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Adam Throne

April 10, 2017

Case Response Paper #1

The United States failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks suggests that Keren Yarhi-

Milo’s Selective Attention Thesis, outlined in her “In The Eye of the Beholder,” is the most

relevant assessment of how governments understand an adversary’s intentions in the 21st

century. Throughout 2001, ample evidence suggested an extravagant attack against the United

States in the near future. However, through oversight by both policymakers and the intelligence

community, the attacks caught the nation by surprise. In a world of modern warfare and

diminishing state sovereignty, the Selective Attention Thesis is more fitting than the outdated

Capabilities and Behavior Theses.

One may argue that United States actions prior to 9/11 support prominent rationalist

approaches. This argument proves inaccurate. The Capabilities Thesis claims that assessments

of an enemy’s future actions are effected by changes in military capabilities. Prior to the 9/11

attacks, terrorists expanded training and technology development to unprecedented levels. On

July 31, the FAA warned the aviation community that terrorist groups were able to build and

conceal sophisticated explosive devices in conventional objects. In August, Zacarias Moussaoui

was arrested for conspiring to hijack a Boeing 747. Through an ongoing investigation, it grew

clear that Al-Qaeda had increased its military capability to directly threaten the United States

by air. Yet, in contrast to the Capabilities Thesis, the United States decided not to increase

security or fortify airlines in any form. The Behavior Thesis states that information is only
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considered pertinent if it is costly to the adversary. Given that al-Qaeda is an organization

rather than a sovereign state, it is difficult to unravel what actions are considered costly. Al

Qaeda’s public intentions of violence directly hurt its capabilities as a recognized organization.

Operatives showed internationally that they were willing to commit suicide to change the

status quo which, according to Yarhi-Milo, is a credible signal of hostile intentions. However,

despite these costly actions, the United States again took little direct action to prevent the

attacks besides raising the level of reporting on terror threats. In the post-Cold War world, it

seems that another approach to assessing an adversary is more fitting.

The intelligence community’s narrow-mindedness and uncooperative organizational

structure contributed significantly to the failure to detect 9/11. These factors are key parts of

Yarhi-Milo’s Organizational Expertise Hypothesis. Pearl Harbor was the only successful attack by

a foreign adversary on United States soil prior to the 9/11 attacks. The 1993 plot led by Sheikh

Omar Abdel Rahman to bomb New York City is one of very few attempted attacks on United

States soil. As a result, homeland security was a limited priority of the United States at the time

of 9/11. Within the intelligence community, there was very little cooperation. Each department

controlled its own operations. Various intelligence agencies engaged in heated rivalries for

power. There was no Director of National Intelligence. The resulting chimneys of information

limited the ability of the community to make informed connections. In particular, there was no

capability to pool domestic and foreign intelligence. As Stiles notes, a foreign attack on

domestic soil fell through the gaps of this existing structure. Intelligence communities

prioritized information within their own agencies and failed to take a step back to appreciate

the credibility of Al Qaeda’s threats across the intelligence community. Yarhi-Milo argues that
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intelligence agencies grow narrow-minded from focusing on military inventory. In this case, the

United States possessed the raw information necessary to prevent the 9/11 attacks from

happening. Unfortunately, narrow-mindedness prevented this information from being analyzed

effectively.

United States decision-makers’ failure to interpret and respond effectively to 9/11

warnings also supports Yarhi-Milo’s Subjective Credibility Hypothesis. Yarhi-Milo argues that

decision-makers’ interpretations are swayed by expectations of an adversary’s characteristics,

personal theories, and vividness of information presented. The United States was aware of al-

Qaeda’s emergence as a threat. Throughout 2001, actions were taken to study the organization

and grasp an understanding of the organization’s intents. It seems that these actions were

ultimately misguided and ineffective, though. The threats which gained the most attention

from the Bush administration were ones which had historical ties or vivid descriptions. March

23, Pennsylvania Avenue remained closed because of concerns against al-Qaeda’s ‘weapon of

choice.’ In the past, al-Qaeda had utilized truck bombs for attacks, so the administration

assumed that another attack was likely to occur in the same manner. The G8-Summit, Sheikh

Omar Abdel Rahman, and visa express program each received action due to its high profile.

Spurred by words such as ‘spectacular,’ biased decision-makers focused their resources on

pivotal targets. Less notable tips, explicitly the Phoenix Memo, were given far less attention.

Why should policymakers waste time on a limited notification in Arizona when terrorists are

vividly focusing on a target in New York or Boston? This flawed personal interpretation is at the

core of Yarhi-Milo’s work.

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In conclusion, Yarhi-Milo’s Selective Attention Thesis seems to be the most appropriate

theory for predicting the actions of adversaries in a modern world where state sovereignty is no

longer the focus of conflict. Despite al-Qaeda expanding its ability to commit violence, the

United States did not respond with direct action like the Capabilities Thesis suggests. Although

al-Qaeda took actions that would be considered costly by a state, the United States did not

respond as the Behavior Thesis suggests. In reality, narrow-minded analysis by the intelligence

community and personal bias by policymakers prevented effective decisions from being made.

It was not until after the terrorist attacks claimed over 3000 American lives that predictable

realist policies were enacted.