Ub Dialogue Book - FINAL

International Conference - 2017
2017
ULAANBAATAR DIALOGUE ON
NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
Fouth International Conference
Ulaanbaatar
2017
Address: Address:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia Institute for Strategic Studies
Peace Avenue 7A, Ulaanbaatar Central P.O. Box 870, Sambuu Str. 11
14210, Mongolia Government Building-11, 8th floor
Tel: (976-51) 261533 15141, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
Fax: (976-11) 322127 Tel: (976) 51 266170
Website: www.mfa.gov.mn Fax: (976) 11 324055
Website:www.iss.gov.mn
CONTENTS
OPENING SESSION 6
H.E. Mr. ENKHBAYAR Jadamba 6
Dr. GANBAT Damba 8
Ms. Sonja BACHMANN 10
SESSION I
THE PARADIGM CHANGES OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN
NORTHEAST ASIA
The Evolving Security Regime in Northeast Asia: Challenges for China
Dr. FAN Xiaoju 15
DPRK’s Measures to Strengthen Self-Defensive Capability and Peace on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia
Mr. Ri Yong Phil 18
Evolution of the Northeast Asian Security Order
Dr. Seiichiro TAKAGI 23
Balance of Power and Power of Balancing
Mr. MASHBAT Otgonbayar 27
The Nuclear Threat of North Korea and Searching for a Way to Peace in
Northeast Asia: Analysis on North Korea’s Economy and Finding a Motivation
Dr. LEE Hyung-Seo 35
Prospects of Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Asia
Dr. Elena BOYKOVA 53
America’s Changing Role in Asia in the Era of Trump
Ms. Jenny TOWN 56
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SESSION II
THE PATH FORWARD: IMPROVING CURRENT SECURITY
SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Towards a Sustainable Security Community (SSC) in Northeast Asia
Dr. LIU Qing 60
The Abandonment of the US Hostile Policy towards the DPRK is a Prerequisite
for Ensuring the Lasting Peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region of
Northeast Asia
Mr. KIM Kwang Hak 63
Why Does the Cooperative Security Idea in Asia Not Succeed?
Prof. Noboru MIYAWAKI 68
Perspective on Building a Multilateral Regional Security Mechanism in
Northeast Asia: the Role of Mongolia
Mr. DORJSUREN Nanjin 71
Cooperative Multilateralism in Northeast Asia: Issues and Prospects
Dr. Sang Hyun LEE 79
New Regional Security System in Northeast Asia
Dr. Vladimir EVSEEV 85
America at War… with Itself, and What It Means for Security in Northeast Asia
Dr. Alexandre MANSOUROV 93
Multilateralism in East Asia and Europe and the Role of the European Union in
Facilitating East Asian Multilateralism
Dr. Eric BALLBACH 106
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SESSION III
IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
CONNECTIVITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Implications of Energy and Infrastructure in Northeast Asia
Dr. YANFEI Li 121
Mitigation of Climate Change: The Breakthrough to Come from Northeast Asia
Dr. ENKHBAYAR Shagdar 126
Initiatives and Future Perspectives of Northeast Asian Energy Interconnection
Mr. YEREN-ULZII Batmunkh 132
The New Energy Partnership Scenario of the NEA – From the Japanese
Perspective
Prof. Yu SHIBUTANI 137
SESSION IV
IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
SECURITY COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Ecological Security: Mongolia and the Northeast Asia
Dr. BATJARGAL Zamba 144
Environmental Disaster and Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia
Dr. CHU Jang Min 150
Natural Resources and Peace Building
Mr. Henrik SLOTTE 158
Regional Cooperation on DRR: Engagement of Mongolia 162
Lieut. Col. BAASANSUREN Demberelnyam 162
CLOSING SESSION 165
H.E. Mr. MUNKH-ORGIL Tsend 165
Dr. GANBAT Damba 167
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 168
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Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security
OPENING SESSION
H.E. Mr. ENKHBAYAR Jadamba

Chairman of the Standing Committee for Security and Foreign Policy
of the Parliament of Mongolia
Distinguished guests and participants
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the outset, I would like to express on behalf of the Parliament and Government of
Mongolia our sincere gratitude to you for your participation in this Conference to exchange
views and discuss opinions on the security issues in Northeast Asia.
One of the priorities of Mongolian foreign policy is “to maintain friendly bilateral
relations and cooperation with Asian countries, to be engaged in Asia-Pacific multilateral
cooperation, to lend proactive support to the policies and activities aimed at strengthening
strategic stability and security cooperation in East Asia, Northeast Asia and Central Asia”.
Within the framework of this guideline, Mongolia came forward in 2013 with an initiative
of “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” and the 4th International Conference
is being held this year.
Almost 30 years have passed since the end of the Cold War, but its remnants still exist
in Northeast Asia. Recent developments in the region further accelerate the military and
political confrontation, making peoples more anxious. Mongolia with its 25 year old nuclear-
weapon-free status reiterates its principled position on the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, that the concerned parties should display restraint, resolve accumulated disputes
and de-escalate the evolving tensions solely through means of dialogue and negotiations.
Northeast Asia is the only sub-region without any established mechanism of security
cooperation. Therefore, it is of vital importance to launch and actively promote a dialogue
for peace, mutual understanding and confidence building in the region. The main purpose
of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue initiative rests with this, and we consider that it should be an
open dialogue mechanism that allows discussing security issues with the participation of all
parties concerned. Compared to previous three conferences organized successfully at Track
2 level, we aimed to organize this year’s Conference at the level of Track 1.5.
Distinguished participants,
Today the traditional security issues should be considered in immediate connection with
sustainable economic growth, energy, and infrastructure and environment security. We need
to freely exchange our views on these subjects within the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue.
Northeast Asia ranks high in the world in terms of key factors of development with its
technology-rich economic potential, abundant natural and human resources. So, we need
to develop intensively and comprehensively mutually beneficial economic cooperation
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and promote integration process. Countries of our region came forward with a number
of important initiatives in this regard, and are working hard to achieve concrete results.
Among them I wish to highlight the Chinese Belt and Road initiative with its emphasis
on connectivity in policy, infrastructure, trade, finance, and people-to-people links, well as
Mongolia’s Development Road initiative.
International and regional organizations have conducted researches and offered valuable
recommendations on various issues in different areas. Thus, in its report issued early this
year the UNESCAP noted that “in addition to energy trade, the promotion of cross-border
energy investment is an essential part of subregional energy integration”. It also stressed
initiatives that promote ecologically friendly renewable energy consumption. For instance,
the Gobitec and the Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia project
is aimed at utilizing the abundant wind and solar energy available in the Gobi Desert of
Mongolia, which may have the potential for generating about 2600 terawatt-hours per year,
which is equivalent to about half of China’s total electricity generation in 2013.
We should also pay particular attention to environment security issues. Northeast Asia
has been affected the most by global warming during the last 50 years. Regional cooperation
is of utmost importance to this end and I believe that the sub-session to be held tomorrow
on environmental security would be beneficial for exchanging views on concrete ways and
means, coordinating our efforts in future.
Distinguished guests and participants,
I would like to stress once again that the Parliament and Government of Mongolia attach
great importance to this Conference. I am confident that during the conference you will
have many interesting presentations and exchange with valuable ideas and opinions. I wish
success in the work of the Conference.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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Dr. GANBAT Damba

Director, the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Mongolia
Honorable Member of Parliament, Mr. J. Enkhbayar,
Esteemed researchers and guests,
Honored Ambassadors,
It is my great pleasure to welcome you all to the 4th international conference on
“Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian security” initiated by President of Mongolia
Tsahiagyn Elbegdorj. On the behalf of Institute for Strategic Studies, I would like to extend
my appreciation to all participants and esteemed guests for attending this conference. Also
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia
for its generous support. Thank you.
As many researchers concluded, Mongolia is located in Northeast Asia. As a part of the
region and a member of the international community, Mongolia always strives to contribute
to the regional security and prosperity. In order to make own contributions to ensure security
and strengthen cooperation, President of Mongolia Ts. Elbegdorj initiated “Ulaanbaatar
Dialogue on Northeast Asian security” 4 years ago or during the 7th ministerial conference
of the Community of Democracies in April, 2013. Within the framework of this initiative,
the country successfully organized “Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians’ Meeting”,
“Northeast Asian Mayors’ Forum”, “Northeast Asian Energy Connectivity Workshop” and
a Youth Symposium. Since 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institute for Strategic
Studies, National Security Council has co-organized International Conference on Northeast
Asian Security and this is our 4th conference.
Security in Northeast Asia is complicated as international relations is. However, in these
days, regional security is getting more complex. In such a complicated time, on the behalf
of Institute for Strategic Studies, I would like to reiterate my appreciation to all participants
and esteemed guests for attending this conference.
In the beginning of “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue”, we aimed to include both government
officials and researchers in the international conference. To this end, the Institute for Strategic
Studies has been taking efforts in past years. This year, we have succeeded in our goal by
bringing together officials and non-officials in one hall. In other words, this year we are
going to organize a conference in Track 1.5 format. It is providing researchers and institutes
engaged in strengthening Northeast Asian security and cooperation with an opportunity
to ensure their research and analysis are reflected in decision making through government
officials. Furthermore, our institute will seek to expand the scope of the conference making
it a platform for researchers and experts to bring their research at the attention of decision
makers.
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In Northeast Asia, traditional security issues are still acute as we see. In recent years, North
Korea intensified its missile tests, while the United Nations approved resolutions to impose
sanctions on the country. It increases the importance of resolving difficult issues through
dialogue and peaceful means. In this time, we have given importance to topics which will
be discussed in each session of the international conference on the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on
Northeast Asia Security. For example, the first plenary session is to discuss pressing regional
issues within the topic of “The Paradigm Changes of Security Environment in Northeast
Asia”. Moreover, we want to engage in frank discussions on how to resolve security issues
through dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the second session entitled
“Improving Current Security Situation in Northeast Asia”. In other words, it is important
for us not only discuss the process but also means and opportunities to resolve the pressing
issues.
Despite traditional security issues, we are facing non-traditional security threats. Non-
traditional security threats will be discussed in day 2. Pressing issues hindering regional
energy connectivity and cooperation and means to resolve these issues will be discussed in
the sub-session entitled “Implications of Energy Connectivity in Northeast Asia”, while the
sub-session on “Implications of Environmental Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia” will
touch upon climate changes. With this session, we will able to exchange views and opinions
regarding how we can strengthen cooperation to fight against environmental degradation.
In Northeast Asia, there is a great potential of cooperation, especially economic
cooperation. It is because there are countries that have natural resource, enormous economic
potential and capacity to develop innovation and new technology. In particular, Northeast
Asian countries’ GDP accounts for 43 percent of the world economy while around 30
percent of the global population lives in the region. Moreover, Russia and Mongolia are
large exporters of raw materials, while energy demand of China, South Korea and Japan is
rapidly increasing. In the future, North Korea will be an active supplier as well as consumer
that will use its resources for the peaceful purposes. In this sense, we will always aim for
closer cooperation and building confidence.
In the today’s 4th international conference, over 100 participants from Mongolia, Russia,
China, DPRK, Japan, the ROK, the U.S., India, Germany, France and as well as international
organizations such as the United Nations and European Union are in attendance. This clearly
demonstrates that number of participants is growing from conference to conference.
Constructive discussions and interesting presentations are to take place and I have no
doubt that dialogue will be fruitful.
Thank you for the attention.
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Ms. Sonja BACHMANN

Senior Political Officer, Team leader Northeast Asia and the Pacific Team in the Asia
and the Pacific Division, UNDPA
Your Excellency, Chairman of the Committee on Security and Foreign Policy,
Mr. Enkhbayar Jadamba, Dr.Ganbat Damba
Excellences, Scholars, Friends:
Greeting from New York and the UN Department for Political Affairs. We are very happy
to support this important Dialogue and I would like to thank the Government of Mongolia
and the Institute for Strategic Studies for having the foresight to hold such interactions.
In particular in the face of a rise in intolerance, populism, social fragmentation, threats to
multilateralism and trust in global institutions, we need to redouble our efforts to stem the
crises that cause human suffering and have to make a fundamental shift from reacting to
crises to investing in early engagement to prevent tensions from becoming full-blown violent
conflicts. Our United Nations Secretary General recently called for a surge in preventive
diplomacy.
Secretary General Antonio Gutierrez has made prevention his highest priority. He recently
shared his vision, which positions prevention as the “golden threat” cutting across all areas
of the United Nations work- peace and security, development and human rights.
I am currently the Team leader for Northeast Asia and Pacific which is a vast and important
area. Northeast Asia alone is home to 1/5 of the world’s population and GDP. The role of
my Team includes keeping the UN Secretary-General and other senior officials informed of
developments and supporting their conflict prevention and peace building efforts.
As you are aware, there is concern about the current level of tensions on the Korean
Peninsula. In recent meetings and briefings to the Security Council, the Secretary General and
UN senior officials have always emphasized the importance of reopening and strengthening
channels of communication to avoid miscalculation and seek peaceful and diplomatic
solutions.
The partnership with Mongolia is very much appreciated as Mongolia has shown itself
as a responsible international actor in terms of its steady contribution to international
peacekeeping and its advocacy in new and emerging democracies and being a connector
through this dialogue platform.
Mongolia is vibrant democracy in the region that needs more champions including for
the participation of women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It is a strong leader in
a nuclear weapons free zone.
The connection between research and policy is critical to move issues forward nationally,
regionally and internationally, and I do hope that some of the ideas are taken back home and
feed into policy making.
We in UN are committed to exploring and finding solutions so when you see me around
don’t hesitate to approach me with ideas and I look very much forward to the discussions
over the next two days. Thank you again for the wonderful hospitality and opportunity.
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International Conference 2017
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13
SESSION I
THE PARADIGM CHANGES OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN

NORTHEAST ASIA
In Northeast Asia, economic interdependence among countries is considerably deepening.
However, there is a tendency for security environment in the region to deteriorate in the
upcoming years. Moreover, Northeast Asia is witnessing paradigm changes on security
environment in 2017, while the regional security has become more complex and intense
than it was in 2016. The region is also exposed to looming policy uncertainty demonstrated
by regional countries. Many of analysts note that tensions and instability on the Korean
Peninsula are escalating. This session will focus on potential changes and security challenges
concerning the region as a whole.
Moderator:
Col. MUNKH-OCHIR Dorjjugder, Director of Administration, Ministry of
Defense, Mongolia
Speakers:
The Evolving Security Regime in Northeast Asia: Challenges for China
Dr. FAN Xiaoju, Associate Research Professor and Deputy Director of Institute of
Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
China
DPRK’s Measures to Strengthen Self-Defensive Capability and Peace on the Korean
Peninsula and in Northeast Asia
Mr. RI Yong Phil, Vice president, Institute for American Studies (IFAS), DPRK
The Recent Developments in the Northeast Asian Security Order
Dr. Seiichiro TAKAGI, Senior Research Adviser, Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA), Japan
Balance of Power and Power of Balancing
Mr. MASHBAT Otgonbayar, Research Professor, Ulaanbaatar Policy Research
Institute, Mongolia
The Nuclear Threat of North Korea and Searching for How to Approach to the way of
Peace in Northeast Asia: Analyzing North Korea’s Economy and Finding a Motivation
Dr. LEE Hyung Seog, Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), ROK
Prospects of Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Asia
Dr. Elena BOYKOVA, Senior Researcher, Institute for Oriental Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences (RAS), the Russian Federation
America’s Role in East Asia Security under Trump
Ms. Jenny TOWN, Assistant Director, US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies, USA
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THE EVOLVING SECURITY REGIME IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

CHALLENGES FOR CHINA
Dr. FAN Xiaoju
Associate Research Professor and Deputy Director of Institute of Japanese Studies, China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China
Introduction
In recent years, there are many discussions about the impact of China’s rise on regional
security. In my opinion, it is equally important to address China’s security concerns in
Northeast Asia, in order to reach mutual understanding. From the perspective of China,
there have been some changes in the security environment in Northeast Asia recently. For
example, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been strengthened under the background of U.S.
strategy of rebalance and high tensions between China and Japan surrounding the contested
islands. This trend continues after President Trump took office. President Trump’s criticism
on Japan during the election campaign concerns Japan that the United States will abandon
its commitments to the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Abe made a lot of efforts to make
sure that the alliance is not weakening. In the meantime, Japan, led by Prime Minister Abe,
is trying to break away from “postwar regime” and to become a “normal state” with the right
to a military and to the exercise of collective self-defense. Along with the “normalizing”
process, the public’s sense of insecurity in Japan rises to a high level. Higher tensions in
the Korean Peninsula are a major reason for the anxiety. As in April this year, the U.S. sent
the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to waters close to the Korean Peninsula, and tensions rose
drastically. Rumors of a sixth nuclear test by Pyongyang and a pre-emptive strike on North
Korea and the like spread quickly, and it is even called April Crisis.
These changing elements intertwine with each other and make the security environment
in Northeast Asia more complicated and bring great challenges to China. To understand the
current situation, it is very important to explore the evolvement of the security regime in
Northeast Asia.
Incompletion of Postwar Settlement

In Northeast Asia, when we talk about tackling security challenges, it is unavoidable to
address the legacy issues. In regard to the postwar security regime in Northeast Asia, there
are different understandings. For Japan and the U.S., the San Francisco System created by
the Treaty of Peace with Japan, namely the San Francisco Treaty, and the Security Treaty
between the United States and Japan, is the cornerstone of the postwar regime. But countries
like China and Russia that are not part of the system does not take it as the foundation of the
postwar regime. Not only that, China advocates that the San Francisco Treaty is illegal and
invalid, and takes Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation as the legal basis for postwar
settlement. Russia shares the view as well. As a result, on one hand, China and Russia are
highly alert to Japan’s movement toward challenging the postwar order, and on the other
hand, there are opinions in Japan that accusing China of altering postwar regime.
Seen from the outside, it seems to be a problem of different understandings on the postwar
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regime, but the essential issue is the incompletion of the legal framework for postwar
settlement. Besides China and Russia, DPRK and ROK were also excluded from the San
Francisco treaty. Obviously, treaties unsigned by a country that directly affect its interests
should not be binding on this country. Therefore, the San Francisco system is not a complete
legal framework for postwar settlement. 3 out of the 4 parties excluded from the treaty,
namely China, Russia and Korea have territorial claims against Japan that have not been
resolved. Furthermore, the postwar settlement of the Korean War was also incomplete. The
Armistice Agreement failed to provide a legal ending to the Korean War, and Peace Treaty
hasn’t been signed yet.
As a result, most security issues in Northeast Asia directly relate to the incompletion
of postwar settlement. There are many consequences. For example, the repeated outbreaks
of historical issue between Japan and China, and between Japan and South Korea. There
are also risks of conflicts surrounding territorial disputes, especially between Japan and
China. Due to the legacy issues, political mutual trust between nations in Northeast Asia
is very difficult to build. And the most profound impact is probably the worsening national
sentiment toward each other.
The Institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

The U.S.-Japan alliance is one part of the San Francisco System, and its main purpose
is to serve the U.S. strategic interests in Asia-Pacific region and to address Japan’s security
concerns. The alliance adjusts along with the changes of the international situation. For
example, the revision to the guidelines on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in 2015 is the latest
adjustment and symbolized the institutionalization of the alliance. However, the process of
adjustment lasted for many years. And the direction of the adjustment has not always been
strengthening the alliance. In the year 2009, the then Prime Minister of Japan, Hatoyama,
advocated a more equal alliance and declared to move a dangerous U.S. marine corps
air station out of Okinawa prefecture. This was the reflection of anti-U.S. base sentiment
in Japan. But Prime Minister Hatoyama failed. Thereafter, more equal alliance is out of
question. When Prime Minister Abe took office, the political agenda became “normalization”
and clinging to the U.S.
It is worth mentioning that after Prime Minister Hatoyama step down, the security
situation in the Korean Peninsula deteriorated and it affected Japan’s perception of its
security environment. Especially after tensions in East China Sea rose drastically in 2012,
Japan became very active in pursuing strengthening of the alliance. In order to have the
U.S. security commitment on the contested islands and intervention at the early stage in
case conflicts occurs in East China Sea, Japan began to consider exercising the collective
self-defense. By doing so, Japan could contribute more to the alliance and ensure seamless
military cooperation with the U.S. It is fair to say that “China threat” also serves as a reason
for the institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The implication of the institutionalization of the alliance for China is two-sided. It makes
the peaceful solution for the territorial dispute more difficult since Japan chooses to utilize
military deterrence of the alliance instead of diplomatic efforts. And risks of conflicts get
higher. At the same time, because Japan relies more on the U.S., it seems to China that it
becomes more important to develop bilateral relations with the U.S. rather than with Japan.
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And I have to say that these two consequences are both negative elements for Sino-Japanese
relations.
Instrumentalization of the Korean Peninsula Issue

Recent tensions showed that, when the security situation in the Korean Peninsula
deteriorated, China faces great pressure. At the same time, tensions provide the U.S. reasons
to pressure both DPRK and China and to promote military deployment in Northeast Asia.
Although Japan is upset about a potential conflict in the Korean Peninsula, so long as a war is
not likely to happen, some degree of tension serves Japan’s interest in “normalization”. There
is a tendency that the Korean Peninsula issue is instrumentalizing. And I think this situation
is very dangerous for all the parties. To ease the tension, China proposed the “suspension-
for-suspension proposal,” and the “parallel-track approach”. It is the most feasible solution
at the current stage. For the sake of real peace in the Korean Peninsula, it is very important
for the U.S. and DPRK come to the negotiation table
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DPRK’S MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN SELF-DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY

AND PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Mr. Ri Yong Phil

Vice president, Institute for American Studies (IFAS), MFA, DPRK
Peace is a century-long cherished desire of the Korean people who have been living in
constant war danger. The history of the DPRK is the one of hard struggle to frustrate the US
war maneuvers and to achieve durable peace.
One year since the 3rd round meeting of UB Dialogue isn’t exceptional. The DPRK has
strengthened its self-defensive forces of the DPRK at the highest speed against the nuclear
war provocations staged by the US at the extremely reckless phase.
I would like to give a presentation on the essence of measures taken by the DPRK in two
parts.
The inevitable choice to safeguard national sovereignty and right to existence
Last one year, the DPRK has taken measures to bolster its nuclear deterrent in multi-
phase and sequence with extremely high speed.
It successfully did multiple test-fires of ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic
ballistic missile Hwasong-10 in June, just after the 3rd round of UB Dialogue and submarine
launched ballistic missile in August as well as the explosion of nuclear warhead and ground
test of grand power engine for geo-stationary satellite delivery rocket in September.
In 2017, the world witnessed the successful test-fire of ground-to-ground medium-
to-long range strategic ballistic missile Pukguksong-2, in February. May was past with
successful test fires of new-type ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic ballistic
missile Hwasong-12, ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic ballistic missile
Pukguksong-2 before its deployment at military units for action and a new-type of ballistic
rocket equipped with precision guidance system. Most recently the DPRK successfully
tested a new ground-to-sea cruise missile that is capable of striking enemy battleships.
The purpose of strengthening military power in peaceful times could be either for
dominance over the region and the world or for preparation to invade the others. It might
also aim at defending itself from the imminent threat.
Korea is a peace-loving nation with no history of invasion upon the others, which is
completely different from the US and Japan. I think none of the participants in this meeting
believe the DPRK, a small and divided country, is bolstering up its nuclear forces in pursuit
of any sort of regional or worldwide dominance or chance to invade the others.
The action taken by the DPRK to bolster its nuclear forces is none other than inevitable
choice to safeguard the sovereignty and the right to existence of the DPRK and peace from
vicious nuclear blackmail and threats of the US. It is well known that Truman, the then U.S.
president, talked about possible use of A-Bomb in Korean War and McArthur, commander
of the US Far-East forces, publicly advocated its plan of dropping 30 to 50 A-Bombs to the
border strip between the DPRK and China. Even after Korean war, the US, widely talking
about so called “bitter lesson” of failing to use A-bomb in the war, made it public its plan
to equip US troops in South Korea with nuclear arms and went far to deploy 1,000 different
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types of nuclear weapons. Since then the US maximized its nuclear blackmail and threat to
the DPRK by mobilizing aggressive nuclear forces in huge scale and staging nuclear war
drills against the DPRK on regular basis.
It is an undeniable historical fact and vivid reality that the DPRK has been under serious
nuclear threat from the very first stage of the appearance of nuclear weapons in the world and
remain a target for nuclear attack by the US.
As well understood, there are two ways in principle to maintain peace.
One is to establish durable peace regime through the conclusion of a peace treaty between
parties concerned and the other is to get strong enough to prevent a war relying on physical
deterrent. The DPRK initiated many proposals for the replacement of Armistice Agreement
with Peace treaty in order to officially put an end to the Korean war and establish peace
regime and exerted energetic efforts to realize it. As a result of the DPRK’s sincere efforts
and vigorous struggle, a resolution was adopted at the 35th general assembly of UN in 1975,
calling for the US to withdraw its aggression troops from South Korea and conclude the
peace treaty with the DPRK.
Nonetheless, the US has rejected those proposals and UN resolution for peace treaty
and imposed grave nuclear war threat on the DPRK while introducing its aggressive
forces into South Korea and to the vicinity of the Korean peninsula. Whenever the US
administration changed, they tried to differentiate its own policy towards the DPRK from
the predecessors. However its inveterate repugnance and wicked ambition to bring down the
system remained unchanged. This year as well, new administration took office replacing the
Obama administration fussing over ‘the end of strategic patience’. However, it developed to
be more aggressive and offensive in its nuclear blackmail and threat and went even further
to set out nuclear war scenarios one another aiming at the overturn of the DPRK government
and beheading operation plan to be introduced into practice. As for this year only, the US
mobilized its aggressive forces and nuclear strategic assets such as nuclear powered aircraft
carrier strike groups and strategic bombers in huge scale enough to wage war and unfolded
a frenzied war racket aiming at preemptive attack on the DPRK. Recently, the authorities
of the Trump Administration are calling for browbeating the DPRK by force of arms and
bringing nuclear aircraft carrier strike groups one after another to the waters off the Korean
Peninsula.
The history of the confrontation between the DPRK and the US and the severe reality
in which justice is being mangled by force, clearly proves that only powerful strength can
ensure the existence and peace of the nation. As an inevitable measure to deter ever-increasing
nuclear blackmail and threat from the US who desperately turned down all proposals for the
establishment of peace regime through conclusion of peace agreement, the DPRK had no
choice but to take the way of possessing powerful nuclear deterrent to remove the nuclear
war danger from the US.
The DPRK sincerely loves peace but it neither fears a war nor wants to avoid it. It is an
unshakable will of the DPRK to go to the end if the US wants to remain unchanged in its
confrontational stance.
Today, the DPRK has become the nuclear power in Eastern hemisphere and Rocket
leading power in Asia.
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It is now able to immediately counter-strike not only the pacific operational theatre but
also the mainland of the US if the US attacks the DPRK and can afford to take preemptive
strike once confirmed the US’s preemptive strike as real. In a word, the DPRK, a small
country in terms of population and territory, has been continuously compelled to put precious
resources into the national defense industry while tightening its belt for over half a century
and is being driven to further strengthen its defense capability in compliance with the line
of simultaneously carrying on the economic construction and the upbuilding of the nuclear
deterrent in order to cope with the vicious nuclear threat and blackmail of the US. The
strengthened military might of the DPRK has put an end to the history of the US’s unilateral
nuclear threat and blackmail to the DPRK and provides the Korean peninsula and the region
with solid foundation and guarantee for durable peace.
The strategic choice to ensure durable peace in the region
The reason why there exists no durable peace regime so far on the Korean peninsula
and in the region since the end of cold war era, lies in the US’s ambition and strategy for
hegemony over Asia-pacific region and the world.
From the consideration of the importance to attain dominance over the Asia, Northeast
Asia in particular, in the process of realizing its world dominant strategy, the US, which is
located across the pacific, actively and deeply involved itself in the Northeast Asian affairs
with special endearment or affection for the title of ‘Asia-pacific’. Therefore, peace prevailing
on the Korean peninsula is the most undesirable scenario for the US. Once military tension
eased and peace prevailed on the Korean peninsula, the US is due to lose its reason or pretext
to foot on Asia and its leverage towards China and Russia considered as main adversaries.
Advocating his ‘Three Edges’ strategy for world dominance, Brejinsky who served as a
national security adviser to the US president used to emphasize the geo-political importance
of the Korean peninsula.
Once military tension eased on the Korean peninsula, it would take good reason from the
US to have its troop stationed in South Korea and lead to disappearance of its bridgehead
to contain the regional powers while weakening the dependency of Japan and South Korea
upon the US. It means that the US should be confronted with ultimate bankruptcy in its
Asia-pacific dominant strategy. It is the very reason why the US enforced its deployment of
THAAD in the South Korea and puts spur to its moves to build up tripartite alliance with
Japan and South Korea.
The action taken by the DPRK to strengthen its nuclear deterrent is a strategic choice to
safeguard peace in the region and the world by frustrating the US’s moves to realize its world
dominant strategy footed itself on the Korean peninsula.
Due to its important geo-political location, the Korean peninsula historically has remained
the target for invasion of foreign powers and turned into the hottest spot in the world since the
end of the World War Ⅱ where the strategic interests between East and the West are sharply
confronted. The bitter memory of being a colony of the Japanese imperialists still rankles
in the hearts of the Korean people. Even after the collapse of the cold war structure, there
prevails severe confrontation around the Korean peninsula among the strategic adversaries
such as Russia and China, the nuclear powers, and the US, the biggest nuclear power, allied
with Japan and South Korea. An accidental conflict on the Korean peninsula could lead to
a worldwide nuclear war in an instant as the Korean peninsula is the strategic point where
- 20 -
the US’s Asia-pacific dominant strategy runs counter to the other nuclear powers’ strategic
interests and where prevails high density of military forces in a worldwide scale. The DPRK,
where used to be the only nuclear vacuum in Northeast Asia, has become a frontline to
ensure strategic balance and to reliably safeguard the peace and security by having access to
self-defensive nuclear deterrent.
This year, story of ‘April war’ and ‘April crisis’ on the Korean peninsula were widely
spread due to the reckless military strike attempt of the Trump administration. After all, that
story turned out to be rumors thanks to powerful nuclear deterrent of the DPRK.
It is a philosophical principle proven by the history of the international politics that peace
could be ensured by maintaining the strategic balance. The US’s access to the nuke for the
first time in the world brought about strategic imbalance amongst big powers last century
and followed by the access to nukes of former Soviet Union as well as UK and France to
keep strategic imbalance in check. Bending all national efforts and resources, China also
managed to successfully conduct its nuclear test in 1964 and later succeeded in H-bomb test
and satellite launch under the great pressure imposed by the existing nuclear powers who
were desperate to make a monopoly of nuke. It is unthinkable that long-standing strategic
adversaries unclenched their fists to shake hands and came to advocate peaceful coexistence
together apart from maintenance of strategic balance relying on the nuclear deterrent.
The action taken by the DPRK is the exercise of sovereignty to safeguard international
justice in real sense. The undisguised high-handedness and arbitrariness of the US keep on
violating the sovereignty of small and weak countries and disturbing the international peace
and stability.
Bloody tragedies happened in Gulf War in 1991, airstrike of the US and NATO on
Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghan War in 2001, and Iraqi War in 2003, keep reminding us of the
truth that it is impossible to defend national sovereignty and the right to existence as well as
peace and stability without powerful self-defensive might. Only nuclear deterrent can cope
with the enemy equipped with nuclear weapons.
It is a bitter lesson drawn from the Libya, who lost its sovereignty and got devastated in
the civil war after giving up its nuclear program under the pressure of the US.
Taking part in Saint-Petersburg International Economic Forum several days before,
Russian president Vladimir Putin said, quote; “as long as the law of jungle is enforced,
the world is to continuously witness serious issues like the one of the DPRK. Small
countries believe that the access of the nuclear weapon is the only way of defending
their independence, security and sovereignty.” His remarks clearly reflect the unfairness
of the current international order. It is today’s reality that the exercise of legitimate right
of a sovereign state is denounced as the illegal and provocation according to the double
standards which was unilaterally fabricated by the US for its own sake. It is also reality that
the UNSC turns a blind eye on the nuclear threat being posed by its permanent member state
to other country, the missile attack made by the member state on a non-nuclear state and the
spy satellite and missile launches conducted by its “allies.”At the same time, it is still an
undeniable reality that the nuclear force of the DPRK serves as balance weight to prevent
nuclear holocaust on the Korean peninsula and safeguard peace in the region, contributing
to the establishment of fair international order.
- 21 -
The nuclear deterrent of the DPRK is the supreme interests neither to be infringed upon
nor to be exchanged for as long as there exist nuclear threat on earth. The US administration
takes the DPRK nuclear deterrent as the major obstacle in the context of its strategy for the
world supremacy and Asia-pacific dominance. Therefore they have been following their
tenacious pursuits to deprive the DPRK of nuclear deterrent. Tuning to the US’s claim,
some countries argue that the action taken by the DPRK gives the US good excuse for the
reinforcement of military hardware such as THAAD deployment in South Korea as well as
solidification of military alliance in the Asia-Pacific area. Their logic is something like a
neighbor’s self-defensive measure gets warmongers busy reinforcing their powers.
History shows that the nuclear powers which had opened the cold war era shook hands
each other on the basis of common ambition for their monopolized position as a nuclear
power. And even now some countries are ignoring the objective reality and the international
justice while putting their interests above all. The reality reinforces the truth of history that
peace is not offered by others but has to be defended by one’s own strength.
All the measures taken by the DPRK to strengthen nuclear deterrent are not the ones taken
as temporary countermeasures to cope with rapidly-changing situation or any bargaining
chips to be put on the table for negotiation, but the inevitable and strategic choice for the
national security and regional peace. In the real sense of the word, the DPRK is a full-fledged
nuclear power and rocket leading power in Asia regardless of anyone’s recognition.
The enemy that our nuclear deterrent deals with is the nuclear war itself which the US
is trying to ignite on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Its righteous nature and
mission will never be changed as long as there remains the threat of nuclear war on earth.
As the respected supreme leader Comrade Kim Jong Un clarified, the DPRK will
continuously exert its efforts to uproot the cause of nuclear war imposed by the US on the
Korean peninsula and safeguard peace in the region and the world, relying on the powerful
nuclear deterrent.
- 22 -
EVOLUTION OF THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ORDER
Dr. Seiichiro TAKAGI

Senior Research Advisor, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Japan
I. Formation of the post-Cold War regional security system

1. Basic structure: Establishment by mid-1990s
* Duality:
- U.S.-centered alliance system plus: “Hub and spoke”
- The security dialogue mechanism
* Establishment by mid-1990s
I-2. Formation of the security dialogue mechanism
1) Earlier attempts
*The end of the Cold War in Europe:
- The stimuli from the OSCE experience
*The South China Sea Workshop (1990): Track II
*North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (1990)
*ASEAN-ISIS discussion (1990)
2) Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum
* ASEAN-ISIS proposal (1991):
* ASEAN-PMC Joint Statement (1991)
*ASEAN-MM decision (1993)
*The first meeting (1994)
I- 2. Reaffirmation of the Japan-US security alliance
1) Drift after the end of the Cold War
- Coincidence with trade frictions
- Cultural heterogeneity
- Gulf War: “Checkbook diplomacy”
2) Japan’s reaffirmation:
- Higuchi Commission report (Aug. 1994), NDPO (Nov. 1995)
3) US reaffirmation: Nye Report (Feb. 1995)
4) Joint Declaration on Security (April 1996)
(1) Purpose: Regional uncertainties and instabilities (No potential enemy)
(2) Strengthening of cooperation
- Revision of the Defense Cooperation Guideline of 1978
- Joint study on BMD
- ACSA
- SACO
(3) China: Shared interest in its “constructive role” (NOT Post-Soviet threat)
5) New Defense cooperation Guideline (September 1997)
* Three situations: Normalcy, Attack on Japan, SIASJ
II. Two contrasting views on the duality
1. Compatibility
* Japan:
- Active involvement in the creation of the ARF: Nakayama speech (July 1991)
- 23 -
- Participation and reaffirmation in NDPO (1995)

- Promotion of evolution into the preventive diplomacy (late 1990s)
* Republic of Korea
2. Incompatibility: China
* Harsh criticism on the reaffirmation of the Japan-US security alliance
- Military alliance: the “relic of the cold war” unfit for the post-CW era
* New Security Concept (1997):
- Cooperative security with Chinese characteristics
* Active involvement in the ARF
* Strategic partnership with Russia:
- Not military alliance
- Promotion of multi-polarity
III. Developments in multilateral security cooperation
1. ASEAN Regional Forum
*Almost simultaneous start of the track 2 process: CSACAP
*Some success in promotion of transparency: China’s defense white papers
*Difficulty in evolving into the next stage
- 1995 Concept Paper: CBM -> Preventive Diplomacy -> Conflict Resolution
*Progress in non-traditional security cooperation: DiREx (since 2009)
2. Multiplication of dialogue mechanism: Limited progress in action orientation
*ASEAN+3 (1997): Food security, financial system, trans-border crimes
*Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001): International terrorism
*(APEC since Oct. 2001: International terrorism)
*Shangri-La Dialogue (2002)
*Six-Party Talks (2003): Joint Statement (2005)
- North Korean nuclear development, sub-regional security system
*ReCAAP (2006): Piracy and armed robbery against ships
*ADMM Plus (2010): HADR joint exercice (2013)
*Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF, Sept. 2012)
*Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (2014)
IV. The evolution of the U.S.-centered alliance system
1. Japan-US bilateral cooperation
1) Follow-up on the Joint Declaration
* The SIASJ Security Law (1999)
* Joint technical research for the missile defense (1999): Taepodong launch
(1998)
2) Cooperation on the post-911 war on terror
* Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law (2001): “Show the flag”
- Supply of oil by MSDF vessels to the Coalition vessels in the Indian Ocean
- Ariel transportation assistance by the ASDF
*Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq
(2003)
- “Boots on the ground”
- After the end of major combat operations
3) Reformulation of the alliance
- 24 -
*Mutual recognition of the “global significance” of the alliance (Summit, May

2003)
*Agreement on the framework of the consultation
- Three stages: (1) Joint strategic objective; (2) Role, mission and capability; (3)
bases
- 2+2
* Common Strategic Objectives (February 2009)
*Mission, roles, and capability (October 2005)
* Roadmap for the base re-organization (May 2006)
* Alliance transformation (May 2007)
4) Slowdown by the change of Japanese government (2009 to 2012)
* Okinawa base relocation
* Limited progress: “Dynamic defense cooperation” (2+2, April 2012)
5) Acceleration by the return of the LDP to power under Abe (Dec. 2012-- )
*Act on the Specially Designated Secrets (Dec. 2013)
*New Constitutional interpretation on the right to collective self-defense
*New Defense Cooperation Guideline (April 2015)
-Alliance Coordination Mechanism
*New Peace and Security legislation (September 2015)
6) Trump shock
*Disturbance by the campaign rhetoric
*Correction by Mattis visit to Japan (February 2017): HNS as the model
*Summit Joint Statement (February 2017)
- Reaffirmations: Extended deterrence, Senkaku
V-2. Evolution: Connecting spokes (into a set of trilateral ties)
1) Japan-U.S.-Australia
*Summit (2007, 2014): Emphasis on security cooperation
*Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue
- 2006 [twice], 2008, 2009, 2013, 2016
*Defense Ministers’ Meeting: 2007, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017
*Joint Exercise: 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016
<Japan-Australia bilateral security cooperation>
- Japan-Australia Summit
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2007)
- Japan-Australia 2+2 (2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015)
- Japan-Australia ACSA (2010, revised 2017)
- Joint naval exercice (2015, 2016)
2) Japan-U.S.-ROK
* Summit (March 2014, March 2016): Necessity of security cooperation
* Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2009, 2010, 2013)
* Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (2012, 2013, 2014)
* Joint exercise
- Japanese observer in U.S.-ROK joint exercise (2010)
- ROK observer in Japan-U.S. joint exercise (2010)
- Genuine joint exercise (2012, 2013, 2014)
- 25 -
* Limitation
-Difficulties in J-ROK security cooperation: GSOMIA last-minute failure (2012)
Trilateral information-sharing on NK nuclear and missile among defense
authorities (Dec. 2014)
[J-RoK GSOMIA, Nov. 2016]
3) Japan-U.S.-India: Connecting bilateral strategic partnerships
* Assistant Secretary-level security dialogue:
- 2011, 2012(x2), 2013(x2), 2014, 2015, 2016
*Foreign Ministers’ meeting: 2015
* Joint Exercise (Malabar): 2007, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2016
V. New Developments: China’s new approach to the duality ?
1. Subtle but important change in the assessment of the military alliance
(1) Xi Jinping’s CICA speech (May 2014): Persistence of the old view
“To beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party is not
conducive to maintaining common security.”
(2) “Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation” White Paper (January 2017): New
approach?
* “In this region there are ASEAN-led security cooperation mechanisms and
platforms such as the SCO and CICA as well as military alliances formed in
history. …it will be normal to see multiple mechanisms advancing together in
the evolution of a regional security framework.”
* Demand on the “relevant bilateral military alliances”:
- “..be made more transparent and avoid confrontation, so as to play a
constructive role in the sphere of regional peace and stability.”
2. Belt and Road Initiative: Suggestions in the Beijing summit communique (May
2017)
* Reference to common values
- Rule-based trading order, level playing-field, universally recognized
international norms, democracy, good governance, the rule of law, human rights,
gender equality
* Emphasis on not creating an alternative order: “Docking with existing systems”
- AIIB: Joint financing with ADB
- 26 -
BALANCE OF POWER AND POWER OF BALANCING
Mr. MASHBAT Otgonbayar

Research Professor, Ulaanbaatar Policy Research Institute, Mongolia
Introduction
I was tasked to talk about “Northeast Asia and Power of Balance” issues. First, I
thought, it was a typo; it should have been “balance of power”, instead of “power of balance”.
I have corresponded with ISS organizers several times, when the typo has appeared and who
made it is unknown, but email conversations say that we were keeping “Power of Balance”
terms in quite number of times. Later, I thought, why not to write about “power of balance?”
I liked the idea, I never changed the term nor notified ISS about it. It was a wonderful little
typo that many interesting new ideas popped up one after another. I had to catch up them
before it faded away although there were mainly mutually contradicting and it was my task
to systemize them to explain the present world order and regional situation.
Key words: Balance of power, power of balancing, North East Asia, China.
Power of balance that balances the balance of power
The first and foremost, “power of balancing” is based on balance of power theory and
basic assumptions are all admitted. Nation-state is the main actor of the international system
and the world order is defined by their relations, among which instruments and resources
for achieving their respective goals are unevenly distributed. This distribution is called the
balance of power. Peace is only possible if the balance of power exists, if not there will be a
war. War ends by establishment of a new balance of power among the nation-states1.
Some term should be added and distinguished besides “balance of power”, which is
an established term in international theory. “Power of balance” is defined the influence of
existing balance of power to the behaviors of regional, middle and small powers. Power
of balance after WW2 had eventually drove the West to the unity under U.S. leadership to
confront the U.S.S.R. East European countries all have purposed to join NATO after the
Cold War, which was power of balance of post-Cold War era. Every system has its order
and power of balance refers to how members of the international system is ordered due to
existing balance of power as a main attractor of the system.
“Balancing power” is about a nation-state that balances other for a relatively smaller
nation. For example, the United States was a balancing power for Japan against the Soviet
Union during the Cold War and continues to be one against rising China today. For Mongolia
as a buffer state, Russia is a balancing power against China and vice versa.
“Power of balancing” refers to a set of strategies of a nation-state that plays around
balancing powers. Mongolia has a power of balancing in regard to Russia and China, two
giant neighbors. Depending on whose side it will take or whom to bandwagon, one of them
takes an advantage over other. External balancing and bandwagoning are the two main
strategies in set of power of balancing; first is strengthens it, second loosens.
1 Kenneth Waltz
- 27 -
Secondly, hegemony is only possible if the hegemon has set of infrastructures that
assists to sustain its interest in global and regional levels alike, which I call here as status quo
power-institutions. Revisionist power has basically two options to challenge the hegemon:
first, it should strengthen its position in existing global and regional organizations against
the hegemon and advance its leadership in the system declining the primacy of the hegemon;
and second, it should build an alternative infrastructure that challenges status quo power and
its infrastructure as whole.
The institutional explanation of Western order developed by John Ikenberry frames
this argument. Since the WW2, relations of the nation-states are institutionalized, by which
means alliances were formed. North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact, both
are self-explaining; moreover, NATO and other institutions such as IMF and World Bank
are still a binding institution of the western power. After the Cold War, the United States
have become the single great power in the world along with its allies, since which so called
unipolar system is in place.
The bond was still in place, even after more than two decades since the collapse
of the bipolar world order. Moreover, these institutions have cemented “the persistence
of American postwar power”2 and leadership role in the world, having a “lock-in” effect,
meanwhile reducing the cost of dominance.3
Necessary condition for building such alliance is great power’s self-imposed
strategic restraint and commitment to abide the rules that commonly agreed on. Meanwhile,
democratic and open decision-making process in hegemonic power promotes secondary
states what to expect from the lead nation or helps to calculate hegemon’s intent. With “voice
opportunities”, member states also assured to constrain the hegemon to be dominated.
“In effect, the United States agreed to move toward an institutionalized and agreed-
upon political process and to limit its power - made credible by ‘sticky’ institutions and open
politics - in exchange for the acquiescence and compliant participation of secondary states”4.
Because of calculation of secondary states that Russia will never self-impose strategic
restraint nor any credible mean to do so, all Moscow backed alliances were failed such as
Commonwealth of Independent States and continues to fail in case of Eurasian Economic
Union unless China supports it. With its innocent enough history that powerful China was
always a peace-loving empire and never invaded others, Beijing might gain cooperation of
other nations although its recent ejection of the decision of the international arbitral tribunal
based on an appeal by the Philippines on Chinese building of a new artificial islands ruined
this hope.
Sufficient condition of such power infrastructure properly worked was defined by the
fact that every nation in the system had power of balancing, which allowed them collectively
constraint U.S. dominance if needed. It is conditioned by U.S. “reluctance” to dominate
over other states, “openness” of its politics and institutions that bound them all in the same
principles and rules.
2 John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Persistence of American Postwar Order”,
International Security, Vol.23, No.3, (Winter 1998/99)
3 Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and Persistence of American Postwar Order”,
4 Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and Persistence of American Postwar Order”, 54-55
- 28 -
Chinese strategy: balancing power and power of balancing

