SECTION IV

CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

 SECTION 4—CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
Scope
4.1 Chemical Material Production ........................................................II-4-8
4.2 Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing ..........................II-4-22
4.3 Detection, Warning, and Identification ...........................................II-4-27
4.4 Chemical Defense Systems ............................................................II-4-34
BACKGROUND
Chemical weapons are defined as weapons using the toxic properties of chemi-
cal substances rather than their explosive properties to produce physical or physiologi-
cal effects on an enemy. Although instances of what might be styled as chemical
weapons date to antiquity, much of the lore of chemical weapons as viewed today has
its origins in World War I. During that conflict “gas” (actually an aerosol or vapor)
was used effectively on numerous occasions by both sides to alter the outcome of
battles. A significant number of battlefield casualties were sustained. The Geneva
Protocol, prohibiting use of chemical weapons in warfare, was signed in 1925. Sev-
eral nations, the United States included, signed with a reservation forswearing only the
first use of the weapons and reserved the right to retaliate in kind if chemical weapons
were used against them. (Note: the United States did not ratify the Protocol until
1975). Chemical weapons were employed in the intervening period by Italy (in Ethio-
pia) and Japan (in Manchuria and China). Both nations were signatories to the Geneva
Convention. Chemical weapons were never deliberately employed by the Allies or the
Axis during World War II, despite the accumulation of enormous stockpiles by both
sides. Instances of employment of chemical weapons in the local wars since then are
arguable, although they were definitely used in the Iran-Iraq conflict of 1982–87. In
January of 1993, a lengthy and detailed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was
signed in Paris by many countries. Unlike the Geneva Convention’s single paragraph
prohibition, the CWC attempts to define the prohibited substances, including their
effects, and to establish enforcement mechanisms. In addition to banning CW use, the
CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weap-
ons.
The CWC obliges a state party to destroy chemical weapons under its possession,
jurisdiction, and control; to destroy all CW it abandoned in the territory of another
state party; and to destroy CW production facilities under its jurisdiction or control.
On April 29, 1997, the CWC entered into force, thereby putting in place a detailed and
intrusive declaration and verification regime. Russia possesses the largest acknowl-
edged stockpile of chemical weapons and may have difficulty adhering to the CWC’s
destruction reuirements because of economic difficulties.
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Highlights
• Chemical weapons (CW) are relatively inexpensive to produce.
• CW can affect opposing forces without damaging infrastructure.
• CW can be psychologically devastating.
• Blister agents create casualties requiring attention and inhibiting
force efficiency.
• Defensive measures can be taken to negate the effect of CW.
• Donning of protective gear reduces combat efficiency of troops.
• Key to employment is dissemination and dispersion of agents.
• CW are highly susceptible to environmental effects (temperature,
winds).
• Offensive use of CW complicates command and control and
logistics problems.
Development of chemical weapons in World War I was predominantly the adapta-
tion of a chemical “fill” to a standard munition. The chemicals were commercial
chemicals or variants. Their properties were, for the most part, well known. The Ger-
mans simply opened canisters of chlorine and let the prevailing winds do the dissemi-
nation. Shortly thereafter the French put phosgene in a projectile and this method
became the principal means of delivery. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard
shells for the first time and simultaneously attempted to use a solid particulate emetic,
diphenyl chloroarsine, as a mask breaker. Mustard, an insidious material, penetrates
leather and fabrics and inflicts painful burns on the skin. These two themes, along
with significant increases in toxicity, represent a large segment of the research and
development of chemical weapons that nations have pursued over the years. There is
first the concept of agents that attack the body through the skin, preferably also through
clothing, and more preferably through protective clothing. Along with that concept is
the idea of penetrating or “breaking” the protective mask so that it no longer offers
protection for the respiratory system. Increasing the toxicity of the chemical agent
used would theoretically lower the amounts required to produce a battlefield effect.
Unless this increase is significant, however, it can be masked by the inefficiencies of
disseminating the agent. Consequently, later development has focused on the methods
for delivering the agent efficiently to the target.
 The chemicals employed before World War II can be styled as the “classic” chemi-
cal weapons. They are relatively simple substances, most of which were either com-
mon industrial chemicals or their derivatives. An example is phosgene, a choking
agent (irritates the eyes and respiratory tract). Phosgene is important in industry as a
chlorinating material. A second example is hydrogen cyanide, a so-called blood agent
(prevents transfer of oxygen to the tissues), now used worldwide in the manufacture of
acrylic polymers. The industrial application of many of the classic chemical agents is
recognized by the CWC and they are included on a schedule wherein few restrictions
apply. They would be only marginally useful in modern warfare and generally only
against an unsophisticated opponent. Moreover, large quantities would be required to
produce militarily significant effects, thus complicating logistics.
Blister agents or vesicants are an exception to the limited utility of classic agents.
Although these materials have a relatively low lethality, they are effective casualty
agents that inflict painful burns and blisters requiring medical attention even at low
doses. The classic mustard is the most popular among proliferant nations since it is
relatively easy to make. Mustard is generally referred to as the “king” of agents be-
cause of its ease of production, low cost, predictable properties, persistence, and abil-
ity to cause resource-devouring casualties rather than fatalities. Its insidious nature is
both an advantage and a disadvantage. Mustard on the skin causes no immediate
sensation and symptoms normally do not appear until several hours after exposure. At
incapacitating levels this may be as long as 12 hours. (Contrary to the normal expec-
tation, horrible fatalities occurred in the Iran-Iraq War because Iranian soldiers, feeling
no effects, continued to wear mustard soaked clothing and inhale its fumes.)
To produce immediate effects, an arsenical vesicant known as lewisite was devel-
oped in the United States. Much of the former Soviet Union vesicant stocks were
mixtures of lewisite and sulfur mustard.
Between the world wars the development of chemical weapons included adapta-
tion to aircraft delivery (bombs) and exploitation of lewisite, since the more potent
mustard was, from a battlefield perspective, slow in producing casualties. Indepen-
dent experiments in several countries led them to consider/adopt mixtures of mustard
and lewisite as fills for chemical munitions.
Nerve gases, or anticholinesterase agents, were discovered by the Germans in the
1930’s and developed during World War II. In 1936 during studies of possible pesti-
cides, the German chemist Gerhard Schrader discovered what he called “tabun” or
GA. Two years later Schrader discovered the even more toxic “sarin” or GB. These
compounds are orders of magnitude more toxic than those used in World War I and
thus represent the significant toxicity increase that changed the concept of employ-
ment. Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans never exploited their technological ad-
vantage, although they did produce a large number of tabun-filled munitions.
Nerve gases are liquids, not gases, which block an enzyme (acetylcholinesterase)
that is necessary for functions of the central nervous system. Similar in action to many
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pesticides, they are lethal in much lower quantities than classic agents. The nerve
gases are effective when inhaled or when absorbed by the skin (percutaneous), or both,
although there are differences in effectiveness. In general, the lower the material’s
volatility (and hence its inhalation threat) the greater its percutaneous toxicity. Nerve
agents are generally divided rather arbitrarily into G- and V-agents, although there are
numerous structural variants that are potent cholinesterase inhibitors. Nerve agents
known to date to have been produced for chemical warfare purposes are all organo-
phosphorus compounds and are liquids at room temperature.
The Italians, Hungarians, Japanese, French, English, Russians, and Americans, as
well as the Germans, all perfected mustard, phosgene, and similar agents during World
War II. Although never used in the conflict, these nations amassed such huge quanti-
ties of chemical munitions that their disposal presented a practical problem, one that
would be virtually insurmountable in today’s more environmentally conscious world.
In those more naive times, however, the munitions simply found their way to the bot-
toms of almost all the world’s oceans in the holds of expendable ships.
After World War II the victors took an interest in exploiting the potential of the
remarkably potent “nerve” agents. The British, in particular, had captured small stocks
of sarin (GB) and set about investigating its potential. The Soviets removed the Ger-
mans’ GB production plant to the Soviet Union. GB turned out to be perhaps the best
of the respiratory agents, being volatile as well as exceedingly toxic. The United States
designed a cluster bomb to exploit the characteristics of GB and followed this with a
litany of adaptations of munitions. Artillery rockets were produced as were bombs,
projectiles, and spray tanks. Many of these used the basic design of high-explosive
weapons and simply changed the fill to GB. In the instance of the spray tank, it was
necessary to use a polymeric thickening material so that the liquid would form large
droplets and not evaporate before it reached the ground. The French, British, and
Canadians all built small-scale facilities to produce the GB for testing. The United
States, however, entered into full-scale production of GB, as did the Russians just a
little later. The Russians also produced soman (GD), an agent the U.S. developers had
decided to forswear because of its properties of being refractory to treatment above a
single lethal dose.
In the late 1950’s, UK scientists discovered another category of nerve agents, the
V-agents. These were particularly interesting in that most of them were very effective
percutaneously and represented an effective way to circumvent the ubiquitous gas mask.
The United States and the UK pursued a form of V-agent called VX, although they
produced it by entirely different processes. The Russians exploited another structural
analog that proved more adaptable to their industrial processes.
The 1960’s saw continued development in nonlethal agents, or riot control agents,
first used in World War I. These materials, most notably CS, are strong irritants of the
mucous membranes with very high safety ratios. The letters “CS” are code letters for
a solid powder classified as a riot-control agent (O-chlorobenzylmalonitrile). This
compound is a highly effective irritant of the mucous membranes with an
exceedingly high safety ratio (~63,000). The purpose of CS and similar materials is
temporary incapacitation without permanent harm. CS was developed and first used
by the UK. It was quickly adopted and used extensively by the United States and since
has been produced and employed by many nations. CS is a solid at room temperature
and presents a problem for effective dissemination in useful particle sizes. Particulate
CS, like most solids, tends to develop an electrostatic charge which causes the par-
ticles to agglomerate into larger particles. Much development effort during the 1960’s
was spent on finding effective dissemination techniques.
The work on particulate CS could be extrapolated to another type of chemical
agent that was of extreme interest in the 1960’s: incapacitating agents. These were
initially seen by some as a panacea to make warfare safe and humane. Thousands of
potential compounds were screened, obtained from government sources in the United
States and from commercial pharmaceutical companies around the world. Although
there were several promising materials, primarily mental incapacitants, only BZ was
ever standardized.
The problem of incapacitants, or incapacitating agents, is complex. The use of
incapacitants in warfare is considered to be prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention even though only a single agent, BZ (3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate), and its im-
mediate precursors are included as listed compounds (Schedule 2) in that Treaty. In
retrospect, while BZ was the only incapacitating agent formally accepted (i.e., type
classified) by the United States, it was a poor choice and is now obsolete. It remained
