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Ricardo Parellada

A R I S T O T L E ’ S T H E O R Y O F P R AC T I C A L W I S D O M

E thical theory usually pays more attention to the ways and possibilities of justi-
1. INTRODUCTION

fying ethical norms, than to the frequent difficulties an agent faces in consid-
ering particulars and circumstances in order to form a moral judgment that can
guide action. The most balanced reflections on this matter belong to the tradition
of ethical thought that goes back to Aristotle. This tradition conceives of prudence
or practical wisdom (fr’nhsij) as an intellectual virtue that is responsible for
moral knowledge and discernment, but not so much about norms and principles
from a general viewpoint, as about their relevance to actual and often unique sit-
uations. The study of practical wisdom and contingency responds to the constant
need to weigh arguments and circumstances in the face of challenges of decision
and action, which usually cannot be met through a direct or mechanical applica-
tion of norms or principles.1
According to the Aristotelian tradition, there is in moral judgment a funda-
mental component of not explicit balancing of norms, values, and emotions,
which cannot be displayed openly or reduced to the application of explicit ethical
principles. Moral judgment is not to be mechanized, but refined and cultivated.
Upbringing and education should take this fact into account, and cannot carry out
their mission properly if they disregard the importance of reasonable habits and
skills for considered judgments and praiseworthy actions. Although it is con-
ceived mainly for the analysis of individual action—the only one I deal with in
this article—the approach from the idea of practical wisdom is also relevant when
considering issues and debates of public and general concern.
Now, according to the classical conception, although practical wisdom is
devoted to tackling contingency, it is not to be identified with the mere ability to
find the most appropriate means to pursue any given end. The reason is that for
Aristotle practical wisdom presupposes an acquaintance with ends of value that is
not purely intellectual, but must rather be involved in character. This acquain-
tance with the good ends lies behind Aristotle’s distinction of practical wisdom
(fr’nhsij) from mere ability (dein’thj): ability is the capacity to find the most
convenient means to achieve any particular end, while practical wisdom is the
same capacity when the end is good. For this reason Aristotle says, as we shall
see, that wisdom is the ability of the just person, and that one cannot be wise with-

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out moral sensibility. Once the agent has appropriate moral knowledge and dispo-
sitions directed toward justice or temperance, for example, practical wisdom has
a double task: in the first place, discerning the most reasonable course of action,
and, in the second place, issuing the command that prompts action on the part of
the corresponding virtue or capacity.
The medieval tradition generally conserved this conception of practical wis-
dom, which disappeared from modern philosophy. Thus, prudential imperatives
are for Kant those of technical reason serving any ends, and prudence (Klugheit)
plays in Kant’s ethics the role Aristotle assigns to mere ability. Contemporary eth-
ical and economic thought generally identifies prudence with instrumental rea-
son. The classical understanding of practical wisdom has importance in various
contemporary forms of reassessing and actualizing Aristotle’s practical philoso-
phy, but it has been the object of divergent interpretations. The main objective of
this essay is to expound the central aspects of the Aristotelian conception of
fr’nhsij as the fundamental practical virtue, its connection with the most basic
values and moral character, and its role in moral judgment and directing action.
Finally, I will mention the significance of the reappraisal of this classical notion
for the understanding not only of individual agency, but also of public delibera-
tion and collective choice.

2. PRACTICAL WISDOM AS KNOWLEDGE

The notion of practical wisdom arises in response to diverse questions about

ABOUT CONTINGENT PARTICULARS

human action in general and its moral aspects. The two fundamental problems
that motivate Aristotle’s reflection are that general knowledge often does not suf-
fice in order to discern the reasonable or convenient in particular situations, and
that reflection and judgment do not provide accurate explanations of human
actions, which are sometimes contrary to deliberations and decisions of the agent.
Aristotle starts his analysis of action from a distinction—widely present in the
previous philosophical and literary traditions—between two general capacities of
the human psyche: reasoning about objects and acting on them. The Aristotelian
reflection upon practical wisdom offers a way of understanding the relationship
between the human mind and will as an explanation for those well-known phe-
nomena and the inadequacy of previous doctrines such as Socratic intellectual-
ism. “For acting well (e‹praxi/a) or badly—Aristotle says—requires both
thought and character (dißnoia and «qoj) [...] That is why decision is either
understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought; and this is
the sort of principle that a human being is.”2
It is well-known that Aristotle begins his reflection on the good in any con-
text by characterizing it as the end toward which things tend. When applying this
notion to the human being, he considers that we can recognize a truly human

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function or task: rational activity. The question about the possibility of carrying
out this activity better or worse seems at first to be a technical question entirely
similar to those referring to the characteristic functions of any beings or objects,
such as other living creatures, human organs, or artifacts created by man. Since
rational activity is directed as much to thought as to action, it will be necessary to
distinguish the capacity to apply it well or badly (with or without virtue) in both
domains. The term employed from the outset by Aristotle to designate rational
activity and those human actions that are worthy of esteem is spoudai^oj.3
The analysis of practical wisdom in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics can
be first approached from this notion of good or excellent action in a sense that
does not yet have to be moral. In the previous books, Aristotle has dealt with other
notions that are relevant to understanding the way practical wisdom handles par-
ticular situations. In accordance with this previous treatment, virtue of character
or moral virtue is an elective habit that operates after deliberation about factors
and circumstances has taken place.4 Moral virtue, as an appetitive or desiring dis-
position, is in charge of choice and action. Choice—and therefore action—,
Aristotle affirms, will be good or appropriate inasmuch as this is true also of rea-
soning and desire: “Now virtue of character is a state that decides; and decision is
a deliberative desire. If, then, the decision is excellent, the reason must be true
and the desire correct, so that what reason asserts is what desire pursues.” And he
explains how we should understand the truth of practical reasoning by means of
the following consideration, which calls for a careful interpretation: “This, then,
is thought and truth concerned with action [...]; for truth is the function of
whatever thinks. But the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing
with correct desire.”5
Therefore, in his analysis of the roles of intelligence and character in good
and valuable choices, Aristotle makes the following statements: (i) choice is
good if practical reasoning is true and desire is correct; (ii) desire has to pursue
what reason says; and (iii) practical reasoning is true if it agrees with correct
desire. As it is evident, if desire is correct simply for following what practical
reasoning concludes, then (ii) and (iii) constitute a circle. In order to understand
properly these apparently circular statements, it is necessary to consider first the
complete discussion of the functioning of practical wisdom and its connexion
with the moral virtues.
In the previous books, the analysis of moral virtue had made it clear when it
is necessary to resort to considerations regarding practical wisdom. Virtue looks
for the reasonable midpoint between two rejectable ends, but in order to attain
this mean appropriately general rules and considerations do not suffice. The mean

