LECTURES THREE AND FOUR The Old Versus the New Liberal Learning

The subject of education/learning/knowledge is very important for the Victorian age, because at
the time it was considered that mass society can be ruled more efficiently by it.
Because the word “liberal” refers neither just to the political party, nor to the free
market/capitalist/laissez-faire state (centered around the free market), but also to the product of
modern education, namely to the liberal minded modern man, it is important to distinguish
between the first modern version of liberal learning, associated to the Oxford and Cambridge
universities of the Middle Ages, on the one hand, and the liberal intellectual educated in the
Enlightenment spirit by the practical philosophers of the Victorian age, for example by John
Stuart Mill, on the other hand.
Today’s lecture will demonstrate why Carlyle’s rejection of democracy, mammonism and
greedy plus merciless captains of industry should be assimilated to the Old Liberal
paradigm,which can be understood more thoroughly when reading the words of another belated
scholar of the old liberal paradigm, John Henry Newman.
John Henry Newman was a theologian by formation; he was a doctor of divinity educated
and teaching at Oxford, where, in the 30s, he became the leader of The Oxford Movement – a
religious revival movement within the Anglican High Church which declared that the Anglican
religion and modern religiousness in general, was tepid (or passive, or insipid, instead of being
fervently felt. For Newman, there existed a necessary connection between theology and learning,
since liberal learning was akin to theology, being, therefore, comparable to a reversible
relationship in chemistry. The model or paradigm he accepted and implemented was the old
liberal model, in so far as he accepted that theology was the master-science, dominant in respect
to the liberal arts. Just as in the first universities of the Middle Ages, for Newman the seven
liberal arts (taught in the first/oldest universities in the world as the trivium: grammar, logic,
rhetoric and the quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy) were subordinated to
theology. They served the same absolute purposes as theology.
Firstly, for Newman, knowledge was not specialized or practical, but it consisted of “a
comprehensive view of truth in all its branches,[a comprehensive view] of the relations of science
to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values”– (PEV I, p. 338). Knowledge is
synthetic: –All Knowledge is a whole and the separate Sciences parts of one–
Secondly, knowledge is characterised as being –capable of being its own end–, –not a
preliminary of certain arts– (…) because that alone is liberal knowledge which stands on its own
pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be informed (as
it is called) by an end, or absorbed into any end, or in order to present itself to our contemplation.
The most ordinary pursuits have this specific character, if they are self-sufficient and complete;
the highest lose it, when they minister to something beyond them.– (PEV, p. 342) It is interesting
to notice how Newman, a theologian by formation, pleads for theory with these words, which, of
course, being written by a theologian are more authoritarian than the philosopher Mill’s; at the
same time he is offering as an example for legitimately used knowledge theology itself. –
Theology–, he continues a few paragraphs further, –instead of being cultivated as a
contemplation, be[ing] limited to the purposes of the pulpit or be[ing] represented by the
catechism, it loses, - not its usefulness, not its divine character, not its meritoriousness, - but it
does lose the particular attribute which I am illustrating; just as a face worn by tears and fasting
loses its beauty, or a labourer’s hand loses its delicateness; - for Theology thus exercised is not
simple knowledge, but rather is an art or busines making use of Theology (our underlining). And
in like manner the Baconian Philosophy, by using its physical sciences in the service of man, does
thereby transfer them from the order of Liberal Pursuits to, I do not say inferior, but the distinct
class of the Useful–. (PEV I pp. 342-3).
Thirdly, for Newman, such perfect knowledge could only be acquired through university
education. Here is Newman’s characterization of the ideal university in The Idea of a University,
his lectures delivered in 1854, on the occasion of the opening of a Catholic university in Dublin,
whose Rector he was:
–it is more correct, as well as more usual, to speak of a University as a place of
education, than of instruction, though, when knowledge is concerned , instruction would at first
sight have seemed the more appropriate word. We are instructed, for instance, in manual
exercises, in the fine and useful arts, in trades, and in ways of business; for these are methods,
which have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are confined in rules committed to memory, to
tradition or to use, and bear upon an end external to themselves. But education is a higher word;
it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character; it is something
individual and permanent, and is commonly spoken of in connection with religion and virtue–

