Response to Fire
Therese McAllister1, Omer Erbay2, Andrew Sarawit3, Mehdi Zarghamee4, Robert MacNeill5,
1 Research Structural Engineer, PhD, PE, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899-8611,
2 Senior Staff, PhD, Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc., Waltham, MA, 02453
3 Senior Staff, PhD, Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc., Waltham, MA, 02453
4 Senior Principal, PhD, Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc., Waltham, MA, 02453
6 Research Structural Engineer, PhD, PE, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899-8611
Abstract
This paper is the first of two papers that present the structural analysis approach used to model
the sequence of fire-induced damage and failures leading to the global collapse of WTC 7. This
paper presents the analysis methods developed and results obtained during the investigation
conducted by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to determine the cause of
collapse of World Trade Center 7 (WTC 7). The structural analysis required a two-phase
approach to address both the gradual response of the structure to fire before collapse initiation
(approximately 6 hrs) and the rapid response of the structure during the collapse process
(approximately 15 s). This paper describes the first phase, a pseudo-static (implicit) analysis that
simulated the response of structural elements to fires that spread and grew over several hours.
1
The analysis accounted for 1) geometric nonlinearities, 2) temperature-dependent nonlinear
materials behavior for both members and connections (including thermal expansion, degradation
of stiffness, yield and ultimate strength, and creep), and 3) sequential failure of structural
framing and connections. The second paper describes the dynamic (explicit) analysis that used
the damage predicted in the first phase as initial conditions, and simulated the progression of
Keywords: World Trade Center, WTC 7, fire-induced damage, structural analysis, failure, global
collapse
1.0 Introduction
World Trade Center 7 (WTC 7) was structurally damaged by falling debris during the collapse of
WTC 1 at 10:28:22 a.m. (eastern daylight time, EDT) on September 11, 2001. The damage
included severed exterior columns on the lower floors. The collapse of WTC 1 also resulted in
initiation of fires on at least 10 floors of WTC 7, extensive window breakage on the south face,
and loss of city water that supplied the automatic sprinkler system in the lower floors. After
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted an investigation into the
collapse of the WTC buildings (NIST 2008, McAllister et al. 2008). A specific objective of the
WTC investigation was to determine why and how WTC 7 collapsed. A series of detailed
analyses were performed, consisting of : 1) a fire dynamics simulation to model the spread and
2
growth of the fires with time, 2) a thermal analysis to predict the temporal and spatial
two-phased structural analysis approach consisting of (a) a finite element analysis to simulate the
response of the structure to the fire-induced temperature histories that led to collapse initiation
(Part I), and (b) a dynamic finite element analysis to simulate the sequence of subsequent
structural failures that led to the collapse of the building (Part II).
In the following sections, the key aspects of the pseudo-static model development are presented.
Additionally, the response of the WTC 7 steel framed and composite floor structural system to
A single software application and solution method was not available to address both the gradual
response of the structure to fire before collapse initiation (up to 6 hrs) and the rapid response of
the structure during the collapse process (approximately 10 s). Therefore, a two-phased
structural analysis approach was adopted for the analysis of WTC 7. In the first phase, a
structural model was developed in ANSYS1 (2007) and used to determine the pseudo-static
structural response to spatially and temporally varying fire-induced temperatures, and to predict
the local structural failures that occurred up to collapse initiation. In the second phase, a
companion structural model was developed in LS-DYNA (2007) and was used to simulate
dynamic structural response in the seconds just prior to the total collapse of the building and the
1
Certain commercial software or materials are identified to describe a procedure or concept adequately. Such
identification is not intended to imply recommendation, endorsement, or implication by NIST that the software or
materials are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
3
sequential failures that occurred during the collapse. Figure 1 shows the sequence of analyses
component failure mechanisms. Failure criteria were developed to identify when a structural
component was no longer contributing to the structural system, and was impeding structural
convergence. When sufficient damage had occurred such that the structural system appeared to
be approaching instability, the fire-induced damage from the 16-story pseudo-static model was
input into the 47-story dynamic model as initial conditions for the phase two analyses.