in U.S. stocks for only a short period of time. The substance is a mental rather than a
physical incapacitant with long-onset time and unpredictable symptoms. The victim
becomes confused and is likely to be incapable of acting decisively. The confusion,
however, may not be readily apparent. The duration of action is long, about 48 hours,
making prisoner management difficult. There are, moreover, hundreds of compounds
more potent, faster acting, and with shorter duration of effect. Mental incapacitants
are predominantly glycolates, whereas some of the more potent candidates for physi-
cal incapacitants have come from research on improved anesthetics. Indeed, almost
all potential incapacitants are byproducts of the pharmaceutical industry and have le-
gitimate pharmaceutical uses. The defining technologies for such incapacitating weap-
ons, then, are the production of a physiologically effective compound in greater than
practical pharmaceutical quantities and incorporation of the material in weapons. It is
probable that the physical state of an incapacitant will be a particulate solid and that
the practical route for effective use is by inhalation.
Binary chemical weapons use toxic chemicals produced by mixing two com-
pounds immediately before or during use. Binary weapons do not necessarily employ
new toxic chemicals. In U.S. parlance, relatively innocuous precursors were stored
separately and reacted to form the toxic chemical agent en route to the target. In prin-
ciple, the binary concept could also be used to produce highly lethal but unstable com-
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pounds or mixtures of compounds unsuitable for long-term storage. The U.S. type
classified and produced a GB (sarin) binary nerve agent weapon, the M687 projectile
(a 155-mm artillery shell), and was in the late stages of development of two other
binary weapons when its offensive CW program was terminated. The Russians have
been publicly accused by dissidents within their own agencies of developing new bi-
nary agents, and the Iraqis are known to have constructed binary bombs and missile
warheads, albeit with crude manual mixing of the reactants.
Other possibilities for chemical agents include toxins and allergens which also
have been, at times, considered biological agents. Although not living organisms them-
selves, these materials are usually products of living organisms with complex molecu-
lar structures. A wide variety of toxins with an equally broad spectrum of chemical,
physical, and physiological properties exists. The CWC attempts to avoid the com-
plexity by listing only two toxins in its list of substances for verification. They are
ricin, a byproduct of castor bean extraction, and saxitoxin, a shellfish poison. Given
the large number of potential toxins, these would appear to be place holders to permit
the inclusion of any toxin if deemed necessary at a future date.
Until the recent attempts at terrorism by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, virtu-
ally all uses of chemical weapons have been as tactical weapons by nations. These
have ranged from attempts to break the stalemate in World War I to the recent use by
Iraq to blunt Iranian human wave attacks in the Iran-Iraq War (1982–87). Chemical
weapons were not employed by the major protagonists in World War II. Between
World Wars I and II, two signatories of the Geneva Protocol (Italy and Japan) em-
ployed chemical weapons. Typically, nations have employed them against unprotected
targets and not against an equally well-armed nation; chemical weapons are therefore
arguably an example of mutual deterrence. Although there have been charges of chemi-
cal weapon use in virtually every conflict in recent decades, most have not been sub-
stantiated by clinical or physical evidence.
The growth of chemical agent technology development that spurred production is
illustrated in Figure 4.0-1. Chemical agents used initially in World War I were indus-
trial compounds adapted for weapons use. As the war continued, more compounds
were screened and specialized agents, particularly sulfur mustard, came to the fore.
After the war, research continued at a slow but steady pace, with the major break-
through being the German discovery of the nerve gases in the mid 1930’s. Agent
technology accelerated again in the 1950’s with the British discovery of the V-agents.
The 1960’s featured extensive work and discovery in incapacitants and riot control
agents as well as the early work on binary agents. If the dissidents of the Russian
chemical program are to be believed, major advances are continuing.
In the lethal chemical arena a development effort that spread out over three de-
cades was the concept of binary agent employment. This concept entailed the creation
of highly efficient yet simple reaction schemes that could be used to create toxic agents
from non-toxic ingredients in the weapon en route to the target. The United States
developed three different binary munitions, a GB projectile (a 155-mm artillery shell),
an aerial bomb producing VX, and a medium-range missile warhead (for the MLRS)
containing an intermediate volatility agent. Iraq made a crude attempt to exploit bi-
nary systems in the Gulf War, but none were actually deployed.
The Russian Army apparently quashed early attempts to develop binary agents by
its technicians, although public revelations in 1995 by scientist Vil Mirzayanov and in
1996 by a former head of the Russian demilitarization program indicate recent Russian
development of binary systems for new and novel classes of nerve agents.
An historical perspective of the growth of dissemination technology in compari-
son to agent technology also can be seen in Figure 4.0-1. Dissemination technology
into the 1950’s consisted mainly of the use of an explosive burster in adapted shells
and iron bombs. During that time the concept of submunitions for better agent dis-
persal (e.g., missile warheads such as the Sergeant) and spray tanks (e.g., the Aero
14B) evolved and led to more uniform dissemination. These were followed in the
mid-1960’s and 1970’s by concepts of thermal dissemination and aerodynamic breakup,
as well as rheological techniques of particle size control in the 1990’s.
Despite the importance of detection, the major technological advances for detec-
tion, identification, and warning are relatively recent. Initially, detectors were papers
impregnated with a dye that underwent a color change when exposed to a chemical
agent. By World War II, air-sampling tubes filled with liquids that changed color on
exposure were available, as well as rather crude wet chemical point detectors. The
advent of the nerve gases after World War II led to the development of sensitive en-
zyme detection techniques and point detection alarms. The latter were based on wet
chemistry and required extensive servicing. The recent advances in microprocessing
and fieldable instrumentation techniques have made remote and area sensing of chemical
agents feasible.
A major advance in individual physical protection occurred very early with the
development of the activated charcoal filtered gas mask. Many incremental improve-
ments to aid in effectiveness against particular agents and to add to communication
and creature comforts followed. Impregnated clothing for protection against percuta-
neous poisoning was another rather early development which continues to be improved
incrementally by increasing protection factors and wearability.
OVERVIEW
This section addresses technologies that would enable a country to develop both
offensive and defensive chemical weapons capability. The United States has forsworn
the offensive use of chemical weapons and is a party to the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention. Therefore, technologies for offensive military operations are not of interest
except to maintain an appreciation for others’ potential and to continue to develop a
robust defense against them. References to offensive operations and technologies are
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included to ensure that there is an understanding of what is required to develop, inte-
grate, and employ chemical weapons.
There are a number of reasons for a country to pursue the development of chemi-
cal weapons. Chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce. Many
standard munitions can be modified and filled with toxic chemicals. A chemical attack
(or even a credible threat of a chemical offensive) can reduce the efficiency of an
opposing force by making it take precautionary steps (donning protective suits, enter-
ing shelters, etc.) or diverting its attention to defensive measures. Casualties incurred
can burden a country’s medical resources. Unlike conventional weapons, chemical
munitions, for the most part, injure or kill people while leaving the surrounding infra-
structure intact. Moreover, because of their unconventional nature, chemical weapons
can be psychologically devastating for a force being attacked.
Military forces that contemplate CW employment have many things to consider.
The use of chemical weapons runs counter to the global norm and is apt to engender
strong denunciation by third parties and retaliation by the nation attacked. There are
significant operational hurdles. Logistics, training, and command and control are com-
plicated by the possible employment of chemical munitions. Care must be taken to
prevent one’s own force from bearing the brunt of an attack. A properly defended
force might be slowed but will not be stopped. Although the “cost” of CW employ-
ment could be high in terms of the above factors, the “benefit” of degrading an
adversary’s performance and the psychological affect might be deemed sufficient to
offset the cost.
This section on Chemical Weapons Technologies contains four subsections.
Chemical Material Production addresses technologies for producing toxic chemical
agents that could be used in chemical weapons. Those that require special expertise
are covered in more detail than those available through standard industrial processes.
Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing addresses those technologies that
a proliferant could use to disperse toxic chemicals and ensure the viability of its dis-
semination systems. Also addressed are Detection, Warning, and Identification tech-
nologies that enable forces to detect and identify toxic agents and provide warning to
minimize the threat. The last subsection, Chemical Defense Systems, discusses those
systems that provide protection from the effects of chemical weapons.
RATIONALE
A number of technologies are required to develop, integrate, and employ chemical
weapons. Although many of these technologies are old and available in the open lit-
erature, successful employment entails more than simply producing toxic chemicals.
Technologies used for dissemination and dispersion are perhaps the most important.
The myriad technologies for offensive use are included in this section to provide the
reader an appreciation of the requirements to develop chemical weapons and an under-
standing of where offensive breakthroughs might occur, even though the United States
has renounced the capability. Technologies needed to detect the use of toxic chemicals
and provide protection are essential to all countries. Even proliferants that employ
chemical weapons require some type of detection and protection capability.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)
Starting in World War I, a number of countries have employed chemical weapons.
After false starts by others, the Germans finally employed chlorine successfully at
Ypres, Belgium, in 1915. Other WWI use included phosgene and chloropicrin in 1916
by the British, and mustard in 1917 by Germany. Lewisite was developed in 1918, too
late to be used in WWI.
Between the world wars, Japan began research on chemical weapons and began
production in the late 1920’s. The Italians used mustard in Ethiopia in 1935–36. Al-
though Allied and Axis nations produced and stockpiled chemical weapons, they were
not used during World War II. Egypt employed mustard and probably G-agent in
Yemen in the 1960’s. Both sides relied on CW during the Iran-Iraq conflict. The Iraqis
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used mustard, tabun, and sarin from 1982–87 and were prepared to do so in the Gulf
War. Libya dropped chemical agents from a transport aircraft against Chadian Troops
in 1987.
Many nations have become States Parties to the CWC and can be expected to
adhere to their commitments not to develop chemical weapons. Others will not sign or
may abrogate their commitments. Any nation with a sophisticated chemical industry
has the potential to produce chemical weapons, although nerve agents require a greater
amount of expertise than classical agents and vesicants. Having the potential, how-
ever, does not indicate intent.
Subnational groups, both independent and state-sponsored, could produce or pur-
chase toxic chemicals or possibly chemical warfare agents to threaten a civilian popu-
lace. Since civilians are poorly prepared for attacks by toxic materials, consequences
of a successful attack could be severe. Governments are increasingly concerned about
the use of toxic chemicals in light of the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo but thus far
have been unable to come to grips with the complexity of the problem. The armed
forces of many nations have some type of detection equipment and protection gear,
although there are wide variations in their quantity and capability.
 Improved gas mask
(protection;
fit; comfort)

