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G.R. No.

133743 February 6, 2007 On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
vs. children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership


assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, 146 thereof.
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
DECISION Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
reconsideration. improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5,
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
December 14, 1973. 6 Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14 should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled
that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
of Article 256 16 of the Family Code. the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of
filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
hearing the case.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, dispositive portion of which states:
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October
Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion. 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings. 29
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the
the facts and law on which it was based. venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Paul T. Arcangel. Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed
in Makati City.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively. virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the letters of administration.
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the administration.
basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to The petition lacks merit.
give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce
having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the
denominated as "a bigamous marriage. case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. x x x 33 [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
were denied by the Court of Appeals. the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36 construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
domicile in another. was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in
the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent divorce. Thus:
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter- "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. the bond of the former marriage."
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. over the alleged conjugal property. 53

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition
for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she Brief Historical Background
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held: On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35,
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She 37, and 38.
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added) On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it so amended, it now provides:
was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
56 Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect. capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited xxxx
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long Legislative Intent
been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage
and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
discussed, to wit: obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added) As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
xxxx
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
Filipino spouse, as in this case. begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
68 the Court stated: Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
be done even as the law is obeyed.
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
they must be alleged and proved. 73 contrary is proven. 77

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co- before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through described the property regime under this provision as follows:
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
xxxx
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
or contingent. 75 marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has
a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. of administration

SO ORDERED. Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in


EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007. was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
Facts: was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the
predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
from the time of their marriage up to his death. owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the
City, Branch 146. Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion
issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for
the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, further proceedings.
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the
case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, The decree provides in part:
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled
QUISUMBING, J.: through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral
proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of
discretion allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil
jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
The parental custody for the children
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated
September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No.
96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially
set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the is granted to the father.
purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses
and the custody of their children. The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject
1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively. On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s
motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by properties between petitioner and private respondent.
the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done
denied in an order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by
1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
RTC. Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of
divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, 3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no
through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Philippine law. Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the
issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of 1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing
their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides: her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated
July 14, 1999; and
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14,
1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and 2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though
the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent
obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and judge is completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to
considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the
dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
with respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.) ground relied upon is not indubitable.

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
which was denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12 therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the
discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition action or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the
the following: pleading.

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its
case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13 order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the
timely filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial
Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997
by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December
the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly. 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the
issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to
this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the
all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries
(Emphasis supplied.) are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory wit:
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has upon the title to the thing;
not yet attained finality.
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
grave abuse of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany. law or fact.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim
divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24
Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with
petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the
respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra
records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to
Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, costs.
private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More
importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the SO ORDERED.
German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately
for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did
not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any
finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth 149, respondents.
Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent QUISUMBING, J.:
exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the
issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent
respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their
for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any
debts during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati
averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was
allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual admission by the parties in their denied.
pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has
no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
deemed in controversy. Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental
custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue
regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce
petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public
claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
which is not at issue.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in
the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s
partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
support and custody of their children. unclear.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
reconsideration. children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful
Ruling: Yes. of the best interests of the children.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained
finality, as in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as
where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries


are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is

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