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is even dependent on the agent, and Aristotle describes it by referring to the lucid-
ity and moderation of the wise person. Thus, the mean is “as the correct reason
says,” and virtue then is “a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean rela-
tive to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by
reference to which the prudent person would define it.”6 When he undertakes a
direct analysis of practical wisdom in book VI, Aristotle appeals to the same
observation, and he asserts that in order to understand the nature and functioning
of fr’nhsij we have to consider which men we call fr’nimoi or wise. The first
thing he finds is the following: “It seems proper to a prudent person to be able to
deliberate finely about things that are good and beneficial for himself, not about
some restricted area—about what sorts of things promote health or strength, for
instance—but about what sorts of things promote living well in general.”7
In accordance with this characterization of the prudent or practically wise
person, the first description or definition of the virtue of practical wisdom
Aristotle offers is that of “a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned
with action about things that are good or bad for a human being.”8 Fr’nhsij is
not a form of science because, unlike science, it deals with the contingent, what
can be otherwise; and it is also distinguished from art (i.e. production) because,
although the latter also focuses on the contingent, it has external ends. By con-
trast, the end of practical wisdom “is acting well itself” (a‹th/ Ω e‹praxi/a
te/loj).9 As Aristotle adds in the same paragraph, science and art can be used for
good or evil, and the voluntary misuse of them indicates expert knowledge; on the
other hand, practical wisdom and the moral virtues cannot be used for evil,
because such misuse would plainly show the lack of them. Practical wisdom is
not an exclusively rational disposition such as the capacities of science or opin-
ion, because it cannot be forgotten like them, which also shows its connection
with the virtues of character. It is true that the sole consideration of the above first
definition of fr’nhsij can prevent one from perceiving its connection with the
moral virtues. But Aristotle points out this connection clearly a few lines below:
“A sign of this is the fact that we call people prudent about some [restricted area]
whenever they calculate well to promote some excellent (spoudai^oj) end, in an
area where there is no craft.”10
Aristotle also points out in passing that individual wisdom cannot cover
everything and that it should not be isolated from the domestic administration and
the political regime, but up to this point he is most concerned with distinguishing
it from science because of its focusing on the contingent. Wise judgment, he says,
can be compared to the intuition (nou ^j) referring to the principles or intellectual
limits that are not the object of reasoning. For judgment concerns the other
extreme of the practical: the individual and contingent, which is not subject to
reasoning either, but to a form of intuition. Aristotle affirms that in the last consid-
eration of complex particular situations, wise judgment can be better described as
a stroke of intuition, than as the outcome of reasoning. That would be often the

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case, for example, when we have to draw a fine line between reasonable and cow-
ardly conduct, or to establish the terms of a fair distribution that cannot be
delayed. He points to this intuition, both in book VI, dedicated to the intellectual
virtues, as well as in book II, dedicated to moral virtue, with the term aiÇsqhsij,
sensible intuition.11

3. THE INTERDEPENDENCE

One of the clearest ways of beginning to see the properly moral considera-
OF PRACTICAL WISDOM AND MORAL VIRTUE

tions that Aristotle introduces is to examine the connection between practical wis-
dom and the virtues of character, or moral virtues. The last two chapters of book
VI are devoted to showing the interdependence of practical wisdom and the moral
virtues: in chapter 12 Aristotle shows that practical wisdom presupposes moral
virtue, whereas in chapter 13 he shows that moral virtue presupposes practical wis-
dom. The first point is that theoretical knowledge of the proper ends of virtuous
behavior—the just, the honorable, the good (di/kaion, kal’n, ¶gaq’n)—is not
enough for a behavior of that nature to take place. As at many other points of his
ethical arguments, Aristotle uses an illustrative comparison with health: inasmuch
as healthy habits are not strengthened by acquaintance with medical science or
gymnastics, the skills of practical wisdom—fine judgment and moderate but deter-
mined action—do not stem from the mere awareness of the ends of value.
Although anchored in intelligence, the habit of fr’nhsij can only operate well if
it displays an appropriate connection with the appetitive or desiring dispositions.
The dependence of practical wisdom on moral virtue is manifest when we
consider the capacity to calculate and deliberate about a course of action inde-
pendently of the nature of the ends pursued. As I have already said, Aristotle
asserts that this capacity is not called wisdom, but mere ability or astuteness
(dein’thj).12 There is no wisdom without ability, but there is no wisdom either
if calculation does not intend, one way or another, to serve some of the noble or
fine ends defined by the different virtues. “Further,” Aristotle says, “we fulfill
our function insofar as we have prudence and virtue of character; for virtue
makes the goal correct, and prudence makes the things promoting the goal [cor-
rect].” Moreover, when the end is not praiseworthy, part of the phronetical
lucidity is lost, for it is often vivified and enhanced by the nature of the end pur-
sued: “And this [best good] is apparent only to the good person; for vice per-
verts us and produces false views about the principles of actions. Evidently,
then, we cannot be prudent without being good (¶du/naton fr’nimon ei«nai
m¬ ◊nta ¶gaq’n).”13

