Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the
paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.

Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:

On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court
convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among
others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively
participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was
already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other
ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified
the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following
issues for our resolution:

a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of
this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court,
constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the
Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in
the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor,
amount to estoppel?

b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is
running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly
crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the
crime charged?

c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling
within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and
subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no
 evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of
this case?

d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide
through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the
prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed
against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect?

e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the
victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the
petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9

Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation
and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear
and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of
Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.

While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless
are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively
participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for
his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any
time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable.

To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which
continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the
matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S.
v. De La Santa15 that:

It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to
objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr.,
vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not
within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind.,
79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16

Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:

4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend
upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:

Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an
instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when
subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a
new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly,
where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the
information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot
successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389;
italics ours.)

Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without
jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy,
that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18

But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of
jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:

It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee
presents the question of this Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted
on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the
jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed
down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that
notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such
conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question
actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over ₱200,000). Our minute resolution in
G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a
parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:

x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision,
without questioning the latter’s jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be
considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of
said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice
of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable
judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20

Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking
lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the
active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting
a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated—obviously for
reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs.
Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-
20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to
the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do
so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals,
it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22

For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in
resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle
of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was
developing into a general rule rather than the exception:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is
to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling
was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24

In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the
one who invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we
refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored
principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to
mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the
exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:

While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has
not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief.
Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, we held:

Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in
its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse
decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180,
July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that
included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the
second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s
jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the
lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)

Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:

In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No.
Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to
comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction
over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the
contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing
pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain
affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.

The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a
litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction
(PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of
Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the
Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241
SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 27
where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that
the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus,
was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on
appeal.281avvphi1

Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:

Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous,
considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of
jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a
number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which
this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a court’s jurisdiction
after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the
issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose
purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the
rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases
in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches
should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez,
which we quote:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is
to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.
Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses
contained in the answer.30

Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part
in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the
doctrine in Calimlim, said:

Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel
through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of
laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32

And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel
by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual
milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly
present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At
several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety
invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner
Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt,
promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that
effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the
case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the
court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on
when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court
does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where
the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before
the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True,
delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it
further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the
condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity
and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less
15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to
be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must
be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the
doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. 39
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the
Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or
tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz
and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government

agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner
or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the
parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of
the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause
of action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by
the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined
by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues
or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and
collateral attacks.43

With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the
petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case
No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 171542 April 6, 2011

ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO
CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, DONATO ENABE and ALFIE FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 20052 in "People of the
Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al."
(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution dated February 6, 20063 denying
respondents’ motion for reconsideration.4 The assailed rulings denied the petition for certiorari
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the ruling5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. DU-10123.6

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder
and double attempted murder against several accused, including Magno, who were public officers
working under the National Bureau of Investigation.7

During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and
authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf
of the Office of the Ombudsman.8 The oral objection was reduced to writing on July 21, 2003 when
Magno filed an opposition9 before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the provisions of
Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.10

The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment,11 while the accused submitted their joint
opposition.12 The respondents likewise submitted their comments to the opposition of the other co-
accused.13

On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that "the Ombudsman is proper, legal and
authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than
those authorized under R.A. 6770."14

In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which the
RTC later denied in its October 1, 2003 Order.15
Proceedings before the CA

On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy,
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.16 They contended that the RTC committed a grave abuse
of discretion in prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the private offended parties,
as the Rules of Court expressly provides that a private offended party may intervene, by counsel, in
the prosecution of offenses.17

Magno, in his comment18 filed on December 15, 2003, insisted that what he questioned before the
RTC was the appearance and authority of the private prosecutor to prosecute the case in behalf of
the Ombudsman.19 He stressed that while the Office of the Ombudsman can designate prosecutors
to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or authorizing
prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state prosecutors and government
lawyers. It does not extend to private practitioners/private prosecutors.20 He further stressed that
while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman is the proper legal and
authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene personally, as the
Office of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private respondents in prosecuting the civil
aspect of the case.21

On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private prosecutor may
appear for the petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the
case is concerned.22

The respondents moved for the reconsideration23 of the CA decision. On September 26, 2005, the
CA amended its decision,24 ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in
Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration
with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.25

Failing to obtain a reconsideration26 of the amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to this
Court through the present petition for review on certiorari27 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Procedure.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the
power to hear and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan.28 To support this contention,
Magno invokes Engr. Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, etc., et al.29 where the Court
held that the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.30

Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor cannot
be allowed to intervene for the respondents as it would violate Section 31 of RA No. 6770. 31 Section
31 limits the Ombudsman’s prerogative to designate prosecutors to fiscals, state prosecutors and
government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to deputize private
practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.32

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, submitted its
memorandum on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may
intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court.33 Section 31 merely allows the Ombudsman to designate and deputize any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution in certain cases.34 The Ombudsman opines that the two
provisions of law "are not diametrically opposed nor in conflict,"35 as "a private prosecutor may
appear for the private offended complainants in the prosecution of an offense independent of the
exclusive right of the Ombudsman to deputize."36 The Ombudsman, however, did not address the
contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to grant the petition.

The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC’s decision not to allow Atty.
Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:

xxxx

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions
or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs
and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the
filing of civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had theretofore
been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by
RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.