Present balance of power can be modelled as a power triangle among the Washington,
Beijing and Moscow. Washington represents a status quo power with its power-institutions
such as IMF, WB, and other regional installations like NATO, ASEAN and bilateral security
arrangements with Japan and ROK. Two decades later since Soviet disintegration and fall
of Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the power-institutions that Moscow enjoyed, Russia tries
again to strengthen its power building a new set of regional institutions such as SCO and
Eurasian Economic Union. China plays with both status quo and revisionist power as a pivot
balancing one against other to maximize its interest.
Beijing has a power of balancing and carefully plays with two games simultaneously,
trying to maximize its gain from both.
If China’s demands can be accommodated through negotiations with the US and other
powers to increase China’s voice and weight in the existing institutions and adjustment to
tweaking of some rules, China would not necessarily become a revolutionary power.5
Zhao’s description gives a good understanding about the twofold games, but also put
more questions than answers, which extend “China’s voice and weight” shall be increased
to satisfy it and etc.
China – the balancing power in the status quo power-institutions:
In this game, there are three actors basically; the United States, China and members
of the status quo power-institutions as whole. The United States and the western primacy
has been seriously declined after 2008 economic crisis although still hold the power to rule
the world system.
The most profound disturbance of 2008 was not the actual economic downturn, but
the fact that the United States was epicenter of the crisis. The post-Cold War era was of
worrying about American unilateralism was over. The problem now was American weakness
and its inability to restore global order. The new era was and remains identified with global
economic uncertainty.6
As a status quo power, the United States interest is to keep its dominance, but to
reduce its cost as possible since it has barely revitalized from the economic recession in
2008. New Presidents call for “make America great again” shows that President Trump has
accepted the fact that today the United States is not great as it was a decade ago. Meanwhile,
Washington’s called China and demanded to increase its role in deal of denuclearization of
the DPRK. Presidents also demanded in NATO members to increase their role and share the
burden.
As for members of power-institutions, their institutional interest is to survive and keep
their status quo power as institution. Reasons is not surprising; members of these institutions
still benefit the current system that they regulate together and share common fear that the
new rising power might change whole international system and ruin the institution that they
had a fair return regardless small or big.
5 Zhao, “China as a Rising Power Versus the US-led World Order”, 14.
6 Womak, Brantly, “China and the Future Status Quo”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2015,
Vol.8, No.2, 124-125
- 29 -
Choice of strategy of the members of the status quo power-institutions is simple

enough; increasing member states power of balancing in regard to the United States and
China. Inclusiveness, therefore, is strategic. Although RMB is “quite a way” from true global
reserve currency status”7, IMF has accepted it in its basket of Special Drawing Rights and
this is the first time that a new currency has been added to the basket since the euro replaced
the French franc and the Deutsche mark in 1999.
As Andrew Tweedie (Director of the IMF’s Finance Department) said.8 Moreover,
the world economic system needs China to be accommodated as its role in the international
business become fundamental as it is the second biggest economy of the world. The increasing
importance of the Chinese economy determined that the 2015 review should focus on the
building blocks relevant for the determination of whether to include the RMB in the basket.9
World economy, as an institution and IMF as one of the main regulating element of it,
needs to share U.S. leadership with China for sake of whole system as it shows. May who
leads the system - Washington or Beijing - might be secondary question unless it keeps the
current world order, including economic system functional.
China also feels the power in this game, and agrees to become a balancing power in
the institutions. Beijing recently began to make statement that recognizing it is an integral
part of this status quo power-institution and ready to take leadership role. Chinese President
Xi Jinping said in G20 summit that;
To brave through the rough waters of world economy and start a new journey for
future growth, it's good to know that we are in the same boat... Let's make Hangzhou a new
departure point and steer the giant ship of global economy on a new voyage from the shore
of the Qiantang River to the vast ocean10, which is clear indication of Chinese ambition.
Moreover, president Xi has also “impassionedly” defended the globalization during the
World Economic Forum in 2017.11
China is a balancing power that helps to survive the current system.
China - power of balancing between the status quo and revisionist power
In this game, there are three actors; U.S. led status quo power, China and Russia.
Purpose of the game is dominance; replacing the status quo power by revisionist power.
Russia as a revisionist power strives to change the present world order. Moscow’s
7 Taplin, Nathaniel, “China’s Yuan Just Joined An Elite Club Of International Monetary Fund Reserve
Currencies” Reuter, (October 3, 2016) http://fortune.com/2016/10/02/china-yuan-imf-currencies/
8 Tweedie, Andrew (Director of the IMF’s Finance Department), “IMF Adds Chinese Reminbi to Special
Drawing Rights Basket”, Interview by IMF News, International Monetary Fund (website), September 30,
2016, http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-
to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket
9 “What motivated the change in the SDR basket?”, International Monetary Fund (website), September 30,
2016, http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-
to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket
10 “China Headlines: Xi takes world's center stage at G20 summit”, Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2016-09/05/c_135660832.htm
11 Sam Dean. “Davos 2017: Chinese leader Xi Jinping says there will be 'no winners' in a trade war as World
Economic Forum begins”, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/17/davos-2017-
breaking-news-updates-world-economic-forum-begins/
- 30 -
strategy is strengthening its traditional influence in former-Soviet countries by means of all

binding political and economic institutions. Leadership of Russia knows that its political
and economic powers are limited to meet necessary and sufficient condition of building such
power-institutions or infrastructure it tries to build an alliance with China.
Russia is dissatisfied with the present world order seen as dominated by the USA and
tries to create a new one together with like-minded countries like China.12
Since 2008 economic crisis, Moscow has frequently tested if U.S. led Western status
quo institution or U.S. hegemonic infrastructure still intact; invading Georgia and Ukraine.
These tests backfired; in one hand, it has locked itself in international sanctions and isolated,
in other hand, it has increased former Soviet countries’ mistrust to Russia, where Moscow
strategically strengthen its influence.
United States and other powers strategy is pretty much straightforward, punish
Russia as it violated rule of the game. U.S. led European economic sanction on Russia
due to Crimean occupation had obvious implication in Russian economy although initial
expectation that Moscow will sit in negotiation table with the West to save its economy was
basically failed. This sanction has merely no strategic implication except for shown Western
unity if one violates the international order.
Confrontation between the West and Russia promoted China to maximize its interest
in both global and regional level as it skillfully uses power of balancing. As said above, it
has strengthened its position in status quo power-institutions. Meanwhile, China has won
Russian support on its initiatives such as “One Belt, One Road” and Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank are designed not only to expand Chinese trade and investment in whole
Eurasia, Central and East Asia included, but also to set its power across the regions.
No, China is not looking to control or even dominate the World-Island, but the
economic success of the “One Belt-One Road” strategy will likely presuppose a degree of
political and diplomatic influence that China has not had in this region since the heyday of
the Mongol Empire13.
As Micallief concluded when he analyzed OBOR by assessing Mackinder learning of
World Island or Heartland. China has an option to act as a revisionist power and create its
own institutions alternative to present ones that, by default, supports its ambition as a great
power.
China in East Asia; different behaviors in different regions
Balancing revisionist power of Southeast Asia
Chinese strategy can be rigorously tested in East Asia, but shows little promising
prospect of keeping the status quo.
In the region, China behaves like a revisionist power and accelerates the tension over
the disputed territories using its relatively stronger power to dominate over other. In 2016,
12 Oldberg, Ingmar, “Is Russia a Status Quo Power?”, Ulpaper, Swedish Institute of Intertnational Affairs.
No.1 (2016), 5
13 Joseph V. Micallef, “Beijing's 'One Belt-One Road' Strategy: Why Geography Still Matters”, Military.com,
(February 16, 2017) http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/02/16/beijings-one-belt-one-road-strategy-
why-geography-still-matter.html
- 31 -
Chinese claim for disputed islands in South China Sea caused a doubt about its peaceful
intention. Beijing’s rejection of the decision of the international arbitral tribunal based on
an appeal by the Philippines on Chinese building of a new artificial islands and the large
military exercise followed by this event called a serious concern of neighbor nations.14
China will surely not engage strategic restraint in East Asia nor accommodate
secondary powers interest. Building artificial islands testing the unity of U.S. led East Asian
security arrangements seemingly modelled after Russian occupation of Crimean testing the
Western unity.
Japan has also received new attention, as a Chinese Navy combat vessel entered
Japan’s contiguous waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time in June;15
Chinese misbehavior left without punishment partially with two reasons; first, East
Asia has no formal military alliance, second, partially because Beijing is already an integral
part of U.S. led power institutions. Series of these events questions in which extend “China’s
voice and weight” shall be increased “in the existing institutions and adjustment to tweaking
of some rules”.16
Assertive status quo power of Northeast Asia
In the Northeast Asia, Beijing also behaves assertive enough as an established status
quo power in contrast of its behavior in East Asia. Northeast Asia has its own specifics; first,
there is no formal status quo power-institution in form of multilateral arrangement except
for U.S. - Japan and U.S. - South Korea bilateral security agreements. Secondly, Russian
presence as a challenging power is limited by its alliance with China and the DPRK acts as
the revisionist power, moreover, partially threatens Beijing’s interest. In this circumstance,
China has decided to take a leadership role in the region and has gradually become more
assertive as it slowly accepts the fact that the Six Party Talk is failed and made its “face” lost.
China used to define itself as a pivot between the DPRK and others and Six Party Talk
should have been a demonstration of this policy; but this policy has unfortunately failed.
However, recent Chinese deployment of its troops on the DPRK border17 demonstrates that
Beijing has changed the previous policy and goes along with status quo powers on the issue
of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This move was made after Xi and Trump meeting
and conformation of their same positions on North Korean denuclearization. U.S. fleet
deployed the same moment on the peninsula18 was signaled that two nations balances each
other in Northeast Asian theatre.
Conclusion
China has a unique power of balancing in the world order today. Peace and stability of
current international system depending on Chinese decision whether it goes along with the
14 Masayuki Masuda, “China: Quest for a Great-Power Role”, East Asian Strategic Review 2017, (National
Institute of Defense Studies), 73
15 Ibid., 74
16 Zhao, “China as a Rising Power Versus the US-led World Order”, 14
17 Brad Lendon, Chieu Luu and Sol Han, “North Korea: China stomping on 'red line' in relations”, cnn.com
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/04/asia/north-korea-china-relations-red-line/index.html
18 Ryan Browne, “US aircraft carrier-led strike group headed toward Korean Peninsula”, cnn.com http://
edition.cnn.com/2017/04/08/politics/navy-korean-peninsula/index.html
- 32 -
present status quo power-institutions or to challenge it with new ones. Russia, a revisionist
power provides a whole range of alternatives to the present status quo institutions.
Status quo power today shall refer to not a single nation-state, but to a set of institutions
that regulate the international relations. In this status quo power-institutions, a single nation-
state may play a key role in the leadership, example of which we can see in U.S. leadership
among its like-minded nations.
China is already an integral part of the leadership of those institutions, meaning
Beijing is a part of status quo power. It is a balancing power in those institutions necessary
to restore from recessions and survive the changing balance of power.
Perspective of Chinese ability of self-imposed strategic restraints;
Will strengthen its position in the institution, moreover, help Beijing to surely replace
U.S. leading role in long term,
Will enjoy institutional return and “lock in” and “cost reduction” effects as the U.S.
did.
Self-imposed strategic restraint, however, is barely observed in Chinese behavior
Asia. In South China Sea, Beijing rejects current order of international law, meanwhile the
regional status quo. China uses its power to change the situation in favor of its domination
in the region and behaves as a ruthless revisionist power. In Northeast Asia, Beijing behaves
as a status quo power already. It balances U.S. interests in the region, meanwhile cooperates
against the revisionist DPRK.
In this moment of China becoming a status quo power and changing the balance of
power in the world, Mongolian neutrality may become more important in Northeast Asia. Its
initiatives like “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” will likely become one
of the important multilateral institution, where all regional nations, including a revisionist
power such as the DPRK may enjoy a room for engaging and explaining its policy.
References
• John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Persistence of American Postwar
Order”, International Security, Vol.23, No.3, (Winter 1998/99)
• Zhao, “China as a Rising Power Versus the US-led World Order”, 14
• Womak, Brantly, “China and the Future Status Quo”, The Chinese Journal of
International Politics, 2015, Vol.8, No.2
• Taplin, Nathaniel, “China’s Yuan Just Joined An Elite Club Of International Monetary
Fund Reserve Currencies” Reuter, (October 3, 2016) http://fortune.com/2016/10/02/
china-yuan-imf-currencies/
• Tweedie, Andrew (Director of the IMF’s Finance Department), “IMF Adds Chinese
Reminbi to Special Drawing Rights Basket”, Interview by IMF News, International
Monetary Fund (website), September 30, 2016, http://www.imf.org/en/News/
Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-
Drawing-Rights-Basket
• “What motivated the change in the SDR basket?”, International Monetary Fund
(website), September 30, 2016 http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/
AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket
- 33 -
• “China Headlines: Xi takes world's center stage at G20 summit”, Xinhua News, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/05/c_135660832.htm
• Sam Dean. “Davos 2017: Chinese leader Xi Jinping says there will be 'no winners' in
a trade war as World Economic Forum begins”, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/business/2017/01/17/davos-2017-breaking-news-updates-world-economic-
forum-begins/
• Oldberg, Ingmar, “Is Russia a Status Quo Power?”, Ulpaper, Swedish Institute of
Intertnational Affairs. No.1 (2016), 5
• Joseph V. Micallef, “Beijing's 'One Belt-One Road' Strategy: Why Geography
Still Matters”, Military.com, (February 16, 2017) http://www.military.com/daily-
news/2017/02/16/beijings-one-belt-one-road-strategy-why-geography-still-matter.
html
• Masayuki Masuda, “China: Quest for a Great-Power Role”, East Asian Strategic
Review 2017, (National Institute of Defense Studies), 73
• Brad Lendon, Chieu Luu and Sol Han, “North Korea: China stomping on 'red line'
in relations”, cnn.com http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/04/asia/north-korea-china-
relations-red-line/index.html
- 34 -
THE NUCLEAR THREAT OF NORTH KOREA AND SEARCHING FOR A

WAY TO PEACE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: ANALYSIS ON NORTH KOREA’S
ECONOMY AND FINDING A MOTIVATION
Dr. LEE Hyung-Seo

Senior Researcher, Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), ROK
At present, Northeast Asia has undergone political changes, and the security situation
is also showing uneasiness in the region. Highly complicated security concerns are occurring
simultaneously, such as North Korea's nuclear threat, U.S.-China security competition, China-
Japan security competition, China’s resolute denial against the deployment of THHAD in
South Korea, Japan’s attempt of rearmament, Korea-Japan dispute on the history issues and
so on. In Northeast Asia, multiple security issues are mutually combined and intertwined
with each other at the same time, and create a more serious situation.
Among the security concerns in the region, it is sure that the most worrying issue is
North Korea's nuclear threat, which could lead not only to a military conflict between the
Koreas but also to a very unstable and uncertain political atmosphere related to Korea, U.S.,
and China.(in case, including Japan and Russia)
In this research, North Korea’s economic situation will be analyzed to find a feasible
strategy of inducing North Korea to sit at the talk table. North Korea’s economy is assessed
to step into the beginning stage of capitalism because of legal or illegal market expansion. By
the way, the major reason that North Korea has been obsessed to continuing the nuclear and
missile development program, can be found at the intention to secure its regime sustainability,
and North Korea’s chronical economic crisis is also deeply related to the nuclear and missile
development program. Therefore, analyzing North Korea’s economy could lead to strategic
possibilities of the first movement to solve the regional and global security problem.
<Contents>
I. Security Environment in Northeast Asia
1. The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy
2. U.S.-Chinese Competition and Deterioration of Security Situation in Northeast Asia
3. North Korea's Enhancing Nuclear Capability and Increasing Security Crisis on the Korean
Peninsula
II. State Identity of North Korea
1. Established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
2. Change in the Political System
3. Change in the Economic System
4. Modernized Feudal Dynasty
III. Causes of North Korean Economic Crisis
IV. Markets in North Korea
1. Marketization
- 35 -
2. Partial Institutionalization of Markets

3. Market Control and Monetary Reform
4. Partial Re-Institutionalization of Markets
V. North Korea’s Strategy to sustain its Regime
VI. Emergence of Mercantilism and Possibility of Capitalism in North Korea
I. Security Environment in Northeast Asia

1. The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy
The Trump administration is anticipated to concentrate U.S. diplomatic and military power
on eradicating ISIS, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and issues in Syria. This is to
achieve results in diplomatic and security realm, which are free from constraints set by the
U.S. judiciary and the Congress.
- The administration’s foreign policies have several features, and one of them is its
attempt to seek cooperation with Russia in uprooting ISIS and tackling issues in
Syria. This is in contrast to the Obama administration’s policy to manage Europe’s
security by cooperating with NATO and EU in the backdrop of inevitable stormy
relationship with Russia in Europe.
- The Republican administration’s traditional foreign policies have focused on
managing powerful countries in Eurasia, and the current administration is
also expected to push ahead with foreign policies based upon cooperation and
coordination with powerful Eurasian nations like China, Russia, and India.
The Trump administration is seeking to steer U.S. foreign policy away from that of the
Obama administration in many realms.
- Trump withdrew from the TPP – the Obama administration’s most pivotal Asia-
Pacific policy for the past 8 years- on the first day in his office and declared the
renegotiation of NAFTA, a deal signed under the Clinton administration.
- President Trump named Herbert McMaster his national security adviser, James
Mattis his Defense Secretary, Rex Tillerson his Secretary of State, all of whom are
playing important roles in formulating U.S. foreign policies. These three figures
are believers of traditional Republican diplomatic/security policies. Hence, the
Trump administration’s foreign policies will not greatly deviate from those crafted
by former administrations led by Republican presidents, apart from trade policies.
- It seems that President Trump has decided not to sit back and watch the Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad's regime using chemical weapons against civilians and
the North Korean regime threatening the safety of U.S. and its Northeast Asian
allies by developing nuclear weapons and missiles.
- U.S. carried out a set of military measures like firing 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles
at an air base in Syria near Homs on April 6th and dropping a powerful ‘Mother Of
All Bombs’ on ISIS caves in Afghanistan.
Washington is anticipated to take ‘decisive and proportional’ measures against the
provocations of the al-Assad and the North Korean regime by working with Russia and
- 36 -
China.
- The Trump administration is expected to engage in diplomacy that seeks cooperation
and coordination with the leaders of powerful nations in Eurasia (like Putin, Xi,
and Modi), while recognizing their clout. That is, the administration will try to
boost its naval power by increasing national defense spending and manage global
peace through balance of power, while acknowledging the influence of regional
superpowers.
- In this case, issues stressed by the Obama administration like human rights can be
treated as relatively minor issues, and the voices of small nations may not be fully
respected.
- The Trump administration seems to have set its foreign policy direction as the
former secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s ‘strategic responsibility diplomacy.’
With regards to the administration’s China policy, it is expected to find a new
formula for engagement.
2. U.S.-China Competition and Deterioration of Security Situation in Northeast Asia
Above all, competition among U.S.-China is a key factor in instability in Northeast Asia.
Due to the rapid economic growth of China and the decrease in national power gap between
U.S. and China, the relative balance of power drastically changes, creating a huge conflict
structure between these major powers.
- In 2010, China overtook Japan in GDP, and in 2014, it surpassed U.S. in Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP). Furthermore, China is expected to become the state of world's
largest economy by 2025, surpassing U.S. in terms of GDP.
- China has built up its confidence and nationalism based on economic power and
aiming political and military hegemonic supremacy in the region. By the way, U.S.
is trying to block the Chinese impact overseas through relocating military forces and
strengthening alliance with allied countries. Based on rapid economic growth and
strengthened military capabilities, China is claiming and challenging new influences
in Korea and the South and East China Sea area, which have been traditionally
within U.S. influence in the past. As a result, specific issues are highlighted and the
possibility of military conflict increases.
- In response to the North Korean nuclear threat, Korea and U.S. deployed THAAD,
high-altitude missile defense system, in terms of security sovereignty. However, in
response, China is imposing economic sanctions against Korea, largely because of
the reason that deployment of THAAD in Korea will destroy the strategic balance
of East Asia. In South China Sea, China also claims territorial sovereignty and
maritime interests.
As a sign of security competition and security dilemma in Northeast Asia, there has been
emerging an arms race among countries in the region. In general, when a state distrusts the
other's intentions and worries about future security situation, its most common response is
expanding armaments to prevent or to win the war if it may occur. Recently, arms race in
Northeast Asia reflects such instability and anxiety.
- China has raised missile attack capabilities to refuse U.S. military forces’ access
into the region, and developed multi-warhead missiles or hypersonic cruise missiles
- 37 -
to penetrate U.S. missile defense networks. China is also attempting to construct

naval submarines such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines for long-range
projection of military forces.
- Against this backdrop, U.S. is accelerating the establishment of missile defense
system, the modernization of nuclear weapons, the construction of naval power, and
the rebalance of military forces in Asia. The greatest military competition between
these two super powers is under way in the post-Cold War era.
North Korea has rapidly strengthened its nuclear and missile capabilities. As a countermeasure
against this, South Korea also pursued enhancement of missile capability, missile defense
network, and naval strength. Korea is also strengthening military cooperation between
Korea-Japan, and Korea-US-Japan as well.
While strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan is not only promoting its rearmament and
normalization of the country, also confronting and taking a hard position toward China.
3. North Korea's Enhancing Nuclear Capability and Increasing Security Crisis on the
Korean Peninsula
Recently, South-North Korea conflict and U.S.-China conflict are overlapping on the Korean
peninsula. Korean peninsula is gradually becoming a power keg in Asia, and even reminiscent
of the Balkans in Europe, or the conflict-crushing area in Central Asia.
The conflict structure, which has been caused by North Korea’s instable regime and nuclear-
missile development in the divided Korean peninsula, accelerates power competition
between the two Koreas. This will also exponentially raises the disputes among countries
directly and indirectly related to the peninsula.
- Four countries in Northeast Asia, including Korea, U.S. China, and Japan, account
for 25% of the world's population and 47% of the world's GDP, and these countries
are injecting 81% of the world's military expenditure.
- Even 10 years ago, various changes in security environment could not be clearly
foreseen in Northeast Asia such as China’s rise, Japan's normalization and
conservatism, North Korea's nuclear armament, Russia's resurgence and U.S.’s
weakening.
- Some geo-strategists and realist theorists warn that the security situation in East
Asia will be worsen in the first half of the 21st century, and they point out that there
might be a certain probability of the war between world powers or the proxy war of
small and medium-sized countries.
On the other hand, many political and economic experts deny the possible occurrence of
severe conflict or war in the region because of China's domestic environment of politics and
economy, social vulnerability, international economic interdependence and high resource
dependence on foreign markets.
Above all, the biggest threat not only to the security of Korea and also to the peace in
Northeast Asia is the North Korean nuclear issue.
- North Korea repeated its provocations in record-breaking numbers such as 2
nuclear tests and 24 missile launches throughout 2016, and in February 2017, it
implemented the launch test of Bukguksung-2(Polaris-2), a new medium-range
- 38 -
missile. In March, it resumed missile provocation with launching four Scud-ERs,

the long-range missiles, in the East Sea.
According to an assessment of the Ministry of Korea National Defense, North Korea
possesses about 50 to 60kgs of plutonium, which is equivalent to 6 to 10 nuclear warheads,
and has advanced enriched uranium program to a significant level too.
North Korea deployed Rodong missile and Scud-ER missile, which cover the range
including Japan by the end of 1990s, and in 2010s, deployed Musudan long-range missile
that can attack U.S. military bases in East Asia. Currently, North Korea is focusing on the
development of ICBM and SLBM aimed at U.S. mainland.
- Some experts assess that North Korea has more than 10 nuclear weapons, and if it
accelerates nuclear development at the current pace, it will have more than 50 by
2025.
North Korea will continue nuclear development and armament with the background as
follows.
North Korea expresses its nuclear doctrine that nuclear weapons will be utilized for deterrence
and retaliation.
- But, there is a big difference between the North Korea’s nuclear doctrine and its
current nuclear posture to realize it.
- Adoption of nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory strategies, as North Korea
declares, is possible when it has sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons, protection
systems, and various transport systems necessary to absorb the impact of the first
nuclear attack from outside after North Korea’s first nuclear attack.
- However, it is difficult to say now that North Korea has nuclear capability to survive
the first attack from outside at the viewpoint of the current nuclear development
pace in North Korea. Therefore, North Korea will attempt to accomplish the
minimization of the transition period in which its security is probably weaker at the
initial stage of nuclear armament.
- As part of this effort, North Korea will concentrate itself on the production of
additional nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, lightening and miniaturizing
nuclear warheads, improving ballistic missile performance, developing SLBM
technology, and developing missile launch submarines.
In addition, as North Korea threatens to launch preemptive nuclear strike against Korea and
U.S., it needs to take further measures to curb the likelihood of preemptive strike from Korea
and U.S.
- North Korea will endeavor to build the secondary nuclear strike capability as soon
as possible and maintain a very aggressive "asymmetric nuclear doctrine" that even
threatens to respond with using its nuclear weapons even to a minor military crash
between South and North Korea.
Kim Jong-un regime’s enhancing nuclear armament and heightening the nuclear threat are to
induce the increase in defense expenditures of Korea-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances, and the
trilateral security cooperation of Korea-U.S.-Japan will be tightened.
- This will lead to China's intervention and military buildup, and ultimately, it is
- 39 -
anticipated that a vicious cycle will appear, in which the U.S.-China and China-
Japan forces become further fiercer. Furthermore, the military tension between
South and North Korea also will be far more raised.
These days, it is a global tendency that each country is seeking for its own going-way
keeping in mind “no one backs me up”, in reasons that side effect of globalization increases,
and but the atmosphere of international cooperation declines. In Northeast Asia, political
and economic fluctuations have taken place such as change in national power, slow-down
of economic growth, strengthening nationalism, and conservative swing in politics, which
are interacting each other in the direction of further intensifying regional competitions and
military tensions.
II. State Identity of North Korea
1. Established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
On September 9th in 1948, North Korea named itself “Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea” and established a country led by Labor Party. The basis of the country was one-party
rule and planned economy through nationalization of production means.
- At the point of the state establishment, North Korea was a typical socialist
economy and politics. However, after the cold war and collapse of the socialism,
it is questionable if the country is maintaining the original political and economic
system.
- If political and economic system of North Korea has changed since its establishment
in 1948, it will not be able to claim itself as a socialist country.
2. Change in the Political System
One of the political characteristics noticed in North Korea is the power transmission by
heredity. The reclusive state leader is attempting to pass on his power to one of his sons, and
it is the third time that the power is passed on to leader’s descendent.
-- This type of power succession is hardly seen in any other modern countries in the
21st century. Even the worst dictators in the human history who left huge damage
to the mankind did not pass on their power to descendants for 3 consecutive times.
Leadership succession commonly witnessed in communist (socialist) countries starts
from training elite politicians of communist party. Then party leaders designate a next top
leadership. The leadership succession by heredity is something far from normal power
transfer in other communist countries.
-- The political system in North Korea can be characterized by “one-man rule”,
“highly centered power”, “life-long autocracy”, and “leadership succession to son”.
Those features are rather close to monarchial dynasty politics.
3. Change in the Economic System
For the last 40 years, North Korea has pushed for development of economy in line with
military advancement. It is the reprehensive and sole economic policy of North Korea, which
targets development of people’s economy and improvement of its military power.
-- Actually, North Korea puts its highest priority on building up the military through
developing and production of arms and weapons. In this process, it seems that the
country puts part of the economic surplus created from military industry into the
- 40 -
people’s economy. In other words, the country makes use of its military industry as
a growth engine of the national economy.
However, that sort of growth policy actually has held back the country since mid of 1970s.
For an effective national economic development, a continued linkage between consumption
and expansive reproduction is a requisite. But, North Korea is putting most of its resources
to the military area where consumption is not generated, hence reducing its capacity for
expansive reproduction.
After 1990s when Soviet Union and communist regimes in East Europe collapsed, China
drove “open policy” and this isolated the North Korean economy and left a serious impact on
the economy. North Korea lost its two major patrons, Soviet Union and China, thus it became
internationally isolated, further plunging into a deep economic problems. In addition, natural
disasters in 1995 and 1996 hit the country hardest beyond recovery.
Due to serious shortage of food, the ration system collapsed. In most of the areas in North
Korea the distribution system is practically not operated anymore. One of the most important
basic necessities for the life of North Korean people, food is not secured through the planned
economy and ration system.
-- The possibility of restarting the food ration system in North Korea is extremely
small. If that is the case, North Korean people should grow crops by themselves
or rely on the market to get food. In addition to food, people will have to get other
necessities of life from the market.
-- Also, with communist production and distribution scheme collapsed and market
created, it would be possible to own private property in North Korea. It is more
likely that the ruling class of Labor Party members and leaders will economically
control North Korean people through their economic vested rights and power.
-- On the other hand, people in North Korea will change similar to the serf class in
17 to 18th century in Chosun Dynasty. Indeed, North Korea is not an agricultural
society like Chosun Dynasty. However, weak expansive reproduction and collapse
of planned production and distribution will force the North Koreans to produce and
exchange resources by themselves for a living. It will make the people similar to the
slave class of serf system in Chosun Dynasty.
4. Modernized Feudal Dynasty
North Korea’s political system is not based on monarchial socialism originated
from Stalin regime in Soviet Union. Also, it is not part of the “changed socialism”, which
introduced market economy features that China is driving today with much achievement. In
North Korea, leadership succession has been done to leader’s descendants. Market economy
is supplementing the weakened expansive reproduction and planned economy. With such
economic and political characteristics, North Korea can be named a “Modernized Feudal
Dynasty”.
-- The word “modernized” indicates that the country’s leader has complete rule over
the subjugated class through full control and manipulation of information based
on modern science technology, which makes it different from feudal dynasty in
centuries ago. This explains how the hermit kingdom has remained itself despite of
the continued speculation of collapse raised since mid of 1990s.
- 41 -
III. Causes of North Korean Economic Crisis

Since the 1990s, internal factors and external shocks have combined to disrupt the North
Korean economy.
- In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union and the communist bloc collapsed, and China
pushed ahead with reform and openness. It has completely shocked the North’s
political and economic paradigm.
- This led to the elimination of the reciprocal trades within the socialist economy.
Furthermore, the influx of resources and technologies into North Korea was blocked
due to the crippled trade. The North Korean economy lost its basic environment to
realize expanding production with imported factors.
- As a result of trade shifting from reciprocal to hard-currency-oriented, North Korea’s
chronic foreign exchange shortage vastly deepened, resulting in a significant setback
in the development of economic relations with the outside world.
- In particular, the Soviet Union, which served as a guardian of the North, has shifted
its national system and China has pushed for the market economy. This accelerated
the collapse of the North Korean economy, which adheres to the socialist economic
system.
Meanwhile, change in the international situation in the early 1990s led to the isolation of
the North Korean economy from outside, and the natural disasters that occurred in 1995 and
1996 caused severe food shortages and resulted in countless deaths in North Korea.
- In North Korea, food shortages led to a huge obstacle in the mobilization of
manpower, the primary component of the planned economy, which has brought
about rapid deterioration of the nation’s production capacity.
The downfall of the North Korean economy stems from the external causes such as changes
in global order and natural disasters. However, it is analyzed that the framework of the
system that has been inherent in North Korea has contributed to a larger factor.
North Korea has been pushing for a “military-economy parallel development” for more than
40 years, and Kim Jong-un renamed it “nuclear-economy parallel development” in 2013
after he took office.
- North Korea is pursuing two goals of boosting economic development and building
up military capability at the same time. It is considered the macroeconomic policy
that is stuck for the longest time in North Korea.
- North Korea has promoted the production and development of weapons through
fostering of the heavy and chemical industries. North Korea also operates its
economy by separating it into the first economy and the second economy. The first
economy represents a general economy and the second economy refers to the North
Korean military.
- North Korea operates the national economy by putting a portion of the surplus
from the second economy into the first. Thus, for North Korea, the military and the
industries related to military are the engine that propels for national income and
economic growth.
North Korea’s economic growth policy centering on the military produced somewhat tangible
- 42 -
results until the 1960s. However, the policy began to worsen North Korea’s economic
situation since the mid-1970s.
- Investment in heavy and chemical industries should serve as a mainstay for the
balanced manufacturing activities of the national economy.
- However, North Korea has invested the most of resources in the military sector,
which hardly generate widespread consumption. This resulted in elimination of a
virtuous cycle between the consumption and the expansive production in North
Korea.
- The preoccupation with “military-economy parallel development” decreased North
Korea’s production capabilities as time passing, and its potential of economic
growth was depleted in the early 1970s.
- In the mid-1970s, the North Korean economy entered into a plateau, and it became
impossible to function normally in the 1980s.
- In the 1990s, the North Korean economy failed to revive itself without outside
aid. The internal inconsistency of the virtuous cycle between consumption
and production and the destruction of the socialist economy coincided with the
simultaneous impact.
But the most fundamental cause of the North’s economic woes lies in obsessive pursuit of
its “military-economy parallel development” so that North Korea imposed restrictions on its
own national production capabilities as a result.
- “military-economy parallel development” can be defined as a policy of economic
growth that is contradictory to the path of expanded reproduction. Without this
internal inconsistency in North Korean economy, it could have absorbed somewhat
of the shock from outside.
<Figure-1> North Korea’s Resource Allocation under Military-Economy Parallel
Development
- 43 -
IV. Markets in North Korea

1. Marketization
Amid the deepening economic crisis in North Korea, private market such as “Jangmadang”
arose in many places. Accordingly, the North’s economic system has been divided into two
categories; the public sector (institutionalized) and the private sector (non-institutionalized).
While distribution by the planned economy is declining, on the other hand, distribution by
the market has been increasing. Meanwhile, the market exerts greater influence on the price
than the centrally planned economy.
Due to the shortage of food and commodities in the late 1980s, “the farmers’ markets”
transformed into permanent markets. In the mid-1990s, almost all commodity transactions
became possible in “Jangmadang”.
Additional value was enabled by activated markets in North Korea. Through these markets
commercial capital could be accumulated, and large wholesale markets and distribution
networks were created.
As the material supply system of the industries was paralyzed, the state-run firms and
production units in the planned economy replaced planned indicators with corporate
indicators, and then converted quantity indices into currency indices.
- As the market expanded, “Donju” (money lender) emerged as a new social class
that amassed capital through trade and commercial activities. They pay a kind of
tax money to the state. They also act as investors in new commercial or industrial
activities.
In the mid-1990s, the spread of the North’s market was a critical factor for Kim Jong-il to
solve food shortages in factories, businesses and institutional organizations.
- Each of the individual economic units formed a company specializing in foreign
exchange and began commercial and trading activities to procure food for
themselves. As a result, North Korea’s distribution markets rapidly expanded.
Since the late 1990s, privileged classes such as the party and the military expanded the scope
of unplanned economic activity in collusion with Donju, the newly emerging rich. Because
of this, the market of North Korea actually became a reality in its economy.
- Since “march of hardship”, the military has emerged as an alternative to economic
activity across the entire economy. With the increasing economic activities caused
by military economic institutions, North Korea’s market space further expanded.
- Market diversification extends beyond distribution sectors, and actors of market
activities are expanded to the party and the military as well as the public.
2. Partial Institutionalization of Markets
The quantitative diffusion and qualitative structuralization of the market pushed the North
Korean authorities to decentralize the planning function and apply partially the market
function.
- Because of the ongoing fiscal crisis, the nation’s resources were intensively
funneled into heavy industries related to the defense. On the other hand, other
sectors inevitably shifted to market mechanisms to an extent.
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- It was necessary for the authorities to control the market space that had been
structured within the North Korean economy.
North Korea announced “the 7.1 economic management improvement measures” on July 1
in 2002, and took advantage of market functions in the process of maintaining the economic
system. This is evaluated as a part of “the internal reform” aimed at normalizing the planned
economic system.
- However, the 7.1 measures raised quantitative growth in diverse sectors of market
(private loan, labor, production, distribution, housing, etc.). Moreover, the planned
economic sector had to depend on market, so expansion of the market has been
further widened.
- After the implementation of the 7.1 measures, North Korea’s market in the mid-
1990s led to the accumulation of wealth as well as the space of livelihood, and
newly rich class emerged in North Korea.
- Various forms of personal economic activity (sales business, individual farming,
private tutors, personal dining room management, personal accommodation)
developed rapidly, and breakaway of labor power from the planned economy was
accelerated.
3. Market Control and Monetary Reform
The planned economy became increasingly influenced by or dependent on the market
economy. The proportion of specific economic sectors also expanded, such as the party
economy and the military economy.
- Privileged economic institutions have amassed wealth in the market with illegal
acts based on backdrop of power. In this process, severe polarization and corruption
were expanded.
- Most of the income of North Koreans and their livelihood depended on
“Jangmadang”, the major unofficial space of the economy.
North Korean authorities retreated 7.1 measures after October 2005, and started controlling
the market by stages; limitation of opening time for markets, restrictions on business
women’s age and width and number of business items and etc.
- In 2009, North Korean authorities closed down the Pyeongseong market near
Pyongyang, the largest wholesale market in North Korea.
The North Korean authorities conducted a redenomination without any warning on November
30, 2009. The exchange rate was 1:100.
- In 2009, Kim Jong-un inherited the position of North Korea’s leader from Kim
Jong-il. Since large-scale construction projects were carried out in 2012 to build
“the grand strong nation”, and for this reason massive financial funds were required.
- For North Korea, it was forced to control the rapidly growing market in order to
ensure stabilization of the third generation of the hereditary regime.
The currency reform caused serious disruption to the North Korean economy and took a toll
on the economic policies.
- The value of the North Korean won fell. On the other hand, the dollar and the yuan
influenced a lot on the North Korean economy.
- 45 -
- At the beginning of the inauguration of Kim Jong-un, extreme inflation took place.
The price of rice per kilogram rose significantly at approximately 250 to 300 percent
at the end of November 2013, compared to the beginning of the same month.
- The economy has stagnated and the state-owned enterprises and the planned
economic sector have shrunken. Furthermore, financial crisis kept worsening in
North Korea.
4. Partial Re-Institutionalization of Markets
Kim Jong-un regime officially began in April 2012. It has been struggling to overcome
chronic economic difficulties, but still facing a wide variety of economic problems.
- At the end of Kim Jung-il’s regime, North Korea pushed ahead with large-scale
construction projects such as “Heechun power plant construction”, but the North’s
industrial productivity remained intact in 1980s.
- In North Korea, people’s livelihood has worsened not only due to “the military-
first economy policy” but also due to the repetition of partially utilizing market
like “permission of market→control of market→connivance of market”. In this
process, polarization of the economy occurred.
- Although the market is structured within the North’s economy, the polarization of
the economy is severely expanded by the failure of institutionalizing the market.
Also, there has been an increase in rent income of the privileged classes.
- Added value and surplus value generated from market activity were not absorbed
into the national treasury, and they were not entered the industrial economy either.
Black markets were proliferated beyond the control of the state.
On March 31, 2012, the Kim Jong-un regime declared “nuclear-economic parallel
development” as a keynote for economic growth policy. And North Korea has implemented
the “North Korea’s own economic management method” in economic units.
- In agriculture, “field responsibility system” managed by “sub-work-teams” were
implemented in cooperative farms for the purpose of raising farmers’ productivity
and enhancing food production.
- In addition, North Korea introduced a “socialist enterprise responsibility” in
factories and businesses and expanded measures of their independent financial and
management.
- North Korea has maintained “military-economy parallel development” as its core
economic policy, name of which was only slightly changed to “nuclear-economic
parallel development” in Kim Jong-un regime. As a result, they are the same
difference. On the other hand, North Korea is also planning to embrace some of the
market segments in other to boost the efficiency and the productivity of economy.
- Kim Jong-un’s actions like this are largely aimed at re-implementing the economic
improvement management measures in 2002, but Kim Jong-un carries out relatively
flexible market policies compared to the Kim Jong-il regime.
However, the “North Korea’s own economic management method” of the Kim Jong-un
regime embodies the limits of “internal reform” just as 7.1 measures did in 2002, because
it continues to realize the principle of the party’s leadership and the principle of socialist
collective ownership.
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V. North Korea’s Strategy to Sustain its Regime