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On the other hand, in chapter 13 Aristotle establishes the difference between

natural virtue and virtue par excellence (kuri/a). Natural virtue is the broad dis-
position we often recognize in people whom nature has endowed unequally with
traits of justice or temperance, whereas virtue proper is the improvement of the
habits of character that cannot actually take place without the guidance of experi-
ence or the perspicacity of practical wisdom. In his previous treatment of virtue,
Aristotle recalls, it was already determined that it is not a rational disposition, as
Socrates thought, but it does not arise in the absence of reason. It is rather accom-
panied by reason (met™ l’gou), and right reason is here practical wisdom.
Moral intention combined with a diminished wit works badly, for it is well known
that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The conclusion is plain: “we
cannot be fully good (¶gaqo\n kuri/wj) without prudence, or prudent without
virtue of character.” Since each virtue requires prudence or practical wisdom and
practical wisdom is required by them all, practical wisdom and the moral virtues
will not be out of balance, but in certain harmony, that reaches its fullness in the
wise one.14
In sum, when analyzing the interdependence of practical wisdom and moral
virtues, Aristotle’s outline is that the virtues offer the end of action—they
embrace the desire of being just or not being a coward, for example—whereas
fr’nhsij deliberates in order to determine what just or brave action would con-
sist of on this or that particular occasion, and looks for the means to carry it out. It
would seem unreasonable to maintain that, since the ends are proposed by desiring
dispositions, they will be in great measure arbitrary, or a mere reflection of the
longings of an individual, a particular society, or a singular cultural moment. To
my mind, the enquiry carried out by Aristotle into the most praiseworthy behavior
in different spheres of life entails a clear estimative purpose. The better ends of
action are not for Aristotle simply those favored by a majority or a certain group,
but those of excellent types of behavior in different spheres of human interaction.
The ends and actions considered by Aristotle are those of a complex and civilized
society, and we can recognize many of them as belonging also to our own moral
and social transactions.15 On the other hand, Aristotle conceives of preferences not
as merely desired, but also as rationally acknowledged, and says that ends should
be the object both of appetite and reason: “For both [his appetitive part and his rea-
son] aim at the fine, and the temperate person’s appetites are for the right things, in
the right ways, at the right times, which is just what reason also prescribes.”16 But
the nature of the ends of action demands a more detailed treatment.

In the characterization of fr’nhsij from the qualities of the fr’nimoj, we

4. THE ENDS OF ACTION

have already seen Aristotle’s observation that only those pursuing a respectable
(spoudai^oj) end are actually called practically wise. Already in the final chap-

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ters of book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, dedicated mainly to the study of happi-
ness, we find a clear distinction among the desirable things between those that
are more or less respectable or noble. Aristotle does not leave determination of
the importance of the different goods or ends in the hands of the many or of the
men of the world; he determines this importance starting from the different life
styles. The different types of ends are from the outset the object of valuing on the
part of Aristotle, who affirms that the person who judges these things rightly it is
the spoudai^oj.
Also, in the discussion of moral virtue in book II an extremely important dis-
tinction between three grand types of desirable ends appears: the noble or fine
(kal’n), the useful (sumfe/ronton), and the pleasant (Ωde/on).17 And in his
thorough analysis of the different virtues of character, Aristotle constantly uses
the terms spoudai^oj, kal’j, ¶gaq’j, eu« to describe the most praiseworthy
action and the agent who carries it out. Aristotle singles out fundamental spheres
of human activity and reflects upon the most convenient and appropriate ways of
acting in each one of them: in the face of dangers and difficulties, in dealing with
our instincts and bodily needs, in the administration of money, and regarding the
idea of oneself, the telling of facts, interaction with fellow men, or the distribution
of resources. As we have seen, he conceives of appropriate behavior as a mid-
point, relative to each agent, between two inappropriate excesses. But, what is a
mean from a quantitative perspective is the maximum from the point of view of
esteem and value, and Aristotle finds that in most cases the appropriate behavior
is the fruit of effort and susceptible of moral valuation. The moral virtues are the
capacities to act well in those different spheres—bravery, temperance, generosity,
magnanimity, truthfulness, affability, justice—and, from the point of view of each
one of them, it is clear that there are noble and base behaviors that Aristotle
describes in some detail.
The person who can discriminate and carry out valuable behavior is
described as spoudai^oj or ¶gaq’j.18 Similarly, the person who can discrimi-
nate between real and apparent goods, and thus between natural and artificial
pleasures, is also labeled in book III as spoudai^oj or ¶gaq’j.19 As we have
seen in the previous paragraph, in the treatment of practical wisdom in book VI
the valuing of ends and actions presented in books II to V appears again, because
without this evaluation, this virtue cannot be described correctly. The analysis of
deliberation also shows, as the interdependence between practical wisdom and
the moral virtues had done, that the language and the moral reality studied by
Aristotle contain a more or less explicit evaluation of the ends and actions of
agents. Thus, Aristotle does not call good a deliberation (e‹bouli/a) that is sim-

