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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS


CHANCERY DIVISION

GUNS SAVE LIFE, INC. and


JOHN WILLIAM WOMBACHER III,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 18 CH 498
v.

VILLAGE OF DEERFIELD, ILLINOIS, and


HARRIET ROSENTHAL, solely in her official
capacity as Mayor of the Village of Deerfield,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief should be denied: Plaintiffs cannot establish a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, nor any of the other elements necessary for

injunctive relief. Instead, the facts demonstrate that the Village of Deerfield (“Deerfield”) acted

within the scope of its home-rule authority to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens

when it amended its assault weapons ordinance to ban these highly dangerous weapons.1

The undisputed record establishes that in July 2013, the Village of Deerfield passed an

Ordinance heavily regulating the possession, sale and use of assault weapons within its

jurisdictional borders. On April 2, 2018, in the wake of the horrific mass shooting at the

Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, and following a series of

meetings with deeply-concerned students, parents and citizens, the Deerfield Board of Trustees

amended its Ordinance and expanded its regulation to include a complete ban on assault weapons

and large capacity magazines. In doing so, Deerfield joined states such as California,

1
The Court also has before it a Motion for Injunctive Relief in a related case, Easterday v. Village of Deerfield,
Case No. 18 CH 427. As the issues raised in that Motion are nearly identical, this brief serves as a response to that
motion as well.

140084121.3
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York, and municipalities

including Boston, Denver, Washington, D.C., Gary, Indiana, Cook County and Chicago, Illinois,

and neighboring Highland Park, Illinois, and Highwood, Illinois, to name only a few. In all,

more than a quarter of the United States population lives under the safety of bans imposed upon

these highly dangerous weapons and accessories. Under the terms of Deerfield’s amended

Ordinance, people in possession of these weapons have until June 13, 2018 to: 1) “Remove, sell

or transfer the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine from the limits of the Village”;

2) “Modify the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine either to render it permanently

inoperable or to permanently make it a device no longer defined as an Assault Weapon”; or

3) “Surrender the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine to the Chief of Police of his or

her designee for disposal . . .” Ordinance No. O-18-06, Section 15-89.

Plaintiffs assert two challenges to Deerfield’s amended statute: 1) that Illinois state law

“preempts” an amendment such as the one adopted by Deerfield; and, failing that, 2) that a ban

on assault weapons and large capacity magazines constitutes a “taking” without “just

compensation” prohibited by the Illinois State Constitution. For the reasons set forth in more

detail below, neither argument is availing. Deerfield’s amended ordinance is precisely the type

of regulation of assault weapons and large capacity magazines recognized and expressly

permitted by the Illinois Firearm Owners Identification Card Act. Beyond this, Deerfield’s ban

on assault weapons and large capacity magazines is not an unconstitutional taking, but simply a

valid, and necessary, exercise of Deerfield’s inherent power to protect the public health, safety

and welfare. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief should be denied.

140084121.3 -2-
Factual Background

Plaintiffs’ Motion ignores several of the qualities of Deerfield which underscore its

decision regarding assault weapons. Specifically, Deerfield is a home-rule municipality with

more than 18,000 residents living across roughly 5.6 square miles. www.deerfield.us

Deerfield’s elementary schools are served by School District 109 which is comprised of four

public elementary schools, Kipling, South Park, Walden and Wilmot, and two public middle

schools, Caruso and Shepard.2 www.dps109.org Deerfield High School, recently ranked fifth in

the State of Illinois, is within School District 113. www.dist113.org/dhs

In addition to its strong educational tradition, Deerfield is also home to an unusual

number of significant corporate headquarters. Walgreens, Baxter International, Beam Suntory,

CF Industries, Caterpillar, Consumers Digest, Fortune Brands Home & Security, Mondelez

International, United Stationers, and the North American operations of Takeda Pharmaceutical

Company all have corporate headquarters located in Deerfield. www.dbrchamber.com

Deerfield is also home to a thriving commercial district, including “Deerfield Square,”

composed of stores, restaurants, workout facilities and other retail elements. Deerfield Square

also contains an outdoor plaza which in the summer becomes a venue for free outdoor concerts.

www.deerfieldsquareshopping.com

Mass Shooting Incidents

The Congressional Research Service has defined a “mass shooting” as a “multiple

homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event,

and in one or more locations in close proximity.” See Krouse, William J., “Mass Murder with

Firearms: Incidents and Victims, 1999-2013,” Congressional Research Service, July 30, 2015.

2
Deerfield also has Rochelle Zell Jewish High School, formerly Chicagoland Jewish High School and two
Montessori Schools. Holy Cross School, a Roman Catholic institution, is located within the village, as well, but is
scheduled to close at the end of the 2017-18 school year.

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Since 2011, mass shootings involving multiple homicides and injuries have occurred with

increasing frequency and with greater losses of life. Morris, S., “Mass Shootings in the United

States,” The Guardian, February 15, 2018. These include:

Date Location Persons Killed Persons Injured


January 8, 2011 Tucson, Arizona 6 14, including U.S.
Representative
Gabrielle Giffords
July 20, 2012 Aurora, Colorado 12 58

September 16, 2013 Washington, D.C. 13 8


Navy Yard
June 17, 2015 Charleston, South 9 1
Carolina
December 2, 2015 San Bernardino, 14 22
California
June 12, 2016 Orlando, Florida 50 53

October 1, 2017 Las Vegas, Nevada 58 851

November 5, 2017 Sutherland Springs, 26 20


Texas

Id.
Mass Shootings at Schools

Mass shooting incidents have all too often affected schools, students and teachers. On

December 14, 2012, a mass shooting occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton,

Connecticut which resulted in the tragic deaths of 26 people, including 20 first graders between

the ages of 6 and 7. Id. As this Court knows, the Sandy Hook tragedy was not an isolated

incident. On October 1, 2015, a mass shooting occurred at Umpqua Community College in

Roseburg, Oregon, which left 10 people dead and another 8 wounded. Id. The devastation

continued this year as well: on February 14, 2018, at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High

School in Parkland, Florida, 17 people were killed and another 17 were injured. Id.