In North Korea, the presence of the private sector could make a positive explanation for the
insufficient production capacity which the public sector is failing to handle with.
North Korea relies on extreme closure and fear to create the power of internal controls.
However, a variety of information circulating in the private sector could be a serious
challenge to North Korea and cast a negative impact on maintaining its regime.
- Because of the decline in factory operation, the workforce is moving to the private
sector for a living. This resulted in North Korean authorities becoming likely to
weaken their control over residents and their mobilization.
- The majority numbers of North Koreans are forced to depend on the private sector
for their livelihood. Therefore, the influence of the private sector on the North
Korean society continues to expand.
However, The North Korean authorities believe that it would lead to a greater risk of regime
survival to eliminate the private sector in order to get rid of the challenges the private sector
might cause.
- Blocking the supply of private sector in North Korea will lead to a total lack of
supply and further worsening the economy, and Kim Jong-un’s political leadership
is currently not confident that he can cope with a large economic calamity.
Therefore, due to the lack of proper economic capability, North Korea’s rational alternative
would be to search for a way to ensure that the current regime could be successfully sustained
through expanding the private sector as far as the regime can allow.
The reform and openness must be a prerequisite for survival of the North Korean regime.
This is due to the fact that structural contradictions and stagnation of “North Korea’s own
socialist planned economy” had the North Korean economy lose its ability to recover from
economic difficulties.
- Historically, the collapse of socialism arose at the decline in labor productivity
caused by the denial of private ownership and free market economy.
- In the case of North Korea, not only the contradiction embedded in socialism but
also the hereditary dictatorship in the North has raised power elites’ incompetence
and corruption, which led to the collapse of North Korean economy.
- The reason why the economy is not totally ruined down onto the ground in North
Korea is that the authorities are acquiescing in “Jangmadang” which mainly
supplies the necessities to the North Korean households.
North Korea’s dilemma is that the regime can only exist if the economy is revitalized through
reform and openness, but reform and openness cannot be compatible with the North Korean
regime and eventually will destroy its foundation.
VI. Emergence of Mercantilism and Possibility of Capitalism in North Korea
There are many opinions that the North Korean economy has recently improved compared
to the past. Actually, the North Korean economic indicators support this view. However,
this phenomenon is considered to be a pitfall of superficial results shown by statistical and
quantitative indicators.
- Recently, North Korea's economic growth rate is showing an increasing trend, but
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this is mainly because the transaction centered on the market has increased rather
than the improvement of the fundamentals of the North Korean economy, and also
because the inflows of materials from China to the North, on the ground or under
the ground, have been incessant.
In general, Macro-based fundamentals improve the economy, but in the case of North
Korea, due to increased commerce, production has been resumed locally as input has been
transferred to North Korea's production facilities which were in a halt.
- Therefore, the expansion of market and the increase of commerce in North Korea
does not mean fundamental recovery and growth of North Korean economy, and
the North’s economic indices are expected to return back to their previous levels
without economic support from outside.
- However, with the highest probability, North Korean economy is supposed to be
muddling through with the things that China provides.
“The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy” (KIEP) estimated the degree of
marketization of North Korea ratio based on the North’s population from the 2008 UN
statistics, which resulted in 83%. In addition, it says that out of 500,000 businesses in North
Korea, 400,000 are using unofficial financial institutions.
As a result of the lack of distribution materials due to the economic sanctions of the
international community and the reform and opening measures of Kim Jong-un, it is analyzed
that the market has become more dependent.
- There never was much progress in marketization like North Korea in any socialist
countries such as East Germany and China at the time of opening.
North Korea's national identity is defined as “The 21st-century feudal dynasty”. In the light
of past historical facts, North Korea shows the mercantilistic characteristics of “the late of
Chosun Dynasty” in the 19th century.
- The emergence of peddlers due to the collapse of the agrarian economy at that
time is similar to the movement of residents in North Korea to obtain food and
necessities and the commercial activities that take place in this process as well.
- At that time in Chosun Dynasty, the movement of logistics and the formation of
commercial districts by means of the financial concentration, created new classes
called as “Geosang” or “Gagju”, who possessed capital, which is in common with
“Donju” (money holder) and “Jangmadang” of North Korea at this moment.
In recent years, there has been a tendency for North Korea to become increasingly unclear
about the distinction between state-owned and private-owned for means of production.
- Legally, privatization is prohibited in North Korea, but indeed in the North,
economic privatization is being de-nationalized by private ownership, which means
that the right of disposing residual income from the means of production is virtually
owned by individuals.
It seems that the North Korean economic system has already entered into capitalism in the
late stage of mercantilism.
- Nearly 90% of North Koreans are estimated to have earned a certain income
through market activities, which indicates that North Koreans understand the life
of capitalism.
- 48 -
- Most of the input of production factors that determines national productivity is

dependent on the private sector, and the capital has been concentrated in “Donju”
through commerce based on the market activities.
- However, North Korea is expected to regulate only the intensity of the current
mercantilistic characters in the market in order to sustain its regime, and in this
process, North Korea is likely to cause instability in the Korean peninsula and
Northeast Asia.
In the mercantilism that has already been formed within North Korea, the market-centered
volume of transactions will increase further, and North Korean capitalists such as “Donju”
will make more efforts to accumulate more wealth.
- In order to accumulate wealth, it is necessary to create new value, so it will be
required to secure new production capacity that exceeds the productivity inherent
in the North Korean economy.
- This would entail a widespread privatization of the means of production and a
much higher level of capital formation than at present.
After Kim Jong-un's regime launched, North Korea's economic growth showed positive
rates from 2012 to 2014, but it turned negative again in 2015.
North Korea’s positive economic growth of 2012-2014 was attributed to the activation of the
market sector rather than to the efficiency associated with changes in economic personnel
or policies.
<Figure-2> North Korea’s GNI and Economic Growth Rate
- Markets in North Korea enabled the transfer of input factors to the production
facilities, which were in an idle state due to economic difficulties. This increased
the production, and resulted in positive economic growth rates.
- The North Korean economy is showing a mercantilistic feature, and the increase
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of production has been generated by the transaction of input factors through the
market rather than by any other elements.
- On the other hand, the international sanctions against North Korea also accelerated
redistribution of the limited resources through the market within North Korea, which
led to increase in production as combined with the trade between North Korea and
China even in the middle of the sanction.
<Figure-3> North Korea’s Foreign Trade and NK-China Trade
However, North Korea's mercantilist economic growth through market trading of internal
inputs is limited. In order to sustain economic growth of North Korea, inputs from outside
need to be introduced.
- In 2015, North Korea's economic growth rate turned back negative, and the decrease
in trade with China exacerbated North Korea's decline in production.
Although the international community gradually raised the level of sanctions against North
Korea, North Korea continued to conduct nuclear and missile provocations.
The effect of economic sanctions is to increase the likelihood of success by raising the
hatred of the regime. However, in the case of North Korea, there is no political system to
mobilize the North Korean people's rejection of Kim Jong-un. Furthermore, China's implicit
or backdoor support continues.
- Since the first nuclear test of North Korea in 2006, the international community has
raised the level of sanctions against North Korea. However, trade between North
Korea and China continued to increase in the face of sanctions, and North Korea –
China trade surged from 2012 to 2014 after Kim Jong-un took office. As of 2015,
North Korea's trade dependence ratio on China reached 91.3%.
- Much of China's tacit and strategic support for North Korea does not appear in
official statistics. For example, China's oil and food aid have become very important
to the military activities of North Korea.
- North Korea is successfully absorbing the impact of economic sanctions. The closed
and dictatorial political system, now supplemented by markets, appears adequate to
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manage the effects of economic sanctions, at least with China continuing to dilute
their impact.
Since the financial system must enable private ownership of the means of production, it
should appear in the form of commercial banks that can generalize the transactions of capital.
There exists irreversibility of operation in the market-capitalism, which cannot return once it
enters. Therefore, “the establishment of a commercial bank” in North Korea to facilitate the
entry of capitalism will be the key to “North Korean capitalist economic system”.
Commercial bank will strengthen monetary background of “Donju” for their capitalist
operations. The establishment of commercial bank in North Korea has a strategic meaning to
segregate the ruling class and the ruled class in North Korea through using the expansion of
“Donju” and their capitalist activities in terms of maximization of economic power against
political power.
This way of North Korean capitalism will be similar to China's early economic development
period. However, it differs from Chinese case in that it does not involve the reform or
opening driven by the regime. This will not cause the political burden or risk to the North
Korean regime.
On the other hand, North Korea's capitalized economy could provide opportunities for
increase in national production and upgrade of living standard for North Koreans. Such
an improvement in North Korean economic condition can significantly reduce the external
aggressiveness and provocation of North Korea.
- North Korea is committed to nuclear development because its main goal is to
maintain its regime by acquiring the status of a nuclear power from the international
community, especially U.S., and to obtain economic benefits in the process of
negotiations stemming from its nuclear threat.
- Hence, if North Korea accepts the way of improving its economy through capitalism,
it will be able to maintain the regime without nuclear threats and negotiations with
neighboring countries, and the security threat from North Korea could become
significantly reduced.
The establishment of a commercial bank to induce North Korean capitalism is not a problem
only between the South and the North but a problem also including U.S. and China. It is
desirable for North Korean commercial banks to choose a pool of funds from around the
world based on a consortium of international societies centered on Korea, U.S. and China
as well.
However, it is clear that the international community, especially Korea and U.S. should
give priority to preventing the North from abusing the benefits of this commercial bank to
instable the security. It should be also clarified that this is the top priority concern as the
precondition for the establishment of commercial bank in North Korea.
For more than a decade, international cooperation on sanctions against North Korea has
been highlighted, and the scope and intensity of sanctions are expanding. At the same time,
however, the Trump administration indicates that military pressure on North Korea is not
only the most useful way, and it says there is a possibility of diplomatic and economic
approach to dialogue with North Korea if a certain condition is satisfied.
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- At the Asia Security Summit in Singapore on June 3, James Mattis, the U.S. Defense
Secretary, said that U.S. could use military force to solve the North Korean nuclear
problem, but first, diplomatic and economic efforts will also be implemented.
In addition to strict international sanctions against North Korea, it should also be motivated
for North Korea to participate as a member of the international community. The larger the
whip, the larger the carrot. The resolution of the North Korean problem will be more likely
to succeed if sanction and incentive are concurrent.
At this stage, sanction against North Korea is considered appropriate and natural. It is
because North Korea's nuclear threat is a global security challenge not only in Northeast
Asia. The goal of sanction is to reduce and eliminate threats in order to secure the peace. If a
pressure through sanction is not to bring about changes in the situation, as a matter of fact, it
will lose its significance. A combination of sanction and new incentive can help to reach the
goal of sanction more effectively.
Therefore, it may be more effective to provide North Korea with the inducement of capitalism
together with economic sanctions. For North Korean capitalism, above all, cooperation and
sharing wisdom in the international community, particularly in the countries neighboring
Korean peninsula, is most important and will be the biggest contribution to solve the North
Korean problem.
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PROSPECTS OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN NORTH-EAST ASIA
Dr. Elena BOYKOVA

Senior Researcher, Institute for Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS),
the Russian Federation
North-East Asia keeps being a zone of the most complicated interweaving of serious
international contradictions and conflicts, very high political instability, acute military and
political confrontation. In the region, there is a great potential for conflict that has recently
deepen. The region faces an increasing number of challenges and threats. Besides the situation
is affected by the factor of cultural diversity, as well as complex historical heritage. However,
one cannot help but notice that in the last few years some qualitative improvements in the
international situation have also taken place in North East Asia. The countries of the region
are trying to abandon obvious confrontation and hostility in their relations; they are in favor
of expanding bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Although, as we know, the situation
on the Korean peninsula is lately creating certain political difficulty, causing an extremely
negative reaction from the US. The situation around the DPRK is another destabilizing factor
in North-East Asia, as in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Despite the fact that Pyongyang
has no ambitions to become a superpower, its actions directly affect the security in the region
and the relations of its member countries.
The NEA countries in aggregate keep remaining a leading force in the development
of the world economy. Currently, many countries in the region are showing increasing
willingness to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The economic factor underlies
stabilization of the international political and military-political situation in the region and
creates the basis for the development of broad international cooperation in the economic
sphere. It is difficult to imagine that this or that country will sacrifice its national interests
and give preference to the interests of other countries, but it seems that NEA states should
seek to formulate and develop a principle of so-called "regional interest" when they could
act together not only in economic, but also in the political sphere. I mean that in practical
terms, it would be more correct to raise, discuss and resolve issues that concern international
cooperation not within the vast Asia-Pacific region as a whole, but primarily within North-
East Asia, which is the sphere of interests of such major states as China, Russia, Japan and
the United States. In particular, these countries determine the main trends and the general
direction of the development of this large regional system.
North-East Asia’s role in the world balance of power is constantly rising; the region
is becoming an important center of world politics and economy. In the present complex
situation North-East Asia, even more than ever, needs an ongoing dialogue at various levels
and through this dialogue – creation of a real community of the countries of the region. There
is a question of further intensification of the process of negotiations between the states of
the region, the creation of temporary and permanent bilateral and multilateral international
negotiating mechanisms for this purpose. Flexible negotiation formats will allow to focus
on the most pressing regional problems. In this context, the following spheres that are of
particular importance for NEA can be emphasized: 1) stimulation of economic growth,
2) strengthening of security, 3) creating an atmosphere of trust, 4) forming relations of
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stable cooperation. The combination of Russia’s eastern regions’ rich energy resources, the
considerable resources of cheap labor in China and the DPRK, capitals and technologies of
Japan and the Republic of Korea could appear to be the basis of the system of international
economic cooperation in North-East Asia.
Until recently, the formation of integration groups within the region was the weakest
link in regional integration. In modern conditions, such an intraregional, cross-border
system is starting to be being built up gradually. Now in NEA two triples can be identified:
the first one – already actively cooperating China, South Korea, Japan and the second one
– China, Russia, Mongolia, embarking on the project of building an economic corridor.
That particular project can become an example of such a systemic interaction, when its
participants initially build their relations not only putting their national interests first, but
also taking into account the interests of their partners and of the region in whole. It should
be also said about another regional project – the Enhanced Tymangan Initiative (RTI), which
is a project of multilateral cooperation initiated by the UNDP in 1991 with a view to the
joint development of the adjacent territories of China, Russia, Mongolia and the Republic
of Korea. Initially, the project was declared as the UN Program on the Development of the
Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) and was a part of the UN Program on
the Development of North-East Asia. RTI was established in 2005 through the transformation
of the UN Tumen River Development Program, funded by UNDP from 1991 to 2005. At the
start of the project, the DPRK was among the participants, but at the present moment, the
participation of the DPRK in the project is suspended, since it withdrew from the project
in 2009. Japan is an observer in this project; its interests in this region can also be realized
through multilateral cooperation, but at present Japan's participation in this format of
interaction is not systemic. The main spheres of multilateral cooperation within the RTI are
transport, energy, investment, tourism and the environment. Currently, the RTI is developing
as a full-scale international organization of multilateral cooperation, with an appropriate
organizational structure, management and decision-making system19. The pattern of the
RTI and other economic projects suggests that the possibility of realization of the objective
common interests of the NEA countries is limited mainly by political contradictions and
clash of interests of some countries, which slows down or even counteracts the processes of
foreign economic liberalization and the development of integration processes. Apparently,
concrete joint international projects in the interests of the participating countries can serve
both economic and socio-political goals and could ensure in the future the smoothing of
political differences and contradictions in North-East Asia.
In the region, there is another channel of interaction – The Association of North-East
Asia Regional Governments (NEAR), established in 1996 and successfully functioning now.
This format of interaction arose on the basis of the commonality of regional development
goals, as well as the need to resolve possible contradictions caused by the territorial conjugacy
of neighboring regions. The association includes the PRC (seven territorial units), Mongolia
(22), Russia (16), Japan (10), North Korea (2), South Korea (16). It should be recognized
that the interaction within the framework of the NEAR is currently not always sufficiently
effective, although the combination of regional interests at the level of national regional
administrations allows to respond more quickly and flexibly to the challenges of time and
current socio-economic problems.
19 http://ukros.ru/archives/13593 - 54 -
When I speak about an integrated system of the large region of North- East Asia, I mean
the interaction in several fields. The main of them are: a) economic interrelations (commodity
exchange, production cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation); b) political and
military-political relations; c) cultural exchange; d) cooperation in the humanitarian field.
Priority should be given to the development and improvement of economic relations, which
directly involve countries in international interaction. Considering, however, the complexity
of the political situation in the region, the necessity of solving problems of international
security and establishing favorable international legal regime remains important.
At the present situation, two centers of power have formed in North-East Asia: one
of them includes the US and its allies – Japan and South Korea, the other one – China and
Russia. It is quite difficult to build an effective security structure in this situation: China and
the US have too much mutual distrust. Experts admit that the situation may change if a third
actor that has influence in the international community appears in the region. If the bipolar
structure disintegrates and the countries of the region can move away from the paradigm of
the US-China confrontation, there will be a chance to overcome mutual distrust and develop
common understanding of the world order20.
Can Russia become such an actor? Against the backdrop of the worldwide trend
towards a more dynamic development of modern international cooperation, Russia often
loses out to its neighbors in the region in terms of efficiency in developing closer ties with
many countries, including NEA. The situation worsened after 2014 due to the introduction
of the sanctions against Russia. From the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, it became
complicated for Russia to pursue its foreign policy course aimed at taking the place of the
third global actor in North-East Asia – on a par with the US and China. As for the place of
Russia in the regional process in North-East Asia, taking into account the current level of its
economic development, it is unlikely that in the near future it will be able to claim a leading
role. On the other hand, NEA has more geopolitical than economic significance for Russia.
In addition, Russia is afraid of opening its eastern borders to more concentrated in the capital
and population Asian countries, as it is quite difficult to predict what impact this will have
on Russia in the long term. However, it does not mean that Russia should remove itself
from regional problems. In this situation, the issue of expanding economic cooperation,
primarily between Russia and China, comes to the foreground. At the current stage, it seems,
this question should be settled by taking into account the requirements for the creation of
an integrated regional economic system covering the regions of the Russian Far East, the
northeast of the PRC, Mongolia, and also partly the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. In the
general concept of the formation of such a system, economic cooperation between Russia
and Japan should be included.
The development of the Russian-Chinese cooperation plays a fundamentally
important role in strengthening Russia's positions in North-East Asia. Bilateral cooperation
is an important link that contributes to strengthening the security of both countries, promotes
the expansion of Russia's economic presence in the region, the rise of Siberia and the Far
East. For Russia, there is a growing need to build a complex of cooperation in North-East
Asia, which would allow not only preventing and overcoming conflicts, but also creating
incentives for interaction in various spheres.
20 http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/09/ru-pub-63751
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AMERICA’S CHANGING ROLE IN ASIA IN THE ERA OF TRUMP
Ms. Jenny TOWN

Assistant Director of the US-Korea Institute
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, USA
To understand how foreign policy is operating under the new Trump administration in
the United States, it is important to better understand the context in which decision making
is occurring. It would seem, since Donald Trump has taken office, politics have not been
business as usual in America.
As president, Trump’s approach to leading America reflects the same behavior he
employed as both a businessman and a celebrity. He has been highly sensitive to ratings
and bad publicity, worrying deeply about how is portrayed as a person, rather than for his
policies. He has been known to monitor coverage of himself on cable news, calling in to
refute what he might disagree with. He seems to have grown frustrated with the limitations
of presidential power, praising strongmen and reverting back to behaviors and approaches
common to CEOs, not politicians. In addition, many of his inner circle of advisers and
cabinet members are also largely from the business, not public service, world, with exception
of a few notable military generals.
As such, what we have seen from this administration is a general lack of cohesion in
formulating and especially articulating government policies. If we focus solely on Trump’s
foreign policy agenda, the inconsistency of messaging from President Trump to Secretary
Tillerson to Ambassador Haley to Secretary Mattis from week to week or at times even
day to day has been almost dizzying – with growing questions of who among them is in
the driver’s seat on foreign policy and how any of them will respond if the next tweet from
Trump contradicts whatever policy has been stated.
Furthermore, if this was business as usual, the wheels of government would continue
to turn. However, five months into this administration, more than 500 key leadership posts
have not even been nominated yet, such as the Assistant Secretaries of State, with additional
talk of eliminating more than 1000 positions within the Department of State alone. So in the
past, when there has been turmoil at the top levels of government, there have been systems
and senior leadership in place to continue policy implementation and sustain diplomatic
efforts, especially in offering solidarity and assurances to our allies that business can continue
as usual. But this is not where we are today. Those systems have been disrupted, which gives
greater weight to the words of Trump and his inner circle in providing policy direction,
leadership and these assurances.
Trump’s approach to the Korean peninsula in his first 100 days illustrates why this
all of this matters. On the North Korea front, the Trump administration has made this a
top national security priority given North Korea’s accelerated pace of nuclear and missile
development and testing. However the inconsistencies in messaging of what a new policy
toward North Korea would be has caused a huge credibility gap now for the administration.
Early messaging that “all options were on the table” when expressing frustration
toward North Korea’s continued provocations came across as implying military actions were
- 56 -
coming. Granted, this was during the time the US was conducting a North Korea policy
review, in which, of course, all options are considered when trying to develop a new policy
and ruled out as seen fit. But the way it was conveyed, the timing it was used all seemed to
intimate a direction before a policy was even established.
In April, when North Korea is known to do provocations to mark key political
holidays, Trump upped the ante by threatening if China doesn’t take care of this problem
that America will go it alone and soon afterwards reported the movement of the Carl Vinson
strike group to Korean waters. This came days after Trump had bombed an air base in Syria
for Syria’s alleged use of chemical weapons against its people, and an ISIS base camp in
Afghanistan, though with no follow through strategy for either case, making each a one-
off showing. While the administration later denied that that these actions were meant to
be messages to North Korea, the intent at this point is essentially irrelevant as they were
certainly interpreted that way.
This also came in the aftermath of the Trump-Xi summit at Mar-a-Lago, where Trump
implored President Xi Jinping that China should do more to contain this issue, with a veiled
threat of actions against China if it couldn’t get North Korea under control. Moreover,
neither South Korea nor Japan were informed of the plans about the Carl Vinson Group,
raising serious concerns from our allies that the new US president was just impulsive enough
to start a war—one that they would largely bear the brunt of.
Whatever Trump thought he might accomplish with this rhetoric, it failed. North Korea
didn’t back down and conducted a missile test anyway on April 16. It was then revealed that
Trump had mischaracterized the mission of the Carl Vinson as well, and that it had not been
on a direct route to Korea after all. So not only did this cause a credibility issue with North
Korea, who called Trump’s bluff so to speak, but it fueled concerns in Seoul and Tokyo as
to what Trump may be willing to do unilaterally that would affect regional security. These
actions built a trust deficit with both US allies and adversaries that will take considerable
time and effort to regain.
After the conclusion of the North Korea policy review, Trump’s policy in theory has
moved away from “strategic patience,” and towards “maximum pressure and engagement.”
However, the test of whether the policy will really be different will be in what the terms of
engagement will be and if they are practical enough to move away from simply a pressure
campaign. While the details of this “new” policy are still somewhat unclear, the general
sense is that the administration has largely moved away from military options after all;
though whether Trump will adhere to this policy consistently over time is yet to be seen.
Furthermore, Trump’s later statements demanding South Korea to pay for the
controversial THAAD deployment and threatening to cancel the Korea-US Free Trade
Agreement without serious renegotiation, has further widened the trust deficit with South
Korea—if not the government, certainly with the general public. While this is Trump’s
negotiation style—threaten extremes and settle for something more reasonable—alliance
management is not a real estate deal and antagonizing allies for small economic concessions
is a flawed diplomatic strategy to say the least. While administration officials quickly
intervened to contradict Trump’s statement on THAAD and reassure South Korea that the
US commitments on this deployment would stand, the reputational damage done in the
process could cause serious problems going forward, especially as the new South Korean
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President Moon Jae-in’s liberal agenda is expected to be at odds with American policies on
a number of core alliance issues.
As the summit between Trump and President Moon Jae-in quickly approaches,
expectations are mixed at best as to how the two are going to get along and whether they will
be able to find consensus on key issues. In this current political structure, the relationship
of personalities at the top has more weight than it has in past years. Having been in political
limbo while the impeachment of Park Geun-hye came to a close, Seoul has yet not been able
to build a relationship with President Trump to share with him South Korea’s world view.
So while Prime Minister Abe and President Xi Jinping were able to get early meetings
with Trump to start to shape Trump’s understanding of security concerns in East Asia aligned
with their national interests, while providing some level of economic concessions to play
to Trump’s ego, South Korea is coming late to the game. Will they be able to build the
same type of relationship with Trump? Will they be able to offer some kind of economic
concession in order to appeal to Trump’s win-lose transactional negotiation style? Will Trump
even be invested in the summit proceedings given all the domestic turmoil unfolding—the
investigations into Russian interference in the elections, the new lawsuits being filed against
Trump’s conflicts of interests, the new legislation curbing his power on Russian sanctions,
the talk of potential criminal charges against Trump and his family members, and so forth?
At the end of the day, the reality is that American foreign policy is not business as
usual. The learning curve for this administration is steep and hopefully they will rise to the
challenge. Though in the meantime, I think it’s important for all us all (Americans too) not
to overreact to Trump’s words/antics/tweets with such fervor, understanding that traditional
diplomacy is simply not part of this administrations’ strengths. But to reserve judgment for
how his administration follows up on those words.
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SESSION II
THE PATH FORWARD: IMPROVING CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION
IN NORTHEAST ASIA
There are several initiatives, proposals and projects that focus on the development of security
mechanisms in Northeast Asia. Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues and talks including Ulaanbaatar
Dialogue on Northeast Asian security also continue to encourage exchange of ideas and
views to build mutual trust and understanding. Meanwhile, the Six-Party Talks remain “a
test of whether these countries can collectively deal with regional security concerns.” In
sense, the region needs to answer a question on how countries can cooperate to build mutual
trust and create shared benefits in a more effective way. This session will focus on policy
options to improve current security situation in the region.
Moderator:
Dr.MUNKHTUR Dorjraa, Dean of Research, the Institute for Strategic Studies
(ISS), Mongolia
Speakers:
Towards a Sustainable Security Community (SSC) in Northeast Asia
Dr. LIU Qing, Director of Department for Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation,
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), China
The Abandonment of the US Hostile Policy towards the DPRK is a Prerequisite for
Ensuring the Lasting Peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region of Northeast
Asia
Mr. KIM Kwang Hak, Researcher of Institute for American Studies (IFAS), MFA,
DPRK
Why Does Cooperative Security Idea in Asia not Succeed?
Prof. Noboru MIYAWAKI, Professor, College of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan
University, Japan
Perspective on Building a Multilateral Regional Security Mechanism in Northeast
Asia: the Role of Mongolia
Mr. DORJSUREN Nanjin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies
of Mongolia (ISS)
Cooperative Multilateralism in Northeast Asia: Issues and Prospects
Dr. Sang Hyun LEE, Director, Research Planning Division, the Sejong Institute,
ROK
New Regional Security System in Northeast Asia
Dr. Vladimir EVSEEV, Deputy Director of the Institute of Commonwealth of
Independent states, The Russian Federation
America at War… with Itself, and What It Means for Security in Northeast Asia
Dr. Alexandre MANSOUROV, Adjunct Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown
University, USA
Multilateralism in East Asia and Europe and the Role of the European Union in
Facilitating East Asian Multilateralism
Dr. Eric BALLBACH, Post- Doctoral Research Fellow, Director Research Unit II:
Korea and International Security, Free- 59 -
University Berlin, Germany
TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE SECURITY

COMMUNITY (SSC) IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Dr. LIU Qing

Director of Department for Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation,
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), China
I. What Will the Northeast Asia Security Look Like?

We are now in a challenging security environment in Northeast Asia, and need to
foster a vision of sustainable security community, which includes four key elements.
Common Security
Every country has the right to equal participation in security affairs and the
responsibility to maintain security in its region. Its legitimate security concerns should be
respected and addressed. We all are security stakeholder. We need to maximize our common
security interests to ensure security for both ourselves and others.
Inclusive Security
When one strengthens its own security, it wouldn’t do harm to others’ security and
create more security risks for others. National security should be based on mutual assured
security, instead of mutual assured deterrence or mutual assured destruction. Decision
makers should be equipped with knowledge and tools that strengthen their ability to develop
inclusive policies and approaches.
Comprehensive Security
We should not take a fragmented approach that treats the symptoms only. Instead,
we need to take a holistic approach to security issues. This means we need to take into
consideration both traditional and non-traditional factors. And we need to take a multi-
pronged strategy that covers political, economic, scientific and technological, social, cultural
and security fields.
Cooperative Security
No country can handle today’s complex security challenges on its own. Countries
need to foster a vision of addressing security challenges through cooperation. We shouldn’t
keep any dialogue away and refuse engagement. We need to conduct candid and in-depth
dialogue and communication to increase strategic trust and reduce mutual suspicion, increase
mutual understanding, accommodate each other’s concerns. We need to have mechanisms to
manage security risks and accidental conflict.
II. How to Build a Security Community?
Build Regional Security Identity
Consensus is built among regional countries for protecting regional security
interdependence and economy prosperity. Regional identity can be cultivated through
increasing regional interaction and integration.
Northeast Asia should expand its linkage with the larger region of East Asia, so that
the process of legalization in the East Asian institutionalism can provide an incentive for
Northeast Asian countries.
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Develop a Habit of Problem-solving Cooperation

Track II or 1.5 multilateral diplomacy is a more effective channel than track I. Its
flexibility and openness lowers the barrier for participation with minimum political risk. It
appears to be non-threatening to any country since it is not attempting to challenge or change
regional order.
Cooperation on soft security issues may be the cutting point. Soft security issues
such as nuclear safety, cybercrime, financial fraud, energy security, health and disaster
management are arguably easier to discuss with fewer political considerations. This means
starting with trans-boundary issues, but there are low levels of political differences.
Soft security cooperation is conducive to a “habit of cooperation”, which certainly
lay the foundation for constructive regional collaboration. It will not automatically expand
to cooperation on hard security issues. However, it creates a spillover effect in the traditional
security sector.
Establish Regional Security Framework
The first is to create mechanisms to build confidence. There are several confidence-
building measures (CBMs) such as reducing the dangers of accidental conflict, reaching
agreement on acceptable and unacceptable military activities, notifying troop movements
and exercises, encouraging visits by military athletic teams, establishing “hot line” between
chiefs of military forces and units in contact across a border, exchanging military personnel
and stationing permanent liaison observers at major headquarters, etc. CBMs should be
inclusive and transparent. Transparency promotes confidence. The exchange of information
and the identification of norms based on common perceptions of values should be the starting
point of any CBM exercise. Any agreed CBMs must be inclusively developed to be effective
by all the participating parties.
The second is to build the mechanisms for collective policy coordination
between states that have just begun to develop sustainable relationships of cooperation. It is
unnecessary to reinvent more new wheels. Rather, seek to connect existing mechanisms and
build on them to create a coordinated, comprehensive and consolidated framework. There
are several existing ones such as China-Japan-ROK trilateral summit, NECD and China-
Japan-ROK security dialogue.
China–Japan–ROK trilateral summit was built in 2008. In September 2011, the
three countries launched the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul.
NECD is an institution for an informal dialogue in which policy-level officials from
foreign and defense ministries participate. The dialogue has earned the support of all six
governments. NECD laid a foundation for the official six party talks which in turn might
eventually lead to a permanent official consultative process for Northeast Asia.
China-Japan-ROK security dialogue was established in 2015. It is a forum in which
former defense officials and security experts from three countries evaluate current East
Asia security situation, new developments of major states’ security policy, identify regional
security challenges, and propose policy recommendations.
The third is to hammer out Framework of Code of Conduct in Northeast Asia,
or A charter for security and cooperation, which could include agreements not to use or
threaten force in the mutual relations of its members; to enhance transparency in military
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affairs; to work for the improvement of human welfare everywhere; to develop cultural and
historical awareness; to encourage the freer movement of people, information, and ideas
across borders.
The final step is to build an organization similar to the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which provides some experiences and insights for
northeast Asia. One of them is that a comprehensive agenda provides a context within which
disparate problems can be solved, partly because it encourages tradeoffs among diverging
national interests. I hope all concerned parties could make concerted efforts to build Northeast
Asia style of OSCE based on an updated six-party talk as soon as possible. Northeast Asia
countries might not agree on each issues but each of them see advantages for themselves in
this organ.
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THE ABANDONMENT OF THE US HOSTILE POLICY TOWARDS THE

DPRK IS A PREREQUISITE FOR ENSURING THE LASTING PEACE ON
THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN THE REGION OF NORTHEAST ASIA
Mr. KIM Kwang Hak

Researcher of Institute for American Studies (IFAS), MFA, DPRK
In his report to the 7th Party Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) the
Respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, the Chairman of the Worker’s Party of
Korea, said as follows:
“To build a peaceful world free from war is the fighting goal of our Party, and to
struggle for regional and global peace and security is a consistent stand of our Party and
the government of our Republic.”
Peace is the common desire of the human being and it is the unanimous desire of all
states and nations to live and prosper in the peaceful and stable environment. Peace is an
intrinsic requirement of socialism, and it is a desire of our people who have been exposed to
the constant danger of a nuclear war. At present, the DPRK, under the wise leadership of the
great Worker’s Party of Korea, is making active efforts to build the powerful socialist country,
the strongest country in the world with great national strength, which is ever-prospering and
whose people live happily without envying anything in the world. And at the same time,
the DPRK is making positive efforts to safeguard the peace and the stability on the Korean
peninsula and in the region of the Northeast Asia and further the world. However, the current
situation on the Korean peninsula and in the region of the Northeast Asia runs counter to the
desire of the DPRK and the progressive people in the region, because it becomes the biggest
hotpot in the world where the danger of the nuclear war has been constantly prevailing due
to the provocations of war by the US. It becomes a matter of urgency to prevent a war and
secure the peace on the Korean peninsula in achieving the goal of ensuring the peace and
stability in the world.
1. The danger and the injustice of the US hostile policy towards the DPRK
The US hostile policy towards the DPRK is extremely dangerous and entirely unjust
policy because it thoroughly undermines the right to existence of the tens of millions of the
Korean people and destroys the peace and security in the rest of the Northeast Asian region
and the world at large as well. The US hostile policy towards the DPRK is in essence to
obliterate it politically, isolate it economically and stifle it by use of force.
First, the US hostile policy towards the DPRK is the completely unjust policy
which can be characterized as the policy of the unprecedented brutal sanctions and
stifling against a sovereign state.
When we look at the international relations, we could witness so many ever-worsening
conflicts and confrontations among the countries for the several reasons such as the historical
and cultural differences, conflicts of interests and maintaining and expanding the sphere of
domination. However, it is so difficult to find the policy that is equivalent to the US hostile
policy towards the DPRK which had been derived from the inveterate and deep-rooted sense
of rejection of the other party. The US policy, which the DPRK makes an issue of, is not
an abstract definition or assertion. That policy has been pursued by the US in practical way
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to brutally threaten the right of the DPRK citizen to existence and development. The US is
openly taking the hostile attitude towards the DPRK; it has blatantly spitted out all sorts of
wicked words against the DPRK such as “axis of evil”, “evil place”, “rogue nation”, “state
sponsor of terrorism” and etc.. All of you will have a vivid memory of what Obama himself
talked about the DPRK in Jan, 2015. During an interview with one YouTube maker, Obama
depicted of the DPRK as the “brutal regime” and further said that “Over time you will see
the regime like this will collapse. Information ends up sipping in overtime in bringing about
the change and that’s something we are constantly looking for ways to accelerate.”
It is so ironic to note that the US, which usually asserts that it is “so concerned” with
the “difficulties that the North Korean people have suffered from” and urges the DPRK
government to “channel its money into raising the living standard of the people”, has
recently expanded the scope of sanctions to banning sales of foodstuff, agricultural and
fishing products, textile and minerals irrelevant to the “development of the WMD” and
furthermore has been pursuing the policy of the “secondary boycotting” against the foreign
individuals and the entities who have the business relations with the DPRK. Moreover, the
US officials are openly asking the other countries to cut off or downscale the diplomatic and
business relations with the DPRK. All these facts lay bare the American-style hypocrisy and
deception. The US consistently denies the fact that it is seeking for the “regime change” of
the DPRK, but their words do not match with their actions.
The US, in accordance with the “North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016”, is resorting to the psychological warfare and “human rights” offensive against the
DPRK to disintegrate it from within. For example, the US authorized as much as USD 50
million from the fiscal years 2017 through 2021 to be appropriated to those things such as
conducting the radio broadcasting to the DPRK and sending lots of receiving apparatuses
into the DPRK under the pretext of “promoting freedom of information”, and providing
grants to the anti-DPRK “human rights” plot-breeding groups under the pretext of supporting
the “propagation of the democracy”. All these maneuvers constitute the most undisguised
attempt of the US to realize the “regime change” of the DPRK. All the participants here
should have the clear understanding of the goal pursued by the US through the means of
sanctions and pressure-oriented policy towards DPRK is rather to realize the “regime change”
of the DPRK by disintegrating it from within, far from achieving the “denuclearization of
the DPRK”.
Second, the US hostile policy towards the DPRK is extremely dangerous policy
which could utterly undermine the peace on the Korean peninsula and in the region of
the Northeast Asia. It has been 20 and odd years since the end of the Cold War between
the former USSR and the US, which had posed a grave threat upon the destiny of the human
being. However, it is to be deplored that the Korean peninsula is still suffering from the legacy
of the Cold War. On the Korean peninsula there still exists the confrontational framework of
the DPRK vs. the alliance of US, Japan and South Korea, and this grave situation is inviting
very dangerous events which means that a war may break out at any moment. Especially,
the US and south Korea wage the large scale joint military exercises targeting the DPRK
while introducing great number of the nuclear assets such as the nuclear submarines, nuclear
aircraft carriers and the nuclear strategic bombers in and around the Korean peninsula.
This constitutes the root cause of the escalation of the tensions on the Korean peninsula.
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The US asserts that the purpose of these exercises and introduction of the nuclear assets is to
counter the “provocations” and the “threats” from the DPRK by embellishing their actions
as of the “routine and defensive nature”.
If that’s the case, the point is how we could explain about the recent military
operations that the US maps out and conducts; the “Decapitation Operation” targeting the
supreme leadership of the DPRK, the “Tweezers Operation” to blow up the nuclear and
rocket bases of the DPRK, the “Offensive operation into the deeper inlands of the North”
and the “Pyongyang Occupation Operation” to realize the “regime collapse” of the DPRK,
even the “High-precision strike exercises” to attack the offices of the supreme leadership
of the DPRK. Moreover, the US mobilized its special mission units to be hurled into the
US-south Korea joint military exercises; the “Navy Seal” Team 6 known as “Warriors’ Unit
using the occult art of transforming” which specializes in the “operations for removing the
headquarters” and “Delta Force”, known as “detached force of the White House”, belonging
to the joint special warfare headquarters. The US consistently introduces and deploys the
nuclear assets in and around the Korean peninsula, which is too small to take those kinds of
measures. There is no guarantee that these military exercises do not be converted to the real
war. Actions are surely to be followed by the reaction, and pressure is surely to be followed
by the resistance. The US is prone to make a reference to somebody’s “miscalculations” or
“unpredictability”. In case the US’s logic is to be followed, there is no guarantee that a large-
scale war would not break out on the Korean peninsula, if the US, misjudging the strategic
position of our Republic, now that it has emerged a full-fledged nuclear power in the East
and a leading rocket power in Asia, persists in clinging to its anachronistic racket of military
confrontation including the joint military exercises.
Once an all-out war should break out on the Korean peninsula, and then it will be
easily followed by the world war leading to the thermonuclear war which the world has
never witnessed before. In other words, the US hostile policy and the military blackmailing
against the DPRK are very dangerous because they invite the horrible nuclear calamity to
the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asia, and furthermore to the whole world. We can
only expect the development and the future as long as we survive, which means that it is so
preposterous to talk about the peace, development and prosperity under the grave situation
where the right to existence is severely threatened. Particularly, judging from the tragic
situation in Iraq, Libya and Syria, the DPRK came to the conclusion that it should increase
its own military capability in order to deal with the nuclear threats of the US with its own
nuclear hammers of justice, and it means death to the DPRK when it gives up its nuclear
weapons before the US, the crazy one which is constantly posing a grave threat upon the
DPRK by deploying the nuclear assets in and around the Korean peninsula and is trying to
wring the neck of the DPRK by imposing the various“ sanctions” tantamount to the “state
of entire blockade” .
2. The ways for ensuring the lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and in the
region of the Northeast Asia
Ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula is an issue vital to the destiny
of our nation, and the volatile situation on the Korean peninsula threatens the existence and
development of our fellow countrymen and hinders the national reunification of the DPRK.
My personal suggestions in securing the lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and in the
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region of the Northeast Asia are as follows;

First, the US should scrap its anachronistic policy of hostility towards the DPRK,
replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and withdraw its aggressive forces
and war materiel from South Korea. The DPRK made it crystal-clear that it went nuclear
for the self-defensive purpose, according to its independent decision as it was badly needed
for preserving its dignity and vital rights from the nuclear threat posed by the US, not
because it had ambition to go nuclear. The DPRK government will wage a vigorous struggle
to remove the root cause of the danger of a nuclear war imposed by the US by dint of our
powerful nuclear deterrent and to safeguard peace in the region and the rest of the world. The
assertion itself that there is no problem with thousands of the nuclear weapons possessed by
the other nuclear powers, but only the nuclear weapons of the DPRK “pose the grave threat
to the international peace and stability” represents the “hostility toward the DPRK”.
Recently some US officials claimed that the US does not seek the “regime change in
the North Korea," earnestly calling on the public to believe it. It is the vivid example of the
hostile policy that a country is openly referring to the “invasion” or “regime change” of a
sovereign state and dare mentioning about whether it will invade the other and whether it
will seek for the “regime change” of it when it frames the “keynote of the policy”. It actually
means that it would make no scruple of bringing down the social system of the DPRK, not
ruling out invasion if the DPRK fails to abandon its nukes. I see no possibilities for the
resolution of this issue until the US changes its negative viewpoint and attitude on the DPRK
and drops its hostile policy towards it, which resulted in the DPRK’s possession and the
steady increase of its nuclear attack capability.
Second, it is important to fight for genuine international justice. Now in the
international arena the globally recognized fundamental principles of international
relations are overtly violated owing to the US-led imperialist forces’ outrageous schemes
for domination and intervention, and even justifiable acts are criminalized as injustice to
serve the interests of the imperialist powers. Adoption of “resolutions” at the UN and in the
international arena designed to justify and legalize the US moves of aggression and war,
and such abnormal practices as violations of justice and truth must no longer be connived
at or tolerated. To criticize with no good reason the self-defensive measures of the DPRK
to bolster up its military capacity, which is aimed at defending its sovereignty and the right
to existence, before examining the injustice and danger of the US hostile policy towards the
DPRK only invites the escalation of the tensions in the region, far from solving the problem.
All the states in the region should respect the sovereignty of the DPRK and play a positive
role beneficial to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Especially, they
should sharpen their vigilance against the trickery of the US which is seeking profits by
sowing seed of distrust and discord among the nations to incite the antipathy.
※※※※※
The DPRK has already made it clear that it is ready to react to any mode of war
desired by the US.
The time when the nuclear weapons were the exclusive property of the US and the
US threatened the DPRK with them at its own will had gone forever. The American-style
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bluffing by which it reduces only non-nuclear states and weak nations into the plaything of
its military action can never work on the DPRK.
The US should neither ignore nor miscalculate the fact that the US mainland and the
Pacific operational theatre are within the striking range of the Korean People’s Army, and
every kind of powerful retaliatory weapon is currently at the hands of the DPRK.
We will continue to build up our self-defense capability, the pivot of which is the
nuclear forces and the capability for preemptive strike as long as the US and its vassal forces
keep on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as they do not stop their war games they
stage at our doorstep disguising them as annual events. Those who really desire the lasting
peace on the Korean peninsula and in the region of the Northeast Asia should strongly urge
the US to drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK. This is the one and only way to ensure
the lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and in the region of the Northeast Asia which the
progressive human beings so eagerly desire. Thank you for your attention.
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WHY DOES THE COOPERATIVE SECURITY IDEA IN ASIA NOT

SUCCEED?
Prof. Noboru MIYAWAKI

Professor, College of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University, Japan
Contents
Background
1) Plural Multilateralism
2) Strong Bilateralism
3) No single multi-security talk on NEA except UBD
4) Similarity Divided Europe and the NEA
1. Cooperative security in the cold war Europe
2. Three independent variables in NEA
1) The United States
2) Neutral Mongolia
3) Japan
3. Conclusion
Background
Our North-East Asia has four features in talking security architectures. At first,
many multilateral talks and initiatives for political / economic dialogues/mechanisms in
this region: CICA, SCO, AIIB, ADB, NAPCI, the Six-Party talks, ASEAN+3+2+1, and
UBD. This is mainly because of, first, the successful integration of ASEAN and, second,
the dramatic change in Chinese diplomacy around 2000. China made itself the leader of
regional multilateralism. The conference with the most members in the security dimension
is the CICA. Second, there are strong bilateral ties like 2+2 talks or strategic dialogues:
e.g. Abe’s cabinet tends to keep strong ties with Russia, and Russia has had the strategic
partnership with China. Russia becomes the vertex of the two bilateral lines.
However, no single talk, except UBD, covers all the political entities in the NEA.
Why? This is because the NEA lacks some variables seen in cooperative security in the
Cold-War Europe. In Europe, there were two big alliances based on the collective self-
defense rights (NATO vs. WP) whereas the NEA has only bilateral alliances of so-called
hub-and-spoke. In the cold war era, any initiative by Asian states for multilateral alliances,
like Pacific Treaty idea by Philippines in the 1950s, failed, except the cases of SEATO or
ANZUS.
In 1970-80s, in western Europe social democrats gained power by elections. While
the Socialist bloc was united, the West was politically divided. FRG was led by SPD, the
UK was led by the Labor Party, and in 1980s France was led by the President Mitterrand
Socialists. Socialists or social democrats in Asia tended to support a national framework of
ideology, which is different from the frameworks in the parties in Western Europe that loved
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international socialism; this greatly contributed to the multilateral security dialogue.

