INTRODUCTION
The process whereby social inequality is created and perpetuated is a central concern of
sociology. Domination of one group by another has been described macroscopically
within multiple domains of stratification such as political, economic, racial/ethnic, age,
and gender. Sociologists are predisposed to note that empirical indicators of group
domination are evident in studies of social institutions such as family, education, reli-
gion, criminal justice, and mass media. Further, it can be argued that social institutions
often operate actively, if not intentionally, as agents contributing to the construction of
ideological hegemony reinforcing the process of group domination. What about cin-
ema? How might movies operate to reinforce domination generally in the culture? This
article will explore that question within the exemplary domain of gender. Rather than
presume that the mere portrayal of female subordination within cinematic narrative
automatically accomplishes its own reinforcement, this article will theorize the process
as a mechanism operating across the micro (biopsycho), meso (psychosocial), and
macro (sociocultural) levels of analysis—with emphasis placed on the mediating meso-
level. Discussion of this process will draw upon compatibilities that exist among several
*Direct all correspondence to J. Greg Getz, Department of Social Sciences, University of Houston-
Downtown, Houston, TX 77002; e-mail: getzg@uhd.edu
slipped past the conscious scrutiny of the viewer. I do not mean to imply that Capra
was consciously encoding an ideological statement about gender roles in Mr. Deeds or
in his other films; in fact, I suspect that he was not. Critically, one could argue that dur-
ing the Great Depression women’s participation in the labor force was a contentious
political issue of which Capra could not possibly have been unaware (Evans 1989).
However, the point of significance is that the conscious intent of Capra (or any partici-
pant in the process of film production) is largely irrelevant to the objective analysis of
ideological structure in a film. Knowledge of a director’s conscious intent might provide
a clue to embedded meaning; but this is not to say that the director achieved his aim or
that he did not subconsciously include other ideological messages.
Characteristics of the audience might qualify the accuracy of the model in predicting
legitimation of conventional ideology in the minds of viewers. Integration of actual
audience reception into an empirically testable model of ideology transmission through
film is advisable, but beyond the scope of the current endeavor.
IDENTIFICATION
One concept often involved in the theorization of how films influence viewers is that of
“identification.” Employment of this notion uncritically is consistent with the charge
that much theorizing of cinema’s influence on viewers remains stuck at the micro(bio-
psycho) level of analysis.
For example, Metz (1982) made a distinction between primary and secondary iden-
tification. The former involves the diegetic effect that refers to the film viewer’s illusion
that he is present, via the camera’s eye, in the fictional world of the narrative. Secondary
identification entails the viewer’s empathetic connection with a character in the narra-
tive leading the viewer to imagine being in the character’s situation. This does not mean
that the viewer believes himself to be the character with whom he identifies (Tan 1996).
It means that the viewer experiences an emotion consistent with the viewer’s illusion
that he understands the character’s social situation.
Recently an even more micro mechanism explaining identification has been offered
by those who suggest a neurological hypothesis. In this case, film viewer empathy is
evoked because of the cinematic activation of mirror neurons. Such neurons are so-
named because they are active “both when subjects perform an action and when they
observe that same action being performed” by someone else (Smith 2014:37–41).
My argument here is that the process of identification functions not only at this
micro (neuropsychological) level but also at a meso(psychosocial) level such that view-
ers identify not only with one or more of a narrative’s individual characters but also
with stereotypic schemas embodying relationships among characters. Viewers empa-
thize not only with characters’ situations but also with TA rackets, games, and life scripts
of a set of characters as discussed below. That is, nested within this Social Cognitive
Theory framework is another approach that engages the issue of audience emotional
identification in a more theoretically complex way. Within this framework emotions
usually regarded as negative or punishing actually are sought as desired outcomes (pay-
offs) consistent with viewers’ life scripts and favored transactional rackets and games.
Games are sets of ulterior transactions, repetitive in nature, with a well-defined psy-
chological payoff. Since an ulterior transaction means that the agent pretends to be
doing one thing while he is really doing something else, all games involve a con. But
a con only works if there is a weakness it can hook into, a handle or “gimmick” to
get hold of in the respondent, such as fear, greed, sentimentality, or irritability. After
the “mark” is hooked, the player pulls some sort of switch in order to get his payoff.
The switch is followed by a moment of confusion or cross-up while the mark tries
to figure out what has happened to him. Then both players collect their payoffs.