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Deerfield residents are also well aware that mass shootings are not distant events far

removed from the suburbs of Chicago. On May 20, 1988, Laurie Dann killed one student and

wounded eight others when she attacked the Hubbard Woods school in the nearby Village of

Winnetka and then took a local family hostage before killing herself. See “20 years later, Dann

rampage still haunts,” Chicago Tribune, May 20, 2008.

Deerfield’s Initial Assault Weapons Ordinance

On July 9, 2013, Illinois amended the Firearm Owners Identification Act, 430 ILCS 65.1

et seq. (“the Act”). Under these amendments, Illinois addressed the regulation of assault

weapons by home-rule municipalities. Specifically, the Act provided a narrow window under

which a home-rule municipality could regulate assault weapons within its jurisdiction, so long as

it enacted an initial ordinance or regulation within 10 days of the effective date of the Act. As

the Act states:

The Regulation of the possession or ownership of assault weapons are exclusive powers
and functions of this State. Any ordinance or regulation, or portion of that ordinance or
regulation, that purports to regulate the possession or ownership of assault weapons in a
manner that is inconsistent with this Act, shall be invalid unless the ordinance or
regulation is enacted on, before, or within 10 days after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.

The Act expressly provided, however, that any ordinance adopted consistent with the

terms of the Act, could be amended by the jurisdiction at its discretion. Specifically, the Act

states:

An ordinance enacted on, before, or within 10 days after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly may be amended.

On July 1, 2013, Deerfield adopted an ordinance regulating assault weapons.

Specifically, O-13-24, defined Deerfield’s terms for what constituted an assault weapon and a

140084121.3 -5-
large capacity magazine. The ordinance also provided strict regulations for the safe storage and

handling of these dangerous weapons.3

On April 2, 2018, following the horrific school shooting in Parkland, Florida, and in light

of the recent tragedies in Las Vegas, Nevada (October 1, 2017) and Sutherland Springs, Texas

(November 5, 2017), each involving multiple deaths and injuries from the use of assault weapons

and large capacity magazines within just the past six months, Deerfield amended its ordinance to

impose a complete ban on these weapons within its jurisdiction.

Under the terms of the amended ordinance, O-18-06, the Village Code now provides:

“It shall be unlawful to possess, bear, manufacture, sell, transfer, transport, store or keep any

assault weapon in the Village. Section 15-87.” Deerfield then provided anyone possessing these

weapons as of the enactment date with three alternatives to comply with the amended regulation:

(a) Remove, sell or transfer the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine
from within the limits of the Village;

(b) Modify the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine either to render
it permanently inoperable or to permanently make it a device no longer
defined as an Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine;

(c) Surrender the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine to the Chief of
Police or his or her designee for disposal . . .

Effective Date

Deerfield adopted these amendments on April 2, 2018. The ordinance was published on

April 3, 2018. In accordance with Illinois law, the ordinance did not become effective until 10

days after publication. Beyond this, the ordinance provides a 60-day period within which

residents may comply with the law by affirmatively accepting one of the three options.

Compliance is therefore required on or before June 13, 2018.

3
Although Deerfield acted shortly before the official commencement date of the Act’s 10-day window, the Act
grandfathers municipal actions concerning assault weapons before the commencement date and therefore
Deerfield’s Ordinance was valid under the terms of the Act.

140084121.3 -6-
ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs cannot meet the standards for either a preliminary injunction or a


temporary restraining order.

“When seeking injunctive relief under the common law, the party seeking a preliminary

injunction or TRO must establish facts demonstrating the traditional equitable elements that: (1)

it has a clearly ascertainable right in need of protection; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm if

injunctive relief is not granted; (3) its remedy at law is inadequate; and (4) there is a likelihood of

success on the merits. Houseknecht v. Zagel, 112 Ill.App.3d 284, 291–92, 67 Ill.Dec. 922, 445

N.E.2d 402 (1983).” County of Du Page v. Gavrilos, 359 Ill. App. 3d 629, 634 (2d Dist. 2005).

Here, Plaintiffs cannot meet any of the elements necessary for injunctive relief.

II. Plaintiffs have not identified a “clearly ascertainable right” to assault weapons and
large capacity magazines.

Plaintiffs begin their argument for injunctive relief by properly recognizing that in order

to obtain a temporary restraining order under Illinois law, they must establish “a clearly

ascertained right in need of protection[.]” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 3, citing Mohanty v. St. John Heart

Clinic S.C., 225 Ill.2d 52, 62 (2006). Plaintiffs then promptly ignore this requirement as they fail

to identify any “clearly ascertained right.” This is plainly because there is no “clearly

ascertainable right” to an assault weapon in Illinois. As Plaintiffs are well aware, the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d

406 (2015), cert denied ___ U. S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), that assault weapons and large

capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment and therefore can be regulated

and even banned as a result. Plaintiffs’ failure to confront this case law is glaring. Because the

140084121.3 -7-
Seventh Circuit has made clear that there is no “protected right” to an assault weapon or a large

capacity magazine, Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief fails on this ground alone.

