-1-

he Celtiberian/Lusitanian and
Numantia War

"The war between the Romans and the Celtiberians was

called the 'fiery war,' so remarkable was the uninterrupted

character of the engagements....The engagements as a rule

were only stopped by darkness, the combatants refusing

either to let their courage flag or to yield to bodily fatigue,

and ever rallying, recovering confidence and beginning

afresh. Winter indeed alone put a certain check on the

progress of the whole war and on the continuous character

of the regular battles, so that on the whole if we can

conceive a war to be fiery it would be this and no other

one."

Polybius, The Histories (XXXV.1)

Scipio Africanus had wrested Iberian Península away from Carthage at the Battle of

Ilipa in 206 BC and ended the Second Punic War four years later at the

Battle of Zama. But subjugation of the Iberian Peninsula would require

another two hundred years of intermittent and often savage warfare, in

which Rome, at least in Cicero's estimation, struggled "as with deadly

enemies, not to determine which should be supreme, but which should

survive" (De Officiis, I.38). The most complete account of this war is

provided by the Greek historian Appian in Iberike, the sixth book of his

Roman History. There, in Chapters 44-98, he discusses the Celtiberian

War and, inserted in that section, the Lusitanian War and its hero

Viriathus.Viriathus was born in Lorica (roman name),in the Hermínius mountains,

modern Loriga,Serra da Estrela,in the central Portugal.Viriathus is considered

a great national hero in Portugal and the best celtiberian leader against

Romans in the Iberian Peninsula.The Lusitanian people,ancient of the Portuguese

people,is most power people in the Iberian Peninsula in the resistance war

against Romans.

There had been peace for almost a quarter of a century when, in 155 BC,

a raid into Hispania Ulterior (Farther Spain) by the Lusitani and the

defeat of two successive Roman praetors encouraged the town of Segeda

in Hispania Citerior (Nearer Spain) to rebel. The following year, it

 -2-

refused to pay tribute or provide a military contingent to Rome but

formed instead a confederacy with neighboring towns and began the

construction of a defensive wall. Quintus Fulvius Nobilior (the son of

Marcus Fulvius Nobilior) was sent against the Lusitanians in 153 BC,

with nearly thirty thousand men. But the consul was late in arriving and

ambushed soon after, with six thousand Romans slain.

(Nobilior had been designated consul for the following year but could

not assume office until the Ides of March. Given the military situation,

the Senate decreed January 1 to be the start of the new civil year, which

permitted him to depart with his legions that much sooner. His defeat on

August 23 was so disastrous that the day on which it occurred was

declared a dies ater, a "black day" and subsequently considered unlucky.

Indeed, Appian relates that no Roman general would willingly initiate a

battle on that day.)

A siege of Numantia (Numancia) several days later, where the Segedans

had taken refuge, was no more successful. Three elephants were brought

up against the town walls but became frightened and turned on the

Romans, who retreated in confusion. There were other setbacks, and the

hapless Nobilior was obliged to withdraw to camp, where more men

suffered frostbite and died of the winter cold.

He was succeeded the next year by Claudius Marcellus, who convinced

the native tribes to come to terms, taking hostages and imposing a fine

but granting them pardon. Resentful of such magnanimity, the Senate

demanded, as it would throughout the war, deditio or unconditional

surrender. It rejected the peace proposal and, in 151 BC, sent Licinius

Lucullus with another army. But, before the new consul could arrive,

Marcellus, who "desired that the war should be brought to an end by

himself, thinking that he should gain glory from this too," persuaded the

coalition to give themselves up. Agreeably light terms were imposed,

and the chagrined Lucullus was deprived of a war.

Indeed, sending consuls rather than praetors to Peninsula, especially given

the relatively insignificant events in Segeda, suggests that Peninsula had

become the new theater for military conquest, where an endemic state of

war provided an opportunity for personal and political advancement.