We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.37 In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion for not dismissing the
information for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA refused to take
cognizance of the case, holding that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition.
Recognizing the amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975,38 we sustained the CA’s
position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to include
petitions for "mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs
and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."39
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by
Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari,
the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with
the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are
public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National
Bureau of Investigation.40

The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we overrule
the September 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of Magno’s motions
for reconsideration.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and

the CA’s judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.

There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law, 41 and
any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void42 and cannot be given any effect.43 This
rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after
final judgment.44

We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et
al.,45 as follows:

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties’ action or conduct.
Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by
law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.1avvphil Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed.
This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone
the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.

We note that Magno had already raised – in his supplemental motion for reconsideration before the
CA46 – the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the CA’s Decision became final. The CA did not even
consider this submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged failure to raise new or
substantial grounds for reconsideration.47 Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction is a new and
substantial argument that the CA should have passed upon.

The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to cure the jurisdictional
defect of its petition before the CA

The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case since Magno raised the issue
of jurisdiction before the CA’s decision became final. Further, even if the issue had been raised only
on appeal to this Court, the CA’s lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. In Machado, 48 citing
People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,49 we held:

In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel." However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated on September 26,
2005, as well as its Resolution of February 6, 2006, NULL AND VOID for having been issued without
jurisdiction. The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision
within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991

NONILLON A. BAGALIHOG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Br. 45, RTC of Masbate; and MAJOR
JULITO ROXAS, respondents.

Jolly T. Fernandez for petitioner.

Antonio Llacer for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

We are asked once again to rule on the validity of a search and seizure as tested by the
requirements of the Bill of Rights and to balance the demands of an orderly society with the
imperatives of individual liberty.

On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the
Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the
petitioner's house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers
had sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless.

Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the
petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant.
The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.

After investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged with multiple murder and
frustrated murder for the killing of Espinosa and three of his bodyguards and the wounding of
another person.

On June 21, 1989, the petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the
motorcycle with an application for a writ of replevin, plus damages in the total amount of
P55,000.001 This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3878 in Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate.

On November 7, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent manifestation for the deposit of the motorcycle
with the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, on the ground that PC soldiers were
using the vehicle without authority. The motion was granted on November 10, 1989, by Judge
Ricardo Butalid.

Judge Butalid later inhibited himself and Civil Case No. 3878 was transferred to Branch 45, presided
by Judge Gil Fernandez. In the criminal cases, a change of venue was ordered by this Court from
Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On October 12, 1990, Judge Fernandez dismissed Civil Case No. 3878, in an order holding in part as
follows:

The question to be resolved is whether Replevin is proper to recover the possession of said
motorcycle.

It is admitted that the motorcycle in question, now in the possession of the Clerk of Court of
Masbate, is to be used as evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 5811-5814, now pending trial
before Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. This Court opined that
it has no jurisdiction to release evidence impounded or surrendered to the PC-CIS Task
Force Espinosa.

Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and cannot be
replevied until such custody is ended. (77 C.J.S. 28.)

Granting as claimed by plaintiff that said motorcycle was illegally seized, he can raise the
issue when presented during the trial.

The proper Court to order its release, the motorcycle in question, is the Presiding Judge of
Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner now asks this Court to reverse the said order.

His contention is that the motorcycle was invalidly seized and that therefore he has a right to its
return.1awp++i1 The proper remedy for this purpose is his complaint for recovery and the issuance
of a writ of replevin as authorized by the Rules of Court. In refusing to grant him relief and
dismissing the case instead on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court committed
reversible error that he prays this Court will correct.

In his comment, the private respondent admits the absence of a search warrant when the
motorcycle was seized but stresses that the crime perpetrated is a heinous offense. Espinosa was a
man of consequence. The motorcycle in question is an extremely mobile vehicle and can be easily
dismantled or hidden, and the unique situation existing at that time required him to place it in the
custody of the PC-CIS Task Force Espinosa without first securing a search warrant. In doing so, he
merely complied with the orders of his superior to preserve the vehicle for use as evidence in the
criminal cases.

We share Captain Roxas's concern for the apprehension of the killers but cannot agree with his
methods. While recognizing the need for the punishment of crime, we must remind him that in our
system of criminal justice, the end does not justify the means. For all his strong conviction about the
guilt of the petitioner, the private respondent must still abide by the Constitution and observe the
requirements of the Bill of Rights. Article III, Section 2, provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
 of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized even during
the days of the absolute monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On this right, Cooley wrote:
"Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his
cottage against him and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly
prerogatives."2

The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be
guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that
in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous" and the victim was "a man of
consequence" did not authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior
orders" condone the omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.

We do not find that the importance of the motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases
excused its seizure without a warrant. The authorities had enough time to comply with the required
procedure but they did not do so, preferring the unconstitutional shortcut. The crime was
committed on March 17, 1989, and the motorcycle was seized only on March 19, 1989, or two days
later. During that period, the private respondent had all the opportunity to apply for a search
warrant and establish probable cause in accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court.
He did not.

The following observation in Alih v. Castro3 is an appropriate reminder:

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent.
They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant
before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would
be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly
processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way
into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.

xxx xxx xxx

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN
civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, they instead simply barged into
the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just
force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his
rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the
ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.

The mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the search warrant redundant for it is not denied
that the vehicle remained with the petitioner until it was forcibly taken from him. The fear that it
would be dismantled or hidden was mere speculation that was not borne out by the facts. The
extraordinary events cited in People v. Court of First Instance of Rizal4 are not present in the case
now before us. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the motorcycle without the prior
obtention of a warrant has not been established.
The private respondent himself emphasizes that the petitioner had promised in the morning of
March 19, 1989, to present the motorcycle in case it was needed during the investigation of the
killings.5 There was no reason to fear that it would be concealed by the petitioner, who presumably
was under police surveillance at the time as one of the suspected killers. He could not have had that
much opportunity to hide the vehicle even if he wanted to.

The private respondent maintains that by the petitioner's promise, he effectively waived the right
to a search warrant and so can no longer complain that the motorcycle had been invalidly seized.
There was no such waiver. The petitioner merely agreed to cooperate with the investigators and to
produce the vehicle when needed, but he did not agree to have it impounded. The record shows
that he expressed reservations when this was suggested and said he needed the motorcycle for his
official duties as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and in his private business.6 At any
rate, it has been shown that he was unwilling to surrender it at the time it was taken without
warrant, and that made the taking unlawful.

In Roan v. Gonzales,7 the Court said:

It is true that are certain instances when a search when a search may be taken validly made
without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a
warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being
arrested is frisked for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting
officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and
contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft
are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and
their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to
be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that
prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the
peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.

The case at bar does not come under any of the above specified exceptions. The warrantless seizure
of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative of "the right to be let alone" by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution. The vehicle cannot even be detained on the ground that it is a
prohibited article the mere possession of which is unlawful.

In dismissing Civil Case No. 3878, the respondent judge said he had no jurisdiction over the
motorcycle because it was in custodia legis and only the judge trying the criminal cases against the
petitioner and his co-accused could order its release. He cited the general doctrine that:

Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and cannot be
replevied, until such custody is ended.8

It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies
only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against
warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by
that fact alone in custodia legis.9 As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar10 "A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive
officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ." Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue
of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.11
The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the clerk of
court on motion of the petitioner did not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The respondent judge
had no authority over it because it had not been lawfully seized nor had it been voluntarily
surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The private respondent observed in his comment that "it
is only when the exhibits are offered in evidence and admitted by the court that they are submitted
to the custody of the Court, and, before that, "they are usually in the possession of the prosecution."
Even he agrees therefore that the motorcycle is not in custodia legis.

At that, the vehicle in the case at bar is not admissible as an exhibit even if offered as such because it
is "the fruit of the poisonous tree." Under Article III, Sec. 3(2) "any evidence obtained in violation"
of the rule against unreasonable searches and seizure "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."

Our finding is that the action to recover the motorcycle in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate will
not constitute interference with the processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and that,
consequently, the complaint should not have been dismissed by the respondent judge.

The Judiciary is as anxious as the rest of the government that crime be prevented and, if committed,
redressed.1âwphi1 There is no question that the person who violates the law deserves to be
punished to the full extent that the attendant circumstances will allow. But the prosecution of the
suspected criminal cannot be done with high-handedness or prejudgment, in disregard of the very
laws we are supposed to uphold. Zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary
methods that the Constitution itself abhors.

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge dated October 12, 1990, is SET ASIDE and Civil
Case No. 3878 is REINSTATED for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321. March 10, 2004]

VICTORY LINER, INC., represented by JOHNNY T. HERNANDEZ, President, complainant, vs. JUDGE
REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

For our resolution is the verified complaint of Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) against respondent Judge
Reynaldo B. Bellosillo, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Orani,
Bataan, and Acting Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, oppression, and inaction on a pending motion.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-935 was cruising along the
National Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista
Morales. Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial expenses of
Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March 2000, VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an
Agreement/Undertaking.1[1] On 14 March 2000, after payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M.
Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of the heirs of the victim, executed a Release
of Claim2[2] and an Affidavit of Desistance3[3] in favor of VLI and the driver Reino de la Cruz.

However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marcianas sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B.
Morales, who were also signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed a Pinagsamang
Salaysay4[4] against Reino de la Cruz. On the strength of that document, a criminal complaint was
filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide,5[5] which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10512.

After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered the
immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be
posted in cash. He further directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to immediately
impound the bus involved in the accident, which could be released only upon the posting of a cash
bond in the amount of P50,000.6[6]

On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion7[7] manifesting that it was depositing to
the court under protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. After making the deposit,
VLIs counsel presented the receipt issued by the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Dinalupihan, to the Chief of
Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, who then released the bus.

On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondents court a petition8[8] to declare null and void the order
directing it to post bond for the release of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed for
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.

On that same day also, respondent Judge Bellosillo issued an order directing the Chief of Police of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and his deputies and investigators to explain in writing why they should not
be held in contempt of court for, and be administratively charged with, having released without a
court order the Victory Liner bus involved in Criminal Case No. 10512. Thus, the bus was re-
impounded by the police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan.