Now we have the chance for a cooperative security environment—following the
experiences of the CSCE in the Cold War, which bridged the 15-year dialogue starting in
1975 between the East and West to avoid the possible war.
1. Cooperative security in Europe: Three independent variables
Cooperative security functions to create a no-enemy security situation, which is
different from traditional collective security or alliances. In the room of diplomacy, there is
no precondition of membership due to style of political, economic, or cultural regime.
Despite political trenches like East-West, member states could agree not totally
but partially on their common interests based on consensus, with the use of room for the
interpretation of abstract words. This successfully leads the multilateral talks as much as of
35 states.
1) The United States: Starting linkage diplomacy based on a realistic perspective: arms
control for inter-German talks or human dimension issues in the CSCE
2) N+N Actors: Nonalignment and neutral countries (N+N: e.g. Finland, Austria, Switzerland,
Yugoslavia, Malta) could bridge between the two blocs in adopting agreements, while it
was the political target of the allegation/ campaign of “Finlandization” by the USSR from
conservative parties in West.
3) Domestic politics and Foreign Policy in Liberal democracies: Social Democrats (FRG
in 1970s and France in 1980s) in Europe were more eager to conduct cooperative diplomacy
with the other bloc than Conservatives are.
2 Three independent variables for the successful cooperative security in the NEA
1) The first variable: US linkage diplomacy
The new US administration clearly pursues its own national interest as the first goal
and looks to conduct linkage diplomacy between security and economics. The alliances
(or other states) of the United States need to pay appropriate side-payment for U.S.,
including related companies’ employment in the United States, for keeping security ties
(or other interests) with the United States. At the same time, the United States showed the
intention of very tough negotiation, for adopting the final agreements of G7 in Italy, with all
members responding to the two-faced words and using ‘footnote’　 diplomacy. If the Trump
administration starts its linkage the Korean Peninsula issues with US-China trade, these
related states would be better off finding the multilaterally complicated talks responding
to the US request. This will certainly be the first point to start the new type of multilateral
security talks.
2) The second variable: Mongolia as a neutral state
Mongolia, as the liberal and neutral state, has sought to initiate the new CSCE
process in Asia, like the meeting of “Security Perspectives of Central and Northeast Asia:
Ulaanbaatar as a New Helsinki,” (ISS, 2008) In 2012, Mongolia became the fifty-seventh
participating state in the OSCE; the OSCE expanding eastward means more political
stability in Mongolia, as the neutral state. Unfortunately, Mongolia seems to need its
neutral friend state to conduct more powerful neutral diplomacy, but it has already gained
strong ties with the “third neighbor” of like-minded countries. Mongolia started the UB
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Dialogue in 2014 as a security dialogue (1.5 track) in the NEA, which was regarded as the
“New Helsinki.” Concretely, Mongolia will be expected to conduct host diplomacy for
continuous multilateral talks (like Finland in the CSCE), and for making the　incomplete
triangle such as Russia-China-Japan stable.
3) The third variable: the domestic politics of liberal democracies in South Korea and
Japan
[Republic of Korea]
In the former government, President Park initiated the NAPCI, hinted at by the CSCE
Process. South Korea has already prepared its multilateral security cooperation idea.
[Japan]
In Japan, in the Cold War era, the idea of CSCE in Asia (CSCA) was traditionally
supported by JSP, coinciding with the Soviet Proposal of Asian Security Conference in
1970s. In 1990s, Japan participated in the ASEAN+3 and Six-Party Talks. But the road of
multilateral diplomacy idea for Japan was not flat. In 1990, FM Nakayama (LDP) launched
the idea of the Asian Security Dialogue, which caused a negative reaction from the SEA
states but became the starting point of discussion with the ARF later. In 1999, PM Obuchi
(LDP) organized the first trilateral meeting of China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN is based on
the Three Summit: 1999-) and PM Aso started the independent the Trilateral Summit from
2008, later with some terms of suspension. In 2008, LDP PM Aso’s cabinet launched the
initiative of “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” but unfortunately got little attention from the
targeted countries.
In 2009, the Japanese people elected the Democratic party as the new government.
PM Hatoyama urged the idea of an Asian Community, based on the ASEAN+3 (and East
Asia Summit), but little progress has been observed because of his short term of office.
In 2012, PM Abe launched the idea of the Security Diamond Initiative (four
maritime democracies—consisting of the United States, India, Australia, and Japan), but
no diplomatic meeting has been convened. In 2017, these four countries tried to organize a
joint naval exercise hosted by India, but India suddenly objected to Australian participation.
These initiatives for multilateral talks originally initiated by the Japanese
government tended to be not easily surviving, but some exceptional cases were the CJK
Summit and possibly Hatoyama’s idea. At the same time, there are recently preferable
tendencies for multilateral idea in Japan. In general Abe’s diplomacy leads the multilateral
talks with a political advantage, like in the meetings of the G7 summit in 2016 and 2017, for
adjusting different national interests among members.
2. Implications and Conclusions
Based on the three independent variables of the success of cooperative security, the
implications are the following three points.
1) The United States needs to start linkage diplomacy in Asia.
2) Neutral Mongolia needs to keep a strong position, with more relatively
independent power.
3) Japan needs to continue to implement its multilateral initiative (without
preconditions) for creating new security dialogue.
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PERSPECTIVE ON BUILDING A MULTILATERAL REGIONAL SECURITY

MECHANISM IN NORTHEAST ASIA: THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA
Mr. DORJSUREN Nanjin

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia (ISS), Mongolia
Abstract
This paper provides a framework for building comprehensive multilateral security
mechanism which promotes mutual understanding and confidence-building in Northeast
Asia. In particular, the roles of the major actors, their policies and postures and their security
“interactions” for peace and cooperation are the key issues of the region. From this perspective,
many scholars and strategists, who involved in research on Northeast Asian security issues,
have argued about the Mongolia’s role and perspective on this process. Through the review
of literature, oral interview and the support of both primary and secondary sources this
paper responds to two main critical questions. In order to build a multilateral security
mechanism in Northeast Asia two questions must be answered: How regional countries
could cooperate more “effectively” to the mutual trust and benefit? What kind of strategic
advantages Mongolia have in the region for building a regional peace regime? So this paper
aims to examine the progress and challenges of the building an “effective” mechanism for
multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia and Mongolia’s role and perspective in
this process.
1. Perspective on Building a Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Mechanism
There are some discussions on “developing the Six-Party Talks to be a regional
mechanism managing broader security issues and build a regional security mechanism based
on the Six-Party Talks.”21 According the recommendations, suggested by the International
Crisis Group to the governments of China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the United States
and others: “Do not accept transformation of the Six-Party Talks into a forum that ignores
denuclearization and recognizes the DPRK as a nuclear state, and ensure that engagement
with the North takes a place in a venue appropriate to the relevant issue.”22 So these
policy trends beg the following questions: How regional countries could cooperate more
“effectively” to the mutual trust and benefit?
To answer these questions the paper argue that when analyzing the prospects of the
building a “multilateral security”23 mechanism in Northeast Asia, it must be recognized that
21 Chun Si Wu, “The Six-Party Talks: A Good Platform for Broader Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia”,
Korean Journal of Security Affairs, Research Institute on National Security Affairs, (Vol.12. No.2, December
2007), pp.109-118, p.109
22 “North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks,” Asia Report 269, (June 2015), accessed March 3, 2016,http://
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/269-north-korea-beyond-the-six-party-
talks.aspx
23 The concept of “multilateral security” can be theoretically described as a balance between different or
conflicting security interests. For example, it “proposes a framework in which each party can specify their
own security requirements and discrepancies between conflicting security interests can be recognized and
negotiated. In addition, no party should be required to place more than a minimal amount of trust in another,”
Gunther Muller and Kai Rannenberg, editors, “Multilateral Security and Communication,” (Addison
Wesley, 1999.) Also the “multilateral security” should be considered following principles: “(1) Take conflicts
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the regional institutional building in Northeast Asia is much different and much complicated
from other regions.
The regional institution building in Asia has long been focused on Southeast Asia,
with its so-called “comparatively advanced institutional structure” of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).24 But in Northeast Asia, according to many analysts,
region, “calls for an effective and a new security mechanism, adapted to the changes of
the political relations and the fast development of economic interdependence among the
nations,”25 or, “should not base its security measures on bilateral frameworks any longer,”
even, “the institutionalization of Northeast Asia has been widely regarded as impossible.”26
However, the Six-Party Talks is still “a test of whether these countries can collectively deal
with regional security concerns.”27
The interests of each party for a multilateral security mechanism are as following:
The Chinese perspective: Recently, China has become a “central to managing, if not
resolving, many of the traditional and nontraditional security issues facing the international
community.”28 In May 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping at the fourth summit of the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) proposed a
“common, comprehensive, cooperative, sustainable” new Asian security concept. He noted
that, “China is working to push forward the Six-Party Talks…making unremitting efforts in
solving international and regional hotspot issues through dialogue and negotiation.” Also,
“China will get more deeply involved in the regional cooperation process, and play its due part
to ensure that development and security in Asia. And China is ready to discuss with regional
countries the creation of an Asian forum for security cooperation in law enforcement.” 29
So, there are several approaches about the China’s interest for a multilateral security
mechanism in Northeast Asia:
Firstly, according to Chinese scholar Pang Zhongying a multilateral security
mechanism would have the following characteristics: “(1) It would include China, and
into account; (2) Respect individual interests; (3) Support interdependence,” Kai Rannenberg, “Multilateral
security a concept and examples for balanced security,” in Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security
paradigms, (ACM Press, 2000), p.151
24 Today few security frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region either promoted by ASEAN, such as the East Asian
Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministry Meeting.
25 Chun Si Wu, “The Six-Party Talks: A Good Platform for Broader Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia”,
Korean Journal of Security Affairs, Research Institute on National Security Affairs, (Vol.12. No.2, December
2007), pp.109-118, p.110
26 Martina Timmermann, “Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities,” “Institutionalizing
northeast Asia: regional steps towards global governance,” (Ed.) Martina Tummemann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama.
(Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2008): pp. 1-18, p.8
27 James Goodby and Donald Gross, “From Six Party Talks to a Regional Security Mechanism,” accessed
March 12, 2016, http://www.glocom.org/debates/20050325_goodby_from/index.html
28 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge; China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); Robert G. Sutter, China’s Role in Asia: Promise and Perils, (Oxford,
UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
29 Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), (21 May 2014), accessed April 5, 2017
http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/remarks-chinese-president-xi-fourth-summit-conference-interaction-
confidence-building-measures-asia/p33637
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even a denuclearized North Korea; (2) It would co-exist with US-led bilateral security
relations; (3) It would be justified or legitimized by ongoing cooperative and constructive
China-US relations; (4) It could help solve other regional security problems, including the
Taiwan problem; and (5) It would lay the foundation for a future-oriented regional security
community.”30
The second approach is, as Chinese scholar Wang Yiwei noted, “China’s role in
building a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia: China will not be the designer
but the key engine to push the architecture of the multilateral security mechanism in
Northeast Asia which reflects Chinese dilemma in shaping tomorrow’s world system and its
new identity as well”.31 In practice, many scholars argue that, China’s participation in any
kind of multilateral regimes tended to be “reluctant and defensive.”
The third approach is that China has an interest to participate in a multilateral regional
dialogues “with-out U.S. involvement”32 and strengthen relationships with Japan and South
Korea on its own terms.
The U.S. perspective: According to many analysts, it is not clear whether the United States
has any interest in establishing a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia.33 Many
scholars argue that the U.S. involvement in the regional issues of Northeast Asia is, “in order
to protect its national interest.”34 Even some views that, the U.S. interest on regional security
mechanism much “skeptical.” As South Korean scholar Ok-Nim Chung noted, “The U.S. has
emphasized its bilateral defense relationships as the foundation of American security policy
in Asia.” In particular, “More comfortable with one-on-one approaches to security issues
in Asia, U.S. officials are rather hesitant to embrace and aggressively pursue a multilateral
approach-particularly in addressing security concerns, and especially when the idea also
draws skeptical responses from North Korea and China.”35 However, US have an interest “to
30 Pang Zhongying, “Beijing seeks multilateral Northeast Asian security,” (Asia Times, April, 2004),
accessed April 2, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD09Ad03.html
31 Wang Yiwei, “China and Multilateral Security Mechanism in Northeast Asia,” Center for American
Studies, Fudan University, 2007, accessed April 5, 2017,
http://www.dbpia.co.kr/SearchResult/TopSearch?isFullText=0&searchAll=China+and+Multilateral+Securit
y+Mechanism+in+Northeast+Asia
32 See for example, Andrew Yeo, “China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast
Asian Politics and Order,” The International Relations and Security Network, (June 2013), accessed April 3,
2017, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=165008
33 Pang Zhongying, “Beijing seeks multilateral Northeast Asian security,” (Asia Times, April, 2004),
accessed April 2, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD09Ad03.html
34 Many US officials and scholars have concerns that a rising China posing “challenge” to the United States.
In particular, “A rising China will transform the status quo of the Asia Pacific region, posing challenges
to Washington’s national interests and regional stability.” (Fu Yu, “Reflections on Maritime Disputes and
US-China Relations”, Contemporary International Relations, (Vol.25 No5, September/October 2015), p.72)
Regarding China, in the 2012, US Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is stated, “The growth of China’s
military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions.” (“Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense”, 2012 US Defense Strategic Guidance, United
States Government Department of Defense. (January 2012) Also according to the “Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015,” Annual Report to Congress, “China seeks
to ensure basic stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to
focus on domestic development and smooth China's rise.”
35 Ok-Nim Chung, “Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia: A Multilateral Security Regime,” Brookings,
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limit China’s capabilities and influence, in Asia and globally.”36 So the peace and stability in
the region, “reflects the ability of China and the United States to dominate the local powers
in their respective spheres.”37 In other words, it is still a deficit of strategic mutual trust
between the two countries. Also many scholars argue that the US approach to Pyongyang’s
WMD programs, so-called “strategic patience,”38 has not achieved a concrete progress and
has been “ineffective” in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program. Especially, some
experts assess that the U.S. should take a relatively “hard” approach to North Korea, at the
same time, engage North Korea to the dialogue. In other words, it has become the time to
“rethink North Korea strategy.”39
The Japanese perspective: The complexity of security environment in the region is
Japanese security measures. The debate is about that Japan’s “over” development of its
military capabilities. This debate mostly raised in the context of Japan’s “reinterpretation”
of the constitution and a National Security Strategy (NSS). However, many analysts argue
that, in the Six-Party process, Japan, “has pursued its own set of interests that do not always
align with other participants.”40 Because, Japanese interest mostly focus on the issue of
Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Despite this issue, Japan has shown interest in
the so-called trilateral talks (China, Japan and South Korea), which focusing on “Strengthen
their cooperation mechanism and boost dialogue and cooperation in a bid to realize peace,
stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia.”41 But recently the trilateral cooperation is still
“politically weak at this stage.”42 Japan also actively participating in the trilateral meeting at
the “ASEAN+3” (Includes Southeast Asian countries plus China, Japan and South Korea)
platform, focused on economic cooperation and annually to discuss major international and
regional issues.43
(September 2015), accessed April 5, 2017, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/09/01diplomacy-

chung
36 Evan S.Medeiros, “China’s international behavior: activism, opportunism, and diversification”, (RAND
Corporation, 2009), p.99
37 Men Jing and Gustaaf Geeraerts, “Northeast Asian Security and China’s role,” Department of Political
Science, Free University Brussels (VUB), (Research Gate, September 2013),p.6, accessed April 3, 2017,
https://www.researchgate.net/
38 This strategy is “the United States could afford to wait for North Korea to make its decision to denuclearize,”
Scott A. Snyder, “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea,” (January 2013), accessed March 14, 2016, http://www.
cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962
39 Sangsoo Lee and Alec Forss, “Rethink North Korea strategy”, (East Asia Forum,2016), accessed April 13,
2016http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/03/17/time-to-rethink-north-korea-strategy/
40 “Japanese Perspectives on the Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” accessed April 5, 2017,
http://www.keia.org/publication/japanese-perspectives-six-party-talks-and-north-korean-nuclear-crisis
41 In order to expand cooperation, three parties decided to encourage a more active promotion of over 50
intergovernmental consultative mechanisms, including about 20 ministerial-level ones, and numerous
cooperation projects, as well as creating new intergovernmental consultative mechanisms. “China, ROK,
Japan work for peace, cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Xinhua News, (November 2, 2015), accessed March
13, 2017, http://english.eastday.com/World/u1ai8514417.html
42 The trilateral meetings mostly focused a ‘soft’ security issues, such as sustainable development, nuclear
safety and disaster management. See Andrew Yeo, “China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation:
Implications for Northeast Asian Politics and Order,” The International Relations and Security Network,
(June 2013), accessed April 3, 2017, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=165008
43 “Backgrounder: ASEAN Plus China, Japan, ROK cooperation mechanism,” (August 2013), accessed March
23, 2016, http://english.cntv.cn/20131008/103724.shtml
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The South Korean perspective: The major reason behind South Korea’s support for
multilateralism: “Its desire for reduced tension on the peninsula, its need to engage the
surrounding powers, and domestic imperatives. At a minimum, South Korea seeks the
amelioration of tension on the peninsula. By pursuing modest goals, such as expanding trade
and facilitating the movement of people between the two Koreas, a multilateral forum might
foster an initial atmosphere of modest détente between the two Koreas.”44 Also, the main aim
of Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), initiated by South Korean
President is, “Building a habit of cooperation on such issues as disaster relief, nuclear safety,
environment, energy security, and cyberspace cooperation. Fostering a habit of dialogue on
‘soft’ security issues will surely be helpful for bringing about a sub-regional atmosphere
of trust where countries can discuss various ‘hard’ security issues in the years to come.”45
However, South Korea have an interest to raise its regional involvement, for instance, the
trilateral framework with China and Japan.
The Russian perspective: According to Chinese scholar Ji Zhi-ye, Russia’s Northeast Asian
policy mainly focused on the two factors: (1) To actively participate in political cooperation
without endangering the security and stability of Russia’s East Siberia and the Far East; (2)
To actively participate in economic cooperation for the development of East Siberia and the
Far East.46 From this perspective, the most priority of Russia is participation in the regional
security dialogue, included the issue of development of East Siberia and the Far East.
Another approach is that, “Russia’s main concern regarding the Korean issue is not to be left
out of the process and to prevent U.S. or Chinese dominance on the Korean Peninsula.”47
As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted, “There is no need to establish a new
international forum to address the situation on the Korean Peninsula and he hoped that the
Six-Party Talks would resume soon.”48
Another approach is that, “Russia’s main concern regarding the Korean issue is not to be left
out of the process and to prevent U.S. or Chinese dominance on the Korean Peninsula.”49
Russia is now aiming to strengthen the bilateral relations with both Koreas. Especially,
Russia has shown an interest to connect the Trans-Siberian Railroad lines with North and
South Korean railroad networks, which as Russia’s Minister for Far East Development
Aleksander Galushka stated, “will serve to stabilize and improve the situation on the Korean
chung
45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROK, accessed April 3, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/press/speeches/
viceministers/index.jsp?menu=m_10_40_30&sp=/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp%3
FtypeID=12%26boardid=4726%26seqno=316425
46 Ji Zhi-ye, “Russia’s Northeast Asian policy,” (January 2013), accessed March 24, 2017, http://en.cnki.com.
cn/Article_en/CJFDTotal-DBYL201301006.htm
47 Andrew Yeo, “China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast Asian Politics
and Order,” The International Relations and Security Network, (June 2013), accessed April 3, 2017, http://
www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=165008
48 “Russia urges adherence to six-party talks,” (April, 2009), accessed April 3, 2017, http://en.people.
cn/90001/90777/90851/6636799.html
49 Andrew Yeo, “China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast Asian Politics
and Order,” The International Relations and Security Network, (June 2013), accessed April 3, 2017, http://
www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=165008
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Peninsula as a whole.”50
The North Korean perspective: Many scholars argue that it is still difficult to identify
North Korea’s interest in multilateral security mechanism. (North Korea joined the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2000) Because it still shows “un-positive” interest in
the multilateral security framework, including the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks is
the only official multilateral mechanism of security cooperation in the region, which is not
resumed and it can’t deal with North Korean nuclear issue.51
As Pyongyang says it has successfully conducted a hydrogen nuclear test, North Korea
“marked steps towards a nuclear weapons state both in name and reality”52 and consistently
maintains its nuclear deterrence. Experts have said that, North Korea could soon have enough
plutonium for nuclear weapons and “when fully operational, the Yongbyon reactor could make
one nuclear bomb’s worth of plutonium per year. About 4kg of plutonium is needed in order
to make a bomb that would explode with a force of 20 kilotons.”53 Also by some predictions,
“By 2020, the North Korea could have anywhere from 20 to 100 nuclear weapons.”54 So this
type of scenario tells that to defend itself from the “US aggressive strategy” North Korea
will pay more attention on its nuclear technology. So, how this scenario will impact on the
Six-Party Talks process? From the North Korean point of view, “the DPRK did not make any
promise with anyone… and the same holds true even after the talks.”55 Also it has offered
to return to the Six-Party Talks “without preconditions” to discuss regional security topics,
such as nuclear disarmament and other issues, but not denuclearization.
However, according to the recommendations, suggested by the International Crisis Group
to the North Korea: “Comply with UN Security Council resolutions regarding development
of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, including by: (1) Returning to the Six-
Party Talks to implement the September 2005 “Statement of Principles” and bargaining in
good faith for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; (2) returning to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.”56
To achieve these goals each parties of Six-Party Talks should pay more attention on the
consideration and consultation regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue.
Today under the general umbrella of “multilateral security mechanism” in Northeast Asia:
50 “Russia to extend Trans-Eurasian rail project to Korea,” (June, 2014), accessed April 5, 2017, https://www.
rt.com/business/164116-russia-railway-north-korea/
51 The Six-Party Talks established five working groups: (1) Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; (2)
DPRK-US normalization; (3) DPRK-Japan normalization; (4) Economy and energy cooperation, and (5)
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.
52 “How North Korea’s nuclear program went from threats to reality,” accessed April 3, 2017, http://edition.
cnn.com/2016/01/05/asia/north-korea-nuclear-program-explainer/index.html
53 “North Korea 'expands plutonium production', says US,” BBC News, (February 2016), accessed April 3,
2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35534995
54 “North Korea's nuclear programme: How advanced is it?,” BBC News, (February 2016), accessed April 3,
2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699
55 “DPRK to Boost Nuclear Deterrence Force,” Xinhua news, (October 2003), accessed April 5, 2017, http://
www.china.org.cn/english/international/76590.htm
56 “North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks,” Asia Report 269, (June 2015), accessed March 3, 2017, http://
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/269-north-korea-beyond-the-six-party-
talks.aspx
- 76 -
1) Each of the countries in the region has their own agenda and incentives for participating
in multilateral security cooperation.
2) Traditional security issues more dominated then non-traditional or economic issues.
The confidence building takes a long time.
2. The Role of Mongolia
The fundamental concept of an “effective” approach for the agenda of a multilateral
security mechanism is clearly interpreted in 1994 Human Development Report. The report
is noted, “The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy
or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust… forgotten were the legitimate
concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.”57 Also the report
outlines the following threats to human security: “economic, food, health, environment,
personal, community and political security.”58 So the “effectiveness” of the multilateral
security mechanism should be related with all aspects of human security threats. From this
perspective, the role of Mongolia in the region is following:
 Many number of scholars point out that one important element of multilateralism in
Northeast Asia is the expansion of membership. For instance, Liu Qing, Director of
Department for Asia Pacific, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) noted,
“The multilateral security mechanism should not limited only by the members of
Six-Party Talks. Mongolia could be a member of the dialogue.”59 Also according
to the South Korean scholar Ok-Nim Chung, “Given that post-Cold War regional
multilateral proposals emerged from such middle powers as Australia and Canada,
and that North Korea currently places more weight on improving relations with
these countries, it is vital to engage in any multilateral process countries as
Canada, Australia and Mongolia.”60 So, in this context, Mongolia has played a
constructive role as a facilitator of dialogue between North Korea and Japan, North
Korea and U.S.61 Scholars argue that these activities are referred to as a Mongolian
“public diplomacy”. Based on the fundamental principles of foreign and security
policy, such as National Security Concept, Mongolia has a strategic advantage for
strengthen and maintain not just a good relationship with its neighbors but also on
multilateral level and it has and can made practical contributions to the multilateral
security dialogue. (Mongolia’s status as “nuclear-free state”)
 According to the recommendations, suggested by the International Crisis Group,
57 Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, United Nations Development Programme,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.22
58 Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, p.24
59 According to the interview with Liu Qing, Director of Department for Asia Pacific, China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS), Beijing, February 2016
chung
61 It has facilitated North Korea-Japan, North Korea-U.S. meetings, to help these states search for mutual
understanding of what each side would need to reenter formal bilateral or multilateral talks. These
meetings provide an important forum to better understand the beliefs and attitudes of each party, to correct
misperceptions on both sides, and to identify, if any, the windows of opportunity for moving forward.
- 77 -
“Support civil society engagement with the DPRK, particularly programs that
enable North Koreans to travel, while exercising care that such engagement is
not utilized as a channel for transactions prohibited by UN resolutions.”62 The
Mongolian civil society can play the role not only between the individual and the
state but also can play the role of “mediator” between the citizens. Many scholars
still argue that, “Engage or isolate? How the world should deal with North Korea,
according to its citizens?”63 So today it is “effective” to engage the North Korean
citizens to the multilateral dialogues and events.
 From the geopolitical perspective, Russia, China, and the United States—the
world’s big powers—have not paid enough attention to the greater regional security
situation but rather, focus on their own national interests. For instance, both China
and Russia have worked to create more pipelines and railroads to serve their
economic and industrial needs, and the U.S. has shifted focus more to the Indian
and Pacific Oceans. When we look at that wide picture, such policies will increase
future tension. Situated in the middle of these great powers, the geostrategic role
of Mongolia in promoting peace and reconciliation in the region has become more
important.
 By the rising demand for energy, such as coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy, the
need for energy cooperation network that promote mutual benefit and cooperation
in the region has never been more pressing. Today in Northeast Asia, the energy
cooperation environment is rapidly changed. The main issue is about energy supply
and demand. Mongolia is a potential country to promote energy cooperation in the
region.
 Many scholars highlight that the agenda of multilateral security mechanism in
Northeast Asia should include the non-traditional security challenges. Especially,
“Non-traditional security issues as economic security, information security,
food security, energy security, water resource security and public health security
demand careful studies and joint efforts to cope with by all the countries in the
world.”64 Also, “We cannot be optimistic about the international security situation,
what with the surge in energy prices, global warming, the ecological crisis, the
gap between the rich and the poor, cross-national crime, and frequent outbreaks
of major epidemics.”65 So these all mentioned non-traditional threats are directly
and acutely affecting each country’s external security environment. Especially, the
natural disaster issue has become more pressing in Northeast Asia. These issues
are makes the opportunity to involve the Mongolian and regional social groups and
individuals in the process of ensure the threats.
62 “North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks,” Asia Report 269, (June 2015)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/269-north-korea-beyond-the-six-
party-talks.aspx
63 “Engage or isolate? How the world should deal with North Korea, according to its citizens?”, accessed April
15, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/25/how-the-world-should-deal-with-north-korea
64 “Non-traditional security: Being unmanageable single-handedly,” (July 11, 2012), accessed April 19, 2017,
http://en.people.cn/90786/7871172.html
65 Evan S.Medeiros, “China’s international behavior: activism, opportunism, and diversification,” (RAND
Cooperation, 2009), p.37
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COOPERATIVE MULTILATERALISM IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

ISSUES AND PROSPECTS
Dr. Sang Hyun LEE

Director, Research Planning Division, the Sejong Institute, ROK
South Korea’s NEA Multilateralism

 Inauguration of Moon Jae-in Government
 Liberal and progressive
 Four principles: responsible, cooperative, peaceful, and democratic foreign
policy
 Key Foreign Policy Agenda
- Diplomacy toward major powers – US, China, Japan, Russia
- Inter-Korean relations – nuclear and missile provocations vs. rapprochement
- Middle power multilateral diplomacy
‘Northeast Asia+ Responsible Community
 Spatial Expansion
 Expansion of NEA in membership and geographical boundaries – EU,
ASEAN, Australia, etc.
 Sharing Responsibility
 Considerate pursuit of national interests
 Sharing ‘sovereign obligations’ for global issues
 Pursuing common prosperity and peace
 Dual Pillars of Security and Economy
 Balancing between security and economy
 Mixing both traditional and non-traditional security agenda
Why Multilateralism Matters to South Korea
 Deepening Globalization
 Progress in transportation and communications
 Increasing opportunities in meeting in larger groups with greater frequency
 Mounting Complex Global Issues
 Overlapping issue areas and multiple stakeholders
 Increasing necessity for transnational cooperation – climate change,
migration, economic & social inequalities, violent extremism, cyberspace
 South Korea’s Expanding Global Roles
 More involvement in diverse international organizations and advocacy
groupings
Changing Global Security Environment
 Diffusion of Power in the International System
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 The ‘rise of the rest’ and the

 Increasing multilateralism in the post-Cold War era
 The need for ‘niche’ diplomacy for certain issue areas
 Enmeshing Internal and External Domains
 Blurring boundaries between domestic politics and foreign policy areas
 Coming of the Network Age
 Increasing importance of inter- or non-governmental transnational
networks
 Open societies, open governments, and open international system (Anne-
Marie Slaughter, “How to Succeed in the Networked World,” Foreign
Affairs, November/December 2016)
Political Landscape in Northeast Asia
 Deeping Economic Interdependence in NEA
 A Quarter of Global Output
 More than 20% of Global Trade
 Includes the 2nd and 3rd Largest Economies in the World
 Worsening Political & Security Tensions
 History, Territory, Maritime Security, Arms Race, Cyberspace
 Regional Powers Seeking a new Regional order (Return of the
Geopolitics)
 Lack of Multilateral Cooperation Mechanism
 The potential of the region remains untapped
 “NEA remains the crucial missing link in UN engagement with regional
or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.” (UN
Secretary-General at the 9th EAS Summit, 13 NOV 2014)
World Order 2.0 (Richard Haass)
 World Order 1.0
 Peace of Westphalia – right of nations to an independence and autonomy
 Increasingly inadequate in today’s globalized world
 World Order 2.0
 Sovereignty as responsibility – ‘sovereign obligations’ – all nations owe to
other nations
 Respect for borders, opposition to their coercive change, norm against
aggression…
 Expanded set of norms and arrangements – support for self-determination
would be less automatic
Trump Risk: Goodbye to Values?
 Goodbye to American Ideas and Values?
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 Embracing thugs, dictators, and strongmen

 ‘America First’ – prioritizing US national interests
 Off-shore Balancing, or Neo-isolationism?
 No more global policeman’s role
 Jeopardizing liberal international order
 Setbacks for Global Issues?
 Withdrawal from Paris Climate Agreement
 Weakening nuclear non-proliferation commitment
 Weakening international organizations and institutions
Northeast Asia Peace & Cooperation Initiative
 Multi-track Approach
 Top priority to ‘create favorable conditions.’ – both bottom-up working-
level collaborations and top-down high-level meetings of vision-sharing
and statement declaration
 Full Participation of Major Players
 In particular the US and China – no such regional initiative that US and
China do not participate is virtually meaningless
 Softer Start
 Starting with soft security issues, moving toward ‘institutionalization’ (e.g.
regularization of summits) and hard security issues
 Utilizing Civilian Powers
 The role of civilian ‘policy community’ or transnational policy networks
– growing role and impact of transnational policy networks shouldn’t be
ignored
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Key Areas of Cooperation
Issues Recent Projects for Cooperation
• Northeast Asia Nuclear Safety Symposium (Top Regulators

Nuclear Safety
Meeting+) (28-30 NOV 2016)
• Northeast Asia Oil Hub Symposium( 17 JUN 2014)

Energy Security • Pacific Energy Summit(30 JUN-1 JUL 2014)
th
• The 4 Northeast Asia Energy Security Forum (12 DEC 2016)
st
• The 21 Northeast Asian Subregional Programme for
Environment Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) High-level Meeting
(16-17 MAR 2017)
• Meeting on Enhancing Regional Cooperation on Disaster

Disaster Management Management in Northeast Asia (16 MAR 2015, on the occasion
of the 3rd WCDRR in Sendai)
Cyberspace • ROK-China-Japan Cyber Policy Consultation (10 FEB 2017)
• The Tripartite (ROK-China-Japan) Health Minister’s Meeting

Health
(23 NOV 2014)
• Meeting among relevant countries on the occasion of

International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) (18 JUN
2014)
Drug
• Meeting among relevant countries on the occasion of the
24th Anti-Drug Liaison Officials’ Meeting for International
Cooperation (ADLOMICO) (1 OCT 2014)
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2015 NAPCI Forum (Seoul)
2016 NAPCI Forum (Washington, DC)
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UB Dialogue and NAPCI in Comparison
UB Dialogue NAPCI
Issues Economic cooperation; Nuclear safety

Military transparency; Energy security
Environmental issues; Climate change and environmental
Non-traditional security threats; protection
Regional stability Cyberspace security
Disaster relief
Public health
Drug trafficking
Principles Common interests Phased and progressive approach

Mutual respect Multi-layered and multi-dimensional
Mutual trust cooperation
Multilateral talks Open dialogue and cooperation
Open and transparent Expansion and enhancement of the
existing
cooperative organizations
Promoting connectivity of the
Korean Peninsula
Action-oriented trust building
Membership Six countries of NEA - Seven countries of NEA – South

Participation of other countries Korea, US,
and entities shall be China, Japan, Russia, North Korea,
discussed in an open and and
transparent way Mongolia – maintain open
regionalism
The Way Forward

 Vision Sharing at the Top Level
 Consensus for multilateral cooperation in NEA among top political leaders
in the region
 Working Level Collaborations
 Both state and non-state actors
 Governmental and civilian collaboration
 Utilizing transnational policy networks
 Policy Support
 How much policy resources will be allocated for this initiative?
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NEW REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Dr. Vladimir EVSEEV

Deputy Director of the Institute of Commonwealth of Independent states,
the Russian Federation
At present, the global balance of forces is changing. The role of the United States in
the world is gradually declining, which places more responsibility on the regional powers,
which will increasingly become involved in resolving regional problems.
Russia’s experience in the settlement of crises in the Middle East
Undoubtedly, the settlement of the Syrian crisis will largely depend on the interaction
of Russia, Turkey and Iran with the involvement of a number of other foreign policy players
(Astana format of negotiations) in this process. At the same time, the presence in the US
of Syria and its allies (with the exception of Turkey, which is a member of NATO, but has
complex relations with Washington) can initially be positive in order, for example, to free
Rakka from the radical organization Islamic State. But in the future, Americans will try to
weaken the Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle as much as possible, which will not help stabilize
the situation in the country in question. In the same direction, Saudi Arabia and other Arabian
monarchies of the Persian Gulf will act the same way.
It should be borne in mind that Russia has come to the Middle East for a long time.
This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that in mid-October 2016, Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed a law on the ratification of the agreement between Russia and Syria on
the indefinite deployment of the last military base of Khmeimim on the territory. According
to the text of this document, all Russian military and base personnel will have diplomatic
immunity. At the same time, a naval base is being set up in Tartus, which will allow Moscow
to control the entire eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.
Russia tries not to interfere in the Iraqi crisis, which in many ways is of the nature
of the Sunite-Shiite confrontation. It is possible that in the future this country will fall into
several parts, and Moscow does not want to be on the side of either Shiite Iran or Sunni Saudi
Arabia. This also applies to Iraqi Kurdistan, which, most likely, will not be able to become
the nucleus of the “Great Kurdistan”, including due to internal fragmentation (in particular,
there is a clash between the clans of Barzani and Talabani, serious misunderstandings exist
between the Syrian Kurds and the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan). But this does not
exclude the strengthening of Moscow’s cooperation with both Baghdad and Erbil, including
in the military-technical sphere.
Another thing is Yemen. Historically, Russia had good connections with South Yemen.
This became one of the reasons why it did not support the husits living in the north of this
country. In addition, Moscow does not want to be drawn into Iranian-Saudi confrontation
there. In such circumstances, it is Russia, which has a serious international authority and
good relations with all the parties to the conflict (now this applies even to Saudi Arabia), can
act as a mediator for resolving the crisis in Yemen.
Separate consideration deserves the situation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban
and other radical Islamists significantly intensified their anti-government activities. So, in
October 2016, the Taliban once again briefly captured Kunduz, the center of the homonymous
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province in the north of the country. However, at the end of September last year, a peace
agreement was signed between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
the Islamic Party of Afghanistan headed by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar (the last of the most serious
field commanders). The current agreement allows him not only to return to the political
stage of the country, but also to recreate his political party as the main political force within
Afghanistan. However, strengthening the position of the Pushtuns within Afghanistan can
lead to an intensification of their confrontation with the Tajiks and other national minorities
(primarily Uzbeks and Hazaras).
So far, the Russian presence in Afghanistan is extremely limited, which makes
it extremely difficult to contain such unconventional challenges and threats as terrorism,
radical Islam and drug trafficking against the strategically important states of Central Asia.
Therefore, it is necessary to expect the penetration of the Russian Federation into this country
by intensifying economic cooperation, providing humanitarian assistance and developing
contacts in the field of culture. At the same time, relations with the local elite and military-
technical (limited military) cooperation between the Russian Federation and Afghanistan
will be strengthened, for example, by helping to restore the country’s helicopter fleet. On
the basis of this in the future, it will be possible to resolve the Afghan crisis on the basis of
Russian-Chinese interaction with the involvement of other foreign policy players, and on a
non-bloc basis.
Obviously, Russia is not an instrument of Chinese influence, and it has its own
national interests. This is especially important, for example, in Afghanistan, where Pakistan
is perceived as a sponsor of terrorism. However, the level of Russian-Indian cooperation
is much higher than such an interaction between Moscow and Islamabad that is friendly to
Beijing. Therefore, Russian-Chinese cooperation in Afghanistan, with the weakening of the
role of the US and its allies, will not cause significant opposition from the Afghans.
New security system in the Asia-Pacific region
Turning to the Asia-Pacific region (APR), it should be noted that it is possible to use
the Russian experience gained in the settlement of the Syrian crisis there (for example the
complete liberation of Aleppo) and building relationships with such complex partners as
China, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
This also applies to such an explosive region as North-East Asia. In this region, the
United States initially provokes North Korea by conducting large-scale US-South Korean
exercises on a regular basis, and then punishes Pyongyang for conducting nuclear tests
and launches of vehicles (in reality, this means creating artificial obstacles to the peaceful
exploration of outer space). And under the cover of the North Korean nuclear missile threat,
Washington is creating a missile defense frontier that is directed against Beijing.
It would seem that in such conditions, especially considering the allied relations of the
USA with Japan and South Korea, it is extremely difficult to create restrictions in the region
for the deployment of an arms race. But this is possible with the so-called sectorial approach,
where the security system is not created immediately in the whole region, but initially in some
parts on a bilateral basis. The basis for this can be the strengthening of Russian-Japanese
relations, including the transition to limited military cooperation, primarily in the navy. In
recent years, the military leadership of Japan has shown an interest in such cooperation, as
it is not sure of the US readiness to protect them from China. In such conditions, Russia is
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seen as a possible partner. And one would like to believe that a political decision on this issue
could be made at the highest level in the near future.
It should be noted that the former Obama administration failed to restore the previous
level of US-China cooperation. But Beijing is not going to further aggravation of the bilateral
relations, especially given the much more flexible position of the new Philippine president,
Rodrigo Duterte, who is extremely interested in obtaining Chinese investment. Even less is
the interest of the ASEAN countries, in particular Malaysia. Under such conditions, Japan
has to take a more restrained position towards China. At the same time, Tokyo is aware of
the potential possibility of the People’s Republic of China to create by 2030 an independent
global financial system by the US and to achieve by this time a military capability comparable
to that the Americans obtain in the APR.
Considering the foregoing, as already indicated, a sectorial approach to the formation
of a unified security system for Northeast Asia can be chosen. To this end, as the first stage, in
addition to strengthening Russian-Chinese military cooperation, one should turn to military
cooperation between Russia and Japan, as well as intensify military-technical cooperation
between Moscow and Seoul. At the same time, one should not forget about the existence of
allied relations between the US and Japan and South Korea. These pairs of states will form
some segments of the future regional security system.
Within each security segment, an assessment of common challenges and threats should
be conducted. It is obvious that for Russia and China the main military threat is represented
by the United States capable of massing air and missile strikes on our states, including using
nuclear weapons. This requires joint exercises. A similar approach takes place in the US,
which, it would seem, calls for the creation of two military-political blocs in Northeast Asia.
However, in practice this can be avoided, given the weakening of both global and regional
influence on the part of Washington. In fact, military-political blocs do not work anymore,
as is evident from the example of NATO, which is trying to deal with the mythical Russian
threat, not noticing international terrorism on its own territory.
Alliance relations are changing in the world. In particular, it is extremely unlikely that
the US will be ready to start a world war for Poland or Romania (especially for the Baltic
countries). But the Americans will fight for Britain, including the use of nuclear weapons. But
will Washington do this in the event of a war between China and Japan? This issue remains
open, which pushes Tokyo to create its own nuclear weapons. In such circumstances, the
creation of a new system of regional security, and on a non-bloc basis, acquires particular
urgency.
Of course, the range of military threats for the PRC is quite wide. In addition to
the United States, such threats for Beijing can be represented by Japan (for the Russian
Federation it is only a challenge), the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. The common challenge
for Russia and China comes from North Korea.
Even more interesting are the prospects for military-political cooperation between
Russia, China and South Korea against the backdrop of the deployment of the US ground-
based missile defense system, the THAAD, on the Korean Peninsula. Obviously, the
interaction between these states should be built on a non-bloc basis by assessing common
challenges and threats, as well as implementing confidence-building measures to exclude
military incidents in the sea or airspace. At the expert level, there is an understanding of
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the need for such interaction, at least between Moscow and Seoul. If it can be implemented
at a bilateral level, then it is possible to involve China in this process, that is, by actually
uniting the two sectors in the field of security. While this seems like an illusion, we still do
not know the priorities of the new Trump administration. If it is more involved in resolving
domestic problems, then Tokyo and even Seoul may have some freedom of action in the field
of regional security.
Of course, much will depend on the role of the United States in Northeast Asia and
the APR in general, the economic condition of Europe and the depth of economic US-China
and Sino-Japanese rivalry. Under certain conditions (for example, weakening the role of the
US or aggravating bilateral contradictions with Beijing, and even more so if the problem of
the “Northern Territories” is resolved in the “2 + 2” format), the rapprochement between
Moscow and Tokyo can accelerate, including in the territory of the post-Soviet space.
Security on the Korean peninsula: state and prospects
The main obstacle to the creation of a new regional security system in Northeast
Asia is the extremely difficult situation on the Korean peninsula. The latter is due to the
factual reluctance of Pyongyang or Seoul to seek a possible compromise. At the same time,
Americans actually play up to the South Koreans, conducting large-scale military exercises,
which, as a rule, are provocative in nature.
In particular, in March-April 2017, the Armed Forces of the United States and South
Korea conducted large-scale military exercises Foal Eagle on the Korean peninsula. And it
was conducted in an atmosphere of heightened tension. Moreover, Washington and Seoul
this time did not provide detailed information on the number of troops involved. Although
it was obvious that they became more ambitious than in 2016, when about 10,000 American
and 300,000 South Korean servicemen were involved in similar exercises.
It was expected that an aircraft carrier strike group of the United States, led by the
nuclear aircraft carrier Carl Vinson, would arrive to the shores of the Korean peninsula
to participate in these exercises. As well as other offensive weapons of the United States,
including nuclear submarines, strategic bombers and the newest multi-purpose fighter F-22
and F-35.
During the same period of time, like all previous years, the Command and Staff
Exercises of the United States and South Korea - Key Resolve - took place. Unlike the Foal
Eagle, they did not carry out massive movements of manpower and equipment.
As Seoul and Washington believed, the unprecedented number and quality of weapons
would serve as a warning to the DPRK and make Pyongyang behave more calmly. However,
this did not happen. Thus, on April 15, a military parade was held in Pyongyang dedicated
to the 105-th anniversary of the birth of the Great Leader Kim II Sung. Earlier, events so
important in North Korea’s life were accompanied by a display of advanced achievements in
the field of armaments (primarily in the sphere of rocketry). But the present has significantly
surpassed them in scale.
In particular, at the military parade in Pyongyang there were tractor-trailers with
mock-ups of two-stage solid-propellant ballistic missiles mounted on submarines (SLBMs)
Pukkykson-1 (Polar Star-1, KN-11). In reality, they are launched from the appropriate
transport-launch container. It is these missiles that must provide Pyongyang with a guaranteed
retaliatory strike.
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It should be noted that on March 24, 2016, the leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un,
was present at the bench tests of a new solid fuel engine whose diameter exceeded a meter
(previously the largest solid-fuel rocket engine was mounted on a short-range ballistic
missile KN-02, its maximum diameter was 65 sm). And in April, information appeared that
a new type of North Korean SLBM has solid fuel (previously it was assumed that only one
type of SLBMs in the DPRK is a liquid one-stage Musudan).
During the flight tests held on August 24, 2016, the range of shooting of the SLBM
Pukkykson-1 was about 500 km, and along a hinged trajectory. This means that it can fly at
least 1 thousand km, which allows it to be classified as medium-range missiles (previously,
according to South Korean data, the maximum range of North Korean solid-fuel ballistic
cancer did not exceed 220 km).
Judging from the available information, the SLBM Pukkykson-1 is relatively small,
which allows it to be placed on submarines and on land mobile carriers. And in the latter
version, it has significant advantages over the liquid ballistic missile Musudan - it does not
need to be refueled before the start due to transportation in the refueled condition. This greatly
reduces the time for the preparation of the rocket to launch, that is, its combat readiness. In
addition, solid-fuel missiles have a shorter active phase of flight, which makes it difficult to
intercept them on this, the most vulnerable part of the trajectory.
At the military parade in Pyongyang a new model of the operational-tactical ballistic
missile Hwaseon-6 was also shown with aerodynamic rudders or stabilizers near the head. It
has received a tank base and a guided combat unit. This makes it possible to use this missile
to defeat small-scale targets at a range of 500-600 km. Thus, according to North Korean
data, during the flight test, held in late May 2017, the deviation of the missile’s head from
the aiming point was only 7 m.
Further on, the military parade demonstrated the newest ground (caterpillar) mobile
missile systems with medium-range solid-fuel ballistic missiles Pukkykson-2 (Polar Star-2,
KN-15, a land version of the North Korean SLBM). Its successful test was conducted on
February 12, 2017, while the height of the missile’s flight, and its range of fire, reached 500
km. And this launch was carried out from the transport-launch container. However, on April
16, the launch of Pukykson-2 was unsuccessful, which indicates its low reliability, which is
typical for modern North Korean ballistic missiles of medium range. The caterpillar launcher
for the Pukkykson-2 missile has a heavy 8-track chassis, which allows it to be deployed on
this missile. Its performance was confirmed on April 12, 2017 in the course of the flight tests.
During the passage of missile technology, medium-range ballistic missiles Musudan
(Hwaseon-10) with various types of warheads were shown. Such a single-stage liquid rocket
was first demonstrated at the military parade in Pyongyang in 2010. As this time it was
transported on a wheeled launcher. Its diameter was 1.5 m and its length was 12 m. In
its appearance, this rocket resembled the Soviet liquid-propellant SL-27 (the diameter of
the hulls and the shape of the head, but the North Korean missile is longer by 1.5 m). Its
maximum firing range can be 3.2 - 4.0 thousand km with a head mass of 650-1000 kg,
respectively. The rate of their production does not exceed two to three missiles per year
(about one battalion).
The ballistic missiles Musudan were immediately developed for two types of basing:
ground and sea. The first successful launch of this type of ground-launched ballistic missile
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took place on June 22, 2016 from the Wonsan missile base in the northeast of the DPRK.
Then the head of the single-stage rocket flew 400 km, but its elevation height exceeded 1.4
thousand km. This makes it possible to allow the development of a warhead in the course
of this flight test, where a nuclear warhead can be installed. Such a minimum range of fire
ensured the flight of the missile and its head in the territorial waters of the DPRK, which
excluded the possibility of their observation by means of technical means of reconnaissance
of the optical range of the sea and air based spectrum (reconnaissance data was then obtained
only with the help of radar and space systems).
Having carried out mathematical modeling based on the available data, the US military
expert Michael Elleman concluded that when firing on the island of Guam (the nearest US
territory), the head of the rocket Musudan cannot exceed 600 kg, which is most likely not
enough for placing the nuclear warhead. At the same time, it was found that the launched
missile Musudan was longer than the earlier model of this rocket. In comparison with its
prototype (the Soviet ballistic missile of the submarine P-27) it is longer by 3 m, which
allows it to carry an additional 4 tons of fuel.
This missile also had lattice stabilizers, which had not previously been observed. This
allows ensuring greater aerodynamic stability during its flight on the active site. And on the
basis of the plume of outgoing gases, the American expert concluded that the latest version
of the Musudan missile had a 4D10 liquid-propellant missile of the Soviet R-27 SLBM,
which made it possible to provide a significantly higher engine thrust than the Nodon-1
ballistic missile.
It is believed In the US that at least 2 more years are needed to confirm the technical
capabilities (completion of the development) of the ballistic missile Musudan. In particular,
the possibility of its flight under different shooting conditions must be confirmed. And the
current flight trajectory was not the most heat-stressed (this is achieved only with shooting
at maximum range).
According to available information, two separate missile battalions (8 mobile PUs) of
the medium-range ballistic missile Musudan, which are deployed near the eastern coast of
the DPRK, have been formed in the armed forces of the DPRK.
In addition to the above, the DPRK is implementing a project to create a three-stage
ballistic missile called Taepodon-3 (its first and second stages are liquid, and the third
is solid fuel). The development of the elements of this rocket was carried out during the
launch of the carrier rockets Ynkha-2 (April 2009) and Ynkha-3 (April and December
2012, February 2016). Its maximum firing range hardly exceeds 5,000 km (according to the
western classification it is an intermediate-range missile).
The DPRK is also working on the creation of a three-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile
KN-08 with a maximum range of about 5,500 kilometers and a rocket with a longer range of
fire KN-14, for which, according to the Americans, can be used cluster (bundle) of missile
4D10 engines. Such a bunch of engines can be used as the first stage of these ballistic
missiles. And in terrestrial conditions for two engines, this has already been tested. Instead
of this cluster, a new first-stage march rocket engine (liquid, its thrust of 80 tons) can be
used, which in North Korea was tested in mid-September 2016. According to US experts, to
create intercontinental range missiles DPRK will need another 5 or 7 years.
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The military parade in Pyongyang completed the passage of two types of mobile
ground-based missile systems (PGRK) with ballistic missiles. One of them (Hwaseon-12,
a modification of the KN-08 rocket) represented a transport-launch container mounted on a
truck semitrailer (similar to the earlier versions of Chinese ballistic missiles DF-21 and DF-
31). According to some reports, this North Korean missile was developed with the help of
Ukrainian specialists. And it is two-stage, including liquid and solid fuel stages. Its weight
is about 20 tons.
May 14, 2017 its flight tests were successfully carried out. Then the height of its flight
was 2112 km, and the range - 787 km (minimum range). When firing at the maximum range,
it is capable of flying 4,500 km, which is enough to fire on the island of Guam (USA) from
the DPRK.
The second is the TPK, mounted on an 8-axle off-road vehicle (formerly it was used
for the display of KN-08 and KN-14 ballistic missiles). It clearly resembles a mock-up,
though outwardly similar to the Russian Topol, which has an intercontinental range of fire.
The role of Mongolia in creating a new regional security system
Mongolia can also play its role in creating a new security system for Northeast Asia,
which includes, in addition to the state under consideration, the northeastern provinces of
China, the Far East region of Russia, Japan, the DPRK, and the Republic of Korea. At
the same time, one should take into account both its geographical location: the location
between Russia and China, the lack of access to the sea; and the availability of the necessary
resources for this.
As noted in Mongolia, some factors hamper the creation of a new security system in
the region. First, serious historical problems remain between the countries of Northeast Asia,
which create an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Thus, China, the Republic of Korea and the
DPRK have previously suffered from the invasion of imperialist Japan in their territory and
from the ensuing cruel enslavement of the peoples of these countries.
Secondly, in North-East Asia there are disagreements over territories and sea borders.
For various reasons, the countries located in the region dispute each other’s various territories:
Japan’s claims to the Kurile Islands that belong to Russia; the problem of the Tokto Islands
between Japan and the Republic of Korea; the problem of the island of Sinkaku (Diaoyu)
between Japan and China, as well as disputes about the sea borders between China and
Japan. Territorial problems have always been considered the most delicate in the relations of
states. They directly relate to the national interests of these states.
Thirdly, the United States strives to maintain its dominance and traditional allied ties
with Japan and the Republic of Korea in North-East Asia, where US military bases are
deployed. This determines US interference in the internal affairs of the states located in the
region. It is not yet clear how this situation will change during the administration of Trump.
Fourthly, the extremely difficult security situation on the Korean peninsula remains.
This inevitably leads to aggravation of relations between the countries of Northeast Asia and
adversely affects regional stability.
In view of the foregoing, Mongolia, which has partnerships with all the states in the
region, could assume the role of a mediator in resolving these problems by proposing its own
initiatives. As one of them, one can consider the restriction on the development of weapons-
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grade plutonium in the DPRK in exchange for a substantial weakening of financial and
economic sanctions directed against North Korea.
Thus, Russia has some experience both in creating new regional security systems
and in building relationships with difficult partners. This can be used in such an explosive
region as Northeast Asia in the form of a sectorial approach to the formation of a unified
security system, that is, first addressing the problems at the bilateral level, and then moving
to a trilateral and multilateral format. In the region under consideration, this is not simply
due to the unsettled nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, it is impossible to
postpone this issue to the future, in order to avoid negative developments. And in the process
of creating a new regional security system, an important role belongs to Russian-Japanese
interaction, which to some extent will balance the inevitable strengthening of China’s
military potential. And Mongolia can play its role in creating a new regional security system.
At the same time, it should be taken into account that North Korea is steadily increasing
its nuclear-missile potential. Now it is estimated at 10-16 nuclear warheads of implosive
type of simplified design (6-8 plutonium and 4-8 of weapons-grade uranium) in the form of
air bombs. Simultaneously, the work on the creation of a nuclear warhead for medium-range
ballistic missiles is being completed or has been completed. With successful scenarios for
the DPRK, the armed forces of this country can already have up to 3-5 nuclear warheads for
medium-range ballistic missiles Musudan and Pukykson-2. Approximately by 2020, North
Korea will have 40-45 nuclear warheads, including up to 12 nuclear warheads (warheads)
for medium-range ballistic missiles, including SLBMs.
However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the North Korean “military power”,
including, in particular, missile weapons. As flight tests of modern North Korean medium-
range ballistic missiles show, they have low reliability, and their range does not exceed 5,000
kilometers. Of course, this will allow the DPRK to create a limited nuclear missile potential,
but it would be premature to say that it will already include intercontinental ballistic missiles
in the near future.
On the other hand, in North Korea the program on creation of solid-fuel two-stage
rockets Pukykson-2 of land and sea basing is quite successfully realized. This allows North
Korean specialists to gradually master the production of the solid-propellant three-stage
KN-08 rocket. It is possible that the resources available in the DPRK will be concentrated
in this direction.
Under these conditions, it becomes obvious that the international community needs to
negotiate with the DPRK on limiting North Korean nuclear missile potential in exchange for
a significant weakening of existing financial and economic sanctions. This approach makes
it possible to raise the question of the possibility of including the DPRK in a new system of
regional security in the medium term.
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AMERICA AT WAR… WITH ITSELF, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR

SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Dr. Alexandre MANSOUROV

Adjunct Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown University, USA
America is facing an acute political crisis at home fueled by the deepening

contradictions within the U.S. ruling class. In November 2016, the American people elected
the first-ever anti-establishment candidate Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United
States, giving him the mandate to “drain the swamp” in Washington and to “make America
great again.” Now “the swamp” is fighting back with vengeance, marring the U.S. global
image and weakening its international credibility. How this internal crisis unfolds and ends
may have serious global implications, including for peace and security in Northeast Asia.
Domestic Factors Limiting the U.S. Effectiveness
and Flexibility The “Deep State,” sometimes
Since coming into office, the Trump administration referred to as the “state
has already carried out a couple of country and issue- within a state” or a “shadow
specific policy reviews66 67 and put in place important government,” is a networked
policy changes with respect to some principal players in community of career
Northeast Asia, including the new “maximum pressure government employees,
and engagement policy” towards North Korea. 68 national security officials,
influential members of
However, the effectiveness and flexibility of the Trump
political establishment and
White House are constricted by the lack of domestic wealthy business and media
bipartisan consensus with respect to the proposed elites, believed to be involved
foreign policy approaches of the new administration, in the secret manipulation
increasing political obstruction of Trump’s initiatives at or control of government
the federal and state levels, and the enduring election policy without regard for
campaign promises that the president is not willing to democratically elected
give up. leadership.
As the Pew Research Center studies show, 69 70
with growing political polarization in the American

public, political ideology now divides Americans along the left-right axis more than ever
before. The left-right divide reflects divisions between varied social identities based on
66 Nike Ching, “Full US Review of Policy Toward North Korea Expected,” The Voice of America, February 23,
2017, http://www.voanews.com/a/full-united-states-review-policy-toward-north-korea-expected/3737223.
html
67 Jenna Johnson and Damian Paletta, “Trump to launch review of trade policy as he levels new threats at China,”
The Washington Post, March 30, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/30/
trump-to-launch-review-of-trade-policy-as-he-levels-new-threats-at-china/
68 “Trump finalizes 4-point strategy on N. Korea: lawmaker,” Yonhap, May 26, 2017, http://english.yonhapnews.
co.kr/northkorea/2017/05/26/0401000000AEN20170526000252315.html
69 “Political Polarization in the American Public,” June 12, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/
political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
70 Amy Mitchell et al, “Political Polarization & Media Habits,” October 21, 2014, http://www.journalism.
org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/
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class, race, gender, religion, region, and ethnic background and has many incarnations –
liberals versus conservatives, progressives versus traditionalist, socialist versus capitalist,
internationalist versus nationalist, Democrat versus Republican, and so on. These ideological
labels tend to be rather confusing and contingent on particular historical context. The
ideological schism between the left-leaning defenders of America’s “global hegemony” and
the right-leaning “America Firsters” within the U.S. political and national security
establishment has now reached the point when each side regards the views of the other not
only as misguided but also as endangering the national security and well-being of the United
States and even “treasonous.” Sharp ideological divisions undercut traditional bipartisan
consensus with respect to the ends and means of American foreign policy and national
security strategy. The lack of bipartisan consensus in foreign policy undermines the U.S.
international positions, credibility and bargaining power around the world.
At home, President Trump is confronted
with the growing resistance of the “Deep
Anti-Trump Investigations:
State” trying to destroy his presidency.
Liberals believe Russian President Putin 1. Federal counterintelligence
elected Donald Trump and uses his protégé investigation led by the Justice
to manipulate American politics to Russian Department’s special counsel,
advantage, whereas conservatives believe the former FBI director Robert
“deep state” is out to get Mr. Trump. Liberal Mueller III; its mandate is
media asserts the Trump administration is in to investigate “the Russian
an existential crisis, whereas conservative government’s efforts to interfere
in the 2016 presidential election,
media contends the supposed crisis is “fake”
the nature of any links between
and “manufactured.” But, whether the political individuals associated with the
crisis is real or perceived, as Bill O’Reilly Trump campaign and Russian
shrewdly observes, “it hurts the president’s government, and whether there
ability to govern because he’s always on the was any coordination between the
defensive.”71 campaign and Russia.”
Donald “The Hunted” regards all three
2. Political investigation of
ongoing anti-Trump investigations as part Russian interference in the 2016
of the well-orchestrated “witch hunt” aimed presidential race in the Senate
at undoing the results of the November 2016 Intelligence Committee chaired by
presidential election and overthrowing him, committee chairman Richard Burr
whereas his Democratic opponents use the (R – N.C.);
“Russiagate” to delegitimize the Trump
presidency, incapacitate his administration, 3. Political investigation of the
Trump campaign’s ties to Russia
and link him to obstruction of justice and even
in the House Select Committee
national treason. There is no question that these
on Intelligence led by Rep. David
investigations heavily weigh on the minds of Nunes
the president, his family members and close
associates and distract them from their other
71 Trent Baker, “O’Reilly on Reports of Strife in the WH: ‘Fake’ News, ‘Crisis Is Being Manufactured’,” May
27, 2017, http://www.breitbart.com/video/2017/05/27/oreilly-on-reports-of-strife-in-the-wh-fake-news-
crisis-is-being-manufactured/
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duties. The Trump administration is haunted by incessant politically motivated national

security leaks from the White House, National Security Council, and law enforcement
agencies, designed to present the president in the most unattractive light as a bully (phone
calls with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull72 and Mexican President Enrique
Peña Nieto73), as a leaker of top secret intelligence (a meeting Russian foreign minister
Sergey Lavrov74), as an admirer of dictators abusing human rights (a phone call with the
Philippine President Duterte75), or as a poor administrator (leak of operational intelligence
related to Manchester terrorist attack76), etc. These out-of-control leaks raise the possibility
that someone close to President Trump himself is essentially acting like a mole in the White
House thereby fueling distrust within Trump’s inner circle. Alternatively, it could be someone
in the NSC, or in the intelligence community, or on one of the congressional intelligence
committees. Mr. Trump believes that “many of the leaks coming out of the White House are
fabricated lies made up by the #FakeNews media. Whenever you see the words ‘sources say’
in the fake news media, and they don’t mention names it is very possible that those sources
don’t exist but are made up by fake news writers.”77 Whoever these people are, their leaks
dent the faith of Trump’s supporters, seriously damage U.S. national security, and undermine
the integrity and effectiveness of presidential diplomacy and intelligence collaboration
between the United States and its allies and partners. There is no question that the leaks
won’t stop until Trump carries out a thorough “house-cleaning” to replace Obamaphiles with
his loyalists in order to restore bureaucratic order and professional discipline and imbue a
sense of loyalty towards the commander-in-chief in his own executive branch.
Extended delays in executive appointments at Departments of Defense and State also
hurt the formulation and implementation of foreign policy of the new administration. More
than 60 percent of the National Security Council staff are not Trump’s appointees: they
are career officials who were loaned from other agencies under the Obama administration.
Some NSC departments have only one Trump appointee.78 What complicates matters further
72 Greg Miller and Philip Rucker, “‘This was the worst call by far’: Trump badgered, bragged and abruptly
ended phone call with Australian leader,” The Washington Post, February 2, 2017, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/no-gday-mate-on-call-with-australian-pm-trump-badgers-and-
brags/2017/02/01/88a3bfb0-e8bf-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html
73 Christopher Woody, “Report: In a 'humiliating' and 'threatening' tone, Trump lambasted Mexico's president
during a phone call,” Business Insider, February 1, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-enrique-
pena-nieto-mexico-phone-call-humiliating-threatening-2017-2
74 Greg Miller and Greg Jaffe, “Trump revealed highly classified information to Russian foreign minister
and ambassador,” The Washington Post, May 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/trump-revealed-highly-classified-information-to-russian-foreign-minister-and-
ambassador/2017/05/15/530c172a-3960-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html
75 Laura King, “In 'warm' phone call, Trump invites Philippines' Duterte to White House,” LA Times, April
30, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-in-warm-phone-
call-trump-invites-1493574246-htmlstory.html
76 Oliver JJ Jane, “‘Furious’ British Police Suspend Intelligence Sharing with United States Following
Manchester Bombing Leaks,” May 25, 2017, http://www.breitbart.com/london/2017/05/25/british-police-
suspend-intelligence-sharing-united-states-following-manchester-bombing-leaks/
77 “Fresh from his travels, Trump rails on Twitter about ‘fake news’,” AFP, May 27, 2017, http://www.breitbart.
com/news/fresh-from-his-travels-trump-rails-on-twitter-about-fake-news/
78 It is those career officials assigned to the NSC under Obama who leaked Trump’s conversation with Russian
officials to former Obama officials and media outlets.
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is that both the Department of Defense and Department of State have hundreds of political
positions unfilled yet. So far, out of 57 Senate-confirmed political appointee positions at
the Pentagon, only two have been filled — Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Air Force
Secretary Heather Wilson.
President Trump’s relationship with the U.S. intelligence community is acrimonious and
counterproductive, which seriously complicates the execution of the U.S. foreign policy.
• The mutual hostility goes back to the presidential election campaign when a number
of retired senior intelligence officials came out publicly backing Hillary Clinton and
accusing the then-candidate Trump of being unfit for the highest office in the land.
For example, on August 5, 2016, the New York Times published an unprecedented
opinion piece written by Michael Morell, the former acting director of the CIA,
in which he endorsed Hillary Clinton for president and branded Mr. Trump as “an
unwitting agent of the Russian Federation” and “a threat to national security.” 79 In
return, Mr. Trump hit back at the CIA, calling Mr. Morell as “another Obama-Clinton
pawn”80 and questioned the competence of intelligence professionals and the value of
their work including presidential daily briefs.81
• During the bumpy presidential transition, Mr. Trump apparently came to regard the
intelligence community through the hostile lenses, suspecting it of having meddled in
the election campaign on Hillary Clinton’s side and stoking public fears of Russian
interference in the U.S. presidential election.
• The president’s visit to the CIA headquarters on 21 January 2017 proved to be
controversial when his unscripted remarks drew criticism from senior intelligence
officials, including the just retired CIA chief John Brennan, who was “deeply saddened
and angered at Donald Trump’s despicable display of self-aggrandizement in front
of CIA’s Memorial Wall of Agency heroes” and believed the president ought to be
“ashamed of himself.”82
• In March, former CIA director Michael Hayden repeated his reference to Mr. Trump
as “Russia’s useful fool” first published in his opinion piece in the Washington Post
a few days before the election on November 3, 2016.83 He also complained that “the
79 “I Ran the C.I.A. Now I’m Endorsing Hillary Clinton.” The New York Times, 5 August 2016, https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/08/05/opinion/campaign-stops/i-ran-the-cia-now-im-endorsing-hillary-clinton.html?_
r=0
80 Alex Griswold, “Trump Hits Back at Former CIA Chief Mike Morell: ‘Another Obama-Clinton Pawn’”,
August 5, 2016, http://www.mediaite.com/election-2016/trump-hits-back-at-former-cia-chief-mike-morell-
another-obama-clinton-pawn/
81 Ken Dilanian, Robert Windrem, and William Arkin, “What Really Happened at Donald Trump’s Intelligence
Briefing,” NBC News, September 8, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/u-s-official-
donald-trump-s-body-language-claim-doesn-n644856
82 Andrea Mitchell and Ken Dilanian, “Ex-CIA Boss Brennan, Others Rip Trump Speech in Front of Memorial,”
NBC News, January 22, 2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ex-cia-boss-brennan-others-rip-
trump-speech-front-memorial-n710366
83 Michael Hayden, “Former CIA chief: Trump is Russia’s useful fool,” The Washington Post, November 3,
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/former-cia-chief-trump-is-russias-useful-fool/2016/11/03/
cda42ffe-a1d5-11e6-8d63-3e0a660f1f04_story.html?utm_term=.d8a7b957a66e
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Trump administration is undermining the intelligence community.”8485

• Ex-CIA director Leon Panetta criticized President Trump on several occasions, calling
his speech at the CIA headquarters as “inappropriate whining,”86 complaining that the
president’s tweets “harm national security,”87 and chastising him for referring to the
U.S. armed forces as “my military.”88
• In May, after the president fired the “nutjob” FBI director James Comey for the lack
of loyalty, the former DNI chief Jim Clapper went on the air to assert that “the US
government is under assault” from the president.89
These insults and accusations of incompetence and malign intent have now morphed
into mutual suspicions of sabotage and treason, leading some observers to argue that the
president and intelligence community are engaged in mutually destructive political warfare.
Consequently, no matter how much valuable information is collected and how timely,
accurate, and reliable intelligence is produced, intelligence professionals cannot do their
work effectively if their principal customer – the President of the United States – suspects
them of disloyalty, does not trust their judgment, holds their advice in low regard, and
keeps them at an arm’s length. What worsens mistrust and adds fuel to political warfare
is the growing public perception that President Trump may have shared “highly classified
intelligence” with Russia,90 and that he may be seeking alternative sources of information
and secret channels of communications with the perceived enemies of the United States.91
The U.S. federal and state courts blocked President Trump’s executive orders restricting
travel and immigration from six Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria and Yemen. In February 2017, Federal District Judge James L. Robart, in Seattle,
Washington, blocked the White House’s first travel ban in response to the legal challenge
filed by Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson — along with his counterparts from
Minnesota, New York, California, Maryland, Massachusetts and Oregon. In March, a federal
84 Mythili Sampathkumar, “Ex-CIA chief says Donald Trump is undermining intelligence efforts,” The
Independent, March 10, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/cia-chief-donald-trump-
michael-hayden-george-w-bush-undermine-intelligence-effort-work-agency-a7623426.html
85 Max Greenwood, “Ex-CIA chief: Trump undermining intel gathering,” Politico, March 9, 2017, http://
thehill.com/policy/national-security/323123-former-cia-chief-trump-undermining-intel-gathering
86 Christina Manduley, “Panetta to Trump: CIA is 'not the appropriate place to start whining about' inauguration
crowd size,” CNN, January 23, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/cia-trump-panetta-blitzer-
cnntv/
87 David Gilmour, “Donald Trump’s tweets harm national security, says former CIA director,” March 8, 2017,
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/leon-panetta-donald-trump-tweets/
88 Mark Abadi, “Trump used the phrase 'my military' — a former US defense secretary was not amused,”
Business Insider, April 13, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/leon-panetta-trump-my-military-2017-4
89 “Former DNI chief James Clapper: US government is ‘under assault’ by Trump after Comey firing,” AP,
May 14, 2017, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/14/james-clapper-us-government-is-under-assault-by-trump-
after-comey-firing.html
90 Matthew Rosenberg, Eric Schmidt, “Trump Revealed Highly Classified Intelligence to Russia, in Break With
Ally, Officials Say,” The New York Times, May 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/us/politics/
trump-russia-classified-information-isis.html
91 Maggie Haberman, Mark Mazzetti, Matt Apuzo, “Kushner Is Said to Have Discussed a Secret Channel
to Talk to Russia,” The New York Times, May 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/us/politics/
kushner-talked-to-russian-envoy-about-creating-secret-channel-with-kremlin.html?_r=0
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judge in Hawaii issued a nationwide temporary restraining order against President Trump’s
second travel ban, even though the second order made no mention of disfavoring Muslims.
Then, the U.S. District Court Judge Theodore D. Chuang, in Maryland, issued a nationwide
preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the 90-day travel ban.92 After the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled against the White House in May, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions took the defense of the executive order to the United States Supreme
Court, arguing it was well within the president’s lawful authority to strengthen national
security and keep the nation safe.93 Legal warfare between the Trump administration and
the judicial branch costs the president scarce political capital, punches holes in his domestic
policy agenda, and mars his reputation as a successful leader who can deliver on campaign
promises.
Tensions between the Trump administration and traditional media build up daily.94
The president calls the “elite media” as “the enemy of the American people” and the
“FakeNews media” that cooks up and disseminates “fake news.” Trump’s senior advisor
Steve Bannon calls the press the “opposition party” and tells the media to “keep its mouth
shut.”95 It is no wonder that liberal media like CNN, the Washington Post, and the New
York Times relentlessly whip up the anti-Trump hysteria, accusing the president of lying
and making up “alternative facts” in his tweets. The left-wing media contend that Trump’s
“dictatorial habits” put him on the dangerous path toward curtailing the freedom of press.96
They claim that American institutions of governance are under assault and pound daily their
audiences with calls for the president’s impeachment. The Hollywood mocks Mr. Trump
in popular shows like “Saturday Night Live” and incites violence against him in gruesome
“artworks” like “beheading” cartoons in the Spawn comic books97 or Kathy Griffin’s bloody
shock photos.98 But, what matters the most is that the escalating Trump-media war appears
to result in persistent deterioration in the public perceptions of how well the president is
doing his job, with his approval ratings hitting record lows week after week.99 The majority
of American voters are now convinced that the president’s first 100 days were largely a
failure, and they seem to be increasingly concerned about his honesty, intelligence and level
92 Richard Gonzalez et. al., “Trump Travel Ban Blocked Nationwide By Federal Judges In Hawaii, Maryland,”
NPR, March 15, 2017, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/15/520171478/trump-travel-ban-
faces-court-hearings-by-challengers-today
93 “Jeff Sessions Vows to Take Travel Ban to SCOTUS,” May 26, 2017, http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2017/05/25/jeff-sessions-vows-to-take-travel-ban-to-scotus/
94 Markus Feldenkirchen, “Inside Trump's War on the Traditional Media,” Spiegel Online, March 24, 2017,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/fake-news-trump-wages-war-on-traditional-media-a-1140173.
html
95 Colin Daileda, “Trump’s war on the media is straight out of a dystopian dictator’s handbook,” May 1, 2017,
http://mashable.com/2017/04/30/donald-trump-media-relationship-press-freedom/
96 “Trump's war with the media is 'darker' than you think, new study from BYU and U. professors says,” April
18, 2017, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865678059/Trumps-war-with-the-media-is-darker-than-you-
think-new-study-from-BYU-and-U-professors-says.html
97 Jerome Hudson, “Donald Trump Beheaded in ‘Spawn’ Comic Book,” August 17, 2016, http://www.breitbart.
com/big-hollywood/2016/08/17/donald-trump-beheaded-spawn-comic-book/
98 Daniel Nussbaum, “Kathy Griffin Beheads Donald Trump in Bloody Shock Photo,” May 30, 2017, http://
www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2017/05/30/kathy-griffin-beheads-donald-trump-shock-bloody-photo/
99 Aric Jenkins, “President Trump's Approval Rating Has Dropped to a Near-Record Low,” May 10, 2017,
http://time.com/4774551/donald-trump-approval-rating-may-quinnipiac-poll/
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headedness.
All of the above factors create fertile ground for the Washington establishment to
sabotage and eventually cut short the anti-establishment Trump administration. The tragedy
is that Mr. Trump went to Washington to “drain the swamp”; but, the “swamp” is striking
back and may eventually envelope and bury alive the rebellious New Yorker. The president’s
domestic political predicament is so serious that some observers even compare the rising
risk of impeachment (just four months into Trump’s term!) to a silent creeping coup to
oust a duly elected president - the coup mounted by career government officials who traffic
harmful leaks anonymously and who are protected by the talking heads in the liberal media
and political heavyweights within the Democrat Party. The tables have recently turned so
much that even the presidential runner-up Hillary Clinton had enough audacity to come out
of the Adirondack woods and publicly compare Mr. Trump to “a man whose presidency
would eventually end in disgrace with impeachment for obstruction of justice” in her
commencement speech at Wellesley College, on May 26, 2017.100
Political crisis at home may have very serious implications for the U.S. national
security and foreign policy. It makes the U.S. foreign policy less predictable and creates
uncertainty about the U.S. intentions in the minds of the foreign counterparts of the United
States. The U.S. domestic political upheaval and consequent policy discontinuities are likely
to leave U.S. allies with more doubts about American security commitments and fuel deeper
concerns about the U.S.-negotiated trade deals while emboldening U.S. enemies to ignore
Washington-imposed sanctions and challenge the White House-drawn “red lines.”
During the election season, Mr. Trump made a number of campaign promises that
were bound to significantly impact the U.S. foreign policy and directly or indirectly affect
the U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia. His public rebuttal of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy
legacy put everyone on notice. President Trump’s determination to lead with strength to
defend American interests worldwide alarmed the U.S. enemies and unsettled the U.S. allies
who were increasingly worried about his administration’s commitment to shared values such
as democratic governance and human rights.
In line with his campaign promises to
make international trade not only free but also Leading with Strength
balanced, reciprocal, and fair for American On May 28, 2017, on CBS’s “Face
workers and businesses,101 102 President Trump The Nation,” Secretary of Defense
withdrew the United States from the Trans- James Mattis was asked what keeps
Pacific Partnership, shocking, frustrating, and him up at night. Mattis replied,
disorienting its most important Asian ally, “Nothing, I keep other people awake
at night.”
100 Emily Shugerman, “The former secretary of state compared Mr Trump to disgraced former President
Richard Nixon,” The Independent, May 26, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
us-politics/trump-impeachment-latest-hillary-clinton-attack-nixon-wellesley-commencement-speech-
address-a7758311.html
101 Wilbur Ross, “Donald Trump will make trade fair again,” The Financial Times, April 4, 2017, https://www.
ft.com/content/c93e66b4-1886-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a
102 “Free and Fair Trade for American Workers and Businesses,” The White House, April 13, 2017, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/04/13/free-and-fair-trade-american-workers-and-businesses
- 99 -
Japan;103 104 condemned huge imbalances in the U.S.-China trade and U.S.-Germany trade,
threatening to impose biting trade penalties on Beijing and Berlin; and declared his intention
to renegotiate the ROK-U.S. free trade agreement, antagonizing Seoul and provoking the
Blue House to vow stiff resistance.105
Mr. Trump’s campaign promises to restructure key U.S. alliances and squeeze more
money from its main allies for their own defenses, let alone joint operations around the
globe, put considerable strain on the U.S. relations with NATO, Germany, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea unsettled by his insistence that Seoul must pay one billion U.S. dollars for
the THAAD system deployed in the South.106 Although Trump’s Florida summits with Prime
Minister Abe107 in February and President Xi Jinping108 in April brought relief and allayed
initial apprehensions in Asia, his talks with European leaders at the May NATO summit in
Brussels and at the G-7 meeting in Taormina, Italy, left them worried and pessimistic about
the future course of transatlantic relations during the Trump era.109 Particularly telling was
the German reaction: Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that Europeans could no longer
rely on the U.S. and U.K. and “must really take our destiny into our own hands,”110 while
German foreign affairs minister Sigmar Gabriel went a step further and blasted President
Trump for the “short-sighted policies” that “weaken the West” and “stand against the interests
of the European Union.”111 In response, Mr. Trump repeated his criticism of Germany for its
massive trade surplus with the U.S. and inadequate payments to NATO, condemning such
an attitude as “very bad” for the United States.112
Finally, Mr. Trump’s high profile campaign pledges to defeat the Islamic State and
to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb are translated into the escalation of U.S.
military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, as well as the intensification of American
103 Sophie Jackman, “Trump’s scrapping of TPP complicates Japan’s trade, growth options,” The Japan Times,
January 21, 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/21/national/politics-diplomacy/trumps-
scrapping-tpp-complicates-japans-trade-growth-options/
104 John Grady, “Panel: Trump’s ‘America First’ Pledge Shocked Japan,” USNI News, January 25, 2017, https://
news.usni.org/2017/01/25/panel-trumps-america-first-pledge-shocked-japan
105 Everett Rosenfeld, “Trump tough on South Korea: Threatens to terminate free trade deal, wants payment
for THAAD missile defense system,” CNBC, April 28, 2017, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/27/trump-
threatens-to-terminate-free-trade-deal-with-south-korea-says-he-wants-seoul-to-pay-for-thaad.html
106 Choe Sang-hun, “Trump Rattles South Korea by Saying It Should Pay for Antimissile System,” The New
York Times, April 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/asia/trump-south-korea-thaad-
missile-defense-north-korea.html?_r=0
107 Courtney Weaver and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Relief after Trump and Abe hit it off at summit,” The Financial
Times, April 12, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/fa95ce76-f146-11e6-8758-6876151821a6
108 “Trump hails 'tremendous' progress in talks with China's Xi,” BBC, April 7, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-39517569
109 “Merkel warns US, Britain no longer reliable partners,” AFP, May 28, 2017, http://www.breitbart.com/news/
merkel-warns-us-britain-no-longer-reliable-partners/
110 “Angela Merkel says Europe can no longer rely on US or UK - and must 'fight for its own destiny',” The
Telegraph, May 28, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/28/angela-merkel-says-europe-can-no-
longer-rely-us-uk-must-fight/
111 “Germany’s foreign minister blasts Trump, says his actions have ‘weakened’ the West,” Q13 Fox, May
30, 2017, http://q13fox.com/2017/05/29/germanys-foreign-minister-blasts-trump-says-his-actions-have-
weakened-the-west/
112 Sylvia Amaro, “Trump fires back at Merkel, says Germany is 'very bad' for the US,” CNBC, May 30, 2017,
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/30/trump-merkel-says-germany-is-very-bad-for-the-us.html
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diplomacy aimed at broadening the anti-Iranian “coalition of the willing.” Of all places,
the President of the United States made his first foreign trip to Saudi Arabia and Israel
in mid-May. It is reasonable to expect him to devote most of the time he will spend on
foreign policy deliberations to the issues concerning global war on terror, fight against Iran
and its Shi’a proxies, as well as pacification and stabilization in the Middle East, at the
expense of other military threats and national security challenges, including those emanating
in Northeast Asia or Eastern Europe. Despite tough words, judging by the actions on the
ground, it appears that neither North Korea nor Russia constitute the real foreign policy
priorities for the Trump administration.
External Factors Impacting US Options
In addition to domestic political considerations, the Trump administration has to bear
in mind a number of important external factors in formulating its foreign policy approach to
Northeast Asia.
First, continued rise of China facilitated by extraordinary economic growth, hardening
authoritarian state, and more assertive diplomacy transforms the infrastructure, economies
and societies in the Asia-Pacific region, re-orients and rebalances bilateral relations, and
restructures the existing international order. Beijing uses sustained increases in national
power and influence to rewrite the rules and reshape the institutions of the international
system, straining existing regional economic and security arrangements. The long-term
prospect of a messy hegemonic transition from the U.S.-led Western dominance of the
world to a China-led Asian-centered world order compounds the security dilemmas facing
Washington and regional powers worldwide.113 The ambiguity, open-endedness, and
transitory nature of the current geopolitical situation leave plenty of room for strategic
maneuver – from escalatory confrontation to selective collaboration (for instance, in North
Korea) to conciliatory appeasement.
Second, Japan demonstrates refreshing dynamism in security policy thanks to the
security reforms implemented under the emboldened leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe, who vowed to pursue a forward-looking foreign policy strategy, making a “proactive
contribution to peace.” In response to China’s rising maritime assertiveness and North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions, in November 2013, the Japanese Diet established National
Security Council under the Cabinet, expanding the command and control functions of the
Prime Minister’s Office in gathering intelligence and formulating security policy, as well as
endowing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with greater leeway to tighten his grip on foreign and
defense policies.114 A month later, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party railroaded into law a
tough secrets protection bill designed to impose stricter control over classified information.115
In September 2015, the Diet passed eleven bills that paved the way for a modest expansion of
the role and capacity of the Self-Defense Forces, expanding their role in non-lethal activities
113 John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west
114 Alexander Martin, “Japan to Form Own National Security Council,” The Wall Street Journal, November 21,
2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-to-form-own-national-security-council-1385024692
115 Lucy Craft, “Japan's State Secrets Law: Hailed By U.S., Denounced By Japanese,” NPR, December 31,
2013, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/12/31/258655342/japans-state-secrets-law-hailed-by-u-s-
denounced-by-japanese
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such as disaster relief and permitting them under some limited circumstances to come to the
aid of allies in collective self-defense operations.116 In 2013, Prime Minister Abe declared
that “Japan will never be a tier-two country,” emphasizing “Japan is back.” Four years later,
we judge that Japan has become a much more useful ally to the United States because the
new “war laws” allow Japan to send the SDF to fight in foreign contingencies under the
umbrella of collective self-defense despite the well-known prohibitions of Japan’s pacifist
constitution.
Third, dramatic, yet orderly, shift of political power to the liberal left in South Korea
in May 2017 adds to the emerging uncertainty concerning the future of the US-ROK bilateral
relationship, caused by some unfortunate public remarks about Korea made by President
Trump. Despite severe international sanctions, the progressive Moon government in the South
is determined to carry forward the engagement policy of the late Presidents Kim Dae-jung and
Roh Moo-hyun and adopt a reconciliatory approach to the North, envisioning the “restoration
and normalization of inter-Korean relations” in a step-by-step and comprehensive manner.
Their plans include the provision of unconditional humanitarian assistance to Pyongyang,
lifting of punitive “May 24 measures,” gradual revival of bilateral trade and multi-faceted
social and cultural exchanges, reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, resumption of
Mt. Kumgang tourism, as well as the restoration of communications hotlines between the
two governments, inter-governmental talks, and military-to-military contacts.117 In contrast,
the conservative Trump administration essentially maintains the former president Obama’s
hardline policy towards Pyongyang, emphasizing “maximum pressure” and allowing for
the possibility of engagement “under the right conditions.” In this light, it is reasonable to
expect the policy contradictions and diplomatic frictions between the White House and the
Blue House to deepen, which may lead to eventual decoupling in the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Hence, the Trump administration is likely to face the mid-term challenge of rebalancing US-
ROK security ties with minimum costs and managing the loosening of US-ROK alliance
under the Moon Presidency.
Fourth, North Korea’s nuclear breakout and heightening threat of military conflict in
the Korean peninsula presents a mid-term security challenge and constant head-ache for all
regional players, and no feasible and promising solutions are in sight. The North Korean
WMD challenge is like a geopolitical splinter, which is ever growing, and getting rotten, and
hurting all states concerned. The U.S. policymakers now perceive it as a “direct threat to
the United States.” That said, they are well aware that “a conflict in North Korea would be
probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes,” as defense secretary James
Mattis told CBS News’ “Face the Nation,” adding that “it would be a catastrophic war if this
turns into a combat if we’re not able to resolve this situation through diplomatic means.”118
Hence, it may be up to Mr. Trump, the consummate master of the art of deal-making, to find
116 Yuki Tatsumi and Mengjia Wan, “Don't Expect Too Much of Japan's Defense Reforms,” The Diplomat,
October 9, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/dont-expect-too-much-of-japans-defense-reforms/
117 “Park Jae-kyu’s Interview: Gaeseong park key to restore inter-Korean ties,” The Korea Times, May 29, 2017,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/05/103_230222.html
118 Kathryn Watson, “War with North Korea would be “catastrophic,” Defense Secretary Mattis says,” CBS
News, May 28, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/war-with-north-korea-would-be-catastrophic-mattis-
says/
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a sui generis way to resolve this thorny security problem without resort to violence - through
negotiation and compromise.
Finally, Russia appears to be on the path towards economic recovery despite enduring
Western sanctions, and it is making a diplomatic comeback despite the post-Crimea
international backlash. In the Far East, its more assertive foreign policy involves not only a
pivot to China but also the redoubled efforts to resolve the long standing territorial dispute
and conclude a peace treaty with Japan, manifested in intensified summit diplomacy with
Tokyo, as well as strong interest in the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. Although
President Trump has very limited options in terms of what he can do in collaboration with
Russia in light of the deepening Russiagate scandal in Washington, the White House can no
longer ignore Russia’s growing military presence119 120 in Northeast Asia and should take into
account Moscow’s more pragmatic and robust Asia strategy.
President Trump’s Strategic Options
The first hundred and twenty days of the Trump administration leave the impression
that the president certainly wants to undo the legacy of his predecessor, but it is still unclear
how he intends to proceed with charting his own course.
Mr. Trump’s “America First” credo may justify two quite opposite grand strategies
of revitalization of American power and status in the world: the “inside-out” and “outside-
in.” The former is based on three “R’s”: retreat, rebuild, and re-engage. The latter is based
on three “E’s”: escalate, emasculate, and empower. Both are risky and potentially costly.
Both strategies will have significant implications for U.S. security commitments, military
presence, economic relations and trade, as well as foreign policies in Northeast Asia.
The “Inside-Out” (3Rs: retreat, rebuild, re-engage) strategy stipulates that the
United States should first reduce its global footprint, retreat from its overextended foreign
commitments, squeeze more equitable contributions from its allies and partners towards
common purposes, whether it is NATO or NAFTA or TPP or Paris Climate Treaty; then,
use American resources saved to renovate decaying infrastructure, replenish hollowing out
domestic industries, and rebuild military capabilities; and only then project the U.S. power
and augment American influence overseas again. Its potential unintended consequences
include a rift in US-German relations, fissures in US-Mexican partnership, and possible
decoupling in the US-ROK alliance. This transactional approach is sometimes represented
by a telling social media meme of “Donald Two Percent.” The big risk of the “3Rs” strategy
is that vacuum in international relations tends to invite power, which means that once the
United States steps down from the pinnacle of power, other great powers may lose the fear of
and respect for America, quickly rise to challenge its hegemony, and resist the U.S. attempts
at comeback with all means at their disposal in future.
The “Outside-In” (3Es: escalate, emasculate, and empower) strategy dictates first
the need for the White House to adopt “new thinking” and wage a bold and assertive foreign
policy from the position of strength, escalating brewing regional conflicts to the boiling
119 “Russia plans to deploy new military division to Kuril Islands,” Jiji Press, February 24, 2017, http://www.
newsonjapan.com/html/newsdesk/article/119136.php
120 “Russia says to deploy new weapons on disputed Kurile islands,” Reuters, March 25, 2016, http://www.
businessinsider.com/r-russia-says-to-deploy-new-weapons-on-disputed-kurile-islands-2016-3
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point in order to demonstrate American power in action and rebuild U.S. international
credibility while silencing domestic critics and rallying supporters around the flag, and, then,
allows for the possibility for the White House to turn inward to advance domestic policy
agenda in the new context of possible weaker resistance from the anti-Trump opposition
subdued by his foreign policy accomplishments. One can already find a few examples of
such transformational initiatives in the making, including unequivocal support for Brexit and
renaissance of the U.S.-UK “special relationship,” a bold switchover from a “war of attrition”
to “annihilation of ISIS” in Syria and Iraq, a possible war against Iran, and Mr. Trump’s
declaration that “all options are on the table” in North Korea, ranging from preemptive war
to “grand bargain.” The big risk of the “3Es” strategy is that any high-profile foreign policy
failure – like a protracted bloody war against Iran or a botched military operation in North
Korea - may compound internal political difficulties and embolden the domestic critics of
the Trump administration, further encouraging them to step up their relentless campaign to
remove Mr. Trump from the White House.
Teetering between Rebuttal and Reassurance, Escalation and Appeasement
After discarding President Obama’s Asia “rebalance,” the Trump administration has
not found an even keel in its approach to the region yet, teetering between a hardline and a
soft line in dealing with allies and adversaries. Mr. Trump’s pirouettes in Asia make heads
spin.
His foreign policy vacillates between rebuttal and reassurance in dealing with allies
and friends. The Trump administration rebuts Tokyo’s pleas to preserve the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), yet it reaffirms its strong support for the U.S.-Japanese military alliance
and encourages Japan to re-arm and step up its role as a local deputy sheriff in East Asia. Mr.
Trump rebuts Seoul’s claims that the THAAD system was provided for free and there won’t
be any renegotiation of KORUS FTA, but he also reassures the South Korean ally in his
iron-clad commitment to its security and defense, enhancing the U.S. extended deterrence
capabilities and increasing the scope and frequency of joint military exercises in and around
Korea.
Trump’s foreign policy resorts to dangerous escalation only to settle on appeasement
in confronting rivals and enemies. Trump’s China policy swings from tough rhetoric,
manifested in periodic accusations of currency manipulation, explicit attacks on Beijing’s
“One China” policy, and veiled threats of naval blockade to deny access to disputed South
China Sea islands, to about-face endorsement of Chinese language on the need for “non-
confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect and win-win cooperation” at the Mar-a-Lago
summit and virtual acquiescence to Beijing’s positions on North Korea and Taiwan in hopes
that China can rein in its recalcitrant ally in Pyongyang. 121 With respect to North Korea, on
one hand, Vice-President Mike Pence proclaims that “the era of strategic patience is over,”
vowing to leverage maximum international pressure to compel Kim Jong Un to return to
denuclearization talks, but on the other hand, the U.S. demonstrations of force in the vicinity
of North Korea, including the concentration of three (!) aircraft carrier groups in the region,
tend to be short-lived and counter-intuitively provoke even more brinkmanship from the
121 Rush Doshi, “Trump's China Policy: A Tale of Two Extremes,” The National Interest, April 3, 2017, http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-must-choose-between-hard-line-china-strategy-soft-20002
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enemy. Although Trump’s four-point strategy towards North Korea includes non-recognition
of North Korea as a nuclear state, maximum pressure through all sorts of sanctions, and
peaceful settlement of the nuclear problem by way of dialogue, it rules out regime change
and omits a military option in dealing with the Kim Jong Un regime. 122
The long-term impacts of current fluctuations in U.S. foreign policy on key bilateral
relations in Northeast Asia are still hard to assess. But, some emerging trends are worrisome.
The U.S. pressure on South Korea appears to complicate Seoul’s relations with Beijing,
especially because of the THAAD issue. The U.S. purely transactional approach towards
China encompassing both pressure and cuddling appears to cause friction in Beijing relations
with Pyongyang and puts strain on China’s relations with Russia. Since China’s relations
with both Koreas appear to be worsening, and its influence in both Korean capitals seems
to be diminishing, while the upward momentum in its relations with Russia seems to have
stalled, Japan stands to benefit the most from Mr. Trump’s initial moves in Northeast Asia.
Conclusion: Give Trump a Chance
The United States is internally divided. The White House is under siege. President
Trump’s popularity and elite support appear to be eroding. The hypothetical threat of
impeachment is rising and may become a clear and present danger if Republicans lose
control of House in midterm congressional elections in November 2018. Domestic political
crisis also reverberates in the national security arena, injecting ideology and politics into
policy disputes and distracting government bureaucracy from public policy administration.
Mr. Trump’s conservative “America-First” doctrine challenges the existing liberal
world order and provokes international backlash in many corners of the globe. But, he is
the U.S. President, not the President of the World. His foremost duties are to safeguard the
U.S. national interests and to promote America’s well-being. He is neither globalist nor
isolationist. Mr. Trump is American nationalist. He is a businessman, not a politician. As an
anti-establishment self-made man, he defies traditional dogmas how public officials ought to
act in office. He is indeed unbound and unpredictable.
Mr. Trump is the President of the United States of America, who was duly elected by
American voters to represent and defend American interests. The American people should
give him a chance to demonstrate his leadership and make America great again, and the
establishment ought to respect it.
122 “Trump finalizes 4-point strategy on N. Korea: lawmaker,” Yonhap, May 26, 2017, http://english.yonhapnews.
co.kr/northkorea/2017/05/26/0401000000AEN20170526000252315.html
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MULTILATERALISM IN EAST ASIA AND EUROPE AND THE