“Payoffs” amount to feelings or emotions aroused in the game players that they sys-
tematically but unconsciously seek as a substitute for adult friendship or intimacy
(defined as honest, nonexploitative, game-free interaction). Berne’s (1972:24) most rig-
orous definition of a game requires six formulaic elements: Con 1 Gimmick 5
Response ! Switch ! Crossup ! Payoff. The game playing actor offers a social stimu-
lus (Con) to the respondent that has an ulterior, psychological motive targeting a weak-
ness or receptivity (Gimmick) in the respondent. The respondent’s accepting of the bait
leads to a Response entailing a shift in role (Switch) on the part of the actor. This causes
a moment of confusion (Crossup) for both players followed by the experiencing of the
negative emotion (Payoff) that they are unconsciously seeking. Series of transactions
involving fewer than these six elements are technically designated rackets as opposed to
games (Berne 1972; Stewart and Joines 1987). The switch or shift in role noted above
means that actor and respondent change roles in the context of a Drama Triangle
involving three roles: Persecutor, Victim, and Rescuer. This will be illustrated below
with regard to Mr. Deeds.
TA assumes that people alternately manifest themselves in one of three ego states—
Parent, Adult, or Child. An ego state is a coherent system of emotions, memories,
thoughts, and behaviors that are correlated with each other as a result of their status as a
network. Certain feelings give rise to a set of coherent thoughts and behavior patterns
resembling those of a person’s actual parental figures as perceived by the child from
infancy onward. They manifest themselves as the Parent ego state (P). Note the similarity
here to the logic of Associative Network/Schema Theory discussed above. P has at least
two subvariants known as the Controlling Parent and the Nurturing Parent. The Adult
ego state is oriented toward an objective appraisal of reality in the present. The Adult is
rational and ideally unencumbered by directives from the Parent or Child. The Child
ego state encompasses emotions, thoughts, and behavior patterns fixated in early child-
hood. Subvariants of the Child are Adapted Child, the Natural Child, and the Rebellious
Child. People tend to develop personal scripts for particular social situations and for
their lives in general. These life scripts are structured by the differential preference indi-
viduals have for the three ego states (Berne 1972; Steiner 1974) and for particular rackets
or games. Child, Adult, and Parent ego states are not simply new names for the Freudian
notions of id, ego, and superego. Although Child and Parent influences on a person’s
patterned thoughts, emotions, memories, and behaviors often operate unconsciously,
unlike id and superego functions, they are accessible to conscious recognition, analysis,
and goal-directed modification. This is consistent with Social Cognitive Theory’s con-
ceptualization of the person as a goal-directed, self-regulating system.
The social activity of any two people constitutes a series of transactions, which can
continue as long as the communication between ego states is complementary; that is,
when response to a transactional stimulus “is appropriate and expected. . .” (Berne
1964:29). Diagrammatically (Figure 2), complementarity or consonance is termed a
“parallel” transaction, that is, (1–1)2, (5–5)2, (9–9)2, (2–4), (4–2), (3–7), (7–3), (6–8),
(8–6) (Berne 1964:32). All other possible transactions result in “crossed” lines indicating
a refusal on the part of one interactant to meet the response expectations of the other.
Space precludes detailed exemplification of this paradigm. Berne (1967) provides multi-
ple examples, as do Harris (1973) and Steiner (1974). A crossed transaction ultimately
results in the cessation of interaction unless one interactant changes his ego state to
complement the stimulus/response of the other.
I argue here that the male and female leads in Mr. Deeds usually adopt either the
Parent or Child ego state when interacting with each other. In other words, the interac-
tion between these characters is not usually Adult to Adult. Their interaction seems to
reflect life scripts adopted in childhood but activated in the immediate social environ-
ment that compels their specific actions.
FIGURE 2. Transactional Analytic Relationships Relative to Ego State Structure: Parent, Adult,
and Child.
Mary who faints on the sidewalk from hunger and exhaustion after a long day of job
hunting. He is captivated, gathers her up, and takes her to dinner during which he asks,
“you were a lady in distress weren’t you?”
Deeds’s “love” for Mary is clearly linked to her status as someone who fits a require-
ment of his life script. Her name is the same as his mother’s. He later tells her that he
has not married because his mother and father were “a great couple,” and that he
thought he “might have the same kind of luck.” Later in the film she reads a love poem
from him in which he refers to her as an “angel too lovely to woo.” The Oedipal impli-
cations here can be interpreted within the TA paradigm as a life script directive compel-
ling Deeds to seek a spouse similar to his mother.