III. Plaintiffs have no likelihood of success on the merits of their alleged claims.

Even if Plaintiffs were able to establish that a “clearly ascertainable right” existed– a

threshold they have made no attempt to meet – Plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success

on any of the issues claimed in their suit because: 1) Deerfield’s ban on assault weapons was not

preempted by Illinois state law; 2) Deerfield’s ordinance is a proper exercise of its police power

and does not constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property; and 3) there is no basis for

Plaintiffs to seek a declaration that Deerfield’s Ordinance does not affect Large Capacity

Magazines.

A. Illinois State Law Does Not Preempt a Ban on Assault Weapons but Instead
Expressly Permits Such Regulations.

Plaintiffs’ contention that Illinois state law somehow preempts Deerfield’s ability to

regulate assault weapons and large capacity magazines ignores the plain language of the 2013

Amendments to the Act. Despite Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, the Act expressly

provides the authority for home-rule jurisdictions to regulate and ban these highly dangerous

weapons.

Plaintiffs concede, as they must, that Deerfield appropriately passed its initial ordinance,

O-13-24, which defined large capacity magazines and heavily regulated and defined assault

weapons. Plaintiffs also concede that the Illinois General Assembly not only permitted the

regulation of assault weapons, but expressly provided that any municipality that properly

adopted an ordinance regulating assault weapons could then amend its ordinance at any time. As

the Act provided: “an ordinance enacted on, or before, or within 10 days after the effective date

of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly may be amended.”

140084121.3 -8-
Despite this explicit authority to amend an assault weapon regulation once adopted,

Plaintiffs contend that Deerfield’s amendment to ban these highly dangerous weapons was too

great a change to be considered a proper “amendment.” What Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge,

however, is the fact that the ability to amend the ordinance has in no way been limited by the

legislature. The General Assembly stated flatly that any ordinance adopted within the 10-day

window “may be amended.” Indeed, the legislation did not impose any restriction on the scope

of such an amendment, the time when such an amendment could be considered or adopted, or,

most importantly, how often any such ordinance could be amended. This last point is critical

since the crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that Deerfield’s move from regulation to ban was too

great a change. Plaintiffs do not assert, however, that a series of incremental amendments

arriving at the same ban would not be permitted. There is no rational basis for distinguishing

between a series of incremental amendments and a single amendment which arrives at the same

place.

Furthermore, there is no question that Deerfield could have adopted an outright ban on

assault weapons as an initial matter. Deerfield’s neighboring suburb, Highland Park, adopted

such a ban, and the constitutionality of that ban has now been litigated and confirmed as far as

the United States Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs’ preemption argument also seeks to obscure the recent events that led Deerfield

to impose a ban upon, rather than simply regulating, assault weapons. The amended ordinance

expressly recognizes that Deerfield is home to a number of public schools, public venues, places

of worship and places of public accommodation. The amended ordinance also recognizes that

assault weapons have been used to kill multiple people in Las Vegas, Nevada (public venue),

140084121.3 -9-
Sutherland Springs, Texas, (place of worship), Orlando, Florida (public nightclub), and Parkland,

Florida (public school), in circumstances all too familiar to the citizens of Deerfield.

A ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines was accordingly reasonable,

prudent, constitutionally permitted, and authorized by the Illinois General Assembly.

B. Deerfield’s Ordinance is a Lawful Exercise of Its Police Power not an


Unconstitutional Taking.

As a threshold matter, Deerfield’s ordinance does not “take” Plaintiffs assault weapons.

Anyone possessing an assault weapon or large capacity magazine not permitted under the

ordinance may sell or otherwise transfer the weapon outside of Deerfield. In the alternative, they

may modify the weapon to make it inoperable or to make it fall outside of the ordinance’s

definition of “Assault Weapon”. Only if Plaintiffs choose to exercise the third option,

surrendering the weapon to the Chief of Police, would the ordinance contemplate a complete loss

of value. Significantly, Plaintiffs do not even confront the question of whether permitting the

sale of property or simply the transfer to a facility outside of Deerfield would involve a “taking”

under any circumstance. A failure to confront this option is entirely inconsistent with Plaintiffs’

burden of demonstrating a “likelihood of success” on this question.

Beyond this, Plaintiffs’ “takings” analysis misconstrues the distinction under Illinois law

between a valid exercise of police power and an unconstitutional taking. Illinois law has long-

recognized that all elements of state government, including home-rule municipalities like

Deerfield, have the inherent authority to impose regulations for the protection of the public

health, safety and welfare. Leavell v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 397 Ill. App. 3d 937, 958–59, 923

N.E.2d 829, 849–50 (2010). This police power is distinguishable from a “taking” of private

property. As Illinois courts’ have frequently discussed:

140084121.3 -10-
“[A]n exercise of police power to prevent a property owner from using his property so as
to create a nuisance or a risk of harm to others is not a ‘taking’ in the constitutional
sense.”4

Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill.2d 106, 130, 284 Ill.Dec. 360, 810 N.E.2d 13 (2004)

(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2901,

120 L.Ed.2d 798, 822 (1992)). In Leavell, the court upheld enforcement of a regulation for the

protection of the public health, safety, and welfare by providing the procedures for plugging

abandoned wells. Leavell, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 959. The court found that the regulation was not

an unconstitutional “taking” of private property without “just compensation” but rather a

permissible exercise of police power for the protection of residents. Id. Accordingly, no

compensation was required. Id. Indeed, “the exercise of police power is presumed to be

constitutionally valid.” Vill. of Algonquin v. Tiedel, 345 Ill. App. 3d 229, 236, 802 N.E.2d 418,

424–25 (2003) (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529, 79 S.Ct. 962, 967, 3

L.Ed.2d 1003, 1009–10 (1959)) (emphasis added). “The party contending that an ordinance is

not a valid exercise of police power has the burden of proving that the ordinance is

unreasonable.” Vill. of Algonquin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 236.