Indeed, eleven of the thirteen commanders sent to Hispania Citerior were

consuls, many of whom, as Appian remarks, "took the command, not for

the advantage of the city [Rome], but for glory, or gain, or the honour of

a triumph." During the next twenty years, the inability of successive

 -3-

Roman consuls to bring the war to a conclusion also made eventual

victory that much more desirable, as each thought he could succeed

where his predecessors had failed.

Certainly Lucullus was such a man. "Being greedy of fame and needing

money," he engaged in a series of unwarranted attacks on a neighboring

tribe, which offered hostages and tribute and the admission of a Roman

garrison into town. Lucullus then had all the adult males massacred and

the town sacked, a betrayal, says Appian, that "brought infamy upon the

Roman name." Another tribe, hearing of such treachery, accepted a treaty

only when Scipio Aemilianus, the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus

and military tribune under Lucullus, personally negotiated for food and

winter clothing. "As for the gold and silver which Lucullus demanded,

and for the sake of which he had waged this war, thinking that all Iberian

abounded with gold and silver, he got none."

In 150 BC, Lucullus joined forces with Sulpicius Galba, praetor for

Hispania Ulterior, who already had been defeated by the Lusitanians the

year before. Now caught between the two armies, the tribe was obliged

to seek peace. Feigning sympathy and offering to resettle them on fertile

land, Galba enticed the Lusitanians out of their towns and divided them

into three groups, each some distance apart. The Romans then massacred

them all in turn. Thousands were slaughtered, the rest sold as slaves.

Galba, "being even more greedy than Lucullus, distributed a little of the

plunder to the army and a little to his friends, but kept the rest himself,

although he was already one of the richest of the Romans." Galba later

was called to account for this treachery but avoided trial. (Although

Lucullus had not even been reprimanded for his earlier atrocity and

Galba escaped punishment by pleading for his children's sake, the Senate

was to become increasingly stringent in its oversight of the war.)

One survivor of the massacre was Viriathus, who emerged as the leader

of the Lusitanians in a sustained the best guerrilla war against Rome

(significantly, guerrilha, itself, is Portuguese in origin, from the diminutive

of guerra, war). He first gained fame when he managed to save his

countrymen just as they were about to surrender. Reminding them of

Rome's perfidy, he promised deliverance if they would obey him.

"Excited by the new hopes with which he inspired them, they chose him

as their leader." With a select band of men on horseback, attacking and

retreating, he harassed the Romans in the field for two days, giving the

others a chance to scatter and escape. In 147 BC, the praetor of Ulterior
 -4-

and ten thousand Romans were ambushed and killed. The next year, his

successor was defeated as well, and Viriathus overran the province.

In 142 BC, having trapped the Romans, Viriathus proposed a treaty

which recognized him as "a friend of the Roman nation." But it, too,

soon was broken, and the Lusitanians were forced to continue fighting

until, finally, in 139 BC, the envoys sent to negotiate peace were bribed

to assassinate Viriathus instead. With his death, "a man who, for a

barbarian, had the highest qualities of a commander, and was always

foremost in facing danger and most exact in dividing the spoils," the

Lusitanian war came to an end. But other guerrilha troops continued to

resist, "the women bore arms with the men, who died with a will, not a

man of them showing his back, or uttering a cry. Of the women who

were captured some killed themselves, others slew their children also

with their own hands, considering death preferable to captivity."

Even as the Lusitanians were resettled, war had begun on another front.

An unexpected defeat had prompted Viriathus to incite the Celtiberians

to renounce their treaty with Rome, and in 143 BC they renewed their

own hostilities. This was the beginning of the Third Celtiberian War or,

as Appian characterizes it, the Numantine War. In 141 BC Pompeius

Aulus was sent to Citerior with thirty thousand men. The campaign was a

series of blundering misadventures and Pompeius was compelled in 139

BC to negotiate a covert settlement. It is likely that the consul had

misrepresented his campaign to the Senate, because, after hostages,

prisoners, and deserters had been turned over, and indemnity paid,

Pompeius reneged and denied ever having made any agreement. His

successor was obliged to refer the entire matter to the Senate, which

decreed that the war should continue.

