State and Intellectuals in Turkey The Life and Times of Nivazi Berkes, 1908-1988 Sakir Dingsahin LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham « Boulder * New York * LondonPublished by Lexington Books ‘An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rownian.com, Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE1! 4B Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books Alf rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any seater mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, they are the result of a constructivist process that began with British rule. The sovereignty of Cyprus was “temporarily” transferred to the British Empire under the Cyprus Convention of 1878,2° The purpose of the Sublime Porte (Babidli) was to secure British support against expansionist Russia following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 that led to the loss of Ottoman territory in the Caucasus and the Balkans. From this point of view, the Convention was an example of diplomatic bargaining between two Euro- pean?’ powers. The transfer of sovereignty was temporary and the British ‘were to pay an annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire. The British, on the other hand, wanted to acquire a military base to protect the Suez Canal,?8 which provided a direct route to India and other British colonies in Asia.2° The temporary transfer of the island’s sovereignty basically meant that the British now acquired the place d’armes necessary to secure the route to their colonies in Asia. Soon after the acquisition of the island’s administration, the British army took over bases in Egypt in 1882 for the defense of the Suez Canal, and Cyprus lost some of its value as a military base.*° However, the British were unwilling to return the island to the Otto- mans. In the historiography of the eastern question, the Great Powers per- ceived the Ottomans as “the sick man of Europe.”7! Similarly, the British policy-makers were convinced that the Ottomans were not powerful enough to retain their sovereignty over the island. If the British returned the island back to the ailing Empire, they might have lost it to a hostile third party.*2 Relying on this mentality, the British maintained their rule over the island at a reasonable price, that is, an annual tribute of £90,000 paid to Ottoman creditors in London who subtracted the amount from the Ottoman debt.*? The tribute did not create a burden on the British economy since the British government levied taxes on their Cypriot subjects. Before British administra- tion, the Ottomans had had a bureaucratic and complicated tax system that granted the religious communities a privileged status within the millet sys- tem. Particularly in Cyprus, the Orthodox Church played a significant role in collecting taxes, a right given to it just after the conquest of the island in6 Chapter 1 1571, and extended in 1660. The Orthodox Chureh worked in close coopera- tion with the Ottomans collecting its share of the taxes from the Orthodox Cypriots.>4 Jan-Erik Smilden cites William Hepworth Dixon, the British au- thor and traveler to the island in 1878, who characterized the relationship between the Ottoman Governor Besim Pasa and the Orthodox Archbishop Sophronios II as follows: “Besim held the whip, but Geronyme (Sophronios) showed him where to strike.”35 This was the division of labor between the Church and the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the British administration introduced a tax system after intensive research on the availability and pro- ductivity of land in Cyprus.36 They came up with a system that imposed equal responsibilities on all Cypriots including the clergy, one of the major benefactcrs of the previous system. ‘The religious institutions, especially the Orthodox archbishop, disliked the British-imposed equality.7 They began to raise their voice against the new system that treated all members of the communities equally and refused the long-standing practice of currying favors to the religious elite. Further- more, in order to collect the taxes the British administration established a modern state structure. Determined to ensure law and order in Cyprus, the state enforced the new rules without taking religious ranks into account. For instance, when two Orthodox priests were arrested simply because their ani- mals entered the forest under protection, they were forced to shave just like an ordinary prisoner.38 Erasing the intra-communal hierarchies, the British governors annulled the Ottoman patron-client social mores that engendered public consent through the cooptation of the miller leaders. Nevertheless, the abolition of the previous social contract between the ruled and the ruler did not lead to a legitimacy crisis since the British admin- istrators were quick to introduce their model of politics and legitimacy on the island. The British model had emerged as a result of vast experience in various British colonies and was based on dividing religious, ethnic, national, or cultural groups within a colony. Thus, scholars tend to lay the blame for the ethnic conflicts between Singhalese and Tamils, Yoruba and Igbo, Mus- lims and Hindus on the British colonial policy of divide et impera. This was a policy that allowed the British rulers to (re)direct popular discontent and transform the potential for uprisings against colonial rule into the potential for internal conflicts, which, in turn, could only be adequately addressed by an external force greater than those at odds with each other. In Cyprus, the Orthodox and the Muslim communities already provided the necessary mate- rial for the implementation of the British policy of divide and rule. Shortly after the inception of the British rule, the communities began to confront each other within the new model of politics. First of all, the British government established the legislative council, Kavanin Meclisi, in 1892, which was comprised of three Muslim, nine Or- thodox, and six British delegates,“° The establishment of the assemblyNipazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 1 faunched a competition between the interests of the three groups of delegates. Although the British Crown had the final say over its legislation, the numeri- cal structure of the assembly implied that the total number of Muslim and Orthodox votes simply outnumbered the British votes.‘' This implied that any kind of collaboration between the Muslim and the Orthodox delegates would damage British interests on the island. However, the two communities found it impossible to cooperate against British colonialism, even when it was in their own interests to do so. The leaders of the communities were convinced by the British that the Muslim and the Orthodox communities had divergent interests. Thus, the Orthodox teadership concentrated their efforts to unify the island with Greece whereas Muslim leaders aimed at preventing the Orthodox supremacy in the assembly by acting in harmony with the British rulers.4? One of the chief instruments that British rulers utilized to enlarge the gap between the communities was their employment policy of hiring public ser- vants, especially police officers, from among the Muslim community." This situation engendered hostility against the Muslims from non-Muslim ‘com- munities on the island who saw the Muslims as the enforcers of British rule. Another tool for dissention was the media. According to Benedict Ander- son, newspapers play a significant role in the making of new identities by providing people with the opportunity to associate themselves with each other and imagine that they are different from others.“ This process occurred in Cyprus when the British allowed community newspapers to circulate on the island. Kypros (1878), Cyprus Herald (1881-1887), Times of Cyprus (1887), Neon Kition (1888), and Evagoras (1898) were among the news- papers published by the Orthodox community.45 Conducting an extensive survey of the Orthodox newspapers, Sophocleus concludes that the written word of the newspapers replaced the spoken word and laid the foundations of Greek-Cypriot national consciousness.“* The Muslims were also encouraged by the British administration to publish their own communal newspapers, the following of which may be mentioned: Saded (1889), Zaman (1891-1892), Yeni Zaman (1892-1893), Kibris (1893-1898), Kokonoz (1896-1897), Akba- ba (1897-1898), Fervat (1899-1900), Mirat-1 Zaman (1900-1910), Siinuhat (1906-1912), islam (1907-1909), Vatan (1911-1913), Seyf(1912-1914) and Kibris (1913—-1914),47 These had a similar impact on the Muslim community and led to the emergence of another homogeneous group on the island. As a result, the Muslims and the Orthodox acquired separate national identities with separate languages and religions. Educational institutions also played a significant role in the process of the formation of national identity after 1878. In general, the British colonial education policy was based on their experience in India. They wanted to raise a generation of locals within British culture who would then serve as media- tors between the British administration and colonial society.48 But in Cyprus,8 Chapter # the British did not follow this traditional educational policy designed to produce “Cypriot gentlemen” who would serve their colonial administra- tion.” They rather augmented the number of traditional schools based on religious segregation. In fact, between the years 1881 and 1901, the number of Muslim schools increased from 71 to 144 and the number of Muslim students increased from 1869 to 5176. Similarly, the number of Orthodox schools increased from 99 to 273 and the number of Orthodox students increased from 4907 to 15,712 in the same period.5° What is more striking is the fact that these institutions promoted nationalistic ideas among the Ortho- dox and the Muslim students. In this period, courses on Greek and Ottoman nationalisms became natural elements of schoo! curricula, For instance, some of the courses were titled “Heroes of New Greece” (i iroes tis neas ellados) and “On [Hellenic] National Education” (peri ethnikis agosis) in the Ortho- dox schools.?! In his memoirs, Canon F. D. Newham, the Chief Inspector of British schools, noted that when he asked to hear the Orthodox school- children sing, they usually responded with a war song: “Forward, follow the drum that leads us against the Turks.”5? The focus of education in the Mus- lim schools was also eventually shifted from religious, traditional, and cultu- ral components towards linguistic and nationalistic items. The British de- signed an educational policy for Cyprus that would sharply divide the island jnto two, and abandoned the traditional British colonial educational policy aimed at producing a local elite serving the colonial administration. As a result, the strategy of dividing Cyprus along religious and linguistic lines served the British well and ethnic tensions between the Muslim and the Orthodox communities began to escalate during the early years of British tule. Various reports of ethnic hostilities between the two communities began to surface. The daily Kzbris (March 19, 1894) reported that during the carni- val in Baf/Baphos, a group of Orthodox Christians humiliated Muslims that escalated into a brawl. 5? On several occasions on Greek Independence Day in 1895, Orthodox Cypriots verbally abused Muslims. School children, for ex- ample, paraded through the predominantly Muslim Tahtakale quarter of Ni- cosia/Lefkosa singing about slaughtering hated Muslims.*¢ Again in 1895, the British Commissioner, B. Travers, reported that the Orthodox deliberate- ly provoked the Muslims at Vitsadha and Vatili.55 In the legislative Council, the Orthodox delegates used every opportunity to pass a resolution to cede Cyprus to Greece. They tried to do so when one of the Muslim delegates, Dervis Pasa, was absent from the council in 1903.%¢ In reaction, Muslim members of the council moved an amendment that if Cyprus were ceded to anyone it should be the Ottomans in accordance with the Cyprus Convention of 1878.57 Tensions subsided with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 but resumed when the Ottoman Empire lost Crete to Greece in 1909, The retreat of the Ottoman Empire after the Tripoli (1911) and Balkan WarsNivazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 9 (1912-1913) also destroyed the possibility of conciliation between the two communities of the island. YOUNG TURKS IN CYPRUS: THE REVOLUTION AND AFTER, 1908-1914 One of the unintended consequences of the modern educational institutions established by Abdulhamid II was the emergence of an enlightened intelli- gentsia within the ranks of the civil and military bureaucracy that adopted the principles of the French Revolution. This group of intellectuals, who are widely known as the Young Turks, “* advocated that the only political model that could prevent the decay of the Empire was constitutional monarchy in which all religious and linguistic elements of the Empire were represented. 59 Despite their strong attachment to the idea of constitutional monarchy, the Young Turks were ideologically divided into several factions. One of the leading factions, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), sought to bring about “union and progress” to the Empire through reforms. It was led by Ahmet Riza, a Young Turk ideologue inspired by the ideas of the French sociologist, August Comte. Riza and his supporters believed that progress could be achieved within a society using positivist ideas.*' in the Ottoman case, the positivist order entailed the union of all Ottomans without respect to religion, language, and ethnicity. This was the dominant element of the Young Turk ideology in 1908 when the Committee succeeded in restoring the constitution, which had been shelved by Sultan Abdiithamid II (1876-1909) in 1878. Thus, the 1908 Revolution was widely welcomed and celebrated with spectacular demonstrations by both Muslims and non-Mus- lims alike. After the revolution, it became clear that the idea of keeping all elements of the Empire united would not work. The non-Muslim communities sought opportunities to establish self-rule in their own nation-states rather than re- maining subjects of the Sultan. In fact, the defeat of the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 necessitated a revision of the Unionist ideology that emphasized religious pluralism in the Empire. Thereafter, the Young Turks changed their understanding of Ottoman identity by putting greater emphasis on Islam as the primary factor for cohesion of the Ottoman-Muslim millet. The Young Turk movement followed a similar trajectory in Cyprus, Emerging in the first half of the 1890s, the movement was represented by Ottoman intellectuals on the island. With the arrival of the Unionist leader Hoca Muhiddin from Egypt, the movement gained momentum, sparking pro- tests for constitutional liberties against the authoritarian rule of the Sultan. + Although the Muslim press took any incident as an opportunity to express10 Chapter i their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, under the Young Turk influence it also published the ideas of unionism, constitutional monarchy, progress, and lib- erty on the island. The movement was so successful that the news of the 1908 Revolution was greeted with widespread jubilation not only by a smail group of intellectuats, but by the Mustim community as a whole.® On the day of the revolution, celebrations took place in Kiraathane-i Osmani, the gathering place of the Unionists in Cyprus. The rest of Cypriot society, especially the Muslim community, soon joined in the events to celebrate the new era. The pictures of the revolutionary officers Enver and Niyazi could be seen every- where in the island together with Ottoman flags. Popular expectation from the new regime was the creation of harmony between various religious, ethnic, and cultural elements of the Empire through representation in the parliament. Similarly, the example of the new regime in Istanbul would be a rapprochement between Muslims and Christians in Cyprus. This idea is evi- dent in the words of Jén Simm, the Young Turk author of the Muslim-Cypriot daily Mirat-1 Zaman, on September 14, 1908: From now on it will not only be our Mehmets, but also our Dikrans, Yorgis and Josephs who sacrifice their lives at our borders. From now onwards there will be no clash between the crescent and the cross, no conflict between the Koran and the Bible because our Christians will defend the erescent. © This new optimism on the island was reflected in the naming of the Berkes twins. Although their African nursemaid Pembe Hanim first gave the twins the traditional Turkish names of Ahmet and Mehmet,” their father and the older brothers, who regularly attended the Kiraathane-i Osmani, the Young Turk Club in Nicosia/Lefkosa, rejected these names.*® Instead they wanted the twins to be named after the Unionist officers, Enver and Niyazi, who led the uprising in Macedonia and became the heroes of liberty in 1908. Eventually, a compromise was found and the twins were named as Ahmet Niyazi and Mehmet Enver, which probably heightened the political and his- torical consciousness of the twins as they grew up in Cyprus. The expectations of peace and rapprochement between the communities soon ended when the Cretan Assembly decided to join Greece in 1908.7° The ethnic strife between Muslims and Christians had been in progress for a long while in Crete. The Christian population in Crete rebelled against the Empire several times together with the Greek nationalists. Although the rebels were repelled in 1821 and 1869, the Ottomans were forced to recognize the is- land’s autonomy after the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897.7! In 1908, the Crete administration declared unification of the island with Greece, which the Ot- tomans formally recognized in 1913.7? For both Christians and Muslims living in Crete, this had been a bloody process costing many Cretans their lives. Moreover, the Muslim community was forced off the island to otherNiyazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 if parts of the Empire. in fact, out of 88,000 Cretan Muslims in 1895, hardly any of them remained in the istand after the Greek takeover. 73 The Muslim community in Cyprus drew many parallels with what had been taking place in Cyprus. The de jure unification of Crete with Greece alarmed the Muslims, and the rhetoric of unionism, which aimed at keeping all religious elements of the Empire together, came to an end. The defeats of the Ottoman army in Tripoli (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) also contributed to this ideological shift. The newspapers of the Christian commu- nity published articles slandering the Muslim community, going so far that the British administration had to step in. The British authorities arrested Kyriakos Phytax because of his articles inciting violence against the Muslim community.”* Muslim papers, for their part, began to promote the idea of unionism again, but this time only among the Muslims. One of the papers, Vatan, cited the Koranic verse “you shall not break up but stand united” (va'tesimu ve la teferruku) in its first issue published in 1911.75 The new unionism no longer included the non-Muslim population of the island, and thereby accelerated the process of national identity formation in Cyprus. In January of the following year the Greek representatives in the legisla- tive council demanded several amendments to the legislative and executive structure that would favor the Orthodox community. They also expressed their intention to end British rule and to unite the island with Greece. After the British rejected their demands, the Greek representatives protested by resigning from their posts in the council.’° They also urged the Orthodox community to protest against the British administration. This protest turned into an anti-Muslim campaign targeting Muslim homes and shops.”” The disproportionate number of Muslims on the police force catalyzed this upris- ing. The British Chief of Police, Captain Gallagher, ’* ordered the officers to fire on the crowd, which the protestors took as a Muslim attack. This incident led to a violent confrontation between the two communities and at the end of the day many civilians from both sides were killed or wounded. This was the first of several confrontations between the communities that resulted in dead- ly violence.” As a result, the relations between the two communities were irreparably broken and any thought of peaceful coexistence and mutual toler- ance was erased by ethnic conflict and growing hatred. The escalating insecurity of the communities resulted in the consolidation of Turkish and Greek national identities. The process peaked during World War I (1914-1918) when the Orthodox and the Muslims felt threatened by the possibility that their mother countries—Greece and Turkey—would be defeated. In fact, the Muslim community experienced trauma when the Otto- mans were forced to sign the Treaty of Sévres in 1920, which left a truncated state for Muslims in Anatolia. Worried about their future, the Muslim com- munity of the island closely followed the Turkish national struggle12 Chapter ! (1919-1922), and within this process they developed an even greater Turkish national consciousness, possibly even before the Mustim masses in Anatotia. WORLD WAR I AND THE ‘TURKISH NATIONAL STRUGGLE, 1914-1922 ‘There was little resentment in the Muslim community when the British Em- pire took over the island’s administration in 1878. The silence of the Mus- lims may be attributed to the fact that the Ottemans would, in theory, contin- ue to be the legal suzerain of the island. Furthermore, any kind of conflict between the Ottomans and the British Empires seemed to be unlikely at the time of the convention.