The 47-story building was 186 m (610 ft) high and constructed over a pre-existing electrical
substation owned by Consolidated Edison. Above Floor 7, the building had typical steel framing
for high-rise construction. The floor systems had steel beams acting compositely with normal
weight concrete slabs on a 76 mm (3 in.) metal deck, with a total floor thickness of 140 mm (5.5
in). Figure 2 shows the floor framing and column numbering system for typical tenant floors.
Shear connections were used at all interior floor framing connections (i.e., beams to girders and
girders to columns). The shear connections were constructed with a single shear plate (also
referred to as a fin connection), double angles, and seated connections. Single shear plate and
double angle connections connected interior beams to girders and girders to interior columns.
Seated connections connected the floor beams and girders to the exterior columns, the north side
of Column 79, and the south side of Column 81. Moment connections were used in the exterior
4
framing and portions of the core framing at Floors 5 and 7 as part of the lateral load resisting
system.
The 16-story pseudo-static finite element model used for calculating the nonlinear response of
o Floors from ground level to Floor 16 (Figure 3), as sustained fires were observed on
properties of steel and concrete, thermal expansion, stiffness and strength degradation,
strain relationships used for ASTM A 572 Grade 50 steel and for normal weight concrete.
o Evolving temperature states, input as a temperature time history for each node at 30 min.
elements” (Zarghamee et al., 2005, McAllister et al., 2008, and Sarawit et al., 2010),
including bolt shear, plate tear-out, or beam walk-off from its seat.
failures, failure of shear studs within a composite floor system, buckling instability of
beams and girders, and crushing and cracking failures of concrete floor slabs.
5
Material and geometric nonlinearities were assigned to the structure between Floors 8 and 14,
while Floor 7 and below and Floors 15 and 16 were modeled linearly with sub-structuring
(super-elements in ANSYS) to reduce the size of the model. The structural loads from the
portion of the building above Floor 16 were applied to the Floor 16 columns to represent the
gravity loading on columns in the lower 16 stories of the building. The sub-structuring and
exclusion of the building portion above Floor 16 allowed the analysis to remain tractable while
including details of the framing and floor connections at the lower floors where fires were
observed.
Beams, girders, and columns were modeled with a 3-D linear finite strain beam element that is
well suited for large rotation and/or large strain nonlinear solutions, namely BEAM188 (ANSYS
2007). Typically, the columns were meshed with 0.6 m (2 ft) long elements, and beams were
meshed with 0.9 m (3 ft) long elements. The floor slab was modeled with a 4-node finite strain
shell element that is well suited for large rotation and/or large strain nonlinear solutions, namely
SHELL181 (ANSYS 2007). Typical mesh size for the floor slab was 0.9 m x 0.9 m (3 ft x 3 ft).
Temperature-dependent inelastic material properties were used for beam and shell elements.
Failure of floor framing connections and shear studs was modeled on Floors 8 to 14, as indicated
in Figure 5. A single-floor fire simulation performed prior to the analysis of the full structure
showed no connection damage west of Columns 73 though 76 contributing to the failures on the
east side of the structure, where the collapse was observed to initiate. Outside the indicated area,
structural damage, such as buckling of the steel frame and crushing and cracking of the concrete
slab, was modeled, but connection failures were not modeled. Connections failures were also
6
not modeled in the exterior moment frame, as no failures were observed there prior to the onset
of global collapse, or at column splices, as the purpose of the ANSYS model was to accumulate
Connection models, including models for shear studs, were constructed with a combination of
rigid beams, contact elements, control elements, spring elements, and user-defined “break
elements”, which modeled component failure (Zarghamee et al. 2005, McAllister et al. 2008, and
Sarawit et al. 2010). A control element is unidirectional and can turn on/off during an analysis to
connect or disconnect parts of the model during analysis. A break element is a multi-degree of
freedom elastic spring with the capability of disconnecting once its capacity is reached. Break
elements were developed initially for the collapse analysis of the WTC 1 and WTC 2 towers
(Zarghamee et al. 2005) to simulate complex modes of failure in connections using relatively
few degrees of freedom. An analytical model for a fin connection is shown in Figure 6
The force and moment capacity of a break element were defined with temperature-dependent
factor. Different tensile and compressive capacities were assigned to connections where
appropriate. Connections with multiple failure modes required several break elements connected
in series and/or parallel as determined by the logical sequence of partial failures prior to the total
failure of the connection. The inclusion of contact elements in the connection models allowed
for slip and construction clearances (gaps) to be taken into account and thus insured different
7
Temperature data were obtained from Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) analyses of the fires and
the analyses of heat transfer from the heated gases to the structural components (McAllister et.al.
