GLOBAL ASIA Cover Story Dangerous Games: The Revival of Geopolitics and Its Risks for East Asia
GLOBAL ASIA Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 2014
The Revival of Geopolitics
in East Asia: Why and How?
By Robert S. Ross
At the center of the revival of SINCE 2010, the geopolitics of East Asia has cap-
tured the attention of observers and scholars
geopolitics in East Asia is the
throughout the world. Conflict and heightened
rise of China and the varying tension involving differences between the United
concerns among other Asian States and China over freedom of navigation
nations and the United States within exclusive economic zones (EEZs), mari-
time sovereignty disputes and maritime economic
about its impact on the region’s
rights have come to define regional diplomacy.
security structure, which has long Geopolitics is a permanent feature of interna-
been dominated by the US. tional politics. During the Cold War, East Asia
was the first focus of US-China competition and
In particular, decades of sharp then of Sino-Soviet competition. Not long after
increases in defense spending the end of the Cold War, as China’s rise became
by Beijing have given China new increasingly evident, Beijing and Washington
capabilities to begin challenging renewed their strategic competition. Each great
power took steps to improve its military capaci-
American dominance of maritime ties in the regional balance of power. But the US-
East Asia. Robert S. Ross looks China competition remained relatively muted.
at the developments that are Since 2010, however, that competition has been
reshaping geopolitical thinking characterized by heightened tension. For the
first time, there is a long-term trend in East Asia
on all sides in the region. toward protracted strategic conflict as a result of
China’s more recent rise in maritime East Asia
and the challenge it poses to US-China relations
and regional stability. There is no returning to
the era of China’s “peaceful rise” and regional
stability premised on US-China co-operation.
POST-COLD WAR US-CHINA COMPETITION
The rise of China from 1978, when the country
began to embrace economic reform and opening,
would eventually contribute to great power com-
petition associated with balance of power politics.
After the collapse of the Soviet alliance system in
1989 and the onset of China’s second post-1978
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economic growth spurt in 1992, the to receive a 100,000-ton US aircraft car-
US began adjusting to China’s growing rier. During the Clinton and George W.
power. The 1996 revised guidelines for the Bush administrations, Washington devel-
US-Japan Alliance, which were essentially com- oped improved political co-operation with
pleted in 1994, recognized the importance of the Malaysia and the navy increased its presence
alliance for responding to the rise of China and at Port Klang. And since the 1990s, the US and
reflected American determination to bolster alli- Australia have co-operated on the expansion of
ance co-operation. US satellite communication and reconnaissance
The 1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation — when facilities in northern Australia.
Beijing fired missiles off of Taiwan as a warning China’s effort to balance US military power in
to then President Lee Teng-hui not to declare the East Asia similarly began in the early 1990s. In
island independent — was the catalyst for the 1992, Chinese defense spending increased by 14
first US pivot from Europe to Asia. In the after- percent over the previous year, and its defense
math of that confrontation and the recognition budget has increased by over 10 percent nearly
that the United States might fight a war with every year since then. In 1991-1992, China
China over Taiwan, regardless of the casus belli, placed its first order for Russian Kilo-class sub-
support emerged in the US for enhancing US- marines and Russian Su-27 military aircraft. As
Taiwan defense ties. In 1999, the US Defense the Taiwan independence movement gained
Department concluded that the US should repo- momentum after 1995, China purchased addi-
sition many of its capabilities from Europe to East tional Kilo-class submarines from Russia, as well
Asia. In 2000, the administration of US President as large quantities of surface-to-air missiles and
Bill Clinton transferred a Los Angeles-class sub- Su-27s. China’s immediate objective was to deter
marine from Europe to Guam. Over the next dec- a declaration of independence by Taiwan and, if
ade, the US deployed every advanced American necessary, engage in a war with the US over Tai-
weapons system to East Asia, including the F-15, wan. But these weapons systems also created
F-16 and F-22 fighter planes, B-1 and B-2 bomb- a layered defense capability that has been the
ers, multiple Los Angeles-class and Virginia- foundation of China’s “anti-access/area denial”
class attack submarines, and converted Ohio- capabilities against the US in the 21st century.
class cruise missile submarines. The US also China’s efforts to modernize its surface ship capa-
stockpiled cruise missiles and established a war- bility, its regional ballistic missile capability and
time crisis operations center at Guam, and the its nuclear forces also date back to the 1990s.
US Navy designated a second aircraft carrier for
operations in East Asia. THE RISE OF CHINA AND
In the mid-1990s, the US expanded co-opera- ALLIANCE POLITICS
tion with its Southeast Asian security partners. Since 2009-2010, US-China strategic tensions and
Following the loss of its air and naval bases in the regional instability have significantly increased.
Philippines after the 1992 eruption of Mt. Pina- The geopolitical source of this new trend is the lat-
tubo, Washington quickly moved to develop an est development in the rise of China. In the 1990s
alternative naval facility in the region. In 1999, and 2000s, China lacked the capabilities neces-
Singapore opened its Changi naval base. In co- sary to defend its interests and develop influence
operation with the US, the facility was designed in maritime East Asia. Thus, a geopolitical divi-
GLOBAL ASIA Cover Story Dangerous Games: The Revival of Geopolitics and Its Risks for East Asia GLOBAL ASIA Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 2014