Just this month, the United States District Court for the Central District of California

considered precisely this question of whether a ban on assault weapons and large capacity

magazines constitutes a valid exercise of “police power” or whether it is instead more akin to an

unconstitutional “taking.” In a lengthy opinion, the federal court held that an assault weapons

ban is a valid exercise of the power to protect the health, safety and welfare of residents and did

not implicate the “takings clause.” Rupp v. Becerra, No. 817CV00746JLSJDE, 2018 WL

2138452, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2018). In Rupp, the court addressed whether California’s
4
A “taking” on the other hand, involves the governmental taking of property “for public use.” Forest Pres. Dist. of
Du Page Cty. v. W. Suburban Bank, 161 Ill. 2d 448, 456–57, 641 N.E.2d 493, 497 (1994). Plaintiffs fail to assert
that the Village of Deerfield intended or even now intends to remove the property of its residents for use by the
public. As such, Plaintiffs’ “takings” argument fails as an initial matter based solely on definitional grounds.

140084121.3 -11-
statewide Assault Weapons Control Act was a valid exercise of police power or a taking of

private property requiring just compensation. Id. The Court stated:

Plaintiffs argue that the AWCA enacts both a physical and regulatory taking.
(FAC ¶ 115). They assert that the law prevents them from bequeathing their
weapons to family members and severely constrains their property rights in the
weapons by forbidding their sale or transfer.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Taking Clause claim fails as a matter of law,
because the law is a valid exercise of the state’s police power.

“If [an] ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the [government’s] police


powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does
not render it unconstitutional.” Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369
U.S. 590, 592 (1962)

It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property
to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the
State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; “[a]s long recognized, some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power[ ]” ... In the case of land, however, we think the notion pressed by the
Council that title is somehow held subject to the “implied limitation” that the
State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part
of our constitutional culture. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). Thus, legislation
pursuant to the police power is generally not a taking, but there are
exceptions under certain limited circumstances, such as where land will no
longer have any economically valuable use.

The Court is persuaded that the AWCA represents an exercise of police


power and is not a taking. The AWCA does not compel conveyance of the
guns for public use, but regulates possession of an object the legislature has
found to be dangerous. The law offers a number of options to lawful gun
owners that do not result in the weapon being surrendered to the
government.

Id. (emphasis added). Here, the same reasoning applies. Just as in Rupp, Deerfield’s decision to

ban assault weapons is a valid exercise of its inherent police power to protect its citizens.

Plaintiffs’ “takings” theory must fail here just as it did in Rupp.5 

5
Similarly, because “an exercise of police power to prevent a property owner from using his property so as to create
a nuisance or a risk of harm to others is not a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense” Plaintiffs reliance on eminent
domain law is also misplaced. Eminent domain is triggered only when a taking has occurred. Leavell v. Dep't of
Nat. Res., 397 Ill. App. 3d at 959

140084121.3 -12-
C. Deerfield’s Amended Ordinance Bans Large Capacity Magazines.

Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the amended Ordinance does not ban large capacity

magazines. This claim is unavailing as well. Deerfield’s initial ordinance concerning assault

weapons stated expressly:

WHEREAS, the corporate authorities of the Village of Deerfield are of the


opinion that assault weapons, as defined in this Ordinance, are subject to
regulation as provided herein, and should be regulated as provided herein within
the corporate limits of the Village of Deerfield; and

WHEREAS, the corporate authorities of the Village of Deerfield find that assault
weapons are capable of a rapid firing rate of fire and have the capacity to fire a
large number of rounds due to large capacity fixed magazines or the ability to
use detachable magazines;

Deerfield’s initial ordinance then provided the following specific definitions:

Assault weapon means: a semiautomatic rifle that has the capacity to accept a
large capacity magazine detachable or otherwise . . .
....
Large Capacity Magazine means any ammunition feeding device with the
capacity to accept more than ten rounds . . .

Ordinance No. O-13-24 (emphasis added). Thus, Deerfield’s initial ordinance made abundantly

clear the Village’s intent that 1) large capacity magazines are covered by the ordinance; 2) for

purposes of the Village, a large capacity magazine was one capable of accepting more than 10

rounds; and 3) these assault weapons and large capacity magazines would both be the subject of

heavy regulation.

In the 2018 amendment to this Ordinance, Deerfield maintained the identical definition of

assault weapon as one accepting a large capacity magazine. In turn, Deerfield maintained the

identical definition of a large capacity magazine as one capable of accepting more than ten

rounds. The amended ordinance, however, now provides: “Any person who, prior to the

effective date of [this] Ordinance, was legally in possession of an Assault Weapon or Large

140084121.3 -13-
Capacity Magazine prohibited by this Article, shall have 60 days from the effective date” to

1) remove, sell or transfer; 2) modify; or 3) surrender “the Assault Weapon or Large Capacity

Magazine[.]” Section 15-90. Clearly, the Amendment’s plain language of “Large Capacity

Magazine prohibited by this Article” is incontrovertible evidence that such magazines are banned

by the amendment. While the Amendment does not contain the language identical to the

provision banning “assault weapons,” of which large capacity magazines are defined elements,

the Amendment, taken in full context, clearly imposes a ban on large capacity magazines. See

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“If the statutory language is plain, we must

enforce it according to its terms.”). As the U.S. Supreme Court further noted when assessing

whether the language of a statute or ordinance is “plain” courts “must read the words in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (internal quotation

omitted) Id. Here, not only is the language of Deerfield’s amendment clear and unequivocal, but

it also fits soundly within a statutory scheme to regulate the possession and use of both assault

weapons and large capacity magazines.