–[ a university is ] A seat of learning, considered as a place of education. An assemblage

of learned men, zealous for their own sciences, and rivals of each other, are brought, by familiar
intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace to adjust together the claims and relations of
their respective subjects of investigation. Thus is created –a pure and clear atmosphere of
thought, which each student also breathes, though in his own case he can only pursue a few
sciences out of the multitude. He profits by an intellectual tradition, which is independent of
particular teachers, which guides him in his choice of subjects. (…) He apprehends the great
outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its
shades, its great points and its little as he otherwise cannot apprehend them. Hence it is that his
education is called –liberal–. A habit of mind is formed which lasts throughout life, of which the
attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom.– (PEV I, p. 337).
2.
It is interesting that the connection between virtue and learning is turned into an asset
also for the modern, fully developed, free thinking individual by John Stuart Mill. He should be
remembered as an exquisite teacher of modern democracy – and the best example of the other
kind of liberal thinking, in accordance with the New Liberal Paradigm.
As regards knowledge in connection with virtue, here is what John Stuart Mill asserts in
“On Individuality as an Element of Well-Being” the third part of his treatise On Liberty
(published in 1859)

Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in

youth as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human
experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human
being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret
experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of
recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances
and character.

The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative

feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised
only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the
custom makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning
or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the
muscular, powers are improved only by being used. The faculties
are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others
believe it.
 If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person’s own
reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be
weakened by adopting it.

This is the pledge of Mill’s humanism in his views on general education: to

strengthen man rather than weaken him by the misuse of reason, either because it is
used in isolation or because it is not used at all. John Stuart Mill’s argument continues
as follows:
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of
life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one
of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his
faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment
to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination
to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to
hold to his deliberate decision. (…) It is possible that he might be
guided in some good path, and kept out of harm’s way, without any
of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human
being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also
what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man
which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying,
the first importance surely is man himself.
Mill presents the conditions of possibility or conditions for developing personal
experience and attaining maturity, which represented a duty for every member of a
modern, democratic society.

The same aim, of attaining maturity, which is characterized by Newman through “the
attributes of freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom” were recommended by
John Stuart Mill – and not only in his treatise On Liberty (published in 1859). It is interesting that
John Stuart Mill’s understanding of truth (its definition, criteria and dynamics), introduces us to
the core of the new liberal paradigm, whose power rests on deliberative (rational) connections
made between principles and practice. 1

3. Public opinion, discussion, is the complement of thought and experience, which are of necessity
limited, just as the individual person is. Exchange of ideas and experience, however, if conducted according
to the laws of justice and rationality, or if conducted fairly enough can correct errors and make humanity
asymptotically approach in actionwhat it cannot hope to attain in principle.

Mill points to the connection between legitimately held opinions and free discussion as
the basis for approaching truth (rather than holding opinions dogmatically):

However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the
possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the

1
This is by contrast of the power resting, in the old liberal paradigm, on the connection of knowledge with
virtue, rather than on the connection of truth with reason.
consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently,
and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living
truth.

The same Chapter II On Liberty highlights the importance of discussion for correcting
strong opinions in addition to its utility for acquiring experience, as seen above. The last
passage deals with the importance of guarding against anyone (authorities or ordinary
people) assuming infallibility and infringing the sacred liberty/fraternity/equality core of
modern democracy.

To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is

false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as
absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
infallibility.

This last statement represents the culmination of a longer demonstration about why it is
evil to suppress the freedom of expression/discussion:

the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is

robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.
If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great
a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.
…………………………………………………………………….
First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may
possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its
truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the
question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the
means of judging.

Here is Mill’s statement of principle:

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be
justified in silencing mankind.

which allows him to get down to the grounds/the essence of democracy:

Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with
the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless
in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the
right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or
by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best
government has no more title to it than the worst.

The essence of democracy is, therefore, to regard coercion/power as

illegitimate itself and to declare that the interest of the people is its supreme value:
No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against
permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with
the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what
doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear.