4. Unciano Paramedical vs CA
Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal, and warned
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision 1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and
its resolution dated June 3, 1991.
The antecedent facts are, as follows:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their
mothers, Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for
injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and
General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr.
Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745. Among other
things, they alleged therein that:
“6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition
proposing to the school authorities the organization of a student council in the school.
They solicited support of their petition from the studentry by asking the students to
endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least 180 signatures.
“6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon
Barroa were summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed
with the proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never
allowed such an organization.
“6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named students
would be barred from enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral,
Dean of Discipline, who told them ‘it’s not true unless you violate the rules and
regulations of the school and if you still insist with your student council.’
“6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of
Nursing, the above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed
them that they would be barred from enrollment for the second semester because they
supposedly harassed a female student, invited an outsider to the school to speak
before the students, and also because the school has an arrangement with the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports not to allow their students to put up a
student council. Dr.
them that if she herself were to give it, it would be marked `expelled.’
“6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed
them that they were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members
of the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino
Students (LFS), officers of the student organization they organized, and, moreover
‘drug addicts.’ The students asked for proof of these accusations but were not given
any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the school has people investigating for (sic) them
but she did not disclose their identities nor provide any proof to support her allegations.
“6.06. On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners retained the services of
counsel FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr.
Mirando Unciano, President of the College, demanding that the constitutional
requirements of due process be complied with prior to unilaterally dismissing the
students, and requesting that a conference be held prior to 17 November 1989, as the
enrollment deadline was fast approaching . . .:
“6.07. On 17 November 1989, acceding to the demand, a meeting was held, attended
by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug, Mr. Rustico Lopez, the students, and their counsel. Due,
however, to the inability of Dr. Moral to resolve the problem in the absence of the
College President and their legal counsel, the meeting was reset to November 22,
1989 upon Dr. Moral’s request. However, notice was sent to the students’ counsel from
Unciano Paramedical College resetting the meeting to November 27, 1989 stating that
the President will attend personally therein . . .
“6.08. On 27 November 1989, due to the absence of the school’s legal counsel and
the President who allegedly just arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again
requested that the meeting be reset. A verbal altercation occurred between the parties
due to the delaying tactics of the school officials and the failure to resolve the problem
by their continuous refusal to discuss the merits of the accusations against the
students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug and Dean Dominador
Santos, ended with the school officials’ request that it be reset for 29 November 19B9
and that the students bring their parents or guardian with them at said meeting. The
students agreed to this request and their counsel prepared a written summary of the
matters discussed and agreed during the meeting. The school officials refused to sign
it, however . . .
“6.09. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had
unilaterally refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or
appeal to the school officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs.
Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school officials to request that their children be allowed
to enroll . . . Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have to decide on
these requests.
“6.10. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees
had refused to grant the parents’ request.” 2
On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17,
1990, enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling private respondents in its College
of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
on June 4, 1990. 3
Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction on
the ground that private respondents are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal
right to the relief demanded. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, the
pertinent parts of which, read:
“xxx xxx xxx
“It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable injury to the petitioners if they
are not allowed to enroll. At least they will miss another semester.
“On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in particular the withdrawal
of the other students and the school will lose money if the petitioners are allowed to
enroll is still a speculation, and may not take place.
“In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction, ordering the respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the first
semester of school year 1990-1991, upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount
of P2,000.00 each.
“xxx xxx xxx
“SO ORDERED.” 4
On June 11. 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. 5
On June 13, 1990, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Order of June 4, 1990
was denied. 6
Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, the same was dismissed on February 7, 1991 for lack of
merit. 7 Said the court:
“The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly anchored on the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs. Philippine School of
Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., L-76353, May 2, 1988;
161 SCRA 7 where it was held that —
‘It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled
for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that
he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the
‘written contracts’ required for college teachers are for ‘one semester.’ It is thus evident
that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers . . .
“However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et
al., G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned
and overruled its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the ‘termination of contract’ theory. But
it must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student
is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority
given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]
‘Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private School which provides that ‘(w)hen a student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester for
collegiate courses,’ which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to
refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one
semester, has already expired.
‘The ‘termination of contract’ theory does not even find support in the Manual.
Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It
serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment
basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the
balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester
for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be
required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials
for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on
Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides:
‘137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the
entire school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester
for collegiate courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within
two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition
and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be
charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first
week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of
whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the
school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However,
if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged
the pertinent fees only up to and including the last month of attendance.’
‘Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be
enrolled for only one semester, and that after the semester is over his re-enrollment is
dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual
recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he
is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:
‘Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting
its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case
of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to his (sic)
complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.’
‘This ‘presumption’ has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the
‘Education Act of 1982.’ Section 9 of this act provides:
‘SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
12. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency,
or violation of disciplinary regulations.’ “ 8
On June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied, again, for lack of merit. 9
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise this lone issue:
“WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY TO GOVERN AND INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF
INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND WHICH
INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER THE ALCUAZ DOCTRINE
PREVAILING AT THE TIME SAID INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE.” 10
Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was
promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and private respondents was
validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990.
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra,
this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of
the contract between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when
a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof, conformably with the case of People v. Jabinal, G.R.
No. L-30061, 55 SCRA 607 (1974). Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the arguments of petitioners.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose
before its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16,
1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools
similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2,
1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory. We had an opportunity to
resolve a similar issue in National Service Corporation, et al. v. NLRC. 11 In this case,
petitioner claimed that as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary
of the National Investment and Development Corporation, a subsidiary wholly owned
by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a government owned corporation), the
terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the civil service
law, rules and regulations. In support thereof, petitioner cited the ruling in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12 that employees of government owned or controlled
corporations are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations, we rejected
this claim of petitioner and held that:
“It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be
given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17
January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees
similarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in
National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of
the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes
involving terms and conditions of employment in government-owned or controlled
corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO).” 13
In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal,
supra, that it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Coming now to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, the case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. 14 discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ:
“The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the
last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy (Rodulfa vs.
Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or
protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the
principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be granted if the party
asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930; Subido vs.
Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37 SCRA 230).
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo,
it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue
‘in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of
relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor where there is a willful and
unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury
being a continuing one and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-
establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, recently
and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed,
the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free
from doubt and dispute.’ (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA
235.).” 15
In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the
end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the
status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to allow private respondents “to enroll
for the first semester of school year 1990-1190.” 16 Guided by the Capitol case,
certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a step backward, then
restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not possess
any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-
admit them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 7, 1991 and its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The
orders of the trial court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13, 1990 and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
5. Cui vs Arellano
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against
the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof
thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by
the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary
evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before
the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant
University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
"All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:
semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was
studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the
mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies
in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle
Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant
and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law
of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled
for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university.
Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was
awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition
fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff
to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to
and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the
fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos
University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to
take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts.
The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which
defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated,
he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby
waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that
some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students — for
excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such
inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate
the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned
continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these
scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that
such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged
to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to
another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have
enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to
other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would
pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the
Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this
ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the
Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript
of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of
P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff
and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue
said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to
said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release said
transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action."
As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under
protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.
Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from
P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees,
and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private
Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding
and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a
counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between
plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another
school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid
or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that
the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that
the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the
contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to
follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the
aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither
approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the
question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant
University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far
reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the
case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the
validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion
that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void.
The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As
the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the
defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the
contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10,
1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust
and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In
determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of
the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of
government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to
lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors
in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in
America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be
prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811;
Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly the
real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to
issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract
of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private
Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic
honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec.
6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public
policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be
done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with
sound policy and good moralsor tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is
sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of
that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase
the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals?
Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and
keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of
social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
 Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements
Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So
also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which
our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school
for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall
be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with
interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this
case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
8. Quita vs. CA
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the
way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment
of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the
latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo.Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming
to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would
be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was
it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as
his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On
27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor
of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in
their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration
was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-
half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other
half.[7] Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one
of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual
issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their
respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as to
who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is
one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts
and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs
of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the
parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate,
simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had
twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.[11] To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication
is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue
with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light
of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the
motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.[15] The trial court did
not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion
with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married
in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding
on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was
not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it
did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate
title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce,
a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court
should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial
court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping,[21] the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also
be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The present petition deals
with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare
the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings
and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception
of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brotherRuperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
9. Catalan vs Braganza
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the
marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on
the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied
the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6Contending that said marriage was bigamous since
Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against
Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as
petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the
merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and
against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is
declared null and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of
moral damages the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00,
including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the
property donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan
Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case
No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO
QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE
QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial
remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and
the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual
issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become
naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a
divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the
findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando
were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April
1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the
allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of
competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial
evidence she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are
American citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured their divorce
decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens
whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with
American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x 16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to
refute or contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando
were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient
to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner
who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that
respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. 18 It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A divorce
obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law
may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. 23 In such
case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other,
in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents. 25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no
existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of
Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did
not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00
to ₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for its proper disposition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
10. San Luis vs San Luis
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his
six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or
less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued
an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994
her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home
to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x
x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant
to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule
v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence –
as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
– Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that
is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings
in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve
election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine
law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed
as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954
when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to
wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice
is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of
the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known
to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid
v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the
proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue
of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which
denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
11. Bayot vs Bayot
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca
Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution [2] of the
CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, [3] granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off
the trial courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979,
assails the March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094,
a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the
RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of
both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6]identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to
Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to
Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil
Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage and leaving
them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody
and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree
No. 406/97,[9] settling the couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement[10] they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property
and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil
Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition[12]dated January
26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the
motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment[15] stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since
1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not
of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of
Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition
was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to
pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds
of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her
application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore,
there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other
hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
 On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for support pendente
lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent
is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the
instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter
of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite,
the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate
to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August
8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution
of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED
in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the
assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount
of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April
30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive
writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the
CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March
25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders
the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the
Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the
basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition
states a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of
a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration
of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February
22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American
citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such
divorce restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown
that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of
Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the
nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to that effect
during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she
applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but
later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14,
1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino
father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and
assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce
precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision,
but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29]Hence,
Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No.
163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds
for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA
erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders which would have entitled
her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting
as follows:
I Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONERS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY
ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to
another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate
court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid
and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may
still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage
as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she
secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau)
of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as
a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was
given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau
Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars
are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to
Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order
of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose
B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the
Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was
issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition;
and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after
the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have
been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued
the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the
1stIndorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that
he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is,
thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino
citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by
the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative
Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the confirmation
by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the
way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport
only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the
1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to
coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that
prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino
citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could
not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates
that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1stIndorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino
citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have
that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured
the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378
of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged
Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the
date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than
a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in
question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the
petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate
of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued
on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be
appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to
her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID
Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was
only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May
2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to
dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken
together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to motion, with their
respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we
will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very
least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship
to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an
American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently
declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly
submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA
M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married,
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of
age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x,
revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 th of February of
1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of
Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. [39] Be this as it may, the
fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, [40] the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to
do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
 Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countrys policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.[42]
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court
formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to
remarry after completing the legal requirements.[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husbands obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. [44]
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability
of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.[45]
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact
of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couples conjugal
property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which
they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered
by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M.
Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the
divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated
March 4, 1997, ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in
this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement.[47]
 Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from
asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their family home
in Ayala Alabang.[48]
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that
Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation
of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack
of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in
the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action
exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente.There is in fine
no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show
how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had
been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27,
1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her
mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years
old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by
Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.In this way, the
actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of
both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if
any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have
finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As
it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition
under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil
Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R.
No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
14. Llorente vs CA
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga
City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-
owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they
lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred
to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited
the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was
not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946,
the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations
for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve
their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement
was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego.Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for
the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including
ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or
existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties
located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto
my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares,
my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds
of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last
Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served
(sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia
R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament
wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. [18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the
testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. [21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-
755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. [24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court
gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol
Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to
the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the
estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained
the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious,
and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13,
1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of
their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also
entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal
shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration
issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned
for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time
come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the
proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and
just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time
when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not
be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration
but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente
as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. [31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and
the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case
to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of
his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis
ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.[37]
 While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoidoctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven
statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law
applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent
was a resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The
trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with
nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one
half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law,
is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate
his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal capacity. [44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount
of successional rights to the decedent's national law. [45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of
the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court
shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.