Gas mask w/voicemitter & Novichok

drinking capability Series
Protective ointment
(Mustard); collective
9 protection; gas mask
w/Whetlerite
CC-2 impregnated
clothing Miniaturization
Laser
detection
7 VX

Gas mask; rosin oil

impregnated clothing Protection Detection
Relative
Development Nerve gas
5 alarm
Tabun Binary munition
Sarin Agent
Lewisite
Blister agent detectors;
3 kit; color change paper
Aerodynamic

Dissemination
Chlorine,
Chloropicrin, Smell Missile warheads;
Phosgene, Mustard spray tanks
1
Projectiles: Aircraft bombs
central bursters

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
CW Use WWI It/Fr/Sp/Japan Egypt Iran/Iraq/Libya
Chlorine: 1915 Chloropicrin: 1916 Mustard; Tabun
Phosgene: 1916 Mustard Mustard
Mustard: 1917 Sarin
Arms
Control The Hague Geneva Protocol CWC
1899 1925 1993

Figure 4.0-1. Relative Development of Chemical Weapons Technologies

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 Country* Sec 4.1 Sec 4.2 Sec 4.3 Sec 4.4
Chemical Material Dissemination, Detection, Chemical Defense
Production Dispersion and Warning and Systems
Weapons Testing Identification
Australia ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Bulgaria ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Canada ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
China ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Czech Republic ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Denmark ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Egypt ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Finland ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
France ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Germany ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Hungary ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦
India ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Iran ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Iraq ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Israel ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Italy ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Japan ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦
Libya ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Netherlands ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
North Korea ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦
Norway ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Pakistan ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Poland ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Russia ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Slovak Republic ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
South Africa ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
South Korea ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Spain ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Sweden ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Switzerland ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Syria ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
United Kingdom ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
United States ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Viet Nam ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Subnationals ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of
concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 4.0-2. Chemical Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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 SECTION 4.1—CHEMICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW
This subsection contains information on a number of the toxic chemicals and their
most important precursors. Included are nerve agents (e.g., sarin, soman, tabun, VX),
vesicants (e.g., sulfur mustards, lewisites, nitrogen mustards), and “classic” chemical
agents (phosgene, cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide). Important precursors are
also listed. These include DF, DC, and QL, all used in producing nerve agents.
There are thousands of toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons.
Those listed have been stockpiled and/or used by a number of countries. The CWC
Schedules of Chemicals (Figure 4.1-1) and the Australia Group (AG) list of precursors
(Figure 4.1-2) are also provided to ensure recognition of those being considered either
for verification provisions of the CWC or for export control. It should be remembered
that the CWC schedules and the AG list do not include all of the known chemicals that
have been or could be used to produce toxic agents.
Depending on the type of agent to be produced, there can be technical hurdles that
must be overcome. “Classic” agents can be manufactured using existing chemical
infrastructure, and most have legitimate commercial uses. Likewise, vesicants are not
technologically complicated. The production of the nerve agents, however, requires
significantly more sophisticated chemical processing. Some production processes re-
quire strict temperature control. Containment of toxic substances and gases can pose
problems. Depending on the immediacy of use, purity of product can add a difficult
dimension to production. In some cases, special equipment or handling is required to
prevent corrosion of equipment and/or rapid deterioration of the product.
These hurdles can be overcome. If sufficient purity cannot be attained, an agent
can be manufactured and used immediately. This presupposes the capability to manu-
facture a sufficient quantity in the time allotted. If special, corrosive-resistant equip-
ment cannot be obtained, corroded equipment can be replaced when necessary or only
a limited amount can be produced. If nerve agent production is technologically infea-
sible for a proliferant, a simpler agent (vesicant or classic agent) can be produced.
Alternatives can entail increased costs, increased munition requirements, or reduced
CW capability.
Some of the simpler classic chemical agents can be manufactured using existing
chemical infrastructure. For example, phosgene is manufactured internally within
chemical plants throughout the world for use as a chlorinating agent. Chlorination is
the most common of chemical intermediate reactions in the chemical process industry.
A reasonable size phosgene facility could be purchased with an investment of
$10–$14 million. Similarly, hydrogen cyanide is currently manufactured worldwide
as an intermediate in the manufacture of acrylic polymers and could be diverted for
II-4-8
Highlights
• There are many routes to produce most toxic chemicals.
• Thousands of chemicals exist that could be considered for chemical
weapons.
• If corrosive-resistant equipment cannot be procured (for corrosive
reactants and products), standard equipment can be used and
replaced or discarded.
• Many CW precursors are common industrial chemicals. Some
have been used in the past as agents in CW.
• Most technologies associated with CW production are old and
available in the open literature.
other uses or separately manufactured with about the same investment. In either in-
stance the technologies are simple, well known, and require no specialized equipment.
These CW agents require high munitions expenditures and are easily defeated by a gas
mask, so that use would most likely be against unprotected populations and/or poorly
equipped combatants.
Almost all proliferant states since World War I have manufactured vesicants, prin-
cipally sulfur mustard, bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide. There are several routes to this com-
pound, none of which require sophisticated technology and/or special materials. The
earlier producers favored the Levinstein Process, which consists of bubbling dry
ethylene through sulfur monochloride, allowing the mixture to settle and (usually)
distilling the remaining material. More recent production has involved chlorination of
thiodiglycol, a relatively common material with a dual use as an ingredient in some
inks. This method does not result in the solid byproducts of the Levinstein Process and
can be more easily distilled. Drums of thiodiglycol, produced in the United States and
illegally diverted from their intended recipients, were found by international inspec-
tors after the Gulf War at Iraqi CW production sites. The principal problem experi-
enced by initial manufacturers of sulfur mustard has been the insidious nature of this
material. Virtually all those producing mustard have experienced a large number of
industrial accidents resulting in casualties from mustard burns. Nitrogen mustards
have been synthesized only in pilot plant quantities, but did not require any unusual
processes or materials. Lewisite was produced by both the United States and the
Soviet Union during World War II. The plants were quite small and unsophisticated by
today’s standards. Lewisite is an arsenical and as such would require unusually large
amounts of arsenates in its production.
Production of the nerve agents requires significantly more sophisticated chemi-
cal processing. In a majority of these materials, there are corrosive chemicals in the
process that require specialized corrosion-resistant construction materials . With the
exception of GA (tabun), manufactured by the Germans in World War II and the Iraqis
during the Iran-Iraq war, G-agent production involves both chlorination and fluorina-
tion steps. Both of these steps require special and expensive construction materials.
Reactors, degassers, distillation columns, and ancillary equipment made of high nickel
alloys or precious metals are needed to contain the corrosive products and by products.
Only the last step of the process involves the highly toxic material, so that special air
handling equipment would be needed for only a small portion of the facility.
There are many process routes for producing the G- and V-agents; the majority
involve the synthesis of methylphosphonic dichloride (DC) at some stage. The United
States designed and built plants for four different processes for producing DC. Two
were used in the stockpile production of GB (sarin), a third represented an upgrade of
the stockpile production process to minimize waste, and the fourth represented a newer
method used in producing material for binary weapons. The Soviet Union used a still
different process to make DC and Iraq one similar to the last U.S. process. DC is a
relatively easy material to store and to ship and need not be produced at the same site
as the final product. It is very stable and has been stored for over 30 years with little
deterioration. The size of the facility required to produce DC in militarily significant
quantities ranges from very large down to room sized. A facility to produce DC with
ancillary support would cost approximately $25 million not including pollution and
environmental controls and waste treatment. Modern waste treatment and pollution
abatement to U.S. standards would more than double the cost, although it is doubtful
that a proliferant would build to these standards. The various DC production pro-
cesses require some special corrosion-resistant equipment, generally glass-lined reac-
tors and storage tanks, although not the ultra-expensive equipment required for later
stages. DC has limited commercial use.
In the actual production of G-agents, the partially fluorinated DC (now a transient
mixture called Di-Di) is reacted with an alcohol or alcohols and the product degassed
and usually distilled. As noted previously, this is the toxic step of the reaction which
requires air handling and filtering and also part of the highly corrosive portion that
requires high nickel alloy (such as Hastelloy C) equipment and piping or precious
metals (such as silver). The U.S. stockpile of GB was produced in this fashion and the
former Soviet Union stockpiles of GB and GD (soman) by a variation of that process.
The Iraqis used a somewhat over-fluorinated DC and mixed alcohols to produce a GB/
GF mixture which was inherently unstable. Most of the alcohols involved in produc-
ing G-agents have large-scale commercial use. An exception is the alcohol for produc-
ing GD, pinacolyl alcohol, which has very limited pharmaceutical use.
II-4-9
Two principal general methods have been employed for V-agent production. The
process used in the United States was called the Transester Process. It entails a rather
difficult step in which phosphorus trichloride is methylated to produce methyl
phosphonous dichloride. The material is reacted in turn with ethanol to form a diester
and this material then transesterified to produce the immediate precursor of VX. The
product is reacted with sulfur to form V-agent. This process has the advantage of
being straightforward and producing high quality product. Conversely, it has the
disadvantage of some difficult chemical engineering steps. The V-agent formed ex-
clusively in the United States was VX. The former Soviet Union, the only other known
producer of significant quantities of V-agent, did not produce VX per se, but rather a
structurally different variant with the same molecular weight. The Soviets designed
their process to make maximum use of production capability already available. The
DC of the G-agent process was used in an Amiton process conducted in solution. The
technique has the advantage of producing a single intermediate (DC). Disadvantages
include the need to recover a highly toxic material from solution and to handle large
quantities of contaminated solvent. In general, the V-agents are not easily distilled,
and it is unlikely that a final purification process can be developed.
Incapacitating agent production is similar in many ways to the manufacture of
pharmaceuticals, since these compounds are normally variations or derivatives of com-
pounds used or postulated for use as pharmaceuticals. Since most pharmaceuticals are
produced in relatively small quantities, production would entail a scale-up to an un-
usual process size for the type of reactions entailed. Moreover, virtually all candidate
incapacitating agents are solids at room temperature and would require drying and
grinding to an inhalable particulate. Given the tendency of many compounds to ac-
quire a static charge and agglomerate, the grinding is a nontrivial manufacturing prob-
lem. The problems associated with manufacture (and use) of solid lethal agents (such
as carbamates) are analogous to those experienced with incapacitants.
As a consequence of the diversity and complexity involved, it is difficult to pro-
vide any generic insights to toxin production. The only toxin to exist naturally in large
quantities is ricin. It is a byproduct of castor oil production. Production of ricin is a
physical separation. There are weak parallels with plutonium extraction or uranium
isotope enrichment in nuclear processing. Toxin separation is much easier, less expen-
sive, and requires smaller equipment. These advantages might make a toxin attractive
to a poor, proliferating country. Most other toxins must be laboriously extracted in
small quantities from the organism that secretes them. While synthetic toxins are
possible, they are complex molecules, the synthesis of which in any significant amount
would be difficult. Biotechnology may enhance the ability to produce toxins that were
previously difficult to obtain in significant quantity.
Production of chemical agents in the past has anticipated their long-term storage
since (in the instance of United States at least) they were viewed as deterrent weapons
and by policy would not have been employed except in response to aggressor use.
This also meant that the agents and/or their weapons of employment might be stored
for extensive periods of time. The life span of chemical weapons was first expected to
be a decade. The requirement was later increased to 20 years when it became clear that
munitions were likely to be stored at least that long. Chemical agents can either be
stored in bulk quantities or loaded into munitions. With the nerve agents in particular,
the quality of the initial material must be excellent and they must be stored under inert
conditions with the absolute exclusion of oxygen and moisture. Generally an overlay
of dry helium was employed to leak check munitions. A small amount of stabilizer
(2–4 percent) was also used to extend agent life span. The United States stored agent
in both bulk containers and in munitions. In the latter instance, the munitions were
normally stored in revetted bunkers. This was particularly true when explosives and
propellants were uploaded in the munitions. Storage of agents in explosive, uploaded
munitions has both advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage is speed
of use when the munition is needed. There is no labor-intensive or time-consuming
uploading process, and most munitions can be handled and shipped as if they were
conventional munitions. The principal disadvantage is that explosives and propellants
become part of the “system,” and their storage and deterioration may complicate the
handling of the chemical weapons. An illustrative case is seen in the 115-mm M55
rockets where burster, fuse, and rocket propellant cannot be easily and/or safely sepa-
rated from the agent warhead before demilitarization. As a consequence, demilitariza-
tion is far more complicated and costly than it would be otherwise.
Agents stored in bulk in the United States are now stored entirely in large cylindri-
cal “ton” containers similar to those used to store and ship many commercial chemi-
cals. The procedure for the former Soviet Union’s stockpile appears to have been to
upload their stocks of nerve agent into munitions when produced, but to store them
without the bursters or fuses. These munitions were then themselves stored in more
conventional warehouse-like structures. Conversely, the older stocks of vesicants (i.e.,
mustard, lewisite and mustard-lewisite mixtures) are stored in bulk, apparently in-
tended to be filled in munitions a short time before use. Bulk storage of the vesicants
by the Russians is in large railroad-car-size tanks again located in warehouse-like struc-
tures. When the Iraqis produced chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a
“make and use” regimen. Judging by the information Iraq gave the United Nations,
later verified by on-site inspections, Iraq had poor product quality for their nerve agents.
This low quality was likely due to a lack of purification. They had to get the agent to
the front promptly or have it degrade in the munition. This problem would have been
less severe in their mustard rounds because of less aggressive impurities. The problem
of degradation inhibited their ability to deploy and employ nerve weapons but prob-
ably did not have a great effect on their use of mustard. Using their weapons soon after
production probably worked well in the Iran-Iraq War, where the skies over Iraq were
controlled by the Iraqis. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, loss of air control in the Gulf
meant the weapons could never reach the front. The chemical munitions found in Iraq
II-4-10
after the Gulf War contained badly deteriorated agents and a significant proportion
were visibly leaking.
Binary munitions were once intended by the United States as a means of retaining
a retaliatory capability without the necessity of an agent stockpile. The relatively
nontoxic intermediates could be stored separately and not placed in proximity to one
another until just before use. This requires some human engineering to ensure the
munitions designs permit simple, rapid mating of the ingredient containers and pro-
duction of the lethal agent en route to the target. The binary system was envisioned
almost exclusively for application to the standard nerve agents. Although at least three
types of binary munitions were planned, only one (155-mm artillery shell) was in
production when the United States ended CW production. The Russians claim to have
considered binary munitions but not produced any. The Iraqis had a small number of
bastardized binary munitions in which some unfortunate individual was to pour one
ingredient into the other from a Jerry can prior to use.
Release of agent by enemy action during shipment is a disadvantage of unitary
chemical munitions. The sinking of the U.S. cargo ship John Harvey in the harbor at
Bari, Italy, during World War II and the subsequent unwitting release of a large quan-
tity of mustard gas is a case in point. Mustard escaped from damaged munitions con-
taminating those escaping the sinking ship and civilians on shore.
RATIONALE (See Table 4.1-1)
Since there are so many toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons,
only those agents of major significance and their precursors have been included. These
toxic chemicals have been designated of most concern by the world community. The
majority of nerve agents, sulfur mustards, lewisites, and some of the nitrogen mustards
are listed in the CWC schedules of chemicals (Figure 4.1-1). Each nerve agent is
representative of a family (hundreds to thousands) of chemicals. Those specifically
included have been produced and stockpiled by a number of countries. The precursor
DC is the fundamental building block for a significant portion of G- and V-agents. The
classic chemicals (phosgene, cyanogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide) have been
included since they are so readily available that a proliferant could obtain them easily.
Although these chemical agents would require high munitions expenditures and are
easily defeated by a gas mask, they could be used effectively against unprotected popu-
lations and/or poorly equipped combatants.
Toxins have not been included in this subsection but can be found in Section 3,
Biological Weapons Technologies. Although toxins are not living organisms, they are
made by living organisms. They are listed in Schedule 1A of the CWC and the bio-
logical agent part of the Australia Group list.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)
Any country with a chemical industry has the capability, if not the intent, to pro-
duce toxic chemicals. Most of the technologies are old and described in the open
literature. The countries listed in Figure 4.0-2 have the capability or have used chemi-
cal weapons in the past and therefore are technically capable of producing chemical
weapons. The assessment is not an indication of current intent. Many of these coun-
tries have signed/ratified the CWC.
There have been numerous press reports of toxic chemicals produced in Russia
that are not covered in the CWC schedules. Vil Mirzayanov, a chemist and former
high-ranking scientist in the former Soviet Union’s chemical weapons program, pub-
lished an article in Kuranty in 1991 (and co-authored another article in 1992 in the
Moscow News) in which he claimed that Russia had developed new kinds of chemical
weapons. Substances like Novichok (A-230, A-232, and A-234) are chemical agents
that the Russians are said to have developed in spite of agreement to halt production of
chemical weapons. These statements were repeated by a former head of the Russian
demilitarization program.
There has been press coverage of a large, underground facility being built at
Tarhunah in Libya that the United States claims is designed as a chemical production
facility. Libya dropped chemical agents obtained from Iran from a transport aircraft
against Chadian troops in 1987. Late in 1988, Libya completed a chemical agent
facility at Rabta as part of its drive to develop an indigenous CW capability. When the
United States brought international attention to the plant, Libya responded by fabricat-
ing a fire to make it appear that the facility had been seriously damaged. This plant
was closed in 1990, but the Libyans announced its reopening in September 1995 as a
pharmaceutical facility. The Rabta facility is still capable of producing chemical agents.
II-4-11
Since the late 1980’s, North Korea has expanded its chemical warfare program.
Today it can produce large quantities of blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve
agents. It also maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or storing pre-
cursors for toxic chemicals, the agents themselves, and weapons. As mentioned previ-
ously, Iran delivered limited quantities of blister and blood agents against Iraqi sol-
diers late in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has increased its rate of production since 1984 and
has produced at least several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking agents. Some
of these agents have been weaponized to support ground combat operations.
Before the Gulf War, Iraq had become nearly self-sufficient in producing many
precursors and had developed a variety of chemical weapons on its own. The chief
inspector of the UN Special Commission chemical destruction group said that all known
chemical munitions, agents, and precursors in Iraq had been eliminated by May 1994.
Many think that Iraq can revive its CW capability in a matter of months in the absence
of UN monitoring or import controls.
On the Asian subcontinent, India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical
weapons. India has a large chemical industry that produces numerous dual-use chemi-
cals that are potential precursors. In June 1997, India submitted CW declarations to
the CWC governing body in The Hague. This was the first time the Indians publicly
acknowledged a CW program. Pakistan has procured dual-use precursors from for-
eign sources and is moving slowly toward the capability of producing precursors.
The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan proved that subnational groups can obtain the
expertise and ingredients to threaten society with chemical agents. A Senate Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations study indicated that the cult had produced the
nerve agents sarin, soman, tabun, and VX, as well as phosgene and sodium cyanide.
Toxic chemicals were used at least twice, including the Tokyo subway attack that left
12 dead and more than 5,000 injured.
 The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purposes of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for
the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1(a), these Schedules do not
constitute a definition of chemical weapons.
(Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, all chemicals possible by all possible
combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical
marked “*” on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.)