®° This projection, however, turned out to be incorrect when the Ottomans joined the Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hun- gaty—to fight Britain and the Triple Entente that included France and Rus- sia. The war came to be a political turning point in the history of the island. In the early stages of the war Great Britain annexed the island, claiming that the war annulled the Cyprus Convention of 1878.8! The Orthodox com- munity saw this as the final stage in the process towards enasis, that is, unification with Greece. This was stated explicitly by the Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece who reportedly claimed that the British annexation of the island could be perceived as the final phase of the national restoration of this great Greek island to Greece.*? The Muslim reaction to the annexation, by contrast, was quite cautious. Annoyed with the rumors of enosis, the Muslim community decided to declare their loyalty to Britain by welcoming the annexation. The local Muslim elite submitted a letter to the High Com- missioner voicing their preference for staying within the British Empire rath- er than having a Greek takeover. Quite apart from the demands of the communities, the war strategy on its own determined the British policy over Cyprus. Since it offered no harbor fit for naval purposes, Cyprus had only limited military value for Britain. However, British policy-makers found a way to turn:the island into a strate- gic asset by offering Cyprus to Greece in return for her intervention in the war. Under German influence, the Greek government declined the offer, but “allowed free passage over its territory of the Allies’ troops going to the Serbian front and maintained an army on a war footing.”*5 The intention was to keep the window of opportunity open if Greece actively joined the Allies in the future.’ These developments psychologically devastated the Muslim community. Drawing an analogy with the Cretan case, the Muslim commu- nity feared that the Greek takeover would result in bloody conflicts and widespread displacement. This incident provoked even greater national awakening among the Muslims who began to identify more and more with the people living in Anatolia. Alerted by the discontent within the MuslimNiyazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 B community, the British administration declared that the offer had lapsed when the Greek government failed to agree to their terms. This, however, did not prevent the Orthodox delegates in the legislative council from submitting several proposals during the war for the concession of the island to Greece, which the Muslim community saw as a threat. This sense of threat escalated when Greece joined the Entente powers in 1917. Greeks again put forward the idea of unification when the Ottomans were defeated in 1918. And yet again, the Paris Peace Conference was used as a stage to lobby for enosis. In January 1919, a delegate of Orthodox representatives went to London to advocate the transfer of the island to Greece. Not surprisingly, the Sévres Treaty (1920) also included articles handing over the island to Greece. The constant emphasis on the issue of enosis triggered a backlash of nationalism among the Muslim community. On several occasions Muslim Cypriots protested the demands for enosis and organized campaigns to pro- vide financial aid for the national struggle in Anatolia. Eventually, the Mus- lim political elite called for a national congress in Cyprus, and the Lefkosa National Congress convened on December 10, 1918.87 The Congress was significant because it was the first time that Cypriot Muslims referred to the Turkish nation. Similar to the nationalist congresses that convened in Sivas (1919) and Erzurum (1919), the Lefkosa Congress illustrated that the Mus- lims in Cyprus had developed a Turkish national identity parallel to the Muslims in Anatolia, Turkish-Cypriot nationalists even attempted to launch a nationalist rebellion. According to the historian George Hill, the Turkish nationalist leaders, Dr. Esat, Dr. Behig, and Hasan Karabardak, attempted a rebellion by releasing Ottoman war prisoners who were kept in the city of Famagusta/Gazi Magusa, *8 However, they were arrested before any rebellion could be organized. Despite the failure of the nationalists to organize a rebellion, Turkish nationalism prevailed among the Muslim community in Cyprus. Muslims strongly identified with the Kemalist nationalists who were fighting against Britain and Greece and other imperial powers. The Turkish dailies Séz and Dogru Yol especially stood out in their campaign to strengthen Turkish na- tionalism among the Cypriot Muslims. The following excerpt from Mehmet Remzi, a columnist in the daily Séz, illustrates the nationalist sentiment of the dailies: Not only to the Orthodox Cypriots but also to all Greeks and to the world, we declare that Turkey was not and will not be defeated. So long as the sun shines on the earth, Turkishness will exist with perfect stability. £9 The Muslim community had cultivated a new Turkish identity based on nationality as a result of the process that went back to the early years ofi4 Chapter 1 British ruie. Berkes grew up during these years when the Turkish national identity was being crystallized. The traces of this process can be seen on his identity. Berkes was six years old when World War | started; he was fourteen when the Turkish national struggle ended. In this period, he was exposed to the nationalist curriculum drafted by the teachers who first adhered to the Ottomanist Young Turk ideology who then became Turkish nationalists. Since the British administration did not allow newspapers to be published in Turkish during the war, he was exposed to the ideas expressed in such papers as Vakit, ikdam, Vatan, Tasvir-i Efkér, and Akgam, smuggled from Anatolia. In his memoirs, he recails that he was following the columns by Stileyman Nazif, Abdiilhak Hamit, Halide Edip, Falih Rifki, and Yakup Kadri who supported the Turkish national struggle.” This implies that he felt empathy for the nationalist struggle in Anatolia through the news and comments con- veyed by the Turkish newspapers. Berkes claims that the most spectacular years in his life were the years of the national struggle in Anatolia: During the war years, the Turkish Cypriots could not migrate anywhere. They were worried about a possible massacre of the Turks by the Greeks who were spoiled by British friendship. .. . | was eleven when the independence war started and fourteen when it ended, My consciousness was aroused by the developments between these ages. 1 have always been under the influence of the events that took place in this period much more than any peers of mine in Turkey, The mental and emotional aspects of my personality were shaped by the events of this period.?! Within this context, Berkes developed a sense of national identity like other members of the Muslim community in Cyprus. He valued the concept of fatherland within a community that was traumatized by the fear of losing the territory to which they felt attached. His memories of his mother, Dervise Harum, praying for the victory of the nationalists in Anatolia, were still alive years later when he wrote his memoirs towards the end of his life.°? His patriotism seems to have its origins in his childhood and adolescence in British Cyprus when new identities were being formed. Nevertheless, the worst fears of the Muslim community did not material- ize. The Kemalist nationalists won a resounding victory in the Turkish War of Liberation on September 9, 1922, However, Cyprus was beyond the reach of the Kemalists. This resulted in a large-scale migration of Muslims from Cyprus to the new Turkey. Among the migrants were Berkes and his family. They decided to move to the capital of the late Ottoman Empire now that the nationalists had saved it. In Istanbul the family felt safer and the twins, Enver and Niyazi, would have access to the best educational institutions that the city of the Sultans, pay-i taht could provide. On July 24, 1923, Kemalist nationalists signed the Treaty of Lausanne and the international community formally recognized the borders of the new Turkey. With this treaty, theNiyazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 15 Kemalists also succeeded in preventing the secession of Cyprus to Greece, but they had to recognize British annexation of the isiand. In the new Turkey Berkes began a new phase in his life that lasted until 1952, when he was forced into voluntary exile to North America. NOTES An earlier version of this chapter was published by Journal of Cyprus Studies 15 (2009): 65-89. |. Niyazi Berkes, Unutulan Yillar (Forgotten Years], compiled by Rusen Sezer (Istanbul: Hetigim, 1997), 33 2. Niyazi Kizilyirek, Mitlivergilik Kiskacinda Kzbris [Cyprus in the Dilemma of National- ism), (Istanbul: fletisim, 2005). 3, Kemal Cigek, “Lefkoge: Iki Dilli, Lki Dinli, Iki Toplumlu Bir Osmanlt Sehrinin Portresi, [Nicosia: The Portrait of a Bi-lingual, Bi-religious, Bi-communal Ottoman City),” Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies, (eds.) ismail Bozkurt, Hiiseyin Atesin, and M. Kansu (Famagusta: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 1998), 95, 4. In this paragraph, the list of the countries that invaded Cyprus has been taken from. The Encyclopedia Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge, vel. 6, 14th ed, (London: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1937), 933-34, 5. Norman Itkowitz and Vamik Volkan, “Turkish and Greek Identities and a Comparison between Them,” Proceedings of the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies, (eds.) Emel Dogramaci, William Haney, and Gtiray Konig (Famagusta: Eastern Mediterranean Uni- versity Press, 1996), 181. 6, Norman Itkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 980), 59: see also H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957). 7, The Ottoman understanding of the state can be attributed to the concept of the “circle of equity” which illustrates the circular relationships among the various classes of society and their functions in a well-run state. Idkowitz defines the circle of equity as follows: “1. There can be no royal authority without the military. 2. There can be no military without wealth, 3, The reaya produce the wealth, 4, The Sultan keeps the reaya by making justice reign. 5. Justice requires harmony in the world. 6. The world is a garden; its walls are the state, 7. The state’s prop is the religious law. 8, There is no support for the religious law without royal authority.” See Itkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islantic Tradition, 88, 8. Feroz Ahmad, “Young Turk-Armenian Relations During the Second Constitutional Pe- riod 1908-1914," Armenians in the Ottoman Society, (ed.) Metin Holagi (Kayseri: Erciyes University Printing House, 2008), 305. 9. For an historical account of the Ottoman millet system, see: Daniel Goffinan, “Ottoman Millets in the Early Seventeenth Century,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 11 (Fall 1994): 135-58; Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myth of the Millet System,” and Kemal H. Karpat, “Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era.” Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, (eds.) Benjamin Braude and Bemard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 69-88 and 141-69. 10, Ibrahim Hakk Bey, “Muhtasar Kibris Coprafyast [The Concise Geography of Cyprus}, 1906,” transliterated into Latin alphabet by Harid Fedai, Kibris Turk Kaltiri: Makaleler [Cypri- ot Turkish Culture Articles], vol.1 (Nicosia: SAMTAY Foundation, 2005), 49. 11. Cyprus (Magazine) “Supplement to Great Britain and the East” Incorporating the Near East and India,” (London, Athens, Alexandria, February 4, 1937), 24, 12. Niyazi Berkes, “Kigisel Anilar [Personal Memories],” Atatiirk ve Devrimler [Atatiirk and the Revolution], (Istanbul: Adam Press, 1982), 12,16 Chapter I ‘lam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Hurst & Company, 1993); and Ivo Andrié, The Bridge on the Drina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). 14, Yusuf Kugtkdag, “Kibns Tekke ve Zaviyeleri [Dervish Lodges in Cyprus].” Proceed- ings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies, 381-83, 15, Ibid. 16, Berkes, Unurulan Filler, 30. 17. Ibid, 18, Charles Fraser Beckingham, “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,” Die Welt des Islams, $ (1/2) (1987): 67. . 19, Oguz Yorgancioglu, “Niyazi Berkes Uizerine Bir Degerlendirme, 1908-188 [An Evalua- tion on Niyazi Berkes].” First Symposium on Remarkable Turkish Cypriots, (ed.) Ismail Boz~ kurt (April 21-23, 1999), 85. 20. Nergis Canefe, ““Tiirkltk Tarihi ve Kibns: Kibrish Ttirk Kimliginin Hikayelenmesinde Bir Yolagzr [History of Turkishness and Cyprus: An Introduction to the Narrative of Turkish Cypriot Identity],” Milliyescilik, Bellek ve Aidiyet (Nationalism, Memory and Belonging], (Is- tanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2007), 366. 21. Ibid., 365-70, 22, See for example Doros Alastes, Cyprus in History: 4 Survey of 5,000 Years, (London: Zeno Publishers, 1976), 308; and Ahmet Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tarkler: Bugiinlere Gelmek Kolay Olmad (The Turks Encircled by Enosis}, (Nicosia: Cyprus Research arid Publi- cation Center, 1996), 35-40. 23. Rolandos Katsinounis, Labour, Society and Polities in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century, (Lefkoga: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996); Rebecca Bryant, Tebaadan Vatandasa Kibris'ta Modernite ve Millivetcilik [From Subjects to Citizens: Modernity and ‘Nationalism in Cyprus], (Istanbul: iletisim Press, 2002). 24. Anderson, /magined Communities. 25, Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalisms since 1780, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1992). 26. The Annex of the Cyprus Convention of 1878 included the following clauses: “1. A ‘Muslimn religious tribunal should continue to function, taking exclusive cognizance of religious matters conceming the Muslims. 2. A Muslim resident of the island, nominated by the Board of Pious Foundations in Turkey, should superintend the administration of all property belonging to Muslim Pious Foundations and the religious establishment, with a delegate appointed by the British authorities. 3. Great Britain would pay the Porte annually the current excess of revenue ‘over expenditure, which was calculated by the average of the {ast five years and stated to be 22,936 purses (11,468,000 piastres or approximately 95,567 pounds), to be verified later, the produce of State and Crown lands let of sold during that period being excluded. 4. The Porte ‘was to have the right to sefl and fease lands and other property belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State, the produce of which would not form part of the revenue referred to in article three. “The British Government was to have the right to purchase compulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public purposes. 6. If Russia restored to Turkey Kars and other conquests made by it in Armenia during the last war, Cyprus would be evacuated by England and the Convention of June 4, 1878, annulled.” See in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East—A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, vol. 2 (Princeton: D, Van Nostrand Company, 1956), 31-33. 27, The Otloman Empire was considered to be a European state since after the Treaty of Paris in 1856. 28. “Cyprus, the Suez Canal, and Disraeli,” New York Times, (31 May 1896), Proquest Historical Newspapers, bitp://www.proquest.com. 29. H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 443. 30. Halil Lbrahim Salih, Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord, (New York: Theo Gaus’ Sons Inc., 1968), 24. 31. For the origins of this epithet, see: Christopher de Bellaigue, “The Sick Man of Europe,” New York Review of Books, (July 5, 2001).ivaci Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 7 32. Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Anns: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, (New York: Praeger. 1966). 33. Bryant, Tebaadan Vatandasa Kibris ta Modernite ve Millivetcitit, 36, 34, Jan-Erik Smilden “When the Turks Saved the Greek Cypriots,” dre We Captives of History: Historical Essays on Turkey and Europe, (ed.) A. Johansson e7 ai. (Oslo; Oslo Aca- demic Press, 2007), 75-76. 38. Ibid.. 80. 36. Bryant, Tebaadan Vatandasa Kebris'ta Modernite ve Millivercilik, 38-39. 37. Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tirkler, 35-36. 38. Bryant, Tebaadan Vatandasa Kibris'ta Modernite ve Miltivercitik, 40. 39. Adamantia Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cy- prus,” Comparative Polities § (4) (1973): 375-99, 40. Salih, Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord, 26-27. 41. Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tirkler, 44. 42. Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy,” 591-92. 43. Canefe, “Tirklik Tarihi ve Kibris,” 367. 44, Anderson, imagined Communities. 45. Andreas CI, Sophocteus, “The First Cypriot Newspapers and the British Administra- tion,” GMJ: Mediterranean Edition, | (1) (2006): 117-19. 46. Ibid., 116, 47, Siileyman irvan, “Kibrsh Tark Gazetecilerin Mesleki ve Btik Degerleri, [Professional and Ethical Values of Cypriot Turkish Journalists]” Kiiresed Hetisim Dergisi Journal of Cultu- ral Communication], 1 (2006): 3. 48. In India, for instance, the British administration required the assistance of the Indians who were competent in the English language and culture for the effective functioning of the state. With this purpose, schools and colleges were opened to “cultivate a local elite who could understand them, and their concepts of rule, who were willing to be inducted into polities, into a public arena where they could freely give allegiance and loyalty to the British crown, a class of persons, as Macaulay had put it [. . .J, “Indian in color and blood but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.”” Sunil Khilnani “Who is an Indian,” in The Idea of Indica (New York: Farrar, 2002), 22-23. 49. For an analysis of the peculiarities of British colonial education in Cyprus see Panayiotis Persianis, “The British Colonial Education ‘Lending’ Policy in Cyprus (1878-1960): An Intri- guing Example of an Flusive ‘Adapted Education’ Policy,” Comparative Education, 32 (1) (1996): 45-68. 30, Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus, 84. 51. Kuzilylirek, Millivetcilik Kiskacinda Kibris, 78. 52. H.D. Purcell, Cyprus, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 238. 53. Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tiirkler, 63-64, $4. Purcell, Cyprus, 238. 58. Ibid. 56. “In Foreign Lands: Cyprus Wishes to Withdraw from British Rule,” New York Times. (March 29, 1903), Proquest Historical Newspapers, http:l/www.proquest.com. 57, Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tiirkler, 81-82. 58. For a historical account of the Young Turks see Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks. The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914, (New York: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1969). 59. Sitkrii Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 60. For a study on Young Turk ideology see Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1962); Serif Mardin, Jén Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri [Political Ideas of Young Turks] , 1898-1908 (Ankara: tg Bank Press, 1964). 61. Sina Aksin, Kisa Turkiye Tarihi [A Concise History of Turkey], (Istanbul: Ig Bank Press, 2007), 49.18 Chapter 1 62. Sacit Kutlu compiled a book of postcards that illustrates the celebrations of the 1908 Revolution in Istanbut. Sacit Kutlu, Didér-1 Harriver: Karfpostallarla fkinci Mesrutivet [The Beautiful Face of Liberty: Second Constitutional Regime on Postcards}, (Istanbul: Bilgi Uni- versity Press, 2004), 63. Hasan Kayalt, Arabs and Young Turks: Otiomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, (London: University of California Press, 1997), 141-43, 64. Billent Evre, “Jon Tork Hareketinin Kibris’a Etkisi, [The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Cyprus).” Akademik Arastarmalar Dergisi (Journal of Academic Research}, 35 (2005): 10, 65. Altay Nevzat, Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave, (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Oulu, 2005), 169. 66. Quoted in Hiiseyin Mehmet Atesin, “Kibis Adasinda Mitsliiman Halkin Laiklesme ve ‘Turk Kimligine Gegig Stirecinde Kibris Tiirk Basmi’nin ve Aydinlarr’mn Oynadiklan Rol, [The Role of Cypriot Turkish Press and Intelfectuals in Secularization and Turkish Identity Formation of the Muslim People on Cyprus Island],” Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Cyprus Studies, 195-96. Translation is mine. The original in Turkish is as follows: “Arik sinlanmizda Mehmetlerimiz degil, Dikeanlanmiz, Yorgilerimiz, Yoseflerimiz de hayatlarm yitireceklerdir. Arik ‘ay’ ile *hag'm kapismasi, Kuran ile IneiP’in gatigmast olmaya~ cak: gfinkt ‘ay’s da tagsyan bir Hiristiyan olacaktwr.” 67. Berkes, Unutulan Yillar, 33. 68. Ibid. 34. 69. Ahmad, “Introductory Essay, Niyazi Berkes: The Education of an Intellectual,” xv. 70. “Crete Decides to Join Greece,” New York Times, (October 8, 1908), Proguest Histor cal Newspapers, hitp://www.proquest.com, 71. Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tiirkler, 85-87. 72. “Turks Give Up All Except Adrianople.” New York Times, (January 2, 1913), Proquest Historical Newspapers, 4, hitp://www.proquest.com. 73. Purcell, Cyprus, 240. 74, Thid., 239. 75, Quoted in Haid Fedai, “Kibris Tiirk Basmmnda Vatan [Fatherland in Cypriot Turkish Press)” Kibris Tiirk Kiteirit Makaleler [Cypriot Turkish Culture Articles}, 5. 76. Salih, Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord, 29. 77. Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tirkler, \11~12. 78. Ibid., 113. 79. Sabahattin ismail, “Kibris Tirk Halka’nin Ulusal Macadelesi’nde ikler [The First Cases in the National Struggle of the Cypriot Turkish People],” Proceedings of the Second Interna- tional Congress on Cyprus Studies, 146. 0. Beckingham, “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus,” 68. 