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ply effective, but “good deliberation is the sort that reaches a good.” Indeed, the
analysis ends up showing that “if, then, having deliberated well is proper to a pru-
dent person, good deliberation will be the type of correctness that accords with what
is expedient for promoting the end about which prudence is true supposition.”20
This observation also makes clear that, although Aristotle generally ascribes
the end to appetite, and deliberation on the specification of the end and on the
means to attain it to practical wisdom, he also refers to the end intended by appetite
as the one captured by practical wisdom. In his classic book, Pierre Aubenque
emphasizes this intellectual apprehension of the ends of action: “it does not seem
that Aristotle has ever given up the intellectual, and thus universalizable, determi-
nation of value. In this sense, Aristotle does not make here any concession to rela-
tivism, which, on the contrary, he tries to overcome.”21 “The wise man also knows
the particular,” Aubenque affirms later on, “but this [also] means in the first place
that his knowledge of the universal is not to be questioned.”22 As he finally puts it
with a beautiful formula, “the substitution of the fr’nimoj, who is not the platon-
ic sage, for the traditional spoudai^oj inaugurates, in the teeth of the empiricism
of the popular tradition and simultaneously against the platonic philosophy of
essences, what could be called an existential intellectualism.”23
The question about the nature of the evaluation offered by Aristotle of the
different ends and the most valuable actions in the different spheres of action has
been the object of controversy, as well as its relevance to contemporary reflection.
On the one hand, some interpreters ascribe to Aristotle an empirical determination
of ends and virtues. In some cases, it is thought that Aristotle does not offer any
kind of evaluative considerations, but ends are rather given by the positive prefer-
ences of the agents. In the best case, it is argued that his analyses of action and the
roles of intelligence and character are significant independently of their relevance
for ethics. In other cases, it is affirmed that the valuations of ends and behaviors
offered by Aristotle correspond to the traditional and collective wisdom of the
Greek race or to the Ancient world in general, incommensurable with ours.24
On the other hand, it is known that Saint Thomas Aquinas ascribes knowl-
edge of the good to the intellectual habit of synderesis or natural reason that offers
valuable ends to the rational and the sensory appetites. Practical wisdom looks for
a way to carry out these ends and is in a relationship of interdependence with the
virtues very similar to that expounded by Aristotle. In the Theological Summa,
which is much more incisive in these matters than his Commentary on Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas offers penetrating analyses of the psychology of
action. These are in many cases very faithful to Aristotle’s spirit and convey more
specific insights on questions Aristotle handles with less detail. Nevertheless, the
concept of synderesis as a habit of practical principles is a contribution that goes
further than an explanation of Aristotle’s ideas. Aristotle attributes the awareness
of ends of action to both appetite and intelligence, and even seems to speak on
some occasions about an intuition of practical principles.25 But an intellectual

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habit such as synderesis actually belongs to the Thomist elaboration, especially

since the foundation of its objects is the will of God. For this reason, I do not
regard the interpretation of Gauthier and Jolif as acceptable on this point.
According to these authors, in order to become a source of obligation, practical
wisdom must entail “a universal knowledge of the purpose of human life, a pur-
pose that is not, certainly, the Good itself of Plato, but the metaphysical vision of
God.”26
However, it is evident that for Aristotle the quality of the different desirable
ends and objects (the noble, the useful, the pleasant), of behavior and the virtues,
cannot be merely empirical, contingent, or arbitrary, but is the object of a deter-
mined evaluative approach and an aware search for the good.27 In his description
of the virtues and the ends of action, Aristotle pays attention to the knowledge
stored in linguistic terms and usage, to received customs and laws, but he never
fails to ask himself about its legitimacy and does not refrain from passing value
judgments when he considers it necessary. Thus, for example, he considers absurd
and unjust a law of Cyme on homicide that allows the acquittal of a criminal if he
can gather a sufficient number of relatives to testify in his favor. For all human
beings, Aristotle says, “seek not the way of their ancestors, but the good.”28
Pierre Aubenque points out this duality of the Aristotelian descriptions of
ends and behaviors by saying that they are both “phenomenological and axiologi-
cal.” 29 In the same sense, Nicolai Hartmann had affirmed without hesitation that
“in the specific determinations of the individual virtues we have a conjunction of
determinations of real being and ideal demands or, if one wants, of empirical and
a priori determinations.”30 Since the reading of Heidegger only highlights the first
of these two aspects, it does not seem to me to be a sound interpretation of
Aristotle’s ethical thought. In his lectures on Plato’s Sophist, in which he devotes
an extensive introductory part to Aristotle, and in particular to book VI of the
Nicomachean Ethics, Heidegger points out that when he interprets the
Aristotelian discussion of fr’nhsij and action as phenomenology of Dasein, he
is only concerned with its descriptive aspects and he leaves aside the estimative
and prescriptive ones. Heidegger does not seem to go further than saying that “the
floor of fr’nhsij is d’xa (opinion).”31
In my opinion, however, the main significance of the Aristotelian conception
of practical wisdom lies in the fact that it does take into consideration awareness
of the valuable ends and behaviors in various spheres of life, as well as attention
to complexity and particularities, not only of the changing situations and circum-
stances, but also of the diverse uses, valuations and received customs. The
Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom has the difficult, endless, and crucial task

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of weighing the objectivity of the most general ends and the true sensitivity
toward particulars and differences. Its significance for contemporary ethical and
political reflection comes from this.

Besides evaluating the different ends of action, Aristotle refers explicitly to

5. THE REASONS FOR ACTION

another central aspect of ethical theory, that is, the fundamental criteria for
assessing actions from a moral point of view. This explicit dimension of
Aristotle’s ethical reflections has not always been acknowledged appropriately.
Thus, for example, in spite of pointing out the axiological side of Aristotelian
ethics, as we have just seen, Pierre Aubenque affirms that Aristotle “does not end
up distinguishing clearly the conditions of the technically effective action and
those of the morally good one, the definitions of the useful and the good.”
Aubenque recalls the double meaning, utilitarian and moral, of Greek expres-
sions such as ¶gaq’j, eÂ, e prßttein and even ‘rq’thj, which can desig-
nate “the rightness of the end as well as the morally neutral perspicacity of
judgment.” The conclusion he draws, however, on a Heideggerian manner, is
that Aristotle provides “a general theory of action, a hermeneutics of human
existence, rather than an ethical theory.”32
Now, in Aristotle’s ethical writings we find not only properly ethical consid-
erations regarding the ends of action, but also, counter to what Aubenque affirms
here, very precise observations about the fundamental criterion for the moral
assessment of actions. As has been pointed out more recently, this criterion is
none other than the reason why these actions are performed. The action that pur-
sues a good end is a morally good one when it is simply motivated by the fact that
that end is worthy of being carried out, and is not performed out of necessity or
convenience.33 An action is just and thus praiseworthy if it is carried out because
it is something just, not because it is what the agent finds most convenient. The
action will be a generous and worthy one if the agent is moved by the intended
result, not by what people may say or think. The criterion for the moral worth of
an agent’s actions is that they be done for the sake of something noble or valu-
able; it consists, for example, in doing the just or the noble, because it is just or
noble. Aristotle says it most clearly:
We begin here: we say that some people who do just actions (t™
di/kaia, the just things) are not yet thereby just, if, for instance, they do
the actions prescribed by the laws either unwillingly or because of igno-
rance or because of some other end, not because of the actions them-
selves (di' a‹tß), even though they do the right actions, those that the
excellent person ought to do. Equally, however, it would seem to be pos-
sible for someone to do each type of action in the state that makes him a
good person, that is to say, because of decision and for the sake of the

