TRIESTE vs SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the
Municipality of Numancia purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of said
corporation. Trieste was then sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act particularly for willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary
interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused
intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from
having any interest.

Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the corporation
when he took his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to his sister; he presented
evidence to that effect. The Solicitor General doubted said sale because it was not
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the advertisement of
Trigen in the local rotary club shows that Trieste is the president of the corporation.

In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-Gen gave credit
to the arguments presented by Trieste as it recommended the dismissal of the case on
the ground that Trieste did divest his interest from the corporation by virtue of his
selling his shares to his sister; that said sale cannot be doubted simply because it was not
reported to the SEC; that sales of stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC.

ISSUE: WON Trieste was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corruption Law?

HELD: No. What is contemplated in Section 3 of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order
that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as
long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law
aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power.

Moreover, There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as

Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to
Trigen. It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery,
under delivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.

Furthermore, considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this
Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of
the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the
affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The
conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General
in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the
administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free
just as it has the task of having, the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and,
therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in
question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice,
the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

PEOPLE vs ABELLO

Facts: On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock in the early morning, while sleeping
in their house with her sister-in-law and nephew. AAA suddenly woke up when his
stepfather Abello mashed her breast. The same situation happened again come July 2,
1998. In these two occasions, AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light
coming from outside which illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00
a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got
awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed Aray
forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The
victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-lawand mother. The RTC
found Abello guilty under the three Information. The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction
on appeal but modified the penalties imposed.

Issue: Whether or not, the court sta quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of
the crime.

Held: We note that both the RTC and CA found AAAs testimony to be positive,
direct, and, categorical, while the RTC found the defenses version too strained to be
believed, while the RTC found the defenses version too strained to be believed for being
contrary to human experience. A material point we noted is that Abello could not say
why AAA would falsely accuse him. The substance and tenor of the testimony and the
element of motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward, categorical and
candid narration by the victim deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown driving
her to falsely testify against the accused. Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial
and his other arguments lead us to reject them for the following reasons:

First, the issue of his credibility was reduced to a choice between the offended party’s
positive testimony and the denial of the accused. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the
mere denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive
testimony of the offendedparty.

Second, we flatly reject Abellos argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him
from the crimes charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of
cases, the relationship between the offender and the offended party has never been an
obstacle to thecommission of the crime against chastity.

Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained
of, to be preposterous. In the normal course, a woman will not expose herself to these
risks unless she is certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the
perpetrator. Based on these considerations and in the absence of clear indications of
errors in giving credence to AAAs testimony, we find no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the RTC and the CA.

TEVES V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188775, [August 24, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

FACTS:

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-
Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the
Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted marriage
with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of
the Certificate of Marriage indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10
December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon
of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006. However,
during the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered
a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the case for bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage
of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final
by a Certification of Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA
contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had already been
extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there is in
effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case
because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity
of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had already been legally
dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial
declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.

HELD:

YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before
the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while
his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the First
marriage AT THE TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

RATIO:

The instant case has all the elements of the crimeof bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC. Thus, the CA
was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26
November 1992. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001. At
the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted
that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27
June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent
marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact
not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage is bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.

If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of
his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been
instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying
his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed.

Loney vs. People G.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006

Facts: Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Pres. and CEO,
Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing
tailings (mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran
a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end.
In a few days, Mt. Tapianpit had discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque with
violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067 or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of
P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act
of 1995, and Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property. In the
Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order quashing the
information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation
of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC
assailing that the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA
7942 and the petition was raffled to Br. 94 while public respondent’s appeal assailing that portion of
the Consolidated Order quashing the Info. for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was
consolidated with petitioners petition. MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondent’s appeal but denied
petitioner’s petition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Br. 94
acted with grave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984,
RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC “proceeded from are based on a single act or incident of polluting
the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the
other charges since the element of “lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence” is common among them, 2. The duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes
the ruling in People v. Relova. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.

Issue:

1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand

2. whether or not Br. 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges
more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early as the
start of the last century, the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more
than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In People vs.Doriquez, the court held that two or more
offenses arising form the same act are not the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because
not all its elements are present. On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the
RPC “absorbs” the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala
in sefelony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes the former felony
is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them. Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling in
People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the court’s statement in Relova that the law seeks to
prevent harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements. Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on a
single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue here, but also because, as the
Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national
statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first
sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in
Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

DEL SOCORO V ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN

FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage
bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made
a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and
her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again
a Filipina and resides again in the Philippines particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also
resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, he being an alien.

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the
Philippine Law?
2. WON a foreign national can be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child

RULING:

1. YES> While it is true that respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine Law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws
of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
 authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if
the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be a great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (RA 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

PEOPLE VS CASTILLO CA 227

FACTS: This is a case of Dr. Leon Castillo and Mrs. Nena Tanalega Raymundo for the
crime of “FRUSTRATED MURDER BY POISONING THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE” that was later changed to “FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE.”
On February 18, 1941, Mr. Silvino Belarmino presented a prescription to the Escudero
Drug Store and asked Dr. Castillo if they could prepare said medicine after having failed to
secure the same in other drug stores in the locality. The complainant requested to prepare
him 1/3 of the formula and the former has written “1/3 f.” The following are the prescribe
medicine: Spartein Sulphate, Phenobarbital, and Carrbromal. With some doubt as to the
figure appearing after the word “carbromal”, Belarmino requested a new written
prescription and returned at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. The
pharmacist Saturnino Cortes was in the house and Dr. Castillo sent for defendant-appellant
Nena Tanalega Raymundo, who was employed in the drug store as pharmacy clerk.
When the medicine was already prepared, the complainant took one of the capsules with
a glass of water at around 5 o’clock of the same day, he felt dizzy and had difficulty in
breathing,, he could hardly stand as his knees became shaky, and for that reason, he
immediately consulted with physicians, namely , Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes.
The latter advised him to go home and rest and explained that the remaining capsules
contains strychnine sulphate a substance sufficient enough to kill a person.

ISSUE:WON defendant-appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crim
frustrated murder through reckless imprudence
WON the defendant-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating the provisions
of section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code
HELD: -- NO. The said judgement is untenable, on the ground that the offense of frustrated
homicide requires the concurrence of the essential requisites of intent to kill, which in
incompatible with the charge of reckless imprudence; although a charge for physical injuries,
serious or less serious, through reckless imprudence, is legally proper under the law; as in that
case the act sought to be punished is the material damage or injury done.
Human health, is the most precious thing, and human life is most sacred. When a
person gets sick or feels sick, he goes to, or sends for, a physician for consultation and treatment,
so that he may secure the proper remedy for his malady.
 Defendant and appellant cannot complain that she has been found guilty of a criminal
offense, without due process of law. She had ample opportunity to defend herself against the
charges filed against her.

 YES. Defendant and appellant Nena Raymundo is found guilty of preparing one’s
medicine for another, under a false name, in violation of the provisions of section 751
of the Revised Administrative Code; Which states that :

SEC. 751 – Responsibility for quality of drugs – Every pharmacist shall be responsible
for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for
sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare,
sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any
fraudulent name. xxx