81. “Cyprus,” New York Times, (November 6, 1914); Proquest Historical Newspapers, hitp://www.proquest.com. 82. Gaziogtu, Enosis Cemberinde Tarkler, 134. 83. Ibid., 135. 84. “Cyprus.” New York Times, (November 6, 1914), Proquest Historical Newspapers, |http://wwrw.proquest.com. 85. “Greek Government Defends its Stand,” New York Times (October 24, 1915), Proguest Historical Newspapers, hitp:/iwww.proquest.com. 86. “Cyprus a Gift to Greece,” New York Times (October 25, 1915). Proquest Historical Newspapers, htp:/!www.proquest.com. 87. fsmail, “Kibmis Tork Halki’nin Ulusal Mticadotesi’nde Hiker,” 147. 88. George Hill, A History of Cyprus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). 89, Quoted in Gazioglu, Enosis Cemberinde Tirkler, 171. Translation is mine. The origi in Turkish is as follows: “Degil yalniz Kabns Rumlarina, bitin Yunanilige, bitin cihana ian edelim ki, Tirkiye mahvolmad: ve olmayacakter. Kiire-i zemin iizerinde gitnes nesr-i envar ettikge TurklGk kemal-iistikrar ile devam edecektir.” 90. Berkes, Unutulan Yillar. 36.Niyazi Berkes in British Cyprus, 1908-1922 i9 91. Ibid, 26-27, Translation is mine. ‘The original in Turkish is as follows: “Harp yillari boyunca bir yere gigemedikteri gibi baslarmda Ingitiz devletinin Yunan dostlugu doiayisiyta, gelecegin Ram kliconm sallanacaga yillarin geleceginden korkmaya basfamislardi, .. . Kurtulus Savaga basladiginda 11, bittiginde ise 14 yasimdaydim. Yasamda kendime geldigim yllar bu U1 ite 14 yag arast yillardi. Bundan étdrii bu dénemin, Tiirkiye’de yasitm olan kisilerden daha gok etkisi altnda kaldim. Yasamumun bundan sonraki diisiin ve duygu yéntind bu dénem izmistr.” 92. Berkes, “Kisisel Anular,” 12.\ Chapter Two The Education and Early Career of Niyazi Berkes during the Construction of the Kemalist State and Ideology, 1922-1933 A young fourteen-year-old Niyazi and his family set off on a journey to nationalist Turkey on an Italian ferry carrying many other Turkish-Cypriots who also had decided to seek their future in the motherland. Upon their arrival in Istanbul, the family took a house in Sultanahmet near the great mosque, completed in 1616. Their home was within walking distance of the Istanbul School for Boys where Niyazi was enrolled. This was a relatively modern school compared to the Muslim-oriented schools, or mektep, of the Empire. At school, he developed a keen interest in the social sciences, which later led him to pursue degrees in law, philosophy, and history in the Dariilfiinun, the imperial school of sciences inherited by the Republic. At this time the teaching posts of the Dariilfiinun were still held by conservative professors who could not teach the modern, national curriculum that was necessary for the newly established nation-state. In response to the world- view of the conservative Muslim tutors at the university, Berkes developed an interest in determinism and behaviorism, and even began to translate books and write articles on these subjects. After graduating, Berkes moved to Ankara, the capital of the nationalist revolution in 1932. in order to contribute to the Kemalist Revolution. He was appointed as a librarian at Ankara People’s Houses (Halkevleri), an educa- tional institution originally designed by the revolutionaries to spread the newly constructed Kemalist ideology to the masses of Anatolia, Berkes’s 2122 Chapter 2 enduring interest in rurai studies and education was rooted in his professional experience at the People’s Houses. Subsequent to his experience in the People’s Houses, Berkes became the founding principal of Maarif Koleji in 1935. This institution was a secondary schoo! in Ankara funded by “the American Friends of Turkey” dedicated to instilling the ideas of the American educationalist John Dewey. However, Berkes found the experiment to be a total failure, mostly because the school turned into an elite school for the children of high-level bureaucrats rather than a pilot study for a national educational model. He therefore resigned from the post within a year. However, because of his education at the Istan- bul School for Boys and Dariilfiinun, Berkes developed an intellectual inter- est in social sciences and a political perspective that motivated him to get involved in the dissemination of Kemalist ideology at the People’s Houses and the Maarif Koleji. THE RISE OF TURKISH NATIONAL EDUCATION The Istanbul Schoo! for Boys and Dariilfiinun were modem in the sense that they represented a break with the classical Ottoman educational model that was based on Islamic ideals and tradition. Ottoman schools were organized around mosques and pious foundations, and students began their primary education from the lowest level at mekteps to the highest at medreses, the Ottoman equivalent of university.! Apart from this educational model, the Janissary Corps practiced a system of devgirme in which it recruited unmar- ried, non-Muslim boys of the Empire and raised them as Bekfasi-Muslim soldiers of the sultans. Often these boys were brought to the capital at such a young age that they hardly had an idea about their ancestors or parents. The entire enterprise of the Janissary Corps was single-minded, namely, to pro- tect the sultan and his empire. These soldiers were refused entry into any other kind of occupation or business, and they were even forbidden to mar- ry.? Similarly, the Palace School (Enderum Mektebi) also drew from the boys of the devsirme recruitment system, but with a major difference, The boys of the Enderun were the brightest students in their community and upon gradua- tion they were expected to hold the highest positions in civil, military, and religious offices of the Empire. This was indeed a platonic model, in which “the artisans” were educated in traditional religious mekteps, “the guardians” were recruited and trained as Janissaries, and “the rulers” were given a philo- sophical formation in the schools of the palace.3 This model worked smooth- ly and effectively during the classical age of the Empire, producing the cadres of professionals and soldiers that were required by the imperial bu- reaucracy.Education and Early Career of Niyazi Berkes, 1922-1933 23 This classical system began to decline by the end of the seventeenth century. After the Treaty of Kigiik Kaynarca (1774), the Ottoman statesmen became aware of this trend, prompting them to introduce reforms meant to reverse the process of decline. Modernization of educational institutions, especially those related to defense, was on the top of the reformers’ agenda. In fact, during this early period of reform Muihendishane-i Bahri Hiimayun (1773) and Mtihendishane-i Berri Hiimayun (1795), the military schools of engineering for the navy and the land forces, were established to raise engi- neers for the army.* Subsequently, the School of Medicine (Tibbiye), the Military Schoo! (Harbiye), and School of Public Administration (Milkiye) were founded one after another in 1827, 1834, and 1859 respectively, adopt- ing Western principles of education and curricula.s These schools first re- cruited students from the graduates of mekteps or medreses, but found that these students hardly had the background required for education in the mod- ern military schools. To fill this gap in the system, askeri riigtive and askeri idadi, modern military schools at lower levels, were opened.® This was the first group of schools at the secondary level. Besides that, non-Muslim citi- zens of the Empire also started modern schools at these levels to meet the need for educated people who would serve as the intermediaries of interna- tional business in the age of rising capitalism.’ Later, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the reformers began to understand that modern educa- tion was the remedy for the dectine of the Empire. Thereafter, the Ottoman state began to play a significant role in the establishment of civil modern schools in the major centers of the Empire such as Bursa, Edirne, Konya, and Selanik/Salonica.® With the enlargement of the modern schools, there emerged a new Otto- man elite that identified with Western values and advocated the adoption of Western political institutions. They were so influential in trade, the media, and the bureaucracy that they also played a significant role in the policy- making of the Empire. In fact, the reform edicts of 1839 and 1856, collective- ly known as the Tanzimat, and the promulgation of the constitution in 1876 and its restoration in 1908 can be listed among the developments that took place in line with the ideas of the new elite. However, despite their influence in politics, the new intelligentsia was alienated from Ottoman society due to their class and cultural differences. Further, the reformers failed to garner any significant level of support among the masses because many of the Anatolian poor suffered increased economic hardship from the reforms that sought to integrate the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world economy. As a reaction, the Muslim masses strongly opposed the reform movements and became even more entrenched in Islamic traditions. The result was a social cleavage between the religious-traditional masses and the secular-modern elite, and this cultural dichotomy was further24 Chapter 2 widened by the challenge that the modern schools presented to the traditional schools.? The Kemalist nationalisis inherited this coeducational model when they proclaimed the Republic on October 29, 1923. The Ministry of Religion and Pious Foundations (Serive ve Evkaf Vekaleti) supported an educational model based on faith and religion, whereas the modern schools provided secular education under the Ministry of National Education. This duality continued to exist until 1924 when the Kemalist government passed the law on the Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), preparing the condi- tions to establish a truly Western, secular system, which in turn would help transform the Anatolian people into modern citizens of the Republic. Parlia- mentarians described this goal as follows: The national educational policy of a state should ensure the mental and emo- tional unity of the nation, and this can only be achieved through the unification of education. ln the Tanzimat period, the attempt to unify education failed, and a dichotomy emerged. This dichotomy has led to many malign and unfavor- able consequences: [that is], the two models of education in the country pro- duced iwo different types of people, When our proposal is accepted, the ulti- ‘mate authority over every educational institution in the Republic of Turkey will be the Ministry of Education. Thereafter, all educational facilities will follow the republican virtue policy as the common educational path," However, another duality between the modern educational institutions occurred. The foundation of modern schools simply aimed at saving the Empire by catching up with the Western empires and reversing the decline. However, the modern schools were intended to play a significant role in the construction of a nation and a nation-state, and were the centerpiece of na- tional transformation in Turkey. This model can be explained with reference to Ernest Geliner, who illustrated the relationship between nationalism and education in the making of a nation-state. For him, the nation-state depends on the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society with mutually substitutable individuals. These individuals are held together by a shared culture shaped by national education to replace a previous complex structure of local groups and cultures.'! This was precisely what the Kemalist nation- alists strove to achieve, Rather than saving an ailing empire, the modern schools of the Republic sought to create the culturally homogeneous society necessary for the consolidation of the new regime. In that sense, the imperial modern schools were incompatible with the nationalist republic. Moreover, “the imperial modernization” promoted by the modern imperi- al schools of the Empire was incompatible with “the nationalist modernity” project of the Republic. The emphasis of Ottoman modernization was “on adopting the materialism of the West, its technology and modern weaponry without adopting Western ideas that would transform the society in theEducation and Early Career of Nivazi Berkes, 1922-1933 25 broadest sense.”!? By contrast, the nationalist regime wanted to modernize by radically reforming Turkey's traditional society. Similarly, the late Otto- man understanding of education, milli terbiye,'3 was based on the distinction between culture and civilization (hars ve medeniyet), which suggested the reception of the universal civilization while keeping the culture local (mahal- 1i)."4 This difference was synthetic for the Kemalist nationalists who claimed that integration into the universal civilization was only possible through sub- stitution of the local, traditional, and religious culture with the universal, modern, and secular one. The Kemalist educational policy was, therefore, a grand project to transform the society as a whole by introducing new values based on a new worldview. As Kazamias noted: Education became a major instrument for what was to be Turkey's “grand transformation,” hence a major focus of reform. First, since secularism was a cardinal tenet of the revolutionary ideology. education must be completely secularized; second, the new Turkish national state, bent as it was on changing the entire fabric of the society along modem Western lines, must possess a national system of public education controlled by the state... . Third, a nationalistic state could materialize only if education itself assumed the Fe- sponsibility of politically educating the new generation in accordance with Turkish nationalism, Fourth, a populist system of government . . . must pro- vide educational opportunities for all the people, must eliminate glaring in- equalities, and must create conditions whereby recruitment and selection into the various occupations were not restricted to self-perpetuating social groups. !5 THE ISTANBUL SCHOOL FOR BOYS The promulgation of this new model in rural Anatolia and even in Istanbul consumed great time and effort. Islamic conservatism in Anatolia and Otto- man modernism in Istanbul proved to be resilient during the first decade of the Republic. The incompatibility of “imperial modernization” with “the nationalist modernity” was quite visible, especially in Istanbul. The Ottoman system had produced professionals, culturally alienated from their society, known to this day in the discourse of conservative politicians as “monger” (i.e., mon cher). However, the impact of this education on Berkes turned out to be much different than one would expect as it contributed to the emer- gence of a republican intellectual who felt closer to the people rather than any power circles, The Istanbul School for Boys was one of the modern-Ottoman schools based on the Western models. It was founded in 1884 by Mehmet Nadir Bey, an important figure in the Turkish history of science for his contribution in mathematics. His ideological opposition to sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) prompted the Palace to seize control of the school in 1896.!626 Chapter 2 The model of education thereafter depended on the international relations of the Empire. At first the French model of education was adopted as the Em- pire had good diplomatic relations with France. Then, with the rise of the German influence at the beginning of the war in 1914, Germany appointed twenty-two teachers in the Boys’ School and turned the school into a Deuts- che Auslandsschule.'7 This, however, did not last long as the German teach- ers returned to Germany following defeat in 1918. After the inauguration of the Republic, the nationalist government closed down foreign schools with the few exceptions of minority and missionary schools.'* The Istanbul School for Boys survived this turmoil as it was considered to be a nationat school that used to be under foreign influence. Nevertheless, the school was still very much an outcome of the German educational model and Ottoman modernization. Berkes experienced this period of educational transition firsthand at the Istanbul School for Boys. He was enrolled in the school when he was four- teen and he graduated at the age of nineteen. The education he obtained had a significant impact on the development of his intellectual personality. First of all, he began to learn English in this school, a striking feature of his educa- tion since he was born and raised in British Cyprus. Secondly, as noted above, this was a transitional period in which the conflict between religious conservatives and secular modernists was quite apparent, especially in the “modern” educational institutions of the late Empire. In his memoirs, Berkes recalls such imperial-minded teachers as Salih Bey, the conservative and authoritarian teacher of Arabic, who demanded the expulsion of a group of students, accusing them of placing a needle on his chair.!° This group in- cluded several who one day would become accomplished and notable in society, such as Sait Faik Abastyanik, the well-known author of Turkish literature, Saffet Nezihi Béliikbasi, a famous lawyer, Hikmet Feridun Es, a journalist, Ihsan Sabri Gaglayangil, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sitki Yarealt, the Minister of State, Enver Behnan Sapolyo, a journalist, and Cem Atabeyoglu, a historian. Sapolyo and Atabeyoglu noted that “the needle inci- dent” was an uprising of the republican youth in the school against the conservative tutor in turban and frock.?° Besides this, there also was Hifzi Tevfik Bey, a teacher of literature, who was committed to old-fashioned Ottoman poetry (divan siiri) and distanced himself from the modern litera- ture based on popular poetry (halk siiri) that was associated with republican reform. At the same time the school hosted a group of teachers who adhered to Kemalist nationalism, such as Hasan Ali Yiicel (1897-1961) who became the minister of education between 1938 and 1946, and Hilmi Ziya Ulken (1901-1974), teacher of modern philosophy and literature and one of the most prominent figures in Turkish intellectual history. These teachers in- spired Berkes to a nationalist worldview and an intellectual interest in the social sciences. Muhsin Bey’s history classes, with its critical analysis ofEducation and Early Career of Niyazi Berkes, 1922-1933 27 Ottoman history from the period of the French Revolution, may be singled out as particularly stimulating to Berkes’s intellectual curiosity. Not surprise ingly, he wanted to go to university to read social sciences after he left school in 1927. DARULFUNUN: THE IMPERIAL SCHOOL OF SCIENCES In his memoir, Berkes argued that the students of his time who continued their education after high schoo! made a choice that would open the gates for them either in the state bureaucracy or in professional life. The young candi- dates being groomed for positions in the civil and military bureaucracy were educated in the School of Public Administration (AMilkiye) and the Military School (Harbiye) respectively, whereas the future professionals were trained in the schools of law, engineering, and medicine within the Dariilfinun. A third alternative was a major in such subjects as philosophy, sociology, liter- ature, mathematics, and chemistry. These were the ieast popular majors as they only guaranteed a teaching career for their graduates whereas the first two alternatives raised the career prospects for representatives of the petty bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, the two major segments of Turkish society competing for political power?! Upon his graduation from the Istanbul School for Boys, Berkes was en- couraged by his family to pursue a degree in law, which could be the basis for a successful professional career. For his part, Berkes was inclined to study social sciences rather than engineering or medicine and he therefore enrolled in the School of Law within the Dariilfiinun. He soon realized that this was not a field of study for him in that the study of law left him unin- spired. The faculty, with few exceptions, was composed of conservative, imperial-minded professors who failed to follow modern developments, Berkes was interested in studying the transformation of the Turkish legal structure but the faculty was indifferent to the legislative reforms being intro- duced in Ankara. As a result, he switched his major from law to philosophy, which better satisfied his intellectual curiosity. The study of philosophy introduced Berkes to the ideas of various modern and classical philosophers, such as Plato, Kant, Durkheim, Bergson, Lévy- Briihl, Spinoza, and Freud, and he also conducted independent research guided by his professors. For instance, the history of philosophy seminars of Orhan Saadettin gave him the opportunity to read the classics and even inspired him to translate Platos’s Politeia. With this demonstration of unusu- al ability, Professor Mehmet Servet encouraged him to publish his transla- tions and essays in The Journal of Philosophy and Sociology (Felsefe ve Igtimaiyat Mecinuasi), which became his first published efforts.”