Subsequently, on 18 April 2000, respondent Judge acted on VLIs Manifestation and Motion dated 30
March 2000 and issued an order9[9] for the release of the bus.
On 23 June 2000, VLI filed a verified complaint10[10] with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) claiming that the respondent (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in impounding its bus
and requiring it to post a cash bond for the release of the bus; (b) gravely abused his authority
when it revoked the surety bond of one of VLIs driver Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373; (c)
knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive order when he increased the bond to P350,000 and
required that it be posted in cash; (d) gravely abused his authority when he ordered the police
authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to file a case against Reino de la Cruz; and (e) is guilty of
inaction or dereliction of duty in failing to resolve, despite the lapse of two months, VLIs petition for
the nullification of the order requiring the posting of a cash bond for the release of the bus involved
in the accident. Later, VLI filed with the Office of the Chief Justice a verified supplemental complaint
against the respondent, which was forthwith indorsed to the OCA.

In his comment,11[11] respondent Judge Bellosillo explains that in the exercise of his sound
discretion and in the greater interest of justice and fair play, he required a cash bond of P50,000 for
the release of the police-impounded vehicle to answer for damages by way of subsidiary liability in
case of accuseds insolvency. The requirement of a bond for the release of impounded vehicles
involved in reckless imprudence cases is practiced not only by him but by other judges throughout
the country.

As for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory Liner bus, respondent Judge claims that it was
just under the circumstances considering that its prior release was illegal. The payment of cash
bond for the release of the impounded vehicle was made by the VLI when respondent Judge was at
his official station in the MCTC of Orani-Samal, Bataan. Thus, in his absence, no order could have
been issued for the release of the impounded vehicle. If ever said vehicle had to be re-impounded, it
was the fault of VLIs counsel, as he was the one who misled the police authorities into believing that
with the payment of the bond, the bus could already be released.

The respondent justifies the substitution of the surety bond of accused Edwin Serrano in Criminal
Case No. 9373 with a cash bond on the strength of the prayer of the prosecutor that the bond be
posted in cash in view of the gravity of the offense. The Rules of Court leave to the discretion of trial
judges the question of whether a bail should be posted in the form of a corporate surety bond,
property bond, cash deposit, or personal recognizance. Having found that Serranos surety bond,
which was not even attached to the information but merely noted on the third page thereof, was in
a minimal amount and had expired already, he required a cash bond. He increased the bond after
considering that Serrano was a fugitive from justice.

Respondent Judge Bellosillo denies that he ordered the police authorities of Dinalupihan to file the
criminal case against Reino de la Cruz. He points to (a) the Pinagsamang Salaysay dated 3 March
2000 of Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, which was the basis for the filing of the criminal
complaint by the police investigator and; (b) the fact that said criminal complaint filed by the police
investigator was duly approved by the Chief of Police. Thus, with these circumstances, it could not
be said that he compelled the police authorities into filing the criminal case.

As to the charge of dereliction of duty for failure to act on the petition for the nullification of the
order requiring a bond for the release of VLIs bus, respondent Judge avers that the same is baseless.
Contrary to VLIs contention, he acted on that petition as early as 10 April 2000, which was the date
set by VLIs counsel for the hearing of such petition.12[12] VLIs counsel did not appear on that date
and refused to accept or receive notices of hearing and court orders from court personnel.

In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza, the OCA Consultant to whom
this case was referred by the Court, submits that Judge Bellosillos resignation, which was accepted
by the Court En Banc effective 27 March 2002, does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative complaint. He finds that the respondent Judge erred in ordering the impounding of
the Victory Liner bus and in requiring a cash bond of P50,000 for its release; in fixing an excessive
bail bond for Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512; and in increasing the bail bond of Edwin
Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373 unconscionably from P60,000 to P350,000. He then recommends
that the respondent Judge be penalized with a fine of P20,000. But for lack of evidence, he
exonerates respondent Judge from complainants charge that he compelled the police authorities
into filing the criminal case against De la Cruz. As to respondents alleged inaction on VLIs petition
to declare null and void the order requiring a bond for the release of the subject bus, Justice Atienza
finds that the said petition was resolved on 10 April 2000, right on the day it was submitted for
resolution. Likewise, he disregards the additional charges in the supplemental complaint, there
being no showing that the respondent received a copy thereof.

Justice Atienza also notes that in A.M. No. 00-1293, promulgated on 5 July 2000, respondent Judge
was reprimanded for issuing a policy action and an order beyond the scope of his authority; and in
MTJ No. 00-1308, promulgated on 16 December 2002, respondent Judge was found guilty of undue
delay in rendering a decision and was ordered to pay a fine of P11,000 to be taken from his
retirement benefits. He further notes the pending administrative cases against respondent Judge:
(1) OCA IPI No. 96-232-MTJ for conduct unbecoming a judge; (2) OCA IPI No. 98-533-MTJ for
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and gross misconduct; (3) OCA IPI No. 96-203-MTJ
for issuing an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law; (4) A.M. No. 99-1222 for
violation of the constitutional rights to information and to speedy trial; and (5) undocketed cases
for unprofessional and ill-mannered conduct, refusing to receive documents, and illegal possession
of firearms.

Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not render moot and academic the
instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in
office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.13[13]
We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the respondent from the charges of inaction on a
pending motion and of compelling the police authorities to file a criminal case against De la Cruz.
We, however, hesitate to hold the respondent administratively accountable for gross ignorance of
the law in ordering (1) the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident and (2) the
posting of a P50,000 bond for the release of the vehicle, both of which were found by OCA
Consultant Atienza to be erroneous.