2008). Temperature data were input to the pseudo-static analyses at 30 min intervals for the fires
observed on Floors 7 to 9 and Floors 11 to 13 for a total of a 6.0 h time period. Linear variation
of temperatures was assumed for structural analysis between the discrete temperatures provided.
Three different thermal cases were used in the heat transfer analyses and pseudo-static analyses.
Case A used temperature data obtained from the FDS simulation of the observed fires. Cases B
and C increased and decreased, respectively, the Case A gas temperature by 10 percent. These
cases were within the range of realistic and reasonable fires in WTC 7 on September 11, 2001,
and were judged to be within the range of uncertainty for the observed fires (McAllister et.al.
2008). This range modified the severity of the fire in three ways. It increased the local heat
transfer to the structural members, it increased the area over which the structural members were
heated, and it increased the chance of hot zone (zone near the fire and the heated upper gas layer)
The model required the double precision version of ANSYS 11.0 for a 64-bit operating system.
The model had approximately 93,000 nodes and 101,000 elements. Inclusion of user-defined
elements prohibited parallel processing, so a 64-bit workstation with a quad-core, 3.0 GHz
processor, and 64 GB of random access memory (RAM) was used. The analysis time was
8
approximately 6 months for a single series of temperature states that simulated up to 4 h of
heating.
The loads applied to the model include the dead load, 25 percent of the design live load on all
floors, and nodal temperature histories due to fire. Gravity loads were applied to the model in
stages that simulated the sequence of construction, where the floor slab participates in the floor
Structural elements heat slowly relative to the rapidly fluctuating gas temperatures in a fire.
Component temperatures, which were determined by the fire dynamic and thermal analyses
(McAllister et al. 2008), were applied incrementally to represent the temperature state of the
structural system in 30 min time steps. The temperatures were assumed to vary linearly between
consecutive steps. The temperature time histories of several floor framing and slab components
Within the ANSYS model, failure criteria were developed for addressing failed components.
Members that were no longer contributing structurally to the response of the building were
efficiency and eliminated many convergence problems. When an element failed according to the
criteria presented below, either the element stiffness was reduced to a lower level or the element
was removed (the element remained in the ANSYS model but contributed a near-zero stiffness
9
value). When element stiffness was reduced, the mass was preserved, and when the member was
removed, the mass of the member was lost. Failed beams and girders were removed, and failed
Shear Stud Failure. Shear stud failure in composite floor systems occurs when the concrete slab
crushes or cracks around the shear stud or the shear stud separates from the steel framing. The
shear strength of studs depends on rib geometry, slab thickness, concrete strength, steel strength,
stud location relative to the steel deck ribs, and loading direction. Using the results from two
sources, Rambo-Rodenberry (2002) and AISC (2005), the average of the strong axis and weak
axis strength of shear studs is 19.5 kip, which was used for shear studs in all load directions.
Rambo-Rodenberry also measured a relative movement between concrete and metal deck at
failure of about 0.2 in., which is indicative of the limited ductility of the shear stud connection.