? He then published a piece on the origins of modern sociology in the Journal of28 Chapter 2 Political Sciences* (Siyasi Ilimler Mecmuasi), and his translations appeared in the journal /¢tihat published by Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932), one of the modernist ideologues among the Young Turks who was known for his strict positivism. Despite these interests and achievements, Berkes was unhappy with the overall quality of education in the department. Some faculty members were unable to adapt to the changing conditions that emerged with the establish- ment of the nation-state. Frequently they were far behind the requirements of the universal science, conveying merely the ideas of a few philosophers in their lectures. In his memoir Berkes notes how Professor Mustafa Sekip Tung was stuck on the ideas of Bergson and Freud; Professor ismail Hakki Baltacioglu worshipped the works of Durkheim; Professor Orhan Sadettin was fond of Plato and Kant; and Professor izmirli [smay1! Hakka only taught about Islamic philosophers without any comparative perspective. Among his teachers, Professor Babanzade Naim influenced Berkes more than any other professor in the department. He was a religious-conservative professor who taught metaphysics with reference to a textbook by a Catholic clergyman, proving the existence of God. Naim was strongly against nationalism and secularism since he was convinced that the wma was the besi social/politi- cal organization ordained by God. In response, Berkes developed an interest in positivism and he began to translate Watson’s book on behaviorism.”4 Furthermore, Naim’s wmmaism also sharpened his views on Turkish nation- alism, something he had begun to develop during his childhood in Cyprus. Berkes was also a student activist during his university years, together with his classmate Macit Giékberk, who later became one of the most impor- tant professors of philosophy in Turkey. Their activism started when they convinced Fuat Képriili, the dean of the faculty, to revive the students’ club at the faculty of literature that had been inactive for years.*> Through the club they became involved in the meetings of the National Union of Turkish Students (Milli Turk Talebe Birligi), the Kemalist-nationalist union whose ideological orientation in the second half of the sixties shifted to right-wing religious conservatism.?6 Participation in the Union was an exercise in de- mocracy, and they urged the members to elect the administration of the Union. They managed to convene two congresses, one in the Turkish Hearths (Tiirk Ocagi) and the other in the Union of Teachers in Sultanahmet. ‘This was Berkes’s sole involvement in political activism. The students decided to give up politics after spending two years in the Union, and thereafter, Berkes distanced himself from politics and never again became a member of any club, association, or political party. The absence of any political affiliation left him unprotected, especially during the political turmoil in Turkey after World War II. The Istanbul School for Boys and Dariilfiinun were two “modern” educa- tional institutions of the late Empire, yet to be overtaken and reformed byEducation and Early Career of Niyazi Berkes, (922-1933 29 Kemalists, The education that Berkes received in these institutions led him to become an idealist striving to contribute to the Kemalist project of transform- ing the society as a whole. This is why he wanted to become a teacher upon graduation from university, With some teaching experience in the German school, the Deutsche Oberrealschule, in Istanbul, he applied for a teaching position in Anatolia, However, he was denied a position on the grounds that teaching posts were only available to those who were granted government scholarships during their education. Berkes had never thought of applying for a scholarship since he was living with his family in Istanbul. With the fledg- ling Kemalist government still too weak to place qualified personnel in stra- tegic positions for their nation-building process, Berkes found a position in Ankara only after one of his friends advised him to meet Ziya Gevher Etili, the Member of Parliament for Canakkale.”’ Finally, in 1933 Berkes began to work as a librarian for the People’s House in Ankara, an institution founded to spread the Kemalist ideology among the people of Anatolia. It had been constructed after the legitimacy crisis in 1930. Thus began his life-long mis- sion to disseminate Kemalism throughout Turkey. THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION In the very early years of the Republic, resistance against the new regime was suppressed through harsh measures. The single party administration legislat- ed laws on high treason (ffyanet-i Vataniye) and maintenance of order (Tak- rir-i Stikun Kanunu) not only to suppress the opposition but also to restrict freedom of expression and association. In fact, in 1925 the government closed down the first party of opposition, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkast), only a year after its foundation.*8 The government alleged that it had collaborated with religious Kurdish rebels in eastern Anatolia. These laws were another attempt to remove from power any leaders of a potential opposition through the Independence Tribunals (stiklal Mahkemeleri).° These tribunals tried the foremost members and leaders of the defunct Committee of Union and Progress who were alleged to have planned the assassination attempt against Kemal Atatiirk, and most of them were sentenced to death. *° Furthermore, freedom of the press and asso- ciation were also restricted. Various associations were shuttered, including the lodges of the Freemasons, which played a very significant role in the politics of the late Ottoman Empire. All this implies that the Kemalists recog- nized the lack of support for their social project and demonstrates just how determined they were to crush all opposition supporting Islam and tradition until the law and institutions of the new regime were strong enough to with- stand competition.*!30 Chapter 2 Berkes must have witnessed how the use of coercion by the authorities failed to put an end to anti-republican and anti-revolutionary movements in Anatolia. For example, in 1930 the Free Republican Party became a source of anti-revolutionary activity soon after its establishment. This was a party that was founded to promulgate liberal economic policies as an alternative to the dirigisme of the Republican People’s Party in order to lessen the impact of the 1929 world economic crisis on Turkey.3? The establishment of the party was encouraged by the Kemalist elite including Kemal Atatiirk himself, as they thought that the revolution now had grassroots support. This is why Ali Fethi Okyar, an important leader within Kemalist circles, launched the party as a “loyal opposition” on August 12, 1930.%3 Before the local elections in September, the supporters of the Free Party attacked members of the Republican People’s Party in izmir and Aydin. The administration of the Free Party, which was mostly composed of loyal Kemalists, were alarmed by the incidents and closed down the party, but not before it succeeded in winning, ten municipalities in the local elections. Besides that, the Republi- cans were also hit hard by a reactionary Islamic rebellion in Menemen, a small town in western Anatolia in late 1930, just afier the Free Party incident. The rebels killed a reserve officer and three military personnel before they could be subdued by the gendarmerie.*# Berkes followed these developments closely as a university student in Istanbul. He was not worried at all about the success of the revolution and thought that the emergence of conservative-reactionary movernents was a natural outcome of the structural changes introduced by the Republic. The Kemalist nationalists were transforming the society whereas the social forces of the ancien régime were resisting. His later writings on the development of secularism in Turkey clearly drew from these lessons. *5 However, these incidents alarmed the Kemalist elite who thought that the opposition was geographically restricted to eastern Anatolia where the Islam- ic, traditional, and tribal social structures were still resilient. The events that took place in western Anatolia during the political campaign of the Free Republican Party and the Menemen incident came as a shock to the Kemal- ists.56 It now became clear that there was strong resistance against the new regime even in western Turkey where the people were considered to be more ‘open to new ideas and values introduced by the revolution. In Cankaya, the presidential residence of AtattIrk, several meetings were held to discuss the similarities between the Menemen and Free Party incidents.*7 It was at this stage that Mustafa Kemal decided to travel around Anatolia in order to feel the pulse of the people and find out what had gone wrong with the revolution. His itinerary carried him to Samsun, the city in the Black Sea from where he had launched the national struggle in May 1919. In Samsun he again voiced the need to initiate a cultural-political struggle in order to get the support of the masses in Anatolia: “Every passing day we have to work more and moreEducation and Early Career of Nivazi Berkes, 1922-1933 31 actively as if we were challenged by many political parties. It is an obligation for us to diffuse our ideas among the masses and convey them to the vil- lages.”58 This implied that Atattirk acknowledged the need to obtain the consent of the masses in Anatolia through ideological conviction rather than through repressive measures, THE CONSTRUCTION OF KEMALIST IDEOLOGY The Kemalisis became aware of the fact that in order to lessen the degree of opposition, they had to do away with the traditional, Islamic, rural, and conservative mental structure prevailing among the Anatolian people and transform the society with an ideology compatible with the requirements of the new regime. To borrow the terms invented by the French philosopher Althusser, the Kemalists realized that “repressive apparatuses of state” such as army, gendarmerie, and police were not enough to establish control over the people within a defined territory unless reinforced by the “ideological apparatuses of state,” that is, education, religion, communication, law, un- ions, ef cetera.” This was indeed what had gone wrong with the Kemalist revolution in its first decade. For the consolidation of the new regime the nationalist revolutionaries had relied mostly on “the state’s monopoly of violence” as Weber had put it.4° Only after the events of 1930 did it become obvious to formulate an ideology and to propagate it among the people through the institutions of the state, The first task was to draw up the framework of the party’s ideology describing the fundamental principles of the grand project that would trans- form society. This framework was established during the third congress (May 10-18, 1931) of the RPP (Republican People’s Party) where republi- canism, populism, laicism, revolutionism, étatism/dirigisme, and nationalism were adopted as the six main strands, or “the six arrows,” of the new ideolo- gy of the party. However, these principles were yet to be crystallized through an extensive ideological debate among the intellectuals and party members supporting the new regime.*! Eventually a rivalry emerged among the organ- ic intellectuals who wanted to ally with the state in the construction of the state ideology. The left-wing Kemalist intellectuals were widely known as the “Kadro Movement” since they were publishing their ideas in the monthly, Kadro (the Cadre). Their manifesto, published in the first issue in 1932, included the following statements: Turkey is now in the process of a revolution. This revolution possesses the theoretical and intellectual elements that constitute the revolutionary principles giving consciousness to those who will survive the revolution. But, these theo- retical and intellectual elements are not well organized within an ideological32 Chapier 2 systématique to become an IDEOLOGY for the revolution, Our revolution is ‘one of the most meaningful movements of history due both to its national characteristics and international impact. Explaining the ideas and principles inherent in the nature of the revolution is one of the most urgent and honorable works that awaits the Turkish revolutionary intelligentsia... . This is the reason for the publication of Kadro. Kadro’s leaders, Sevket Siireyya Aydemir, Asaf Burhan Belge, Vedat Nedim Tér, and ismail Hiisrey Tokin,3 advocated the leftist doctrine of Mir Said Sultan Galiyev, a faculty member at the Communist University of the Workers of the East in Moscow. According to him, national liberation move- ments were the prerequisite of the world-wide socialist revolution. This doc- trine played down the significance of the working class by placing emphasis on national liberation, thereby making the colonial societies that lacked strong labor movements a link in the socialist chain of revolutions.* Ascrib- ing to this doctrine, the leftist group within Kadro claimed that the principles of populism and étatism/dirigisme would lead to a classless society with a socialist economy. For them Kemalism was an anti-imperialist, national lib- eration movement that could become a model for societies exploited by the capitalist-imperialist powers. 45 Berkes developed personal friendships with the members of the Kadro movement in the thirties. He was especially impressed with the ideas of Sevket Siireyya Aydemir on political economy. Berkes did not join the Ka- dro movement, but the parallels in their perspectives brought together Berkes and some members of Kadro around another Kemalist-leftist journal in the sixties called Yén, the effect of which will be explored in a later chapter. The leftist interpretation of Kemalism created a reaction among the right- wing conservative supporters of the party who were influenced by the Italian model of the fascist-corporatist state. For this group, various segments of Turkish society who now opposed the revolution would come together and support the new regime if they were given an ideological orientation based ‘on the concepts of “nationalism,” “chiefdom,” and “authority.”4* At a time when fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany were rising, the fascist-cor- poratist model found significant support within the ranks of the Republican People’s Party. For example, Recep Peker, the Minister of Interior and Gen- eral Secretary of the Party, wanted to give the party a fascist outlook as he was convinced about the effectiveness of the fascist state model especially after his visit to Germany in 1934-1935, Inspired by what he witnessed, he even achieved the fusion of the party with the state during the premiership of ismet inénii in 1935. According to this model, the Secretary General as- sumed the post of Minister of Interior in the cabinet while the chairmen of the provincial organizations became the governors of their provinces. This model, however, did not meet the approval of Atatiirk who, in 1937, removedEducation and Early Career of Niyazi Berkes, 1922-1933 33 Peker and indné from office and appointed Ceial Bayar, a liberal figure among the Kemalist circle, as prime minister. As a result, this group failed to establish a totalitarian political structure similar to those in Germany and Tealy. Indeed, neither the left-wing nor right-wing groups aimed at restructuring the state strictly in line with the fascist or socialist models. Their purpose was to put forward an ideology that would unite all social forces in the country around the single party similar to the fascists in Italy and to the socialists in the Soviet Union.“ This common ground was best illustrated in the words of Falih Rifki Atay, the moderate Kemalist intellectual and journalist who was very close to Cankaya. In the daily Hakimivet-i Milliye, he wrote: Tam bringing a lesson from Russia, This lesson is about organizing the Turk- ish revolution, bringing up new youth, and educating Turkish society in a few steps . .. | am coming back from Russia not as a communist but as a conscious man who realized the significance of making a structural and economic plan for the construction and economic devetopment of Turkey, restructuring the revolutionary party by following the examples in the communist and fascist countries that moved from the old order to the new order, adopting revolution ary methods rather than being stuck in the bureaucracy, and immediately inau- gurating the education of large masses. 48 As a result, both groups agreed on the formation of the one-party state and dissemination of the official ideology to the masses through the ideologi- cal apparatuses of the state. In line with this idea, the press, religion, and education were (reorganized so as to cultivate the support of the people for the new regime. On July 25, 1931, the press law (matbuat kanunu) was passed in the Assembly banning the publication of ideas favoring caliphate, sultanate, anarchism, and communism. It gave the government the right to close down journals and newspapers voicing ideas that were deemed incom- patible with the national interest. Thereby, “the new regime established a press which was in harmony with the operation of the revolution” as noted by Sikrii Kaya, the minister of interior.‘? The People’s Houses were established on February 19, 1932, as another state apparatus to provide masses with political, cultural, and ideological consciousness. Another ideological appa- ratus of the Kemalist state was the control of religion. The caliphate had been abolished and Islamic educational institutions were closed down in 1924. Now, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was institutionalized by a legisla- tion of the parliament in 1935, in order to (re)interpret Islam in line with the requirements of the new regime. *°34 Chapter 2 PEOPLE'S HOUSES Along with the national education system, the People’s Houses were started as an educational institution. The Houses inherited the facilities of the Turk- ish Hearths, which were closed down in 1931 due to their indifference to the revolution. Between the years 1932 and 1952, 478 People’s Houses and 4322 People’s Rooms, the smaller version of the houses in the villages, were opened.5! The purpose of these institutions was to indoctrinate the masses into Kemalist ideology in order to create an ideologically homogeneous soci- ety loyal to the republic. 5? In other words, as Prime Minister [ndnii noted, the focus of the People’s Houses was the reformation of the national and social life of all people fiving in Turkey: In the making of a nation, schools are the classical institutions. However, contemporary nations do not find school methods good enough to turn the nation into an organized entity. In addition to schooling, it is necessary to have the people [the adults] educated and get them to work together. *? The People’s Houses had a significant place in the life of Berkes as he worked in the headquarters of the houses in 1932 and 1933. He was in charge of establishing the central library of the People’s Houses, which was inaugu- rated by Kemal Atatiirk and the two generals of the “Red Army” during the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the Republic. His first professional experience in this institution gave Berkes a broader perspective on Turkish society, and here his ideas on Turkish villages, modernization, secularism, and nationalism were further developed. His first observation during his work in the Houses was on the failure of the institution in reaching the villagers. In his memoirs he recalls that on his first day in the People’s Houses, a villager was not allowed to enter the headquarters.** This first impression endured during his entire tenure. He came to the conclusion that the People’s Houses would not play a significant role in the education and urbanization of the villagers’so long as they func- tioned in this way. Despite the intentions of their creators, the Houses be- came a center for the cultural entertainment of the urban social classes nos- talgic for village life, but were in no way able to transform the mindset of the rural population.®5 The regular members of the Houses perceived industrial- ization as potential threat for the new regime because industrialization could create a strong working class. For this group, the best strategy was to trans- form the villagers into loyal supporters of the Republic through an ideologi- cal education without altering the agrarian social structure. This, however, turned out to be “mission impossible” as the education reforms did not im- prove the daily lives of the villagers and were thus abandoned.Education and Early Career of Niyazt Berkes, 1922-1933 35 Berkes offers another reason for the failure of the People’s Houses: the left-wing progressive group and the right-wing conservative group had total- ly different ideas about the true meaning of Kemalism. In the People’s Houses these groups were led by Said Aydoslu of the ideological right, and Sevket Stireyya Aydemir on the left.°6 The conflict between these groups ‘was so intense that the groups were constantly complaining and issuing re- ports about each other. In fact, although he declined to participate, Berkes was once asked to prepare a report by Necip Ali, the president of the People’s Houses, highlighting the parallels of the Kadro movement with Marxism, Berkes also claimed that this ideological rivalry even hindered the work of the Houses in progress. As an example, the library commission could never convene because of the conflict between the right- and left-wing Kemalist delegates.57 Despite his disappointment, Berkes was determined to contribute to the People’s Houses. The director of the People’s Houses in Ankara, Nafi Atuf Kansu, encouraged him to develop projects in line with the main principles of the institution. As a response, Berkes drafted two projects, one on village life and the other on opinion workshops. Kansu welcomed both of these projects. As a result, a study tour was organized to Kutludiigiin, one of the villages near Ankara, Among the participants were two different groups. One was the elitist-Kemalist group who kept their distance from the villages despite their sympathy for the village life as indicated in the popular song of that time: “There is a remote village out there; it still belongs to us whether we go there or not.”58 But the other group was composed of activist-Kemal- ists who wanted to stay in the village for a while and observe the villagers and village life.5° Berkes was among the second group and his experience gave him the opportunity to better understand village life and villagers. That trip brought him to the understanding that the peasants were quite progres- sive in contrast to their stereotypical image among intellectuals. After con- ducting research in several other villages around Ankara he later wrote a monograph on the Turkish villagers in the forties, all of which stemmed from this initial trip into Anatolia.