Notably, in its Motion to Resolve, VLI submits that this case presents a good occasion for us to
resolve, among other issues, the legality of the imposition by trial judges on bus operators to post
bail bond for their impounded vehicles in accident cases, in addition to the bail bond required for
the provisional liberty of accused-drivers. According to VLI, our ruling on this matter would guide
trial court judges nationwide in accident cases so that bus operators and their personnel would not
be at the mercy of judges like the respondent in this case, who during his incumbency had been
requiring vehicle owners involved in accidents to post cash bonds for the release of impounded
vehicles.

In Lacadin v. Mangino,14[14] the respondent Judge therein was sought to be administratively liable
for extending the lifetime of a search warrant issued by him. We held that even if he may have
committed an error of judgment or an abuse of discretion for such act, he cannot be punished
administratively therefor in the absence of proof that he was motivated by ignominy or ill-will.
Moreover, we ruled that the administrative case is not the right forum to determine whether the life
of a search warrant may be extended by the court upon proper motion filed before the expiration of
the 10-day period.

Worth noting also is the case of Caas v. Castigador.15[15] In that case, an Isuzu trailer truck
involved in a vehicular mishap was ordered impounded in an Order of 11 September 1996 of the
trial court where the criminal case against its driver was pending. That order was addressed to the
Chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite, or any officer of the law. In an earlier order of 14 August
1996, the vehicle owner was required to surrender the truck to the court. Subsequently, on motion
of the prosecutor, the trial court declared the vehicle owner guilty of indirect contempt for
continued defiance of the 11 September 1996 Order. However, upon the vehicle owners petition,
we found respondents order holding the petitioner therein guilty of indirect contempt to be highly
improper for several reasons. But we did not pass upon the issue of the legality of the impounding
of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident. We did not declare the order for the impounding of
the vehicle to be illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it could have been one of the several reasons
for admonishing the respondent Judge therein.

In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the
legality of respondents order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded
vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less
by way of an administrative case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago
v. Vasquez,16[16] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking a ruling directly from us must be put to a halt.17[17]

It must be recalled that on 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent judges court a Petition to Declare
Order Directing Victory Liner, Inc., to Post Bond for the Release of the Bus Null and Void.18[18] In
that petition, VLI submitted that there is no legal basis for the order directing the impounding of the
bus and the posting by the bus owner of a cash bond for its release, and hence that order is void ab
initio.19[19] However, despite notice, VLIs counsel Atty. Reynaldo R. Romero did not appear on 10
April 2000, the schedule20[20] for the hearing of that petition as set by him.21[21] The respondent
thereupon issued an order22[22] dismissing the petition outright on grounds of improper venue
and lack of jurisdiction, and ordering that a copy of the said order be furnished VLIs counsel at his
given address. However, VLIs counsel reportedly refused to accept or receive from court personnel
notices of hearing and court orders. And, according to respondent Judge, he (VLIs counsel) never
appeared and continued not to appear before the respondent for reasons known only to him.23[23]
VLI cannot, therefore, resurrect that issue directly before us, and much less through a mere verified
administrative complaint or motion to resolve.

To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an
administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and
of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements
inherent in the filing of a proper petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall
shun from passing upon that issue in this case.

In any event, the absence of a ruling in Caas v. Castigador on the legality of the impounding of
vehicles involved in an accident, as well as the foregoing statements of VLI in its Motion to Resolve,
implies that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter. They would, therefore, negate a
finding of gross ignorance of the law or grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent Judge.
Moreover, even assuming that the acts of the respondent in ordering the impounding and
subsequent re-impounding of the subject vehicle and in requiring the posting of a cash bond for its
release were erroneous, as found by OCA Consultant Atienza, such are errors of judgment that
cannot be the subject of a disciplinary action absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or bad
faith.24[24] A judge may not be held administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision
he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render a judicial office unbearable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
rendering a judgment. For a judge to be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, it is
necessary that the law be sufficiently basic that all that the judge must do is to simply apply
it;25[25] or that the error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith.26[26]

We, however, find respondent administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on
accused Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373.

The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.27[27]
Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,28[28] provides that in
fixing the amount of bail, the judge must primarily consider the following factors:

a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

c) Penalty for the offense charged;

d) Character and reputation of the accused;

e) Age and health of the accused;

f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;

g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;

h) Forfeiture of the bonds;

i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.

The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this
purpose. Excessive bail shall not be required.29[29] In implementing this mandate, the accuseds
financial capability should particularly be considered. What is reasonable to a wealthy person may
not be so to a man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.30[30]

Moreover, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice (DOJ), crimes of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
bail shall be P30,000 regardless of the number of deaths. 31[31]
De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Although permanently employed as drivers of VLI, it could not be said that each was
capable of posting a cash bail bond of P50,000 and P350,000, respectively. In fixing such amounts,
the respondent apparently did not take into account the gravity of the offense charged and the
financial capability of the accused. He thereby willfully disregarded the guidelines under Section 9,
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, and the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of
the DOJ. In effect, he violated the constitutional right of the accused to bail, as well as the
prohibition against excessive bail, making the right, in the words of Justice Jackson, a teasing
illusion like a munificent bequest in a paupers will.32[32]

The bail fixed by the respondent is all the more excessive because it was in the form of cash. The
posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its
procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of
altogether denying the accuseds constitutional right to bail. On the other hand, a surety bond may
be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. A surety or property
bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property
owner. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at
which the property can be sold is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of
the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to conviction or acquittal.33[33]

While cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond
primarily belongs to the accused,34[34] as can be gleaned from the language of Section 14, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,35[35] which read:

SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash
with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount
of bail fixed by the court or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case, and
upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the accused shall be discharged from
custody.
The respondent judge, therefore, grossly erred in converting Serranos surety bond to cash bond
and in demanding that De la Cruz post a cash bond to obtain their provisional liberty.36[36]

It bears repeating that judges should exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the basic legal
norms and precepts, as well as with statutes and procedural rules. As advocates of justice and
visible representations of the law, they are expected to keep abreast with the law and
jurisprudence, and be proficient in the application and interpretation thereof. When the law or rule
is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less than that is gross ignorance of
the law.37[37]

In light of our current jurisprudence,38[38] the respondent should be fined in the amount of
P10,000 for his act of imposing on accused De la Cruz and Serrano an excessive bail to be posted in
cash in violation of pertinent rules and guidelines, as well as the constitutional right of the accused
to bail and the proscription against excessive bail.

WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and oppression in imposing excessive cash bail bonds
on Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373,
respondent Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) to be taken from his retirement benefits.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154557

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
The HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, 12th DIVISION, RICO Promulgated:
LIPAO, and RICKSON LIPAO,
Respondents. February 13, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction continues to the final
conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over
such dispute in another court or tribunal unless the statute provides for retroactivity.39[1]

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify the June 13, 2002
Decision40[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 which set aside the July 25,
1994 Judgment41[3] of the Surigao City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 551 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao for violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 705,42[4] as amended by Executive Order No. (EO)
277.43[5]

On February 24, 1992, private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao were indicted for and
pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO 277. The Information in
Criminal Case No. 551 reads:
 That on or about the 21st day of October 1991 in Cagdianao, Surigao del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rico
Lipao and Rickson Lipao without legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess without license eight (8)
pieces of round timbers and 160 bundles of firewood with a market value of
P3,100.00, said forest products not covered with legal transport document, and
willfully and unlawfully load these forest products in the pumpboat Rickjoy owned
by Rico Lipao, nor the accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao holders of a license
issued by the DENR, to the prejudice of the government in the sum of P3,100.00.

Contrary to law. The offense is punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as provided under Section 68 of PD
No. 705.44[6]

The offense charged is punishable under Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 309. Penalties.Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. The penalty of prisiόn correccional in its medium and maximum

period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
Prisiόn correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months while prisiόn correccional in its
maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years.

Parenthetically, during the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and before the RTC
rendered its Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 769145[7] took effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days
after its publication on March 30, 1994. RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MCTCs) in criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof. Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof.

On July 25, 1994, the RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private respondents guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Rico Lipao
and Rickson Lipao both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section
68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of
1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; and each to pay one-half
of the costs.
The posts and firewood in question, or the proceeds thereof if sold at public
auction are hereby forfeited in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.46[8]

Private respondents seasonably interposed their appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 17275. They argued that private respondent Rickson was subjected to an illegal search and
seizure of the round posts and firewood which cannot be used as evidence against him. They
insisted that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) personnel together
with some Philippine National Police personnel who stopped private respondent Rickson did not
have a search warrant. They also opined that the plain sight or open review doctrine is inapplicable
as the posts and firewood are not incriminatory, more so as firewood is available and sold in public
markets without the requirement of any permit from the DENR.

Moreover, private respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove their lack of
license to possess timber. They contended that since private respondent Rico is merely the owner
of the pumpboat and was not present when the posts and firewood were seized, he could never be
held liable for illegal possession of timber as he was never in possession of the round posts. Relying
on People v. Macagaling,47[9] private respondents asserted that constructive possession of forest
products is no longer the rule in successfully prosecuting offenses for violation of the Forestry
Code.

On June 13, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting the appeal of private
respondents and dismissing the case before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. The
decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE.
The instant criminal case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.48[10]

In sustaining the appeal of private respondents, the CA did not rule on the assigned errors
or on the merits of the case. It anchored its dismissal of the criminal case on the lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC to hear and decide it.
 Thus, People of the Philippines filed the instant petition, raising the sole assignment of error
that:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY

DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ON THE
GROUND THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE IN VIEW OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691 WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE
ON APRIL 15, 1994.49[11]

Petitioner People posits that the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto take jurisdiction
away from the RTC to hear and decide the instant criminal case instituted prior to the passage of
said law expanding the jurisdiction of the MTCs.

On the other hand, in their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents do not meet
head on the sole issue raised by petitioner on jurisdiction but instead argue that the instant petition
should have been outrightly dismissed on the grounds of noncompliance with the

requirements for a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and the requisites for a valid
verification. Private respondents asseverate that the instant petition cannot be entertained as no
motion for reconsideration has been filed before the CA, which is a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy available to petitioner and an indispensable and jurisdictional requirement for the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, relying on Labudahon v. NLRC.50[12] Moreover, they contend
that an action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy as the dismissal by the CA on lack of
jurisdiction did not constitute double jeopardy and, thus, an appeal through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy. They maintain that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), while undoubtedly the counsel for the State and its agencies, cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office,
which in the instant case is the DENR.

The arguments of private respondents are unmeritorious.