Lateral-Torsional Buckling of Beams and Girders. When lateral support of the top (compression)
flange was lost due to failure of the shear studs, floor beams could laterally displace and buckle
in the lateral-torsional mode. The girders did not have shear stud connections to the concrete
slab. Therefore, girders with one-sided floor framing were also subject to lateral-torsional
buckling. Buckled members were removed when the web rotation was large enough that the
member would become unstable under its own gravity loading. In other words, it was assumed
that if a beam or girder web rotated so that there was a relative lateral displacement between the
top and bottom flange of more half of the flange width, the beam or girder would be unable to
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Loss of Vertical Support for Beams and Girders. Under elevated temperatures, a beam could
lose vertical support at its ends through connection failure, including walking-off the beam
support seat (referred to here as walk-off failure). Walk-off failure is due to either 1) movement
along the axis of the beam due to sagging of beams or girders during the cooling phase of the
beam, or 2) lateral displacement of the beam resulting from thermal expansion of the orthogonal
beams. Gravity loads in a beam are transferred to the bearing seat from the bottom flange of the
beam near the web. Therefore, when the web was no longer supported by the bearing seat, the
beam was assumed to have lost support, as the flexural stiffness of the bottom flange was
assumed to be insufficient to transfer the gravity loads. Under such a condition, the beam was
removed. While axial walk-off was possible, the calculated connection failure mode was lateral
walk-off.
Cracking and Crushing of the Concrete Slab. Local temperature effects and failure of
supporting beams and girders caused slab elements to undergo large compressive and tensile
strains. The ANSYS material model of a concrete slab, reinforced with welded-wire-mesh, was
based on an isotropic plasticity formulation without strength degradation at high strains and,
hence, it could not represent cracking under tensile strains or crushing under compressive strains.
To address this issue, slab elements that reached the tensile or compressive failure strains were
removed. Any slab element with a principal tensile strain equal to or greater than 0.0015 at mid-
depth of the section was assumed to be fully cracked in tension. (Concrete starts to micro-crack
at a tensile strain of about 1.4 x 10-4; beyond this strain level, the concrete will soften, until at a
strain level of about 1.5 x 10-3 concrete no longer supports tension and steel reinforcement is
11
yielded.) Similarly, any slab element with a principal in-plane compressive strain equal to or
When these strains were reached, the slab was softened, i.e., the concrete elastic modulus was
numerically reduced. The reduced elastic modulus was equivalent to the in-plane stiffness that
would be provided by the welded-wire-mesh in the slab. Softening of a section of the slab, and
not removing it from the analysis, allowed the weight and the live loads that were applied to the
Three different thermal response cases (Cases A, B, and C) were used as input to the pseudo-
static analysis. It became apparent as the pseudo-static analyses progressed that the connection,
beam, and girder failures occurred essentially at the same locations and with similar failure
mechanisms, but shifted in time between the three cases. Case B failures occurred at the earliest
time, followed by Case A, and then Case C. Therefore, only Case B results are described below.
As the temperature histories were applied, the following structural responses led to failures in a
Failure of shear stud connections occurred on the east side of the building where the floor slab
was continuous and the floor beams framed into girders on one side only (see Figure 2).
Generally, the steel framing heated more quickly than the concrete slab. When a concrete slab
section was heated, it was restrained by cooler adjacent slab sections. When the floor beams
12
were heated, their thermal expansion was first restrained by the shear studs and, after the shear
stud connections had failed, by weak axis flexure of the girder. Both factors led to differential
thermal expansion between the concrete slab and the floor framing.
The capacity of 28 shear studs on a floor beam in the northeast corner was estimated at about
546 kip, which is less than the force produced in a fully restrained floor beam with an average
temperature increase of 100 oC. Therefore, shear stud connection failures were expected to occur
early in the heating process. Shear stud connection failures also can occur when concrete
crushes due to compression forces in the slab, causing the shear studs to be ineffective.