¢! Berkes’s second project brought together a group of intellectuals at an opinion workshop in the library of the People’s Houses.® At that time, there was no place in Ankara where intellectuals could meet and discuss issues. Berkes thought that the People’s Houses could fill this gap and he brought together a group of intellectuals that included Nafi Atuf Kansu, Sevket Siireyya Aydemir, Halil Fikret Kanat, Cevdet Nasuh, Said Aydoslu, and Muzaffer Serif Bagoglu. In their first meeting, Aydoslu, a conservative intel- lectual, took the lead and presented his ideas on Turkish history. The first experiment was successful as they decided to come together regularly. How- ever, in the second meeting, Sevket Aziz Kansu got into a row with Muzaffer36 Chapter 2 Serif Basoglu, who accused him of being a racist based on his anthropologi- cal studies. This incident collapsed the workshop experiment. Berkes remained hopeful about the eventual success of the Kemalist revo- lution. He understood the failure of the People’s Houses was quite inevitable because the backwardness of people and their ideas cannot be undone in a single step of revolution. He believed that the Kemalists would gradually succeed in transforming society as a whole and he sincerely wanted to con- tribute to this grand transformation. This was his frame of mind while he worked on the construction of the central library of the People’s Houses. The work on the library also gave Berkes time to read many books that broadened his intellectual horizons. For example, the history of mathematics led him to realize the significance of studying the evolution of scientific thought by looking at its historical development in the West.® He also read the books of such scholars and philosophers as Arthur Eddington, Bertrand Russell, Rudolph Eucken, Adam Miiller, and Othman Spann. This liberty to study made him more aware of the incompetence of the professors in the history and philosophy departments of the Dariiffiinun. However, his reading adventure in the library of the Houses came to an end after the inauguration of the library by Kemal Atatiirk as part of the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the Republic in 1933. MAARIF KOLE]I Pleased with the work he had done in the library of People’s Houses, Nafi Atuf Kansu, the director of Ankara branch, asked Berkes to become the principal of Maarif Koleji, the newly established secondary school in Anka- ra. This was one of the schools of the Turkish Education Association (Tiirk Maarif Cemiyeti) that was established in 1928 to promote education by open- ing private schools and dormitories, providing students with scholarships, and educating students according to the requirements of contemporary civil- ization. By this means the Association hoped to contribute to the consolida- tion of the republican regime.® The school of the Association was first established in Ankara in 1931 as a primary school together with a pre-school education center.®? Following the success of the primary school, the adminis- tration of the association began to consider opening a secondary school. This school would compensate for the lack of schools in Ankara with a reputation comparable to the American missionary or French Catholic schools in {stan- bul. With this purpose, the association decided to collaborate with the American Friends of Turkey. This reminded the American Friends of Turkey of the ideas of the American educationalist John Dewey, who wrote a report on the Turkish educational system after his study tour in Turkey in 1924. In this report,Edtucation and Early Career of Nivazi Berkes, 1922-1933 37 Dewey argued that the Ministry of Education should adopt a decentralized, flexible policy in order to overcome the diversified educational needs of different regions. He also advised the Kemalist government to establish a model school to experiment with modem teaching methods and curricula prior to the spread of this model to other parts of the country. Upon approy- al of the Ankara government, the American Friends of Turkey sponsored the school and invited Dr. Beryl Parker, a follower of John Dewey at the Univer- sity of Chicago, to introduce the ideas of Dewey to Turkish education. Ex- perimenting with the ideas of Dewey became the driving force that laid the foundation of the association’s secondary school, Maarif Koleji, in 1933.7 As required by law, the principal of the school had to be a Turkish national. Nafi Atuf Kansu, a member of the executive board,”! nominated Berkes to become the principal of the school. Niliifer Giirsoy, daughter of Celal Bayar, was a student in the school at the time. She told this author that the students did not welcome Berkes. They were used to the previous princi- pal of the school, who had to be replaced since he was not a university graduate. The students expressed their deep disappointment with his replace- ment by crying on Berkes’s first day as principal. This must have been an unpleasant start for Berkes. Nevertheless, the pleasure of working on an educational project motivated him beyond the emotional protest of the first day. However, he would soon lose this motivation. At the school, Berkes had to work with Dr. Parker, the educational advis- or of the project. At first both of them agreed to come up with a flexible model that could satisfy the differing educational needs from region to re- gion, as suggested by Dewey. However, they were disappointed to watch as the school became elitist for only the children of Ankara bureaucrats in direct conflict with Dewey’s recommendations. The Ankara elite, who could not send their children to the foreign schoois in Istanbul, wanted to have a similar school in Ankara, and thus, the Maarif Koleji experiment was hijacked with no chance for recovering its original intentions. Niliifer Giirsoy again told this author that Berkes was unhappy with the social background of the students in the school. For him, this place had become a bourgeois school. in fact, this was frustrating both for Berkes and his colleague Parker, and they eventually decided to warn the government about the developments by resigning from their posts. Parker also wrote a report to the government and referenced Professor Dewey’s proposal for the Turkish educational system.” In the end, Maarif Koleji experiment may not have led to the implementation of Dewey’s ideas but it pioneered Anatolian High Schools, which educated students from all social classes and parts of Anatolia. His early career as an educationalist ended when Berkes resigned from Maarif Koleji for ideological reasons. After his resignation, Berkes decided to go back to Istanbul where he found an assistantship at the sociology38 Chapter 2 department of the old Dariilfimun, which had become Istanbul University after the Kemalist University Reform in 1932. He spent a year there and became familiar with modern sociological approaches, thanks to the profes- sors who fled from Nazi Germany and found refuge in Turkey. However, he was then invited to the graduate program at the University of Chicago by the members of the sociology department, who had heard of and been impressed by his work at Maarif Koleji. Thus, what seemed to have been a short-lived career in education, Berkes’s experiences at the Istanbul School for Boys, the Dariilfimun, and Maarif Koleji, paved the way for his graduate studies, first in Istanbul University and then at the University of Chicago. NOTES 1. For a historical account of education in the classical period see Necdet Sakaogli, Osmanh dan Giniimiize Egitim Tarihi [History of Education from Ottomans to the Present Time}, (Istanbul: Bilgi University, 2003), 17-43; Hasan Ali Koger, Tiirkiye‘de Modern Fgitimin Dogusu ve Gelisimi [The Rise and Development of Modem Education in Turkey], (istanbul; Milli Egitim Yayinlari, 1991), 5-21; and for medrese education see Kenan Yakupoghi, Osmani: Medrese Egitimi ve Felsefesi Otoman Medrese Education and Philoso- phy], (Istanbul: Gékkubbe, 2006). 2. For a historical account of the Janissary Army see Godfrey Goodwin, The Janissaries, (London: Saqi Essentials, 2006). 3. Plato, The Republic, (transtated by Alan Bloom) (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 4, Sakaoglu, Osmanhs ‘dan Gitniimitize Egicim Tarihi, 35-86. 3. Aksin, Kisa Turkiye Tarihi, 27-28. 6. ibrahim Ethem Basaran, “Tarkiye'de Egitim Sisteminin Evrimi [The Evolution of Edu- cational System in Turkey}” 75 Yidda Egirim (Education in the 75th Year], (Istanbul: ITistory Foundation, 1999), 92. 7. Sakaoglu, Osmanit'dan Ginimiize Egitin Tarihi, 87; Koger, Tiirkive‘de Modern Egitimin Dogusun ve Gelisimi. 57. 8, Basaran, “Tiirkiye’de Egitim Sisteminin Evrimi,” 93; Sakaoglu, Osmant ‘dan Giumiimiize Egitim Tarihi, 79-86. 9. For this argument, see Niyazi Berkes, Banicrlk, Ulusculuk ve Toplumsal Devrimler {[Westemism, Nationalism, and Social Revolutions], (Istanbul: Yén, 1965); Idris Kiigtikismer, Diizenin Yabancilasmasi {The Alienation of the Order], (Istanbul: Ant, 1969); and Ahmet YViicekk, Turkiye ‘de Orgitlenmis Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabami, :1946-1968 |Socio-Econom- ic Basis of Organized Religion in Turkey}, (Ankara: SBF, 1971). 10. Quoted in Sakaoglu, Osmantr'dan Gitrimize Egitim Tarihi, 169. Transtation is mine. The original in Turkish is as follows: “Bir devietin genel egitim siyasetinde, milletin diigtince ve duygu bakimmdan birligini saglamak gereklidir ve bu da dgretim birligi ile olur. Tanzi- ‘mat'n ilan edildigi siralarda 6gretim birligine gegilmek istonmigse de basaril: olunamanns, bilakis bir ikilik ortaya gkmustir, Bu ikilik egitim ve égretim birligi bakimindan birgok kati ve sakinealt sonuglar doBurmus, iki tirli egitimle memlekette iki tip insan yetismeye baslamustir, Onerimiz. kabul edildiginde, Turkiye Cumburiyeti dahilindeki bitin egitim kurumlanmin bitic- ik merci Maarif Vekaleti olacaktwr, Baylece biitin egitim yuvalarnda, Cumhuriyetin irfan siyaseti, ortak bir epitim yolu izlenecektir.” 11, Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 57. 12. Feroz Ahmad, “Kemal Atatiirk and the Founding of Modern Turkey.” Balkan Strong- men: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe, (ed.) B. J. Fischer, (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 154.Education and Early Corer of Niy Berkes, 1922-1933 BD 13. Giirsen Topses, “Cumburiyet Déinemi Egitimin Gelisimi {Fhe Development of Educa- tion in Republican Turkey},” 75 Yedder Bitim [75 Years of Education] (Istanbul: History Foun- dation, 1999), 11. 14. Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziva Gokalp (Translated and edited by Niyazi Berkes), (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1959); Ziya Gokalp, “Milli Kiltir ve Medeniyet [National Culture and Civilization)” Tarkeatigin Esastart (Fundamentals of Turkism] (Istanbul: Ministry of National Education, 1990}, 30-46. 15, Andreas M. Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 263-64. 16, Erdal Indnt, Bir Bilin ve Egitim Onciisti Mehmet Nadir Bey {Mehmet Nadir Bey: A Leading Figure of Science and Education] (Istanbul: TUBITAK, 1992), 12. 17, “Istanbul Lisesi |[stanbul School for Boys].” Istanbul Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Istanbul], (2nd ed. 2003), 232. 18. See John Dewey, “Foreign Schools in Turkey,” New Republic, 41 (1924/25): 40-42, 19. For a concise history of the Istanbul School for Boys see Sikri Levent Deniz, “istanbul Erkek Lisesi’ne Tarihge [History of Istanbul School for Boys],” in Diiyiiner Umimivye ‘den Istanbul Erkek Lisesi'ne [From Public Debt Adminisiration to Istanbul School for Boys], (Istanbul: Istanbul School for Boys Foundation, 2006), 127-35. 20. Enver Sapolyo and Com Atabcyoghu, “line Olay: [The Needle Incident].” in Diytin-t Unnimive ‘den Istanbul Erkek Lisesi'ne, 14044 21. Berkes, Unuudan Yillar, 51. 22. Niyazi Berkes, “Behaviourism,” Felsefe ve igtimaivat Mecmuast, 3/1 (1931): 13-21, 23, Niyazi Berkes, “Modern tetimaiyatin Mengeleri [Origins of Modem Sociology].” Sivasi Hiniler Mecmuast, 2/19 (1932); 384-89, 2/20 (1932): 416-31. 2/21 (1933): 467-82. 24. John B. Watson, Behaviorism, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). Berkes did not get this translation published. 25. Berkes, Umuuian Yullar, 60. 26. M. Cagatay Okutan, Bozkurt tan Kuran'a Milli Tark Talebe Birligi [From Grey Wolf to Quran: National Union of Turkish Students}, (Istanbut: Bilgi University, 2004); see also Joseph Szyliowicz. A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case, (London: Sage rublications, 1972). 27. Cemil Kogak, rit, (October 1997): 61. 28, Peroz Ahmad, “The Progressive Republican Party," Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (eds.) M. Heper and J, Landau, (London; 1,B,Tauris, 1991), 65-82. 29. See Ergun Aybars, istiklal Mahkemeleri [Independence Tribunals], (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1998). 30. Erick J. Zurcher, Turkey A Modern History, (London: LB. Tauris, 2004), 174. 31. Ahmet Yiicekik, 100 Soruda Tirkive ‘de Din ve Sivaset (100 Questions and Answers on Religion and Politics in Turkey], (Istanbul: Gergek, 1988), 58-39, 32. Walter F. Weiker, “The Free Party 1930.” Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (eds.) Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, (London: LB, Tauris, (991), 33. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, (London: Routledge, 1993), $9. 34, Kemal Ustiin, Menemen Olay: ve Kubilay (The Menemen Incident and Kubilay], (Istan- bul: Cagdas Yayinlart, 1977). 38. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: MeGill University Press, 1964), 36. Yakup Kadri {Karaosmanoglu}, a Kemalist intellectual and diplomat captured the anger and bewilderment aroused by the Menemen affair in parly circles:“[I] is as though nothing has happened all these years, as though . . . the idea of any of our radical reforms has not altered anything in this country... . It means the prevailing climate and environment, the moral environment was not that of the revolutionary, republican and patriotic Turkish youth; it was the environment of Dervish Mehmed, a devotee of the Nagshibandi {Sufi] Order which we have described with such adjectives as *rebellious,’ “brutal,” ‘thieving,’ and *reactionary.”” Quoted in Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 60. iyazi Berkes*in Ansari [Memoirs of Niyazi Berkes].” Toplumsal Ta-40 Chapter 2 37. Hasan Ersel, Ahmet Kuyas, Ahmet Oktay, and Mete Tungay, “Menemen’de Aysklanma {The Rebellion in Memenem},”* Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1923-1940 [Encyclopedia of Repub- lie], (istanbul: Yaps Kredi, 2002), 150-51. 38. Daily Hakimiyeti Milliye, 30 November 1930 quoted in Cetin Yetkin, Turkiye ‘de Tek Parti Yonetimi 1930-1945 [Single Party Administration in Turkey], (Istanbul: Altun Kitaplar, 1983), 29. 39. Louis Althusser, /deolaji ve Devletin Ideolojik Aygrtlari, 33-34. 40. Max Weber defined modern states as follows: “[A] state is a human community that (successfuily} claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” For this argument see, “Politics as Vocation,” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociolo- gy. (trans, and ed.) H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 7-128. 41, See Feroz Ahmad, “The Search for Tdeology in Kemalist Turkey 1919-1939," Exsays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 1, (Istanbul: Bilgi University, 2007), 173-94. 42. Kadro, lkinci Kanun (1932), Kadro 1932-/, (ed.) Cem Alpar, (Ankara: Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences, 1978), 3. Translation is mine. The original text in Turkish is as follows: “Turkiye bir inkulap igindedir. Bu inkilap kendine prensip ve onu yasatacaklara suur olabilecck bitin nazari ve fikri unsurlara maliktir. Ancak bu nazari ve fikri unsurlar inkalaba IDEOLO!I olabilecek bir fikriyat systemi iginde terkip ve tedvin edilmig degildir. Gerek milli mahiyeti gerck beynelmilel stimul ve tesirleri itibarile, tarihin en manah hareketle~ rinden biri olan inlalibunizm, zatinde miindemig bu ileri fikir ve prensip unsurlarint, simdi inkilibin seyri iginde ve onun icaplarina uygun bir gekilde izah isi, bugiinktl Tork inkilép mievverligine disen vazifelerin en acil ve en sereflisidir . . . KADRO, BUNUN ICIN CIKIYOR.” 43. Asaf Burhan Belge and Ismail Hsrev were educated in the Communist University of the Workers of the East in Moscow. Sevket Streyya and Vedat Nedim Tér were among the nationalist, anti-comintern faction of the Communist Party of Turkey in the twenties. 44, Omir Sezgin, Kadro Hareketi, Kadro 1932-1, (ed.) Cem Alpar, 14 and passim. 45, Hasan Ersel et a/., “Kadro dergisi yayimlanmaya basladi [The Journal Kadro Began to be Published],” Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi 1923-1940, 194. 46. One of the journals that promoted such ideas was Hifi: Oguz [Bekatal’s Cigir, which adopted the Turkish version of the fascist motto “The fascist disdains the comfortable life” (Fasist rahat hayatt istihkar eder.) See Hasan Ersel et ai., “lz birakan fikir ve sanat dergileri [Journals of Art and Ideas That Left Their Mark Behind),” Cumhuriyee Ansiklopedisi 1923-1940, 212. 47. Cetin Yetkin, Tiirkive ‘de Tek Parti Yonetimi 1930-1945, 42; and Feroz Ahmad, The Search for Ideology in Kemalist Turkey 1919-1939, 185. 48, Falih Rifkt Atay, Yerti Rusya [New Russia], (Ankara, 1931), 170-172, quoted in Getin Yetkin, Tiirkiye de Tek Parti Yonetimi, 34-5. Translation is mine, the emphasis added. The original text in Turkish is as follows: “Rusya’dan ben bir ders getiriyorum: Bu ders, Tlrk intilalini organize etmek, yeni gencligi yetistirmek ve Ttirk cemiyetini birkag hamlede terbiye etmek usulleridir. . . . Rusya’dan komtinist degil, fakat daha guurlu olarak geliyorum: Tiirkiye’nin iktisat ve inga planin: yapmak, Inkilap Firkasim komiinist ve fagist, yani eski nizamdan (diizenden) yeni bir nizama gegen memleketlerin firkalarndan 6mek alarak kurmak, biirokrasi yerine ihtilalci metodlar almak, hig durmaksizm buyOk yiganmn terbiyesine gegmek.” 49. Ekrem Ergtiven, Sikea Kaya: Sozleri ve Yazilart, 1927-37 [Writings and Statements of Stkril Kaya, 1927-37], (Istanbul, 1937), 305-9. 50. Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, 50 (1) (1996): 42. 51. Tahran Erdem and f, Selguk Erez, Halkevleri, 1932, 1952, 1963 [People’s Houses, 1932, 1952, 1963], (Istanbul: RPP Istanbul Youth Branch, 1963). 52. See Sefa Simsek, Bir ideolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi: Halkevleri 1932-1951 [An Ex- periment of Ideological Mobilization: People’s Houses: 1932-1951], (Istanbul: Bogazi¢i Uni- versity, 2002); Antl Cegen, Aratiirk iin Kittie Kurumu: Halkevleri (Atatik’s Cultural Institu- tions: People’s Houses]. (Ankara: Gindogan Yayinlari, 1990).Education and Early Career of Nivazi Berkes, 1922-1933 Al $3. Quoted in Necdet Sakaoglu, Osman ‘dan Giniimiize Egitin Tarihi, 198, Translation is nine. The original text in Turkish is as foliows: “Bir milletin yetigip gelecoge hazirlanmasinda klasik kurumlar okullardir. Fakat cagdas uluslar, bir varlik olarak yetisip érgiittenmek igin okullanin bilinen yéntemlerini yeterli gérmiiyorlar. Bu sirada, oku) dgretiminin yaninda matla- ka bir halk egitimi yapmak ve halki bir arada galistirmak gereklidir.” $4. Berkes, Unatulan Yillar, 72. 55. tbid., 89. 56. thid., 74. 57. Ibid. 77. 58. Translated by Rilya Koksal, “In the Lazika Land: Cepni Turks,” Crossroads, 2 (Winter 2003): 8. 59. Berkes, Unutlan Yitlar, 94. 60. ibid., 93. 61. Niyazi Berkes, Bazi Ankara Koyleri Uzerine Bir Arastirma [A Survey on Several Vile lages of Ankara], (Ankara: DTCF Philosophy Institute, 1942). 62. Berkes, Unutidan Villar, 89. 65. Ibid., 77. 66. Turkish Education Association, Bes Senetik Faatiyer Raporu 1928-1933 [Report of Activities 1928-1933], (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1933), 7. 67. Turkish Education Association, & ve Orta Okullart [Primary and Secondary Schools]. (Ankara: Prime Ministry, 1935). 1. 68. The American Friends of Turkey was an organization to promote Turkish-Ameriean friendship and to counteract anti-Turkish propaganda in the United States, The organization was founded by a group of American intellectuals and philanthropists in New York on 11 June 1930. The organization was also active in the field of education by teanslating and publishing literature in the new alphabet, by sending graduate students to the United States, and by establishing experimental kindergartens and primary schools. For detailed information on the origins and activities of the American Friends of Turkey. see American Friends of Turkey (New York: American Friends of Turkey. Ine. 1931), See also, Suhnaz Yilmaz, “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-War Era,” Middle Easiern Studies. 42 (2) (2006): 229. 69. John Dewey, Tiirkive Maarifi Haklinda Rapor [Report on Turkey’s Education], (Istan- bul: Ministry of Education, 1939); see also Selahattin Turan, “John Dewey’s Report of 1924 and His Recommendation on the Turkish Educational Systems Revisited,” History of Educa. tion, 29 (6) (2000): $46; Sabri Blydkdtivenci, “John Dewey's Impact on. Turkish Education.” Studies in Philosophy and Education, 13 (1994/95): 395. 70. Ibid., 7. 71. Turkish Education Association, Bey Senelik Faaliyet Raporu, 6. 