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G.R. No. 171664, March 6, 2013
Whether or not an employer be charged for unfair labor practices for effectively reducing
the number of its employees?


Yes, if such reduction of employment would be shown to affect in whatever manner

the right of the employees to self-organize. In this case, it could not be shown that the
company committed ULP. There was no proof that the program was meant to encourage the
employees to disassociate themselves from the Union or to restrain them from joining any
union or organization. There was no showing that it was intentionally implemented to stunt
the growth of the Union or that Bankard discriminated, or in any way singled out the union
members who had availed of the retirement package under the MRP. True, the program
might have affected the number of union membership because of the employees’ voluntary
resignation and availment of the package, but it does not necessarily follow that Bankard
indeed purposely sought such result. It must be recalled that the MRP was implemented as a
valid cost-cutting measure, well within the ambit of the so-called management prerogatives.
Bankard contracted an independent agency to meet business exigencies. In the absence of
any showing that Bankard was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed
at interfering with its employees’ right to self-organize, it cannot be said to have committed
an act of unfair labor practice.
G.R. No. 170007, April 7, 2014
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction over issues with which a strike is
grounded, even if such issues are not within its competence?

Yes. There was already an actual existing deadlock between the parties. What was
lacking was the formal recognition of the existence of such a deadlock because the union
refused a declaration of deadlock. Thus, the union’s view that, at the time the Secretary of
Labor and Employment exercised her power of assumption of jurisdiction, the issue of
deadlock was neither an incidental issue to the matter of unfair labor practice nor an existing
issue is incorrect. More importantly, however, the union’s mistaken theory that the deadlock
issue was neither incidental nor existing is based on its premise that the case is all about the
company’s alleged unfair labor practice of bargaining in bad faith, which is the ground stated
in its first Notice of Strike. The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article
263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and
decide the same accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it includes questions incidental
to the labor dispute; that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and not
just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. The
totality of the company’s Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, including every allegation
therein, also guided the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the proper determination of
the labor dispute over which he or she was being asked to assume jurisdiction.

G.R. NO. 166879, AUGUST 14, 2009


(1) Whether or not the eight employees liable for illegal strike by means of concerted action?
(2) Was the strike staged by respondents on October 22, 1997 illegal, due to alleged commission
of illegal acts and violation of the “No Strike Clause?”


Yes. The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the
first strike or the mechanics’ refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their
disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a
non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a
violation of the "No Strike-No Lockout Policy" in the existing CBA

It was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, but it was an illegal strike. The
Union complied with procedural requirements, therefore the same was not a violation of the "No
Strike- No Lockout" provisions, as a "No Strike-No Lockout" provision in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when
the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions
from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to
prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union
believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on
account of the 30-day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer
and perceived union-busting, among others.

However, well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its
objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed
are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code,
particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any
act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or c) obstruct public thoroughfares.

The Union members’ repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm directed
against company officers and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of
placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the
company, which put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts
under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.

That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost
eight months that the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or
widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it require that violence must be
continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike.
EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 135806. August 8, 2002]


Whether or not possession of a certificate of registration is an adequate and unas

sailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file a Petition for Certific
ation Election.


No. The Court said that the issuance of a certificate of registration in its favor is a
n adequate and unassailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file
a Petition for Certification Election. Not necessarily. It was evident that the union has be
en issued a certificate the day after it applied for it considering that processing course ha
d to pass through routing, screening, and assignment, evaluation, review and initialing,
and approval/disapproval procedure, among others, that a 30-
day period is provided for under the Labor Code for this purpose. As emphasized in Prog
ressive Development Corp. –
Pizza Hut v. Laguesma, if a labor organization’s application for registration is vitiated b
y falsification and serious irregularities, a labor organization should be denied recogniti
on as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of registration has been issued,
the propriety of its registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registra
tion proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly,
by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election. We belie
ve the procedural requirements to impugn the registration by petitioner were more than
adequately complied with as shown in the 1997 case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corpo
ration v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union.

There is no reason to belabor the primordial importance of strictly complying with the r
egistration requirements of the Labor Code. As we have explained in a long line of cases,
the activities of labor organizations, associations and unions are impressed with public i
nterest, hence, must be protected.
G.R. Nos. 143013-14, December 18, 2000
In case of assumption orders from the Secretary of Labor, can a union validly hold a
strike against its employer?

No. It is clear from Article 263 of the Labor Code that the moment the Secretary of
Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national
interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order
directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary
of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return
to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. Also, Article 264 provides that “No
strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the President or
the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout.” The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has
been properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be
interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. It was held in a
number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary
of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status
of any striking union officer or member.
G.R. No. 105775, February 8, 1993
Whether or not union member in an unlawful and violent strike constitute a valid cause
for his dismissal from employment?

Yes. His participation in the unlawful and violent strike, which strike resulted in
multiple deaths and extensive property damage, constituted serious misconduct on his part.
Since his participation in the unlawful and violent strike was amply shown by substantial
evidence, the NLRC was correct in holding that the dismissal of Chua was valid being based
on lawful or authorized cause.
On the issue of granting financial assistance, the Court disagrees with the Labor
Arbiter that Chua should be entitled to it. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court
considers that such award of "financial assistance" was obviously unjustified. This Court has
several times ruled that "financial assistance", whatever form it might assume, is permissible
where the employee has been validly dismissed, only in those instances where the cause of
dismissal was something other than serious misconduct on the part of the employee or other
cause reflecting adversely on the employee's moral character.
OLISA, et al. vs ESCARIO, et al.
G.R. No. 160302, September 27, 2010
Whether or not the participants of an illegal strike entitled to reinstatement with back

No. Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is: (a) unlawful
lockout; and (b) participation in an illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article 264(a)
authorizes the award of full back wages only when the termination of employment is a
consequence of an unlawful lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision
distinguishes between a union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his
employment status, but a union member who is merely instigated or induced to participate
in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the explanation for the benign
consideration for the union member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who
are misled into supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed
illegal acts during the period of the illegal strikes. The petitioners were terminated for joining
a strike that was later declared to be illegal. The NLRC ordered their reinstatement or, in lieu
of reinstatement, the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-file
workers whom the Union’s officers had misled into joining the illegal strike. They were not
unjustly dismissed from work.