Deeds’s meeting with, and attraction for, Mary is not the only context in which
his life script directive to be a rescuer is manifested. As noted above, Mary is actually
Louise “Babe” Bennett, a Pulitzer Prize–winning newspaper reporter assigned to get
a story on the new multimillionaire her collapse in the rain was a trick. Having
gained his confidence and affection, she meets him nightly and writes a series of sto-
ries about him. Dubbing him the “Cinderella Man,” she recounts his eccentric
exploits so as to make him appear foolish. After Deeds discovers Mary/Babe’s duplic-
ity and true motives, he (temporarily) rejects her; his compulsion to rescue then
shifts to the economic arena. He devises and finances a welfare program to aid poor
farmers; becoming their savior, their shepherd, reiterating his earlier coding as a
Christ figure. At this point, cathexis shifts to his Parent ego state which continues the
rescue script.
Deeds is attempting to live out a mythic theme he selected as a child. As indicated
above, this theme appears in several of the film’s narrative threads, though our concern is
with its implications for Deeds’s gender role relations. The attempt to live out mythic
themes is frequently observed in the clients of TA therapists. As Steiner (1974:87–88) puts it:
The youngster who finds himself unable to make sense of the pressures under
which he lives needs to synthesize his decision in terms of a consciously under-
stood model. This model is usually based on a person in fiction, mythology,
comic books, movies, television, or possibly real life. The mythical person
embodies a solution to the dilemma in which the youngster finds herself. . . .
Incidents . . . in which the (life) script’s mythical character becomes a con-
sciously understood identity, are commonplace phenomena in scripts.
(one) important set of injunctions and attributions which affect children from
the earliest day on causing premature script decisions is the gender-linked pro-
gramming called sex roles.
Why Deeds has a consciously understood identity encompassing the role of rescuer
is not of concern here. Again, it is not claimed that this analysis is a case study of a real
person. The concern is to show that he adopts a non-Adult programmed stance toward
the woman who is his romantic interest.
Beginning with the attorney’s remark (cited above) about having “dreams like that
when we’re young,” Deeds is identified as a child. In explaining to his associates how
easy it will be to get Deeds’s power of attorney, lawyer Cedar remarks, “he’s as na€ıve as a
child.” Near the end of the film the lawyer refers to Deeds’s courtroom defense of his
plan to aid the poor as “childish ravings,” while Deeds has defended the sensibility of
his plan in terms of its logical obviousness to a “10-year-old child.” Thus, rather than
juxtaposing himself against the imagery of a child, Deeds identifies himself with that
imagery but inverts its value connotation. The lawyer invokes the negative image of the
irrational, ill-tempered child while Deeds invokes the positively oriented wisdom-in-
innocence child.
Throughout the film, humor is generated through the portrayal of a grown man as
childlike in his innocence. Deeds chases fire engines as part of his rescue script. In his
New York mansion, he slides down the banister and plays around with an echo in the
cavernous entry hall. His temperamental nature is expressed through a tendency to
punch people in the nose or “knock their heads together” when he is victimized by their
bad manners, mockery, or dishonesty. Like a gangly youth, he is physically clumsy. With
Mary/Babe on the roof of a skyscraper overlooking Times Square, he remarks, “you can
almost spit on it can’t you?” Mary/Babe, reflecting the contempt she is beginning to feel
for her own urban values, says, “Why don’t you try?” He does and the wind blows it
back onto his overcoat. Later, after expressing his love for her and essentially proposing
marriage, he falls over a trash can and then runs away. Clumsiness is, thus, a coding for
childlike nonsophistication in her presence.
The Child is also reflected in Deeds’s demeanor, and in the tone of his voice. There
is an innocent, matter-of-fact quality to the tone and the substance of Deeds’s remarks.
He takes others literally. Even when making a remark revealing a mature adult insight
or when calling his exploiters to account, he has the stern demeanor of an indignant
child imitating a remonstrating parent. From a TA perspective, this suggests that Deeds’s
innocence is really a front or come-on designed to create a social situation in which he
has the moral justification to play a game such as Now-I’ve-Got-You-You-Son-of a
Bitch (Berne 1964:84–86), and to punish the offending party either physically or
psychologically.
