PAKISTAN’S TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES

Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal TI(M), Consultant to IPRI on Policy and Strategic Response
Abstract
National security agenda has gone beyond the preview of state and military. The existing
state-centred approach to national security, confined to the defence of a country against
territorial aggression, has been widened to the idea of security inclusive of a larger set of
threats to the people of the state. While the sphere of traditional security concerns is quite
precise—threat arising out of military means, no similar concurrence exists in the context of
non-traditional security. Broadly, non-traditional threat is perceived as: “Challenges to the
survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources,
such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion,
infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling,
drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime”. Pakistan faces an assortment of
traditional and non-traditional threats. However, none of these is serious enough to be
categorized as existential threat.

Introduction
Global strategic environment is in a state of perpetual flux; whereby, the nature of threats and
security discourses are incessantly shifting positions. The security agenda has gone beyond the
preview of state and military. Advocates of an alternative approach to security studies question
the conventional wisdom of restricting the expanse of security to military dimension alone. Even a
super power cannot adequately and sufficiently handle some non-traditional challenges. For
example, Hurricane Katrina exposed huge gaps in the disaster management regime of the United
States. It was one of the deadliest hurricanes ever to hit the United States 1. The impacts of these
new NTS challenges are deep and wide ranging. For example earthquake of 2005 and flash
floods of 2010 caught the state and the people of Pakistan off guard and kept them off balanced
until international community extended a helping hand. V. R. Raghavan2 has observed that, ―The
existing state-centred approach to national security, confined to the defence of a country against
territorial aggression, has been widened to the idea of security inclusive of a larger set of threats
to the people of the state.‖ It is therefore becoming increasingly crucial to analyze how the non-
traditional security threats are reshaping the global institutional architecture3; singly as well as
jointly with traditional security challenges.

1
Kim Ann Zimmermann, Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage & Aftermath, Live Science Contributor Date: 20 August
2012 Time: 12:47 PM ET, http://www.livescience.com/22522-hurricane-katrina-facts.html 9 (accessed on July 10,
2013)
2
Lt Gen (R) VR Raghavan is one of India‘s leading military strategic thinkers. He is currently the Director of the
Delhi Policy Group and President, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai. He is a member of India‘s National
Security Advisory Board. http://www.csa-chennai.org/about/f-gen.htm (accessed on July 03, 2013).
3
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security Threats‖, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).
Ibid.

1
Conceptual Differentiation: Traditional and Non-Traditional Security
The sphere of traditional security concerns is quite precise; whereas no similar concurrence
exists in the context of non-traditional security. According to Mely Caballero-Anthony4 non-
traditional security threats may be defined as: ―Challenges to the survival and well-being of
peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-
border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters,
irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of
transnational crime.‖5
During the Cold War, main threats to security were pegged around East-West rivalry and nuclear
confrontations between the two blocs led by the US and USSR, these military related threats
were further extended by the two superpowers through their hydra-headed proxy wars. There
was hardly any conflict in the World where both super powers of that era did not have covert or
overt participation. In tandem were the threats like: environmental hazards; terrorism; organized
crime and illegal immigration. However, the fast moving military issues had overshadowed and
relegated non-military threats to a second-class status. Though the era of heated rivalry between
the US and Russia is over, world continues to be sprinkled with regional conflict zones and sticky
bilateral issues. However, these latent hotspots are not potentially over-loaded to graduate to a
global level conflict. With the end of Cold War, and termination of military threat, issues like
economic instabilities and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have propped up
to centre stage. They have acquired the status of main sources of concern for global security.
Since the demise of Soviet Union, the non-traditional aspects of security have been an important
area for research6; especially in the context of disintegration of the Empire, both without any
external military intervention and in the absence of any internal armed struggle.
The parlance ‗non-traditional security‘ is a contemporary buzzword and its usage is on the rise
amongst the practitioners of statecraft, strategy and politics. However, as a concept, it still lacks a
precise and commonly accepted or, say, an authoritative definition. Military deterrence, diplomatic
manoeuvrings and short-term political arrangements are ineffective and or inadequate in
addressing non-traditional security issues. Tackling them essentially requires non-military means
including comprehensive political, economic and societal responses. It‘s an ongoing process that
can only be sustained through robustness of institutions, sufficiency of resources and participative
response from state(s) and society/ (societies).
Now non-traditional threats are increasingly discussed at transnational and multi-national levels in
a comprehensive manner, which clearly reflects the enormity and significance of these issues in
the contemporary world. Policy makers now portray these challenges as potent threats to their
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the well-being of respective people and
societies. This is a significant development. If such ‗security framing‘7 is to be effective, it must

4
Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony is associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Her research interests include multilateralism and regionalism in the
Asia-Pacific, Asian security with particular focus on non-traditional security and human security, and conflict
management. At RSIS, Dr. Anthony is coordinator of the Non-Traditional Security Programme. She is also
secretary general of the newly established ‗Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia‘.
5
B H Chaudhuri , “Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia”, Defining Non-traditional Security Threats,
Global India Foundation, 2011. http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on
July 02, 2013).
6
M. Aydin (Ed.), Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus (Istanbul
IOS Press, 2011), i-xii.
http://academia.edu/987789/NonTraditional_Security_Threats_and_Regional_Cooperation_in_the_Southern_Cauc
asus
7
Mely Caballero-Anthony, ―Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political-
Security Community (APSC)‖. Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No 7, September 2010. Centre

2
attract due attention to these challenges, convey a sense of urgency, and develop the capacity to
rapidly mobilise national and international resources and create elaborate institutional support for
commandeering these resources for their effective, efficient and equitable employment to mitigate
these challenges and their consequences.
Though this discourse has swayed the focus away from military power, as the core and sole
determinant of international order and security, to several non-traditional determinants, with a
much enhanced role of economic, political, and societal forces, it does not mean that the military
dimension has become dormant or irrelevant. Coming in full circles, the concept of non traditional
security shares much ground with the ‗Fifth Generation Warfare (5 GW), generally called
‗unrestricted warfare‘ that may be described as the employment of ―all means whatsoever –
means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the force of arms, means that
involve military power and means that do not involve military power, means that entail casualties,
and means that do not entail casualties‖.8
Also, one could argue that within the umbrella of national strategy, some of the NTS challenges
fall under the rubric of indirect strategy. Application of non-kinetic strategy9 also has overlaps with
some of the NTS dilemmas. Causing climatic changes through, mystery surrounded, scientific
military-funded High-frequency Active Auroral Research Programme (HAARP) to unleash floods
may fall in this realm10. Usage of soft power11 could also be a preparatory stage for inducting NTS
challenges and later pushing in the traditional security stampede. Likewise, in the domain of
cyberspace, sub-activities like crime, conflict, competition and spying have a complementary
overlapping zones where both traditional and non-traditional security could concurrently lay their
claims upon. Whistle blowing by Snowden in the context of cyber spying by the US, the UK and
other countries have amply demonstrate how a state with adequate cyber capacities could intrude
on the privacies of other states and individuals, and how in such pursuits political borders become
meaningless. It also brought to light the tacit collusion of State with its own intelligence agencies.
Hence national security needs an all comprehensive treatment whereby it could prevent,
minimize and mitigate the impact of both traditional and non-traditional threats, which may be in a
sort of perpetual orchestration, intricately interwoven in a well thought out benign looking format
up to a point when terminal transition takes place from NTS to traditional phase— the final push.