72, Beryl Parker, Tiirkive ‘de lik Tahsil Hakkinda Rapor {Report on Primary Edueation in Turkey], (Istanbul: Ministry of Education, 1939).Chapter Three Kemalist University Reform, the Great Depression, and the Graduate Education of Niyazi Berkes, 1933-1939 Resigning from his post at Maarif Koleji, Niyazi Berkes decided to go back to Istanbul where he found an assistantship at the sociology department of the old Dariilfiinun. This was a period of radical transformation of the uni- versity system, in which the Kemalist revolutionaries, acting upon the 1932 report of Swiss educationalist Professor Albert Matiche, reinvigorated the building blocks of the university including the faculty, the curricula, and the library. Many of the teaching faculty were expelied from the university and the need for distinguished scholars was met by the professors fleeing Nazi Germany. These German professors laid the foundations of modern, scholar- ly university education in Republican Turkey. Berkes became a research assistant in this transitory period and from them became familiar with the modern approaches in social sciences. This was complemented by his unex- pected graduate education in the United States. KEMALIST UNIVERSITY REFORM Berkes became an assistant in the sociology department of Istanbul Univer- sity after the university reform in 1933. This project had been on the agenda of the Ottoman reformers and Kemalist revolutionaries for a long time. In- deed, lively debate over the strategy for educational reform could be heard among Ottoman intellectuals long before the advent of the Republic. In the early years of the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), the debate between Emrullah Efendi! (1858-1914), the Minister of Education, and Sati 4344 Chapter 3 Bey? (1880-1969), the principal of the teachers’ college (Dariilmuallimin), was So influential that it still has a significant place in educational thought in Turkey. According to Emrullah Efendi, the educational system resembled “the tree of heaven” with its roots in the sky and its branches growing downward to earth. Ideally, the education system was to be organized from top to bottom, beginning, therefore, with the university (Dariilfiimun) towards the lower level schools (mektep). By contrast, Sati Bey argued that reforming. the university would be meaningless and a waste of resources unless mekteps were reformed first. Among these two alternatives it seems that the Kemalist nationalists preferred Sat: Bey’s approach, and they launched the university reform in 1932 subsequent to the modernization of the educational system in general. The backwardness of Dartilfiinun drew Ankara’s attention first in 1924 when the university administration wanted to punish a group of students who had their pictures taken on campus.* Upon the appeal of some conservative professors, who believed that taking pictures was a sinful act, the university administration issued a warning to the students. However, this reprimand infuriated the revolutionaries in Ankara. Kemal Atatiirk himself made it clear that the administration should rather reprimand the conservative professors than the students using modern technology. After this, the university admin- istration stepped back and the file against the students was closed, but this was indicative of the governing mentality, and demonstrated the need for reform. Not surprisingly, the Dardlfimun professors also distanced themselves from the Republican reforms. The law faculty was so indifferent to the legal reforms being legislated in the Assembly that in 1925 the Kemalists revolu- tionaries had to establish a schoo! of law in Ankara in order to support the reform process. Berkes found the education at the Istanbul School of Law both boring and anti-intellectual. He was interested in studying the transformation of the legal structure in Turkey but the indifference of the professors to the process impelled him to change his major from law to philosophy. However, he was disappointed yet again with the political attitude and educational quality in the philosophy department: After studying law for a year and passing all its exams, | feft the Law School and entered the Philosophy Department with great expectations, Here again, the Dariilfiiaun was alien to Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey as though it were a foreign school. Or it was even like a Western primary school, which had no compatible thought with [Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey] in its foreign reservoir of ideas. It was a place where cacophonic conversations, unaware of or indiffer- ent to the direction of the national liberation, were taking place. 4Graduate Education of Nivazi Berkes, 1933-1939 45 The Dariilfiinun aiso opposed the introduction of the new alphabet based on the Latin script. During the discussions over the costs and benefits of introducing the new alphabet, the Dariilfimun professors harshly criticized changing the Arabic script. Discussions were heated by 1924 when the pro- fessors said that they would break their pens and would not write a single line in the new alphabet.* After the adoption of the new alphabet in 1928, the Dariilfiinun professors, sticking to their old habits, refused to write in the Latin script. Berkes describes in interesting detail the attitude of the profes- sors to the new alphabet on the day of Kemal Atatiirk’s visit to the Dariilfinun in 1930: ‘That day, the professor [Babanzade Naim] was about to give evidences for the existence of God. Then, there was a knock on the door. The Dean’s Secretary, Sitkt Bey said excitedly “the Ghazi is here!” and he rushed out to inform other rooms. The professor put on a sour face but remained calm. He put away his dear book. ... He did not forget to warn] us either and said “If you have any notes written in the old script, hide them, This man is an unpredictable per- son.” He had not taken him [Atatiirk] seriously, yet. But, we [the students} knew what he [Atatiirk] was up to. ‘The reluctant attitude of the Dariiffiimm in contributing to the reform process also drew the attention of several authors in the press. Falih Rrfki Atay (1894-1971), an ardent representative of the Kemalist intelligentsia, harshly criticized the Dariifiinun’s unwillingness to participate in the revolu- tionary socio-cultural projects of the Republicans in the daily Cumhuriyet: Dariilftinun has not published even a single page on the Turkish Revolution. How should we analyze the attitude of Daziifimen towards the Turkish Revo lution that touched upon all material and moral institutions in the country by creating a brand new material and moral order? We accept neither objectivism nor incompetence [as an excuse]. The need for university education reform was also emphasized by the Kadro movement, the leftist-Kemalist group in Ankara. Following the histo- ty congress that convened in Ankara in 1932, Burhan Asaf described the presentations of the Dariilfiinun professors. He argued that the incompetent professors had failed to recognize the significance of the national liberation in political and economic spheres and this time they failed to see the impor- tance of liberating the national history.§ Another criticism against the Dariilfiinun was leveled by Sevket Siireyya after the Conference of the Turk- ish Economists in Istanbul in 1933.9 He argued that the scholarly works of the professors should support the basic principles of the Revolution, includ- ing especially revolutionism, étatism, and nationalism. During the confer- ence of Turkish economists, the Kadro editorialists were especially disturbed46 Chapter 3 by the critical attitude adopted by the Dariilfiinun professors towards the Gtatism of the new regime as an economic policy. The Dariilfiimm professors also recognized the need for reforming the university but they had two different views on the reform strategy. Moderate conservatives, to which the university administration was closer, advocated a gradual reform process. The Rector, Professor ismail Hakki Baltactoglu (1886-1978) led this group among the faculty. Under his guidance, in 1929 the Dariilfiinun professors sketched out a reform proposal to improve the quality of education in their own institution. '° But Ankara rejected this pro- posai, opting for more substantive and radical reforms. The second group, led by Professor Kerim Erim (1894-1952), the bril- liant mathematician who wrote his doctorate under Albert Einstein’s supervi- sion at Berlin University, included professors who were convinced of the need to transform the school into a modern university by taking strict meas- ures. Erim was reported as saying that his group was “the suicide club of Turkish professors” since they were advocating such radical measures that they risked losing their own place in the university.!! As a result, when the Kemalists took on the task of reforming the university, the members of the first group, including Professor Baltacioglu, were expelled from the univer- sity whereas the second group, with few exceptions, survived. Through this action Kemalist university reform was accused of being a politically motivated operation against the opponents of the new regime. However, university reform was not only part of a political operation but also part of the socio-cultural revolution that was launched after 1930. Rather than political considerations, Kemalists wanted to reform the university sys- tem for its own sake. This point became evident in 1931 when Ankara invited Professor Albert Malche (1876-1956), the Swiss expert on education, to advise on university reform. With this purpose, he surveyed the faculty mem- bers and wrote a comprehensive report on the deficiencies of the university system. The report was submitted to the government in June 1932. The government sent the report to Kemal Atattirk, who placed the highest priority on education reform. Atatiirk had been involved in the design and implementation of educational and cultural reforms since the adoption of the new Turkish alphabet in 1928. He designed the reform projects with groups of experts and statesmen around his dinner table in Dofmabahge, the ornate palace of the Ottoman Sultans on the Bosphorus, confiscated by the national- ists in 1923, These meetings took place in the form of modern colloquia, which are widely used in the Western world but foreign to Turkish society, even to this day.!? Various papers on education were presented and many ideas on the issue were expressed. Professor Malche reported on his findings at one of these meetings. Atatiirk himself read the report line by line and underlined the following points: (1) The number of scientific publications in Turkish is not sufficient, and there are very few students who are capable ofGraduate Education of Nvazi Berkes, 1933-1939 47 reading and comprehending scholarly works in other languages. (2) The teaching method adopted by Dariilfiinun professors is outmoded and un- promising. Conveying encyclopedic information to students in the lectures prevents the development of critical thinking and real scientific works. (3) The incentive for recruiting new faculty members should belong to the min- istry rather than colleagues. Similarly, the power to end contracts should belong to the ministry that had appointed the professors. (4) Prospective Turkish professors cannot be educated in the Dartilfiinun. Young academi- cians should be sent abroad for graduate studies, (5) The university should play an active role in the society. Conferences, lectures, seminars, and trips open to the public should be organized. The university should also publish an academic journal in Turkish. '> The Kemalist university reform was jaunched in 1932 in line with the proposals of the Malche Report. Responsible for carrying out the reforms was Resit Galip (1893-1934), the radical Kemalist who had become the Minister of Education after he criticized the previous minister during discus- sions around Atatlirk’s dinner table. In this colloquium, when Atatiirk :inter- vened to defend the Minister, Galip replied that he was ready to defend the revolution against anyone, even Atatiirk. This incident impressed Atatiirk who then appointed him to the education post.'* Unsurprisingly, the reforms were very radical with Galip in office, His purpose was not only to upgrade the scientific level of the university but also to transform it into an ideologi- cal apparatus of the revolution. In fact, he launched the university reform by saying that “[T]he new university aims to conduct research for deepening our knowledge of the truth; and to collect, upgrade and disseminate scientific information. , , , The most significant aspect of the new university will be its national and revolutionary character. The new university will process the ideology of the Turkish revolution,” 5 To this end Galip constructed a committee of reformers chaired by Albert Malche. The committee also included Kerim Brim, the leading figure among the Dariilfiinun professors who supported the Kemalist university reform, Riistii Uzel (1891-1965), the director-general of technical and vocational education, and Avni Bagman (1887~1965) and Osman Horasan, the members of the teaching and training committee. The biggest task awaiting the mem- bers of the reform committee was making a decision about the future of the Dariilfiinun professors. The members were all committed to following objec- tive, scientific criteria, which aided their ability to draft the list of professors who would be expelled from the university. The situation of each faculty member was evaluated through an ordinal scale measurement method in which five points were assessed to full professors, three points to those who knew a foreign language, and three points for each publication.'> However, political considerations affected some decisions, such as the expulsion of Baltactoglu, the rector of the Dariilfiinun. Nevertheless, political considera-4g. Chapter 3 tions could not play a significant role in the decisions because Malche re- stricted the role of politics on the committee. As a result, 157 of 250 mem- bers of the old Dariilfiimun were expelled from the university and reap- pointed either as high school teachers or as civil servants in government offices. ASSISTANTSHIP AT ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY The expulsion of the incompetent and conservative professors created a lacu- na that could now be filled by hiring distinguished professors to re-establish the university. The committee decided to appoint new faculty members from among Turkish nationals who recently graduated from Western universities. For example, Enver Ziya Karal (1906-1982) and Mehmet Karasan (1907-1974) were appointed associate professors when they returned to Tur- key after studying history and philosophy, respectively, at Lyon University, in France. Berkes tells the story of their appointment in his memoir.'7 He wrote that Karal and Karasan only expected to find teaching positions at a high school upon returning to Istanbul. Both were surprised when they saw their names on the list of the newly appointed professors of the university. This implies that the reform committee followed the situation of the Turkish nationals who were educated abroad and appointed them as tutors even with- out consulting them. In addition to the Turkish nationals educated abroad, the government also invited German professors who were forced to leave Nazi Germany. The government took up contact with Philip Schwartz, the Swiss representative of Jewish professors who had lost their jobs in Nazi Germany, and invited thirty-four professors to Istanbul University.'® The number of German pro- fessors eventually increased to fifty-eight as the government invited profes- sors scattered throughout Europe seeking a safe haven.'? The contract al- lowed the professors to teach in German and English for three years while they learned Turkish. Meanwhile, Turkish professors and teaching assistants would translate their lectures, which required the university to employ assist- ants who were fluent in Western languages. As he was fluent in English, Berkes applied for an assistantship at the university. He wrote to Macit Gékberk, his classmate from the Dariilfiinun, who had become an associate professor at the new university. Gékberk found. an assistantship, and Berkes resigned from his post in Maarif Koleji. He moved from Ankara to Istanbul to work as an assistant to Professor Gerhard Kessler (1883-1963) in the department of sociology. Kessler was a professor of political sociology. A Catholic, he was expelled from Nazi Germany ow- ing to his political views rather than confession. He adhered to ChristianGraduate Education of Niyazi Berkes, 1933-1939 49 Socialism, which was intoierable under the National Socialism of the Hitler regime. Kessler taught political sociology and cooperativism in the department, and assigned readings from Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), the founding fathers of modern socialism. He especially fo- cused on their brochure of 1848, The Communist Manifesto, intending to illustrate the deficiencies of Marxist socialism in comparison to Christian socialism. In his memoirs Berkes remembers that the professor could not convince the students of the supremacy of Christian socialism over Marxist socialism. However, the seminars, especially on the Manifesto, awakened his intellectual curiosity in the fields of history and ecenomics.2° He became aware that without studying the social and economic history of Turkey, it would be meaningless to apply teleological-socialist theories to the Republic. It was wrong, he noted, to assume any similarity between Turkey and West- ern countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, These convictions lay at the foundation of his works on the political economy of Turkey, including the two volumes on the economic history of Turkey.?! Although Berkes was Kessler’s assistant, a professional who had been educated in Germany translated Kessler’s lectures. However, the translator had a degree in business and hardly had any background in the social sci- ences, particularly sociology. Berkes noted that, although the number of students who could speak a Western language was very limited, the students who understood German ridiculed the translator for his mistranslations.*? The widespread inability of students to work in Western languages was one of the criticisms raised by Professor Malche in his education report on the old Dariilfiinun, In an effort to correct this deficit, the Ministry of Education founded the School of Foreign Languages within the university, and learning a Western language became a requirement for students to obtain a degree. The foreign professors were also asked to learn Turkish. In 1934, while still an assistant at Istanbul University, Berkes was called up for military service. In fact, he and his twin brother Enver were exempt from military service since they were born in Cyprus, Although they could decline the call, they both preferred to serve in the army and declined to benefit from the privilege given to Turkish-Cypriots by the Lausanne Treaty (1923). Berkes noted in his memoir that they never thought themselves dif- ferent from Turks living in Turkey. Thus, he would definitely serve in the army like all his peers, He became a reserve officer in Selimiye, reporting to the modern barracks built by Sultan Selim IiT (1761-1808) towards the end of the eighteenth century. Military service gave him the opportunity to ob- serve Turks from various social groups. On one occasion he slapped a soldier who continually ignored his commands. However, he then realized that the soldier was a Kurd who could not speak Turkish, Regretting his rash re-30 Chapter 3 sponse, and to make up for his mistake, he spent an hour every day teaching the soldier to speak Turkish.”* This anecdote coincided with the language campaigns of the Republic. Military service showed Berkes the significance of the language campaign, which not only focused en non-Muslim minorities but also on Muslim groups such as Kurds, Arabs, and others who did not speak Turkish, The purpose of these campaigns was to construct a national identity around the Turkish language and Turkishness that, by definition, sought to minimize ethnographic distinction. Altan Oymen (1932), a significant figure in Turk- ish politics and the media, who was the leader of the People’s Republican Party between 1999 and 2000, noted this aspect of the language campaign in his autobiography by saying that: “Kurds, Arabs, and citizens from other ethnic origins who were previously the subjects of the Ottoman Empire and currently citizens of Republican Turkey shail now say ‘i am a Turk,’ speak Turkish, or learn to speak Turkish if they cannot.”*4 The Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were expected to act similarly. They would preserve their culture and religion but they would learn to speak Turkish. Thereby, the various non- Turkic peoples within the boundaries of the new state would be able to communicate with each other and come together around a national language and identity. Another significant development of 1934 was the adoption of the sur- name law, followed soon thereafter by the law that lifted the usage of hier- archical and religious titles of the old social structure, including aga, hac, hoca, hafiz, molla, bey, efendi, hamm, pasa, and hazretleri, These laws were conscious steps to remove the social and religious differences among, the citizens of the Republic in line with the Kemalist principle of populism. Besides that, the government adopted the policy of purging the Turkish lan- guage of foreign words. The citizens were therefore encouraged to take “pure” Turkish surnames. The list of possible surnames compatible with the language policy was disseminated among the people through population reg- istration offices. As sincere supporters of the republican reforms, Berkes and his family wanted to take a pure Turkish name, probably from the govern- ment list. They decided on Berk-es, which literally means “strong blow” and seems to refer to Turko-Shamanic culture in Central Asia. Berkes returned to the university in 1935 after spending a year in the army. This was the year when the first group of female members of the parliament was elected. The Turkish Women’s Union had been struggling for equality since 1924 and in 1934 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey adopted the law granting women full political rights including suffrage. These achievements led the International Women’s Union to call for a con- gress in Istanbul in 1935.25 Two-hundred-ten delegates from thirty countries came together in the congress. Berkes also attended this congress together with a group of assistants from the university. The presentations in the con-Graduate Education of Nivazi Berkes, 1933-1939 Si gress proved to him the significance of women in the modernization of the society. He immediately wrote and published an article emphasizing the emancipation of women within the Kemalist revolution.”6 This would prove to be one of his last initiatives as a research assistant at Istanbul University. GRADUATE EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Soon after that, Berkes was invited to study in the graduate program at the University of Chicago. Beryl! Parker, his American colleague in Maarif Kole- Ji, was so impressed by his ideas on education that, when she conveyed them to other sociologists at the University of Chicago, they decided to offer Berkes a fellowship in the department of sociology. Berkes accepted the offer and moved to the United States, where he spent four years studying sociology, politics, history, and culture. In the meantime, he worked on the thesis “Development of Secularism in Turkey,” which subsequently became a seminal book in the field of Turkish politics. American education had a significant impact on him and reshaped his intellectual personality. Indeed, Turkish intellectuals educated in the United States over different time periods came back to Turkey with a different perspective.’