One final observation supporting this suggestion that Deeds’s actions are Child ego
state–scripted involves the casting of Gary Cooper as Deeds. Cooper’s general appeal
and uniqueness as a star are partly bound up with the man/child persona which he proj-
ects in many of his films. He is tough and aggressive in macho conflicts with
other males; but with women, he usually displays modesty, gentleness, and boyish
“aw-shucks-Ma’am” innocence. In Mr. Deeds, this dialectic is pushed to an extreme
such that Cooper almost becomes a caricature of himself.
Much of the humor in Mr. Deeds is achieved by juxtaposing the hard-nosed action
of the Adult or Parent ego states with the persona of the Child. For example, Deeds flab-
bergasts the opera board by refusing to finance the civic opera unless it is reorganized to
avoid a deficit; he is immune to the other board members’ attempts to manipulate him
through flattery and subtle intimidation. This same scene is interrupted by Deeds’s exu-
berant rush to the window at the sound of a fire truck siren. Again, I am not suggesting
that Capra planned these juxtapositions in order to create a particular gender role struc-
ture. He brilliantly uses this device to make the film funny and to provide it with a
rhythm that is unmistakably Capra’s.
However, the humor in such juxtaposition functions to distract the viewer from a
consideration of the inconsistency implicit in the man/child dialectic. A TA approach
leads one to take inconsistency (incongruity in TA parlance) seriously and to explore its
social psychological significance. I have pointed to several facets of the film as indica-
tions that Deeds’s relationship with Mary/Babe is scripted by his Child ego state. One is
the overtly expressed lady-in-distress theme. Another is the coding of Deeds as rescuer
in general, through his identification as Christ figure (son of Joseph and Mary Deeds),
son of a physician, volunteer fireman, and benefactor to the poor. A fourth is the incon-
gruity of the man/child dialectic.
Although Deeds’s demeanor is consistently childlike, his thought processes are not.
When confronted by various people who are after his money, he thwarts them with a
deductive finesse that belies his “innocence.” For example, in his confrontation with the
opera board, it is revealed that the opera has accrued a deficit of $180,000. From this, he
deduces that the opera has been mismanaged and suggests:
. . . we must give the wrong kind of shows . . . maybe you charge too
much . . . maybe you’re selling bad merchandise.
He is unmoved by the board members’ patronization of him and refuses to accept their
definition of the situation that the opera is an “artistic institution” and should not be
conducted for profit.
Another example is found in his interaction with crooked lawyers. One confronts
him claiming that Deeds’s deceased benefactor had a common law wife and child who
are entitled to one-third of the estate—about seven million dollars; but then he adds:
We didn’t expect that much. I’m sure I can get her to settle quietly for one
million.
. . . there’s something fishy about a person who would settle for a million dollars
when they get seven million. I’m surprised that Mr. Cedar [the deceased bene-
factor’s lawyer], who’s supposed to be a smart man, didn’t see through that.
This shrewd sensitivity to the hidden agendas of others also is revealed in Deeds’s
interactions with Cedar who is constantly pestering Deeds to sign over his power of
attorney. At one point Deeds remarks:
Cedar responds:
Why no extra charge . . . that’s an added service a firm like [ours] usually donates.
Deeds replies:
There was a fellow named Winslow here a while ago . . . wanted to handle my
business for nothing, too. [I don’t understand] why these people all want to
work for nothing. It isn’t natural. I guess I better think about it some more.
Deeds replies:
You’re not my attorney yet, Mr. Cedar, not till I find out what’s on your mind.
Suppose you get the books straightened out quick so I can have a look at them.
Thus, regarding economic matters, Deeds is hardly a gullible pushover. Why, then, is
he so gullible with regard to the manipulation of Mary/Babe? He never questions their
chance meeting or her motives, even though he has been hounded since his arrival in
New York by people who want his money. After the derogatory newspaper stories begin
to appear, it does not occur to him that she was the only observer of all events recounted
in the stories. From the perspective of TA, this inconsistency suggests that his gullibility
is scripted by his Parent or Child ego state. He has a script injunction against being taken
advantage of economically. But he is compelled to be gullible with Mary/Babe in order
to further another element of his life script—his betrayal and symbolic martyrdom.