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN FACILITATING EAST ASIAN
MULTILATERALISM
Dr. Eric BALLBACH

Post- Doctoral Research Fellow, Director Research Unit II: Korea and International
Security, Free University Berlin, Germany
Abstract
This paper addresses the external dimension of Korean unification and focusses in
particular on the role of (regional) multilateralism. Building on a brief theoretical discussion
and acknowledging a highly instrumental perspective on multilateralism in Northeast
Asia the paper argues for the necessity and functionality of embedding Korean unification
within a stable regional order, and aims to shed light on the question whether the European
experiences with embedding Germany’s unification multilaterally provides any valuable
insights for Korea and Northeast Asia. Moreover, the paper discusses the limits and potentials
of the European Union’s (EU) role in facilitating the complex process of Korean unification
and argues for the role of a ‘proactive broker of multilateralism’.
1. Introduction
The process of regional integration in Europe has long been used as a (sometimes
fitting and sometimes not so fitting) ‘model’ for understanding and analyzing the complex
processes of regionalization in Northeast Asia. However, due to several complexities,
comparing regional integration and multilateral institution building in Europe and East
Asia is a daunting analytical task. Firstly, while the word ‘multilateralism’ is often used,
the concept is seldom defined, let alone operationalized. Certainly, most observers would
agree that both in Europe and East Asia, multilateralism matters, leading some to argue,
that “multilateral cooperation best suits the complex situation in East Asia, and therefore
gets taken up even by those – like the US and China – who are skeptical about its utility
and reach.” However, “multilateral cooperation” can refer to various types and forms
of intergovernmental as well as non-governmental interaction as well as to a specific
foreign policy strategy. Hence, a comparison between European and East Asian variants
of multilateralism requires a thorough understanding of the complexities of this particular
concept in the first place. What distinguishes multilateralism from other organizational
forms, and what, then, are the conceptual differences between European and East Asian
multilateralisms? Secondly, it is important to note that such a conceptual comparison does
not aim at unilaterally applying some sort of “European model” of integration and institution
building to the East Asian region. Contrasting and comparing European and East Asian
experiences with multilateralism should not privilege one region’s experience at the expense
of the other. Rather, such a comparison should lead to a bi-directional dialogue and debate on
the similarities and differences of European and East Asian experiences with multilateralism
as a particular organizing principle.
- 106 -
2. Scholarly Perspectives on Multilateralism123

While the first documented use of the term ‘multilateral’ dates back to the year 1858,
the noun form of the word only came into use in the aftermath of World War I (see Powell
2003: 5). As James Caporaso (1992: 600–601) points out, the noun ‘comes in the form of
an “ism”, suggesting a belief or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs’. An
understanding of multilateralism as it was debated in the United States (US) after 1945
seems to reinforce this rather normative perception of multilateralism, depicting it simply
as the ‘international governance of the “many”’, while its central principle was said to be
the ‘opposition [of] bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance
the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict’ (see
Kahler 1992: 681). Despite such early efforts to approach the term, the disciplinary debate
on multilateralism in the fields of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis
(FPA) is still comparatively young. For too long, to refer to a popular critique from Tom
Keating (1993: 12), political science limited its research to the notions of ‘institutions’ and/
or ‘cooperation’ without explicitly paying attention to the phenomenon of multilateralism.
Although the term multilateralism is frequently used in various contexts — including the
debate on the chances and limits of regionalization in NEA and in the context of the Korean
question — the concept still lacks analytical clarity and is only ‘seldom defined or even
operationalized’ (Dosch 2006: 2; see also Seol 2008).124
To very briefly summarize the theoretical debate on multilateralism one may
distinguish two different perspectives, both of which refer to interrelating actors and therefore
conceptualize multilateralism as a phenomenon of international politics rather than a foreign
policy phenomenon. A first scholarly definition and a typical example of what was later
labeled a quantitative (e.g. Baumann 2007: 443), formal (e.g. Diebold 1988: 1), or nominal
(e.g. Ruggie 1993: 6) perspective was provided by Robert O. Keohane (1990: 731), who
defined multilateralism as ‘the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or
more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’. While acknowledging
its accuracy in principle, a number of scholars subsequently criticized this definition or,
more precisely, its ‘incomplete character’.125 Arguably the most prominent critic was offered
by John G. Ruggie (1993: 6, 11), who notes that Keohane’s nominal definition misses the
qualitative dimension of the phenomenon, thus overlooking those properties that differentiate
it from other ‘generic institutional forms’ – namely bilateralism and imperialism. Ruggie
(1993: 11) subsequently defines multilateralism as“an institutional form that coordinates
relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct—that
is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to
particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific
occurrence.”
123 This chapter draws heavily on Ballbach, Eric (2013): Between Autonomy and Influence? Multilateralism
and North Korean Foreign Policy in the Six-Party Talks, in: Frank, Rüdiger, James E. Hoare, Patrick
Köllner and Susan Pares (eds.): Korea Yearbook 2013: Politics, Economy and Society, Vol. 7, Leiden und
Boston: Brill (forthcoming in September 2013)
124 For recent examples of scholarly works without a definition and/or operationalization of the concept, see:
Kang 2006 and Kwak 2006.
125 For example, Jörn Dosch (2002: 25) states that multilateralism defined in a nominal way refers to
nearly every form and type of cooperation which encompasses at least three actors. Similarly, Weiss and
Rihackova (2010: 8, italics in original) note that ‘according to this view, every interaction with more
than two participants is multilateral, regardless of whether the coordination occurs only once or regularly,
whether it is institutionalized or ad hoc.’
- 107 -
However, this qualitative definition not only conceptualizes multilateralism solely as a

phenomenon of international politics but furthermore brings with it a very narrow analytical
focus that by and large excludes the vital strategic dimension of the concept. Ruggie (1993:
10, 12) himself characterizes multilateralism as a ‘highly demanding institutional form’
and explicitly excludes particularistic interests or strategicInternational exigencies from Conference 2017
his definition.
Baumann also emphasizes the qualitative character of multilateralism when he maintains
that to be characterized
particularistic interests or as ‘multilateral’,
strategic exigenciesthefrom
relations between Baumann
his definition. states should
also to a large degree
emphasizes the
be shapedcharacter
qualitative by the principles of non-discrimination
of multilateralism when he maintains that and toindivisibility (Baumann
be characterized 2007: 445–
as ‘multilateral’, the
46). However, in NEA multilateralism is arguably best understood ‘as an
relations between states should to a large degree be shaped by the principles of non-discrimination andextension and
intersection of national power and purpose rather than as an objective force in
indivisibility (Baumann 2007: 445–46). However, in NEA multilateralism is arguably best understood ‘as itself’ (Green
andextension
an Gill 2009: 3). Incorporating
and intersection an power
of national instrumentalist
and purposeperspective
rather than asseems particularly
an objective force inrelevant
itself’
when discussing the question of Korean unification, an issue which is inherently
(Green and Gill 2009: 3). Incorporating an instrumentalist perspective seems particularly relevant linkedwhen
to the
strategic calculations of the involved parties. Against this background, a
discussing the question of Korean unification, an issue which is inherently linked to the strategicbroader definition
of multilateralism
calculations seems appropriate,
of the involved parties. Againstone that
this allows fora analytically
background, capturing
broader definition the strategic
of multilateralism
dimension and the instrumental value of multilateralism as a distinct foreign
seems appropriate, one that allows for analytically capturing the strategic dimension and the instrumental policy tool.
Multilateralism is thus defined here as a specific type of foreign policy (behaviour)
value of multilateralism as a distinct foreign policy tool. Multilateralism is thus defined here as a specific which
type of foreign policy (behaviour) which is characterized by the willingness of a single country on
is characterized by the willingness of a single country to coordinate its foreign policy to a
specific issue and/or in a specific area with at least two other states within varyingly
coordinate its foreign policy on a specific issue and/or in a specific area with at least two other states dense
institutionalized
within varyingly densestructures to achieve
institutionalized its foreign
structures policy its
to achieve objectives at hand—notwithstanding
foreign policy objectives at hand—
what this willingness is based upon.
notwithstanding what this willingness is based upon.
Figure 1: Different (Ideal-Typical) Analytical Perspectives on and Characteristics of
Figure 1: Different (Ideal-Typical) Analytical Perspectives on and Characteristics of Multilateralism
Multilateralism
Multilateralism as an object
of research in political
science
Multilateralism as a Multilateralism as a
phenomenon of foreign policy
international politics phenomenon
ML as an indispensable ML as a negligible part

Quantitative Qualitative
part of a state’s foreign of a state’s foreign
Multilateralism Multilateralism
policy design policy design
Reflectivist Instrumentalist
multilateralism / multilateralism /
high commitment low commitment
Source: Author
Source: Author
Using such a broad definition opens the possibility for distinguishing between various
manifestations
Using such a broad ofdefinition
multilateralism
opens thein the realm
possibility for of foreign policy,
distinguishing betweenranging
variousfrom reflectiveofto
manifestations
highly instrumental
multilateralism (e.g. Anderson
in the realm and Goodman
of foreign policy, 1993).
ranging from Moreover,
reflective theseinstrumental
to highly different (ideal-
(e.g.
type) manifestations
Anderson and Goodmancan be analyzed
1993). Moreover, viathesedifferent
differenttheoretical
(ideal-type) and methodological
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can be analyzed via
while the
different reflectivist
theoretical position has approaches:
and methodological been takenwhile up primarily by social
the reflectivist positionconstructivists,
has been taken up the
instrumentalist arguments can be associated with rationalist approaches to the study of
primarily by social constructivists, the instrumentalist arguments can be associated with rationalist
multilateralism
approaches (see of
to the study also Kratochwil(see
multilateralism 1993; Baumann 1993;
also Kratochwil 2006;Baumann
Caporaso 2006;1992; Fey 1992;
Caporaso 2000;
Martin
Fey 2000;1993).
Martin Ultimately, all approaches
1993). Ultimately, all approachesmakemakeassumptions aboutthe
assumptions about thebasic
basic motivations
motivations of
of state
state behavior
behavior and canandthus
canbethus be drawn
drawn on to analytically
on to analytically address the address
motivesthe of motives
a specificofcountry
a specific
in
country toin orreferring
referring rejectingto or rejecting asmultilateralism
multilateralism a means of its as a means
foreign policy.ofInitsthe
foreign policy.
following In the
section, a
followingapproach
neorealist section, a neorealist
is applied to help approach
make sense is of applied to help
North Korea’s make inconsistent
seemingly sense of NorthforeignKorea’s
policy
seemingly
vis-à-vis inconsistent
the SPT, foreign
characterized policy
by both vis-à-vis
cooperation and the SPT, characterized by both cooperation
non-cooperation.
3. Multilateralism in Europe and East Asia- –108
A View
- from Germany
3.1 Similarities and differences between European and East Asian Multilateralism
105
and non-cooperation.
3. Multilateralism in Europe and East Asia – A View from Germany
3.1 Similarities and differences between European and East Asian
Multilateralism
Despite all the differences, it is important to remember that there are some similarities
between European and East Asian multilateralisms. Most importantly, both regions share
a Cold War history of division caused by the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. As a result, United States continues to play a crucial role in both regions, albeit in
different manifestations and with different consequences. That being said, it is apparent that
differences between European and East Asian multilateralisms abound:
 Europe was the source of many of the dominant international institutions, rules,
and norms in the current international system. By contrast, many Asian nations, as
postcolonial states, have struggled with the tension between adaptation and resistance
to core global norms and institutions.
 Europe has a robust, well-organized, and active civil society; in Asia, civil society is
in the process of uneven expansion because some Asian countries are more open than
others. In broader terms, Europe is also more culturally cohesive than Asia.
 European multilateralism is more legalistic and institutionalized, whereas Asian
multilateralism is more practice-based and informal. This distinction, however, should
not be overstated because it is less stark in practice.
 European nations, during the past five decades, leveraged US security protection to
pursue their own project of regional economic integration. East Asian nations, for
the most part, have not. In Europe, the United States acted as a catalyst for European
integration beginning in the 1950s. In East Asia, the United States has not been a driver
of regional integration; instead it has established itself at the center of a hub-spoke
pattern of security relations while East Asia nations pursued distinct and autonomous
paths to develop their national economies.
 In Europe, major powers — the Franco-German core — drove the construction of
a multilateral order. This core exercised a magnetic attraction among its smaller
neighbors. If East Asia followed the EU experience, then China and Japan would
have to lead the way, following in the footsteps of France and Germany. Despite
recent progress, neither Beijing nor Tokyo is there yet. Sustained Sino-Japanese
rapprochement will be a key to political and economic integration in East Asia.
 Moreover, EU multilateralism benefited from the similar social orders of its member
states, most being democratic, open market economies, and with large middle and
working classes. These similarities contributed to policy convergence and integration.
In East Asia, the underlying social orders have been more diverse and incompatible,
and each of the states has pursued a distinct approach to economic development. Asia
has a mix of industrial and agrarian states, closed state-centric economies and open
decentralized economies, egalitarian political orders versus oligarchic orders. In Asia,
major power competition among states and the prospect of war still looms over the
region; such adversarial competition is largely absent from Europe. These structural
features limit the degree of regional integration and institution building in Asia.
 A variety of views, practices, and experiences has inhibited multilateral institution
building. There is a strong emphasis on state sovereignty and non-intervention in
the internal affairs of other states. Many Asian nations care more about process than
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results. Bilateral interactions are still a preferred way of managing state-to-state

relations. Many Asian nations lack the state capacity to contribute to substantive
multilateral cooperation. Current intra-Asian cooperation has largely resulted from
event-driven as opposed to vision-driven interactions
3.2 Security Challenges in Europe and East Asia
In Europe, multilateral security institutions exhibit a comparably high degree and level of
development and have, in past decades, de facto contributed to regional security. Central to
the development and functioning of such multilateral security institutions was the commonly
accepted approach of ‘collective defense’ to deter well understood threats. More specifically,
several factors have contributed to Europe’s success at establishing effective multilateral
security institutions:
 The geographic proximity in Europe forced major powers to address the issue of
regional security early in the process of institution building, in the 1950s.
 Western Europe’s two major players (France and Germany) achieved rapprochement
early on and then led the process of regional integration, which centered on the
European order and opened the door to economic integration
 Regimes in Western Europe were similar in type and orientation. They practiced
institutionalized restraint domestically, making them suited to strategic restraint
in their statecraft. In some cases, such strategic restraint was a clear goal of their
promotion of regional economic integration and creation of regional security
institutions.
 The United States was an advocate of regional integration; it needed European
integration to convince France to allow German rearmament.
 America’s cultural affinity with Europe made Washington more comfortable with
multilateralism and regional integration
As successful as EU security institutions have been at fostering economic and political
integration, they face problems in the security realm. As one observer noted:
“Security institutions in Europe are in trouble. NATO, the EU (ESDP), and OSCE are not
fulfilling their promise. NATO and the EU are in a process of ‘competitive decadence’, while
the OSCE seems to suffer from a hopeless stalemate. Different sets of dilemmas affect the
security institutions, some are as old as international politics, and others are linked to the
new international security agenda. All demand renewed leaderships and commitments.” The
ongoing shift from “collective defense” to “collective security” as the modus vivendi for
NATO has been highly problematic for transatlantic relations.“
The nature of contemporary threats is not conducive to an enhanced role of security
institutions. Neither the EU nor NATO offer an obvious value-added. Despite the activation
of NATO’s Article 5 after 9/11, defense and foreign policy choices have been mostly decided
on a national basis. Counterterrorism is a matter of national security rather than collective
action.” The role of the EU in counterterrorism cooperation has been largely symbolic.
As a result, EU nations are divided on the EU’s role in the post-Cold War international
security agenda and, specifically, their cooperation with the United States. A common
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has yet to take form, raising questions about
its relevance in tackling contemporary security challenges. The EU and NATO both suffer
from continued strategic ambiguity and a lack of consensus on the core functions of the EU
and NATO.
In East Asia, too, multilateral security cooperation has flourished. At the same time, East
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Asian multilateralism differs from the European variant. Generally speaking, multilateral
security institutions in East Asia are characterized by the following features:
 The level of institutionalization and legalization of East Asian security institutions
remains comparatively low. But this limitation has been driving recent efforts to
develop an ASEAN Security Community and the 2007 creation of the ASEAN Charter.
Many participants noted that even these steps are quite limited in their contribution to
enhancing the role of ASEAN.
 East Asian multilateralism has been led by small states, and mainly by those within
ASEAN. The role of major regional powers, such as China and Japan, in institution
building is growing, but they disagree on the right models to pursue.
 Asia has no tradition of successful regional institutions that were specifically created
and maintained by great powers. Many Asian states remain wary of heavy US or
Chinese involvement in institution building. However, many of these same states
want to continue the system of US bilateral alliances as a check against future threats
to regional security.
 The oldest and most successful regional organization in Asia is the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group of small and relatively weak states.
ASEAN has been the normative and institutional platform for most subsequent Asian
regional security institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Participants
disagreed about ASEAN’s value to promoting regional integration and further
institution building; its mandate and influence are limited.
 Asian multilateralism was founded upon a shared commitment to state sovereignty
and the principle of “noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.” Centuries
of colonial rule over the region ensured that the preservation of sovereignty and
noninterference would be the key normative basis of Asian regional institutions.
This is a constraint on further development of effective multilateral institutions in the
region.
 US policy makers, in general, remain ambivalent about the potential contributions
of security institutions in East Asia. While the US government rhetorically supports
current regional institutions and calls for building new ones (such as in Northeast
Asia), Washington seldom relies on them to shape regional security affairs —with
the relatively recent six-party talks standing out as the exception which proves the
rule. This could change as key US allies in the region, such as Japan and Australia,
express support for a greater role in managing regional security questions. Many of
these limitations were by design. In past decades, East Asian nations — as newly
postcolonial states —did not want strong multilateral organizations for fear they would
be dominated by the United States, India, or Japan. Keeping institutions informal and
weakly legalized was a deliberate preference of Southeast Asian states. This provided
small powers in Southeast Asia with the opportunity to guide such institutions and to
establish norms and processes for managing regional affairs more predictable and to
boost the capabilities of multilateral security institutions. Bilateral relations could be
used to improve the quality of multilateral security organizations
3.3 Is there a Distinct Role for Multilateralism in East Asia?
As the brief theoretical discussion made clear, multilateralism is to be considered
a multi-dimensional phenomenon, ranging from strictly strategic to normative. While we
should avoid a ‘romanticizing’ view of European multilateralism and acknowledge that
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multilateral cooperation in Europe is strategic as well, there is no denying the fact that
European multilateralism is more norm-driven, legalistic and institutionalized, whereas East
Asian multilateralism is more practice-based and informal. While East Asian multilateralism
is arguably best understood in instrumental terms, this low degree of institutionalization
does not suggest that multilateralism is not important. European and Northeast Asian
multilateralisms are characterized by very different degrees of institutionalization, resulting
primarily from the degree to which the respective multilateral process is characterized
by strategic and instrumentalist and/or a norm-driven considerations. While multilateral
structures in Northeast Asia are primarily instrumentalist, this does not per se diminish the
value and importance of multilateralism in Northeast Asia. Hence, when Paul Evens (2007)
describes Northeast Asia as an anti-region with regard to multilateral security cooperation,
he bases such an assessment on a mere qualitative understanding of the multifaceted concept
that is multilateralism. In the context of Northeast Asia, an understanding of multilateralism
that by and large excludes the concept’s crucial strategic dimension and its instrumental value
as a distinct foreign policy tool is highly problematic. Moreover, to acknowledge a primarily
instrumentalist perspective on multilateralism in Northeast Asia does not per se mean that
the phenomenon would be superfluous in the region. As the developments in the post-Cold
War era have shown, multilateralism has made considerable progress in the post-Cold War
era and has already begun to play an increasing role in addressing major challenges with
regional implications – despite (or because of) the fact that the parties primarily participate
in multilateral initiatives out of strategic calculation and are not driven by certain shared
norms or values. While the regional powers may have had diverging or sometimes not so
diverging interests, they all have shown some level of support for multilateral initiatives
to enhance regional stability, as is exemplified by such multilateralisms as the Trilateral
Cooperation and Oversight Group (TCOG), the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), the Four-Party Talks, and the Six-Party Talks on the Track-I level as
well as the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Northeast
Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) on the track-II level. As these examples already
illustrate, acknowledging an increasing role of multilateralism as an ordering principle in
Northeast Asia is not to deny the continued primacy of bilateralism. None of these structures
could have been established without sound bilateral relations on which they were build and
have much less did they replace any bilateral processes. In fact, progresses and achievements
within the above-mentioned multilateral processes were nearly always preceded by bilateral
consultations. Hence, such multilateralisms provide an (increasingly important) added
layer to East Asia’s primarily bilateral ordering structure: it operates in addition to not as a
replacement for the bilateral superstructure.126
Given this ‘multilateral change’ in Northeast Asia and considering the important
role multilateralism played in the context of embedding Germany’s unification it is safe
to assume that even a highly instrumental perspective on multilateralism in Northeast Asia
does not discount the importance of multilateralism in the context of the Korean question.
In fact, despite (or because of) the highly strategic calculus of the (Northeast Asian) states’
multilateral involvement, there is reason to believe that multilateralism will be crucial before,
during and after Korean unification:
To begin with, given that the division of Korea was itself a process in which external
126 The most recent example for this logic at work is the Six-Party Talks. Established in 2003 to address the
North Korean nuclear issue, the six-party process was characterized both by bilateral and multilateral
structures.
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powers played a crucial role, the sensitive question of Korean unification would naturally
provide strong incentives for regional powers to make their strategic interests heard during
all stages of Korean unification. As was the case with Germany in Europe, Korea’s pivotal
geopolitical position in Northeast Asia makes the specifics of the country’s unification quite
naturally a matter of regional relevance with important ramifications for the whole Northeast
Asian order. Hence, neither the German nor the Korean unification could have been/can be
achieved without some kind of formal international agreement (e.g. a formal peace treaty).
Given that the Korean unification will lead to a noticeable shift in power in Northeast Asia,
the process requires a robust and sustainable framework of regional order in order to prevent
regional destabilization.
Moreover, solving the Korean question will raise a number of issues that are arguably
best solved multilaterally – not because of any inherent normative considerations but because
important dimensions of the challenges in the context of Korean unification could and most
likely must be to some degree addressed comprehensively through multilateral cooperation.
Many of the specific issues that in the case of Germany could be resolved only multilaterally
will – in the Korean case – similarly need some form of regional cooperation. Thus, to
argue for the relevancy of multilateralism in contributing to the political ordering of Korean
unification is to acknowledge that a number of related issues – such as the nuclear question,
the question of conventional military forces, the economic framework of and for unification,
and the question of (non-)alignment – are of immediate regional and international concern
and naturally touch upon the very core interests of all regional players. Multilateralism
could therefore facilitate the necessary mutual accommodation of interests and objectives
and contribute to diminishing the risks of polarization as well as broaden the opportunities
for trade-offs, hence for package deals (Maull 2001: 4). Therefore, it is safe to assume that
similar to the German case multilateral cooperation will be of considerable importance in
addressing the external (and sometimes internal) aspects of unification.
3.4 The Differences and Limits of the European Model
To argue for the importance of multilateralism in East Asia may lead to the temptation
to look at the European experiences as a model. However, a closer look reveals some
important differences with regard to the general role multilateral structures played in the
two regions. To begin with, both West and East Germany had been closely integrated in
dense webs of multilateral cooperation structures (and in the case of West Germany even
integration) in Europe. While this artificial integration could not be sustained in East
Germany due to a lack of roots in and support by the East German society, in West Germany,
the deep integration into European structures both reflected and in turn solidified profound
changes in German society and the country’s political culture. Multilateralism was therefore
very important in bringing about German unification in the first place; it constituted a vital
condition facilitating unification:
“Multilateralism made German unification possible: it provided essential reassurance
for Germany’s neighbours, constrained Germany’s freedom and provided anchors to
German foreign policy behaviour. Unification in the case of Germany also acted as a catalyst
for multilateral co-operation and integration in Europe and across the Atlantic” (Maull &
Harnisch 2001: 6).
As Maull (ibid.) continues, in the case of Germany there thus developed a virtuous
circle, in which the progress of multilateralism produced further impulses towards both the
deepening and widening of multilateral cooperation in Europe.
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Figure 2: Multilateralism in Germany’s and Korea’s Unification
Source: Author
While multilateralism has also come to play an increasingly important (although by
comparison much different) role in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula, it is hard
to imagine that multilateralism could similarly work as an immediate enabling factor and
catalyst of Korean unification in the near future. This is because the politically dominant
external relationships and the primary ordering structure of the Korean peninsula affairs are
still the bilateral security ties of South Korea with the United States and – at least traditionally
– those of North Korea with China and thus the multilateral structures in the region are not
deeply rooted in the political order. Unlike in the case of Germany, therefore, the process
of Korean unification will most likely not be backed by similar multilateral structures that
have evolved over several decades and that have themselves stabilized the bilateral relations
among its members. The fact that European multilateralism has evolved over decades –
often in bitter dispute – is an important point that is often lost in the ‘romanticized view’ of
European multilateralism:
“Europe’s overall effective means for a cooperative, comprehensive and pro-active
approach to security affairs are the results of a long process which is still far from being
completed. Despite a large set of shared norms and values and mostly compatible foreign
policy interests it took the Western European states almost four decades from the foundation of
the European Economic Community in 1957 to the first steps towards the institutionalization
of a European security policy. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) came
only into existence as the result of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 while the more elaborated
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was born in 1999 at the European Council
meetings in Cologne and Helsinki” (Dosch 2003: 13).
In closing this chapter it may be said that while the European experiences with
embedding Germany’s unification multilaterally are of analytical and political value for
addressing the complex unification of Korea, there are clearly limits to simply transferring
the European experiences. At the same time, if we reject the rigid and one-sided conceptual
framework of ‘transfer’ and if we define security not simply in military terms, than Europe’s
and Germany’s experiences may still be useful for Northeast Asia and Korea – and they may
well define Europe’s future role on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
4. Is there a Role for Europe in Facilitating East Asian Multilateralism?
Any potential future European contribution to peace and stability in Northeast Asia
requires a realistic consideration of both Europe’s stakes and the potential and limits of
engagement in the region. As will be shown, this brings to light a different level of economic
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and security engagement by the EU in Northeast Asia which points to a discrepancy between
Europe’s own aspiration (as a player) and its actual engagement (as a mere payer). While
Europe has in the past only modestly contributed to peace, stability and prosperity in
Northeast Asia, it could and should do more. Despite or because of the fact the EU’s strategic
influence in the region is limited Brussels should consider to take the role of a ‘proactive
broker’.
4.1 Europe’s Stakes and the EU’s (Modest) Involvement
Europe’s influence in Northeast Asia clearly is not vital, but its strategic interests are
important. One the one hand, East Asia is home to crucially important economic partners
for the EU. As such, Europe has an immediate stake in peace, stability and prosperity in
the East Asian region, although this seems to be far less debated in Europe itself. Political
turmoil in East Asia would most certainly have global political and economic repercussions
– e.g. through the interconnectedness of the international financial markets and activities as
well as the likelihood of Europe’s contribution to any crisis management. Thus, Europe’s
interests are not and should not be seen as being exclusively economic. Given that security
developments in the region have an immediate effect on European security interests, patterns
of regional cooperation and conflict in East Asia are likely to have implications for Europe’s
own external relations. As a matter of fact, since the mid-1990s the EU did get engaged on
the Korean peninsula beyond the mere economic realm and although Europe’s involvement
in the region has been primarily driven by economic interests, before the outbreak of the
‘second nuclear crisis’ the EU did (although modestly) contribute in a number of ways to the
stabilization of the security situation on the Korean peninsula:127
- European countries have provided a substantial contribution to the IMF financial
support for South Korea during the Asian crisis, both in the IMF program and the so-
called “second line of defense” credits;
- Europe participated in a number of regional multilateral initiatives such as the
ASEAN-Europe-Meeting (ASEM) and the now defunct KEDO process. Both the
European Union collectively and several European countries individually have
participated in the multilateral KEDO process, in which the EU obtained one of the
three directorships;
- Explicitly designated as a contribution to regional stability, the European Commission
has provided substantial food and humanitarian aid to the DPRK, the latter receiving
roughly 370 million Euros from the EU between 1995 and 2005
- Several European countries as well as the European Commission have established
diplomatic relations with the DPRK since the early 2000s. Today almost all member
countries have diplomatic ties with the DPRK. The visit by an EU troika to Pyongyang
in May 2001 was interpreted by many as signaling Europe’s determination to play a
more active diplomatic role on the Korean peninsula;
- Europe is a significant supplier of arms to South Korea, and recently has developed its
involvement in bilateral and regional security dialogues with East Asia;
While these examples show that the EU did indeed take some steps towards a more active
approach vis-à-vis the Est Asian region since the mid-1990s up until the early 2000s, the
EU’s influence on ‘hard security issues’ in the region is still limited at best and its immediate
contribution to regional peace and stability has consequently been rather modest. Nothing
127 The following list draws heavily on Maull 2001: 11-12; see also Ballbach 2010.
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illustrates this point better than the limited role of the EU following the outbreak of the
second nuclear crisis, in which the EU’s role was limited to supplying verbal assurances
and support for its regional partners. European countries seem to have defined their interests
in Korea in commercial, rather than in political and strategic terms, and - as the passive
stance during the second nuclear crisis has shown - they have at times been more disposed
to quarrel among themselves than pull their weight jointly. In the longer term, such a limited
role of the EU in the East Asian security structure is not only problematic considering the
high stakes of Europe in the region, but it also contradicts Europe’s own ambition and stated
goal of being a player, and not only a payer.
4.2 Europe’s Potential: The EU as an Active Broker of Multilateralism?
When discussing the European Union’s (potential) role with regard to facilitating
multilateralism in East Asia, one has to consider the limits of Europe’s influence in the
region. That is, one has to acknowledge a discrepancy between Brussels economic and
security involvement. Certainly, awareness of the strategic interconnectedness of the two
regions clearly is growing on both sides - witness the ASEM process and the FTA or the
contribution of European countries such as Germany in transferring knowledge with regard
to its own experiences with unification and the role of multilateralism. In fact, Europe
already does contribute, modestly but significantly, to peace, stability and prosperity in East
Asia, but it could and should do more still. This is not to suggest that Europe could play a
strategic role in East Asia, comparable to that of the US. Even if Europe would live up to its
own expectations of being a vital political player in the region, the EU will in no way be a
militarily relevant player. Yet, given that Europe’s stakes are more substantial than is presently
recognized in Europe itself, the EU has not yet fully exploited its potential. It is argued here
that the EU would be well advised to take up the role of an ‘active broker of multilateralism’.
European influence could be useful in providing additional resources to any material efforts,
and in its ability to moderate, precisely because of its position as an outsider without much
strategic power or specific strategic interests, tendencies among the key players in the region
to pursue biased and risky policies. Europe cannot and should not define the rules for East
Asia’s regional order. But it could contribute both to the establishment of the relevant and
necessary multilateral structures and to upholding them once they are in place. Such a role
of an active broker wouldn’t be (primarily) based on a direct influence power position within
the institutions themselves – the European Union could have a subsidiary role in any “+N”
approach towards regional peace and stability. Rather, the EU should actively promote and
even be of help to establish and maintain vital multilateral processes in East Asia. This role
as an active broker of multilateralism could contain a variety of tasks:
• As much as Germany shares its experiences with unification with the ROK, Europe
could similarly share its own experiences with multilateralism in Europe more
forcefully. However, to be reliable as an active broker of multilateralism and in order
to share Europe’s experiences with multilateralism in a substantial way would also
require an open discussion of the EU’s failures, not only its successes. The fact that
the OSCE has recently been more active in sharing its experience with South Korea
and Japan is an encouraging signal in this context.
• In line with the first point, the EU could actively engage in persuading the involved
powers in the region of the merits of stable multilateral channels to address regional
issues in East Asia . While Europe may be predestined to take a more proactive role
in the context of the Korean question, to gain influence beyond the Korean peninsula
(i.e. in Washington and Beijing) on regional issues in East Asia would require a much
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greater political investment in its relations with the region – which would in turn
require a greater willingness to better coordinate the EU’s foreign policy towards the
region.
• The EU should use of its historically grown ‘special role’ (particularly with regard
to the Korean peninsula) more forcefully. However, current political developmental
rather point to a retreat from the region and its challenges than to a more proactive
engagement in the region.
5. Conclusions
Building on a short theoretical debate on the multifaceted phenomenon that is
multilateralism, the paper discussed the lessons and limits of European experiences with
multilateralism for facilitating the complex process of Korean unification. It was furthermore
discussed if and what role the European Union may play in facilitating Korean unification.
The main argument of the paper is that despite the highly instrumental (as opposed to
normative) nature of the Northeast Asian states’ perspective on multilateralism, there is
reason to believe that multilateralism will nonetheless be crucial before, during and after
Korean unification. Not only is any solution of the Korean question naturally linked to the
interests and influences of the regional powers, but a number of related issues – such as the
nuclear question, the question of (reduction of) conventional military forces, the economic
framework of and for unification, and the question of (non-)alignment – are of immediate
regional and international concern and are best addressed multilaterally. Yet, to argue for
the relevancy of multilateralism in the context of Korean unification is not to dispute the
ongoing influence of bilateralism as the primary ordering principle in Northeast Asia and
most likely in the process of Korean unification. Rather, it is assumed that multilateralism
will be a crucial additional ordering principle for the complex unification process. Any long-
lasting multilateral structure in which the Korean question may be embedded in requires a
sound bilateral substructure among the states involved. To put the same thing differently: any
qualitative Northeast Asian multilateralism in the sense of Ruggie requires a normalization
of bilateral relations first. Without bilateral normalization, multilateralism will remain
highly strategic and instrumental and therefore reaffirm the primacy of bilateralism as the
most important ordering principle in Northeast Asia. Against this background it comes
as no surprise that the role of the European Union on the Korean peninsula has thus far
been rather limited. Europe, it was argued, has thus far neither lived up to its potential nor
its own aspiration of being a player, not only a payer. Yet, with the stakes being high for
Europe as well, it was proposed that the EU may well play the role of an ‘active broker’ of
multilateralism on the Korean peninsula.
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Korean Peninsula: The Relevance of Europe”, 18-19 June 2001, Seoul
• Maull, Hanns W. and Sebastian Harnsich (2002): ‘Embedding Korea’s Unification
Multilaterally’, in: Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 29-62
- 118 -
• Ruggie, John G. (1993), ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, in: John G. Ruggie
(ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York:
Columbia University Press, pp. 3–47
• Seol, Gyoosang (2008), ‘Tongbuga anbo tajajuŭiwa insikkongdongch’eŭi yŏkhal’ [Northeast
Asian security multilateralism and the role of epistemic communities], in: Tongsŏyŏn’gu
[East-West studies], 20 (1), pp. 5–31
• Weiss, Tomás, and Vera Rihackova (2010), ‘Promoting Multilateralism? Conceptualizing
Multilateralism in the Czech Foreign Policy’, in: Perspectives, 18 (1), pp. 5–22
- 119 -
SESSION II
IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
CONNECTIVITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Energy and infrastructure security is an important element of bilateral and regional
economic security. It is a strategic factor in ensuring the economic development and stability
of states. Northeast Asia is a region with abundant natural resources such as oil, gas, coal
and renewable energy. Parallel to this, Northeast Asia contains some of the highest energy
consuming countries. Energy efficiency for all countries in the region may be achieved
through enhanced energy cooperation and policy consistency among regional actors. This
session will focus on the energy connectivity in the region to improve the domestic energy
security and reliability, which are part of the basis for economic development.
Moderator:
Mr. SUGAR Bayanjargal, Head of Investment and Production Division, Policy and
Planning Department, Ministry of Energy, Mongolia
Speakers:
Implications of Energy and infrastructure in Northeast Asia
Dr. YANFEI Li, Energy Economist, Economic research institute for ASEAN and
East Asia (ERIA)
Mitigation of Climate Change: The Breakthrough to Come from Northeast Asia
Dr. ENKHBAYAR Shagdar, Senior Research Fellow, Economic Research Institute
for Northeast Asia (ERINA)
Initiatives and future perspectives of Northeast Asian energy interconnection
Mr. YEREN-ULZII Batmunkh, Senior Officer, Policy Planning Department,
Mongolia
The New Energy Partnership Scenario of the NEA – From the Japanese Perspective
Prof. Yu SHIBUTANI, Chief Researcher, Waseda University, Japan
Northeast Asian Transport Union and Energy Club in the Eurasian Space
Mr. PUREVBAATAR Luvsandagva, President, Railway Engineering Association
of Mongolia
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IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY AND

INFRASTRUCTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Dr. YANFEI Li
Energy Economist, Economic research institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Overview of Energy Supply in Northeast Asia:
Overview of Energy Supply in Northeast Asia

TPES per capita (toe)
6
0
2000 2005 2010 2014
China Japan North Korea South Korea Mongolia Russia
Source: IEA World Energy Balances 2016 Source: IEA World Energy Balances 2016
Overview of Energy Mix in Northeast Asia

Japan South Korea North Korea
China Russia Mongolia
Source: IEA World Energy Balances 2016

- 121 -
Energy Resources in Northeast Asia
Asia Super Grid and the Reality
Existing
Source: ECS et al.
Constructing (2014), Newcom
/ Planned
Group, and ERIA
Proposed
- 122 -
The Costs of Long Distance and Cross-border Transmission
Source: Gobitec and Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia (2014); Li and Chang (2015)
Market Reform, Openness, and Trust
Source: Gobitec and Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia (2014)
- 123 -
Coordination of Policies
Source: Gobitec and Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia (2014)
Infrastructure Investment and Financing
Source: Chang, Kimura and Li (2016)
- 124 -
Conclusions
• Abundant resources with complementarity between countries, such
as Mongolian NRE and Russian thermal and hydro
• China’s participation is critical, since the most economic routes
mainly go through its Northeast and Northern provinces
• The required amount of investment both in NRE generation
capacity and cross-border high-capacity transmission lines is
enormous
• The potential risks involved in the investment of such energy
infrastructure are also perceived as high under current
circumstances
– Political risk
– Legal and regulatory risk
– Market risk
• Market reform and liberalization of domestic power sector would
help promote the development of trade of electricity in the region
• Strong regional cooperation and coordination, political stability and
trust, as well as mutual commitment at high levels are prerequisites
- 125 -
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE BREAKTHROUGH TO COME

FROM NORTHEAST ASIA
Dr. ENKHBAYAR Shagdar

Senior Research Fellow, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA)
Outline
• Introduction: Studies in NEA on low-carbon energy cooperation
• NEA Regional Energy Cooperation Options: “Duty” vs “Clean”
• Electricity Interconnections in NEA
• Conclusions
Today I’d like to introduce 2 recent studies into the low carbon energy cooperation in the
region. These are:
 Mitigation of Climate Change: The Breakthrough to Come from Northeast
Asia
Authored by:
Dr. G. Safonov, Director of the Center for Environmental and Natural Resources Economics,
National Research University at the Higher School of Economics of Russia, and who was an
Invited Overseas Researcher at ERINA last year and me (Sh. Enkhbayar, Senior Research
Fellow, ERINA)
The other study is:
 Asia International Grid Connection Study Group, Interim Report, carried out
by the Asia International Grid Connection Study Group
Both studies are available online and those interested can download them. The addresses are
shown on the slide.
The 2nd study was carried out by the Asia International Grid Connection Study Group, which
is Chaired by Prof. Oyama of Yokohama National University and the other members are
listed on this slide.
The Key Messages of the Study titled: Mitigation of Climate Change: The Breakthrough
to Come from Northeast Asia are as follows:
Utilizing the resources, know-how, and investments available in the region, NEA
region is very well-positioned:
 to take the deep decarbonization pathway; and
 support and enhance each other’s efforts to develop a carbon-neutral economy;
 gradually upgrade the industrial technological basis, infrastructure, and the
energy and transportation systems;
Asia International Grid Connection Study Group, Interim Report underlines

that:
 The greatest distinguishing feature of NEA is the fact that multiple large-scale
demand zones, centers of economic activity, adjoin each other;
- 126 -
 It would be worthwhile to consider energy systems interconnection in NEA, whereas

Mongolia’s vast potentials of renewables deserves a particular attention;
Projections of Economic Development up to 2050
In the last 25 years the Northeast Asian countries have changed dramatically, speeding
up their economic growth and strengthening their positions in the globalizing world. While
world GDP (in terms of PPP128) increased 2.2 times during the period 1990–2015, the GDP
of Northeast Asian countries has tripled. The overall share of the regional economy within
global GDP increased from 18% in 1990 to approximately 25% in 2015.
The forecasts for socioeconomic development are usually limited to 10–20 years,
and therefore it is very difficult to get appropriate data for longer term horizons, such as to
2050. However, based on fairly reasonable assumptions, we can get an understanding of the
macro-level picture of the envisaged changes in the regional economies.
First of all, UN forecasts illustrate an approximate 2% rise in the total population of
Northeast Asian countries by 2030 with a subsequent decline to 3% below the current level
by 2050. China, Russia, and Japan are expected to have somewhat lower populations, while
in the DRPK and Mongolia the population will increase and in the ROK it will stay relatively
stable.
At the same time, the economic growth in leading Northeast Asian countries is expected
to be rather high. During 2014–2050, the GDP by PPP may rise 3.5 times in China, 1.7 times
in Japan, 2.1 times in Russia, and 2.3 times in the ROK (PwC, 2015). This corresponds to an
approximate 3% annual average rate of GDP growth for these countries.
The standard of living of the population is also expected to rise: by 2050, GDP by
PPP per capita may rise 3.4 times in China, 1.9 times in Japan, 2.2 times in Russia and 2.5
times in the ROK. In a scenario by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2015) the ROK will
overtake Japan in GDP PPP per capita from 2030 onwards, while Russia will be able to
reach practically the current level of GDP PPP per capita of Japan in 2030 and continue an
approximate 2-fold rise by 2050.
Summary of Selected Development Indicators in NEA Economies up to 2050
For our purposes, the most important policy targets are related to energy, freight
and passenger transportation, industries (cement, metals, and some others), residential and
commercial buildings, agriculture and forestry, and environmental management (waste
treatment, and methane emission regulation, etc.). This Table provides a summary of
selected indicators up to 2050 (as projected by the national modeling teams under the Deep
Decarbonization Pathway Pproject), which we consider useful for further analysis of the
low-carbon development strategies and policy options.
Reserves of Conventional and Non-conventional Fuels in the North East Asian Countries
The known reserves of conventional and non-conventional fossil fuels in the Northeast
Asian countries, including coal, natural gas, crude oil, shale oil and gas, and methane
hydrates, are enormous: over 1.7 trillion tonnes of oil equivalent.
Even if we do not have economically viable technologies for the extraction and use
of all these resources currently, scientific and technological progress may help in utilizing
them within the coming 1–2 decades. We can already see it in shale oil and gas extraction
(the so called “shale revolution” in the United States, increased shale gas production from
128 PPP stands for purchasing power parity.