Schedule 1 (CAS registry number) (5) Lewisites:

A. Toxic chemicals:
(1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates,
e.g., sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8)
soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0)
(2) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates,
e.g., tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate (77-81-6)
(3) O-Alkyl (H or ≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated
salts,
e.g., VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl
phosphonothiolate (50782-69-9)
(4) Sulfur mustards:
2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide (2625-76-5)
Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide (505-60-2)
Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane (63869-13-6)
Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane (3563-36-8)
1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane (63905-10-2)
1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane (142868-93-7)
1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane (142868-94-8)
Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether (63918-90-1)
O-Mustard: bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether (63918-89-8)
Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine (541-25-3)
Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (40334-69-8)
Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine (40334-70-1)
(6) Nitrogen mustards:
HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (538-07-8)
HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (51-75-2)
HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (555-77-1)
(7) Saxitoxin (35523-89-8)
(8) Ricin (9009-86-3)
B. Precursors:
(9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides
e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride (676-99-3)
(10) O-Alkyl (H or ≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g. QL:
O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite (57856-11-8)
(11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate (1445-76-7)
(12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate (7040-57-5)

(cont’d)

Figure 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals

II-4-12
Schedule 2 Schedule 3
A. Toxic chemicals: A. Toxic chemicals:
(1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] (1) Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride (75-44-5)
phosphorothiolate (78-53-5) (2) Cyanogen chloride (506-77-4)
and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts (3) Hydrogen cyanide (74-90-8)
(2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)- (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane (76-06-2)
1-propene (382-21-8)
(3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*) (6581-06-2) B. Precursors:
(5) Phosphorus oxychloride (10025-87-3)
B. Precursors: (6) Phosphorus trichloride (7719-12-2)
(4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, (7) Phosphorus pentachloride (10026-13-8)
containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, (8) Trimethyl phosphite (121-45-9)
ethyl, or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon (9) Triethyl phosphite (122-52-1)
atoms, e.g., (10) Dimethyl phosphite (868-85-9)
Methylphosphonyl dichloride (676-97-1) (11) Diethyl phosphite (762-04-9)
Dimethyl methylphosphonate (756-79-6) (12) Sulfur monochloride(10025-67-9)
Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl (13) Sulfur dichloride (10545-99-0)
ethylphosphonothiolothionate (944-22-9) (14) Thionyl chloride (7719-09-7)
(5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic (15) Ethyldiethanolamine (139-87-7)
dihalides (16) Methyldiethanolamine (105-59-9)
(6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (17) Triethanolamine (102-71-6)
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates
(7) Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1) Source: The Chemical Weapons Convention, “Annex on Chemicals,” Part B.
(8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (76-93-7)
(9) Quinuclidine-3-ol (1619-34-7)
(10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-chlorides
and corresponding protonated salts
(11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols
and corresponding protonated salts
Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol (108-01-0)
and corresponding protonated salts
N,N-Diethylaminoethanol (100-37-8)
and corresponding protonated salts
(12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols
and corresponding protonated salts
(13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide (111-48-8)
(14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol (464-07-3)

Figure 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals (cont’d)