Observers have long understood

to maintain pre-eminence in the waters and the
airspace in the East and South China Seas. What Is Geopolitics?

that power transitions contribute

Nonetheless, the modernization of Chinese
maritime capabilities has allowed China to Geopolitics is a concept understood at least

to heightened great power conflict

develop a more proactive security policy that since the ancient Greeks, but the term itself
poses new challenges to regional stability. Chi- was coined in 1899 by Swedish political
na’s civilian maritime surveillance fleet is bet- scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who saw it as:

and that the rise of China would ter trained and larger than ever before, allowing
it to maintain a long-term presence in disputed ‘The theory of the state
challenge regional stability. waters. The PLA Navy possesses a large and more
capable surface fleet that enables sophisticated
as a geographical organism
or phenomenon in space’
The US-China power transition is operations. Chinese naval exercises are more
complex and they take place far from the Chinese

far from the point where conflict

coast in the western Pacific Ocean, throughout Its use spread from the time of the First
the South China Sea near US security partners World War and its aftermath, becoming

dynamics become especially perilous,

and in the vicinity of disputed islands. China’s widespread during and following the Second
active participation in anti-piracy operations in World War. During the Cold War years its use

but great power conflict increases all

the Gulf of Aden attests to the growing sophisti- diminished as superpower rivalry diminished
cation of the Chinese Navy. geographical discourse, and later advances
China is no longer a passive actor in maritime in communication and transportation

along the course of a power transition. East Asia, which is no longer the exclusive zone
of the US Navy. China can use its resources for
technology appeared to reduce its influence.