? For example, the first group of students educated in America just before World War | included Ahmet Emin Yalman, Ahmet Sitkrti Esmer, Cevat Eytip Tasmen, Abdullah Hamdi Toker, and Nikola Agdini. One can say that the American experience had an effect that turned them into liberal- minded intellectuals.?8 In contrast to that, Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, who were educated in the States in the years leading up to the Bolshevik Revolu- tion, returned from America with a thorough understanding of Marxist ideol- ogy. Behice Boran, Muzaffer Serif, Mediha Berkes, and Niyazi Berkes also acquired leftist-progressive perspectives during their education in the thirties. This was mostly because of the resilience of the economic depression in the inter-war period (1919-1939), which reached its zenith after 1929. Among. this group of Turkish students, Berkes had the opportunity to observe the impact of the crisis on both American academia and society. Thus, the im- pact of the American experience on Berkes was not confined to his education at the University of Chicago. Berkes set off on his journey to the United States from Istanbul on the Orient Express to Europe. He wanted to see a bit of Europe before he was introduced to America. He thought he had better be exposed to many cultures and civilizations on his way to and back from the United States so that he would not return to Turkey as a blind lover of one country. However, the stop on his itinerary that impressed him most turned out to be Nazi Germany. He found Berlin very crowded and the streets overrun with Nazi officers. He had to greet them by raising his right hand and shouting “Heil Hitler” in hotels52 Chapter 3 and restaurants. When a young prostitute approached him on the street, he noted that even the Nazis could not do away with the oldest profession in the world, He was struck by the cleanliness and orderly structure of the city. Nevertheless, he knew that was not a Nazi invention but a typical characteris- tic of German culture, He also visited various monuments, museums, and other historical sites in Berlin before he went to Hamburg, from where he embarked on the transatlantic journey that took him to New York City.?? Upon arriving in New York, Berkes was received by Beryl Parker who took him sightseeing. At first, Berkes felt somewhat offended as he thought that his American friend was attempting to show him how magnificent American civilization was. When Dr. Parker took him to the Empire State Building, which was the tallest structure in the world at that time, he was convinced of her American hubris. Later, however, Dr. Parker showed him groups of unemployed workers waiting in the soup lines all over New York, which was quite a contrast to the scenic view from the Empire State Build- ing. He felt ashamed of his previous thoughts. The Americans were preoccu- pied with economic crisis. This was why Dr. Parker wanted to introduce him to the highest floor of the Empire State Building before they discussed the prevailing impact of the economic crisis in American society.3° During his stay, he saw the impact of the crisis on all aspects of American social, political, and intellectual life. The collapse of Wall Strect in New York brought massive unemployment to Chicago as well. During his education, he studied the social outcomes of the crisis in Chicago including the Turkish migrants and hobos. In one set of case studies, Berkes was able to observe the impact of the Great Depression on people when Turkish immigrants*! in Chicago got in touch with him. Most of them were unemployed workers that sat all day in a coffee-house decorated with pictures of Kemal Atatiirk and Marshall Fevzi Cakmak (1876-1950), the heroes of the national struggle. *? They all wanted Berkes to tell them about the greatness of the Turkish army, the strength of the Turkish government, and the huge population of their homeland. They were disheart- ened when they heard the truth about the social and economic difficulties of the new Turkey. News of a better and prosperous Turkey was the only means they had to lift their spirits above their economic hardships. Another group studied by Berkes was the hobos. This group was com- posed of unemployed, homeless workers who, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, had lost all hope of being re-integrated into society. It seems that the Chicago government was unable to effectively deal with the skyrocketing unemployment, which led to the proliferation of hobos. Berkes was dis- traught by the conditions of the hobos.*5 An alternative resource for the faltering economy was a main focus of the students and professors since the early days of the Depression. A thought in the back of everyone’s mind was “the recollection of old-fashioned life onGraduaie Education of Niyazi Berkes, 1933-1939 53 the farm where all human needs were routinely met by family and neighborly action, and where in time of business depression, subsistence farming could keep everyone going until the exchange economy recovered.”*4 Chicago's social scientists knew that a return to agriculturalist times was not a proper prescription for the economic ills. However, they could neither provide an explanation nor a remedy for the economic crisis. The adherence to liberal and rational approaches, especially in the social sciences created indecision, confusion, and distress in academia during the period of the Depression.+5 The confusion of the university professors, who clung to a liberal, ration- alist worldview, created an opening for radical new doctrines. The first group on the campus challenging the liberal philosophy was the Thomists led by Mortimer Adler (1902-2001) who reinvented the Aristotelian rationality of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the father of the Dominican church, who founded scholastic thought by bridging the gap between reason and faith. Inspired by Aquinas, Adler attacked the logical shortcomings of the social and natural sciences as practiced at the University of Chicago in the thir- ties.*° Adler illustrated the inconsistencies of facts and evidence in the natu- ral sciences and claimed that science and faith would eventually overlap. Students, dissatisfied with the liberal-rational philosophy of science prevail- ing on the campus, found Adler’s Thomism appealing. Another ideology that began to influence the campus during the Depres- sion years was Marxism. The inability of anyone to find an effective eco- nomic cure for the Depression led Chicago students to turn to Marxism as they believed that it offered the only true explanation of the Depression. 37 The Communist and Socialist student clubs actively advocated Marxism as a plausible answer to what ailed the American economy. This group became so influential that the university was accused of teaching communism in 1934. As a result, the administration had to dismiss two professors in order to be cleared of the charge of propagating communism, ** However, “the university community continued to harbor a lively sect of Marxists who did in fact advocate revolution, often in extreme and childishly irresponsible fashion.”3? The popularity of socialism began to fade away only when it became clear with the rise of Stalin in 1936 that the Soviet Union had become a communist police state. It was only later, after the advent of the Cold War between the “free world” and “Iron Curtain,” and especiaily after 1948 by the Red Scare led by the anti-communist campaign of Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908-1957) that the left had been destroyed on American campuses. This was the ideological context of the campus when Berkes came to the University of Chicago. Among the two rival ideologies on the campus, he was influenced by Marxism rather than Thomism. Previously, he had wit- nessed the rivalry between the left and the right wings of the Kemalist ideol- ogy during his tenure in the People’s Houses. Although he was closer to the leftist Kadro movement, he had largely remained neutral in this ideological34 Chapter 3 conflict. His second exposure to Marxist thought was in Istanbul University where he worked as an assistant to Professor Kessler, who assigned Marxist readings to be criticized from a Christian Socialist perspective. His encounter with Marxism at the University of Chicago was different from his previous experiences. During the Depression years, when the liberal American per- spective had difficulties in providing either an explanation or a cure for the economic crisis, Marxism must have seemed more meaningful in comparison to his previous encounters. However, he never got involved in student poli- tics after his experience within the National Union of Turkish Students (MTTB) in the Dariiifimun. Nevertheless, he could observe the leftist current on the campus and was impressed by their thoughts and activities. Although he never became an orthodox Marxist, these experiences would prove in- fluential in his works on the political economy of Turkey. The methods adopted by the sociology department also had an influence on his work. He was especially impressed with the accuracy of the quantita- tive research“° and he thereupon improved his knowledge of statistics. Addi- tionally he benefited from the spatial, historical, and theoretical approaches in the department. The champion of this kind of sociology in the department was the American sociologist Robert E. Park (1864-1944), one of the found- ers of the Chicago School of Sociology. His understanding of sociology was based on new concepts such as life history, participant observation, and ecological technique. Life history was an autobiography that “offered a con- crete account of how each stage of the life of the individual in question was affected by his dispositions and beliefs acquired in the past and the kinds of situations in which he was located.”4! Berkes later employed this approach in his writings on Turkish intellectuals that included Ziya Gdkalp, Namik Ke- mal, Yusuf Akgura, and (brahim Miteferrika. Participant observation entailed living among the members of a small, local society in order to understand them as much as possible from an emic perspective. The ecological technique focused on the location and ecology of centers and sub-centers. Berkes would later use both of these techniques, especially in his studies on Turkish villages in the forties. 4? In his memoirs Berkes recalled his first meeting with Professor Park as a humiliating experience since he could not answer any of his questions about sociological studies in Turkey on social classes, urbanization, family, popu- lation, crime, marriage, divorce, social mobility, women, and gender. This conversation led Berkes to examine the development of sociology in Turkey. He came to the conclusion that the social sciences had developed in various countries in response to questions arising in connection with the crisis in the social fife of that particular country.“ Accordingly, sociology in Turkey and America had followed two distinct trajectories of development. He decided to write an article introducing Turkish sociology to American readers. He was also encouraged to write by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), theGraduate Education of Niyazi Berkes, 1933-1939 33 Durkheimian sociologist who was in Chicago as a visiting professor.) As a result, Berkes’s “Sociology in Turkey” was published by the American Jour- nal of Sociology in 1936. In this paper, Berkes argued that Turkish social thought developed in order to provide an answer to the decline of the Otto- man Empire. In fact, the schools of pan-Islamism, nationalism, liberalism, westernism, and positivism in Turkish sociology all appeared with the mo- tive of finding a solution to the decline of the Ottoman state and society. He thereby iflustrated the interplay between social thought and politics using the Ottoman/Turkish case. The success of his paper on Turkish sociology led him to write a series of papers on the development of American sociology. This time his purpose was to demonstrate the relation between the development of social thought and politics in the United States. These articles appeared in Ui, the journal of the People’s Houses under the title “Sociology in the United States of America.” He specifically argued in these papers that the history of social thought in America was the history of capitalism and its crises. He elaborated on social issues together with the sociological ideas in different periods of American history such as the colonial period, the Civil War, the industrial revolution, and the twentieth century. As a result, he revised his hypothesis about the relationship between political context and social thought, taking American history as a case study. Convinced about the effectiveness of this hypothesis, Berkes also wanted to write his dissertation in line with the idea of constructing a relationship between social thought and social needs. He approached Louis Wirth (1897-1952), one of the founders of the Chicago school of sociology work- ing on urbanism, with his proposal. Wirth encouraged Berkes to write his thesis on the development of secularism as an aspect of urban culture. The thesis would also be a reflection of his hypothesis by establishing a relation- ship between the evolution of secular thought and the needs of Ottomar/ Turkish society. However, events at the forefront of the twentieth century changed ail his plans. The death of Kemal Atatiirk on the eve of Kristalinacht and the beginning of World War il prompted the Ministry of Education in Ankara to recall him to Turkey, forcing him to abandon the dissertation and his studies at Chicago. The events of Berkes’s life during this educational phase demonstrate that an intellectual personality is the outcome of the political and social context surrounding an individual. His own intellectual horizons were vastly broad- ened as he was influenced by key individuals and ideas of this time in Istanbul University and the University of Chicago. Moreover, the foundation for his future intellectual contributions was being shaped during these forma- tive years. This we may see in his later contributions to both politics and society. But significantly, he was not merely the object of new methods and means. During this period of graduate study he made significant contribu-36 Chapter 3 tions in his own right, contributions that were recognized as original and inventive at the highest levels of his various fieids. Although forced to return to Turkey because of unfolding events in his country and Europe, these contributions wouid by no means end with his departure from formal gradu- ate education. NOTES 1. See Mustafa Ergon, “Emruliah Efendi: Hayatr, Gortisleri, Calismalart (Emrullah Efendi: His Life, Thoughts and Works],” D7CF Dergisi, 30 (14) (1979-82): 7-36. 2. See Mustafa Ergin, “Sati Bey: Hayat ve Tork Egitimine Hizmetteri (Sati Bey: His Life and Contribution to Turkish Education], Inna Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. | (1987) 419 3. Abdurrahman Cayer, “Atattirk, Bilim ve Universite [Atattirk, Science and University], Atatiirk Aragarma Merkezi Dergisi, 4 (10) (1987): 64, 4, Niyazi Berkes, Atatiirk ve Devrimler, 19. Translation is mine, The original text is as follows: “Bir yil okuyup bitin imtihanlarm gecirdigim Hukuk’u bahar ‘oaytik uomutla girdigim Fetscfe Bolimi’nde de Darilfiinun, yabancr okullardan |. Mustafa “Kemal ‘Tarkiyesi cergevesine yabanct ve sagirdi. Ya da yabanes fikir dagaresginda ona uyacak bir fikri olmayan bir Bat lIkokulu gibiydi. Ulusal Kurtulug dzgtirlaguntin nereye gideceginden haber- siz, ya da ondan umursamast kakafonik seslerle konugmalar yapitan bir yerdi.” 5, Tahir Hatipoglu, /irkive Universite Tarihi [University History in Turkey], (Ankara: Selvi, 2000), 90. 6. Niyazi Berkes, Atattirk ve Devrimler, 21-22, Translation is mine. The original text is as follows: “O gan hoca [Babanzade Naim] yarm kelan {Tanrimm varligtar] ispat delillerini antatmak tizereydi ki kap) hizla galdi. Dekan Sekreteri Sitki Bey heyecanindan sadece, “Gazi geldil” diyebildi; baska odalara haber vermek Gzere kogup gitti .. . Hoca’nm yiizii sapsari olmus, fakat sakinligini bozmamust.. Sevgili kitapeagizim Kapayarak kaldirdi . . . Bizi de unutmadi, ‘Oniinizde eski harflerle yazih notlariniz varsa bir yere saklaym. Bu adamin sag solu belli olmaz’ dedi. O, onu hala ciddiye almamisit, Onun saginin solunun nerde oldugunu biz bile biliyorduk.” 7. Falih Ratkt Atay, Cumhuriyet, 17 [July] 1932. Translation is mine. The original text is as follows: “Dardlftinun Turk Inkilibina dair on seneden beri bir tek sayfa telif etmemistir. Dardlftinun’un memleketin maddi ve manevi miiesseselerinin hepsine dokunan yepyeni maddi, manevi bir nizam yaratan Tirk Inkilabina karst bu vaziyeti nasil tahlil olunabilir? Biz ne bitarafligy ne de kifayetsizligi kabul ederiz.” 8. Burhan Asaf, “Arkada Kalan Dardilftinun (Dariilftinun that Fell Behind],” Kadro, (Au- gust 8, 1932), 47-8. 9. Sevket Streyya, “Dariilftinun Inkilép Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey Iktisatgihgs (Dardlfiinun’s sensitivity for the Revolution and Economic Mentality of Cavit Bey,” Kadro, 14, (Subat, 1933), 511. 10. Ali Arslan, Dariiffinun ‘dan Universiteye [From Daralfiinun to University), (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1995), 289. 11, From the unpublished memoirs of German migrant Philip Schwartz, quoted in Horst Widmann, Atattirk ve Universite Reformu [Atatirk and University Reform], (Istanbul: Kabatct, 1999), 74, 12. Sakaoglu, Osmantr'dan Gianitmiize Egitim Tarihi, 200. 13. Utkan Kocatiirk published the notes taken by Atatirk himsel!'on the Maiche report. See Uskan Kocatiirk, “Atatiirk’tin Universite Reformu ile IIgili Notlari [Atatark’s Notes on Univers sity Reform],” Atattirk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi, 1 (1) (1984): 3-10. 14. Kazim Ozalp, Atatiirk ten Amar [Memoirs from Atatiirk], (Istanbul ty Bank, 1998). 15, ‘Tahir Hatipoglu, Turkiye Universite Tarihi, 137. Translation is mine. The original text is as follows: “Yeni Universitemiz hakikatleri arastirmak ve derinlestinnek, bilgiyi derlemek,Graduate Education of Niyazi Berkes, 933-1939 37 yikselimek ve yaymak gayelerini giider. . . . Yeni tniversitenin en esash vasfi millilig’ ve nkilapesligidi. Tiirk inkilébinin ideoiojisini yeni tniversite isleyeoektir.” 16. Arslan, Davitifiinun ‘dan Universite 've, 332-33. 17, Berkes, Unutulan Yidlar, 107. 18, Avner Levi, who refers to an issue of Journal d’Orient (March 31, 1933), claims that the number of professors who came from Germany was 34, Avner Levi, Tiirkive Cumhuriyet inde Yahudiler [Jews in the Republic of Turkey}, (Istanbul: Hletigim, 1998), 98, 19. Rifat N. Bali, Cumfuriver Yillarinda Tiirkive Yahudileri: Bir Tirklestirme Seritvent {Turkey's Jews in the Republican Period: An Adventure of Turkification}, (Istanbul: Hletisit 2005), 332. 20. Berkes, Unusulan Yillar, 109. 21, Niyazi Berkes, Turkiye iktisat Tarihi I [Economic History of Turkey}, (Ankara: Gergek, 1970). 22. Berkes, Unutulan Yillar, 104. 23, Berkes, Unutulan Yillar, 109-10. 24, Altan Oymen, Bir Dénem Bir Cocuk [A Period and a Childhood), (Istanbul: Dogan, 2004), 282, 25. The Turkish Women’s Union was closed down by its own administration after the congress of International Women's Union in 1935. The administration argued that the union lost its raison d'etre once Turkish women were granted full political rights. This, however, coincided with the closing of all associations in 1935 when the corporatist, right-wing interpre- tation of Kematism dominated the party under Recep Peker, the minister of internal affairs under premier Ismet Indna. 26. Niyazi Berkes, “Diinyada Kadintar Kongresi [Congress of World’s Women],” Sivasi Jlimler Mecmuasi, 49, (1935). 27. Zafer Toprak, Turkish-American Relations in the Republican Period, seminar organized by Tarih Vak, 2007. 28. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Yaken Tarihte Gordiklerim ve Gecirdiklerim I [Observations and Experiences in Late History I], (Istanbul: Rey, 1970), 111-12. 29, Berkes, Umuulan Yillar 112-15. 30. Ibid, 117. 31. They were Ottoman-Muslims who migrated to the new world between 1860 and 1920 from the multi-religious Ottoman Empire, which was gradually becoming multi-national. Prior to the foundation of the nationalist republic, “Ottoman” was an uncommon term in the Westen world and “Turk” was used instead. Ail Ottoman migrants were therefore recorded as Turks, Kemal H. Karpat, “Introduction.” /nternational Journal of Turkish Studies, 12 (1-2) (Fall 2006): 32. Berkes, Unutulan ¥illar, 118-19. 33. Ibid., 124, 34, William H, McNeil, Hutchins’ University: A Memoir of the University of Chicago 1929-1950, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 46. 