II-4-13
Chemical C.A.S. # Chemical C.A.S. #

1. Thiodiglycol 111-48-8 30. Triethyl Phosphite 122-52-1

2. Phosphorus Oxychloride 10025-87-3 31. Arsenic Trichloride 7784-34-1
3. Dimethyl Methylphosphonate 756-79-6 32. Benzilic Acid 76-93-7
4. Methyl Phosphonyl Difluoride 676-99-3 33. Diethyl Methylphosphonite 15715-41-0
5. Methyl Phosphonyl Dichloride 676-97-1 34. Dimethyl Ethylphosphonate 6163-75-3
6. Dimethyl Phosphite 868-85-9 35. Ethyl Phosphinyl Difluoride 430-78-4
7. Phosphorus Trichloride 7719-12-2 36. Methyl Phosphinyl Difluoride 753-59-3
37. 3-Quinuclidone 3731-38-2
8. Trimethyl Phosphite 121-45-9
38. Phosphorus Pentachloride 10026-13-8
9. Thionyl Chloride 7719-09-7
39. Pinacolone 75-97-8
10. 3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine 3554-74-3
40. Potassium Cyanide 151-50-8
11. N,N-Diisopropyl-ß-Aminoethyl Chloride 96-79-7
41. Potassium Bifluoride 7789-29-9
12. N,N-Diisopropyl-ß-Aminoethane Thiol 5842-07-9 42. Ammonium Bifluoride 1341-49-7
13. 3-Quinuclidinol 1619-34-7 43. Sodium Bifluoride 1333-83-1
14. Potassium Fluoride 7789-23-3 44. Sodium Fluoride 7681-49-4
15. 2-Chloroethanol 107-07-3 45. Sodium Cyanide 143-33-9
16. Dimethylamine 124-40-3 46. Tri-ethanolamine 102-71-6
17. Diethyl Ethylphosphonate 78-38-6 47. Phosphorus Pentasulphide 1314-80-3
18. Diethyl N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidate 2404-03-7 48. Di-isopropylamine 108-18-9
19. Diethyl Phosphite 762-04-9 49. Diethylaminoethanol 100-37-8
20. Dimethylamine Hydrochloride 506-59-2 50. Sodium Sulphide 1313-82-2
21. Ethyl Phosphinyl Dichloride 1498-40-4 51. Sulphur Monochloride 10025-67-9
22. Ethyl Phosphonyl Dichloride 1066-50-8 52. Sulphur Dichloride 10545-99-0
23. Ethyl Phosphonyl Difluoride 753-98-0 53. Triethanolamine Hydrochloride 637-39-8
24. Hydrogen Fluoride 7664-39-3 54. N,N-Diisopropyl-2-Aminoethyl 4261-68-1
25. Methyl Benzilate 76-89-1 Chloride Hydrochloride
26. Methyl Phosphinyl Dichloride 676-83-5
27. N,N-Diisopropyl-ß-Amino-Ethanol 96-80-0 Source: ACDA Fact Sheet on Australia Group Export Controls,
November 7, 1995 (current as of September 6, 1997).
28. Pinacolyl Alcohol 464-07-3
29. O-Ethyl 2-Diisopropylaminoethyl 57856-11-8
Methylphosphonite

Figure 4.1-2. Australia Group Chemicals

II-4-14
 Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; Phosphorus Needs expensive None identified
for O-Alkyl ( ≤C10, incl. annual production of approx. WA ML 7; trichloride; DF; DC; corrosive-resistant
cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, 100 tons hydrogen fluoride; equipment such as
n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphono- USML XIV isopropanol hastelloy or silver
Subnational: capable of
fluoridates, e.g., sarin producing any amount
(GB) : O-Isopropyl
methylphosphonofluori-
date (CAS: 107-44-8)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; Phosphorus Needs expensive None identified
for O-Alkyl ( ≤C10, incl. annual production of approx. WA ML 7; trichloride; DC; corrosive-resistant
cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, 100 tons hydrogen fluoride; equipment such as
n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphono- USML XIV pinacolyl alcohol hastelloy or silver
Subnational: capable of
fluoridates, e.g., soman producing any amount
(GD) : O-Pinacolyl
methylphosphono-
fluoridate (CAS: 96-64-0)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; Phosphorus None identified None identified
for O-Alkyl ( ≤C10, incl. annual production of approx. WA ML 7; oxychloride or
cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl 200 tons phosphorus
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) USML XIV trichloride; sodium
Subnational: capable of
phosphoramidocyani- producing any amount cyanide;
dates, e.g., tabun (GA) : dimethlyamine; ethyl
alcohol
O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl-
phosphoramidocyanidate
(CAS: 77-81-6)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; QL; sulfur or DC if Inert atmosphere None identified
for O-Alkyl (H or ≤C10, annual production of approx. WA ML 7; Amiton-like process High-temperature
incl. cycloalkyl) Me, Et, 200 tons is used methylation equipment
n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl USML XIV
Subnational: capable of (QL process)
alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) producing any amount
phosphonothiolates and
corresponding alkylated
or protonated salts, e.g.,
VX (CAS: 50782-69-9)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; DC Glass-lined reactors None identified
for Phosphonochloridates, annual production of approx. WA ML 7;
e.g., chlorosarin: 300 tons
O-Isopropyl methyl- USML XIV
Subnational: capable of
phosphonochloridate producing any amount
(CAS: 1445-76-7)
(cont’d)

II-4-15
 Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; Sulfur monochloride None identified None identified
for Sulfur mustards: (see annual production of approx. WA ML 7; or sulfur dichloride
Figure 4.1-1 for names) 500 tons or Thiodiglycol
USML XIV
- CAS: 2625-76-5 Subnational: capable of
- CAS: 505-60-2 producing any amount
- CAS: 63869-13-6
- CAS: 3563-36-8
- CAS: 63905-10-2
- CAS: 142868-93-7
- CAS: 142868-94-8
- CAS: 63918-90-1
- CAS: 63918-89-8
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; Arsenic trichloride None identified None identified
for lewisites: annual production of approx. WA ML 7;
- Lewisite 1: 2-Chloro- 500 tons
USML XIV
vinyldichloroarsine Subnational: capable of
(CAS: 541-25-3) producing any amount
- Lewisite 2: Bis(2-
chlorovinyl)chloro-
arsine
(CAS: 40334-69-8)
- Lewisite 3: Tris(2-
chlorovinyl)arsine
(CAS: 40334-70-1)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; HN 1: ethyl Glass- or enamel-lined None identified
for Nitrogen mustards: annual production of approx. WA ML 7; diethanolamine equipment
- HN1: Bis(2-chloro- 500 tons HN 2: methyl
USML XIV
ethyl)ethylamine Subnational: capable of diethanolamine
(CAS: 538-07-8) producing any amount HN 3:
- HN2: Bis(2-chloro- triethanolamine
ethyl)methylamine
(CAS: 51-75-2)
- HN3: Tris(2-chloro-
ethyl)amine
(CAS: 555-77-1)

(cont’d)

II-4-16
 Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; None Normally made in None identified
for Amiton: O,O-Diethyl annual production of approx. WA ML 7; solution, extraction
S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] 500 tons equipment
phosphorothiolate and USML XIV
Subnational: capable of
corresponding alkylated producing any amount
or protonated salts
(CAS: 78-53-5)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; None Needs expensive None identified
for PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3- annual production of approx. WA ML 7; corrosion resistant
Pentafluoro-2- 2,000 tons equipment such as
(trifluoromethyl)-1- USML XIV Hastelloy or silver
Subnational: capable of
propene (CAS: 382-21-8) producing any amount

Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC (exempted None Corrosion resistant None identified
for Phosgene: carbonyl annual production of approx. from WA ML); equipment
dichloride (CAS: 75-44-5) 2,000 tons USML XIV
Subnational: capable of
producing any amount
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC (exempted None None identified None identified
for Cyanogen chloride annual production of approx. from WA ML);
(CAS: 506-77-4) 2,000 tons USML XIV
Subnational: capable of
producing any amount
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC (exempted None None identified None identified
for Hydrogen cyanide annual production of approx. from WA ML);
(CAS: 74-90-8) 5,000 tons USML XIV
Subnational: capable of
producing any amount
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; DC; hydrogen Production equipment None identified
for Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i- annual production of approx. AG List; fluoride made of Hastelloy or
Pr) phosphonyldifluorides, 200 tons other high nickel alloys;
e.g., DF: Methyl- WA ML-7; silver
Subnational: capable of
phosphonyldifluoride producing any amount CCL Cat 1E
(CAS: 676-99-3 )

(cont’d)

II-4-17
 Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; Thionyl chloride or Glass-lined vessels None identified
for Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i- annual production of approx. AG List; phosgene or Glass-lined distillation
Pr) phosphonylchlorides, 400 tons phosphorous columns
e.g., DC: Methyl- WA ML-7; pentachloride.
Subnational: capable of
phosphonyl dichloride producing any amount CCL Cat IE Dimethylmethylphos-
phonate (DMMP)
(CAS: 676-97-1) (many production
Note: This material, processes
rather than DF, is the available).
fundamental building
block of a significant
portion of G and V
agents.
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; TR (diethyl Waste treatment None identified
for O-Alkyl (H or ≤C10, annual production of approx. AG List; methylphosphonite) incinerators
incl. cycloalkyl) O-2- 200 tons KB (2-(N-N- Distillation columns
dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i- Subnational: capable of WA ML 7;
diethylamino) High-temperature
Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, producing any amount CCL Cat 1E
ethanol). methylation equipment
Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
phosphonites and Similar esters and
corresponding alkylated amino alcohols.
or protonated salts,
e.g., QL
(CAS: 57856-11-8)

II-4-18
 Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Manufacturing processes for Oxidation; alkylation; fluorination; Troop concentrations, sabotage. A number of production
O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) esterification. Large power needs. processes have been
alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)- Must be distilled and stabilized unless documented
phosphono–fluoridates, manufactured for immediate use.
e.g., sarin (GB) : O-Isopropyl
methylphosphonofluoridate
(CAS: 107-44-8)
Manufacturing processes for Oxidation; alkylation; fluorination; Troop concentrations, sabotage. A number of production
O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) esterification. Large power needs. processes have been
alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)- Must be distilled and stabilized unless documented
phosphonofluoridates, manufactured for immediate use.
e.g., soman (GD) : –O-Pinacolyl
methylphosphonofluoridate
(CAS: 96-64-0)
Manufacturing processes for Cyanation reaction Troop concentrations, sabotage. A number of production
O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) processes have been
N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) documented
phosphoramidocyanidates,
e.g., tabun (GA) : O-Ethyl N,N-
dimethyl phosphoramido-
cyanidate
(CAS: 77-81-6)
Manufacturing processes for Alkylation reaction or use of Amiton- Troop concentrations, sabotage, A number of production
O-Alkyl (H or ≤C10, incl. like process. terrain denial processes have been
cycloalkyl) Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)- Product should be stabilized. documented
aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-
Pr) phosphonothiolates and
corresponding alkylated or
protonated salts, e.g., VX
(CAS: 50782-69-9)
Manufacturing processes for No fluorinated reactor involved; Sabotage (more applicable to A number of production
Phosphonochloridates, e.g., therefore, do not need Hastelloy subnational) processes have been
chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl although glass-lined vessel required. documented
methylphosphonochloridate Easier to produce, but far less toxic.
(CAS: 1445-76-7)

(cont’d)

II-4-19
 Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Manufacturing processes for Ventilation; filtration Troop concentrations, sabotage, A number of production
Sulfur mustards: (see Figure 4.1-1 terrain denial processes have been
for names) documented
- CAS: 2625-76-5
- CAS: 505-60-2
- CAS: 63869-13-6
- CAS: 3563-36-8
- CAS: 63905-10-2
- CAS: 142868-93-7
- CAS: 142868-94-8
- CAS: 63918-90-1
- CAS: 63918-89-8
Manufacturing processes for Corrosion; potential for explosive Troop concentrations, sabotage A number of production
lewisites: reactions processes have been docu-
- Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyl- mented
dichloroarsine (CAS: 541-25-3)
- Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)-
chloroarsine (CAS: 40334-69-8)
- Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)-
arsine (CAS: 40334-70-1)
Manufacturing processes for Chlorination; neutralization Troop concentrations, sabotage A number of production
Nitrogen mustards: processes have been docu-
- HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)- mented including those to make
ethylamine (CAS: 538-07-8) other nitrogen mustards not listed
on CWC schedules
- HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)-
methylamine (CAS: 51-75-2)
- HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine
(CAS: 555-77-1)
Manufacturing processes for Byproduct of Teflon manufacture Gas-mask penetrant A number of production
PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2- processes have been docu-
(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene mented
(CAS: 382-21-8)
Manufacturing processes for Used heavily in commercial processes Nonpersistent gas A number of production
Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride processes have been docu-
(CAS: 75-44-5) mented