for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; Nanyang technological
University, Singapore.
8
Thomas PM Barnett, ―System Administration‘ based Global Transaction Strategy‖,
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/ (accessed on May 24, 2013).
9
Timothy Noah, When warfare gets "kinetic.", Posted Nov. 20, 2002, at 6:40 PM
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth_of_a_washington_word.html/ (accessed
on July, 2012). In common usage, "kinetic" is an adjective used to describe motion, but the Washington meaning
derives from its secondary definition, "active, as opposed to latent." Dropping bombs and shooting bullets—you
know, killing people—is kinetic. But the 21st-century military is exploring less violent and more high-tech means of
warfare, such as messing electronically with the enemy's communications equipment or wiping out its bank
accounts. These are "non-kinetic."
10
Austin Baird, HAARP conspiracies: Guide to most far-out theories behind government research in Alaska, posted
on
September 20, 2011 http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/haarp-conspiracies-guide-most-far-out-theories-behind-
government-research-alaska (accessed on July 10, 2013)
11
The term soft power was coined in the early 1990s by Joseph S Nye Jr, in his book, ―Bound to Lead: The
Changing Nature of American Power‖. He refined the concept in his follow up book in 2004: ―Soft Power: The
Means to Success in World Politics‖. In Nye‘s words Soft power is, ‗the attractiveness of a country‘s political ideas
and policy‘. The term is now widely used in international affairs by analysts and statesmen. The former US
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates spoke of the need to enhance American soft power by "a dramatic increase in
spending on the civilian instruments of national security i.e. diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign
assistance, civic action, economic reconstruction and development."

3
Benign looking non-traditional threats may soften the state to the extent that it is no longer
capable of defending its territory and people against the traditional threat. It is in this context that
even a traditional enemy may make inroads through non-traditional threats with intent to degrade
the national potential to ward off military threat planned for an appropriate time. Smart application
of non-traditional means could even eliminate the need of application of traditional means,
because the victim state may become a pliant state due to erosion caused by non-traditional
means; and by the time it realizes as to what is eating it up, it may have lost the capability and
national will to resort to traditional defensive means. In a similar way, an apparently friendly
country may be engaged in clandestinely generating, supporting and sustaining non-traditional
threats. Whenever, norms of healthy competition are violated, a usually benign activity could
crossover to the domain of non-traditional threat.
Expanse, Scope and Speed of NTS Challenges. Mely Caballero-Anthony‘s definition12
brings forth few common characteristics in the context of non-traditional security threats;
ordinarily they are non-military in nature and transnational in scope. These are neither totally
domestic nor purely inter-state. These are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and
communication revolution13. Non-traditional security issues are those which are termed in
contrast to traditional security threats and refer to the factors other than military, political and
diplomatic conflicts, but can pose threats to the survival and development of a sovereign state
and human kind as a whole.14
Therefore, these non-traditional threats are much more intimidating than the traditional ones as
they require the national leadership to look not only outwards to cultivate international
cooperation, but also inwards, with an open outlook to execute internal socio-economic and
political reforms15. These threats require maintenance of continuous capacity to generate
appropriate response with or without formal warning, for example in case of floods, earthquakes
and epidemics.
Notwithstanding, the contemporary shift in the study and analysis of security and the world order
from a traditional framework to a non-traditional approach16, one must avoid going overboard by
making water tight compartment for the two. One may err in the comprehension unless there is a
clear perception about the overlap zones. Non-traditional issues can affect both government
institutions and civilian populations and these can originate from a variety of non-state human and
natural causes; such threats may be upshots of certain acts by individuals or social groups, rather
than the actions of states. Hence, one may observe that the outbreak of non-traditional issues is
more unpredictable, and the enhanced mobility and expanding activities of individuals enable
their impacts to spread and proliferate far more quickly. As indirect effects, such issues can cause
tremendous economic losses to a region or the whole world, as done by the Asian Financial

12
A variant of her definition of non-traditional security (NTS) has been adopted as the working definition by the
Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia, otherwise known as NTS-Asia. For more details, see the
NTS-Asia Web site at www.rsis-ntsasia.org ( accessed on July 03, 2013), where NTS is defined as: ―Challenges to
the survival and well being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate
change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters,
irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime‖.
13
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security Threats‖, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).
14
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security Threat‘, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).
15
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security‖ Threats, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).
16
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security Threats‖, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).

4
Crisis of 1997, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2002-200317 and the
tsunami triggered Fukushima nuclear fiasco of 2010.
The most comprehensive definition of the concept of non-traditional security was provided by
Richard H. Ullman18 in 1983. According to him national security should not be perceived in the
‗narrow‘ sense of protecting the state from military attacks from across the territorial borders.
Such a perception was, for him, ―doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous‖, because it
―draws attention away from the non-military threats that promise to undermine the stability of
many nations during the years ahead. And it presupposes that threats arising from outside a state
are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise within it.‖ Ullman rather
preferred to define a threat to national security as, ―an action or sequence of events that
threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the
inhabitants of a state, or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to
the government of a state or to private nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations
etc) within the state.‖19
Branches of Non-Traditional Security
Generally, six broad branches of non-traditional security are identified, namely: International
Terrorism; Trans-national Organized Crime: Environmental Security: Illegal Migration: Energy
Security; and Human Security. However, one size does not fit all. Each nation is likely to have its
own list, which may or may not include all six, likewise regional and sub-regional arrangements
would also modify the generic list. Irrespective of the list, each item would ordinarily require an
independent analysis, with adequate attention upon the necessity of securitization of each issue.
Likewise the response would vary as to each particular threat depending upon whether it affects a
specific set of people who may belong to one or more states.
Transnational expanse and enormity of such NTS challenges means that they can no longer be
sufficiently managed only by domestic resources, measures or strategies. As a consequence of
increasing futility of unilateral measures, there is growing realization about the necessity of
evolving sub-regional, regional and global approach. However, critical to building effective and
credible regionalism is the political will of governments to put in place systems, structures and
resources to translate the regional plans into actionable deeds20.
Role of Non-State Actors/Entities. Non state actors have a dual role to play. They could
generate a non-traditional threat; say by manipulating the market dynamics and playing with the
intricacies of stock exchanges. An individual coming home on vacation from a distant county
could inadvertently be a carrier of a locally uncommon virus that could erupt in to an epidemic,
against which the recipient country has little or no countering capacity. High seas piracy is
another no-traditional threat whereby only a handful group of pirates could radiates a sense of
insecurity over a wide area. On the other hand, non state actors, both individuals and entities,
also have a role to play in mitigating the effects of some of the non-traditional challenges.

17
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security Threats‖, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).
18
Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University. During 1982-83 he was a Visiting
Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/37968/richard-h-
ullman/at-war-with-nicaragua (accessed on July 03, 2013).
19
Saurabh Chaudhuri, ―Defining Non-traditional Security Threats‖, Global India Foundation, 2011.
http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013). & Richard H
Ullman,
― Redefining Security‖, International Security, Summer(Vol: 8 No 1) MIT Press, Massachusetts.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/84675722/Redefining-Security-Richard-Ullman (accessed on July 03, 2013).
20
Mely Caballero-Anthony, ―Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization‖, London: Ashgate, 2006.