Deeds is actually conducting a transactional “racket.” A racket is an emotion that is
habitually activated by someone as his/her payoff in a preferred game (Berne 1972:137–
41). Specific emotions become rackets when one learns to exploit them in the context of
a game. Such feelings, which are often substitutes for Adult sexual feelings, are collected
and then cashed in. We learn from his housekeeper and when Mary/Babe asks him, that
Deeds does not spend time with women. Instead, he is collecting feelings of indignation,
that is, anger aroused by something unjust. Prior to Deeds’s sanity hearing, the viewer is
reminded twice about Deeds’s coding as a Christ figure via allusions to crucifixion.
When Mary/Babe is beginning to feel ambivalent about her duplicity with Deeds, she
articulates to her roommate, Mabel Dawson:
that guy’s either the dumbest, stupidest or the most imbecilic idiot in the world or
else he’s the grandest thing alive. I can’t make him out. . . . I’m crucifying him.
Mabel responds:
People have been crucified before.
Mary/Babe:
Why? Why do we have to do it?
Mabel says:
You started out to be a successful newspaper woman, didn’t ya?
Thus, Deeds’s betrayal by Mary/Babe is explicitly tied to her achievement motivation as
an occupationally role-reversed female. Later in the film when Mary/Babe attempts to
visit the incarcerated Deeds prior to his sanity hearing, she is denied entry. Interacting
with Cornelius Cobb, Deeds’s buffer from the press and public, Cobb tells her:
He doesn’t want any lawyers. He’s sunk so low he doesn’t want help from anybody.
You can take a bow for that. As swell a guy as ever hit town, and you crucified
him for a couple of stinking headlines. You’ve done your bit. Stay out of his way.
There are indications, however, that Babe’s Parent is eventually conned by Deeds’s
Child. While taking a walk, she tells him that she’s also from a small town, that her
father played in the town band, and that he reminds her of her father (I would suggest,
of her father’s Child ego state) toward whom she may have played a nurturing role; no
mention is made of Babe’s mother. Also, Babe has no romantic interest. At the paper
she is “one of the boys.” Shortly thereafter, she reads the love poem he wrote referring
to her as an “angel too lovely to woo.” This juxtaposition with her previous remark
about her father serves to code her as a Parent to Deeds’s Child. Babe’s voice and
demeanor are never childlike as are Deeds’s. Her parental, protective fury emerges in the
courtroom where she rises in his defense.
Thus, what began as a consciously manipulative “angular” transaction on Babe’s
part, becomes a duplex transaction with motives complimentary to those of Deeds.
From a TA framework, their relationship ends as a Parent–Child transaction.
The lack of sensuality in their relationship is notable. Only in the film’s final scene
do they kiss. Prior to that, Deeds’s courting of Mary/Babe is entirely verbal; they
embrace only once on her doorstep. This is remarkable for people seemingly in their
late twenties, unless one infers that their relationship is not sensually motivated in the
first place, or unless it is seen as a manifestation of incest taboo.
In summary, we have shown that from a TA perspective, the psychological dynamics
of the relationship between Deeds and Mary/Babe indicate something other than an
Adult–Adult transaction. Both have hidden agendas which, while not finally malevolent,
preclude the experience of true intimacy between them. However, both of them are
attractive, appealing individuals. Cooper’s persona combined with Capra’s comedic
genius make Deeds a seductive force within the film’s text. His charisma serves to gener-
ate credibility not only for his explicit, populist, political–economic ideology, but also
for the gender role ideology implicitly lurking in his relationship with Mary/Babe.
Generally, persistent audience reception of Parent–Child coding of gender roles rein-
forces the patriarchal subordination of women characteristic of American culture. Films
reflect cultural values, but they also reinforce them insofar as the narrative structure of
films does not make those values politically problematic. In the Capra comedies, the
manifest message involves the viability of traditional, small-town American values in an
industrial society that is becoming increasingly oligarchic and corrupt. The patriarchal
subordination of women, however, is not linked to this manifest message in the filmic
text. Instead, portrayal of patriarchal gender role structure as “normal,” that is, unprob-
lematic, in the text functions as a vehicle by which the manifest message is delivered.