On the issue of the propriety of the resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 instead of a petition under Rule 45, we find that Rule 65 is the proper remedy. The CA ruled that
the RTC was ousted of its jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of RA 7691. While the defense of
lack of jurisdiction was never raised by private respondents before the RTC and the CA, the CA
nevertheless proceeded to acquit private respondents based on the new law. It is quite glaring from
Sec. 7 of RA 7691 that said law has limited retroactivity only to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion as it acted in an arbitrary and patently erroneous exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the use of Rule 65 is proper.

On other procedural issues, we also find for petitioner. First, we reiterate our holding in
Santiago and City Warden of the Manila City Jail that the signature by the Solicitor General on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this

Court is substantial compliance of the requirement under Sec. 4,51[13] Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, considering that the OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, more so in a criminal case where
the People or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.
 Second, while it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed CA Decision which normally is a ground for dismissal for being premature52[14] and to
accord respondent CA opportunity to correct itself,53[15] yet the rule admits of exceptions, such as
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless,54[16] and where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government.55[17]

In the instant case, these exceptions are present; thus, the propriety of the instant petition.
The assailed CA Decision rendered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction clearly bespeaks that any
motion for reconsideration is useless. For one, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was never raised by
private respondents in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,56[18] but was considered motu
proprio by the CA. For another, the issues and errors raised by private respondents were not
considered and much less touched upon by the CA in its assailed Decision.
 But of more importance, as this Court held in Vivo v. Cloribel,57[19] a motion for
reconsideration is not necessary before a petition for certiorari can be filed when the respondent
court took almost eight years to the day to resolve private respondents appeal. It is not only the
accused who has a right to a speedy disposition of his case, but the prosecution or the State
representing the People also has and must be accorded the same right. Thus, any further delay
would prejudice the interest of the Government to prosecute and bring closure to a criminal case
filed way back in early 1992.

On the main issue of whether the RTC retained jurisdiction over the criminal case, we agree
with petitioner. The passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto relieve the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear
and decide the criminal case against private respondents.

This issue has been laid to rest in People v. Velasco, where this Court emphatically held:

As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional
Trial Court of jurisdiction over appellants case, we rule in the negative. It has been
consistently held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the
rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a
statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot
be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply
only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from
an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having
retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional
Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated above is the
controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case against the appellant was
 commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court
had jurisdiction over the offense charged, inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior to the amendments introduced by R.A. 7659 and
R.A. 7691), provided that:

Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal

Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent
original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this
Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of
cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.

xxxx

It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent

jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the
jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by
the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the
information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the
action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to
stress, prospective in nature.58[20] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case of Yu Oh v. Court of
Appeals,59[21] in the 2004 case of Alonto v. People,60[22] and in the 2005 case of Lee v. Court of
Appeals.61[23]
 Thus, where private respondents had been charged with illegal logging punishable under
Articles 30962[24] and 31063[25] of the Revised Penal Code with imprisonment ranging from four
(4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction at
the inception of the criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the criminal case attached upon the filing
of the information, then the RTC is empowered and mandated to try and decide said case
notwithstanding a subsequent change in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the same nature
under a new statute. The rule is settled that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it
can do to exercise that jurisdiction unless the law provides otherwise.64[26]

While jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, private respondents
did not bother to raise the issue of jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. In addition, private
respondents did not lift a finger to reinforce the CA decision relying on lack of jurisdiction as
ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 551 in their submissions before this Court. Indeed, it
appears that even respondents are not convinced of the correctness of the CA ruling on the issue of
jurisdiction.

Lastly, the CA committed reversible error in making use of the values adduced during the
hearing to determine jurisdiction. It is basic that the jurisdiction of a court is determined both by
the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action and by the allegations in the
Complaint or Information.

Thus, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction when it heard and decided Criminal Case No. 551. The
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled
that the RTC was divested of jurisdiction by reason of the enactment of RA 7691.

However, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, we remand the case to the CA to
resolve the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 13, 2002 CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 17275 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The CA is directed to resolve the appeal of
private respondents on the merits and with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199113

RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for
certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for
redetermination of probable cause.

The factual antecedents:

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they
purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they
constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the
petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the
Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits
between him and private respondent’s family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable
cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for
review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was
void ab initio.8

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ
which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices
to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an
information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012)
and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of
the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a
distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost
their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act
No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to
have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the
MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the
motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that
since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in
Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired
Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the
motion for reconsideration.14

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the
person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the
court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal
fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been
lost on account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was
already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his
subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not
his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.

On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after
finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy
or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino
citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioner is now before us arguing that –

A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by
re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not to
 have lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his
wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the
same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the
retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings in
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the
retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application
therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the
simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public document, it is
not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s
defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a
full- blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that
in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination
of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction
by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and
personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the
evidence submitted before the court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly
denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003," was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said
law read:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,

natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
(Emphasis supplied)

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another
country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the
phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of
natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are
those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino
citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, "re-
acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of
Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and
"retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization
in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title
declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He
asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred
because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it
becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been
understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of
R.A. 9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made
clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin
Drilon was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:

REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, "Any
provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of
their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who
acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their
citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this
act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-
born citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered
natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their
citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon
the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.

The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So
that’s the distinction.

REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between
natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because
natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But
just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization.
Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth
Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section
3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came
into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section
3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section
3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.

Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced.
Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle
that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23
R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC
refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:

(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;

(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;
and

(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen
at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for
denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior
to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of
arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person,
is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29
(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of
probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the
law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102
and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo
City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito
Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s
name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt
Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated
December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently,
Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were
fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the
P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No.
0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal
and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust
from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt
Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for
expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266,
but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the
said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of
P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not
Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner
was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive
portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty
of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned
information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a
penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4)
Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth
Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from
the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings
and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under which he was accused in
the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC in
a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of
the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on
Certiorari12 before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for
review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the
following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK
OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER
THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO
CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the
evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999,
without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22
December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well.
Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption
that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The
only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by
petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati.
Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the
crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita.
Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended
party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by
Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no
showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion
for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed
its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The
OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the
delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him
and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his
claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is,
in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However,
the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not
raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also
one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof
was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the
demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in
view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the
factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as
follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission
of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to
where it was committed:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja,
the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage
of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to
him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount
of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied
with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered
that said receipts were fabricated documents.15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific
evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the
prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing
evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence,
but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a
reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was
executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was
delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the
money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes
with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even
pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus,
his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution’s
evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he
had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be given
evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have
been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and
assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate
tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also
prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction
of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution
failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court’s
jurisdiction. The Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave
any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum
scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC
of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from
the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of
the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of
P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the
certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap
wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to
Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense
charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of
Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the
latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap
wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap
wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in
Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce
Yu to part with his money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the
crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with
the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b)
of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust
from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati.
However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to
where the offense was committed. It provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS

the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me
a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to
transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay
the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid
property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a check

for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of
P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at
Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods
or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where
the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also
shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will
work for the Deed of Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain
tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND
PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial
as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go
 over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you
said Atty. Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas by
you, what happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in
Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution
evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati.
The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise.
That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed
or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province
where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case,
where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was
unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly
militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02
of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.1âwphi1
Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money
(if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner
has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an
order to immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of
interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4
January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case
No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors
for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and
122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and the June 23, 20022
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 20023 and the September 18, 20024
Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.

The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus:

G.R. No. 154473

On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City.5 The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues
of the Manila Bulletin.6

Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in
his speech that

Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a
registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn’t
even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at
it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government
that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.7

filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint8 for libel.

Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information10 for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.

Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime N.
Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the
judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondent’s father-in-law. Petitioner
further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-
02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the
case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.12

On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioner’s motion to inhibit. While the RTC found
that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed
by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the
alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office—he delivered the speech in his
official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction
over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.

On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case.14

Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
following grounds:

I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE
RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.16

G.R. No. 155573

On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda
Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised
nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show’s episode that day was entitled "COMELEC
Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation transpired:

Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a "PR" campaign against
you? Is that what you are saying?

Benipayo: No, I think [it’s] not COMELEC funds, [it’s] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly,
according to [c]hargé d’[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is
what’s been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4 [m]illion
U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] that’s about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldn’t
tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think it’s pretty obvious.18

Petitioner considered respondent’s statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized

representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case
No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
101.

Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the
court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal
prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.22

On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed
September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.25

Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on pure
questions of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND

II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.

III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.27

Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same parties, the
Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the cases.29

The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether
the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the
conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which court—the RTC
or the Sandiganbayan—has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes
that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which the parties, and
even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel
cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be
pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.

Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),31 as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of
written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the
Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics ours.]1avvphi1.zw+

More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,34 acknowledged the unmistakable
import of the said provision:

There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial
Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is
free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All
that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.35

This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v.
Estanislao,36 where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if
the libelous act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact that the phrase "by similar
means" is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in those that
followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of
the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, 39
we explained at length that:

The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that
jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).

This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of
Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was
raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction
due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judge’s orders
were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."

Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter:

"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent
Court of Appeals in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention **
that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be
sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and
two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal
Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom **
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in
Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the
Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction
over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot
be applied to libel cases."

Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in
ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.

For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by
expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later
enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws
vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail
over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance)
which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing
law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction
conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on
the MTC.

Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter
the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so
indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition
must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two
laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the
first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking
cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive
jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence
of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore,
does not apply to cases of criminal libel.

Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the
proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:

"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS

DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.

xxxx

"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER
THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring
supplied)40
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Br. 32,41 Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it
still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other
courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply
override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC
vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means. 42 The
grant to the Sandiganbayan43 of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office,
similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and
original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed
in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even
simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.45

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is
unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to
office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged
libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try
the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the
respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds
unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are
GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent
to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged
was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused,
HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO,
which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT
law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the
government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section
4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more
beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that
the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged
to have conspired with a public officer.6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of
the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a
government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing
that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-
public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in
this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE
IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases,
among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who
was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation
of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible
therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in
execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by
each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at
the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of
the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator
is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of
and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive,
to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement
to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of
the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in
U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law
the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one,
or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself
alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done
in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all
acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and
intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created
by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.

xxxx

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This
rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily
liable.22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25
that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary
Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement
(Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over
the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute
resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the
part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he
must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If
he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to
have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the
person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to
his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of
the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order
requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and
Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However,
by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and
the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors,
such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of
the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No.
28090.

SO ORDERED.