5
Domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often network with the
state/governmental structures and create synergy in disaster management. Many philanthropic
individuals and entities with various politico-religious leanings have traditionally acted as an
extended arm of the government organizations likes National Disaster Management Authority
(NDMA), Civil Defence, and Red Crescent Society. However, if left to themselves, such entities
are unable to carry out even handed and large scale activities, mainly due to capacity issues. If
allowed to operate for a long time some entities could also trigger non-traditional threats of other
types through their doctrinal beliefs, practices and cultural incompatibility.
State’s Central Role. Given that many NTS issues are transnational and trans-regional,
national efforts in addressing these issues need to be complemented with multidimensional,
multilevel, and multi sectoral initiatives. Willing involvement of different regional actors can strike
a delicate balance between the push and pull factor for greater regional cohesion. Nevertheless,
in spite of the crucial role that regional commitments, frameworks and mechanisms have in
coping with NTS challenges, the central role and capacity of states towards gainful integration of
the mobilised effort is very vital. While regional frame work is critical for addressing common
problems through resource augmentation, it is certainly not sufficient21; effected state has to play
central role and take charge for operationalising the regional effort.
Pakistan’s Traditional Security Challenges
These challenges emanating out of military inventory and doctrinal intent of potential adversaries
comprise of external military threat and internal security dilemmas. During this era of science and
technological advancement, threat does not necessarily emanate from immediate neighbours.
Due to continental ranges of weapons and delivery system, extra regional forces can pose
equally formidable national security challenges without physically moving to close proximity.
Moreover, internal and external threats may not be separable in totality, causes, planning,
execution and effects may criss-cross in various combinations.
External threat
Pakistan has four immediate neighbours: China, Afghanistan, India and Iran. Moreover there is a
long coastline to the South. Pakistan has no threat from China and Iran, in the traditional domain,
there is no history of unmanageable threat from the sea side as well. Militarily, Afghanistan
becomes a country of concern as and when it houses extra-regional forces on one pretext or the
other; and threat recedes in-terms of military value when foreign forces depart, but Pakistan is,
invariably left to deal with the debris of the conflict in the form of fallout of war-cum drug economy
in the shape of small weapons & drug proliferation and localized incidents of militancy. Pakistan
has good relationship with China and Iran. Better relations with India and Afghanistan are the
leading objectives of Pakistan‘s foreign policy. If Pakistan can cultivate a peaceful
neighbourhood, a very substantial part of its traditional security dilemma gets sorted out.
Traditional Threat Emanating From India
Pakistan has a history of facing traditional threat from India in the form of use of or threat to use
military force—resulting into three wars and numerous standoffs. This threat is of existential
magnitude, in 1971, Pakistan lost Eastern part of the country due this factor. Unfortunately,
Pakistan-India relationship is perpetually on tenterhooks, ready to ignite on mildest pretext. On
the outbreak of any crisis, first thing that happens is breakdown of communications, followed by
rapid climb on escalatory ladder, by India, to a level just a rung or two below actual shooting
level, from where neither further climb is tenable nor a graceful descent remains a viable option,
hence ending up in a prolonged stalemates in the form of protracted deployment of militaries.

21
Mely Caballero-Anthony, ―Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization‖, London: Ashgate, 2006.

6
 Pakistan needs a sustainable equilibrium in the South Asia. Higher conventional military
asymmetry between India and Pakistan is one of the most serious threats to South Asian
security. Indian actions and intent that radiate, aggravate and substantiate traditional threat are:
India has a numerical advantage in personnel and inventory that varies between 1:3 and 1:5 in
favour of India; and its defence budget is more than five times the Pakistani defence budget.
India‘s robust economic growth supports such spending, thus creating dilemmas for Pakistan.
Moreover, India has an inclination to embrace dangerous doctrinal concepts which indicate
provocative mindset of Indian military command.

Indian Doctrinal Gimmicks. Alongside an arm race, India has also embarked upon
offensive sounding doctrinal gimmicks. Dangerous concepts like ―limited war under nuclear
overhang, ―Cold Start Doctrine‖ later renamed as ―Proactive Operation‖22 and rhetoric
articulations about execution of ―massive nuclear strikes‘ in case of terrorist attack on India
originating from Pakistan; or in case Pakistan uses tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) against
India23are regularly floated to keep Pakistan guessing about Indian intent. Moreover, Indian
defence budget has more than doubled since Operation Parakram.24 A monumental confusion in
regard to India‘s nuclear doctrine is quite evident in a recent article written by a well-known Indian
defence analyst, PR Chari, a former Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
(IDSA), the premier think-tank of New Delhi. PR Chari later headed another prestigious think-
tank, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, and is now a Research Professor at the same
institution. As both the institutions that Chari has associations with are government funded, what
Chari says reflects confusion within the ranks of the Indian nuclear establishment 25.It is obvious
22
Col. Anil Athale, ―Cold Start Doctrine,‖ Indian Defence Review, 26:2 (April-June 2011),
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/search/?idr_search=idr&search=cold+start+doctrine+&searchsubmit=Search
(accessed October 22, 2013). Under American pressure (on Pakistan‘s behest), Indian government distance itself
from the term Cold Start Doctrine, terming it a military thought process. However, practically requisite military
reorganization is at a fairly advanced stage under the garb of ―Proactive Operations.‖ Critics are of the view this
through this reorganization India is regressively embracing the erstwhile concept of ―Blitzkrieg‖. And by doing so
strategic potential of the army would stand compromised.
23
Shyam Saran, head of the National Security Advisory Board articulated in April 2013 that India would retaliate with
strategic weapons against Pakistan if a 26/11 like attack occurred on its land. He cast these remarks as his
personal views. However, many in India and outside saw his statements as articulating official policy on a sensitive
issue, while maintaining deniability. The Times of India, for example, said Saran was ―placing on record India‘s
official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi.‖ He
visualizes an escalatory ladder that triggers with a sub-conventional event or a terrorist attack. After which Pakistan
tries to dissuade India from carrying out punitive conventional retaliation, by deploying its tactical nuclear weapons
and India responds by using strategic weapons. Saran warns that any nuclear attack–whether by strategic or
tactical weapons –would be met by ―massive retaliation‖ from India. This will be ―designed to inflict unacceptable
damage on its adversary.‖ ―Any nuclear exchange once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the
strategic level.‖ ―Pakistan,‖ he declares, should ―be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to
do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons.‖ Most importantly Saran‘s
escalatory scenario lays bare an underlying frustration that India‘s Cold Start Doctrine has been challenged if not
blunted by Pakistan‘s TNW response. India is no longer committed to no-first-use nuclear. Its current policy is
ready-arsenal and deterrence by punishment.
24
Admiral Sushil Kumar, former Navy chief, ―Operation Parakram was the most punishing mistake.‖ Last updated on
November 4, 2011 19:36 IST. "There was no aim or military objective for the Operation Parakram...I don't mind
admitting that Operation Parakram was the most punishing mistake for the Indian Armed Forces, Kumar said in
New Delhi, addressing a seminar on limited wars in South Asia-against a nuclear background. He maintained that
the government then lacked any political aim or objective for deploying the army along the Indo-Pakistan border,
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-nuclear-mindset-we-have-is-a-false-sense-of-security-admiral-
sushil-kumar/20111104.htm (accessed October 24,2014).
25
Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, ―Confusion in Indian Nuclear Doctrine‖,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/#inbox/14689ff8e0efbb42 (accessed on June 12, 2014), .. [PR] Chari points out that
its[Indian] nuclear capability has not deterred Pakistan-based militants from cross-border attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 to the Mumbai attack in 2008, not to mention Kargil in 1999. He says ‗More generally, it would