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actions themselves (a‹tw ^n prattome/nwn).34

Both in his analysis of moral virtue in book II as well as in the subsequent indi-
^n e”neka tw

vidual treatment of the different ethical virtues, Aristotle affirms again and again
that the valuable and praiseworthy aspect of an action is that it be done for the
sake of a valuable end. He points out this role of moral motivation with diverse
expressions such as di™ kal’n, ÷ti kal’n, kalou ^ e”neka. This point is also
clear in the Eudemian Ethics: “it is by a man’s purposive choice that we judge his
character—that is, not by what he does but what he does it for. Similarly also bad-
ness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives.”35 Clearly,
that the action is morally good if it is done for the sake of a valuable end is an eth-
ical criterion that is similar to the one proposed by Kant, according to whom the
action is morally good if it is done out of respect for a norm or, in other words,
from duty. Christine Korsgaard has clearly pointed out this parallelism.36 As she
explains in full, the Aristotelian “for the sake of the noble” (tou
and the Kantian “from duty” (aus Pflicht) are similar as the motives that give
^ kalou ^ cßrin)

moral worth to an action.37

Now, this concurrence in the role of motivation as the source of the moral
worth of actions should not make us loose sight of the very different ways both
thinkers conceive of our knowledge of the actions that should be performed.
According to the Aristotelian analysis, the agent responds to the valuable aspect
of an action (just, moderate, generous), that is to say, to a materially determined
end. On the other hand, according to the Kantian analysis, the agent acquires
awareness of ethical norms through the application of the formal mechanism of
the categorical imperative. In fact, it is in opposition to the Aristotelian character-
ization of the ends of value, together with the role of the virtues in the happy life,
that Kant maintained that the material considerations must unavoidably be empir-
ical, and that we can only arrive at universal ethical norms by means of the ratio-
nal and formal mechanism of the categorical imperative. The parallel treatment of
ethical motivation by both thinkers has no equivalent in their conceptions of our
access to norms, so if we want to speak of the form of the action in Aristotle’s
case it must be in a different sense.38
It is true that, besides the subjective condition of action—that it be done for
the sake of an end of value, which determines its moral worth—for Aristotle the
fully achieved and praiseworthy action must comply with some objective condi-
tions, such as being done in the right way, at the right time, directed to the right
object, etc. But it is difficult to infer from this a notion of the form of the action to
which we can ascribe its nobility. The Aristotelian analysis of the different types
of valuable actions—phenomenological and axiological at the same time, as

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Aubenque says—is always guided by the meaning of those types of action. The
analysis of what is usually understood, and what should be understood, by a just,
moderate or generous action focuses on the sense of these notions, and for this rea-
son it is known as material analysis. On the other hand, Kant seeks a characteristic
of the maxim of action that can turn it into a moral law independently of material
considerations, that is, in a formal way—this characteristic is its universality. The
Aristotelian treatment of moral motivation—that the action be done for the sake of
its nobleness or value—is referred, in a material way, to the different types of ends
worthy of being pursued, that we have considered in the previous paragraph.39
What is certain is that the difference between carrying out an action for the
sake of the noble (in Kantian terms, from duty) and carrying it out because of an
external obligation or convenience (in Kantian terms, for different types of inclina-
tion) cannot be more explicit in Aristotle’s ethics. For example, when dealing with
voluntary action, Aristotle affirms: “[E]veryone in every action aims at something
fine or pleasant (t™ Ωde/a kai\ t™ kal™ [...] tou/twn g™r cßrin pßntej
pßnta prßtoussin).”40 When dealing with courage: “[The soldiers] are worse
to the extent that they act because of fear [di™ f’bon, a type of inclination], not
because of shame [di' ai'dw ^, awareness of the fine or noble], and to avoid pain, not
disgrace [...] The brave person, however, must be moved by the fine, not by com-
pulsion (dei^ d'ou' d'a'nßnkhn a'ndrei^on e«nai, a'll' ÷ti kal’n).”41 And, when
considering the transition from ethics to politics, Aristotle bases the need for some
i

properly moral precepts among the laws on the same distinction:

Hence we need laws concerned with these things [the discipline of
adults] also, and in general with all of life. For the many yield to com-
pulsion more than to argument, and to sanctions [external obligation,
inclination] more than to the fine [internal obligation, duty, respect for
the norm]. That is why legislators must, in some people’s views, urge
people toward virtue for the sake of the fine (tou ^ cßrin).42
Aristotle begins his reflections on the good and the virtues in technical terms. But,
^ kalou

as we have seen, he immediately goes into considerations about the value of ends
and the moral worth of actions. These analyses are thorough and clear, and they
offer not just a phenomenology or hermeneutic of human action, as Heidegger
and Aubenque say, but, importantly, key notions and elements of ethical theory.

