Present:
CORONA, C. J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO DE-CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Primarily assailed in this petition for review filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is the Decision dated 21 January 2010 rendered by the
Former Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
111153,[1] the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
The Facts
Subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project, the
issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of PNBs services on 29 January 2001,
NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution of Planters Development
Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29 January 2001.[11] By 24 October 2002, however, all
the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already
amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets
with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a
call on HGCs guaranty and to execute in the latters favor a Deed of Assignment
and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool, consisting of: (a) 105 parcels of
land comprising the Smokey Mountain Site and the Reclamation Area, with a total
area of 539,471.47 square meters, and all the buildings and improvements thereon;
(b) shares of stock of Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI); and, (c) other
documents.[12]
On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and
NHA which was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the
Manila Regional Trial Court, a Special Commercial Court (SCC). Contending that
HGCs failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining
possession of the Asset Poolballooned the stipulated interests and materially
prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool, R-II Builders alleged,
among other matters, that the DAC should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its
authority in executing the same prior to HGCs redemption and payment of the
guaranteed SMPPCs; that while the estimated value of Asset Pool amounted
to P5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005, its total liabilities was estimated
at P2,796,019,890.41; and, that with the cessation of PDBs functions as
a trustee and HGCs intention to use the Asset Pool to settle its obligations to the
Social Security System (SSS), it was best qualified to be appointed as
new trustee in the event of the resolution of the DAC. Assessed docket fees
corresponding to an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, the complaint sought
the grant of the following reliefs: (a) a temporary restraining order/preliminary and
permanent injunction, enjoining disposition/s of the properties in the Asset Pool;
(b) the resolution or, in the alternative, the nullification of the DAC; (c) R-II
Builders' appointment as trustee pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Court; (d)
HGCs rendition of an accounting of the assets and the conveyance thereof in favor
of R-II Builders; and, (e) P500,000.00 in attorneys fees.[13]
Undaunted, HGC filed its 22 March 2009 motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, arguing that: (a) the case is real action and the docket fees paid by
R-II Builders were grossly insufficient because the estimated value of properties in
the Asset Pool exceeds P5,000,000,000.00; (b) a complaint cannot be amended to
confer jurisdiction when the court had none; (c) the RTC should have simply
denied the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens instead of
rendering an advisory opinion thereon. In addition, HGC faulted R-II Builders with
forum shopping, in view of its 10 September 2008 filing of the complaint docketed
as Civil Case No. 08-63416 before Branch 91 of the Quezon City RTC, involving a
claim for receivables from the NHA.[26] In turn, R-II Builders opposed the
foregoing motion[27] and, on the theory that the Asset Pool was still in danger of
dissipation, filed an urgent motion to resolve its application for the appointment of
a receiver and submitted its nominees for said position.[28]
c) R-II Builders need not pay any deficiency in the docket fees
considering its withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint;
The Issues
HGC urges the affirmative of the following issues in urging the grant of its
petition, to wit:
Did the Honorable Court of
Appeals Seriously Err When It
Failed to Rule That:
III. The order appointing a receiver was made with grave abuse of
discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction for having
been issued under the following circumstances:
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to
act in a case.[37] In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the
law,[38] the rule is settled that a courts jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, [39] the law in effect when
the action is filed,[40] and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.[41] Consistent with
Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the
prescribed fees shall be paid in full upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding, the well-entrenched rule is to
the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of
the prescribed filing and docket fees.[42]
The record shows that R-II Builders original complaint dated 23 August 2005 was
initially docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a
designated Special Commercial Court.[43] With HGCs filing of a motion for a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer[44] and R-II
Builders filing of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint dated 31 July
2007,[45] said court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of
the case upon the finding that the same is not an intra-corporate dispute.[46] In a
clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008,[47] the same court significantly took
cognizance of its lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:
At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special Commercial
Court tasked to try and hear, among others, intra-corporate controversies to the
exclusion of ordinary civil cases.