But the vehicle, itself, is a message. It is not value neutral. In Mr. Deeds, Mary/Babe is a
tough newspaper reporter who wants money and engages in the deceit and abuse of
Deeds in order to get it—under the guise of professionalism. On the social psychologi-
cal level of analysis, the narrative structure suggests that her Parent was being set up to
be exploited by Deeds’s Child. Deeds’s transactional racket is to experience righteous
indignation in her suffering with guilt. For the film to make a covert sociological state-
ment, however, Mary/Babe’s retribution is best portrayed in a public setting. Her guilt
must be accompanied by shame. It is appropriate, therefore, that her self-repudiating
confession occurs in a courtroom full of people. She becomes a moral martyr (Parental)
to complement Deeds’s emotional (Child) martyrdom. This public and self-accepted
humiliation of the role-reversed female whose actions are inconsistent with patriarchal
domination is not portrayed as ideologically problematic. Thus, the viewer is not led to
question consciously those values directly associated with gender roles; instead, the nor-
mative structure of the film functions to obscure or gloss over those values. Such covert
legitimation is more likely to influence the viewer compared with the overt legitimation
found in films whose producers purposefully politicize a hegemonic value structure. As
noted by Pratkanis and Aronson (2001), persuasive communications constituting prop-
aganda are most effective when their delivery evokes “peripheral” (i.e., schema-driven,
emotional) information processing mode rather than “central” (i.e., cognitive analytic)
processing mode. Although all films encode value assumptions, not all films are equally
effective in legitimating those values for the audience. Politicization is one variable spec-
ifying conditions under which what is legitimated within the text of the film is subse-
quently legitimated within the mind of the viewer.
CONCLUSION
Employing a Social Cognitive theoretical perspective the reward/punishment structure
of the protagonists in Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936) was analyzed. It was concluded
that with regard to the issue of female subordination, this is an ideologically conserva-
tive film because the only gender role-reversed female character is punished for her
role-violating behavior. However, upon quitting her job and publically confessing both
her exploitative manipulation of Deeds and her love for him, she is rewarded by his
reanimated acceptance of her. That is, when the portrayed gender role structure is
counter-normative, the female role incumbent is punished in the form of rejection by
the male protagonist and by public shaming in a judicial setting. When the gender role
structure transforms to normative the female lead is rewarded; thus, legitimating the
conventional, ideological subordination of women.
Employing the compatible assumptions of Social Cognitive Theory and Associative
Network/Schema Theory, the claim was addressed that films influence viewers because
viewers “identify” with characters in the narrative. While such microlevel identification
may occur and may be facilitated by the viewer’s experience of empathy with a charac-
ter’s perceived situation; it was concluded that a higher order, meso modality of identifi-
cation is in play—namely identification with a stereotypic schema defining a social
relationship. Viewers experiencing a filmic narrative evocative of schemas that they have
already deeply internalized are less likely to question the ideological legitimacy of narra-
tive elements—in this case the element of female subordination.
The logic of TA was then utilized to discuss the nature of the male and female protag-
onists’ relationship. Evidence from the narrative was presented to support the claim that
Deeds’s life script mandated that he be a messianic rescuer and that he undergo symbolic
crucifixion at the hands of his female persecutor, only to be resurrected from his state of
deep despair by her spell-breaking protestation of love for him. One could argue that
Deeds began the narrative playing the TA game Kick Me and then switched to Now-I’ve-
Got-You-You-Bitch consistent with the TA notion that games involve rackets wherein
players have the ulterior motive of experiencing an emotion such as anger or righteous
indignation as their payoff—often a substitute for Adult–Adult intimacy. Thus, psycho-
logically unhealthy relationships portrayed in cinematic narrative can be read as meta-
phors for pathologically structured culture reinforcing gendered domination.
How does the cinematic portrayal of gender role behavior as “gamey” facilitate
women’s acquiescence to domination? One answer emerges via the observation that
film viewers are most likely to identify with characters whose ulterior life scripts and
preferred games resonate with their own. Because game playing is ubiquitous in our
everyday lives, film viewers easily, subconsciously recognize TA racket and game por-
trayal in films. Interpretive schemas activated by a film’s narrative mirror viewers’ inter-
personal social experiences. Consistent with both cognitive dissonance theory and the
Weberian notion of “elective affinity,” film viewers are most likely to embrace cinematic
narratives that are consonant, that is, logically compatible with their own ideas,
thoughts, emotions, memories, or behaviors already firmly lodged in heuristic interpre-
tive schemas.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to Professor Brenda Wineapple, Department of English, Union College,
and to Professor Richard Hawkins, Department of Sociology, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, for their instructive comments on an early draft of this article.
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