Keeping in mind the previous considerations about the ends of action and the
6. THE STRUCTURE OF MORAL ACTION

connection between practical wisdom and the moral virtues, we can reconstruct
the structure of moral action as conceived by Aristotle. In the face of a concrete
and vital situation that demands an answer here and now on the part of the agent,
it is clear that the first task of practical reason and, consequently, of fr’nhsij,
consists in deliberating about the action to be carried out.43 As we have seen,

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deliberation is properly phronetical or wise for Aristotle—not the work of mere

astuteness—if it presupposes an address of the appetitive dispositions toward the
ends of value, that is, if there is a previous inclination or intention of moral virtue
toward its proper end. Next, practical wisdom has to pass a judgment about the
course of action that must be followed and, since in Aristotle’s moral psychology
the principle of movement always comes from the appetitive dispositions, moral
virtue must choose—that is, undertake—the proposed action.
Now, says Aristotle, “it is even more difficult [than deciding] to abide by our
judgment, since the results we expect [when we endure] are usually painful, and
the actions we are compelled [to endure, when we choose] are usually shame-
ful.”44 For this reason, within the context of traditional ethical thought, it has fre-
quently been held that the task of practical wisdom does not end with judgment,
but rather it culminates in a lingering rational command that encourages the will
to follow through with the chosen behavior. Thus, Aquinas assigns a great impor-
tance in his psychology to this command on the part of practical wisdom, which is
known as imperium. With his habitual analytic perspicacity, he discusses, for
instance, whether this action of commanding is characteristic of the reason or the
will, and he concludes that it is an act of reason that presupposes the motion of the
will.45 Nevertheless, later philosophical tradition discussed vividly whether or not
an accurate description of our practical reason should ascribe to practical wisdom
this third psychological act, following deliberation and judgment.
Be this as it may, the Thomist conception of imperium or command, which is
more elaborated on this point, is perfectly compatible with Aristotle’s treatment.
Indeed, in chapter 10 of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics we can find the
thought that motivated the distinction between the judgment and command of
fr’nhsij: “That is why comprehension [su/nesij, good judgment, sagacity] is
about the same things as prudence, but not the same as prudence. For prudence is
prescriptive (e'pitaktikø, commanding), since its end is what action we must or
must not do, whereas comprehension only judges (kritik¬ m’non).”46
With this structure of action, Aristotle tries to acknowledge the different
tasks carried out by intelligence and character, discovered in the course of his
detailed anthropological reflections, and to explain some psychological phenom-
ena—such as the weakness of the will—which are difficult to understand with the
conceptual tools of earlier moral psychology. Thus, moral action in the face of a
complex real situation entails the following psychological acts: (1) the intention
of moral virtue toward its proper end, such as justice; (2) the phronetical delibera-
tion about the real factors and circumstances that are relevant in that situation; (3)
the phronetical judgment about what appears, in that particular moment and situ-

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ation, as the most just course of action; (4) the choice of moral virtue, which
undertakes the necessary movements to carry it out; and (5) the command of
practical wisdom, which reaffirms and ensures the determination of the will to
follow the indications of judgment and choice:47
1. The intention of moral virtue.
2. The deliberation of practical wisdom.
3. The judgment of practical wisdom.
4. The choice of moral virtue.
5. The command of practical wisdom.
Starting from this structure, there is a natural interpretation of the apparent circle
found in the passage quoted in the first paragraph of this article. Firstly, the obser-
vation that practical reasoning is true if it agrees with correct desire can be taken
as meaning that the judgment of fr’nhsij must agree with the previous correct
intention of moral virtue. Secondly, the indication that desire has to pursue what
reason says can be interpreted as meaning that moral virtue must follow, in the
next moment, the judgment of fr’nhsij. According to this understanding of the
structure of moral action, choice is correct if practical reasoning is true and desire
is good. In other words, it is correct if fr’nhsij is in agreement with the previ-
ous desire of a good end and if action follows the judgment of fr’nhsij. Carlo
Natali, for example, offers a reasonable explanation of what Aristotle understands
by the correctness of desire:
In order to define practical truth, the virtue of logistik’n, i. e. of the
deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle is obliged to establish what is
meant by “truth” or, better, “correctness” in speaking of desire. This
may seem a strange question to us now, but Aristotle, also in the case of
desire, regards a form of correspondence with its object as being truth.
Just as in scientific knowledge truth is affirming or denying in conformi-
ty with the state of things, so too in desire truth is a movement tending
toward the true good and away from the apparent good.48
Once we clearly understand what Aristotle means by the correctness (sometimes
even called truth) of desire, it is not difficult to understand also what he means by
practical truth: that is, the concurrence of practical deliberation and judgment
with the desire directed toward the ends of value. This is in full agreement with
the Thomist interpretation of practical truth: verum per conformitatem ad apeti-
tum rectum.49
This structure of moral action renders clear also Aristotle’s conception of the
practical syllogism, sometimes called the syllogism of fr’nhsij. The first
premise of this syllogism of action is the intellectually comprehended direction of
appetite toward the good or the just, or its expression in a general norm of behav-
ior, for instance: “It is not fair to get paid for the work done by another person.”
The second premise is the defining one, and it is determined by the judgment of
fr’nhsij, after due consideration of the situation and its circumstances:50