7
that there are serious problems in India‘s strategic thinking. In the first place, Indians profess a
commitment to total and universal disarmament, but they pursue policies entirely contrary to this
principle. Aggressive nuclear doctrine of a triad capability including sea-based missiles of 2002,
followed by the highly provocative Cold Start doctrine of 2004, and finally the concept of Mutually
Assure Destruction (MAD) style massive retaliation concept was floated last year. All these years,
Pakistan has been proposing a Nuclear Restraint Regime to India. Its development of a full
spectrum credible minimum deterrence is a natural reaction to an aggressive Indian posture that
gets more and more threatening. Chari concludes that ‗the essential problem that remains and
will tax the government of Narendra Modi is how India plans to credibly engage Pakistan in the
interests of nuclear stability in South Asia‘. It is only to be hoped that India will finally come to
terms with the instability that its confused doctrinal hiccups have unleashed, and restore
rationality to its nuclear thinking. In the article, carried in a Carnegie Endowment posting, entitled
‗India‘s nuclear doctrine: stirrings of change‘, Chari addresses the issue of what exactly is his
country‘s nuclear doctrine. He begins his piece with a reference to a speech made by the former
Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, at IDSA in April this year, in which Singh called for the
creation of a global convention to pledge the non-use of nuclear weapons. Chari writes ‗Why the
Indian Prime Minister chose to make this major policy declaration in the last hours of his term in
office is a mystery‘, which demonstrates his bewilderment at this position. He says that this
speech led the BJP to state in its election manifesto that the party would ‗study in detail India‘s
nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times‘. BJP
leaders started saying that India‘s no-first use policy would be reviewed. However, due to the
concern raised in many quarters that India‘s time-honoured position and ‗a central feature of
India‘s nuclear doctrine‘ ever since it conducted its nuclear tests would be altered without debate,
candidate Modi had to declare that there would be ‗no compromise‘ on no first use, ‗which
reflected India‘s cultural inheritance‘. Given the BJP‘s naturally aggressive posture, such
clarifications must be viewed with some skepticism and it is legitimate to explore what may be on
the agenda. The no-first use formulation was made in August 1999 by the Vajpayee government
and later endorsed by the Cabinet Committee on Security, making it the official Indian position for
the last 15 years. Chari says ‗There are valid grounds to revisit India‘s nuclear doctrine, as much
has happened over the intervening years that challenges the assumptions made‘ at that time. He
maintains that ‗On the conceptual front, the limitations of nuclear deterrence have become
apparent. In important ways, India‘s acquisition of nuclear weapons has not increased its
security‘. It is obvious that there are serious problems in India‘s strategic thinking.26
Indian Military Build-up. Alongside the rhetoric of Cold Start Doctrine or Proactive Operations,
Indian Military high command has been able to convince the political leadership for an ambitious
allocation worth US$ 120 billion, spread over a long term. This would result in a major weapon
system transition from low to mid-tech Russian equipment to hi-tech American and European war

seem that Pakistan has acquired virtual impunity in launching terrorist attacks at will into India through organizations
that enjoy its patronage‘. He then refers to Pakistan‘s development of short range missiles. Seeing them as enabling
Pakistan to deploy ‗tactical nuclear weapons in a battlefield mode‘, he says that they are ‗meant to be used against
invading Indian troop formations that Pakistan does not have the conventional capabilities to defeat‘. Chari does not
mention, in this context, the provocative Cold Start doctrine that India first articulated in 2004. He then dismisses, the
‗massive retaliation‘ doctrine in response to Pakistan‘s development of short range missiles by saying that ‗the
determinism inherent in India‘s nuclear doctrine that any level of nuclear attack will invite massive retaliation is too
extreme to gain much credibility‘. He says ‗It defies logic to threaten an adversary with nuclear annihilation to deter or
defend against a tactical nuclear strike on an advancing military formation‘. Chari concludes by saying that ‗It should
be emphasized that neither former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh‘s last ditch attempt to universalize India‘s
qualified no-first use policy nor the confusions created by BJP protagonists regarding their commitment to this policy
are to be commended. A detailed study of India‘s nuclear doctrine is required to address all the relevant issues in
their totality‘.
26
Ibid.

8
machines. Space programme and cyber warfare are new capability additives. Ongoing integrated
missile development programmes has been given additional boost to meet targets like ICBMs
with MIRV capability. Strategic capabilities like nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, long range
military air transport aircraft and around 150 high technology multi-role fighter attack aircraft are
on order. An anti ballistic missile (ABM) system is being setup. Military formations have already
undergone massive reorganization to keep pace with new doctrinal orientations.
These actions indicate that India is striving to enhance its military outreach well beyond
the region. This capability could however be unleashed entirely against Pakistan, on as require
basis. Over 80 percent of Indian arsenal is Pakistan specific and most of its military command
and control structure is Pakistan perched. India‘s robust economic growth supports such
rearming, thus creating dilemmas for Pakistan. As of now Indian defence budget is seven times
the Pakistani defence budget. “SIPRI Fact Sheets‖ issued in March 2013 & 2014 state that:-

―India was the world‘s largest importer of major conventional weapons in 2008–
12. Its arms imports, accounting for 12 per cent of global imports, were 109 per
cent higher than those of China, the second biggest arms importer. India
imported 59 per cent more arms in 2008–12 than in 2003–2007. In 2008–12 it
improved its long-range military capabilities with the import of such items as
over 100 Su-30MKI combat aircraft from Russia, 3 A-50E airborne early warning
aircraft (combining components from Israel, Russia and Uzbekistan), an Akula
nuclear-powered submarine from Russia and the first of 8 P-8I anti-submarine
warfare aircraft from the USA.27
―India‘s imports of major arms increased by 111 per cent between 2004–2008
and 2009–13, making it the world‘s largest importer. Its imports—14 per cent of
the global total—were almost three times larger than those of China or
Pakistan... India received 90 of 222 Su-30MKI combat aircraft ordered from
Russia. It also received 27 of a total of 45 MiG-29K combat aircraft ordered for
use on aircraft carriers. India has 62 Russian MiG-29SMT and 49 French Mirage
2000-5 combat aircraft on order. It has also selected, but not yet ordered, 144
Russian T-50 and 126 French Rafale combat aircraft‖28.
Strategic Dimension of Threat from India
Every time India test-launches a new ballistic missile, officials from the defense industry go giddy
about the next missile, which they say will be bigger, more accurate, fly longer, and carry more
nuclear warheads.29 Moreover, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
had time and again indicated that all future missiles will be deployed in large canisters on road or
rail mobile launchers to get ―drastically‖ shorter response time with an ability to launch in ―just a
few minutes.‖30 If the Indian government has authorized quick-launch capability, it is bad news for

27
Paul Holtom et al, ―Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2012,‖ SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (Solna, Sweeden: March, 2013), 1,3,4,6.
28
Siemon T. Wezeman et al, ―Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2013,‖ SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (Solna, Sweeden: March, 2014), 1,4,6.
29
Hans M. Kristensen, ―India‘s Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence.‖ Hans M. Kristensen is director
of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with
analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons. He
specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is a frequent consultant to and is
widely referenced in the news media on the role and status of nuclear weapons, http://blogs.fas.org/ &
http://www.fas.org/ (accessed October 9, 2013).
30
Ibid.