35. Ibid.. 46. 36. Ibid., 58-59. 37. Ibid., 59-61. 38. Ibid., 63-64. 39. Ibid., 65. 40. In the department, Emest W, Burgess (1886-1966), and William Ogbum (1886-1959) were the two strong proponents of the use of quantitative methods in sociology. Unfortunately. Berkes could make only limited use of this knowledge when he retumed to Turkey because tative methods were underrated in the sociology departments. 41. Shils. “Emest W. Burgess, 1886-1966,” Remembering the University of Chica- go: Teachers, Sciemtists, and Scholars, (ed.) E. Shils, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9. 42, Berkes, Bazi Ankara Kéyleri Uzerine Bir Calrsma, 43. Berkes, Unutulan Yiliar, 126.58 Chapter 3 44, Niyazi Berkes “Sociology in Turkey,” The American Journal of Sociology. /42 (2), (1936): 238. 43, Berkes, Unutulan Yallar, 127. 46. Niyazi Berkes, “Birlesik Amerika Devletlerinde Sosyoloji [Sociology in the United States of Americal,” Uikit, 11 (2) (1938): 157-64; 11 (63) (1938): 225-32; 11 (64) (1938): 529-38; 12 (67) (1938); 21-28; 12 (68) (1938): 129-34; 12 (79) (1939): 41-46; £2 (85) (1940): 513-19.Chapter Four Niyazi Berkes’s Role in Power Struggles of the Post-Atatiirk Period, 1939-1945 The nature of the political regime in Turkey had already begun to change by the time Niyazi Berkes returned home from the United States. By a unani- mous vote of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, ismet inénii was elected as the second President of the Republic on November 11, 1938, the day after Atatiirk died. Indeed, the unanimous election of indni to the presi- dency was quite surprising for many observers who were aware of the dis- agreements between Atatiirk and inénii, and is likely attributable to the deci- sion of Marshall Fevzi Cakmak, the Chief of General Staff, to not let his name stand as a presidential candidate. Once elected to the presidency, lnénit sought reconciliation with the anti-Kemalist opposition. Accordingly, signifi- cant figures of the opposition, including Fethi Okyar, Kazim Karabekir, Hitseyin Cahit Yalgin, Refet Bele, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, were elected to the assembly from the lists of the Republican People’s Party in the 1939 elec- tions, At the same time, indnii honored the memory of Atatiirk by declaring him the “Founder and the Eternal Leader” of the party, and also took this opportunity to declare himself the “National Chief,” a title in the late 1930s reminiscent of “J! Duce” in fascist Italy and “Fihrer” in Nazi Germany.! ‘This title of Ismet indnti’s was so widely accepted in Turkey that the single party period after Atatiirk has been referred to as the “National Chief Peri- od,” covering the years between 1938 and 1946. World War I! played a major role in the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey during these years, During the war, Ankara pursued a foreign policy of staying out of the war at any cost, prompting Turkey to hedge its bets by building complex alliances with all belligerents, In the first stage of the war 5960 Chapier the Turkish government feared an Italian attack and expected a Franco-Brit- ish victory. Thus, the government signed an alliance with Britain and France on October 19, 1939. In the seeond stage of the war, Germany gained the upper hand on the battlefield against Britain and France, and the Turkish government signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on June 18, 1941. Thereafter, expecting a German victory, Ankara began to pursue pro- German domestic and foreign policies. In the third stage, following the de- feat of the German forces by the Soviets in Stalingrad on January 31, 1943, the Turkish government again moved closer to the Allied Powers. Finally, Turkey declared war against the Axis Powers on February 23, 1945, “when the Red Army was 50 kilometers away from Berlin and when allied powers were in Cologne.”? With this symbolic declaration of war, the government wanted to make sure that Turkey could join the United Nations Conference convening in San Francisco on March 6, 1945. The government’s foreign policy of vacillation between war belligerents and domestic policy of co-opting the anti-Kemalist opposition greatly weak- ened the Kemalist ideology as originally envisioned and established by Atatiirk. In the new era, the political power base once enjoyed by the single party regime now had to be attained by building new ideological alliances. Now two ideological groups competed against each other in the formation of the new version of the official ideology. On the one side, an ultra-nationalist or even a racist group of intellectuals, politicians, and army officers coa- lesced under the influence of Nazi ideology.? This group included intellectu- als, politicians, and army officials such as the author Nihal Atsiz (1905-1975), the lieutenant Alparslan Turkes (1917-1997), who then be- came one of the leaders of the ultra-nationalist movement in Turkey, the professors Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) and Reha Oguz Tirkkan (1920-), the retired generals Nuri Killigil (1881-1949) and Hiseyin Hisni Emir Erki- let (1883-1958), and the high-ranking bureaucrat Resat Semsettin Sirer, who became Minister of Education in 1946. This group adapted the Nazi ideology to the Turkish context, proclaiming the superiority of the Turkish race, al- though they refrained from making any direct comparison between the Turk- ish and German races. They rather focused on the racial origins of people already living in Turkey, in sharp contrast to Atatiirk’s desire to define iden- tity in terms of citizenship.4 During the war the Turkish ultranationalists published journals and books praising the Nazi model. For them, the new official ideology in Turkey should not ignore the rise of Germany because collaboration with Germany was the only way for Turkey to expand towards the ethnic Turks living in the Caucasus and Central Asia.> The Turkish government allowed and even encouraged the activities of this group be- tween the years 1941 and 1943 when a German victory looked highly prob- able. The government stopped tolerating this group only when the defeat of Germany became visible after Stalingrad.Niyazi Berkes's Role in Power Sruggles of the Post-Atatiirk Period, 1939-1945 61 On the other side, a new group of progressive politicians and intellectuals came together that adhered to liberal, anti-racist, humanitarian, leftist, social- ist, and even communist worldviews. In the re-construction of the official ideology, they proposed a model with a more leftist tone. This group sup- ported Britain and the Soviets during the war, and openly opposed Nazi influence in Turkey. This was a grand coalition of progressives that included the owner and editorial writer of the daily Vatan Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1972), a couple of socialist journalists publishing the daily Tan Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, leftist professors at Ankara University such as Mediha Berkes, Niyazi Berkes, Pertev Naili Boratav, Behice Boran, and Muzaffer Serif, the pro-Western Minister of Education (1939-1946) Hasan Ali Yiicel, the leading figures of the liberal opposition within the incumbent Republican People’s Party Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, and the Chief of the Gener- al Staff Marshall Fevzi Cakmak, who was renowned for his conservative but humanist worldview. The government was supportive of this left-leaning group so long as the Allied Powers had the upper hand in the battlefield against the Axis Powers. Throughout the war years, the Turkish government was unable to form an alliance with either of the two groups. It rather utilized these two groups to show that newspapers, magazines, and books supporting both sides of the war could find a place in the press, and thereby sought to demonstrate its neutrality. However, Turkish policy on neutrality always intended to favor the ultimate winners of the war rather than strict impartiality. As the war progressed, the position of the Turkish government changed in accordance with the ebb and flow of the war. Besides that, the government also shifted its attitude towards ideological groups at home by openly befriending Turk- ish supporters of the countries closer to victory while putting pressure on the others. As a result, Turkish foreign policy played a significant role in the power struggles between ultranationalists and progressives. The ideological base of this struggle was already being formed while Berkes was studying in the United States. Especially after the rise of Nazism in Germany, the ultra-nationalist group began to flourish in Turkey. As they gained prominence within the ranks of the Ministry of Education, they began to harass doctoral candidates in foreign universities outside Germany. One of those was Berkes, who had been studying at the University of Chicago since 1935. He was writing his dissertation on the development of secularism in Turkey when he began to receive telegrams from the Ministry ordering him to return to Turkey. Although his colleagues and professors recommended that he stay in the States as the world was drifting towards a great war, he decided to comply with the call of the ministry. He thought that he did not have to stay in Chicago just to write his thesis so he returned to Turkey in 1939.62 Chapter 4 When he arrived in Istanbul, Berkes immediately went to Istanbul Uni- versity where he once had held an assistantship in the Department of Phifoso- phy. Surprisingly, the university administration knew nothing about the tele- grams urging him to come back because the telegrams apparently had been sent directly by the pro-German group within the Ministry in Ankara. Conse- quently, he was told that there was no position for him in the department. His appeals to the university administration proved fruitless. His requests for re- appointment were rejected by Professor Hamit Ongunsu (1885-1967), the dean of Faculty of Arts and Letters, and by Professor Celal Bilsel, the rector of Istanbul University,” and he suddenly found himself unemployed. Mean- while, an opportunity arose when sociology and psychology departments were founded at the Philosophy Institute in the Faculty of Languages, Histo- ry and Geography in Ankara, creating a demand for experts in the fields. However, personal networks played a greater role in appointments than merit and achievement as old imperial patron-client practices still prevailed in the Republic.8 Berkes was aware of this fact and he traveled to Ankara to’ ar- range an appointment with Hasan Ali Yieel, the Minister of Education, who had been his high school teacher at the Istanbul School for Boys. Ytcel remembered his old pupil and invited him for an interview. The interview took place in front of a committee, including the high-level bureaucrats of the ministry. Among them was Regat Semsettin Sirer (1903-1953), a pro-German educator who served in Germany as the inspec- tor of Turkish students. He was in favor of promoting Turkish nationafs who were educated in Europe, especially in Germany. He therefore opposed the appointment of Berkes, claiming that there was no vacancy left in the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography. The Minister and other members of the committee did not challenge Sirer during the interview and Berkes was told to look for another position. But after the interview, Minister Yiicel stopped Berkes on his way to Istanbul near the Ankara train station, The minister told him to get in touch with Edhem Menemencioglu, the professor of political science, who was in charge of recruiting the staff of the new departments.’ This was the first incident in which Berkes witnessed ideologi- cal struggle between pro-German and progressive groups. This time he was on the winning side owing to the intervention of progressive Minister Yiicel who got him appointed to the Philosophy Institute on November 1, 1939. Atthe Institute, Berkes initially thought that he had finally found a friend- ly and open intellectual environment, but soon realized that the professors were also divided into ultranationalist and progressive camps. Naturally he felt closer to the progressive scholars including Pertev Naili Boratav (1907-1998), Muzaffer Serif Basoglu, and Behice Boran (1910-1987). Berkes was already acquainted with these scholars before they came together at the Philosophy Institute. Berkes and Boratav had been classmates at the Istanbul School for Boys. Later, they joined Darii/fiinun, that is, IstanbulNivazi Berkes's Role in Power Struggles of the Post-Atattirk Period, 1939-1945 63 University before the Kemalist university reform. At Dariilfiinun, Berkes studied law before he changed his major to philosophy whereas Boratav studied Turkish language and literature. Upon graduation, Boratav became an assistant to Professor Fuad Képriilii (1890-1966), a prominent figure in Turkish academia and politics. After that, Boratav was sent to Nazi Germany for graduate studies where his progressive attitude drew the attention of pro- Nazi Turkish students. Sirer, the inspector of Turkish students in Germany, reported Boratay to the Ministry and, like Berkes, he was obliged to come back to Turkey without completing his doctoral dissertation. Nevertheless, Minister Yiicel appointed him as an associate professor in the Philosophy Institute, again despite the opposition of the ultranationalist, Pan-Turkist bu- reaucrats, Berkes also knew Muzaffer Serif Basoglu from the Istanbul School for Boys and Dariilfiinun. Bagoglu had been under the influence of ultranational- ist ideologies when he was an undergraduate student in the thirties,!! but changed his politics in the course of his graduate studies at Columbia Univer- sity and became a leftist intellectual. He wrote a dissertation on “the Psychol- ogy of Social Norms,” which became a magnum opus in the field of social psychology.'? He too came back to Turkey and became an associate profes- sor at the Philosophy Institute. Maybe because of his ultranationalist inclina- tions in the past, Berkes could never get on well with Basoglu. Despite this friction, they were ideologically close while at the Institute. !? Lastly, Berkes was familiar with Behice Boran as they were both educated in the United States during the same period of time. She received her PhD from the Uni- versity of Michigan with a thesis on the American working class: “A Study of Occupational Mobility: An Analysis of Age Distributions of Occupational Groupings in the United States, 1910-1930.” She returned to Turkey with a sociological methodology consisting of American sociology and Marxism. '4 Also his wife, Mediha Esenel-Berkes, should also be considered within the progressive group. Berkes and his wife met in 1935 at istanbul University where he was an assistant and Mediha Esenel was a recent graduate. follow- ing their marriage, Mediha joined her husband in Chicago where she also studied sociology at the University of Chicago. When they came back to Turkey she started as an assistant at the Turkology Institute of the Faculty, soon after her husband entered the Philosophy Institute. '5 In addition to the colleagues in the institute, Berkes began to gather with a group of leftist intellectuals in Ankara. One of them was Sabahattin Ali (1907-1948), who was well-known for his teaching of literature and his own writings of poetry, short stories, and political humor. Moreover, his literary critiques found place in major journals of literature in Turkey such as La Turquie, Yeni Diinya, and Marko Pasa. Another intellectual who entered Berkes’s circle in Ankara was Ruhi Su (1912-1985), a student at the Ankara State Conservatory, who was concentrating on Western classical music de-64 Chapter 4 spite his interest in Turkish folkloric music. This is how he became a student of Boratay and a friend of Berkes. Besides that, Adnan Cemgil (1909-2001) was also a regular participant in the tea and talk sessions of the progressive scholars at the institute. Cemgil had a degree in philosophy from Istanbul University and was quite an activist in the period, writing articles for several journals and transiating books. This group of scholars and inteflectuals put their stamp on the history of Turkish political thought with their works and activities in the forties. How- ever, there has been a controversy in the studies of Turkish intellectual histo- ry regarding the ideological stance of the progressives. On the one hand, some leftist historians claimed that the progressive group of the forties was the secret extension of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP). Their purpose was to prepare the society for communism through legal activities. 16 These accusations of the ultranationalists lacked any valid grounds. Professor Mete Tuncay, a later scholar who has done extensive research on leftist move- ments in Turkey, claims that Boran and Basoglu were Marxist but: their works could net be categorized as Marxist studies. He further argues that Berkes and Boratav were only anti-capitalist intellectuals, removed from Marxism.!7 Boratav claimed as much, identifying their group as leftist, dem- ocratic scholars opposed to the Nazi ideology.'* Mediha Esenel confirmed Boratay’s testimony and argued that they may be referred to as social-demo- crats who were open to socialism, Marxism, and Kemalism.'° In his me- moits, Berkes clearly stated that he was distant from the radical left in the forties. He wrote as follows: Since the national struggle, socialism in Turkey could not be more than a fight for justice with reference to Omar the Caliph, nor more than a child’s game of marriage and neighborhood, nor more than a game of police and thief. Neither the peasants nor the workers knew anything about this game. The only players were educated people, intellectuals. . . . And, [in the forties] they only had a legendary martyr and a poet in prison.2° As a result, the common denominator for this group, including Berkes, was their strong opposition to fascism in the forties. Although they were all Jeft-leaning intellectuals, their ideological position requires a broader defini- tion. I would, therefore, say that they were leftist, progressive, anti-capitalist intellectuals who adhered to the principles of Kemal Atatiirk. This ideological position brought about ultranationalist, racist hostility against the left-leaning professors and intellectuals both on and off campus. Racism among the faculty members was an unintended consequence of the “Turkish history thesis” formulated by the Kemalist nationalists.?! The pur- pose of the thesis was to establish through scholarly works the link between modem Turkey and its ancient origins. In the construction of this nationalist narrative, some professors emphasized the accumulation of knowledge inher-Miyazi Berkes's Role in Power Struggles of the Post-Atatiirk Period, 1939-1943. 65 ited from the civilizations both in Anatolia and Central Asia, whereas other professors developed a chauvinistic interpretation of the thesis, seeking evi- dence for primordial origins of the modern Turkish nation in history. Under the influence of fascist ideologies in the West, this group adopted Turkish racism as an ideology. The appointment of leftist professors, including Berkes, to the faculty disturbed this group of right-wing professors. Howev- er, before the tension between them translated into a real conflict, the young- er male professors were called up to military service due to the German advance in the Balkans. Berkes also had to join the army as a reserve officer and he spent the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1941 as part of a military unit near Pethanor, an Anatolian village.22 Berkes resumed his teaching position at the university when he returned from his second tour of duty in the second half of 1941, which coincided with German advances on the battlefield. Not surprisingly, the government ad- dressed the new situation and signed a friendship and trade agreement with Nazi Germany. After that, the government began to pursue pro-Nazi foreign and domestic policies, For instance, Turkey secretly allowed the passage of German naval ships through the Straits during wartime, contravening the 1936 Montreaux Convention on the Straits”? and became the main supplier of chrome for the German military industry. There also were internal ramifi- cations whereby ultranationalism became a normal element in the formula- tion and implementation of government policies. This became evident when Prime Minister Siikrii Saragoglu said the following while reading his cabi- net’s program in the Assembly on August 5, 1942: “We are Turks; we are Turkists and we shall always be Turkists. For us, Turkism is a matter of conscience and culture as much as it is a matter of blood.” In this period the Turkish government was so inspired by the anti-Semitism of the Nazi regime that various laws were legislated against minorities, especially the Jewish minority. For example, with the capital tax, the Jews and other non-Muslim minorities of Turkey were forced to pay taxes disproportionate to their in- comes.?5 Those who could not pay the tax were sent to labor camps in Eastern Anatolia2® where they had to stay until the capital tax was abolished and the labor camps were closed subsequent to the defeat of the Germans in Stalingrad in 1943.77 Nevertheless, the government considered even those non-Muslims who paid the tax to be an unreliable ethnic element and took steps to keep them under control. It passed another law conscripting all non- Muslim men above the age of eighteen.2* Not surprisingly, these Jewish soldiers were sent to labor battalions. The government was also careful when dealing with Ottoman Jews who were living abroad and willing to migrate to Turkey. Recent discoveries in the archives of the Prime Ministry reveal that thousands of Ottoman Jews were deprived of Turkish citizenship between 194] and 1943.79 Last, the number of pro-German, ultranationalist publica- tions in Turkey increased. These included the journals Orhun, Atsiz, Bozkurt,