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“Although it seems that I have done this work myself, and some extra money
would not hurt me, it is crystal clear to me that someone did it for me and that it
would not be fair that I get paid instead of that person.” The conclusion of the syl-
logism of action is not a proposition, but the action that corresponds to the previ-
ous reasoning and the rightness of character: “I choose that the work be charged
by the person who did it.” Now, as Aristotle says, we sometimes find it difficult to
be consequent with our own judgments—the flesh is weak—and for this reason
practical wisdom must get involved again. If I find it difficult to act in accordance
with what I have decided or even started to undertake, practical wisdom protests
and orders the will to end what it has already begun: “Just let the money go to the
legitimate hands.”
This Aristotelian notion of fr’nhsij or practical wisdom disappeared from
the currents of modern philosophy which do not generally take account of the
Aristotelian and scholastic traditions. As we have seen, Aristotle conceives of
practical wisdom as interdependent with the moral virtues and as acquainted
through them with ends of value. By contrast, in Kant’s ethics, for instance, the
virtue of prudence is reduced to instrumental ability, entrusted exclusively with
finding the most appropriate means to a given end. There is also little room for the
psychological subtleties of practical wisdom in contemporary philosophical or
economic theories of rational choice and action that understand them as unana-
lyzed outcomes of the interaction of the beliefs and desires of agents. The classi-
cal virtue of practical wisdom is intended mainly at understanding individual
action, but it can be significant also when we want to highlight the importance, in
collective action, of appropriate deliberation and judgment, while at the same
time retaining certain general ends of value.51 From individual and collective
points of view, this conception of practical wisdom and moral action points out
that there can be no lucid deliberation or balanced judgment in the absence of
1In the last decades, there have been impor- rev. ed. 2001), Love’s Knowledge (Oxford:
tant developments in moral philosophy devoted Oxford University Press, 1990). See also John
to the difficulties of moral perception and moral McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge,
judgement. Some contributions have anti-theo- MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Lawrence
retical implications; for example, Bernard Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (New
Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
University Press, 1981), Ethics and the Limits of Another line of thought argues for the context-
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard dependence of moral reasons and questions ethi-
University Press, 1985). Other positions have cal principles from a viewpoint of “moral
forcefully tackled the problem of moral percep- particularism,” mainly inspired by the writings of
tion and the priority of the singular in Jonathan Dancy; for example, Moral Reasons
Aristotelian or literary manners; for example, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Ethics Without
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 2004). A good survey of the positions prompted