IV. Plaintiffs have not identified any irreparable harm and the law provides more than
adequate remedies.

Finally, even if Plaintiffs could define an “ascertainable right in need of protection” and

could further demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, they cannot demonstrate either

irreparable harm or a lack of adequate remedies at law.

At most, under the amended ordinance, Plaintiffs must either sell their assault weapons or

locate a storage facility outside of Deerfield, such as a gun range or gun club. Indeed, the

amendment does not force Plaintiffs to take permanent measures such as selling or disposing of

their property. As such, Plaintiffs cannot genuinely contend that the potential harm to them is

140084121.3 -14-
irreparable, where, if they were to succeed on the merits of their claim, they can retrieve their

firearm from whatever storage facility they have chosen to use.

Further, if Plaintiffs do face a burden complying with the amended ordinance, they may

seek damages at law for the costs that they believe are unreasonable. Such costs may include the

price of storing their weapon or even the loss of value from having sold or disposed of their

weapon.

Friedman v. Highland Park, however, makes clear that Plaintiffs do not have and cannot

assert a constitutional injury to their rights under the Second Amendment. 784 F.3d 406. States

and municipalities may regulate and even ban assault weapons and large capacity magazines.

Such bans do not implicate the Second Amendment, nor do Plaintiffs attempt to assert anything

to the contrary here.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs seek any relief from the costs of complying with

Deerfield’s amended ordinance, such claims can be resolved at law and any damages can be

ascertained through the legal process. There is no basis for either a temporary restraining order

or any other injunctive relief.

V. Conclusion

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants the Village of Deerfield and

Harriet Rosenthal respectfully request an Order of this Court denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.

DATE: June 5, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Christopher B. Wilson


One of the Attorneys for Defendants

140084121.3 -15-
Christopher B. Wilson, ARDC No. 6202139
John B. Sample, ARDC No. 6321438
Perkins Coie LLP
131 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1700
Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: (312) 324-8400
Cwilson@perkinscoie.com
JSample@perkinscoie.com

Steven M. Elrod, ARDC No. 6183239


Hart M. Passman, ARDC No. 6287062
Holland & Knight, LLP
131 South Dearborn Street, 30th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 263-3600
Steven.elrod@hklaw.com
Hart.passman@hklaw.com

Jonathan E. Lowy
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence
840 First Street, N.E., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20002
New Direct Dial: (202) 370-8104
jlowy@bradymail.org

Attorneys for Defendants Village of Deerfield,


Illinois, and Harriet Rosenthal, solely in her
official capacity as Mayor of the Village of
Deerfield

140084121.3 -16-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Christopher B. Wilson, an attorney, certify that on Tuesday, June 5, 2018, the

foregoing DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois,

and served by electronic mail upon the following:

David H. Thompson Christian D. Ambler


Brian W. Barnes Stone & Johnson, Chtd.
Cooper & Kirk, PLLC 111 West Washington Street
1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Suite 1800
Washington, D.C. 20036 Chicago, IL 60602
202.220.9600 312.332.5656
dthompson@cooperkirk.com cambler@stonejohnsonlaw.com
bbarnes@cooperkirk.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Guns Save Life, Inc. and John William Wombacher III

/s/ Christopher B. Wilson


Christopher B. Wilson

Christopher B. Wilson, ARDC No. 6202139


Perkins Coie LLP
131 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1700
Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: (312) 324-8400
Cwilson@perkinscoie.com

One of the Attorneys for Defendants Village of


Deerfield, Illinois, and Harriet Rosenthal,
solely in her official capacity as Mayor of the
Village of Deerfield

140084121.3 -17-
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
CHANCERY DIVISION

GUNS SAVE LIFE, INC. and


JOHN WILLIAM WOMBACHER III,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 18CH498
v.

VILLAGE OF DEERFIELD, ILLINOIS, and


HARRIET ROSENTHAL, solely in her official
capacity as Mayor of the Village of Deerfield,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON QUESTIONS RELATING


TO PREEMPTION OF HOME RULE AUTHORITY

140220662.1
Following a telephonic hearing on June 7, 2018, the Court on its own Motion requested

additional briefing on a question of public policy which neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants had

addressed in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction.1 Specifically, the Court has asked for additional briefing to address two

questions suggested by the parties’ initial submissions:

Whether the Firearm Owners Information Card Act validly preempts a home rule
unit’s constitutional authority to regulate assault weapons to the extent the statute
expressly permits an unlimited number of home rule units to regulate assault
weapons simultaneously and expressly permits amendment of any such
ordinance?

Defendants’ research reveals this is a case of first impression for the Court. No case has

directly addressed the question of whether the State may, consistent with its authority under

Article VII, Sections 6(h) and (i) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, adopt legislation purporting

to assert exclusive authority while simultaneously permitting potentially unlimited local

regulation of the same subject matter. Related authority, however, suggests that the State may do

so consistent with its constitutional authority.

In the alternative, this Court, or a reviewing court, may determine that the State has failed

to properly preempt the otherwise broad power of home rule units to “regulate for the protection

of the public health, safety, morals and welfare.” 1970 Illinois Constitution, Article VII, section

6(a). If the State has failed to establish an express preemption of the regulation of assault

weapons, then home rule units, including the Village of Deerfield, may establish any regulation

consistent with their home rule authority pursuant to Section 6(a).

Most importantly, there is no answer to this question that creates a likelihood of success

on the merits on Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief. If the State’s legislation is valid, then by

1
The Court also asked for briefing in the related case of Easterday v. Village of Deerfield, Case No. 18 CH 427.
This filing responds to that case as well.