(cont’d)

II-4-20
 Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Manufacturing processes for None identified Quick-acting casualty agent A number of production
Cyanogen chloride Degradation of mask filters processes have been
(CAS: 506-77-4) documented
Manufacturing processes for Used heavily in acrylic industries Bombs, grenades A number of production
Hydrogen cyanide processes have been
(CAS: 74-90-8) documented
Manufacturing processes for Fluorination reaction; corrosion Key component in binary G agents A number of production
Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) processes have been
phosphonyldifluorides, e.g., DF: documented
Methylphosphonyldifluoride
(CAS: 676-99-3 ) .
Manufacturing processes for Chlorination reaction Used to make DF and Di-Di mix A number of production
Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) Also can be used in some V agent processes have been
phosphonylchlorides, e.g., DC: processes documented
Methylphosphonyl dichloride
(CAS: 676-97-1 )
Note: This material rather than DF
is the fundamental building block
of a significant portion of G and V
agents.
Manufacturing processes for Transesterification reaction Component of VX binary weapon; may A number of production
O-Alkyl (H or ≤C10, incl. High-temperature methylation be intermediate in VX process processes have been
cycloalkyl) O-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n- documented
Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me,
Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and
corresponding alkylated or
protonated salts, e.g., QL
(CAS: 57856-11-8)

II-4-21
 SECTION 4.2—DISSEMINATION, DISPERSION, AND WEAPONS TESTING
OVERVIEW
Perhaps the most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the
efficiency of dissemination. This section lists a variety of technologies that can be
used to weaponize toxic chemical agents. Munitions include bombs, submunitions,
projectiles, warheads, and spray tanks. Techniques of filling and storage of munitions
are important. The principal method of disseminating chemical agents has been
the use of explosives. (Figure 4.2-1 shows an example of a U.S. chemical bomb, the
MC-1.) These usually have taken the form of central bursters expelling the agent
laterally. Efficiency is not particularly high in that a good deal of the agent is lost by
incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Particle size will
vary, since explosive dissemination produces a bimodal distribution of liquid droplets
of an uncontrollable size but usually having fine and coarse modes. For flammable
aerosols, sometimes the cloud is totally or partially ignited (flashing) in the dissemina-
tion process. For example, explosively disseminated VX ignited roughly one third of
the time it was employed. The phenomenon was never fully understood or controlled
despite extensive study. A solution would represent a major technological advance.
Figure 4.2-1. MC-1 Gas Bomb
II-4-22
Highlights
• Efficiency of dissemination is the most important factor in the
effectiveness of chemical weapons.
• Much of the agent is lost in an explosive dissemination by
incineration and by being forced onto the ground.
• Flammable aerosols frequently “flash” (ignite) when explosively
disseminated.
• The environment (winds and temperature) are important factors in
CW dissemination.
Aerodynamic dissemination technology allows nonexplosive delivery from a line
source. Although this method provides a theoretical capability of controlling the size
of the particle, the altitude of dissemination must be controlled and the wind direction
and velocity known. Accurate weather observations can enable the attacker to predict
wind direction and velocity in the target area.
An important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of
dissemination as it is tailored to the types of agent. The majority of the most potent of
chemical agents are not very volatile. Indeed, the most volatile of the G-agents is GB
(sarin), which has a volatility near that of water. All are nonvolatile liquids or solids at
room temperature. VX is an oily liquid.
An advanced proliferant might attempt to develop on-board sensor systems for
initiation and control of agent dissemination/dispersal for ballistic missiles, cruise mis-
siles, and artillery. In these cases, the sensor (target-detection device) may employ
technologies common to other electronic fuzing applications. The efficacy of explo-
sives and pyrotechnics for dissemination is limited by the flammable nature of some
agents.
In some respects, long-range strategic weapons pose a lesser problem than short-
range tactical weapons that are fired over, or in the vicinity of, one’s own forces. The
agent must be dispersed within the boundary layer (<200–300 ft above the ground)
and yet high enough to allow effective dispersal of the agent. This poses design prob-
lems because the ground/target detection device must be substantially more sensitive
than for conventional munitions. The increased sensitivity also results in increased
susceptibility to false firing due to noise, mutual interference, and electronic counter-
measures (ECM).
 Casualties due to premature initiation of the warhead are unacceptable in tactical
weapons. Accordingly, an additional function such as a simple electrical or mechani-
cal timer may be used to arm the height-of-burst sensor.
A more recent attempt to control aerosol particle size on target has been the use of
aerodynamic dissemination and sprays as line sources. By modification of the rheo-
logical properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can
theoretically be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved. In practice,
the task is more difficult, but it represents an area where a technological advance could
result in major munition performance improvements. The altitude of dissemination
must be controllable and the wind direction and velocity known for a disseminated
liquid of a predetermined particle size to predictably reach the ground and reliably hit
a target.
Thermal dissemination, wherein pyrotechnics are used to aerosolize the agent
has been used particularly to generate fine, inhalable clouds of incapacitants. Most of
the more complex agent molecules, however, are sensitive to high temperatures and
can deteriorate if exposure is too lengthy. Solids are a notoriously difficult problem
for dissemination, since they tend to agglomerate even when pre-ground to desired
sizes.
Dispersion considers the relative placement of the chemical agent munition upon
or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination so that the material is most
efficiently used. For example, the artillery rockets of the 1950’s and early 1960’s
employed a multitude of submunitions so that a large number of small agent clouds
would form directly on the target with minimal dependence on meteorology. Another
variation of this is multiple “free” aerial sprays such as those achieved by the BLU 80/
B Bigeye weapon and the multiple launch rocket system. While somewhat wind de-
pendent, this technique is considerably more efficient in terms of agent quantities.
Testing requirements for munitions seek to measure the efficacy of dissemina-
tion. This has been done historically on instrumented grids with samples of the dis-
seminated material taken at known positions. The positions are assigned area values
and these are integrated to determine total dosage and dose isopleths. While the
technique was constantly improved, it still was crude by most standards and required
II-4-23
numerous tests to provide useful information. Instrumental methods such as versions
of light detection and ranging (LIDAR) may well be better suited to more accurate
measures but without the signature of the chemical grids.
Modeling dissemination patterns for agent laydown can be an effective way to
predict dispersal without physical testing. Little testing would be required given good,
verified models. The problem, however, is model verification.
RATIONALE (See Table 4.2-1)
Many dissemination technologies have been included because many are available
to a proliferant. In World War I, canisters of chlorine were simply opened to allow the
gas to drift across enemy lines. Although this produced limited results, it is indicative
of the simplicity of potential means of dispersion. Although central bursters have
limitations, countries usually use this method in the early stages of CW development,
although it does not have to be the first one. There is sufficient open literature describ-
ing the pros and cons of various types of dissemination to dictate the consideration of
all of them by a proliferant. Most countries could develop the toxic agents and adapt
their standard munitions to carry the agents. It is much more difficult, however, to
achieve success in effective dispersion and dissemination. Weather observation and
forecasting are essential to increase the probability of effective CW dissemination and
reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)
As stated previously, most countries have the capability to develop chemical weap-
ons. Those with a well-developed military infrastructure could readily adapt existing
munitions for chemical warfare. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq delivered mustard and
tabun with artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, and rockets. Virtually any country
or subnational group with significant resources has sufficient capability to attain the
minimum capability that would be needed to meet terrorist aims. Any nation with
substantial foreign military sales or indigenous capability in conventional weapons
will have (or have ready access to) both the design know-how and components re-
quired to implement at least a moderate capability.
 Table 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Projectile cases for CW Ability to produce fillable, USML II, IV; High fragmentation Projectile forging, casing Liquid fill ballistic
agents fireable, and leakproof WA ML 2, 4 steels and production, high-integrity programs
munition casings corrosion/leak weld or ball seals, inert Dissemination prediction
resistant casings gas insertion, helium models
leak check equipment,
acoustic metal flaw
detection.
Warheads for CW missile Ability to produce casings for USML IV; Corrosion/leak- High-integrity weld or ball Ballistic programs able to
systems either bulk liquid or sub- WA ML 4; resistant casings seals, inert gas account for effects of
munitions capable of insertion, helium leak liquid fills
appropriate opening for MTCR 4 check equipment. Dissemination and
dissemination Ability to dynamically dispersion prediction
balance loaded warhead. capabilities
Electronic time fuzes Accuracy/setability to within USML III; Accurate electronic Ability to test fuze None identified
0.1 second WA ML 3 clock technology accuracy and reliability.

High-explosive Precisely tailored energetic USML V; Although standard Measures of explosive Explosive dissemination
formulations properties to prevent ignition WA ML 8 formulations are stability, oxygen balance pattern prediction
usable, formulations desirable.
to reduce potential
aerosol ignition are
desirable.
Energetic materials Low-temperature burning USML V; Energetics with Measurement of Dissemination
energetic materials capable WA ML 8; sufficiently low and energetic mix burning effectiveness predictive
of vaporization/condensation controllable burning temperatures. models
or ablative dissemination of WA Cat 1C; temperatures that
solid agents CCL Cat 1C do not destroy the
material being
disseminated.