9
South Asia. The combination of multiple warheads, increased accuracy, and drastically reduced
launch time indicates that India is gradually moving from minimum deterrence doctrine towards a
more capable nuclear posture. The ability to launch quickly is only relevant if India plans to
conduct a first strike against its adversaries. Planning for first strike would contradict India‘s no-
first-use policy. Pressure to give up ―No First Use‖ (NFU) is well beyond loud thinking and the
ruling BJP has recently passed a resolution to this effect, however, candidate Narendra Modi
distanced from it. Nevertheless, capability and capacity for revoking NFU is, by and large in
place. This could significantly decrease stability both in peacetime – by stimulating Pakistani
planners to further increase the responsiveness of their nuclear missiles; and in a crisis time, the
shortening of decision-making may profound the risk of miscalculation, overreaction and
escalation. Most of the independent analysts tend to agree that India appears to be inching form
nuclear war avoidance capability to acquiring nuclear war fighting capability.31

Afghanistan Factor. Afghanistan has traditionally remained the focus of Indian regional
policy.32 One of the objectives of this focus was to counter balance Pakistan through politico-
military pinpricks, on as required basis. Indian efforts in Afghanistan to re-establish its influence
have been broadly focused on three aspects: a major role in the reconstruction process and
economic development; building linkages with the Central Asian States; and attempting to
marginalize Pakistan‘s influence in Afghanistan.33
On October 04, 2011, Afghanistan also signed a comprehensive bilateral Agreement on
Strategic Partnership with India.34 India provides military training to Afghan police and Army.
Through most of the innocent looking development projects like road building, training and
health, India has been clandestinely proliferating its military footprint by executing these
activities though the Indian organizations staffed mainly by its retired military /civil armed forces
personnel like Border Road Organization etc. Indian direct investment in Afghanistan exceeds
well above US$ 10 billion. Now based on this investment India is laying claim for its role in
shaping post 2014 Afghanistan, and a permanent strategic role in that country. In its eagerness,
India has of late floated the narrative that India is an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan and its
direct contact is severed by Pakistan‘s illegal occupation of Indian territory—reference to Gilgit-
Baltistan. Pakistan has expressed concerns regarding opening of Indian consulates along Pak-
Afghan border which are more than the legitimate consular services in the area. There is credible
evidence that these Consulates are being used as launching pad for separatist and terrorist
elements in Balochistan and FATA.
India has many interests in Afghanistan, none of which poses existential threats to
Pakistan. Attempt to encircle Pakistan is not likely to work. India is not likely to have a pliant
government in Afghanistan irrespective of the composition of post 2014 Afghan government. In a
provocative essay for Brookings, ―A Deadly Triangle,‖ William Dalrymple argued that Afghanistan
had become the site of an Indo-Pakistan proxy war. Pakistan‘s attitude to India, he explained, is
shaped by its fear of being caught in an Indian ―nutcracker‖: trapped between an age-old enemy
to the south and a war-ridden, pro-Delhi state to the north. But such analyses quickly collapse

31
Hans M. Kristensen, ―India‘s Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence.‖
32
Fahmida Ashraf, ―India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11,‖
http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDEFile/INDIA%C4%90AFGHANISTAN_RELATIONS_POST-9-
11.HTM?Archive=191494691967&File=INDIA%ADAFGHANISTAN+RELATIONS+POST-9-11_HTM (accessed
October 31, 2013).
33
―India‘s Irons in the Afghan Fire,‖ Asia Times Online, 26 October 2004, http://atimes.com/
34
Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India,
http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/Agreement%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership%20between%20Afghanistan%20an
d%20India%20-%20English.pdf (accessed November 14, 2013).

10
under scrutiny. India‘s ability to construct a two front dilemma for Pakistan is grossly over
projected.

The Central Asia Factor. An Indian analyst, Meena Singh Roy, has observed in one of
her articles, ―India as an extended neighbour of CARs has major geostrategic and economic
interests in this region. It was also concerned about Pakistan‘s influence in the Central Asian
region. However, India needed the Afghanistan link to maintain its contacts with the Central
Asian states.‖
India has completed the refurbishment of a military base at Ayni in Tajikistan: the process
began in 2002 and has been accomplished at a cost of US$10 million.24 Apart from Russia, US,
and Germany, India is the fourth country to have a military air base in Central Asia. Initially, India
was planning to deploy MiG-29 fighters at Ayni; however, due to the reservations expressed by
Pakistan, Tajikistan has allowed India to deploy only Mi-I7V1 helicopters. The base is of strategic
importance to India, and existence of fighter attack jet capable infrastructure is a point of concern
for Pakistan, because such bases can be activated within 48-72 hours for undertaking full
spectrum offensive air operations. As observed by an Indian analyst, Sudha Ramachandran, ―A
base at Ayni allows India rapid response to any emerging threat from the volatile Afghanistan–
Pakistan arc …It also gives New Delhi a limited but significant capability to inject special forces
into hostile theatres as and when the situation demands…in the event of military confrontation
with Pakistan, India would be able to strike Pakistan‘s rear from Tajik soil…Ayni has to do with
India‘s growing interests in Central Asia as well.‖35
Traditional Security Challenges from Afghanistan
Situation in Afghanistan after 2014 will not only determine the shape of the region but also
the extended neighbourhood. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is crucial for the economic
potential of Central Asia, South Asia, South West Asia and Asia Pacific to unleash itself at
its optimal capacity. Main concerns that hamper forward movement in this direction are:
allowing Afghan territory for launching attacks on Pakistani territory; illicit small arms and
drugs trafficking into Pakistan; logistical facilitation of India to pursue its interventionist
pursuits in FATA and Balochistan; influx of economic and political immigrants; ripple effect
of Afghanistan‘s war and drug economy; and provision of safe sanctuaries to TTP for cross
border attacks in Pakistan. Afghanistan has serious economic issues at hand. And there is
no foreseeable way of quick transition from war into a normal economy.
Operational and maintenance cost of Afghan National Army and police is likely to be
between US$ 3-4 billion per annum. International community must not let ANSF
disintegrate; this would have disastrous effects on the region. Border management is a
weak area and root cause of many problems. Embedding Taliban into post 2014
arrangement is a prerequisite for any enduring political settlement. Lacklustre efforts
regarding intra-Afghan reconciliation and integration could only lead to patchy outcome.
Implications of signing of US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) without co-
opting Taliban would be serious. Any degeneration of Afghan security status into civil war
like status, in post 2014 time frame, would create formidable traditional security dilemmas
for Pakistan. The points of immediate importance between Afghanistan and Pakistan are:-
 Political mistrust between the two countries has the potential of turning into an
uncomfortable stalemate; at worst it could lead to a zero-sum attitude towards each
other

35
―India Makes a Soft Landing in Tajikistan,‖ Asia Times, March 3, 2007,
www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC03Df0I.html (accessed October 6, 2013).

11
  Cross border attacks‘ capability has become quite potent; it could perpetuate a sense
of perpetual trans-border insecurity leading to security-insecurity paradox.
 Border management is a weak area and root cause of many problems.
 Likely spill-over effects of intra-Afghan transitions—be they political, military or
economic transitions.
 Strategy of embedding or neglecting Taliban into post 2014 political arrangement.
 Difficulties regarding transition of Afghan economy from war-drugs to modern format.
 Effects of disenfranchisement of Afghan refugees lodged in neighbouring countries
during both rounds of Afghan Presidential rounds in 2014.
 Lacklustre efforts regarding intra-Afghan reconciliation and integration.
 Drug trafficking and small weapons proliferations.
 Implications of signing or otherwise of US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement
(BSA).
 Inordinate delay in South Asia-Central Asia connectivity.
 Facilitation of launch pad to India for combatant and non-combatant penetration into
Pakistan.
 Peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees and their socio-political reintegration into
Afghan society.
 New Afghan government may not be strong enough or influential enough to effect
intra-Afghan reconciliation leading to voluntary demobilization of militants.
Way Forward. International effort for institutional capacity enhancement of Afghan
institutions—especially the Afghan national Security forces must continue. There should be
long term commitment for provision of budgetary support to Afghan government for creating
alternative economic opportunities for its people. Deployment of UN peacekeeping mission
for about 5 years to institute a cooling off‖ phase, between the departure of foreign forces
and taking over by ANSF, may be helpful. There should be mutual agreement between six
neighbours on Afghanistan on Border management Frame-work. Capacity of Afghan
government should be enhanced for effecting adequate border control arrangements on its
side of the border. Options may be explored for co-opting a personality of the repute of
Bishop Desmond Tutu for effecting intra Afghan integration.