Review of literature did not find much data that documented shear stud connection failure in
composite floors subjected to fire. One reason for the lack of such failures is that most
experimental tests of composite floor sections (a beam and slab section) have the same boundary
conditions applied to the beam and floor slab, which results in similar rates of thermal expansion
None of the columns reached temperatures over 300 °C and, therefore, none of the columns
failed or buckled due to fire-induced thermal weakening (significant thermal weakening occurs
at temperatures greater than about 500 °C). The interior columns were not thermally restrained,
so they did not develop additional compressive loads due to thermal expansion. The exterior
columns had some restraint to thermal expansion, due to the moment frame construction of the
exterior framing. However, the exterior columns tended to have lower temperatures than the
13
interior columns, as they were only heated on one side and the heat dissipated to the outside.
Thermal expansion of either interior or exterior columns had little or no effect on the failure
The calculated temperatures in the steel floor framing of Floor 13 at 3.0 h, 3.5 h, and 4.0 h are
shown in Figure 8 (a, b, c). These temperatures are largely due to heating from the fire on the
floor below. The corresponding calculated failures of floor beams and girders of Floor 13, based
on the described failure criteria, at 3.0 h, 3.5 h, and 4.0 h are shown in Figure 8 (d, e, f). (For
temperatures and damages to other floors, see McAllister et al. 2008). Although cooling
occurred for many structural members in other parts of the structure, critical components that
contributed to collapse initiation had not begun cooling between 3.0 h and 4.0 h of heating (see
Figure 7).
At temperatures less than approximately 400 °C (when averaged over the beam length),
restrained thermal expansion effects caused two types of failures in the floor beams and girders:
Localized elevated temperatures in the concrete slab resulted in compressive failure through
crushing, and loss of composite action with the floor beams due to failure of concrete at shear
stud connections. This failure mechanism usually occurred at locations where fires were burning
and slab temperatures were much higher in a localized area. Slab tensile failures occurred when
14
beams and girders failed at their connections and the slab experienced reverse curvature over
Thermal expansion of beams and girders caused connection failures in the form of 1) bolt shear,
2) failure of welds, and 3) walk-off of the seated connections after bolts had sheared off. Shear
failure of bolts or failure of welds at the beam and girder web in header connections resulted in
In seated connections, the shear failure of bolts at the bearing seat and at the top clip or plate
caused loss of horizontal support, but not vertical support. Loss of vertical support occurred
when the beam or girder walked off the bearing seat or the bearing seat weld failed. Girder
walk-off occurred when the beams that framed into girders from one side thermally expanded
and the resulting axial compression forces pushed the girder laterally from one side, sheared the
bolts at the seated connection, and then continued to push the girder until it walked off the
bearing seat. Other factors that contributed to this failure were an absence of shear studs on the
girders, which would have provided lateral restraint, and the one-sided framing of the east
girders by the floor beams, which allowed the floor beams to push laterally on the girder when
thermally expanding.
On Floors 10, 11, and 12, tensile failure of knife connections caused the failure of the
connections between Columns 76 and 79. The tension was caused by the expansion of the
15
3.5 Failures Leading to Collapse Initiation
After 4.0 h of heating, the floor framing and slabs at Floors 8 to 14 were weakened by fires and
Columns 79, 80, and 81 had lost lateral support at several floors due to the failure of connections,
floor beams, and girders. The fire-induced failures of the floor framing resulted in increased
unsupported column lengths for Columns 79, 80, and 81. Figure 10 indicates failed floor beams
or girders in the pseudo-static analysis after 4.0 h, where failed members (by either buckling or
end connection failure) are shown as red and intact members as blue. Figure 99hows that at this
point in time, Column 79 was laterally unsupported at three floors in the east-west and north-
south directions, Columns 80 was laterally unsupported at one floor in the east-west and north-
south directions, and Column 81 was laterally unsupported at one floor in the north-south
direction.
The pseudo-static analysis performed by the pseudo-static model provided the response of the
structure to fire, but did not include the effect of the dynamics of failure and transfer of
momentum and kinetic energy of the failing components to the remaining parts of the structure.