- 127 -
2.1 billion cubic feet (bcf)/day in 2000 to 44.1 bcf/day in 2016, accounting for about 40%
of current total gas production129), and the continuation of efforts to use methane hydrates in
Japan (with the first successful project implemented in 2014 and plans to commercialize this
energy source by 2023).130
The current economic development strategies and programs in the Northeast Asian
region overwhelmingly include plans for expanding traditional energy systems, based on
fossil fuel extraction, transportation, and consumption. There are numerous examples of
such activities that will enhance the use of coal and gas in the region, and eventually lead
to sustaining higher levels of carbon emissions, and the “carbon lock-in” situation, where
the new capital investments in fossil-fuel-fired power plants and delivery infrastructure
will reduce the willingness to switch to no-carbon technologies for the 40–50 years of their
lifetime.
Technically Available Potential of Renewable Energy Sources in Northeast Asian
Countries
Examining the data on renewable energy sources, they showed enormous potential
in all the Northeast Asian countries. This Table provides an overview of the technically
available potential in wind, solar PV, hydropower, geothermal, tidal energy sources and
biomass. These renewable sources have outstanding potential: the capacities of onshore and
offshore wind energy generation can reach over 6,300 GW; solar PV, over 10,000 GW;
hydropower and biomass, over 850 GW each; tidal, over 168 GW; and geothermal, over 34
GW. These data may look very extreme, as the overall technical potential of over 18,000
GW is 12 times more than the total installed capacity in the world’s largest energy system,
China, with 1,505 GW as of 2014 (CIA, 2016), and 72 times more than in Russia (255 GW
currently).
Not all technical potential can be utilized at a reasonable cost. However, there are
several reasons to consider these no-carbon energy options seriously.
1) Costs. Unlike the scientific arguments about the need for climate friendly
development, the costs are a strong incentive to take practical steps in choosing
specific technology options. In the last three decades the cost of renewables has been
falling dramatically.
 If the carbon pricing mechanisms came into force on a global scale,131
and the carbon price reached a sufficiently high level (over €30/tCO2 or
thereabouts), then the comparative advantage of carbon-free energy would
be boosted and the fossil fuel-based technologies would face an unavoidable
“shrinking effect”.
 On a macro level, the investment costs of the deep decarbonization of the
129 Source: the US Energy Information Administration database.

130 Japan's Methane Hydrate R&D Program was established in 2001, under which the industry–government–
academia consortium MH21 undertakes extensive scientific research. The first practical results were
reported in the “Japan Times”, 25 December 2014.
131 A Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition was officially launched at COP21 in 2015, with support from
74 countries and more than 1,000 companies. More than 380 investors representing over US$24 trillion
have urged governments to “provide stable, reliable and economically meaningful carbon pricing that
helps redirect investment commensurate with the scale of the climate change challenge.” (UNGC-UNEP-
UNFCCC-WRI, 2015).
- 128 -
world economy, aiming at “well below the 2°C target” and a reduction of
GHG emissions by 50% by 2050 in 16 leading economies, were estimated
to be as much as 0.8–1.3% of GDP (SDSN–IDDRI, 2015). To some extent,
these capital investment costs can be considered as incremental to GDP
growth in these countries, and not just the “costs of decarbonization”. Also
they relate not only to the energy sector, but to transport, infrastructure,
construction, agriculture, forestry, metallurgy, cement production and other
industries. These “costs” can be considered as a fairly affordable price for
avoiding the damage from climate change impacts, estimated at 5–20% of
global GDP per annum in the “no mitigation” scenario (Stern, 2006).
2) Investment and financing. Since 2013, the installation of new renewable energy
capacity has exceeded that of fossil fuel capacity. The widely declared global
initiative for elimination of fossil fuel subsidies will likely affect both fossil fuels and
nuclear power subsidies, which are estimated to be as much as US$550 billion–5.6
trillion per year, depending on how they are defined and calculated. In the case of
“switching” just 10–20% of these subsidies from say coal to renewables, the latter
would experience an even greater booster effect, similar to the introduction of a high
carbon price.
The climate concerns and risks of strengthening carbon regulation have also been
reflected in the investment strategies of some key global players. All international financing
organizations, such as the World Bank, the IFC, the EBRD, and the ADB, have banned the
financing of new coal projects worldwide. The dynamics of this process are very impressive:
in just one year decarbonized investments increased 50-fold.
Even private investors consider “clean” assets more attractive. The new instruments
of financing for clean energy have been expanding, including green bonds, crowdfunding
for small companies and start-ups, self-labelled corporate bonds, and clean energy project
bonds, etc.
So far, I’ve introduced the key elements of the 1st study.
Now, let me move to the 2nd study: Asia International Grid Connection Study Group,
Interim Report
Structures of electricity industries and markets in Northeast Asian countries (2016)
Transmission lines crossing international borders have been in use in Europe and
North America for a long time. In recent years, the roles and value of grids have been
increasing due to factors such as expansion in markets for electricity, use of power systems
across wider areas, and, during recent times in particular, large-scale integration of variable
renewable energy sources into the power systems.
Current structures of electricity industries and markets in Northeast Asian countries
(2016) are illustrated in this Table. While still lagging behind Europe in electricity market
liberalization, all the countries in NEA region but Japan have already set up independent
transmission companies, and these transmitting companies also are demonstrating proactive
approaches to interconnection. In part because those companies are owned and run by state,
some arrangements could be made between different regulations and systems once any
agreement is formed among national governments.
- 129 -
Difference in retail electricity prices for households in Northeast Asia

Electricity prices for households in Northeast Asian countries and areas as of 2015
are illustrated in this Table. Japan’s price is the highest at 23 cents/kWh. Prices in Mongolia,
some areas of China, and the Russian Far East are a third of Japan’s price or less.
It should be noted that prices are different not only among countries but also among
areas to be interconnected within a country.
Comparison of winter peak hours in each country
Also, there are distinctive differences between the patterns of electricity supply-
demand in Northeast Asian countries. While the electricity demand in Japan, China, and
South Korea peaks twice a year, in summer and winter, the peak in Mongolia and Russia
(Siberia and the Far East) is only in winter.
Peak hours are also different in each country (compared based on Japan time). Winter
peak hours are in the morning in South Korea, and early evening or later in Japan, Mongolia,
and Russia. In addition, because of time difference, there is a time lag of an hour or two
in these peak hours in early evening or later. If there were an international power grid
connecting Northeast Asian countries, electricity could be mutually traded from areas with
enough generation capacity to areas with short supply, considering such regional differences
in supply-demand patterns.
Map of existing interconnections in Northeast Asia
As of 2017, bilateral interconnections in Northeast Asia had been achieved between
Russia and China, Mongolia and Russia, and Mongolia and China, as shown in this map.
But their operation scales are limited, and they have not been developed enough to be called
international power grids.
Summary of current status and issues of interconnection in Northeast Asia
There are some issues were identified in the existing interconnection in Northeast Asia
as illustrated in this Table.
First, while some countries gain certain benefits by utilizing power sources of a
neighboring country for the peak demand, the main use of the interconnection is one-way
export, and there is no mutual trading, considering differences in supply-demand patterns.
Second, because the trading is based on a long-term contract between the two
countries on a negotiation basis, the prices are decided according to the relative strength
of the countries. Therefore, generation costs and actual supply-demand conditions are not
necessarily reflected in price setting and trading.
Third, although hydropower plants are utilized in Russia’s export of electricity to
China, its main purpose is not necessarily cross-regional utilization of renewable energy
at the moment. Therefore, if we make the most of differences in supply-demand patterns
and generation costs depending on power supply structures, greater benefits can be gained
by interconnection in the Northeast Asia region. To make this come true, it is necessary to
utilize low-cost renewable energy preferentially and develop a trading system to flexibly
adjust prices based on actual supply and demand
Examples of international power grid schemes in Asia
Since the 2000s, research institutions in some countries have released their visions for
interconnection in Northeast Asia, such as:
 North East Asian Electrical System Ties, announced in 2002 by the Korea
- 130 -
Electrotechnology Research Institute and ESI in Russia;

 GOBITECH Initiative, proposed in 2009 by the Seoul Office of Hanns Seidel
Foundation;
 After the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident in 2011, the Renewable Energy
Institute has proposed Asia Super Grid concept, which is based on renewable energy;
 In addition, Japan Policy Council, the private council, proposed “Asia Pacific Power
Grid” scheme aimed to overcome the issues of renewable energy as unstable power
sources by interconnection and establish the Asia partnership in energy coordination.
Conclusions
 The traditional way of combusting the huge fossil fuels reserves available in the
NEA region would lead to overwhelming amounts of greenhouse gases.
 Thus, the countries should deeply decarbonize their economies, energy systems,
industries, transport, buildings, products and services, while continuing growth of
GDP and improving the standard of living of the population.
 Plentiful sources of renewable energy in combination with advanced technologies,
investments, and land infrastructure developments can transform the NEA countries
into decarbonized, climate- and environment-friendly economies with sustainable
growth and development;
 It would be worthwhile to consider energy systems interconnection in NEA, whereas
various potential options exist for supplying green energy to these connected energy
grids;
 Therefore, NEA countries need to enhance cooperative activities to realize various
ideas and prospective projects already in the pipeline;
Thank you for your attention!
- 131 -
INITIATIVES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES OF NORTHEAST ASIAN

ENERGY INTERCONNECTION
Mr. YEREN-ULZII Batmunkh

Senior Officer, Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Energy, Mongolia
REGIONAL ENERGY COOPERATION POSSIBILITIES

ENERGY DEMAND OUTLOOK IN NORTH EAST ASIA
Unit: Mtoe
Ази,
Source:номхон далайн
ADB 2013 COAL
бүсийн орнуудын хүрээнд OIL нэгдсэн
эрчим хүчний NATURAL GAS
систем ELECTRICITY
байгуулах санаачлагууд
Currently, NEAsian region use

1/5 and countries use 1/4 of 406
RUSSIA 506
world energy supply 257

310
126 159
69 103
2015 2030
9
3 3 2
1 0 1 0
2015 2035
MONGOLIA
2240
66 45
CHINA
1708
2010
DPRKOREA
787 754 94 93
67 76 185
552 43 40 39 49
500 152
400 129 129
111 101 86 92
164
2015 KOREA 2035
3
2015 2035
2015 JAPAN 2035
NEA POWER INTERCONNECTION
- 132 -
ELECTRICITY TRADE IN NEA
Electricty Export and Import in NEA
Unit: mil. kWh

Source: UN Comtrade
World Export NEA Export NEA/World(%)
713,069 4,749 0.7
Korea Russia China Mongolia Japan Sum
Korea -
Russia 3,299 284 3,584
China 1,115 1,115
Mongolia 51 51
Japan 6-
NEA ENERGY COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT
Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Intergovernmental mechanisms
Intergovernmental Collaborative Mechanism on Energy Cooperation in

North-East Asia (ECNEA):
• established by DPRK, Mongolia, ROK and Russia in 2005 and operated by
KEEI and ESCAP
• Facilitated dialogue under Senior Officials Committee (SOC), Working Group
on Energy Planning and Policy (WG-EPP), Working Group on Coal (WGC)
and Government– Business Dialogue, and produced reports on Energy
Policy and Statistics in North-East Asia
• In 2015, Decided to change its status from intergovernmental to interagency
mechanism. The mechanism is named as NEA Energy Forum today
Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI - China, Mongolia, ROK and Russia)

Energy Board: Created in 2007 to serve as an advisory board to GTI
governments as well as an institutional tool to facilitate energy cooperation in
NEA. Approved research proposals during the last 4 Board Meetings, but has
not made significant progress yet.
7
- 133 -
NEW INITIATIVES
– Gobi Tec and Asia Super Grid Initiative (Renewable Energy Institute,
previously, Japan Renewable Energy Foundation)
8
Resource: “GOBITEC AND ASIAN SUPER GRID FOR RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA” Report 2014
- 134 -
NEW INITIATIVES
Resource: “GOBITEC AND ASIAN SUPER GRID FOR

Recourse Based Power Trade RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA” Report 2014
Renewable based
• Rich Solar and Wind Rich Resources in Gobi Area
/Southern part of Mongolia and Northern part of China/
• Green and Sustainable Energy
– Gobi Tec and Asia Super Grid Initiative
10
NEW INITIATIVES
NEA Super Energy Ring Initiative Think Tank - Skolkovo Institute of Technology
September 2016: the proposal for “East

Asia Super Energy Ring” and an
Intergovernmental Working Group by
the Russian President Putin during the
Eastern Economic Forum
- 135 -
NEW INITIATIVES
Global Energy Interconnection Innitiative Think Tank – Global Energy Interconnection

Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO).
12
NEA ENERGY COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT
Recent major progress for Power interconnections
March 2016 : a MOU by Global Energy Interconnection Development and

Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO), Korea Electric Power Corporation,
ROSSETI of Russia and SoftBank Group of Japan
•June 2016: a programme for tripartite economic corridor for China, Russia
and Mongolia
•September 2016: the proposal for “East Asia Super Energy Ring” and an
Intergovernmental Working Group by the Russian President Putin during the
Eastern Economic Forum
•October 2016: Northeast Asia Regional Power Interconnection Mechanism

(RPIC) by the China State Grid Corporation and China Electricity Council
October 2016: North East Asia Fist Energy forum, hosted by Korea energy
economic institute. Former Intergovernmental Collaborative Mechanism on
13
Energy Cooperation in North-East Asia (ECNEA):
- 136 -
THE NEW ENERGY PARTNERSHIP SCENARIO OF THE NEA – FROM THE

JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE
Prof. Yu SHIBUTANI
Chief Researcher, Waseda University, Japan
1. Introduction
The Six Economies of China, ROK(Republic of Korea), DPRK(Democratic Republic
of Korea), Japan, Mongolia and Russia in the North East Asia(NEA) looms further energy
reliance on the outside oil and natural gas imported in particular from the unstable Middle
East, and they are currently growing sensitive to energy security risks .
The new energy partnership scenario advocates to mitigate energy security risks by
use of energy connectivity in Eurasia Asia extending to Japan, green innovation technologies
transfer, and the new shale oil and gas as an alternative source.
The proposed vision of “North East Asia Energy Community (NEAEC)” will present
the policy mix scenario of the matrix of the functional (“private sector”) and the institutional
framework (“public sector”).
Making our efforts to architect the NEAEC would avoid tendrils and tentacles of
geopolitical concerns that wrap around the NEA, and subsequently provide opportunities to
build on common energy interests.
2. The Current Energy Landscape in the NEA

2.1 Growing energy market imbalances
The dramatic changes of overall energy market structure in the North East Asia (NEA)
have been undergoing. The three economies of China, Japan and ROK are net-importers
of oil, natural gas, and coal. They constantly attempt to increase their self-sufficiency and
diversify import sources, so as to reduce dependence on from the unstable Persian Gulf.
The total primary energy supply/demand balance for the overall NEA accounts for
16% deficit (net-import ) in 2015, according to the IEA statistics, due to the remarkable
increasing of China’s coal import, by seventy percent more against the previous year of 2014
(table 1).
China has phased-in stage of the normal growth economy in such moderate manner.
Mongolia emerges with plenty of natural resources potential, despite the current financial
difficulties. DPRK take risks of self-sufficient economy and isolationism in such poor oil
and natural gas resources. Both ROK and Japan are OECD members in such low growth
economy. Five economies have shared with the “Achilles’ Heel” vulnerabilities in terms of
energy security risks.
On the other side, Russia as the largest energy exporter, actively advances “East Pivot
Strategy” and enhances the resource development program in East Siberia and offshore
Sakhalin Island, and makes access to the Asia Pacific market. An increasing Russian
hydrocarbon export to China, ROK, Japan and other Asia Pacific economies would mitigate
heavy reliance on the European market.
The historical Russo-Sino energy agreement in 2014 convinces Russia to be more
orienting and also integrating with the Pacific-Asian market, and its plenty supply of gas will
contribute to reduce net-import position (deficit) of energy trade of the inter-NEA.
- 137 -
　　　Table 1: Primary Energy Balances of Six Economies of the NEA in 2015

（Unit：Million oil ton）
Oil Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Renewable Total
China Production 215 124 1,827 39 255 63 2,523
Consumption 560 178 1,920 39 255 63 3,015
Net Import 345 54 93 0 0 0 492
ROK Production 1 37 1 2 41
Consumption 114 39 85 37 1 2 278
Net Import 114 39 84 0 0 0 237
DPRK Production 18 1 19
Consumption 1 9 1 11
Net Import 1 0 -9 0 0 0 -8
Mongolia Production 17 17
Consumption 1 2 3
Net Import 1 0 -15 0 0 0 -14
Japan Production 1 1 22 15 39
Consumption 190 102 119 1 22 15 449
Net Import 190 102 118 0 0 0 410
Russia Production 541 516 185 44 39 0 1,325
Consumption 143 352 89 44 39 0 667
Net Import -398 -164 -96 0 0 0 -658
Production 756 640 2,049 121 318 80 3,964
Total Consumption 1,455 810 4,059 121 318 80 6,843
Net Import 699 170 2,010 0 0 0 2,879
Sources: BP Statistical Review 2015、IEA Energy Balances and Author
Note: 　－（Minus)　＝Net Export
2.2 Energy infrastructure and connectivity network

In 2015, China has started construction of its section of the eastern gas pipeline route
known as the “Power of Siberia” that will deliver up to 38 billion cubic meters of Russian
gas annually. China will double its imports of Russian ESPO (The Eastern Siberia–Pacific
Ocean oil pipeline) crude to 30 million ton annually, according to the media reports.
The new project of “the Asia Super Grid” combined with solar and wind power was
launched at Gobi desert in Mongolia, seeking for the smart network across the NEA even
extending to Japan.
At the center of Eurasia, the three heads of state agreed to bring together building of
the China’s “the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R)”, the renovation of Russia’s “Eurasia Land
Bridge” and the proposed development of Mongolia’s “Steppe Road”. In July 2015, the three
leaders agreed in principle of the “China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor”.
Bilateral negotiations of between Russia/DPRK and Russia/ROK over the trans-
Korean Peninsula gas pipeline project are said to be undertaken of the pre-feasibility study,
respectively.
The Russo-Japanese natural gas pipeline and electricity grid plan have been proposed,
despite the dead lock of boundary negotiation between Moscow and Tokyo over the northern
islands.
China’s “the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R)” take risks of the non-traditional
approach to energy security issues in the NEA, in terms of energy availability, affordability
and sustainability, according to Dr. Zha Daojiong, Professor, Peking University.i
2.3 Green innovation and clean technology transfer
In post-Kyoto protocol negotiation on the climate change, clean innovation technology
includes CCS (carbon capture storage), gas combined cycle generation, hybrid and electric
vehicles, safer nuclear reactor, and low-carbon technologies will soon prevail in the NEA,
- 138 -
where Japan,” as a top runner” is accumulating a lot of successful achievements. Notably

since 1990 China has contributed and resulted in an impressive increase of six percentage
points in its average efficiency of coal fire plant.
2.4 Japan’s dilemma in Post-Fukushima days
Due to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident in March 2011, all of
Japans nuclear reactors has ceased to load, and nuclear energy consumption dramatically
decreased to virtually zero level. Before the Fukushima Daiichi accident, nuclear energy
accounts for 29% of total electricity generation mix.
Soon after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japanese government ordered to halt all
nuclear generation operation, and the almost total loss of nuclear energy was met with fossil
fuels, including LNG, coal and oil, of which total share of 88% are imported in 2014.
In April 2014, the government, under the safer nuclear stations management in some
of which it admits to re-start, has officially set forth the energy mix scenario for 2030, to
lessen dependence on nuclear energy between 20 and 22 percent (electricity output), while
renewable increases to between 22 and 24 percent (compared with 11% in 2010).
The Strategic Energy Plan (SEP) was approved by the Cabinet in April 2014, and
METI enacted the long-term energy supply and demand outlook.
The point of the energy policy is to first and foremost ensure stable supply (“Energy
Security”), and realize low-cost energy supply by enhancing its efficiency (“Economic
Efficiency“) on the premise of “Safety.” It is also important to make maximum efforts to
pursue environment suitability (“Environment”). The plan stipulates nuclear energy as a key
base-load power source contributing to all premised on safety assurance. On 8 November
2016, Japan ratified the “2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement” to cut emissions and prevent
climate change. PM Abe puts a priority in making maximum efforts to pursue nuclear and
renewable energy policies, to slash greenhouse gas emissions by 26 percent by 2030 from
2013 levels.ii
2.5 The new shale oil and gas as an alternative option
As the result of shale revolution, the United States became the world’s biggest oil
producer and North America becomes a net exporter of crude oil. The paradigm shift in
the geography of oil trade from the Atlantic to the Pacific begins soon after 2016, when the
United States oil export ban lifted. The East Siberia Oil Pipeline (ESPO) crude produced in
Russian East Siberia marks a key indicator in the Asia Pacific crude market.
The United States would also allow U.S. companies to ship liquefied natural gas
(LNG) to China as part of the bilateral agreement reached following President Donald
Trump’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April, 2017.
LNG export from North America plays a major role not only in buttressing supply,
but also in its increasing flexibility of free of the destination clauses. The development of
Russia’s first LNG plant at Sakhalin (production started in 2009) has already allowed some
diversification of Russia’s gas supply.
Both Japan and ROK, as a gas hub, may well reduce its gas imports, depending on the
pace at which Japan’s nuclear reactors re-start over the period to 2020 and beyond.
Mr. Donald Trump, the new president of the United States has committed to export
shale gas and oil to the Asian-Pacific market, in which message Mr. Trump calls for open
access to the NEA.
Moreover, the pace of China’s unconventional gas growth is a major uncertainty
- 139 -
facing global gas markets, aspects of the geology, and the structure of the gas sector, despite
the largest resource potential.
2.6 Arctic resources development and sea traffic
The Russia LNG tanker from Norway arrived in Japan on December in 2012, and
it was the first shipment of LNG produced in the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific market via
northern sea route.
The gigantic Russia’s Yamal LNG in the Arctic, expected to debut later 2017, plans to
start deliveries under long-term contracts in 2018, according to the media report.
The success literacy of “Arctic LNG to Asia Pacific” suggests that;
a. Opens worldwide options for supply diversification and reduces shipping days and
fuel cost
b. Reduces choke-points risks (Straits of Hormuz, Suez, Panama, Malacca)
c. Develops Asian gas hubs in Japan/ROK/China
3. The New Vision of Energy Community in the NEA
3.1 The “public sector” and “private sector” initiatives
3.1.1 The proposed vision of “North East Asia Energy Community (NEAEC)” will
formulate the policy mix of the conceptual matrix of the project oriented function (“private
sector”) and the institutional (“public sector”) framework (table 2).
Table 2: Sectoral Collaboration Matrix of the NEA (Concept)
Multilateral Cooperation Bilateral Cooperation
Private Sector
"Asia Super Grid" Clean Coal Technology
PM 2.5 Energy Investment/Finance
Joint Initiative/CDM Cogeneration and ESCO
High North Development Smart Community
Oil/LNG Hub
Public Sector
Marine Traffic and Safety Energy Infrastructure Connectivity
Joint Oil Stockpiling/Sharing Joint Hydrocarbon Development
"Paris Accord" on Climate Change Safer Nuclear Power Generation
(Source) EGLJ
3.1.2 The private sector initiatives seem more proper that plays a bigger role in efficient
way in such fields in the bilateral approach;
a. clean coal technology by use of CGS (carbon capture storage) to reduce CO2
emission
c. project finance scheme(BOT/BOO) , that is a key to energy infrastructure
d. advanced technology of coal and gas fired electric power generation
e. efficient cogeneration and energy service companies (ESCO).
f. LEV (low emission vehicle) and renewables for goal of the smart community.
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3.1.3 In a multilateral approach, the private sector lines-up;

a. modelling the inter-connector of “Asia Super Grid” and “Energy Bridges ”
b. enhancing “Asian blue sky program” to combat with PM 2.5
c. Clean Development Mechanism project in Mongolia
d. developing the Arctic Sea for energy resource and traffic route
e. Proposed trading hub of LNG and oil in the NEA
3.1.4 The public sector activities initiated by the government engagement, mainly with the
massive “hardware infrastructure”, would include;
a. energy connectivity and interconnectors of grid and pipelines, as elaborated
earlier
b. joint development area in East China Sea and offshore Sakhalin
c. safer nuclear power generation in post-Fukushima days
d. marine safety and protection to combat oil spill in the East China Sea, Yellow
Sea, Sea of Japan (East Sea) and Sea of Okhotsk.
e. joint oil stockpiling/sharing scheme in emergency time
f. “Paris accord” on climate change concerns after Trump statement
4. Closing Remarks
4.1 Energy Alliance and Club/Dialogue
The Russia-China supplier-customer relation has come along fast, and entered a
strategic embrace of sorts in March 2006, or so called “energy alliance”.
Both Japan and ROK have enacted the International Energy Program of the IEA
(International Energy Agency) within the OECD framework, which endorses oil import
union.
The goal of the NEAEC would not be a copy of “the EU (European Union) Energy
Union” agreed in 2015, in which the EU’s commitment to increase the share of renewables in
the energy consumption and enhancement of EU-Russia energy relations, of which platform
originally derived from the “Energy Charter Treaty” *.
*The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) coming into effect in 1998, has been a multilateral legal
framework that includes such principles as open market for the trade and transit of the energy
resources, products and equipment as well as the promotion and protection of investment in
the energy field. 47 countries and 1 international organization (EU) are the parties to this treaty.
As of June 2015 three countries (including Japan, Mongolia and Russia of NEA) have signed.
China, in turn, in favor of club/dialogue style, seems not to adhere with a binding
accord, rather than the Energy Charter Treaty and the EU Energy Union.
4.2 Looming geopolitical hurdles
The current NEA economies have dilemma over geopolitical or energy security
environmental hurdles, including economic sanctions approved by the United Nations
Security Council against DPRK’s nuclear tests and missile programs, and the economic
sanctions with Russia that were approved by the western countries and organizations.
The joint Japan-China governmental committee attempts to compromise the diplomatic
disputes on the East China Sea gas field development program. And also Japan enters at new
- 141 -
stage of cooperation with Russia to architect the multimillion dollars finance and investment
program in the East Siberia and Sakhalin projects including resources development and grid/
pipeline connectivity, amidst territorial dispute on return of the northern islands.
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump of the United States declared that he was
pulling the U.S. from the landmark Paris climate agreement, shrinking worldwide efforts to
combat global warming.
4.3 Japan’s “Enevolution” initiative
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) launched its
“Enevolution” initiative in May 2015, aiming to achieve diversification of energy sources
and a stable energy supply in Asia by utilizing Japan’s experience in energy policy planning
and advanced technological capabilities.
Japan will export its energy conservation systems and promote the diffusion of energy-
efficiency technologies which in turn, will ease pressure on demand in international energy
markets, as elaborated in the “Japan’s Energy White Paper 2016”.
Further, Japan envisages the blue print of the inter-connector network in Eurasia Asia
of the “Asia Super Grid” and “Energy Bridges”.
The proposed vision of “North East Asia Energy Community (NEAEC)” would be
the strategic software infrastructure, assure disputes deterrence, and accumulate the mutual
confidence.
In conclusion, making efforts to architect the NEAEC would avoid tendrils and
tentacles of geopolitical concerns that wrap around the NEA, and subsequently provide
opportunities to build on common energy interests.
- 142 -
SESSION II
IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Today several multilateral environmental cooperation initiatives are in operation to deal with
threats and challenges including Northeast Asian Sub-regional Programme for Environmental
Cooperation (NEASPEC), Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), and
the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM). However, there is an urgent need
to enhance multilateral environmental security cooperation in order to mitigate, prevent
and manage environmental threats. This session will focus on opportunities to expand
cooperation in emerging areas such as climate change and natural disasters, improve the
coordination of multilateral cooperation through NEASPEC and TEMM.
Moderator:
Dr. OYUN Sanjaasuren, Chair of Global Water Partnership, former Minister of
Environment and Green Development, Mongolia
Speakers:
Ecological Security: Mongolia and the Northeast Asia
Dr. BATJARGAL Zamba, Special envoy on Climate change; former Minister of
Environment, Mongolia
Environmental Disaster and Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia
Dr. CHU Jang Min, Chief research Fellow; Head, Environmental policy research
group, Division of Environmental Strategy, Korea Environment Institute, ROK
Natural Resources and Peace Building
Mr. Henrik SLOTTE, Chief of Disasters and Conflicts Management Branch, UN
Environment (UNEP) based in Geneva
Regional Cooperation on DRR: Engagement of Mongolia
Maj. BAASANSUREN Demberelnyam, Director, Disaster Risk Management
Department, The National Emergency Management Agency of Mongolia
- 143 -
ECOLOGICAL SECURITY: MONGOLIA AND THE NORTHEAST ASIA
Ecological Security: Mongolia and

Dr. BATJARGAL the Northeast Asia
Zamba
PSpecial envoy on Climate change; Ministry of Zamba
Dr. BATJARGAL Environment and Tourism, Mongolia
The themeSpecial
of theenvoy on Climate
sub-session change;
is too Ministry
broad, but I of Environment
would and Tourism,
like to focus here onMongolia
two to three
issues.
The Climate
theme change (CC)
of the sub-session issue:
is too broad,Impact of CC
but I would likeitself andhere
to focus implication of international
on two to three issues.
cooperation regime on CC for Northeast Asia (NEA)
➢ Climate change (CC) issue: Impact of CC itself and implication of international cooperation
 Water
regime as
on aCCtop
forsecurity
Northeastconcern
Asia (NEA)for all countries in NEA
 Trans-boundary and cross-nationscountries
➢ Water as a top security concern for all migrationin NEA
of risks
➢ Trans-boundary and cross-nations migration of risks
 Environmental cooperation and security challenges for NEA
➢ Environmental cooperation and security challenges for NEA
Climate change: Mongolia’s experience
Global scale mean temperature Climate change:
change Mongolia’s
for the year 1880-2012experience
is 0.850C, whereas in Mongolia
it has been warmed by 2.07 C during the last 70 years (1940-2014).
0
The principal message
Global
from thescale meanchange
climate temperature change
studies in for the year 1880-2012
Mongolia as a basisisfor 0.85 0
C, whereas
policy makingin Mongolia
are: it has been
warmed by 2.070C during the last 70 years (1940-2014). The principal message from the climate change
• Present global warming in the long run would lead to the shift of climate zones
studies in Mongolia as a basis for policy making are:
with more dominance of arid and semi-arid areas in Mongolia.
• Present global warming in the long run would lead to the shift of climate zones with more
• Vegetation zones will move to the north and semi desert and steppe zones will
dominance of arid and semi-arid areas in Mongolia.
expand.
• Vegetation zones will move to the north and semi desert and steppe zones will expand.
•
• Aboveground
Aboveground biomassbiomasswill will be diminished
be diminished andquality
and pasture pasture quality
will will be deteriorated.
be deteriorated.
Figure
Figure 1.
1. Climate change
Climate change trend
trend overover Mongolia
Mongolia for thefor the 1940-2015:
period period 1940-2015: a) Annual
a) Annual mean temperature,
degreetemperature,
mean °C, b) Annual precipitation
degree °C, amount, mm
b) Annual precipitation amount, mm
Source: Z.Batjargal, 2016
Source: Z.Batjargal, 2016
According to some estimations , Mongolia will witness: 1) Dry and hot summer, milder but
132
more snowy winter, 2) Evapotranspiration132will be much higher than the projected slight increase in
According to some estimations , Mongolia will witness: 1) Dry and hot summer,
precipitation, and 3) The severity of extremes like drought might be doubled by 2080.
milder but more snowy winter, 2) Evapotranspiration will be much higher than the projected
slight increase in precipitation, and 3) The severity of extremes like drought might be
doubled by 2080.
132
Global Circulation Model projections for the 21st century (AIACC, MARCC)
132 Global Circulation Model projections for the 21st century (AIACC, MARCC)
- 144 -
Ulaanbaatar Dialogueclimate
For Mongolia, on Northeast
relatedAsian Security
natural disaster usually refers to drought and zud133,
which has significant social and economic consequences. When we talk about zud impact,
we refer FortoMongolia,
the number climate related lost
of animals natural disaster
during theusually
event. refers
We had to drought
the mostand zud133, zud
notable which has
event
significant
in the winter social ofand economic
so-called consequences.
Monkey When we talkduring
year, 1944-1945, about zud
whichimpact, we refer of
50 percent to all
the livestock
number of
animals
perishedlostand during
the the
most event. We had
recent zudthe most notable
occurred zud event ininthewhich
in 2009-2010, winter22 of so-called
percent of Monkey year,
livestock
perished. Therefore,
1944-1945, during which Mongolia
50 percentisofranked amongperished
all livestock the topandin terms
the most of recent
climatezudrisk, according
occurred to
in 2009-
Germanwatch
2010, in which 22Global percentClimate riskperished.
of livestock index 2014. Therefore, Mongolia is ranked among the top in terms of
climate When
risk, according
we are to Germanwatch
talking Global Climate
about climate changerisk weindex
have2014.
to consider about what is going
on in the other part of the world. The El Nino
When we are talking about climate change we have to consider and La Nina events, though
about what issome
goingmight
on insay
the
it’s in the pacific, so why would Mongolia have impact from these
other part of the world. The El Nino and La Nina events, though some might say it’s in the pacific, phenomena, do indeedso
havewould
why a bigMongolia
impact on theimpact
have weather fromcondition in Mongolia.
these phenomena, Aforementioned
do indeed have a big impact dzud on events and
the weather
the related
condition in livestock
Mongolia. losses are related
Aforementioned to the
dzud transition
events and the from
relatedEllivestock
Nino tolosses
La Nina. Also Arctic
are related to the
oscillation and Atlantic multi-decadal oscillations have direct linkage
transition from El Nino to La Nina. Also Arctic oscillation and Atlantic multi-decadal oscillations have to the precipitation
trend linkage
direct in Mongolia (long lastingtrend
to the precipitation dry inperiod
Mongolia and (long
drought, frequency
lasting dry period ofand
wildfires).
drought, frequency of
And what ‘s going with the glaciers and permafrost? The glaciers in the western
wildfires).
Mongolia are retreating at a rapid speed. Scientists say that by 2040, we might no longer
And what
have glaciers in ‘swestern
going with the glaciers
Mongolia. and permafrost?
It means that, the The glaciers inshould
government the western
thinkMongolia
from now are
retreating at a rapid speed. Scientists say that by 2040, we might
how the local communities will survive once these glaciers all melt away. During the lastno longer have glaciers in western
Mongolia.
few decades, It meansthe that, the government
permafrost should
soils have thinkmelting
been from now how the localDuring
significantly. communities will survive
the 1960-1970,
once these glaciers all melt away. During the last few decades,
around 63 percent of Mongolia’s land area covered by permafrost, which has now becomethe permafrost soils have been melting
significantly. During the 1960-1970, around 63 percent of
twice less, i.e. we have permafrost in less than 30 percent of our territory.Mongolia’s land area covered by permafrost,
which has now become twice less, i.e. we have permafrost in less than 30 percent of our territory.
63% 29.3%
63%
Figure 2. Distribution of permafrost in Mongolia: a) during 1968-1970, and b) in 2016

Figure 2. Distribution of permafrost in Mongolia: a) during 1968-1970, and b) in 2016
More than 70 percent of the territory has been affected by middle and high rate
desertification
More than and
70 the riskofofthedesertification
percent territory has beenis increasing year by
affected by middle andyear.
high rate desertification and
the risk Of
of desertification
course, the most is increasing
important year by year.
issue is water. Because the precipitation is not increasing,
but the Of demand is increasing rapidly in pace
course, the most important issue is water. with the population
Because increase.
the precipitation is notWater issue but
increasing, is not
the
only a case in Mongolia, but also in the rest of the world.
demand is increasing rapidly in pace with the population increase. Water issue is not only a case in
Mongolia,In Gobi
but alsoregion, where
in the rest of thethere is no surface water, groundwater is like fossil fuel. If the
world.
groundwater in the region is exhausted due to intensive industrial use, then local people
(herders) In Gobi region,
in that areawhere there have
will also is no surface
to move water, groundwater
to some other isplace
like fossil fuel. to
in order If the groundwater
survive. Still,
in the region is exhausted due to intensive industrial use, then local people
we don’t know what will happen to the atmospheric circulation regime for the territory (herders) in that area will also
of
have to move to some other place in order to survive. Still, we don't know what will happen to the
133
133
ZudZudis is
a aMongolian
Mongoliantermtermforfora asevere
severewinter
winterinin which
which large
large number
number ofof livestock
livestock die,
die, primarily
primarily due
due to
to
starvation due
starvation due to beingtounable
being to
unable
graze,toingraze,
other in other
cases cases from
directly directly
the from
cold. the cold.
- 145 -
International Conference 2017
atmospheric circulation
Ulaanbaatar regime
Dialogue for theAsian
on Northeast territory of Mongolia. For example, currently most of moisture
Security
supply for Mongolia’s territory comes from the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, and Monsoon line is
Mongolia.Mongolia.
not approaching For example,
Whatcurrently most ofinmoisture
we can expect the next supply for Mongolia’s
few decades is that weterritory
only havecomes
assumption
from
of scientists. the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, and Monsoon line is not approaching Mongolia.
What we can expect in the next few decades is that we only have assumption of scientists.
Figure
Figure 3.
3. Moisture
Moisture supply
supply of
of atmospheric
atmospheric circulation regimefor
circulation regime for the
the territory
territoryof
of Mongolia and
adjacentMongolia
land areasand adjacent land areas
Source: present-day monsoon limit after Herzschuh (2006)
Source: present-day monsoon limit after Herzschuh (2006)
Highpriority
High priority issues
issues onon
environmental
environmental cooperation in NEA in NEA
cooperation
Some experts on NEA said that the questions, which can be considered top concern
for NEA
Some are trans-
experts on NEA frontier
said air
thatpollution (acid rain
the questions, which only), marine
can be pollution
considered top (radionuclides
concern for NEA are
and oil only), migratory animals (fisheries and birds only) and trade-environment linkages
transfrontier air pollution (acid rain only), marine pollution (radionuclides and oil only), migratory
(including forestry). Here, I pick up only two of them.
animals (fisheries and birds only) and trade-environment linkages (including forestry). Here, I pick up
Trans-frontier dust storm from China and Mongolia is a very serious problem for
only two of them.
Korean peninsula and Japanese island. Even sometimes, dust can reach the east coast of the
USA.
Trans-frontier dust storm from China and Mongolia is a very serious problem for Korean
peninsula andDust and sandstorm
Japanese island. Even(DSS) is not quite
sometimes, dustnew
canphenomenon.
reach the eastFor thousands
coast of years, dust
of the USA.
from Asia had come to the Pacific Ocean and the seas with positive impact. Because dust
usually brought
Dust and minerals
sandstorm to seas
(DSS) is notand oceans
quite newtophenomenon.
support marineForecosystem
thousands as of ayears,
big source of Asia
dust from
seafood. But DSS from Mongolia in modern days are different due to the change
had come to the Pacific Ocean and the seas with positive impact. Because dust usually brought mineralsin source
area and in its pathway to Korean peninsula and Japan.
to seas and oceans to support marine ecosystem as a big source of seafood. But DSS from Mongolia in
modern days are different due to the change in source area and in its pathway to Korean peninsula and
Japan.
- 146 -
Ulaanbaatar
Ulaanbaatar Dialogue
Dialogue on Northeast
on Northeast AsianSecurity
Asian Security
Figure 4. Trans frontier air pollution
Figure
Figure4.4.Trans
Transfrontier air pollution
frontier air pollution
DSS
DSS inin modern
modern daysdaysarearenotnotjust
justa blowing
a blowing dustdust lifted
lifted fromfrom natural
natural sand dunes
sand dunes or
or degraded
degraded grassland.
grassland. The aerosolsThe
fromaerosols
differentfrom
man different mancarried
made sources made by sources carriedindustrialized
DSS through by DSS throughareas in
industrialized
northeast
DSS inChina areas
modern in northeast
are increasing
days arethe China
notrisk a are
in affected
just increasing
blowing dust the
countries. riskfrom
lifted in affected
naturalcountries.
sand dunes or degraded
The
grassland. TheThe background
aerosols information provided by Korea stated that the concentration
heavyofmetals
background information provided by Korea stated that the concentration ofindustrialized
from different man made sources carried by DSS through heavy(Fe,
areas in
metals (Fe, Mn, and Zn etc.) was increasing by 2-10 times depending on soil components of
northeast
Mn,China
and Znareetc.)
increasing the riskby
was increasing in 2-10
affected
timescountries.
depending on soil components of the DSS (National
the DSS (National Institute of Environmental Research, 2001-2006).
Institute of Environmental Research, 2001-2006).
The background information
The DSS emission area isprovided
limited,by butKorea stated thatarea
the deposition the is
concentration of heavy metals (Fe,
very extended.
The DSS emission area is limited, but the deposition area is very extended.
Mn, and Zn etc.) was increasing by 2-10 times depending on soil components of the DSS (National
Institute of Environmental Research, 2001-2006).
The DSS emission area is limited, but the deposition area is very extended.
Figure 5.
Figure 5. Spatial distribution of Spatial distribution
annual emissions of annual
and deposition emissions
of yellow dust in and
2010
There are past lessonsdeposition

from Europe of yellow dustAmerica
and North in 2010on environmental effects of acid
deposition, which we would not like to repeat. Therefore, some countries of NEA initiated the
There of
establishment areThe
past lessons
Acid fromMonitoring
Deposition Europe and North
Network America
in East on environmental
Asia (EANET). effects
Mongolia was one the
of
firstacid deposition,
countries which
to engage wethe
with would
EANETnot activities.
like to repeat. Therefore,
Now this networksome countries
considers of NEA of
best examples
Figure initiated
5. Spatial the
cooperation distribution of annual
notestablishment
only in NEA butof emissions
The
also Acid
in Asia and
as deposition Monitoring
aDeposition
whole. of yellow dustNetwork
in 2010 in East Asia
(EANET).
There areMongolia was one
past lessons fromtheEurope
first countries to engage
and North with the
America on EANET activities.
environmental Now of acid
effects
this network considers best examples of cooperation not only in NEA but also in Asia as a
deposition,
whole.which we would not like to repeat. Therefore, some countries of NEA initiated the
establishment of The Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET). Mongolia was one the
first countries to engage with the EANET activities. Now this network considers best examples of
- 147 -
cooperation not only in NEA but also in Asia as a whole.
Internation
Figure 6. The Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), and
Figure 6. The Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), and Ecolog
Ecological Monitoring sites (19 sites) of EANET
9 sites) of EANET
Some examples about cooperation of Mongolia with its neighbor countries