When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified as an intra-
corporate case. However, in the ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative
defences raised by defendants, even the plaintiff conceded that the case is not an
intra-corporate controversy or even if it is, this Court is without authority to hear
the same as the parties are all housed in Quezon City.
Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare that it does not
have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to
whether it is personal or civil, this Court would rather leave the resolution of the
same to Branch 22 of this Court. (Italics supplied).
We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153,[48] HGC
correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no
authority to order the transfer of the case to respondent RTC.[49] Being outside the
jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are
civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in
a regular court.[50] With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch
24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a
court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another
court.[51] Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint,
considering that the affirmative defenses for which HGC sought hearing included
its lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Calleja v. Panday,[52] while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of
the RTC exercising jurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special
Commercial Courts authority, dealt squarely with the issue:
Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or
power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial
Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss
the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Certainly, the pronouncement of Br. 24, the Special Commercial Court, in its
Joint Order of 2 January 2008 that the case is not an intracorporate controversy,
amplified in its Order of 1 February 2008 that it does not have the authority to hear
the complaint it being an ordinary civil action is incompatible with the directive for
the re-raffle of the case and to leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this
Court. Such a directive is an exercise of authority over the case, which authority it
had in the same breath declared it did not have. What compounds the jurisdictional
error is the fact that at the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already
acted on the case and had in fact, on 26 October 2005, issued the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point,
there was absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case
considering that the order that was supposed to have caused the re-raffle
was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of absence of jurisdiction. So
faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left the impression that its previously issued
preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from which it issued was
not dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a
transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it
cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the
other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.
2. It is settled that once jurisdiction is acquired and vested in a Court, said Court
maintains its jurisdiction until judgment is had (Aruego, Jr., et al. vs. CA). Such
acquired jurisdiction is not lost by the amendment of a pleading that raises
additional/new cause(s) of action. The jurisdiction of a Court is not even lost even
if the additional docket fees are required by reason of the amendment.
Indeed, the Supreme Court held in PNOC vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107518,
October 8, 1998) that:
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the
lower courts jurisdiction.Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fees should be considered as a lien on the
judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as
its claim for damages in its amended complaint.
Thus, even on the assumption that additional docket fees are required as a
consequence of any amended complaint, its non-payment will not result in the
courts loss of jurisdiction over the case.[57]
The Order of 3 March 2009, with its logic and reason, is wholly
unacceptable.
Admittedly, this Court has repeatedly laid down the test in ascertaining
whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by
determining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. While a claim is,
on the one hand, considered capable of pecuniary estimation if the action is
primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the action is considered incapable of
pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a
consequence of, the principal relief sought.[65] To our mind, the application of
foregoing test does not, however, preclude the further classification of actions into
personal actions and real action, for which appropriate docket fees are
prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages, real
actions are those which affect title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein.[66] While personal actions should be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,[67] the venue for real actions is the
court of the place where the real property is located.[68]
Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its
continuing stake is, in the first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the
conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the same properties sought in the
original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a
real action for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed
or estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid. In
support of its original complaints second cause of action for appointment as trustee
and conveyance of the properties in the Asset Pool, R-II Builders distinctly alleged
as follows:
5.12. As the Court-appointed Trustee, R-II Builders shall have and exercise the
same powers, rights and duties as if [it] had been originally appointed, having the
principal duty of redeeming and buying back the Regular SMPPCs and thereafter
liquidating the Asset Pool, which are also the end goals of the Agreement.
5.12.1. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right
to invest, transfer, convey or assign any of the assets of the Asset Pool,
whether funds, receivables, real or personal property, in exchange for
shares of stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties of any kind,
class or nature, provided that any such investment, transfer, conveyance or
assignment shall not impair the value of the Asset Pool.
5.12.2. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right
to sell, change, assign or otherwise dispose of any stocks, bonds,
securities, real or personal properties or other assets constituting the Asset
Pool.
