court processes in violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban. 76360. Inguillo. August 24. Branch 162. Valiente.G.

employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment. Alcazaren. Tecson. Rodriguez. De Mesa. Quezon in what was clearly a case of forum shopping. Ramirez. Castillo. Valois . Corpuz. Lastimosa. Echiverri. It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes. Moreover. Gloria. Inguillo. Rañigo. Page 1199 Espina. and even a motion to cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision. Palad. Marquez. Francisco. Santos.Court of Mauban. Cabañgon. respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against the three judges hearing these cases. Albano. Catindig. and feigning ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court. Coronel. Corporal. Reyes. De la Cruz. Martinez. Asensi. Valiente. Tabugan. Sy. Lumberio. Sandoval.

" FACTS: Wilson Chua entered into a retainership agreement with Atty. Jimenez filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted and reinstated the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. Jimenez for the latter to handle all his legal problems against Excellent Quality.00 intended for payment of filing fees as evidenced by photocopies of checks payable to him and cash vouchers showing details of said payment. De la Cruz. Rañigo. On 23 October 2003. In the meantime. Ramirez. Rule 22. Corpuz. Asensi. a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical. Jimenez had received P235. Jimenez moved for the lifting of the default order attaching thereto his Answer with Counterclaim. but the IBP denied. Alcazaren. 2016 DOCTRINE: A lawyer's negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant particularly his client. Wilson subsequently moved that Atty. but he requested for additional 15 days within which to comply. WILSON CHUA vs. Lumberio. For the last seven years prior. Jimenez failed to submit his position paper. Reyes. DIOSDADO B. and Amosup. Rodriguez. He filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and another Urgent Motion to File Answer. Thus. Tecson. 9880 November 28. Wilson insisted that Atty. Diosdado B. Wilson complied. Atty. malpractice.127. Coronel. Atty. Sandoval. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of 3 months and that he be ordered to return the pertinent files and documents to complainant.127. Marquez. Valiente. but modified the recommended penalty to suspension of 1 year from the practice of law and to return the files and documents of the complainant. Sy. Cabañgon. Alexander Ty. Clarita Tan. Corporal. Tabugan. By way of Reply.C. Lastimosa. JIMENEZ. Echiverri.04 as well as Canon 22. both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers.127. A. Castillo. Rules 18. Jimemez to file his Answer within 15 days. Francisco. the IBP directed Atty. He entrusted to him all the pertinent documents and gave P235. Jimenez alleged that he withheld the filing of the complaints due to Wilson’s non-payment of his professional fees. Gloria.03 and 18.00 for the necessary filing fees. Jimenez be declared in default which the IBP granted and set the mandatory conference on April 28. Palad. Jimenez’s legal services for failure to file the necessary cases and filed a complaint for grave misconduct. Valois . Atty. and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar against him with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline on October 20. On 24 September 2003. from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession. 2003.02. except those involving Clarita Tan and Union Bank where he was a defendant. dishonesty. Jimenez guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Benny Lao. He also denied receiving the amount of P235. and the amounts duly supported by receipts. he had never attended a single hearing on any case that he had assigned to him. De Mesa. Albano. he terminated Atty. Martinez. particularly Canon 18. while Atty. No. Inguillo. 2004. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Catindig. Santos. Page 1200 Espina. ATTY. After the termination of the mandatory conference.00 from complainant.

Valiente. Valois . Rañigo. Rules 18. Lumberio. Diosdado B.03 further states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. Inguillo. Palad. Marquez. Martinez. Rodriguez. While the same Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes the right of a lawyer to have a lien over the funds and property of his client as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees." This is a reiteration of Rule 16." "Indeed. the Code of Professional Responsibility. De Mesa. Echiverri. which states that "a lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for or from the client. He should not have used the same as a ground for his inaction insofar as the cases referred to him were concerned. Consequently. Santos. Jimenez fell short in being fair and loyal to his client." Albano. Wilson Chua. from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession. when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose. a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical. Sy. showing that he spent the money for the purpose intended. states: A lawyer shall observe candor. "A lawyer's negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant particularly his client. Cabañgon. Canon 15. misleading him for seven years. Rule 16. Sandoval. Alcazaren. Lastimosa. Diosdado B." He miserably disregarded the mandate of accountability expected of him. Atty.The records of the case was thereafter transmitted by the IBP to Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. lawyers pledge not to delay any person for money or malice. His issue on the supposed non-payment of his fees should have prompted him to seek communication with Wilson and resolve such matter. and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Jimenez violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Catindig. Tecson. He was utterly lacking in this responsibility to his client as he unfairly kept him in the dark. HELD: In particular. Asensi. Rule 18. Corporal. Castillo.01. Coronel." "A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. Ramirez. Corpuz. Tabugan. Francisco.04 continues: A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to his client. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De la Cruz. He did not even file the cases for which he was engaged and upon which he collected filing fees.03 demands that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. Page 1201 Espina. Reyes. Thus. under their sacred oath. Gloria.

-----. Coronel. Alcazaren.NOTHING FOLLOWS ----- Albano. Tecson. Valiente. Asensi. Marquez. Inguillo. Lastimosa. De la Cruz. Sy. Castillo. Rañigo. Valois . Ramirez. Gloria. Catindig. Corpuz. Sandoval. Page 1202 Espina. Martinez. Francisco. Lumberio. Rodriguez. Santos. De Mesa. Cabañgon. Palad. Reyes. Echiverri. Tabugan. Corporal.