CASE DIGEST:

[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997]

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

FACTS:

This case is originally commenced by the wife, Gina Lao Tsoi against the against her uncaring husband, Chi MING Tsoi. It was decreed in
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The following facts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, xxx Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract.

"After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It was contrary to the expectations of the wife, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love or sexual intercourse with each other.
However, it was noted that they slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. During this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.The results were the wife was still a virgin who is normal and healthy while her husband’s results were kept confidential and unlike
the wife, the husband was given confidential prescription and was even asked by the doctor to return but he did not.

It was stated in the case that the plaintiff was not willing to reconcile with her husband.

Also, another physical examination was conducted by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr. to the husband, for the purpose of finding out whether he was impotent.
The results were negative and the husband was potent and capable of erection.

"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there was no collusion between the parties and that the evidence was not fabricated.[2]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage be declared as VOID.

Ruling:
The SC held that a judgment was rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the
Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
and there was no collusion between them.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164435

Present:
VICTORIA S. JARILLO,
Petitioner, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 29, 2009

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
This case resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information
in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11.
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY. She entered a subsequent marriage (church
wedding) on April 16, 1995 with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy while her previous marriage (church wedding) held on May 4, 1975 with Rafael Alocillo
was still not legally dissolved. The subsequent marriage was discovered only on January 12, 1999.
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy then filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Victoria Soriano Jarillo is Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
RULING:
The SC held that all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. , the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. [9]
The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence about petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without
a marriage license. Also petitioner’s defense for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy was a ground for suspension of the
proceedings. However as as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting.
Also, it was held in the case at bar that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588 in which decision is set aside and the marriage is declared valid."[2] Earlier, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) had ruled that the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is
declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code.
It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: on September
6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of
Pasig and on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila. Out
of their marriage, five (5) children were born.
The conflict in their marriage started due to the husband’s failure to engage in gainful
employment that they would often quarrel and would hit and beat his wife. He would even
force her to have sex despite her wife’s weariness from work. He would also inflict harm
on their children. This led in 1992 that they were already living separately.
The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the psychological incapacity had been established by the totality of
the evidence presented.
RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable. The behavior of respondent can be attributed to the
fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as
a taxi driver.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision[1]of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, , which
affirmed the decision of the Regi onal Trial Court of Olongapo City in declaring the marriage of
Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.[2] Erlinda and
Avelino begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear
again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she
refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.[5]

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was
the one already supporting the family. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime,[6] and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.[7] On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the psychological incapacity had been established by the totality of
the evidence presented to grant annulment of marriage.
RULING:
The SC held that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven
by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was
not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.
 FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner,

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]
RULING:
THE SC HELD hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;

3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.Hence,
the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage be annulled in the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The SC held that there was no psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to
us to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
 FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188320

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
HONORIO TIBON y DEISO,
Accused-Appellant. Promulgated:

June 29, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
During trial, the following facts were established:

Accused-appellant and his common-law wife Gina Sumingit (Gina) lived together as
husband and wife since 1994. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert
(Reguel).[2] Due to financial difficulties, Gina went to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper,
leaving accused-appellant with custody of their two children.[4] After some time, accused-appellant
heard from his sister who was also working in Hong Kong that Gina was having an affair with
another man. After the revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two
children.[5]

On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellants

mother[6] and his siblings, among them Zernan and Leilani, went to accused-appellants
room. They saw accused-appellant with KenKen and Reguel. The two children appeared
lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies.
accused-appellant stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen knife
He tried to end his life by jumping out the window of their house. [7] Accused-appellant
sustained a head injury from his fall but he and his two children, KenKen ande
Reguel, were rushed to Mary Johnston Hospital by his siblings Renato and Leilani and
some of their neighbors.

accused-appellant received treatment for his injuries. The two children, however, could no longer
be revived.[8]
Gina called long distance on December 13, 2008 and asked about KenKen and Reguel. When
told about the stabbing incident, she immediately flew back to Manila the next day.[9]

SPO3 Bagkus informed Tibon his constitutional rights so he voluntarily admitted stabbing KenKen
and Reguel.[12] Tibons sister Leilani, likewise, told SPO3 Bagkus that Tibon was responsible for
the killings. [13]

Gina confronted Tibon at the hospital where he was confined. When asked if she could
quantify the damage caused to her in terms of money, she said it was for PhP 500,000. [14]

Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he could not
recall what happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could not
remember being taken to the hospital. He said he was only informed by his siblings that he had
killed KenKen and Reguel, causing him to jump off the window of their house.[15]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and found that the defense did not
overcome the presumption of sanity.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLLANT.
RULING:

We affirm Tibons conviction.

The Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
The defense has unsatisfactorily shown that Tibon was insane when he stabbed his two young
sons. Article 12 of the Code states:

Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a

lucid interval. x x x
The change in Tibons behavior was triggered by jealousy. He acted out of jealous rage
at the thought of his wife having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are
not equivalent to insanity.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406 convicting accused-
appellant Honorio Tibon y Deiso of parricide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant should pay the heir of the victims
 SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188611

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

BELEN MARIACOS, Promulgated:

Appellant.
June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
FACTS:

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.

During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the

information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La

Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just
alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the

accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for
examination to the Crime Lab;

5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug

submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence
of marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained

(sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
 7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit
executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the

accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and
Magdalena Carino.
the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY
the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12]
The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the
bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was
valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the search and arrest is valid.

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to
make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant
before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case.
The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board
the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally,
a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions of
Section 5:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
 PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 188124
THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS Promulgated:

AND JOEL LORICA LABAD,
Accused-Appellants. June 29, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------
- -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
On 8 December 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Nio Noel Ramos
(Nio) had just brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino (Dianne), home in Sto.
Nio, Paraaque City. On his way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge connecting
the barangays of Sto. Nio and La Huerta. Thereat, Nio was stabbed and mauled.[4]
Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Nios brother, was in the vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La
Huerta when he heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was about to proceed to the
bridge, he met Nio and noticed that his brother was soaked in his own blood. Nio
relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar immediately brought Nio to
the hospital where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later.[5]
Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station that her cousin
informed her of a commotion on the bridge and met a friend who told her that her
boyfriend, Nio, was stabbed and brought to the hospital. However in her testimony,
she narrated that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Nio.
Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense.
But affter trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants. the trial court
concluded that the appellants conspired in assaulting and stabbing Nio.
On 13 September 2006, appellants filed a notice of appeal informing the RTC that
they are appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals.[16]

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC by
awarding exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

ISSUES:
1. whether the testimonies of the witnesses are sufficient to prove appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
2. whether the killing was qualified by treachery and evident premeditation
3. whether conspiracy has been adequately proven.

HELD:
Diannes testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the
rule that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex-
parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Corollary to this is the doctrine that,
where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained and they dwell on
material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit the veracity of the
witness' claim.[24] The second rule is apt to the case at bar.
Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened to do harm on the victim, she failed
to identify who the perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the Court, this
omission in Diannes affidavit is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to
attribute authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne altogether
becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecutions case did not necessarily crumble. The victims
dying declaration is a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an. As an exception to
the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[28]
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement
of the victim communicated to Cesar
 based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was no direct evidence linking
appellant Joel to the crime.
The medical records support the finding of treachery. The nature and location
of his wounds are indicative of the positions of the victim and his assailant at the
time the incident occurred. The victim was stabbed twice from behind.
In the instant case, appellant uttered the words iyang mama na iyan, may araw
din siya sa akin. Even conceding that these utterances were in the form of a threat,
it still cannot be presumed that at the time they were made, there was indeed a
determination to kill and that appellants had indeed clung to that determination,
planning and meditating on how to kill the victim.
There is nothing on record that would prove that conspiracy existed. The
circumstantial evidence cited by the OSG are not sufficient to prove that appellant
conspired with other individuals to perpetrate the crime. Further lending doubt to
this claim is the fact that the alleged co-conspirators identity was not established.
Joe-An is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. The
acquittal of the other appellant, Joel, is in order on the ground of reasonable doubt.
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.

HERNANDEZ, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh.
A).[2] Three children were born to them.
Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage on On January 1, 1981, private respondent
showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported
him through college.After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of
the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on
himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have
the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices, engaged in philandering and even
contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner, the private respondent would also beat petitioner
and later he abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is
incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. not close to his children and that he had abandoned
petitioner.[18]On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[23]

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [26] Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary
can these be overturned.