140220662.1 -1-
its express terms, Section 13.1(c) permits local regulation of assault weapons and further allows

amendment of those regulations by home rule units. If the State’s legislation is invalid, then

Deerfield’s regulation of assault weapons is valid per se. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motions for

injunctive relief should be denied.

I. Argument

A. The 1970 Illinois Constitution Establishes Sweeping Authority for


Deerfield and other Home Rule Municipalities.

Article VII, Section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution establishes sweeping authority

for home rule units:

Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.

Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6(a). Section 6 further provides that these broad “Powers and functions of

home rule units shall be construed liberally.” Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6(m).

The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized this fundamental shift in the balance of power

between home rule units and statewide authority established by the 1970 Constitution. In City of

Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill.2d 504 (1998), the Supreme Court stated:

The “ ‘concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution
was designed to drastically alter the relationship which previously existed
between the local and State government.’ ” City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85
Ill.2d 101, 107, (1981), quoting Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill.2d 161, 166,
(1972);

184 Ill.2d at 516. Noting the broad language of Section 6(a), the Roman court elaborated:

As a result of section 6(a), [a home rule unit] draws its power to regulate for the
protection of public safety directly from the constitution. This power does not
depend on any grant of authority by the General Assembly, as was the case prior
to 1970. .

140220662.1 -2-
As the Supreme Court has often noted: “Section 6(a) gives home rule units the broadest

powers possible.” Roman, 184 Ill.2d at 517, quoting Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill.2d

164, 174, (1992) (emphasis added); Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo. Ass'n, 2013 IL

110505, ¶ 29 (Il. 2013). Accordingly, the concepts of home rule are based on the assumption

that home rule governments should be allowed to address problems with solutions tailored to

their local needs. Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill.2d 281, 286 (2001).

The home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution “were designed to drastically alter

the relationship between our local and state governments.” Roman, 184 Ill.2d at 516.

B. The authority of a home rule unit is concurrent with the State on any matter
“pertaining to its government and affairs” unless the State by statute
expressly declares the State’s authority to be exclusive.

Consistent with the broad home rule authority established by Section 6(a), Section 6(i), in

turn, provides:

Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power
or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law
does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the
State's exercise to be exclusive.

Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(i). Reviewing this language, the Supreme Court observed in

Scadron: The purpose of section 6(i) ‘is to eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum the

circumstances under which local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of

unexpressed legislative intention. 153 Ill.2d at 174. Thus, while the General Assembly may

preempt the exercise of a municipality's home rule powers, it can only do so by enacting

legislation expressly doing so. See Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill.2d at 287; Scadron, 153 Ill.2d at

185–86. “If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, the statute

must contain an express statement to that effect.” City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill.2d 101,

140220662.1 -3-
108 (1981) (citing Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill.2d 523); Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive

Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505.

In Palm, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a municipality could impose more

stringent recordkeeping requirements upon condominium boards than those established by the

State’s Condominium Act. The Court held that while establishing and maintaining a system of

condominium law was traditionally a matter of statewide concern, nothing in the legislation

limited concurrent jurisdiction for home rule municipalities. The Supreme Court then noted:

Under section 6(i), home rule units may continue to regulate activities even if the
state has also regulated those activities. Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill.2d at 287–
88. To restrict the concurrent exercise of home rule power, the General Assembly
must enact a law specifically stating home rule authority is limited. Scadron, 153
Ill.2d at 185–86.

Palm is thus consistent with Scadron and Roman. As Roman provides:

To meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express


language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by
the State…When the General Assembly intends to preempt or exclude home rule
units from exercising power over a matter, that body knows how to do so. In
many statutes that touch on countless areas of our lives, the legislature has
expressly stated that, pursuant to section 6(h) or 6(i), or both, of article VII of the
Illinois Constitution, a statute is declared to be an exclusive exercise of power by
the state and that such power shall not be exercised by home rule units.

184 Ill. 2d at 516–18 (internal citations omitted); see also generally D. Baum, A Tentative Survey

of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 137, 152-53. As the

Supreme Court concluded in Palm: “In sum, the constitutional framework places almost

exclusive reliance on the General Assembly to determine whether home rule authority should

be preempted.” 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 44. While the State may declare its exclusive jurisdiction

and preempt concurrent home rule authority, it must do so expressly, directly and completely.

C. The Firearm Owners Information Act Contains an Unusual, Hybrid


Preemption Provision As Applied to Assault Weapons.

140220662.1 -4-
As this Court is well aware, Section 13.1 of the Firearm Owners Information Act contains

a unique “preemption” clause which purports to create for the State “exclusive power and

functions” over the regulation of assault weapons. Specifically, paragraph (c) states:

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Section, the regulation of the


possession or ownership of assault weapons are exclusive powers and
functions of this State. Any ordinance or regulation, or portion of that ordinance
or regulation, that purports to regulate the possession or ownership of assault
weapons in a manner that is inconsistent with this Act, shall be invalid unless the
ordinance or regulation is enacted on, before, or within 10 days after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly. Any ordinance or
regulation described in this subsection (c) enacted more than 10 days after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly is invalid. An
ordinance enacted on, before, or within 10 days after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly may be amended.

430 ILCS 65/13.1(c) (emphasis added). Section 13.3, in turn, provides that any local

ordinance regulating assault weapons or any future amendment to an established local

assault weapons regulation must be submitted to the Department of State Police, which

will then publish any such ordinance for public review. 430 ILCS 65/13.3.

Thus, while purporting to create “exclusive powers and functions of this State”

over the regulation of assault weapons, the General Assembly created a legislative

scheme providing for an unknown number of municipalities to “opt out” of this matter of

ostensible “statewide concern.” Any municipality could choose before or within 10 days

after the enactment date to regulate assault weapons outside of the state’s authority.