Mongolia and Russia Some examples about cooperation of Mongolia with its neighb
Happy location but an unhappy burden: Mongolia as a country located in upstream
area, we are happy.Mongolia
But we face and
someRussia
unhappy burden because of Lake Baikal. The Selenge
River of Mongolia is a primary contributor of water to Lake Baikal, the biggest and deepest
Happy location but an unhappy burden: Mongolia as a country located in
fresh water lake in the world, and its tributaries drain approximately 80 percent of the lake’s
happy. But
watershed. Lake Baikal is a World we Heritage
face someSite unhappy burdenofbecause
and wetlands of Lake
the Selenge Baikal.
River The Selenge R
delta are
primarySite.
designated as a RAMSAR contributor
Sediment of transport
water to Lake Baikal, the
from Selenge biggest
River formed andunique
deepest fresh water lak
giant
delta that buffers lake Baikal from external influences. The Selenge Delta is home to
tributaries drain approximately 80 percent of the lake's watershed. Lake Baikal is unique
ecosystems, includingand more thanof70the
wetlands rareSelenge
or endangered species
River delta of plants and
are designated as animals.
a RAMSAR It Site. Se
provides valuable habitat for more than 170 species of birds.
Selenge River formed unique giant delta that buffers lake Baikal from external in
Concern withDelta
proposed
is homealternative
to unique solutions: Waterincluding
ecosystems, of the Selenge
more River
than 70 is used forendangered
rare or
agricultural irrigation, community water supplies, industry, mining, recreation, tourism
and transportation animals.
from both It provides
Mongolian valuable habitatside
and Russian for more thanborder.
of state 170 species
Manyofofbirds.
these
activities degrade the quality of the water, limit downstream availability, and
Concern with proposed alternative solutions: Water of the Selenge River produce
ecological impacts. Mongolia and Russia share an international effort to manage the Selenge
irrigation,
River to improve water community
quality and sustain water
the supplies, industry,
water resource. Themining,
agreementrecreation,
was madetourism and tra
Mongolian
between the governments and Russian
of Mongolia and theside of state
Russian border. Many
Federation in 1995 ofonthese activities degrade the
the protection
limit resources
of trans-boundary water downstream availability,
has more extendedand produce
coverage ecological
of areas including impacts.
over 100Mongolia a
small rivers and streams located in the different part of the country. It does
international effort to manage the Selenge River to improve water qualitynot include the and sust
explicit restriction The
of water use (in contrast to the previous single body, namely,
agreement was made between the governments of Mongolia and the Russian Selenge
river related agreement, signed before the 1990th) but added new commitment for both sides
the protection of trans-boundary
on monitoring of water quality, exchange of informationwaterfor
resources
predictionhasofmore
floodextended
and others. coverage of ar
small rivers and streams located in the different part of the country. It does no
Economy vs. Environment: Recently two working groups were formed in Mongolia
restriction of water
under the Mining Infrastructure Support useProject
(in contrast to theand
(MINIS), previous
they are single body, namely,
preparing for the Selenge ri
feasibility studies signed
for the before
ShurentheHydropower
1990th) butdam added
on new commitment
the Selenge Riverforandboth sides on monito
another
exchange of information for prediction of flood and others.
- 148 -
Economy vs. Environment: Recently two working groups were formed i
Mining Infrastructure Support Project (MINIS), and they are preparing for the fea
dam on the Orkhon River to support Orkhon-Gobi water conveyance project. The issue
is becoming source of “tension” between Mongolia and Russia, with growing concern in
parliaments, multiple agencies and scientific institutions of two countries. Some international
environmental groups like Earth Island Institute, Greenpeace, WWF and others have voiced
also their concern.
Mongolia and China
In 1994, an agreement was signed between Mongolia and China on the protection of
trans-boundary water resources concerning Lake Buir, the Kherlen, Bulgan, Khalkh rivers,
and 87 small lakes and rivers located near the border. Currently the Chinese side is expressing
a concern about diminishing recharge of the Dalai lake from Buir lake through Sharilj river.
But the past records have shown that the size of Dalai lake was around 230 km2 in 1934
and since then it increased up to 2210 km² (almost 10 times increase). During this period of
time the size of the Buir lake was decreased from 1050 km2 to 630 km2 and its water level
dropped by 1.5 meters leading to changes in salinity and other water quality parameters. This
example illustrated an importance of science based monitoring of the hydrological regime
not only for practical water use exercises, but also for trans-boundary water share issues.
Mongolia initiated to sign the agreement between Mongolia, Russia, and China on
the establishment of linked network of protected areas. First international network was
established in 1994 in area close to the Amur river basin, mainly for migratory birds. This
approach has been further applied to other parts of these countries for other species and
ecosystem. Nowadays, there are big international infrastructure projects going on in the
region, such as One road One belt, on the other hand, railway and highways can lead to
prevention of habitat. Recently the Government of Mongolia issued an order, a mandatory
standard to create passages for wild animals along the highways and railways in steppe and
gobi areas.
NEA has several environmental cooperation mechanisms. Mongolia is engaged only
in two of them.
Conclusion
 Recent developments have shown that still there are certain risks to push back green
bullies and to slow down the joint efforts of international community to cope with
emerging environmental challenges, including climate change. All countries of NEA
need to double their joint efforts toward full implementation of the long debated
climate instruments like Kyoto protocol and Paris agreement.
 Environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is not only essential for defusing
environmental threats in the region; but also can serve as a means to alleviate
political tensions and promote confidence building, since environmental issues are
more human security attributed rather than state security associated concerns.
- 149 -
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN

Environmental Disaster and Regional ASIA
NORTHEAST Cooperation in Northeast Asia
Dr. CHU Jang Min

Dr. CHU Jang Min
Chief research
Chief Fellow;
research Fellow;Head, Environmentalpolicy
Head, Environmental policy research
research group,
group,
Division of of
Division Environmental
EnvironmentalStrategy, KoreaEnvironment
Strategy, Korea Environment Institute,
Institute, ROK
ROK
I. Environmental disaster in Northeast Asia (NEA)

I. Environmental disaster in Northeast Asia (NEA)
Characteristics
Characteristics of of Global
GlobalEnvironmental
EnvironmentalDisaster
Disaster
Increasing environmental disaster in Asia
Increasing environmental disaster in Asia
• In whole Asia environmental disaster, not only social disaster, but also the natural
• Indisaster
whole isAsia
increasing.
environmental disaster, not only social disaster, but also the natural disaster is
increasing.
• Compared to 1993-2012, social disasters in Asia increased during 2003-2012 whereas
• Compared to 1993-2012,
the rate decreased social disasters
in America and Europein Asia increased during 2003-2012 whereas the rate
decreased in America and Europe
number natural disaster number

2000 1993-2002 374 social disaster
1993-2002 400
2003-2012 2003-2012
1500 300 250
1000 200
500 100 67
39 50 52 44
30
2 2
0 0
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Africa America Asia Europe Oceania
Source: IFRC (2003, 2013)

Source: IFRC (2003, 2013)
• Causesfor
• Causes forincrease
increaseofofenvironmental
environmental disaster
disaster in Asia
in Asia are:are: vulnerable
vulnerable to climate
to climate change,
change, rapid
rapid urbanization,
urbanization, and industrialization:
and industrialization:
Of thethe
- - Of top top
10 countries in Climate
10 countries in Risk Index,Risk
Climate 6 are Asian
Index,countries
6 are Asian countries
- Ratio of population in the urban areas: 17 in 1950 -> 44 in 2010
- - Ratio
Most of of
the population
major cities ininAsia
the urban areas:
are located 17coastal
in the in 1950 -> 44
regions in 2010
which are hydro-meteorologically
- Most of the major cities in Asia are located in the coastal regions which are
vulnerable
hydro-meteorologically vulnerable
Distribution of potential mortalities from hydro-
meteorological disasters in Asia
2nd: Myanmar
5th: Bangladesh
6th: Vietnam
7th: Philippines
8th: Mongolia
9th: Thailand
- 150 -
urbanization, and industrialization:
- Of the top 10 countries in Climate Risk Index, 6 are Asian countries
- Ratio of population in the urban areas: 17 in 1950 -> 44 in 2010
- Most of the major cities in Asia are located in the coastal regions which are hydro-meteorologically
vulnerable
Distribution of potential mortalities from hydro-

meteorological disasters in Asia
2nd: Myanmar
5th: Bangladesh
6th: Vietnam
7th: Philippines
8th: Mongolia
9th: Thailand

Source: German Watch (2014), Source: ENSCAP, UNISDR(2012)
Source: German Watch (2014), Source: ENSCAP, UNISDR(2012)
Occurrence of complex (combined) disasters

Occurrence of complex (combined) disasters
Complex (combined)
Complex (combined) disasters and damage
disasters increaseincrease
and damage in 2000sin
compared to 1990s to 1990s
2000s compared
-- Natural
Natural disaster
disaster + disaster
+ social social (Type
disaster (Typedisaster
1), Natural 1), Natural disaster
+ Natural disaster+(Type
Natural
2) disaster
(Type 2)
Complex (combined) disaster (Type 1)
Human injury
Trend of complex (combined) disaster (Type 1)
Trend of human injury
Source: EM-DAT home

Source: pagehome
EM-DAT (http://www.emdat.be/disaster-list)
page (http://www.emdat.be/disaster-list)
Disasters from environmental pollution

Disasters from environmental pollution
• Mortality caused by air pollution estimated to be 7 millions in 2012 (WHO, 2014)
• Mortality caused by air pollution estimated to be 7 millions in 2012 (WHO, 2014)
- The figure exceeds the mortalities and affected population from natural disasters (1.39 million) in 2012  
- The figure exceeds the mortalities and affected population from natural disasters
(1.39
• Mortality by million)
Region:   in 2012  
• Mortality by inRegion:
- 2.8 million   region including China  
West Pacific
2.8 million in WestAsia
-- 2.3 million in Southeast  
Pacific region including China  
- Asia Pacific region accounts for more than 50 percent of total mortality  
- 2.3 million in Southeast Asia  
- Asia Pacific region accounts for Disaster
Environmental more thanin50 percent ofAsia
Northeast total mortality  
Natural disaster
• During 1990-2013, total of 927 cases of natural disasters in the region (68 percent of natural disasters
occurred since 2000s)
• Types of natural disaster: Typhoon (33%), flood (32%), earthquakes (15%)
- 151 -
- 2.8 million in West Pacific region including China  
- 2.3 million in Southeast Asia  
- Asia Pacific region accounts for more than 50 percent of total mortality  
Environmental Disaster in Northeast Asia
Environmental Disaster in Northeast Asia
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
• During1990-2013,
• During 1990-2013, totaltotal of cases
of 927 927 cases of natural
of natural disastersdisasters in the
in the region (68region
percent(68 percentdisasters
of natural of
natural disasters
occurred occurred since 2000s)
since 2000s)
• Types
• Typesofofnatural disaster:
natural Typhoon
disaster: (33%),(33%),
Typhoon flood (32%),
flood earthquakes (15%)
(32%), earthquakes (15%)
Social disaster
Social disaster
• During 1990-2013, total of 508 cases of industrial (social) accidents (81 percent of
social disasters occurred since 2000s)
• 92 percent of social disaster occurred in China
• 65.3 percent of the industrial accidents are explosion
Analysis of environmental disasters in NEA

Table 1. Trend and characteristic of disasters
Type Major disaster Trend Characteristic
Natural Flood, windstorm, earthquakes Increase in • Urgent issue for all
disaster frequency and countries
intensity • Difference in
vulnerability
• Massive damage
Social disaster Chemical spill and environmental Increase in massive • Occurrence in some
pollution accident accidents countries
• Low frequency but
massive damage
- 152 -
Complex • Natural disaster (earthquake/ Increase in • Diversification of

(combined) tsunami) frequency and disaster
disaster + Social disaster (nuclear potential accidents • Significant damage
accidents)
• Natural disaster (earthquake/
flood)
+ natural disaster (landslide)
Disaster from Severe air pollution, DSS, oil spill Transboundary • Pollution of disaster
changes in environmental level
the global disasters • Different impacts
environment
Table 2. Comparison of environmental disasters of each country

Type RO Korea China Japan Russia Mongolia D Korea
Natural disaster
◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎
Social disaster ○ ◎ △ ○ △ △
Complex
△ ◎ ◎ △ ○ ○
disaster
Disasters
from changes
◎ ◎ △ △ ◎ ◎
in the global
environment
△: Low Occurrence, ○: High Occurrence, ◎: Very High Occurrence
II. REGIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER IN

NEA
There are several cooperation activities among countries in NEA.

TEMM (Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among Japan, China and ROK)
• Disaster countermeasure seminar in January, 2013, Fukushima
• In the TEMM 15th meeting in 2013, recognition for cooperation needs for environmental
disaster
- Emphasis on sharing of information, capacity enhancement, joint-response for
preventing disaster
• In the TEMM 16th meeting in 2014, environmental disaster response selected among one
of the priority cooperation areas
Trilateral Heads on Government Agency Meeting on Disaster Management
• Adopted joint statement for Cooperation of disaster management between 3 countries
(First meeting in 2009)
• Cooperation Areas
- Sharing of information for capacity enhancement for management of disasters
- Development of comprehensive disaster management system
- 153 -
- Development of system to minimize vulnerability and damage

- Trilateral Table Top Exercise (TTX) on Disaster Management (two times)
Northeast Asian Top Regulators Meeting on Nuclear Safety
• Annual conference from 2008 
- China National Nuclear Security Administration, Japan Nuclear Regulation
Authority, Korea Nuclear Safety and Security Commission
• Agreement to strengthen nuclear safety cooperation in November, 2013 in the 6th meeting
- Establishment of Nuclear Information Exchange Framework
o Initial: Informing nationals and neighboring countries of
incident
o Progress: Provide information of technical analysis, etc. immediate
- Korea China Japan Joint Prevention Training (2014.10~11,
expected)
- Plans for regional cooperation project
- Operation of online meeting system among 3 nations
- Establishment of on -line information sharing system in stages
Trilateral Meeting for Earthquake Cooperation
• Annual meeting since 2004 but changed to biennial meeting after the 4th meeting
• Objective of meeting: Alleviate disaster from earthquakes and tsunami in Northeast Asia
• In the 6th meeting in 2013, 3 countries agreed to share observation data on earthquakes
- JMA and KMA sharing of data real-time, CEAand KMA sharing of data quasireal-
time
- CEAand KMAsharing of data related earthquake and volcano observation data in
Mount Baedu, efforts to raise awareness internationally
Trilateral Agricultural Ministerial Meeting
• Scoping for cooperation among 3 countries from the occurrence of AI (avian influenza)
in China in 2012
- Sharing of information on epidemics and establishment of secretariat for livestock
control cooperation
- Not implemented due to lack of continuous discussion
• MOU between Korea-China for Preservation of wild animals and natural biodiversity in
2014
- Sharing of information on occurrence of AI and bird migration routes
Actions for oceanic accidents: NOWPAP MERRAC
• Implementation of Korea China Japan cooperation for oceanic accidents in line with
international agreement for oil spill
• Cooperation for sharing of resource for prevention and accident information, analysis of
accident response, joint prevention trainings, development of guidelines, etc
- 154 -
• Establishment of detailed guidelines for NOWPAP MERRAC

• In case of oil spill or other forms of accidents, setting of commanding country and system
for communication, designation of responsible government agency
- Korea: Korea Coast Guard, Japan: Japan Coast Guard, China: China Marine Safety
Administration, Russia
Results and limitations
• Since the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011, regional cooperation for environmental
disaster has become one of the key areas
- In the 15th and 16th TEMMeeting, there has been an agreement on the prevention of
environmental damage from disasters and environmental crisis. In the top cooperation
priority areas for 2015-2019, environmental disaster has been selected.
• In the bilateral or multilateral summits, issues related to disaster countermeasures has
been discussed and agreement has been made for cooperation
• Agreement for cooperation projects in nuclear security areas through the establishment
of information exchange system and joint prevention trainings
• Environmental disaster countermeasures in marine pollution is one of the well
institutionalized areas for cooperation
However, there are some limitations:
• Major gap in environmental disaster countermeasure cooperation despite agreement for
the establishment of information sharing system, etc.
• Lacks an integrated cooperation framework for cooperation despite the increase of
environmental disaster in Northeast Asia region
• Early stages of cooperation for potential volcanic explosion in Mt. Baekdu and AI (avian
influenza)
• Lack of cooperation in areas where countries are relatively less influenced (for example,
water pollution)
- 155 -
III. Strengthening of Regional Cooperation in NEA

Table 3. Evaluation of importance for regional cooperation
Risk Urgency
Environmental
disaster Current Potential Information Substantial
damage damage sharing countermeasure
Natural disaster
◎ ◎ △ ○
Natural disaster influenced
◎ ◎ △ ○
by climate change
AI (avian influenza) ◎ ○ ◎ △
Damage from volcano △ ◎ ◎ ◎
Environmental accidents ○ ◎ ○ ◎
Nuclear accidents △ ◎ ◎ ◎
Marine accidents ○ ○ ○ ○
Yellow dust ○ ○ ◎ △
Air pollution ◎ ◎ ◎ △
△: Slightly important, ○: Important, ◎: Very important
Priority Cooperation Areas

• Natural disaster: damage from volcano 
• Social disaster/complex (combined) disaster: nuclear & chemical accidents
• Environmental disaster due to changes in global environment: Air pollution
Based on the research results, I suggest some cooperation ideas for strengthening of
regional cooperation in NEA.
Strategy and Program of Regional Cooperation in NEA
Establishment of Cooperation Mechanism for Integrated Risk
Strategy
Management
Program
• Need for agreement among countries for construction of integrated risk management
<Agreement on Cooperation for Environmental disaster integrated risk management in
NEA>
• Operation of 1.5 track communication channel with participants including

government representatives, experts, industries, NGOs
• Adoption of joint agreement through summit meetings among countries
• Objective of agreement: To strengthen regional cooperation in Northeast Asia in

response to environmental disaster through integrated risk management
• Development of “Program for Environmental disaster management in Northeast Asia”
for implementation of agreement
• Establishment of “Ministerial meeting for environmental disaster risk management in
Northeast Asia”
• Voluntary efforts for Cooperation Fund
- 156 -
Strategy Strengthening Cooperation of Priority Areas

Program
(1) Strengthening cooperation for nuclear plant security
• Establishment of system for information sharing on nuclear plant operation
• Establishment of cooperation system for prevention of accidents and emergency plans
• Operation of management system and joint evaluation for nuclear plant safety
• Establishment of regional radiation monitoring and information sharing network
(2) Strengthening cooperation for volcano disasters

• Formation of task force team to deal with Mt Baekdu volcano
• Joint investigation for scientific observation
• Construction and operation of observation center for international joint research
(3) Strengthening cooperation for addressing air pollution

• Establishment of Web based air pollution data sharing system
• Ministerial Meeting on Air Pollution
• Northeast Asia Clean Air Program (NACAP)
- Package program (policy, technology, equipment, management system etc.)
(4) Strengthening cooperation for environmental (chemical) accidents

• Establishment of cooperation network for chemical management among countries
• Information sharing/policy dialogues and joint projects of prevention technology and
management system
- 157 -
NATURAL RESOURCES AND PEACE BUILDING
Mr. Henrik SLOTTE

Chief of Disasters and Conflicts Management Branch,
UN Environment (UNEP) based in Geneva
There are two important caveats that I need to mention before I begin. First, when I
use the term environment in my presentation, it refers to both ecosystem services as well
as natural resources – both renewable and non-renewable. Second, I think it is important
to remind everyone that the UN system reflects the collective will of the member states –
so when I say the UN responded, it really means UN member states. The strength of any
response depends on political will.
Let me start by explaining how we understand the natural resources. When we speak
about natural resources and conflicts, usually come to our mind then the forests, also the
minerals, hydrocarbons, and may be we talk about gold and blood diamonds. All these can
be one of the reasons that start the conflicts. In several cases in Africa, we have seen that
the blood diamonds, oil, and timber keep the conflict going. For us, specific interest is to
understand in the peace building phase, how can the natural resources be used in a wise
manner, to bring the stability to the country, and to bring income of the natural resources,
not only to in a lead, but to the benefit to whole of the population. This is something that we
have been studying to understand. My work here is based on a global work that I hope it can
be of interest to the Northeast part of Asia.
If we map these phases onto the conflict cycle, they look like this.
- 158 -
The challenge we face in the UN right now is how to integrate these three phases
within a coherent programming framework. How do we use natural resources for peace
while also considering how they contributed to conflict and were impacted by warfare? This
is the challenge faced by the emerging field of Environmental Peace building and I welcome
your advice on how this can be achieved.
The most important take home message is that understanding these three phases – and
how they relate to each other - is critical for sustainable and peaceful use and governance of
natural resources. Following a discussion of these three phases – I will then move to some of
the major challenges in the field and the current research needs.
Let me begin by saying that while peace building takes a different form in every single
country, it is essentially about 5 core objectives and processes:
 Redistribution of power between groups – establishing a new social contract
between the state and its citizens (political dimension)
 Establishing safety and security and demobilizing combatants (security
dimension)
 Establishing new institutions and governance mechanisms, as well as instituting
rule of law and access to justice (legal and institutional dimension)
 Kick-starting economic growth, revenue generation, sustainable livelihoods and
basic services (economic dimension)
 Rebuilding relationships and trust between groups and between citizens and their
government (social dimension)
UN has a unique role to play in each of these domains when supporting national
processes, and is increasingly recognizing the ways in which natural resources can contribute
to each of these objectives. The main caveat is that since each conflict is so fundamentally
different, we must resist the temptation to apply any kind of cookie cutter approach.
Our aim to help countries address environmental risks, impacts and opportunities
across the peace and security continuum is achieved by:
 Designing tailor made programmes that respond to needs of government and local
- 159 -
stakeholders (communities, companies, academia)

 Leveraging our UN neutrality to convene stakeholders, offer safe space for
dialogue and provide impartial information (what can we offer that no other actor
can do)
 Working through partnerships with UN agencies, governments and local actors
 Offering a scientific and technical orientation, strategic advice and visible field
projects focusing on immediate benefits from natural resources
Two recent tools or lines of expertise that we can currently offer are:
- Oil for Development Partnership
- Extractive industry
Environmental safeguards and performance monitoring for extractives
In the countries that are fragile, that maybe are post-conflict, oil usually has a key
role. We are working with the Norwegian development agency, as an oil producing country,
solid and very long experienced in the oil industry, they bring expertise in technical, fiscal
and social side, and we bring then the environmental expertise on how to start or how to
maintain the oil industry so that the environmental footprint will be as limited as possible. It
is feasible, as we know from more than one countries Norway and UK, but it is not evident
in other countries, we are only starting.
As extractive industry, we usually refer to mining. What we have been developing
with the World Bank since 3-4 years back, is a web-based tool where you can bring all
the different information to the local stakeholders. What we have learned is that, often it
is lack of information that triggers conflicts between, for example, company and the local
population. We are trying to intervene in a way that local population will be better informed
about the concessions, economic and business plan etc. It is not an easy work, especially in
countries like Afghanistan and DR Congo, but it is something that is very interesting. In the
case of EU, there is now a new regulation since last month, that EU decided to seek to avoid
importation of what is called conflict minerals. We (UN Environment Program) have been
asked to bring this tool that we call MAP-X to the use of the EU so that they can help their
companies to avoid importation of conflict minerals by the year 2020.
- 160 -
MAP-X has two goals: multiparty sharing of best available data and participatory
monitoring of resource agreements using next generation digital technologies
Our work on natural resources and conflicts, the cycle starting from what triggers a
conflict if it is natural resources, what keeps it going, to what to do in a post-conflict zone,
is based on 150 case studies from 225 experts and 60 countries, and we have published 6
reports.
Thank you for your attention.
- 161 -
REGIONAL COOPERATION ON DRR: ENGAGEMENT OF MONGOLIA
Lieut. Col. BAASANSUREN Demberelnyam

Lieutenant Colonel, Director of Disaster Risk Management,
National Emergency Management Agency, Mongolia
Introduction
The Asia-Pacific region is exposed to natural disasters of many types which each year
kill thousands of people and wreak vast economic destruction − often striking a number of
countries simultaneously.
Over the period 2005-2014 the Asia-Pacific region had 1,625 reported disaster events.
Approximately 500,000 people lost their lives, around 1.4 billion people were affected, and
there was $523 billion worth of economic damage. Many of these disasters were on a vast
scale, but there were also multiple smaller events that never hit the global headlines. Indeed
since the 1970s, most disasters in Asia and the Pacific have had fewer than 100 fatalities but
cumulatively have affected 2.2 billion people and caused over $400 billion worth of damage.
Even these figures are probably underestimates, since there is no standardized methodology
for gathering disaster statistics, and many disasters go unreported. (Table 1)
Table 1. Disaster occurrence and impacts in Asia and the Pacific, total 2005-2014
Source: Disasters without borders: Regional Resilience for Sustainable Development, UN ESCAP 2016
The most disaster-prone subregion has been South-East Asia − many of whose countries
lie along the earthquake-prone Pacific ‘Ring of Fire’, or along major typhoon tracks. There
are also high seismic and flood risks in South and South-West Asia. The subregion with
the greatest economic damage, however, has been East and North-East Asia which has the
greatest concentration of exposed economic assets. In general, the most vulnerable countries
are those with special needs − including small island developing States, least developed
countries and landlocked developing countries.
Mongolia is all deeply concerned with an increase in frequency, geographic coverage
and socio-economic losses caused by disasters due to climate change, increasing density of
urban population and industrialization, deepening globalization and loss of ecologic balance,
- 162 -
happening not only our Asian region but the whole world.
In the present times when international situation is becoming unstable due to
climate changes and geopolitical circumstances, it becomes vital to develop further closer
coordination and effective cooperation at the regional level.
The Government of Mongolia (GoM) reaches out to the region for sustainable
economic, social and environmental development through reducing disaster risks and impacts
caused by climate change, and adapting to climate change. In addition, Mongolia emphasizes
the importance of key international documents, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction, the Sustainable Development Programme 2030, and the Paris Convention
against Climate Change. GoM, for its part, is implementing the policy document “Vision of
Sustainable Development of Mongolia until 2030”, which was ratified by the Parliament of
Mongolia in 2016. It defines our priority as “To strengthen the prevention system from climate
hazards and natural disasters, and the national capacity to adapt to climate change”. After the
approval of the Sendai Framework, two laws and some policy documents on disaster risk
reduction have been approved by the Great Ikh Khural (Parliament), GoM, Deputy Prime
Minister (DPM) aligned with the Sendai Framework. (1) “Law on Fire Safety” (reformulated
version) by the Great Ikh Khural (Parliament), July 2015, (2) “Law on Disaster Protection”
(reformulated version) by the Great Ikh Khural (Parliament), Feb 2017: It brings a lot of
positive changes into the Emergency Management System of Mongolia.
The key changes are:
• Disaster terminology is newly defined to align with international terminology
• Phases of disaster protection are clearly defined (activities before disaster,
during disaster and post disaster)
• Legal environment to establish DRR National and Local Platforms is created
• Provision for the coordination of domestic and international aid during
disaster is included
• Roles and duties of multiple stakeholders, including government and non-
government organizations, private sectors, volunteers and citizens, in DRR
are defined
• Mandatory Funds for DRR are required by the law for state and local
administrative organizations and legal entities
• Legal status is defined for Emergency management organization, its
structure, organization, management, and staffing rules and legislations
• “The National Programme of Community Participatory Disaster Risk
Reduction (2015-2025)” June 2015 by GoM, and its implementation plan
by DPM, May 2016
• “The National Plan for Prevention and Rescue of Population, Animals, and
Properties from Disaster (disaster response and disaster early recovery)” by
GoM, Oct 2015,
• “Volunteerism in Disaster Management” by DPM, May 2016
- 163 -
A draft of the medium term DRR Strategy for the Implementation Plan of the Sendai
Framework on DRR in Mongolia (2020) has been developed and currently we are working
for its approval by the Government of Mongolia. It includes four strategic objectives based
on the four priority areas of SFDRR, and under the strategic objectives there are a total of 9
sub-objectives with 34 related activities. Mongolia expects that the document will be a part
of our commitments for the Global Target “E” of Sendai Framework.
Mongolia contributed to the UNISDR working group for the development of the
indicators for global targets and terminology for DRR and measuring progress on the Sendai
Framework.
Three cities have joined in the UNISDR Resilient City campaign, and senior and
key staff of city agencies and provinces has received serial trainings on implementing the
campaign.
Moreover, Mongolia is working to enhance international cooperation on DRR.
Development projects on DRR from UNDP, WB, ADB, JICA, Mercy Corp and Mongolian
Red Cross Society are successfully implemented in the country.
We must unite our efforts and be more pro-active in implementing our commitments
to reduce disaster risks and impacts of climate change, and work for our mission to ensure
the peaceful and sustainable socio-economic development in our region. Mongolia has been
strongly supporting the international community efforts in disaster risk reduction and has
been actively participating in international and regional cooperation.
The most regions have its own DRR mechanism or platforms such as Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of American States (OAS), NATO
Centers of Excellence (COE), Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Economic Community
of Central African States (ECCAS), League of Arabian States (LAS) and others.
Therefore, Mongolia proposes to initiate Northeast Asian cooperation mechanism for
DRR among our Northeast Asian countries.
- 164 -
CLOSING REMARKS
H.E. Mr. MUNKH-ORGIL Tsend

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mongolia
Distinguished guests and participants

First of all, I would like to warmly welcome our guests to Mongolia and extend
our earnest appreciation for your active participation in the work of the 4th International
Conference of “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security”.
Dear participants,
We are deeply encouraged by the fact that many interesting ideas and perceptions have
been expressed in your presentations on the main topics of the Conference. Presentations
provided us with diverse analyses of present tense situation in Northeast Asia, its security
environment, strategic interests of different countries, and perspectives for the future.
Convergence and divergence of positions expressed in the course of deliberations provide
us with rich food for thought for our future endeavors. And I would like to share some my
views on some of them.
First, on the issue of cooperative security mechanism in Northeast Asia. Unlike other
parts of the world, there is no institutionalized security mechanism in NEA. A number of
ideas and initiatives were put forward by the countries of the region as you discussed it
yesterday. As for Mongolia the issue of addressing security concerns in the Asia-Pacific,
including NEA has been long on our agenda. Mongolia first proposed the idea of creating a
regional security dialogue mechanism in early 1980s. It called for an all-Asian convention
prohibiting the use of force to prevent conflicts. Later, in 2000 we proposed to have an
informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of NEA countries on the margins of ARF Ministerials
to start discussing the least contentious issues. But some of our partners in NEA preferred to
normalize their bilateral relations first. Since 2014 we have held the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue
meetings for 3 years consecutively at track 2 level. This year it is being organized at track
1.5 level. Many of you have expressed your interest in a possible cooperative security
mechanism in NEA. I am sure it will be main topic of our future deliberations.
Second, about multilateralism. Many important insights were shared by the scholars
yesterday, including those on the European experiences. As we live today in an increasingly
interdependent world, multilateralism in its broad sense becomes more and more evident and
indispensible. Traditional security issues are considered in close conjunction with sustainable
development, energy, infrastructure and environmental security concerns. Presentations and
discussions held today at our sub-sessions clearly indicate that the challenges which we
face today have to be met successfully only through multilateral cooperation. Mongolia,
like others, attaches particular importance to promoting multilateralism in its foreign policy
activities. We do believe that effective multilateralism ought to be pursued in parallel to
bilateral and trilateral cooperation in all relevant areas, including humanitarian dimensions.
Third, about the importance of continued engagement. Many of you have highlighted
the importance of engagement during your discussions yesterday. We all agree that the
outstanding issues should be resolved solely through means of dialogue and negotiations
- 165 -
with participation of all parties concerned. Therefore, engagement should be an important

prerequisite for any dialogue to succeed. In fact, the EU Ambassador pointed out that
“isolation is not a recipe for success”, and we agree with that. We are for engagement,
indeed, for a constructive engagement of all countries, including the DPRK, in de-escalating
the tension and resolving the outstanding issues. The main objective of the Ulaanbaatar
Dialogue initiative rests with this. We consider that it should be an open dialogue mechanism
with the participation of all parties concerned.
And finally, I am pleased to note that the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue enjoys broad support.
We are greatly encouraged by your views and recommendations for the future, in particular
to continue our efforts to promote this initiative, to conduct host diplomacy for continuous
multilateral talks as professor Noboru Miyawaki underlined in his presentation. As professor
rightly concluded it is the only setting which “covers all the political entities in NEA”.
Indeed, Mongolia is the only country in NEA which does not have any unresolved issues,
be it territorial or political, with other countries in the region, or any other country in world.
Our aim is to provide a neutral ground for constructive dialogue and engagement. With
your support and cooperation I have no doubt that the UB Dialogue will further evolve
and contribute to our common efforts towards a peaceful and sustainable future in the NEA
region and beyond.
Distinguished participants,
From the summary reports made by the Moderators I assume that interesting
presentations and lively discussions have taken place on energy connectivity and environment
security cooperation. Realization of various initiatives, including the NEA Super Energy
Ring, the Gobitec and Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energy project and the Transport
corridor covering all countries in NEA could be beneficial to all individual countries and
contribute to regional stability and sustainability.
In conclusion, I wish to once again express our sincere thanks to all participants for
your active participation.
Thank you for your kind attention.
- 166 -
CLOSING REMARKS
Dr. GANBAT Damba

Director, the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Mongolia
Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Munkh-Orgil,

Esteemed researchers and guests,
Honored Ambassadors,
We have successfully concluded the 4th international conference within the framework
of “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian security”.
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all speakers, moderators,
scholars and experts for taking their time to participate in this conference and sharing their
valuable views.
When we started the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue 4 years ago, we had a goal to create a
platform of track 1.5 bringing together academics and government officials. In this conference,
we had both researchers and government officials. Today we have witnessed that the one of
the main of goal of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue has become real. Since the track 1.5-format
allows researchers and academics to make their analysis and research reflected in decision
making, we will continue to organize the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue in this format. We hope that
our participants will support us to maintain the basic goal to continuously stand in track 1.5.
Although the participants of the UBD represent their own countries or institutions,
they have become friends and colleagues. These bonds might have seen as simple, however,
these are the basis of confidence that we would like to achieve through the UBD. Because
I believe that confidence is built on ordinary interactions between people. The confidence
built through the UBD will pave the more peaceful relations in Northeast Asia.
Taking this opportunity, I would like to extend my appreciation to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Mongolia. We could not have done it without your valuable support.
Moreover, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all participants, especially those
that took time to come from abroad and have made their valuable contribution in making
this dialogue practically useful and successful. And look forward to seeing you again in
Ulaanbaatar. Also, I would like to extend my appreciation to our international and domestic
partners who continuously worked with us to make this dialogue realize.
With this, I want to conclude this conference. I wish you all the best in your future
endeavors. Thank you very much.
- 167 -
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
- 168 -
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS BY ALPHABETICAL ORDER
CANADA
BURTON Christopher Director Northeast Asia and Oceania Division. Canada
Global Affairs
CHENG Jonathan Seoul Bureau Chief, The Wall Street Journal
CHINA
FAN Xiaoju Associate Research Professor and Deputy Director
of Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
HUANG Ying Associate Research Professor, China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
LIU Qing Director of Department for Asia-Pacific Security and
Cooperation, China Institute of International Studies
(CIIS)
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
RI Yong Phil Vice president, Institute for American Studies (IFAS),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KIM Kwang Hak Researcher of Institute for American Studies (IFAS),
KIM Chol Min Researcher of Institute for American Studies (IFAS),
AN Song Il Desk Officer for Mongolia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
FRANCE
DUPONT Cyril French Defense attaché, Embassy of the French Republic
MILLET Jean-Michel Head of the Asia-Oceana, Latin America and Caribbean
department of the General directorate for international
relations and strategy (DGRIS), Ministry of Armed Forces
REGAUD Nicolas Special representative for the Asia-Pacific of the General
Directorate for International Relations and Strategy
(DGRIS), Ministry of Armed Forces
GERMANY
BALLBACH Eric Post- Doctoral Research Fellow, Director Research Unit
II: Korea and International Security, Free University
Berlin
- 169 -
JAPAN
MACHIDA Hideaki 1st Secretary, Embassy of Japan
MIYAWAKI Noboru Professor, College of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan
University
NAKAO Akihito 3rd Secretary, Embassy of Japan
SHIBUTANI Yu Chief Researcher, Research Institute for Strategy of
Natural Resources, Waseda University
TAKAGI Seiichiro Senior Research Adviser, Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA)
TAKIZAKI Shigeki Deputy Director-General, Asian and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, MFA
TOKUYA Yukiko Official, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Northeast
Asia Division, MFA
TAKAHASI Kozue Attache, Embassy of Japan
MONGOLIA
BAASANSUREN Director, Disaster Risk Management Department, The
Demberelnyam National
Emergency Management Agency of Mongolia
BATJARGAL Zamba Special envoy on Climate change; former Minister of
Environment
DAVAASUREN State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia
Damdinsuren
DORJSUREN Nanjin Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies
of Mongolia (ISS)
ENKHBAYAR Jadamba Chairman, Standing Committee on Security and Foreign
Policy, State Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia
GANBAT Damba, Director, the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS)
MASHBAT Otgonbayar Research Professor, Ulaanbaatar Policy Research
Institute
MUNKH-OCHIR Director of Administration, Ministry of Defense
Dorjjugder
MUNKH-ORGIL Tsend Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia
MUNKHTUR Dorjraa Dean of Research, the Institute for Strategic Studies
(ISS)
OYUN Sanjaasuren Chair of Global Water Partnership, former Minister of
Environment and Green Development
- 170 -
PUREVBAATAR President, Railway Engineering Association of

Luvsandagva Mongolia
SUGAR Bayanjargal Head of Investment and Production Division, Policy
and Planning Department, Ministry of Energy
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
BAE Jong Hyung Second Secretary, Embassy of Republic of Korea
CHOI Eunmi Visiting Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute
CHU Jang Min Head of Division of Environmental Strategy, Korea
Environment Institute
JIN Chang Soo President, The Sejong Institute
JUNG Ki-won, First Secretary, Embassy of Republic of Korea
KANG Sang In Chief Research Fellow, Korea Environment Institute
KIM Hoon sang Defense Attaché, Embassy of Republic of Korea
LEE Hyung-Seo Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security
Strategy (INSS)
LEE Sang Hyun Director of Research Planning Division, The Sejong
Institute
SEO Young-min Deputy Director, Division for Policy Planning and
Coordination, MOFA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Appoeva Tamara Kh. Attache, Embassy of Russian Federation
ARZHAEV Igor N. Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Russian Federation
BOYKOVA Elena Senior researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences
EVSEEV Vladimir Deputy director, the Institute of CIS countries
LISHTOVANNYI Evgenii I. 1st Secretary, Embassy of Russian Federation
LYAKHOV Anton K. Military attache assistant, Embassy of Russian
Federation
POSTIGOV Anton N. 3rd Secretary, Embassy of Russian Federation
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KENT Matthew R. Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Defense Official/ Defense
Attaché, Embassy of the United States of America in
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
MANSOUROV Alexandre Adjunct Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
- 171 -
MICHEL Renee M. Major, U.S. Army, Assistant Army Attaché

Embassy of the United States of America in
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
TOWN Jenny Assistant Director, US-Korea Institute at John Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
BACHMANN Sonja Senior Political Officer, Team leader Northeast Asia and
the Pacific Team in the Asia and the Pacific Division,
UNDPA
ENKHBAYAR Shagdar Senior Research Fellow, Economic Research Institute
for Northeast Asia (ERINA)
LI Genxin Director of the Legal and External Relations Division
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO)
LI Yanfei Energy Economist, Economic research institute for
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
SLOTTE Henrik Chief of Disasters and Conflicts Management Branch,
UN Environment (UNEP) based in Geneva
TOKOUBO OCHILET Deputy head at Regional Delegation for East Asia,
Vincent Raymond International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
REITERER Micheal EU Ambassador to Korea, Delegation of EU to ROK
12
i
Symposium on “The Belt & Road and Northeast Asia Energy Security Environment”
December 19, 2015 Beijing, China, organized by National Institute of International Strategy Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (NISS CASS)
ii
Source: Nuclear Safety and Simulation, Vol. 8, Number 1, March 2017, IJNS, Symbio Community Forum
- 172 -

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International Conference - 2017

H.E. Mr. ENKHBAYAR Jadamba

Dr. GANBAT Damba

Ms. Sonja BACHMANN

International Conference 2017

THE PARADIGM CHANGES OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN

THE EVOLVING SECURITY REGIME IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

Incompletion of Postwar Settlement

The Institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Instrumentalization of the Korean Peninsula Issue

DPRK’S MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN SELF-DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY

Mr. Ri Yong Phil

EVOLUTION OF THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ORDER

Dr. Seiichiro TAKAGI

I. Formation of the post-Cold War regional security system

- Participation and reaffirmation in NDPO (1995)

*Mutual recognition of the “global significance” of the alliance (Summit, May

BALANCE OF POWER AND POWER OF BALANCING

Mr. MASHBAT Otgonbayar

Chinese strategy: balancing power and power of balancing

Choice of strategy of the members of the status quo power-institutions is simple

strategy is strengthening its traditional influence in former-Soviet countries by means of all

THE NUCLEAR THREAT OF NORTH KOREA AND SEARCHING FOR A

Dr. LEE Hyung-Seo

2. Partial Institutionalization of Markets

I. Security Environment in Northeast Asia

to penetrate U.S. missile defense networks. China is also attempting to construct

missile. In March, it resumed missile provocation with launching four Scud-ERs,

III. Causes of North Korean Economic Crisis

IV. Markets in North Korea

V. North Korea’s Strategy to Sustain its Regime

- Most of the input of production factors that determines national productivity is

<Figure-2> North Korea’s GNI and Economic Growth Rate

<Figure-3> North Korea’s Foreign Trade and NK-China Trade

PROSPECTS OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN NORTH-EAST ASIA

Dr. Elena BOYKOVA

AMERICA’S CHANGING ROLE IN ASIA IN THE ERA OF TRUMP

Ms. Jenny TOWN

TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE SECURITY

Dr. LIU Qing

I. What Will the Northeast Asia Security Look Like?

Develop a Habit of Problem-solving Cooperation

THE ABANDONMENT OF THE US HOSTILE POLICY TOWARDS THE

Mr. KIM Kwang Hak

region of the Northeast Asia are as follows;

WHY DOES THE COOPERATIVE SECURITY IDEA IN ASIA NOT

Prof. Noboru MIYAWAKI

international socialism; this greatly contributed to the multilateral security dialogue.

PERSPECTIVE ON BUILDING A MULTILATERAL REGIONAL SECURITY

Mr. DORJSUREN Nanjin

(September 2015), accessed April 5, 2017, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/09/01diplomacy-

COOPERATIVE MULTILATERALISM IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

Dr. Sang Hyun LEE

South Korea’s NEA Multilateralism

 The ‘rise of the rest’ and the

 Embracing thugs, dictators, and strongmen

Key Areas of Cooperation

Issues Recent Projects for Cooperation

• Northeast Asia Nuclear Safety Symposium (Top Regulators

• Northeast Asia Oil Hub Symposium( 17 JUN 2014)

• Meeting on Enhancing Regional Cooperation on Disaster

Cyberspace • ROK-China-Japan Cyber Policy Consultation (10 FEB 2017)

• The Tripartite (ROK-China-Japan) Health Minister’s Meeting

　　　Table 1: Primary Energy Balances of Six Economies of the NEA in 2015