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by particularism is the collection edited by Brad
Hooker and Margaret Little, Moral Particularism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Since the
main objective of the present essay is to provide a
self-contained picture of Aristotle’s conception of
practical wisdom, with its anthropological and eth-
ical implications, I do not refer here to these con-
temporary complex positions.
2Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 2, 1139 a 36 - b 6.
Trans. T. Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis/Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1999). Greek text
ed. Bywater in Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, reprinted 1962).
3In classical Greek, spoudai ^oj means
‘respectable,’ ‘worthy,’ and is contrasted to
geloi^oj, ‘ridiculous,’ ‘unworthy of respect.’
Plato uses the term frequently as a contrast to
^loj, ‘of little worth’ (Plat. Phaedr. 261 b 2,
Resp. 424 e 7, Leg. 816 d 9). I owe these indica-
fau
tions to I. Rodriguez Alfageme (Complutense
University of Madrid).
4NE, II, 6, 1106 b 35.
5NE, VI, 2, 1139 a 23-31.
6NE, VI, 1, 1138 b 21 and II, 6, 1107 a 1-3.
English translations usually render phronesis by
practical wisdom, in order to distinguish it from
the usual meaning of prudence as instrumental
ability. In his recent translation, T. Irwin has
revived the old term prudence, which is closer to
Latin’s prudentia and to the terms used in Roman
languages. In my text I use both practical wis-
dom and prudence for Aristotle’s phronesis.
7NE, VI, 5, 1140 a 26-28.
8NE, VI, 5, 1140 b 5-7.
9NE, VI, 5, 1140 b 8.
10NE, VI, 5, 1140 a 29-31.
11NE, II, 9, 1109 b 24 and VI, 8, 1142 a 29.
12NE, VI, 12, 1144 a 23.
13NE, VI, 12, 1144 a 8-10 and 35-37. Carlo
Natali expresses this dependence in conceptual
terms: “[possession of phronesis] analytically
contains [possession of ethical virtue],” in The
Wisdom of Aristotle, G. Parks, trans. (Albany,
New York: SUNY Press, 2001), 51.
14NE, VI, 13, 1144 b 31 - 1145 a 2.
15Martha Nussbaum has widely argued for a
reappraisal of Aristotle’s virtues and main good
ends. See, for example, “Non-Relative Virtues:
An Aristotelian Approach,” in M. Nussbaum and
A. Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 242-269. On the other
hand, Aristotle is an important source of inspira-
tion for her capabilities approach, restated and
reassessed in Women and Human Development:
The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge/New
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York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) (list of
capabilities on pages 78-80). It is worth mention-
ing also the contributions to a Symposium dedi-
cated to Nussbaum’s political philosophy,
published in Ethics 111 (2000), with her response
on pages 102-140. As I have already said, in the
context of this article I cannot deal with these
important contemporary developments.
16NE, III, 12, 1119 b 17-20. After reviewing
carefully different ways of understanding this
point, Carlo Natali affirms that for Aristotle the
means are the object of reason (pp. 45-49), that
hands them down to desire, whereas the ends are
the object of desire, but must be acknowledged
by reason (pp. 49-54).
17NE, II, 3, 1104 b 31.
18Cf. S. Broadie, “Aristotle’s Elusive Summum
Bonum,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 16
(1999): 233-251, at p. 236, n. 14: “Aristotle com-
monly uses ‘spoudaios’ (literally: serious) to
mean ‘morally good’.”
19NE, III, 4, 1113 a 28.
20NE, VI, 9, 1142 b 23 and 33-35.
21P. Aubenque, La prudence chez Aristote
(Paris: PUF, 1963), 46-49.
22Ibid., 58. Cf. NE, VI, 8, 1141 b 15.
23Aubenque, 50.
24Cf. the trenchant arguments against these
views in Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An
Aristotelian Approach.”
25Cf. the discussion of the role of the intuition
of principles and particular cases within theoreti-
cal and practical knowledge: NE, VI, 11.
26Aristote, L’Éthique à Nicomaque, R. A.
Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, eds. (2nd ed.
Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/
Nauwelaerts, 1970), II, 2, 469. Although I dis-
agree on this point, I regard this commentary of
Aristotle’s ethics to be one of the most precise
and useful.
27On the same line, see S. Broadie, Ethics with
Aristotle (New York/Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 257, and O. Guariglia, La ética en
Aristóteles o la moral de la virtud (Buenos Aires:
Eudeba, 1997), “La voluntad de lo bueno,” 210 ff.
28Politics, 1268 a 39 ff. Cf. Nussbaum, “Non-
Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,”
242.
29Aubenque, 38.
30N. Hartmann, “Die Wertdimensionen der
Nikomachischen Ethik” (1948), in Kleinere
Schriften, Bd. I (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1955), 207.
31M. Heidegger, Plato: Sophistes (1925), GA
19 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992), 55. Cf.
Natali 2001, 184, 187.
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32 Aubenque, 103.
33 I learnt this, as many other things, from Juan
Miguel Palacios’ rich lectures on Ethics at the
Complutense University of Madrid. See also C.
Korsgaard, “From Duty and for the Sake of the
Noble,” in S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, eds.,
Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 203-236;
and K. Rogers, “Aristotle on Loving Another for
His Own Sake.” Phronesis 39 (1994), 291-302.
34NE, VI, 12, 1144 a 15-21.
35Eudemian Ethics, EE, II, 1228 a 2-4: kai
\
di™ tou ^to e'k th ^j proaire/sewj kri/nomen
poi^’j tij, tou ^to d' e'sti\ to\ ti/noj eÅneka
prßttei a'll' ou' ti/ prßttei. ”moi/wj de\ kai\
proai/resin. Trans. H. Rackham. Loeb Classical
Ω kaki/a tw ^n e'nanti/wn eÅneka poiei^ th\n
Library (London/Cambridge, Mass.: Heinemann/
Harvard University Press, reprinted 1992).
36C. Korsgaard, “From Duty and for the Sake
of the Noble” and “Self-Constitution I. The
Metaphysical Foundations of Normativity,”
Lecture I of the Locke Lectures 2002 at Oxford
University (2002, unpublished).
37This ethical criterion did not remain unno-
ticed by Anselm of Canterbury: “Disc. Nec
minus apertum mihi videtur quia sicut volendum
est unicuique quod debet; ita volendum est ideo,
quia debet, ut justa sit ejus voluntas. Mag. Bene
intelligis haec duo necessaria esse voluntati ad
justitiam: velle scilicet quod debet; ac ideo, quia
debet [...] Mag. Bene ergo diximus justitiam esse
rectitudinem voluntatis servatam propter se, id
est quae servatur propter se.” “S. And it seems no
less clear to me that in order for a man’s will to be
just, he must will for the reason he ought, even as
he must will what he ought. T. You understand
well that these two things are necessary for a will
to be just: willing what it ought [to will] and will-
ing for the reason it ought [to will] [...] T.
Therefore, justice is uprightness-of-will kept for
its own sake.” In De veritate, cap. XII. J.
Hopkins and H. Richardson, trans. (Minneapolis:
Arthur Banning Press, 2000). I owe this refer-
ence to Juan Miguel Palacios.
38Cf. Korsgaard’s argument, 1996, 218: “It is
even possible to argue that nobility is a formal
property... Now when Aristotle specifies the
orthos logos, he always gives us a list of what we
might also think of as the parts of the action. The
action that is in accordance with the orthos logos is
done in the right way and at the right time, directed
7/12/11 9:37 AM Page 17
to the right object, and so on. So we might think
that its overall rightness consists in the way its
parts are combined, that is, in its form. The parts
are combined in a way that enables them to func-
tion, taken together, as a reason for action.”
39Although he does not identify its role as a
fundamental moral criterion, Carlo Natali does
point out clearly the function of the end as the
motive of action: “The end that one intends by
means of an action is actually the cause of [rather
the motive for] that action, and is the principle or
starting point of deliberative reasoning,” in
Natali 2001, 177.
40NE, III, 1, 1110 b 12-13.
41NE, III, 8, 1116 a 31-b 4.
42NE, X, 9, 1180 a 4-8.
43NE, VI, 7, 1141 b 8-9.
44NE, III, 1, 1110 a 32-34.
45Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,
II-II, qq. 47-56, esp. 47. Cf. L.-E. Palacios, La
prudencia política, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Gredos,
1978), 95 ff.
46NE, VI, 10, 1143 a 7-11. The term e
tikh/ should not be translated as ‘normative,’
'pitak-
because this term conceals the commanding
dimension of fr’nhsij. Irwin’s translation ren-
ders it well with “prescriptive,” and so does
Rowe’s in Nicomachean Ethics, C. Rowe, trans.,
S. Broadie, introd. and commentary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002). Rackham makes
the point even more explicit: “issues com-
mands.” This important meaning of the term is
manifest in the dictionaries of Liddell-Scott-
Jones (commanding, authoritative) and Bailly
(qui concerne le commandement; epitaktikos:
47Aquinas, ibid. Palacios 1978, ibid.
impérativement).
48Natali 2001, 12 f.
49Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 57, 5,
ad 3; Palacios 1978, 71. In my opinion, it is not
correct to ascribe to Aristotle a notion of the prac-
tical truth of actions due to their contribution to
achieving happiness, as it is often done.
50Paul Ricoeur explains this task of the second
premise in the following way: “trouver l’uni-
versel approprié à une situation singulière et con-
struire la mineure, en cela consiste l’opération de
la pensée qu’Aristote a appelé tour à tour calcula-
trice, opinante, législative”, in “À la gloire de la
phronesis,” 21 f., in J.-Y. Château, ed., La vérité
VI (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 12-22.
pratique: Aristote, Éthique à Nicomaque, Livre
Ricardo Parellada
Aristotle’s Theory of Practical Wisdom
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51As I have already noted, much work of
Martha Nussbaum goes decidedly in this direc-
tion. A recent application of the idea of phronesis
to capability theory and human development that
combines respect for general norms and complex
particulars can be seen in S. Deneulin,
“Promoting Human Freedoms under Conditions
of Inequalities: a Procedural Framework.”
Journal of Human Development 6,1 (2005), 75-
92.
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52I am grateful to Salvador Mas, Ignacio
Rodríguez Alfageme, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
and William Charron, editor of this journal, for
comments and corrections. This essay was writ-
ten during a visiting period at Harvard
University. I am very grateful to its Philosophy
Department, the Real Colegio Complutense at
Harvard and the Madrid Regional Government
for support.