To calculate the dynamic response of the structure and determine whether the failures resulted in
total collapse, a separate analysis using dynamic model was performed and the sequence of
failures were determined starting the analysis with the temperatures and the resulting cumulative
16
4.0 Summary
To address both the gradual response of the structure to fire before collapse initiation and the
rapid response of the structure during the collapse process, a two-phased structural analysis
approach was adopted for the analysis of WTC 7. In the first phase (this paper), a 16-story
pseudo-static finite element model was used to simulate the pseudo-static response of the
structure to the fire-induced temperatures time histories and the resulting structural failures. In
the second phase (Part II), a 47-story dynamic finite element model was used to simulate the
The 16-story pseudo-static model was developed to determine the structural response of WTC 7
to elevated temperatures resulting from fires on Floors 7 to 9 and Floors 11 to 13 that spread and
grew. The finite-element model represented columns, beams, girders, composite floor slab, and
connections. The model employed geometric and material nonlinearities, including temperature-
dependent material properties of steel and concrete, thermal expansion, stiffness and strength
degradation, and creep of steel at high temperatures. Temperature time histories for each node
were input at 30 min. intervals. Detailed connection models captured failure of connection
components, including bolt shear, plate tear-out, or beam walk-off from its seat. Failure criteria
shear studs within a composite floor system, buckling instability of beams and girders, and
crushing and cracking failures of concrete floor slabs were developed and used to remove failed
components.
17
Three different thermal response cases (Cases A, B, and C) were used as input to the pseudo-
static analysis, where the temperature data from simulations of observed fires (Case A) were
increased (Case B) and decreased (Case C) by 10 percent. This range modified the severity of the
fire in three ways: the local heat transfer to the structural members increased, the area over which
the structural members were heated increased, and the chance of hot zone overlap on adjacent
floors increased. The pseudo-static analyses had similar failure mechanisms and patterns, but
were shifted in time between the three cases. Case B failures occurred at the earliest time, and
The results of the pseudo-static analysis simulated a sequence of structural failure of beams and
girders by lateral torsional buckling and connection failures that led to collapse initiation in the
dynamic analysis. Collapse initiation was a result of fire-induced failures of connections, beams,
and girders in the lower floors that resulted in loss of lateral support for Column 79 over several
floors. The damage from falling debris and the failures predicted from the pseudo-static analysis
of the structural response to temperature histories over several hours were input into the dynamic
model as initial conditions to simulate the progression of structural failures and global collapse
The computational and time demands of the analyses pointed out that the following capabilities
18
- Beam elements that can be use for heat transfer and structural analysis. At present, solid
elements are used for heat transfer analyses and temperature data is manually applied to
- A computationally efficient concrete material model for shell elements that includes
- Parallel processing capabilities for elements that model failure (i.e., the user defined
6.0 References
ANSYS. (2007). ANSYS Mechanical Release 11.0, ANSYS Inc., Southpointe, 275 Technology
Frankel (1985), Frankel Steel Limited, Fabrication Shop Drawings, 7 World Trade Center.
Cilke, C. Navarro. (2005). Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers, NIST
NCSTAR 1-2B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
19
McAllister, T. P., R. G. Gann, J. D. Averill, J. L. Gross, W. L. Grosshandler, J. R. Lawson, K. B.
Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and
Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-9. National
MacNeill, R., S. Kirkpatrick, B. Peterson, and R. Bocchieri, (2008). Federal Building and Fire
Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Global Structural Analysis of the
Response of World Trade Center Building 7 to Fires and Debris Impact Damage. NIST
NCSTAR 1-9A. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, November.
NIST NCSTAR 1A. (2008). Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Building 7, NIST,
Rambo-Roddenberry, M.D., (2002). “Behavior and Strength of Welded Stud Shear Connectors”.
Ph.D. thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, April 8.
Sarawit, A.T., O.O. Erbay, Y. Kitane, M.S. Zarghamee, T.P. McAllister, J.L. Gross, (2010).
“Modeling Structural Response to Fire with Break Elements”. Submitted to the ASCE Journal of
20
McAllister. (2005). Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Component, Connection, and Subsystem Structural Analysis. NIST NCSTAR 1-6C.
21
Figure 1. WTC 7 analysis sequence (McAllister et. al. 2008).