diplomatic leverage and to better defend its sov- In the modern day, geopolitics is widely seen
ereignty claims in the East and South China Seas as a loose synonym for international politics,
sion existed, whereby China dominated the East assert its interests and resist adverse political against challenges from US security partners. but its focus is more clearly on power, what
Asian land mass (with the exception of South and security trends. And China can actively resist adverse regional influential geographer Colin Flint in 2006
Korea) and US influence was largely limited to The Chinese Navy cannot yet challenge the US security trends involving the US and its regional described as “the struggle over the control
maritime East Asia. The large expanse of water in maritime East Asia. China’s aircraft carrier pro- security partners, including frequent US military of spaces and places.” This is amplified by
separating these two sub-regions served as a geo- gram remains in its early stages. China has tested surveillance close to the Chinese coast. contemporary Gerard Toal, a key figure in
political buffer that mitigated great power compe- advanced military aircraft, but these aircraft rely China’s more active role in East Asian secu- ‘critical geopolitics,’ who described it thus:
tition and contributed to regional stability. China on imported technologies and when they are rity creates regional alliance dynamics that com-
could not challenge the US presence in maritime operational they will have a limited range from plicate US-China diplomacy and the prospects ‘Geopolitics is discourse
East Asia and the US could not challenge Chinese the Chinese coast. China has yet to develop an
influence on its territorial periphery. anti-ship ballistic missile capability, which may
for regional stability. China’s efforts to defend
its security necessarily challenge the security
about world politics, with
But after 35 years of technological develop- ultimately be unachievable. The PLA Navy pos- of Japan and South China Sea countries that a particular emphasis
ment and improved training and more than 20 sesses advanced submarines, but compared to depend on the US for their security. On the other on state competition
years of increased annual defense spending, the the US, its submarine fleet is quite small and its hand, US security partnerships are critical to
modernization of Chinese maritime capabili- anti-submarine capability is nearly non-existent. American competition with China and to the and the geographical
ties has blurred the geopolitical division, con- The US thus continues to have major advantages regional balance of power. Chinese challenges to dimensions of power.’
tributing to heightened great power rivalry. In with both its in-region bases and numerous sur- the territorial claims of US security partners can
the East and South China Seas, China can now face ships and submarines enabling the US Navy thus undermine the credibility of American secu-
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GLOBAL ASIA Cover Story Dangerous Games: The Revival of Geopolitics and Its Risks for East Asia
What’s the Big Idea? rity commitments that are the foundation of the
US security system in East Asia.
Key concepts and issues in geopolitics as it affects East Asia — as measured The US must reassure its partners that it has
by how frequently the relevant phrases occur in this package of cover stories. the ability and the resolve to contend with a more
capable China. But this US imperative to support
its allies will place it in opposition to China and
can lead to alliance policies that undermine Chi-
nese security, eliciting Chinese perceptions of
heightened US “containment” and contributing
to greater regional tension. The challenge for US
policy is to sustain its regional security partner-
ships while simultaneously minimizing unneces-
sary US-China tension.
China also faces policy challenges. As a rising
power, it will use its improving maritime capa-
bilities to defend more actively its security inter-
ests. But it must also manage its growing power
and foreign policy to avoid excessive US concern
that China is intent on challenging US strategic
partnerships in East Asia, leading to a US secu-
rity policy that undermines Chinese security and
regional stability. As China rises, its leaders must
exercise patience and restraint so as to both pro-
mote greater Chinese security as well as co-oper-
ative US-China relations and regional stability.
CHINA’S RISE, ALLIANCE DYNAMICS
AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EAST ASIA
Heightened US-China tension and regional insta-
bility since 2009 have reflected the rise of China
and the complexities of alliance politics. China’s
improved maritime capabilities and its corre-
sponding forceful assertion of its maritime eco-
nomic and sovereignty claims have aroused con-
cern among US allies over American resolve to
contend with a rising China and the credibility
of US security commitments. The Obama admin-
istration’s response was its “pivot” to East Asia.
Similarly, China’s refusal to restrain North Korea
after its 2010 sinking of the South Korean Navy
ship, the Cheonan, and its shelling of Yeonpyeong
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GLOBAL ASIA Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 2014
Island led the US to increase defense co-opera-
tion with South Korea.
The 2010 pivot and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s diplomacy at the July 2010 ASEAN
Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi reflected US
efforts to reassure its Southeast Asian allies of
the US “return to Asia” and of American resolve
to contend with the rise of China. American
diplomacy directly inserted the US into the South
China Sea territorial disputes, straining relations
with Beijing and contributing to tension between
China and the Philippines and China and Viet-
nam. Similarly, following the Japanese govern-
ment’s September 2012 purchase of the Senkaku
(Daioyu) Islands, US efforts to reassure Japan of
American resolve inserted the US into the Sino-
Japanese territorial dispute, exacerbating ten-
sions. And from 2010 to 2012, the US increased
its military presence in South Korea, challenging
Chinese security.
In 2013, US-China relations improved consid-
erably. The June California “Sunnyland Sum-
mit” between President Xi Jinping and President
Barack Obama reflected US restraint in early
2013 regarding East Asian maritime disputes
and Chinese co-operation with US and South
Korean efforts to constrain North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program. And the summit contributed