More confusingly, the General Assembly then provided that any municipality that elected

not to be part of the state’s authority could then freely amend any initial regulation which

had been timely adopted. Defendants are not aware of any other Illinois legislation

which creates a similar system purportedly addressing a matter of “statewide concern”

while simultaneously allowing every local governmental body – home rule and non-home

140220662.1 -5-
rule units alike – to elect to ignore the statewide mandate and instead impose its own

local regulatory framework.

D. Even if the State’s Unusual Approach Satisfies the Constitutional


Requirements Established By Article VII, Section 6(i), Deerfield’s
Amendment Is Valid.

Pursuant to Section 6(i), the General Assembly may “specifically limit the

concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.” Because

the phrase is written in the disjunctive, the plain text of the Constitution appears to

provide two scenarios: the General Assembly may restrict home rule authority by

declaring any area of law to be an area of exclusive statewide control; or, on the other

hand, the General Assembly may simply “limit” home rule authority in some significant

way short of declaring “exclusive authority.” As Scadron, Roman, Schillerstrom Homes,

and Palm each establish, however, the General Assembly must do so expressly.

Here, given that the title of Section 13.1 is “Preemption” and the text speaks to

both a limitation and “exclusive powers and functions,” there can be little question that

the General Assembly intended to limit any home rule unit that did not opt out of the

statewide regime. As with any issue of statutory interpretation, “the fundamental

objective . . . is to ascertain and give effect to the drafter's intent. The statutory language,

given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of legislative intent.” Palm,

2013 IL 110505 ¶ 48. When engaging is this exercise in construction, the courts must be

mindful that:

The language of a statute must be reviewed as a whole, such that each section of a
statute is examined in relation to every other section. Another basic principle of
statutory construction is that courts should start with the language of the statute
itself, and give the language used its plain and commonly understood meaning,
unless the intention of the legislature is to the contrary.

140220662.1 -6-
Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 185. Here, the legislative intent seems abundantly clear. If a home rule

municipality had an existing regulation involving assault weapons, or adopted one within 10

days after the effective date of the legislation, those municipalities could exercise concurrent

jurisdiction. Because home rule units, including the City of Chicago and the Village of Morton

Grove had already adopted complete bans on these weapons at the time of this legislation, it is

also clear that the General Assembly intended to permit complete bans of assault weapons.

Beyond this, the General Assembly provided that any municipality that adopted an ordinance

addressing assault weapons could then freely amend that ordinance. Because a significant

amount of the State’s population was already covered by such an assault weapons bans, there is

similarly no basis to assume that the General Assembly intended to limit the scope of these

amendments in any way. The only limitation the General Assembly imposed was procedural. A

municipality must provide a copy of any amendment to the Department of State Police. 430

ILCS 65/13.3. If, however, a municipality did not have any existing ordinance regulating assault

weapons, or if a municipality failed to adopt such an ordinance within the 10-day period after the

effective date, then the State would assert exclusive authority over the issue of assault weapons

within that jurisdiction.

Section 13.3, which provides for notice to the Department of State Police, makes clear

that the General Assembly’s concern was for notice rather than substance. Some municipalities

had adopted existing regulations and even bans on assault weapons; others would adopt them

within the 10-day waiting period; and still others would amend regulations, imposing greater or

lesser restrictions over time. The General Assembly did not express any interest in the outcome

of any local decision. The only concern was that the public be made aware of: 1) those

municipalities which had opted out of the legislative program; 2) the ordinance so regulating

140220662.1 -7-
assault weapons; and 3) any amendment to an assault weapons ordinance. For any municipality

not opting out of the program, the State then would exercise its exclusive authority to regulate

assault weapons.

While this approach appears unprecedented – a search of the Illinois Compiled Statutes

could not locate any other example of this hybrid approach -- the intent of the General Assembly

appears clear: the state has assumed a form of “exclusive control” while allowing any local unit

of government to adopt its own regulation and to amend that regulation as it sees fit. Under this

reading, Deerfield’s amendment is valid. To avoid this outcome, Plaintiffs suggest an alternative

approach: the Court should accept the first part of the legislative scheme, “grandfathering”

existing regulations of assault weapons and any passed within 10-days of the effective date, but

ignore the provision allowing amendments. Plaintiffs’ approach would also require ignoring

Section 13.3, the requirement that local government’s provide any amendment to the

Department of State Police. Plaintiff’s unprecedented approach, however, is inconsistent with

any rule of statutory construction. A court cannot simply ignore both the intent of the General

Assembly and the text of a statute in order to render a provision constitutional. For this reason

alone, Plaintiffs’ argument must fail.2

E. Because the General Assembly has failed to define an area of statewide concern
properly, the entire preemption section must fail as a matter of law.

2
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Third District’s Decision in Athey v. City of Peru, 22 Ill. App. 3d 363
(3d Dist. 1974) is similarly misplaced. Plaintiffs’ contend that Athey somehow provides a bright-
line test for determining when an amendment is actually a new ordinance. It does not. Instead,
Athey suggest a factual inquiry into the extent of the textual differences. In Athey, the Court held
that where the municipality had amended its Zoning Code from 16 pages to 115 pages, and had
created nearly 100 new definitions, among numerous other changes, that the better reading
would be to consider this a new Zoning regime rather than a simple amendment. None of these
factors exist here.