Pakistan’s Internal Security Challenges

Pakistan‘s internal security challenges have three aspects: extremism leading to terrorism;
porous borders; capacity issue of civilian LAEs—police, immigration, prosecution, forensics
and lower judiciary.
Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was relatively a calm country. Though low profile infrequent
incidents of violence did occur, they came within the purview of law and order, intensity of such
events was limited in time, expanse and severity. After 9/11, Pakistan became the biggest victim
of terrorism that emanated from and via Afghanistan. Pakistan has stood by the international
community to combat terrorism.
Pakistan has carried out meaningful reforms in various sectors to create a hedge against
facilitation of terrorism. Of special mentions are Banking sector reforms; a lot of effort has also

12
gone into gradual reform of Madrassah system as well. Pakistan has all along been making a
strenuous effort to combat terrorism at home. To supplement international effort, Pakistan has
employed its military, even in traditionally no-militarized tribal areas, to tackle the terrorist outfits.
A number of major and minor operations have been launched to take the terrorists head on.
While combating terrorism, Pakistan has suffered over 60,000 civilian and over 6000 military
casualties. Moreover, quantifiable economic loss is of the tune of US$ 100 billion. Rehabilitation
and reintegration of militants are important steps in eradicating terrorism. Enormous international
effort, in the form of a marshal plan may be required to create appropriate socio-economic
environment to prevent relapse of those who renounce the militancy. Erstwhile concept of
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) was a brilliant idea–now no one talks about it. Spirit of
ROZs needs to be carried forth, may be under a different brand name. Pakistan army has
established and successfully ran some model skill enhancement rehabilitation programmes in
Swat and some other areas. However, key to success of such programmes is that once an
individual acquires a skill, corresponding job should be waiting for him. This requires appropriate
funding. Government of Pakistan has issued a comprehensive national security policy, with a
special focus on internal security. It aims at creating a multi-disciplinary effort to eliminate
terrorism.
Pakistan is a playing an active role of global effort to eliminate terrorism. Pakistan is a part
of counter terrorism effort launched in the form of UNSC Resolution 1540. Pakistan has also
signed a number of agreements and protocols supporting this effort.
TTP is an umbrella organization of 16 major and around 50 medium and small size militant
outfits. Perpetuality of tactical level terrorist activity and over-claiming of the incidents by the TTP
helped in larger than life projection of these terrorist entities. Beside wide spread public
perception, there are credible assessments that besides other foreign support, Indian intelligence
sources had made deep inroads into some of these entities; especially the outlawed sectarian
organizations. Indian intelligence agencies have heavily invested to make their enduring contacts
amongst these organizations and local notable in FATA and Baluchistan for post 2014 usage.
A little is discussed about the financial sponsoring of terrorist activity. It is an expensive
enterprise; its continuation is not possible without regular flow of money and combat gear.
According to a candid assessment, launching of one suicide bomber costs between 5 to 10
million Rupees (about US$ 5000 to 10000). An opinion has it that part of money generated by
pay-outs for Afghan route security, drug and timber trade recycles through a complex process
and ends up in the hands of Taliban—both Pakistani and Afghan. Lack of or collapse of state
structures in Pakistan-Afghanistan trans-border zones makes it difficult to reach out to their
locations. Use of air power has its own limitations; when employed in anti-guerrilla role. Hence it
is considered opinion that application for military only—no matter how long—could not bring a
lasting solution to terrorism. It is in this spirit that government of Pakistan has engaged the TTP
elements into political negotiations aimed at persuading its cadres to give up militancy. However,
even this process alone is not likely to bring an end to acts of terrorism.
There has to be comprehensive approach encompassing all facets of terrorism, most
importantly, rehabilitations of demobilized militants. Enormous international effort, in the form of a
marshal plan may be required to create appropriate socio-economic environment to prevent
relapse of those who renounce the militancy as a result of political process and again become
disgruntled due lack of adequate reintegration plan.
As of now Terrorism is a major source of internal security challenges. Pakistan stands
committed to contribute its bit towards eradicating terrorism, apart from application of military
power against terrorist individuals and entities there is need for a whole range of non-military
measures to achieve the objective. This requires international support and resourcing.

13
Pakistan’s Non-Traditional Challenges
An assortment of NTS challenges confronts Pakistan. Specifically these could emanate from:
Extremism; Economy; Energy Crisis; Demographic Challenges; Governance issues; Human
Security; Border Security; Refugees and Illegal Emigrants; Trans-border/ trans-national crimes;
Food Security, Climate Change; Fragile Political system; Foreign Policy Dilemmas, Foreign
Influences; Institutional Wrangling etc. In an interesting way most of these sub-systems are
intricately interrelated. Moreover, most of these operate simultaneously, hence accentuating the
cumulative effects much more than the linear sum total. Of these, some also make interesting
subsets, like economy, energy and demographic challenges; posing hen and chicken dilemma as
to which one causes the others.36 While mapping Pakistan‘s main NTS challenges Ali Tauqeer
Sheikh37 states that:38
 Climate change will continue to negatively affect human activities and livelihoods in
Pakistan through increasingly frequent extreme weather events and changes in temperature and
precipitation. With the ―Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change‖ (IPCC) conservatively
projecting the average world surface temperature to increase from 1.4°C to 5.8°C over the course
of the 21st century39, it is evident that alterations in the planet‘s ecological, biological, and
geological system will not only continue but also intensify. In Pakistan, low-probability and high-
impact events such as floods, droughts, storms, and cyclones are now increasing in frequency.
An analysis of data for the past 60 years, taken from the ―Centre for Research on Epidemiology of
Disasters‖ (CRED), shows that the number of natural disasters per decade has increased
considerably over the last two decades.
 Pakistan‘s large population and high growth rate adversely affects all aspects of society,
the economy, and the environment. Population growth creates and exacerbates vulnerabilities by
endangering basic civic amenities, leading to a lack of clean water and space for housing and
ultimately burdening society.
 Growth in agricultural productivity has broadly kept pace with accelerating demand.
However, medium-term food security challenges will become far more daunting if immediate
attention is not paid to managing water resources, both underground and in the Indus basin river
system.
 Water security is the most serious challenge for Pakistan due to several factors,
particularly the increasing pressure of population and urbanization, massive expansion of tube-
well irrigation, reduced levels of precipitation caused by climate change, and the accelerated
retreat of Himalayan glaciers.
He recommends that40:-
 Pakistan can mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters through early warning
systems, technological advances in building and infrastructure construction, improved sanitation
systems, increased disaster preparedness, and an organized health sectoral response.
Expanding and enhancing the information and knowledge base on climate change as well as

36
Mely Caballero-Anthony, ―Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization‖, London: Ashgate, 2006.
37
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh is CEO, LEAD Pakistan & Director Asia, Climate and Development Knowledge Network
(CDKN). http://apmen.iom.int/en/advisory-board/68-ali-tauqeer-sheikh (accessed on July 03, 2013)
38
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, ―Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan‖, The National Bureau of Asian Research NBR
Special Report #32, October 2011.
39
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2001
(Charleston: Biblio Gov, 2001).
40
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, ―Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan‖, The National Bureau of Asian Research NBR
Special Report #32, October 2011.

