6. People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129.
July 31, 1962] Respondent union alleges that instead of multiplying the COLA by 22 it should be multiplied by 30 representing the
FACTS: [D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the
peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied
the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed
the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD: YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for trial on
the merits.
RATIO: The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only
been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace
are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly
and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no
application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the
trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
FACTS: Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted
the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred
the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD: NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.The unambiguity of the express
words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, FREDERICK WHITE and JESUS SANTIAGO 
vs.
 Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FFW-GLOBE MACKAY EMPLOYEES UNION and EDA
CONCEPCION
Facts:On October 30, 1984 Wage Order No. 6 mandated an increased in the cost-of-living allowance of non-agricultural
workers in the private sector for P3.00. The order was complied by the petitioner Corporation by multiplying the same
by 22 days, equivalent to the number of working days in the company.
number of days in a month, as what the corporation's normal practice prior to the said Wage Order. Thus the union filed
a complaint against the Corporation for for illegal deduction, underpayment, unpaid allowances, and violation of Wage
Order No. 6.
Issue: Whether or not COLA under Wage Order No. 6 should be multiplied by 22 or 30 representing the number of
working days in a month.
Held: Labor Arbiter Adelaido F. Martinez sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that since the
individual petitioners acted in their corporate capacity they should not have been impleaded; and that the monthly
COLA should be computed on the basis of twenty two (22) days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 paid
days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company. His reasoning, inter alia, was as follows:
To compel the respondent company to use 30 days in a month to compute the allowance and retain 22 days for vacation
and sick leave, overtime pay and other benefits is inconsistent and palpably unjust. If 30 days is used as divisor, then it
must be used for the computation of all benefits, not just the allowance. But this is not fair to complainants, not to mention
that it will contravene the provision of the parties' CBA.
Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 uniformly read as follows:
Section 5. Allowance for Unworked Days. All covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during
the days that they are paid their basic wage, even if unworked. (Emphasis supplied)
... it is evident that the intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence, we have the
principle of 'No Pay, No ECOLA.
MM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993]
FACTS: Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the second
paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules
to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to
pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the
petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with
Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, “to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a
result of recruitment violations or money claims.” The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and commented that
appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the
POEA to the NLRC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
RATIO: Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – that the thing may rather have effect than
be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-
podge of conflicting provisions. Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA
Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect
nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.
Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the
same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner
to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter
No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of
a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
HELD: YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO: Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency
employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law
but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular,
temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the
AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim
in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof
as that which is expressed”.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application for early
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an
application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the
interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2)
years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.
Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
FACTS: [C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is “An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and
guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election
Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No.
2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A.
7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the
aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned
COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
RATIO: Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note
of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.No law is ever enacted that
is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance,
its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they
shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.
People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]
FACTS:[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the
peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied
the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed
the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD: YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for trial on
the merits.
RATIO: The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only
been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace
are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly
and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no
application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the
trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al. [G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978]
FACTS: The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at
Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT
No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No.
735, were issued to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower
court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of Tuason and
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to
dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents
Aquial and Cordova.
HELD: NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs.
RATIO: Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943
without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.It is against
public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court’s time and
energies at the expense of other litigants.