140220662.1 -8-
Despite its clear intent, the State has not properly established that assault weapons are

any area of statewide concern. Absent this, there can be no basis for exclusive control. As the

Court alluded to during the recent telephonic hearing, Section 13.1(c) is essentially a statute at

war with itself. Plaintiffs have similarly conceded that “there is a contradiction . . . that put it at

odds with itself.” Easterday Reply at 6. On the one hand, the General Assembly states flatly:

“the regulation of the possession or ownership of assault weapons are exclusive powers of this

State.” In the next breath, however, the State cavalierly announces that despite this purported

“exclusive authority,” the State will cede this authority to any municipality that has adopted an

ordinance regulating assault weapons or any municipality that adopts an ordinance within 10

days of the effective date. The General Assembly, thus, not only “grandfathers” any existing

local ordinance but simultaneously creates a window for an unknown number of municipalities,

and potentially every municipality in the State, to adopt regulations outside of this ostensible

matter of statewide concern.

The General Assembly is therefore claiming that assault weapons are a matter of

exclusive statewide concern while allowing every element of local government, home rule and

non-home rule units alike, to legislate in this area as they please. The only limitation is temporal

– adopting within 10 days – not substantive. Defendants have not identified any similar

legislation that purports to assume statewide control while simultaneously expressly providing

for local regulation. The entire legislative regime makes clear that despite its pronouncement of

“exclusive powers and functions of the State,” the General Assembly neither believes that assault

weapons are a matter of statewide concern, nor has any objection to a patchwork of local

ordinances on the matter. The court has correctly surmised that this is unlike any “exclusive

authority” established under any other Act.

140220662.1 -9-
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that firearm regulation has been a

matter of local concern since before the nation’s founding . See District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U. S. 570, 683-88 (2008) (Justice Breyer dissenting) (providing colonial examples of firearm

ordinances in Boston, New York City and Philadelphia). The General Assembly’s legislative

scheme has confirmed this approach, not reversed it. Under Section 13.1(c), any municipality –

home rule or non-home rule – may adopt any regulation of assault weapons and may then amend

that regulation as it sees fit.

The touchstone for any preemption analysis is whether the subject matter involves a

matter of “vital state interest.” City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 25. In

StubHub, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether, in the absence of a preemption

provision the court could permit simultaneous regulation by home rule units. The Court noted:

[t]he rule [of construction] limits our function under section 6(a) to a threshold
one, in which we can declare a subject off-limits to local government control only
where the state has a vital interest and a traditionally exclusive role. This test was
used by a unanimous court as the definitive analysis under section 6(a) in Scadron
v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill.2d 164, 176 (1992), Village of Bolingbrook v.
Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill.2d 133, 139 (1994), and Schillerstrom
Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill.2d 281, 290 (2001). It is now settled
law.

Id. Here, the question is not whether regulation can exist in the absence of a preemption

provision. Rather the question is whether preemption can exist where the General Assembly has

expressly permitted not only unlimited local regulation but unlimited amendment of any such

regulation. This is the polar opposite of “exclusive statewide control.” Preemption of local

authority is constitutionally disfavored and courts should err on the side of concurrent authority.

As the First District has noted:

Our supreme court has “consistently recognized that the home rule provisions of
the Illinois Constitution are intended to eliminate or at least reduce to a bare
minimum the circumstances under which local home rule powers are preempted
by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.”

140220662.1 -10-
Midwest Gaming & Entm't, LLC v. County of Cook, 2015 IL App (1st) 142786, ¶ 60, quoting

Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 34.

Despite the text of the statute, the State has not created a system of exclusive power and

function, but instead has established the opposite. For this reason, the General Assembly’s

purported preemption of local regulation is invalid. The legislative scheme created for “assault

weapons” cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article VII, Section 6. Plaintiffs’

claims must fail on this basis as well.

II. Conclusion

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants the Village of Deerfield and

Harriet Rosenthal respectfully request an Order of this Court denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Under either interpretation of the

adequacy of the General Assembly’s preemption of home rule authority, Plaintiffs cannot

demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.

DATE: June 11, 2018 DEFENDANTS


VILLAGE OF DEERFIELD
AND HARRIET ROSENTHAL

By: /s/ Christopher B. Wilson


One of Its Attorneys

Christopher B. Wilson, ARDC No. 6202139


John B. Sample, ARDC No. 6321438
Perkins Coie LLP
131 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1700
Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: (312) 324-8400
Cwilson@perkinscoie.com
JSample@perkinscoie.com

140220662.1 -11-
Steven M. Elrod, ARDC No. 6183239
Hart M. Passman, ARDC No. 6287062
Holland & Knight, LLP
131 South Dearborn Street, 30th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 263-3600
Steven.elrod@hklaw.com
Hart.passman@hklaw.com

Jonathan E. Lowy
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence
840 First Street, N.E., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20002
New Direct Dial: (202) 370-8104
jlowy@bradymail.org

140220662.1 -12-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Christopher B. Wilson, an attorney, certify that on Monday, June 11, 2018, the

foregoing DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON QUESTIONS RELATING

TO PREEMPTION OF HOME-RULE AUTHORITY NOTICE OF FILING was filed

electronically with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois, and served by

electronic mail upon the following:

David H. Thompson Christian D. Ambler


Brian W. Barnes Stone & Johnson, Chtd.
Cooper & Kirk, PLLC 111 West Washington Street
1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Suite 1800
Washington, D.C. 20036 Chicago, IL 60602
202.220.9600 312.332.5656
dthompson@cooperkirk.com cambler@stonejohnsonlaw.com
bbarnes@cooperkirk.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Guns Save Life, Inc. and John William Wombacher III

/s/ Christopher B. Wilson


Christopher B. Wilson

Christopher B. Wilson, ARDC No. 6202139


Perkins Coie LLP
131 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1700
Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: (312) 324-8400
Cwilson@perkinscoie.com

One of the Attorneys for Defendants Village of


Deerfield, Illinois, and Harriet Rosenthal,
solely in her official capacity as Mayor of the
Village of Deerfield

140220662.1 -13-