Hostilius Mancinus, the next consul, fared no better. In 137 BC, while

besieging Numantia, he panicked at the rumor that reinforcements were

being sent and surrendered his entire army, pledging peace between

Rome and the Numantines as equals (foedus). So ignominious was this

treaty to the Senate, having been made without its authorization, that

Mancinus was recalled and Aemilius Lepidus, the other consul for the

year, sent to Peninsula in his place. Inpatient at having to await the outcome

of the debate over the treaty, which eventually was repudiated, he began

to ravage the countryside. The Senate was incredulous at this

unprovoked renewal of hostilities and demanded to know why "after so

many disasters had befallen them in Iberian, Aemilius should be seeking a

 -5-

new war." Suffering from a lack of food, the Romans were compelled to

retreat and desperately tried to decamp under cover of darkness. "Such

was the confusion that they left behind everything, and even the sick and

wounded, who clung to them and besought them not to abandon them."

Only a lunar eclipse saved the Romans from being pursued. Lepidus was

deprived of his command while still in the field (the first time that such

an abrogation ever had occurred) and recalled to Rome in disgrace.

There was debate in the Senate. Mancinus argued that Pompeius was to

blame, having made a similar treaty, himself, and bequeathed to him an

unprepared army. Pompeius contended that he already had been

subjected to an inquiry. Exasperated with both consuls, it was decreed

that Mancinus would be returned to Peninsula and symbolically delivered

naked and bound to the Numantines, in repudiation of the treaty, but he

was refused.

Clearly, the situation was becoming intolerable. There was more

indecisive fighting until, in 134 BC, "the Roman people being tired of

this Numantine war, which was protracted and severe beyond

expectation," elected Scipio Aemilianus to end the war, the law being

waived to allow him the consulship for a second time. Scipio had

destroyed Carthage a dozen years before and, having learned from the

mistakes of his predecessors, took with him only friends and volunteers,

including the Greek historian Polybius, whose lost account of the

Numantine war was utilized by Appian in his own history. This was just

as well, for the valor of the Celtiberians, relates Polybius, was such that

"young men avoided enrolment, finding such excuses as it was

disgraceful to allege, unseemly to examine, and impossible to check"

Mindful, says Florus (I.34.11), of the adage that a general has the army

which he deserves, Scipio expelled the prostitutes and fortune tellers

from camp and dispensed with the use of beds, as well as unnecessary

wagons and pack animals. Camps were fortified and then demolished,

trenches were dug and then filled in again. Men were given allotted tasks

and assigned a particular place while on the march, the army never being

divided or separated. "When he judged that the army was alert, obedient

to himself, and patient in labour, he moved his camp near to Numantia."

Refusing to engage the Numantines, who had fought so desperately in

the past, Scipio sought to defeat them through starvation. Nearby fields

were laid waste and what was not used burned. The stronghold of

Numantia then was circumvallated with a ditch and palisade, behind

 -6-

which was a wall ten feet high. Towers were placed every hundred feet

and mounted with catapults and ballistae. To blockade the nearby river,

logs were placed in the water, moored by ropes on the shore. Swords and

spear heads were embedded in the wood, which rotated in the strong

current. Allied tribes were ordered to send reinforcements. Even

Jugurtha, who later would revolt from Rome, himself, was sent from

Numidia with twelve war elephants. The Roman forces now numbered

sixty-thousand men and were arrayed around the besieged town in seven

camps. The Numantines, "ready though they were to die, no opportunity

was given them of fighting" (Florus, I.34.13).

There were several desperate attempts to break out but they were

repulsed. Nor could there be any help from neighboring towns.

Eventually, as their hunger increased, envoys were sent to Scipio, asking

if they would be treated with moderation if they surrendered, pleading

that they had fought for their women and children, and the freedom of

their country. But Scipio would accept only deditio. Hearing this demand

for absolute submission, the Numantines, "who were previously savage

in temper because of their absolute freedom and quite unaccustomed to

obey the orders of others, and were now wilder than ever and beside

themselves by reason of their hardships," slew their own ambassadors.