to greater US-China co-operation through the
rest of the year. But China’s abrupt announce-
ment in December 2013 of its East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) elicited
renewed regional concern over Chinese ambi-
tions and another round of alliance politics as
the US once again aimed to reassure its security
partners of its resolve.
In January 2014, the White House threatened
China with a more forward defense policy should
China declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea
— a move many feared Beijing was considering.
Washington inserted itself again into the region’s
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GLOBAL ASIA Cover Story Dangerous Games: The Revival of Geopolitics and Its Risks for East Asia
territorial disputes. For the first time, the US pub-
lically challenged China’s “nine-dash line” in the
South China Sea, which effectively claims the
vast majority of the sea for China. Then, senior
US officials began to accuse China of using coer-
cion against other claimants to the disputed ter-
ritories to alter the status quo in East Asia. In
April, before he arrived in Tokyo and twice dur-
ing his visit to Tokyo, Obama declared that the
US-Japan alliance covers the Senkaku (Diaoyu)
Islands. No US president had ever made such a
statement. Then, during Obama’s visit to Manila,
Washington reached an agreement to station US
troops in the Philippines. As before, the US had
backed its allies against China, contributing to
greater Chinese perceptions of “containment”
and to heightened tensions.
Whereas China’s role on the Korean Penin-
sula reflects its traditional reliance on its ground
forces to influence countries on its territorial
periphery, the recent modernization of Chinese
maritime capabilities has blurred the geopolitical
mainland-maritime division of East Asia, contrib-
uting to heightened US-China competition and
greater US concern for the credibility of its alli-
ance commitments. This is the predictable out-
come of rising power dynamics; observers have
long understood that power transitions contrib-
ute to heightened great power conflict and that
the rise of China would challenge regional stabil-
ity. The US-China power transition is far from the
point where conflict dynamics become especially
perilous, but great power conflict increases all
along the course of a power transition.
China and the US face complex policy-mak-
ing challenges. China will seek a greater voice in
East Asian maritime affairs, but it also requires
regional stability and US-China co-operation
so that it can focus on its demanding domestic
agenda of economic, political and social prob-
lems. The US will respond to the rise of China
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with efforts to sustain its regional security sys-
tem, but Washington also requires US-China co-
operation to realize its global interests and to
minimize unnecessary regional tension.
Successful US and Chinese management
of East Asian security will be difficult. It will
require both China and the US to avoid demoniz-
ing the other, to recognize their respective
impact on the other’s security and the corre-
sponding necessity for restraint, and to avoid
policies that seek to simply impose compliance
on the other. The alternative is a downward spi-
ral in relations. It is incumbent on both China
and the US to effectively contend with the
complexities of East Asian geopolitics, or incur
unnecessary and costly conflict.
Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political
Science at Boston College, Associate,
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies,
Harvard University, and Senior Advisor,
Security Studies Program, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. His research
focuses on Chinese security policy and
East Asian security, incuding Chinese use
of force and the role of nationalism in
Chinese defense policy.
GLOBAL ASIA Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 2014
The Cold War as a Guide to
the Risk of War in East Asia
By Øystein Tunsjø
During the long Cold War in Europe, the bipolar world defined
by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union
posed an existential risk to countries on both sides because of
the threat of invasion and use of nuclear weapons.
With the emergence of a new bipolar world in Asia shaped by
relations between China and the US, an existential threat of
invasion and nuclear war isn’t the greatest risk, but maritime
disputes and other sources of friction could more easily spark a
conflict between Beijing and Washington than was ever the case
between Washington and Moscow, writes Øystein Tunsjø.
IN THE AFTERMATH of Sino-US rapprochement in ratio of US gross domestic product (GDP) to Chinese
the 1970s, a security order emerged in East Asia GDP has narrowed from 15:1 to 2:1. China’s economic
that saw China dominate mainland East Asia, while growth has facilitated the build-up of “anti-access/
the United States maintained maritime superiority. area denial” military capabilities that allow the
The balance of power was consolidated during the naval forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
post-Cold War unipolar system dominated by the to challenge the US Navy in coastal waters and the
US, and East Asia became the most peaceful region near seas. China has developed advanced submarine
in the world. Since China was still relatively weak capabilities and its fleet has become more modern
and its rise required a benign security environment, and capable of patrolling blue water seas. This allows
it was constrained and reluctant to seek regional China to promote its claimed sovereignty in East
hegemony. Instead, Beijing sought to bide its Asian waters. With increased capabilities, the PLA
time and to rise peacefully within the existing US Navy now operates in closer proximity to US carrier
international order. battle groups, harassing US Navy ships and planes.
Today, as US unipolarity wanes and US-China It has also begun to resist US surveillance activities
bipolarity emerges, the “geography of peace” in East within its exclusive economic zone.
Asia is increasingly challenged.1 Growing capabilities China has also channeled increased resources
now allow China to assert its interests in the US into coast guard and maritime surveillance agencies
sphere of influence in maritime East Asia more that can better safeguard its interests and enforce
forcefully. Much of this is due to China’s economic its interpretation of the international law of the
growth. Between 1991 and today, for example, the sea. US defense expenditures remain roughly three
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