14
mapping vulnerabilities, trends in internal migration, and new incidence of disease, can help
create adaptive measures for reducing the effects of climate change.
 The successful implementation of mechanisms to address non-traditional security issues
will require the South Asian countries to work together to adopt ecosystem-wide approaches that
incorporates trans-boundary strategies.
 South Asia faces numerous NTS threats that in most cases predate the conventional
security problems in the region. NTS threats make many conventional security challenges
intractable, as regional conflicts are frequently rooted in the division or management of natural
resources, ethnic divides, or ecosystem bifurcations.
 The progress in managing, let alone resolving, these NTS threats has been slow, primarily
because the negotiating parties do not view them in the broader context of ecological civilization
or ecosystem integrity. South Asia as a region has been slow in developing regional approaches
to address NTS issues. Modest beginnings by the South Asia Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) still require political will, resource allocation, and operational mechanisms.
Recent efforts to develop shared positions on climate change have received a lukewarm
response.41

Due to inadequate sub-regional and regional cooperative mechanisms, Pakistan like other
countries of South Asia is often caught in the thick of some of the NTS challenges. Natural
calamities related disaster management suffers from inadequacy of resources. Hence, initial
response is slow. Pakistan is yet to make up its mind whether it wishes to treat its high population
growth as an asset or a liability. So far, the position has been of jockeying between the two
positions. Insecure borders pose illegal immigrants‘ issue that entails transnational crimes.
Conflict in Afghanistan is a major driver of pushing in large scale influx of refugees. Measuring
against the yardstick of the UN laid down MDGs, Pakistan‘s performance is unenviable, it is
under performing in all eight sectors, posting highest child mortality rate in South Asia42.
According to a recent report released by a child rights body,43Pakistan has the second highest

41
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, ―Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan‖, The National Bureau of Asian Research NBR
Special Report #32, October 2011.
42
The Nation (Islamabad), July 12, 2013.
43
Pakistan has second highest 'out-of-school' children globally, News Track India,
http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2013/06/28/212-Pakistan-has-second-highest-out-of-school-children-
globally.html (accessed on July 15, 2013). The Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (Sparc) stated in
it's annual report titled 'The State of Pakistan's children 2012' that one fourth of the 19.75 million children in
Pakistan who were aged five to nine were out of school and including adolescents, the figure rose to about 25
million. Of these children, seven million aged three to five did not receive any primary schooling. The report added
that Pakistan had reduced its spending on education from 2.6 percent to 2.3 percent of the GNP (gross national
product) since the last decade, and it ranked 113th of the 120 countries included in the Education Development
Index. On the brighter side, at the province level, Punjab had the highest NER (net enrolment rate) for children in
primary schools at 61 percent along with Sindh at 53 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at 51 percent, while
Baluchistan fared lowest at 47 percent. Overall, Pakistan recorded an NER of 74.l percent for all age groups
enrolled either in primary, secondary or higher education but the youth literacy rate was only 70.7 percent with only
61 percent of girls are literate as compared to 79 percent boys in the age group of 15-24 years. The country is
placed at the 129th position among the 135 countries on the Gender Gap Index 2012, according to the Global
Gender Gap Report, 43 percent of children in Pakistan are afflicted with stunting; five years mortality rate has
declined from 122 to 72 per 1,000 births in 2011; and 30 percent of polio cases worldwide along with 2.1 million
cases of measles are found in this part of the world, along with a high instance of HIV. The report further stated
that a lot of children have been victims of drone strikes over the years and they were subject to a lack of
educational opportunities, poor health conditions, no protection for poor and vulnerable children, miserable
conditions in juvenile jails and employment of minors in hazardous occupations. In the absence of a national

15
number of out-of-school children in the world, behind only Nigeria. Other South Asian countries
are also not far better. There is a need to evolve South Asian response towards some of the NTS
challenges which are transnational in nature and where collective resources could be utilised in a
more efficient and effective way. Still on a larger canvas, there is a need for Asia level entity to
address the challenges which have continent level outreach in terms of effects. For menaces like
drug trafficking and terrorism, there is a need for broader regional as well as global efforts.
Though Pakistan is grappling with a number of NTS challenges, survival of state and the society
is not in an imminent danger of extinction. Hardship notwithstanding, the state and people of
Pakistan would continue to inch forward and maintain their relevance in the regional and global
affairs.
Economy
Low performing economy is the root cause of most of the non-traditional challenges. Weak
economy prevents accomplishment of minimum essential socio-economical development
goals and strong economy provides adequate resources for taking corrective and preventive
measures for eradication or mitigation of non-traditional challenges. Pakistan has had a low
performing economy over a decade of which has accentuated some of the non-traditional
challenges—like human security and disaster induced damage.
Climate Change
Climate change will continue to negatively affect human activities and livelihoods in Pakistan
through increasingly frequent extreme weather events and changes in temperature and
precipitation. There is a need for comprehensive climate change mitigation/adaptation strategy.
Pakistan is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. It is a disaster prone county. Pakistan
has topped the list of the Global Climate Risk Index produced by German watch, a non-
governmental organisation that works on global equity issues.

In 2010, Pakistan was listed as the number one country in the world affected by climate
related disasters; in 2011 it was ranked as number three and now country ranks in the top 10 list
of the most vulnerable countries in the world when it comes to suffering from the impacts of
climate change. Pakistan is highly vulnerable to weather-related disasters such as cyclones,
droughts, floods, landslides and avalanches. Pakistan faces a range of threatening climate
change impacts: changing monsoon patterns, melting glaciers, rising sea levels, desertification
and increasing water scarcity. Climate change effects could cost Pakistan‘s economy up to $14
billion a year, and needed to be urgently dealt with. Devastating floods in 2010 disrupted the lives
of 20 million people - many more than the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami - and cost $10 billion. The
country cannot run away from the effects of a changing climate.
In the past 40 years, nine out of the top ten natural disasters in Pakistan have been
climate-triggered which shows the magnitude of the challenge. Disasters per decade have
increased considerably over the last two decades. This incidentally is the period during which
average global temperatures have been the highest44. The Centre for Research on Epidemiology
of Disasters (CRED) data as shown in Table 1 below indicates how the number of climate
induced disasters has increased since mid-twentieth century. Number of such disasters rose from
2 in decade 1941-50 to 36 during the decade 2001-10.

database on violence against children, it was difficult to account for the number of cases of physical violence,
sexual abuse, trafficking, and recruitment in armed conflicts and acid attacks.
44
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, ―Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan‖, The National Bureau of Asian Research NBR
Special Report #32, October 2011,4.

16
 Climate Induced Natural Disasters in Pakistan: 1941-2010

Year Climate Induced Disasters

Storms Tropical Floods Droughts Total
Cyclones
1941-50 0 1 1 0 2
1951-60 0 0 5 0 5
1961-70 0 2 2 0 4
1971-80 1 0 6 0 7
1981-90 3 0 6 0 9
1991-2000 6 2 14 1 23
2001-10 4 1 31 0 36
Total 14 6 65 1 86
45
Source: Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) .
Note: CRED maintains a global database, called EM-DAT, of natural and technical disasters from 1900 onward.
Table 1

The first ever climate change policy, developed with the support of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), recommends some 120 steps the country could take to slow
down the impact of global warming, as well as adapt sectors such as energy, transport and
agriculture. Measures include flood forecasting warning systems, local rainwater harvesting,
developing new varieties of resilient crops, promoting renewable energy sources and more
efficient public transport etc.