5.12. 3. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and
right to enter into lease agreements as lessor or any other related contract
for the benefit of the Asset Pool; and
For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original
complaint or, for that matter, its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed
in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order, it stands to reason that jurisdiction over
the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the rule that "a case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court"
in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,[76] this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. To temper said ruling, the Court subsequently issued the following
guidelines in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,[77] viz.:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
The factual and legal milieus of the case at bench could not, however, be
more different. While R-II Builders styled its original complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint as one primarily for the resolution and/or declaration of
the DAC, it simultaneously and unmistakably prayed for the conveyance,
possession and control of the Asset Pool. Alongside the fact that HGC has
consistently questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by R-II
Builders, estoppel cannot be said to have set in since, the lapse of more than five
years from the commencement of the complaint notwithstanding, it appears that
the case has yet to be tried on the merits. Having admitted that its original
complaint partook the nature of a real action and having been directed to pay the
correct docket fees for its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, R-II Builders is,
furthermore, clearly chargeable with knowledge of the insufficiency of the docket
fees it paid. Unmistakably manifesting its intent to evade payment of the correct
docket fees, moreover, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint after its admission and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended
Complaint on the ground that said earlier pleading cannot be considered admitted
in view of its non-payment of the docket and other fees it was directed to pay. In so
doing, however, R-II Builders conveniently overlooked the fact that the very same
argument could very well apply to its original complaint for which given its
admitted nature as a real action - the correct docket fees have also yet to be paid.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 139-165.
[2]
Id. at 165.
[3]
Id. at 1063-1077.
[4]
Id. at 1078-1087.
[5]
Id. at 1063.
[6]
Id. at 1068-1069.
[7]
Id. at 1088.
[8]
Id. at 19-20 and 1094.
[9]
Id. at 1112-1117.
[10]
Id. at 20-22, 354, 142-143 and 505.
[11]
Id. at 22 and 356.
[12]
Id. at 1118-1119.
[13]
Id. at 348-376.
[14]
Id. at 24 and 146.
[15]
Id. at 1416-1423.
[16]
Id. at 440-445.
[17]
Id. at 446-489.
[18]
Id. at 435-437.
[19]
Id. at 438-439.
[20]
Id. at 490-495.
[21]
Id. at 496-500.
[22]
Id. at 496-538.
[23]
Id. at 539-549.
[24]
Id. at 585-590.
[25]
Id. at 325-332.
[26]
Id. at 613-656.
[27]
Id. at 775-793.
[28]
Id. at 823-827.
[29]
Id. at 333-347.
[30]
Id. at 178-313.
[31]
Id. at 139-165.
[32]
Id. at 154-165.
[33]
Id. at 1375-1415.
[34]
Id. at 40-41.
[35]
Id. at 1451-1484.
[36]
Id. at 1485-1488.
[37]
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No.
165382, 17 August 2006, 499 SCRA 253, 263.
[38]
Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 165027, 16 October 2006, 504
SCRA 528, 540.
[39]
General Milling Corporation v. Uytengsu III, G.R. No. 160514, 30 June 2006, 494
SCRA 241, 245.
[40]
Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA 521, 530.
[41]
AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 166744, 2
November 2006, 506 SCRA 625, 654-655.
[42]
Lacson v. Reyes, G.R. No. 86250, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 729, 733.
[43]
Rollo, pp. 348-377.
[44]
Id. at 1416-1423.
[45]
Id. at 446-487.
[46]
Id. at 435-437.
[47]
Id. at 438-439.
[48]
Id. at 211-217.
[49]
Id. at 41-47.
[50]
Atwell v. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc., G.R. No. 169370, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA 272, 281.
[51]
Igot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150794, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 668, 676.
[52]
G.R. No. 168696, 28 February 2006, 483 SCRA 680, 693.
[53]
Rollo, pp. 490-495.
[54]
Id. at 496-538.
[55]
Id. at 539-549.
[56]
Id. at 325-332.
[57]
Id. at 327-328.
[58]
Id. at 333-347.
[59]
Id. at 157-158.
[60]
Id. at 364-371.
[61]
Id. at 376.
[62]
Id. at 357-358.
[63]
Id. at 436.
[64]
Id. at 460-463.
[65]
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 62,
66 (2002).