In 133 BC, after eight months of siege, the starving population was

reduced to cannibalism and, filthy and foul smelling, compelled to

surrender. But, "such was the love of liberty and of valour which existed

in this small barbarian town," relates Appian, that many chose to kill

themselves rather than capitulate. Families poisoned themselves,

weapons were burned, and the beleaguered town set ablaze. There had

been only about eight-thousand fighting men when the war began; half

that number survived to garrison Numantia. Some of the pitiable

survivors were chosen for Scipio's triumph, the others were sold as

slaves and the town razed to the ground, the territory divided among its

neighbors.

"All glory to a brave city, a city blessed, so it seems to

me, even in its misfortunes; for it loyally helped its allies

and with so small a force withstood for so long a period a

people which was supported by the resources of the whole

world."

Florus, Epitome of Roman History (I.34.16)

The defeat of Numantia in 133 BC marked the end of organized

 -7-

resistance in Iberian Peninsula. Scipio, surnamed "Africanus" (Minor) because of his

earlier victory over Carthage, came also to be known as "Numantinus."

As to why Scipio destroyed the stronghold of Numantia, which had been

a symbol of Celtiberian autonomy for so long, Appian muses that

perhaps it was because "he thought that great calamities are the

foundation of great glory."

Still, there was resistance. In 26-25 BC, the Cantabrian War was fought

in the mountains of northern Peninsula, the first year of the campaign led by

Augustus, himself. In celebration of victory, the doors of the Temple of

Janus, traditionally kept open in times of war, were closed for only the

fourth time in the long history of Rome. But the gesture was premature.

The Cantabrians revolted again in 22 BC and, although they were

defeated,

"Not many of the Cantabri were taken prisoner, for when

they saw they had lost all hope of freedom, they lost all

desire to preserve their lives either. Some set fire to their

forts and cut their own throats, others willingly remained

with their companions and died in the flames, while

others took poison in the sight of all. In this way the great

majority and the fiercest among the tribesmen were wiped

out."

Cassius Dio, Roman History (XLIV.5)

There was one last rebellion in 19 BC, when many of the Cantabrians,

having been sold into slavery after their earlier defeat, murdered their

masters and returned home. Subdued by Agrippa, who killed almost all

those of military age and disarmed the others, the tribe was forced from

its strongholds and compelled to live in the plains. After almost two

centuries, the wars in Iberian Peninsula had come to an end.

On the return of Augustus from Peninsula and Gaul in 13 BC, the Ara Pacis

(Altar of Peace) was consecrated by the Senate to commemorate peace in

the empire. Livy suggests why it had taken so long.

"...Iberian by the nature of the country and the character of

its people, was better adapted than any other place in the

world to making losses good for a renewal of hostilities.

This is the reason why Iberian, though it was the first

mainland province to be entered by the Romans, was the

last to be completely subdued, and held out till our own

times, when it was finally conquered under the leadership

 -8-

and auspices of Augustus Caesar."

The History of Rome (XXVIII.12)

It is difficult not to remember what another rebel leader, in the highlands

of Scotland, is to have said about the Romans before he, too, was

defeated: "They rob, kill and rape and this they call Roman rule. They

make a desert and call it peace."

References: Appian: Wars of the Romans in Iberia (2000) by J. S.

Richardson;

Appian's Roman History (Vol I: The Wars in Spain) (1912) translated by

Horace White (Loeb Classical Library); Polybius: The Histories (Vol VI)

(1927) translated by W. R. Paton (Loeb Classical Library); Dio Cassius:

Roman History (Vol II) (1914) translated by Earnest Cary (Loeb

Classical Library); Lucius Annaeus Florus: Epitome of Roman History

(1929) translated by Edward Seymour Forster (Loeb Classical Library);

Livy: The War with Hannibal (1965) translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt

(Penguin Classics); Cassius Dio: The Roman History (1987) translated

by Ian Scott-Kilvert (Penguin Classics); Tacitus on Britain and Germany

(1948) translated by H. Mattingly (Penguin Classics).

________________________________________