22
N
23
1
ELEMENTS
MAY 29 2008
14:59:09
FL16
FL14 Upper
FL13 Superelement
FL12
FL11
FL10
FL9
FL8
FL7
Z
Lower
Y
X Superelement
FL1
N
WTC 7 16-Story Model
Figure 3. 16-story pseudo-static model representing lower 16 floors of the WTC 7 building.
The nonlinear part of the model subjected to thermal loading is shown in blue
(McAllister et. al. 2008).
24
5
100
600 30
80 4
500 25
Stress (MPa)
Stress (ksi)
60 400 20
Stress (ksi)
Stress (MPa)
300 15
40 2
200 10
20 1
100 5
0 0 0 0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003
Strain (in./in.) (mm/mm)
Strain (in./in.) (mm/mm)
T = 20 C T = 400 C T = 450 C
T = 20 C T = 100 C T = 200 C
T = 500 C T = 550 C T = 600 C
T = 650 C T = 700 C T = 750 C T = 300 C T = 400 C T = 500 C
T = 800 C T = 850 C T = 600 C T = 700 C T = 800 C
25
Col. 76
N
Col. 78
Note: Black colored dots show the location of shear studs and
connections modeled with break elements.
Figure 5. Area of the floor where connections modeled in detail using break elements
(McAllister et. al. 2008).
26
Coped beam at beam-
to-girder connections
Local z
Break element to model Beam element to model bolt
tear-out, (USER104) stiffness (BEAM4)
Local x
Beam element Elevation View of Fin
to model girder
(BEAM188) Connections
Beam element
to model floor beam
(BEAM188) Rigid beams Fillet weld
(BEAM4)
Figure 6. Analytical model for a fin connection (based on fabrication shop drawings,
Frankel 1985) (McAllister et. al. 2008).
27
1000
Column (Average)
Floor Girder (Average)
800 Slab Over Floor Girder (Top Surface)
Slab over Floor Girder (Bottom Surface)
Temperature (F)
Girder-to-Column Connection
600
400
200
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time (h)
1000
Column (Average)
Floor Beam (Average)
800 Slab Over Floor Beam (Top Surface)
Slab over Floor Beam (Bottom Surface)
Temperature (F)
Beam-to-Girder Connection
600
400
200
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time (h)
Figure 7. Temperature time-history of selected floor framing and slab at Floor 13.
28
Figure 8. Floor 13 framing temperatures at (a) 3.0 h, (b) 3.5 h, and (c) 4.0 h. (Temperature
scale range: 0 ºC to 675 ºC; temperatures > 675 ºC are grey.) ANSYS floor 13 beam and
girder failures (by buckling or end connection damage) at (d) 3.0 h, (e) 3.5 h, and (f) 4.0 h
(McAllister et. al. 2008).
29
Figure 9. Pseudo-static analysis beam and girder failures around Columns 79, 80, and 81 at
4.0 hr (McAllister et. al. 2008).
30
List of Figures
Figure 3. ANSYS 16-story model representing lower 16 floors of the WTC 7 building. The
nonlinear part of the model subjected to thermal loading is shown in blue (McAllister et. al.
2008).
Figure 5. Area of the floor where connections modeled in detail using break elements
(McAllister et. al. 2008).
Figure 6. ANSYS analytical model for a fin connection (based on fabrication shop drawings,
Frankel 1985) (McAllister et. al. 2008).
Figure 7. Axial force in girder between Column 76 and 79 at different floor elevations.
Figure 8. ANSYS floor 13 framing temperatures at (a) 3.0 h, (b) 3.5 h, and (c) 4.0 h.
(Temperature scale range: 0 ºC to 675 ºC; temperatures > 675 ºC are grey.) ANSYS floor 13
beam and girder failures (by buckling or end connection damage) at (d) 3.0 h, (e) 3.5 h, and (f)
4.0 h (McAllister et. al. 2008).
Figure 9. ANSYS beam and girder failures around Columns 79, 80, and 81 at 4.0 hr (McAllister
et. al. 2008).
31