(cont’d)

II-4-24
 Table 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
On-board sensors for Radar or radio proximity USML XI, XII; None identified Specially designed HOB measurement and
sequencing and initiation sensors for reliable measure- WA ML 11, 15 ground approach or detection algorithms and
of CW warheads ment of altitudes from 50 to terrain return simulators logic algorithms for
100 meters. ECCM or terrain feature
Guidance integrated fuzing. analysis
Nonenergetic electro-
mechanical mechanisms for
warhead control and initiation.
Aerodynamic Nonexplosive dispersion of USML XIV; Compatible Rheogoniometer for Dissemination
dissemination CW agents in a line source in WA ML 7 thixotropic additives measurement of dynamic effectiveness predictive
the atmosphere for control of particle rheological properties of models
size batches
Submunition dispersion Capability to produce and USML IV; None identified Corrosion/leak-resistant Dissemination
disperse agent filled sub- WA ML 4 casings for sub- effectiveness predictive
munitions munitions. Sub-munition models
fill capability for missile
warheads.
Prediction/sensing of Ability to predict wind velocity CCL EAR 99; None identified Deployable micro- Linkage of sensor data
micro-meteorology and direction in a target area USML XIV, XXI meteorological sensors to weapons system to
control employment
De-agglomeration of Ability to have majority of pre- USML XIV; Effective (probably Reliable particle size None identified
particles ground solid particles in the WA ML 7 item-specific) de- measurement
inhalable range agglomerant
Dosage/Area Ability for reasonable USML XIV; None identified Techniques for measure- Software to translate
measurement measurement of dissemina- WA ML 7 ment of aerosol concen- data to concentration
tion effectiveness trations versus time isopleths
and/or ground deposi-
tions over a broad area
Fuzzy logic for Use of fuzzy logic in con- WA ML 21; None identified None identified Fuzzy programs to
unmanned aircraft junction with on-site micro- USML XXI rapidly adjust delivery to
meteorological data to prevailing meteorological
optimize dissemination conditions
performance

II-4-25
 Table 4.2-2. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Projectile cases for CW agents Acquiring/producing fillable/fireable Bombs, projectiles, submunitions, None identified
and leakproof munition casings warheads
Warheads for CW missile systems Producing casings for either bulk liquid Missiles None identified
or submunitions capable of
appropriate opening for dissemination.
Electronic time fuzes Producibility Conventional, biological and chemical Radar fuzes, proximity fuzes
warheads
High explosive formulations Ability to cast stable explosives for All munitions systems None identified
weapon environments.
Energetic materials Low-temperature burning energetic All munitions systems None identified; many energetics
materials capable of vaporization/ available
condensation or ablative
dissemination of solid agents.
On-board sensors for sequencing Effects of initiation mechanism on Technology common to conventional Delivery from manned aircraft
and initiation of CW warheads agent cannister weapons and strategic/ Surface burst/contact sensor
tactical nuclear weapons
Aerodynamic dissemination Nonexplosive dissemination of CW Line source delivery of CW agents Different delivery system
agents
Submunition dispersion Fuzing, filling CW agent delivery Bombs, warheads
Prediction/sensing of micro- Data collection Prediction of CW effects On-site observers
meteorology
De-agglomeration of particles Keeping particles in inhalable size Dissemination of CW agent None identified
Dosage/Area measurement Detection, collection Contamination avoidance, command Use animals
and control
Fuzzy logic for unmanned aircraft Computational ability Delivery of CW agent Normal logic

II-4-26
 SECTION 4.3—DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION
OVERVIEW
Because many toxic chemicals act quickly, rapid detection is needed to prevent
lethal or incapacitating results from unwanted exposure. This subsection covers a
variety of technologies that can be used to detect CW agents. Sample collection, sample
processing, and information processing are vital to enable identification and warning
of chemical exposure.
Detection can be accomplished at a designated location (point detection) or at a
distance (standoff detection). No single fielded sensor detects all chemical agents of
interest. Standoff detection is particularly difficult for low volatility agents (e.g., ei-
ther U.S. or Russian forms of VX). Sensitivity of a detector is crucial to detecting
lethal concentrations. Equipment must be reliable, provide identification quickly with
a low false alarm rate and high accuracy, and be integrated into an alarm system so that
warning can be distributed and proper action taken. Unknown factors can include
location, persistence, and intensity of the agent. These are critical parameters for com-
mand decisions. Figure 4.3-1 shows a U.S. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). Detec-
tion, warning, and identification have an offensive CW component and are also neces-
sary in a defensive context.
Figure 4.3-1. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)
Some amount of detection and warning capability is needed if a country is to
develop and employ chemical weapons. When toxic chemicals are produced,
II-4-27
Highlights
• Detection requirements for a purely offensive posture are minimal.
• A prudent attacker must be prepared to defend against a counter-
attack in kind if the CW threshold is crossed.
• Detection, warning, and identification of the employment of CW
are key to implementing defensive measures.
• Detection of CW is a key aspect of CWC compliance.
detection and warning are necessary to the extent that the safety of workers is impor-
tant. If storage sites are established, detection is needed to verify the integrity of the
weapons. and to ensure that the surrounding area does not become contaminated. These
concerns can be mitigated if production occurs just before use. Even though soldiers
and airmen employing chemical weapons might wear some type of protective cloth-
ing, detection is necessary to prevent inadvertent exposure and to minimize contami-
nation. It should be noted that other countries have not considered safety to be as
important as the U.S. did when it was involved in offensive CW preparation. Conse-
quently, they may dispense with procedures that the U.S. deemed essential.
Proliferators of chemical weapons would not need much detection equipment.
The agent(s) being produced and used would be known. Point detectors would be
sufficient to determine inadvertent leakage. Detection capability is required to know
when the environment is safe for normal operations after CW has been employed.
Detection, warning, and identification are critical in a defensive role. Protection
against chemical agents is available, but since wearing protective gear degrades mili-
tary performance, units must not assume a protective posture until it is mandatory.
Many prophylactic measures are most effective if implemented before exposure, and
many therapeutics must be initiated soon after exposure. The sophistication needed
depends on the technological capability of the enemy.
The detection and identification requirements in a defensive posture are much
more difficult to meet than those required for offensive operations. Detection, warn-
ing, and identification systems are further stressed because the time, place, amount,
and type of agent used are determined by the attacker. The defender must be ready for
anything at any time and in any amount.
 Historically, detection of ground and surface contamination has depended on a RATIONALE (See Table 4.3-1)
color change on special paper that was exposed to an agent. Another method was a
To prevent unnecessary casualties during production, transport, storage, and em-
color change that occurred when air was drawn through tubes with special dye chemi-
ployment, a proliferant might need only be able to detect those agents that are being
cals on a substrate. Special analytical kits were used to determine the presence of
developed. A number of technologies could be used for this purpose, although only
chemical agents in water. Various technologies are used in automatic detectors. All of
point detectors would suffice, since the location and identity would already be known.
them indicate the presence of an agent in one location. A number of detectors are
Warning would be quite simple. A prudent attacker, however, must be prepared for a
being developed to provide standoff capability. Figure 4.3-2 shows the U.S. Remote
retaliatory attack by an adversary. In this case, the agent to be expected might not be
Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), which is designed to detect nerve and
known. Identification and warning would be critical to taking proper defensive mea-
vesicant agent clouds at up to 5 km. If an agent can be detected at a sufficient distance,
sures.
measures can be taken to avoid the contamination and the need to wear protective
clothing. The ability to detect and identify toxic agents and provide warning to forces is
essential for operating in a chemical environment. Early detection and warning pro-
vide situational awareness to allow military forces to avoid or reduce the threat. If
exposure cannot be avoided, troops must don protective clothing. Military forces also
must know when contamination has been reduced to a level that permits normal opera-
tions. Knowledge of areas of residual contamination is important as well.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)
A number of Western countries (Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United
States) have significant capability in sensor technology. Russia and Israel also are
well advanced in this field. At least 18 countries have some type of chemical detector
in their armed forces. Countries among the 18 include China, Finland, Hungary, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, the Netherlands, North Korea, the Czech Republic, and South Africa.

Figure 4.3-2. RSCAAL

II-4-28
 Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Ion Mobility Detect level 0.05– WA ML 7; Radioactive None identified Spectral data base
Spectrometry (IMS) 1.0 mg/m3 of CW agent WA Cat IA; materials in some
AG List; systems
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B
Mass Spectrometry- Detect level 0.1– WA ML 7; None identified Miniaturization and Spectral data base
mass spectrometry (MS- 100 picograms of CW agent WA Cat IA; ruggedizing of current
MS) AG List; technology required
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 3A
Passive Infrared (IR) Detect level @1,000 m WA ML 7; None identified Database development Requires data base of
~100 mg/m3 of CW agent WA Cat IA; emission patterns
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 6A
Wet chemistry Detect >1.0 mg of CW agent WA ML 7; None identified None identified None identified
WA Cat IA;
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B
Enzymatic reactions Detect level <0.1 mg of CW WA ML 7; Enzyme (aceto- None identified None identified
agent WA Cat IA; cholinesterase)
AG List; substrate
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B
Gas phase ion chemistry Detect levels <1.0 mg of CW WA ML 7; None identified Ion source None identified
agent WA Cat IA;
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B
3
Gas Chromatography Detect level 0.1–1.0 mg/m of WA ML 7; Carrier gas None identified Spectral data base.
(GC)-IMS CW agent WA Cat IA; Retention time indices.
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 3A

(cont’d)

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 Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
GC-Mass Spectrometry Detect level 1– WA ML 7; Carrier gas None identified Spectral data base
(MS) 100 picograms of CW agent WA Cat IA; Retention time indices
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 3A
GC-Flame Photometric Detect level 10– WA ML 7; Carrier gas None identified Retention time indices
Detector (FPD)-Flame 1,000 picograms of CW agent WA Cat IA;
Ionization Detector (FID)
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B
Transverse Field Detect level 0.001– WA ML 7; Radioactive None identified Spectral data base
Compensation (TFC)-IMS 0.01 mg/m3 of CW agent WA Cat IA; materials
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B
Surface Acoustic Wave Detect level 0.01–1.0 mg of WA ML 7; Polymer coatings None identified Signal patterns of arrays
(SAW) Crystal Arrays CW agent WA Cat IA, 3A;
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 3A
Absorption LIDAR Detect levels of 1 mg/m3 of WA ML 7; None identified None identified Spectral data base
CW agent WA Cat IA, 6A;
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 6A
Scattering LIDAR Detect levels above WA ML 7; None identified None identified Spectral data base
1 mg/m3 of CW agent WA Cat IA, 6A;
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL Cat 2B, 6A

(cont’d)

II-4-30
 Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Information Processing Any capability is a concern CCL EAR 99 None identified Multiplexed system for Adaptations of existing
(e.g., data reduction, detection of CW agents systems.
information transfer,
sensor multiplexing,
decision making
Sample Processing Any capability is a concern WA ML 7; None identified Analytical chemistry Spectral recognition
(e.g., concentration) WA Cat IA; equipment algorithms
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL 2B
Remote liquid particulate Detect levels above 1 mg/m3 WA ML 7; None identified None identified Emission data base
sensing WA Cat IA;
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL 2B
Remote solid particulate Detect levels above 1 mg/m3 WA ML 7; None identified Database development Requires database of
sensing WA Cat IA; emissions
AG List;
USML XIV;
CCL 2B

II-4-31

Technology
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS)
Mass Spectrometry-mass
spectrometry (MS-MS)
Passive Infrared (IR)
Wet chemistry
Enzymatic reactions
Gas phase ion chemistry
Gas Chromatography (GC)-IMS
GC-Mass Spectrometry (MS)
GC-Flame Photometric Detector
(FPD)-Flame Ionization Detector
(FID)
Transverse Field Compensation
(TFC)-IMS
Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW)
Crystal Arrays
Absorption LIDAR
Scattering LIDAR
Information Processing (e.g.,
data reduction, information
transfer, sensor multiplexing,
decision making
Table 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data
Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Replacement of radioactive elements Point alarm Use another detection technology
Power requirement Verification Use another detection technology
Potential interference of atmospheric Remote detection of chemical agents Use another detection technology
pollutants; identification of specific
substances; limited to relatively
volatile material; atmospheric trans-
mission window; signal processor
intensive
Requires significant servicing; Point alarm Use a live animal
environmental limitations on reactants
Requires individual processing and Point alarm Use another detection technology
interpretation; sensitivity of living
substrates to environment
Source of ionization; analysis of Point alarm Use another detection technology
products
Electric requirement Point alarm Use another detection technology
Electric requirement Point alarm Use another detection technology
“Long” (1–20 min) response time
Electric requirement Point alarm Use another detection technology
“Long” (2–10 min) response time
Electric requirement Point alarm Use another detection technology
“Long” (0.5–5 min) response time Point alarm Use another detection technology
Substance dependent sensitivity; Remote sensing Use another detection technology
atmospheric transmission window
Substance dependent sensitivity Remote sensing Use another detection technology
Availability/preparation of comprehen- Areas where comparison of spectral Manual data analysis
sive data base on known and potential and/or other data is required for
toxic material detection/identification
(cont’d)
II-4-32
 Table 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Sample Processing (e.g., Differentiation of samples from All areas of agent sensing None identified
concentration) background
Remote liquid particulate sensing Several agents (e.g., VX) are of very Remote sensing None identified
low volatility and provide little material
for sensing
Remote solid particulate sensing Highly toxic particulates cannot be Remote sensing None identified
detected by current remote methods