According to a recent Pew Research Centre survey only fifteen percent of Pakistani citizens view
climate change as a major threat. Pakistan‘s underwhelming commitment to dealing with the
effects of climate change stands in stark contrast to the threat it faces. Environmental experts
believe that the average annual financial losses in Pakistan due to environmental degradation are
of the tune of approximately Rs 450 billion ($5.2 billion USD). This is in addition to recent
catastrophic natural disasters like the 2010, floods, which caused an estimated $43 billion in
damage and killed over 1,700 people.46

Germanwatch‘s ninth annual Global Climate Risk Index nattates: ―The landfall of Hurricane Sandy
in the US dominated international news in October 2012. Yet it was Haiti - the poorest country in
the Western Hemisphere - that suffered the greatest losses from the same event,‖ said Sönke
Kreft, team leader for international climate policy at Germanwatch and co-author of the index.
Report shows that Haiti led the list of the three countries most affected by weather-related
catastrophes in 2012. The others were the Philippines and Pakistan.
According to the report‘s assessment, the extreme weather calamities caused Pakistan
losses worth 0.7% of the country‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over 20 years. Pakistan‘s
winter season is shrinking @44 hours per annum and the winters are becoming harsher. During
the 2013 season record low level temperatures were recorded in almost all parts of the country.
The major response so far has been the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) that was
developed by the Ministry of Environment and adopted by the Cabinet in September 2012 .The
policy was formally launched by the Ministry of Climate Change on February 26, 2013. National
Climate Change Policy was formed after extensive consultations with the provinces.

45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.

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Millennium Development Goals
The MDGs are eight international development goals that were established in 2000 by UN and its
member states for completion by 2015. These goals, comprising social and health issues, have
been further divided into over 60 indicators, of which Pakistan had pledged to 41. However,
Pakistan aims to achieve only nine, missing out on over 30 key indicators focusing on health,
debt services, education and living standards. Pakistan‘s performance is unenviable, other South
Asian countries are also not far better.
Reasons for missing most of the indicators include internal and external economic and
non-economic challenges. Natural disasters, conflicts, administrative and political changes, weak
commitments to economic reforms, lack of awareness, fading commitments by development
partners due to global recession of 2007 and belated ownership of MDG agenda at the sub-
national level, are contributory reasons for failure. Impact of these challenges has reflected in
slow progress and hence non-achievement of many of the indicators47.
The government is working to enhance the capacity of the people through human resource
development which involved better education, health, population welfare, skill development
services, improved access to clean water and sanitation, and gender mainstreaming initiatives.
Some of the under-way steps this regard are: provision of productive assets, inclusion of micro
finance and transitioning toward social safety net to protect the people against natural and
manmade disasters. Poverty headcount had declined significantly under the Pakistan Living
Standards Measurement survey data – from 34.5% in 2001-02 to 12.4% in 2010-1148.
Findings of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013, has revealed that
Punjab is far ahead in achieving the MDGs as compared to other provinces. The findings also
stated that no MDG will be achieved in entirety in Sindh, but that the province had made
significant progress in certain indicators such as ‗ensuring environmental sustainability‘ (MDG 7)
and ‗promoting gender equality and women empowerment‘ (MDG 3). Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa had
made significant progress in MDG 7 which reflected in its achievement of forest cover and
protection of land area for conservation of wildlife. Progress in other MDG areas, however has
suffered in part owing to the unprecedented natural as well as manmade calamities which have
afflicted the province. Balochistan is the worst performing province in most if not all areas of the
MDGs. No MDG can be achieved in entirety in the province and in the aftermath of the floods,
and the declining national economic indicators, even the achievements made so far in a few
indicators are at risk of being undone, the UNDP report stated49.
The country is unlikely to meet six out of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015,
according to a report launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on
January 08, 2014. Pakistan is a state that has consistently failed to help itself. The cumulative
effects of the failure to reach a range of goals add up to an institutionalised inadequacy that
ensures its position at the trail of developing nations.
Population is growing at an unsustainable rate. Coupled together, these form a picture of a state
that has too many people, too few jobs, suffers from chronically poor health and demonstrates an
inability or unwillingness to act decisively in respect of the blindingly obvious. The 2013 MDG
report reveals poor performance in respect of poverty, primary education, the empowerment of
women, child health and combating common diseases. Pakistan Millennium Development Goal
Report 2013 highlights the country‘s sluggish performance in reaching targets associated with
poverty, primary education, child health, women‘s empowerment, maternal health and combating
47
The Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 09, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/656715/lagging-behind-pakistan-
off-track-on-millennium-development-goals/ (accessed on January10, 2014)
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.

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diseases. UN Assistant Secretary General and UNDP Director for Asia and the Pacific Haoliang
Xu noted the commendable performance of Nepal and Sri Lanka on achieving the MDGs vis-a-vis
Pakistan and emphasised the need for South-South learning. Four lessons from countries in
South Asia on accelerating progress on MDGs were highlighted; social policies are as important
as economic policies; investing in women and girls has multiple, strong benefits for all MDGs;
public sector expenditure on the social sector is important including education; and governance
issues can be a major constraint50.
Measuring Progress against MDGs Benchmarks51
Poverty and Hunger. Pakistan‘s employable population has grown to 30.9% in 2010-2011,
making the prospect of full employment by 2015 unlikely. The target for malnutrition is less than
20%, which is also unlikely to be met.
Primary Education. Pakistan targets 100% primary school enrolment, but rates of net primary
enrolment and completion have been fluctuating. Pakistan targets 88% literacy rate, while at
present there are 70% literate males compared to 47% females.
Child Mortality. Pakistan has set the objective to reducing under-five child mortality by two-
thirds. Pakistan is short of the MDG targets of 52 deaths per 1,000 live births for under-five
mortality and 40 deaths per 1,000 live births for infant mortality.
Maternal Health. Pakistan intends to reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters, but it has only
been halved and ensure universal access to reproductive health. The fertility rate at 3.8 remains
higher than 2.1.
Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases. Growth of TB and HIV cases and the
proportion of people in high-risk areas for malaria who are using effective prevention and
treatment measures remains 75% against the target of 40%. Measles and Polio cases are on the
rise. It is a matter of embarrassment that Pakistan is facing travel restrictions due to its inability to
counter polio.
Coincidentally, on the same day that the MDG report was released so was the third Pakistan
Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2012-13. The population increase is unsustainable
even though the rate has decreased from 4.1 per cent in 2007 to 3.8 per cent in 2012, and
although Pakistan has made advances, it still lags way behind others in the region in exactly the
same way as it trails in the MDG race. It is not that there is no progress, but there is not enough
to reach the set.52.
Conclusion
Traditional and non-traditional challenges being confronted by Pakistan are enormous. However,
Pakistan is suitably anchored and none-of the challenges is as grave to be categorized as
existential threat. Being a developing country, Pakistan has to follow a long and arduous route of
hard work to safeguard its people against nature induced challenges, invest heavily to measure-
up to UN Development Goals, develop all inclusive robust social security network and maintain
compatible military readiness to deter potential aggressors. For that Pakistan has clearly spelled
50
The Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 23, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/662235/report-launch-meeting-
mdgs-pakistan-still-has-a-long-way-to-go/ (accessed on January 24, 2014)
51
The Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 23, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/662235/report-launch-meeting-
mdgs-pakistan-still-has-a-long-way-to-go/ (accessed on January 24, 2014)
52
The Express Tribune (Islamabad), Editorial January 24th, 2014.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/662478/missed-targets/ (accessed the same day)

19
out priorities. Central emphasis is on creating a peaceful neighbourhood, a robust economy and
total destruction of extremist and terrorist networks. In his quest for peaceful neighbourhood,
Prime minister Nawaz Sharif has completed his first round of visits to immediate neighbouring
states. Economy has taken a positive turn. As the economy pickup, in due course, Pakistan shall
be able to devote more resources towards mitigation of non-traditional challenges and improve
the quality of life of its people. In the context of traditional challenges, the way forward is peaceful
resolution of disputes. Pakistan‘s proposal to India under the rubric of Strategic Restraint Regime
is still on the table, it offers a sustainable road map to mitigate traditional challenges.

Note: This article was published as Chapter 13 of Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)‘s
book titled: Pakistan‘s Strategic Environment Post 2014. ISBN: 978-969-872-45-9
http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Strategic-
Environment-Post-2014.pdf

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