II-4-33
 SECTION 4.4—CHEMICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS
OVERVIEW
Chemical defense includes individual and collective protection and decontamina-
tion. The goal of individual and collective protection is to use clothing ensembles and
respirators as well as collective filtration systems and shelters to insulate forces from
chemical agents. Decontamination is essential to return personnel and equipment to
normal operating conditions. Technologies for these types of equipment are included
in this subsection.
Masks protect the respiratory system by preventing the inhalation of toxic chemi-
cal vapors and aerosols. They protect eyes and face from direct contact with chemical
agents as well. Important considerations in mask design are the ability to don the mask
and hood quickly, communications, respiration, performance degradation, and the ability
to consume fluids while the mask is in place. Masks must be compatible with opera-
tional missions and equipment (e.g., night vision goggles). Ideally, protective clothing
(garments, gloves, and boots) should provide protection from contact with chemical
agents as well as flame protection, with a minimum amount of heat stress. Ensembles
must be durable and able to be laundered and decontaminated. Protective equipment
reduces the efficiency of the person wearing it.
Collective protection enables groups to work in a toxic-free environment in tents,
vehicles, or special shelters. Efforts are aimed at making systems mobile and easy to
erect. Air supplied to shelters is purified in much the same way as it is for individual
masks.
Shelf life of protective equipment is a concern to all users. Periodic inspections
are necessary to ensure readiness.
Decontamination removes toxic substances or renders them harmless. Individu-
als and equipment must be decontaminated. Depending on the particular agent, CW
agents can be washed and rinsed away, evaporated, absorbed, or removed by heat
treatment.
There is medical treatment available to offset the effects of chemical weapons.
Atropine and 2-PAM chloride can be administered upon suspicion of exposure to a
nerve agent. Atropine is an anticholinergic agent. It blocks the action of acetylcholine
(a nerve transmitter substance), preventing it from stimulating nerves. 2-PAM chlo-
ride is anoxime, which increases the effectiveness of drug therapy in poisoning by
some—but not all—cholinesterase inhibitors. Atropine and 2-PAM chloride only work
to a limited degree with refractive nerve agents such as GD. Their administration
when an exposure has not occurred can be harmful. Diazepam (more commonly known
as Valium) is used as an anticonvulsant once an individual exhibits incapacitating
II-4-34
Highlights
• Masks and protective clothing are needed to defend against many
toxic chemicals.
• Reduction in combat efficiency from wearing protective gear is
estimated to be up to 50 percent.
• Proliferators may not provide the same measure of protection that is
afforded U.S. troops.
• Training and protection reduce the effectiveness of chemical
weapons.
symptoms of nerve agent exposure. The carbamate pyridostigmine, given in a dose of
30 mg every 8 hours, can be used as a pretreatment for nerve agent exposure.
Without appropriate chemical defenses, operations may have to be limited. Forces
could be required to remain covered until the threat of further exposure is reduced.
This could be mission threatening if persistent agents are encountered. An alternative
is to avoid contamination. To do this, detection equipment must be integrated with a
command and control system to ensure an alarm is disseminated.
In chemical warfare, effective chemical defense measures can greatly limit the
damage inflicted by a chemical attack. In World War I the gas mask had a dramatic
effect in limiting the significance of chemical weapons. Developments since then
(improved masks, protective clothing, detectors, and training) have further widened
the margin of protection. Collective protection takes defensive measures one step
further by providing a toxic-free environment for group functions such as command
centers and medical facilities. Since World War I, chemical warfare has only been
used against those entirely lacking or highly deficient in protective equipment. Some
suggest that chemical defense acts as a deterrent to the initiation of chemical warfare
because there is less incentive to attack a well-protected force. World War II is cited as
an example of this theory, since both sides were well equipped for chemical defense
and neither side used chemical weapons. Others suggest that equivalent offensive
capability is the real deterrent. While protective clothing can reduce the effects of CW,
its use poses other problems.

Figure 4.4-1. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)
The wearing of individual protective equipment can hinder performance by inter-
fering with vision, communication, and dexterity. High ambient temperatures are par-
ticularly devastating to those required to don protective clothing. With training, many
of the negative effects can be minimized. Overheating, however, is difficult to over-
come. In hot weather, full protective gear is very burdensome. Even the threat of
agents can dictate the donning of gear. Commanders must then consider limiting the
duration of operations or elect to compromise the protection afforded by individual
gear. Figure 4.4-1 shows the newest U.S. protective clothing.
Although the CWC prohibits the development, production, possession, and trans-
fer of chemical weapons, it places no restraint on chemical defensive measures. The
Convention ensures the rights of parties to maintain chemical defense programs and
grants parties the right to “...participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material, and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection
against chemical weapons.”
Chemical defense systems are needed by both an attacker and a defender. An
offensive unit needs to limit the number of casualties caused by inadvertent exposure.
In addition, troops must be prepared for a retaliatory strike once chemical agents have
been used. Since the attacker chooses the time, place, extent, and duration of an at-
tack, defensive measures by the attacker can be planned accordingly. The extent of
defensive equipment needed by a proliferant is dictated primarily by the value the
nation places on human life and well-being of its forces. Other factors include poten-
tial adversaries, extent of CW use expected, quality of munitions and sealing
II-4-35
techniques, and proficiency of both military and civilian populations obtained through
training.
RATIONALE (See Table 4.4-1)
Even proliferants must provide some amount of protection for their people if they
are to prevent casualties during production, storage, transport, and employment of
chemical weapons. Often rogue states include defensive training for their ground forces.
That is not to say that protection must or will be supplied according to U.S. standards.
In World War II, the Soviets were reported to have filled chemical shells in the open
with no protection. When workers died, they were replaced.
If a defensive posture is developed, individual protection, decontamination, and
collective protection could be part of the program. Military requirements are much
more stringent than commercial applications which deal with known substances.
Ground, air, and naval forces are all subject to attack with unknown agents and must
be protected. A robust defensive capability not only protects troops but could act as a
deterrent against a chemical-capable adversary.
Technologies in this section can enhance chemical protection for troops. If con-
tamination is unavoidable, protective clothing enables an individual to continue opera-
tions in a chemical environment. Collective protection is important for providing a
safe and contamination-free work area and rest/relief facilities. A key use of collective
protection is in medical facilities.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)
Numerous countries produce chemical protective gear. Production of masks is
the most common, including masks for civilians (as seen in Israel during Operation
Desert Storm), although limited shelf life remains a problem. Many NATO and former
Warsaw Pact countries as well as Middle East and Asian states produce protective
clothing. Only a few manufacture aircraft respiratory equipment: Canada, Norway,
Russia, and the UK. A number of countries have developed collective protection for
shelters: Finland, France, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, Rus-
sia has fielded and maintains a substantial inventory of collective protection systems
for a wide variety of vehicles and shelters.
Since 1990 North Korea has placed a high priority on military and civilian
chemical defense readiness. Training in a chemical environment is mandatory and an
integral part of armed forces training. Pyongyang is attempting to equip all forces,
including its reserves, with full protective gear. In addition, it has directed that the
entire population be issued gas masks. Iran has increased defensive chemical warfare
training in the last few years and is making efforts to buy foreign equipment.
 Table 4.4-1. Chemical Defense Systems Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Production and design Any type of vapor and WA ML 7; Butyl rubber; Simulated agents; Software for generating
technology for protective aerosol protection WA Cat 1E; silicone rubber; leakage testers; facial contours
masks plastics mannequin-face model
USML X for mask and suit design;
particle-size analysis
equipment.
Production and design Any type of vapor and WA ML 7; Charcoal activated Simulated agents; None identified
technology for protective aerosol protection WA Cat 1E; cloth; particle-size analysis
clothing semipermeable equipment; testing
USML X membranes; methodology
polymers
Absorption technology Any type of vapor and WA ML 7; Impregnated Simulated agents; None identified
for collective protection aerosol protection USML XIV; charcoal filters; particle-size analysis
polyethylene; equipment
fluoropolymer/
aramid laminate
Nonaqueous decon- Ability to decontaminate to USML XIV; None identified None identified None identified
tamination technology mission essential levels WA ML 7
Aqueous decontamina- Ability to decontaminate to USML XIV; Sufficient water None identified None identified
tion technology mission essential levels WA ML 7 supply

Medical prophylaxis Ability to protect mission USML XIV; None identified None identified None identified
technologies essential personnel WA ML 7
Therapeutic Ability to protect mission USML XIV; Chloromide S-330; None identified None identified
technologies essential personnel WA ML 7 atropine/obidoxime
chloride
(CAS 114-90-9)

II-4-36

Technology
Production and design technology Communications (microphone pass-
for protective masks
Production and design technology Integration with hood/mask; closure
for protective clothing
Absorption technology for
collective protection
Nonaqueous decontamination
technology
Aqueous decontamination
technology
Medical prophylaxis technologies
Therapeutic technologies
Table 4.4-2. Chemical Defense Systems Reference Data
Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Aircrew masks; protective masks Technologies that enable
through); respiration (air manage- contamination avoidance
ment); eye protection; composite eye
lens retention system; anthropo-
metrics; performance degradation;
ability to consume fluids; protect from
unknowns; shelf life
Individual protection Technologies that enable
technology; performance degradation; contamination avoidance
ability to consume fluids; limited life
span; protect from unknown; environ-
mental considerations; shelf life
Affordable; deployable; adaptable to Collective protection Individual protection technolo-
structure; modification to deal with gies; technologies that enable
filter penetrants; protection from contamination avoidance
unknown; charcoal for most organic
materials
Volume of toxic agent; time required; Reduce contamination to allow military Weather (time); aqueous decon-
adaptability to unknown agents; operations tamination; technologies that
disposal of agent; identification of enable contamination avoidance
what needs to be decontaminated;
identification of decrease of toxicity to
allowable level; solubility of agent;
corrosiveness on material; sensitivity
of electrical components
Volume of toxic agent; time required; Reduce contamination to allow military Weather (time); nonaqueous
adaptability to unknown agents; operations decontamination; technologies
disposal of agent; identification of that enable contamination
what needs to be decontaminated; avoidance
identification of decrease of toxicity to
allowable level; solubility of agent;
corrosiveness on material; sensitivity
of electrical components
Efficacy of prophylaxis; pre- vs. post- Reduce casualties; reconstitute Therapeutics; individual and
exposure treatment; side effects; forces collective protection technolo-
storage; application synergism. gies; technologies that enable
contamination avoidance
Side effects; response time Reduce casualties; reconstitute Technologies that enable
forces contamination avoidance
II-4-37