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BURLEY ON THE LAST DIFFERENCE IN DEFINITION 329
MARTA VITTORINI
The Last Difference in Definition ␣ : Burley and the

Tradition of the Posterior Analytics Commentaries
The apparent contradiction between the account of difference Aristotle

gives in the Analytics and the one he provides in the Metaphysics gives rise,
among the medieval authors, to a discussion on the relation between the last
difference in the definition and the substantial form in the extramental
reality. For in the Analytics the Philosopher maintains that definition is
constituted by genus and differences in such a way that each of them is more
common than the species defined, while their conjunction espresses the very
notion of the species ␣ ; in the Metaphysics, by contrast, he maintains that the
last difference is convertible with the species defined 1 .
These two Aristotelian formulations imply a different way of conceiving
the relation between genus and difference. Such a point has been dealt with
by Granger, Morrison and Mariani regarding the Organon and, recently, by
Galluzzo regarding Thomas Aquinas’s account of definition 2 .
The Analytics’s point is that a definition is constituted by all the essential
predicates which describe the essential components of the species. So, it
seems that, since a single difference is more common than the species, only the
sum of all differences can express the species which is the object of definition.
By contrast, in the Metaphysics, the genus can be eliminated from definition
and the last difference can alone express the nature of the species defined.
According to Galluzzo, Aristotle’s account of definition in the Analytics is that
both genus and difference are essential predicates which express the ‘what is
it’ of the object defined ␣ ; moreover, the statement that two-footed is animal (A,
22, 83a39-b3) implies that there is an essential relation between genus and
1
The texts are ␣ : A RISTOTELES , Analytica Posteriora, II, 13, 96a24-35 (= Aristoteles Latinus,
IV.1, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges-Paris 1968, p. 92, lin. 3-10) ␣ ; Metaphysica, VII, 12, 1037b9-
1038a36 (= Aristoteles Latinus, XXV.3, Brill, Leiden 1976, pp. 156, lin. 652 - 158, lin. 712).
2
Cfr. H. G RANGER , Aristotle on Genus and Differentia, « ␣ Journal of the History of Philosophy ␣ »,
22, 1984, pp. 1-23 ␣ ; D. M ORRISON , Le statut catégorial des differences dans l’« ␣ Organon ␣ », « ␣ Revue
philosophique ␣ », 118, 1993, pp. 147-178 ␣ ; M. M ARIANI , Aristotele e la differenza, in A. F ABRIS , G.
F IORAVANTI , E. M ORRICONI edd., Logica e Teologia. Studi in onore di Vittorio Sainati, ETS, Pisa
1997, pp. 3-21 ␣ ; G. G ALLUZZO , Aristotele e Tommaso d’Aquino sul problema dell’unità della
definizione, « ␣ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale ␣ », 13, 2002, pp. 137-191.
330 MARTA VITTORINI
difference, so that a difference relates its genus in the same way as an inferior
genus is related to a superior one. In the Metaphysics, instead, it seems that
Aristotle’s main purpose is to show more evidently the unity of definition␣ : he
proposes a model of definition in which the last difference expresses and can
be identified with the form of the object defined. Such an account is based on
an ontological consideration of the genus, that is, the genus does not exist
apart from its actual being as a determinate and specific form3 .
Medieval commentators try to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between
the two texts and generally regard the Metaphysics view as more perfect and
apt in expressing the metaphysical ground of definition.
In this paper I deal with Burley’s account of the role of difference in the
definition, by pointing out the original solution he gives to such a discrepancy.
Burley treats this topic in a twofold way ␣ : for in the commentary on the
Analytics he cites word by word Grosseteste and Aquinas, and therefore he
mentions the traditional views on this topic withouth adding anything, whilst
in his questions on the Analytics he marks himself off from the other
commentators, by advancing his own peculiar position. It seems to me that
Burley’s original view on the one side comes from Avicennian suggestions, on
the other side is analogous to the so called pluralists’ point on forms and
definition ␣ ; and consequently our philosopher introduces in the general view
of the unicity of form (which he undoubtedly supports) some elements drawn
from the pluralists’ tradition.
So, first of all I will outline the solutions to the problem of definition along
the tradition of the commentaries on the Analytics, that is, Grosseteste’s,
Kilwardby’s, Albert’s, Aquinas’ and Giles of Rome’s accounts. Secondly I will
briefly outline pluralists’ views on definition, by emphasizing the main points
of disagreement with the supporters of the unicity of the forms. Thirdly I will
present the Avicennian views, which are supposed to be Burley’s sources in
the questions on the Analytics. Finally I will examine Burley’s position with
regard to the Commentary on the Analytics, the Questions, the treatise on the
definition and the Commentary on the Isagoge.
I. T HE TRADITION OF THE COMMENTARIES ON THE P OSTERIOR A NALYTICS
Medieval philosophers who comment on the Analytics tackle Aristotele’s

account of definition by considering the views which the Philosopher maintains
in the Metaphysics. Each of them tries to reconcile the two accounts on the
one side by distinguishing between two ways of conceiving the definition, on
3
Cfr. G ALLUZZO , Aristotele e Tommaso cit., pp. 141, 147, 150.
the other by considering one kind of definition more perfect than the other,
insofar as it is more adequate to its ontological ground.
In this section I will present the positions of Grosseteste, Robert Kilwardby,
Albert the Great, Aquinas and Giles of Rome by emphasizing on the one side
the continuity and the consistency of their views, and on the other side the
personal contribution of each of them.
1. Robert Grosseteste
Grosseteste’s commentary marks the beginning of the Latin tradition of

commentaries on the Posterior Analytics 4 . Even if Grosseteste does not
explicitly points to a discrepancy between the Analytics and the Metaphysics,
he expresses doubts about Aristotle’s account of definition, and in particular
on the view that differences are more common than the species defined, and
suggests an explanation. According to him, the intermediate and proximate
genus are composed by a material and a formal part, which are, respectively,
the superior genus and the constitutive difference. Consequently, the divisive
process, which draws out the species from the genus, is twofold, and is carried
out by resorting to two couples of differences, the one dividing the genus in
relation to its formal part, and the other dividing it in relation to its material
part. These four differences are, according to Grosseteste, excedentes and
excessas. This seems to mean that ␣ : i) they restrict one another’s notion ␣ ; ii)
each of them, if it is taken alone, can express more than only one species.
Grosseteste gives this example ␣ : ‘animal’ is a genus, composed by the superior
genus ‘corporeal’ and the constitutive difference ‘endowed with soul’.
Consequently, ex parte corporis can be divided into the couple ‘mortal’ and
‘unmortal’, while ex parte animae it can be divided into the couple ‘rational’
and ‘irrational’.
« ␣ Propter quid autem contingat omnem differentiam divisivam esse in plus

quam diffinitum dubitabile est. Et dico ad hoc quod natura cuiuslibet generis
non generalissimi est modo aliquo composita ex parte sibi materiali et ex
parte sibi formali, unde ei accidunt ad minus due divisiones prime, quarum
una fit ex parte forme et reliqua ex parte materie. Sicut posito quod celestia
4
The commentary dates to 1230. On the date of this work see P. B. R OSSI , Introduction, in
R OBERTUS G ROSSETESTE , Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, ed. P. B. R OSSI ,
Olschki, Firenze 1981, pp. 15-21. On Grosseteste’s formulation of conclusiones see G. R. E VANS ,
The « ␣ Conclusiones ␣ » of Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the « ␣ Posterior Analytics ␣ », « ␣ Studi
medievali ␣ », 24, 2, 1983, pp. 729-734. The practise of drawing conclusions from the text will be
taken up by Walter Burley.
332 MARTA VITTORINI
corpora sint animalia, accidit animali una prima divisio ex parte forme,
scilicet rationale vel irrationale, et accidit ei alia prima divisio ex parte
corporis vel materie, scilicet mortale vel inmortale. Verumtamen due
differentie que accidunt generi ex parte formali sunt magis essentiales et
prius ordinate in diffinitione ␣ ; et has quatuor differentias necesse est esse
excedentes et excessas. Cum autem omne genus subalternum compositum sit
ex genere superiori et differentia vel differentiis superadditis, necesse est
ipsum compositum recipere unam divisionem primam ex parte generis, in
quantum ipsum habet sibi admixtam naturam differentie, et aliam divisionem
primam ex parte differentie constituentis, secundum quod ipsi differentie
admixta est natura generis superioris, velut in predicto exemplo. Mortale
namque et inmortale accidit animali ex parte corporis, secundum quod ei
admixta est animatio, et iterum accidit animali rationale et irrationale ex
parte anime, secundum quod ei coniuncta est corporeitas. Et dico etiam quod
alicui generi generalissimo eo quod habet in se naturam multiplicitatis
accidunt due divisiones prime, sicut manifestum est quod huic generi
‘quantitas’ accidunt due divisiones prime, continuum et discretum, et iterum
habere positionem partium vel non habere ␣ ; et forte in aliis generalissimis
idem accidit, licet non sit nobis ita manifestum. Quod si est, manifestum est
quod omnes diffinitiones fiunt ex partibus quarum quelibet est in plus quam
diffinitum, totum autem in eque ␣ » 5 .
The conclusion seems to be that we need both ‘mortal’ and ‘rational’ for
describing ‘man’, and neither of them can be considered to be the only and, as
it were, real specific difference of man. This is the reason why, according to
Grosseteste, each difference in a definition is in plus than the species ␣ : for each
difference is not the only divisive one of a genus, and therefore it does not
divide the genus into its species. Such a point will be taken up and developed
by the subsequent commentators, who will treat it in a wider context.
2. Robert Kilwardby
Robert Kilwardby in his Notulae Libri Posteriorum 6 explicitly emphasizes

the contradiction between the account of definition Aristotle elaborates in
the Analytics and in the Metaphysics. Therefore, he inaugurates a topic which
the subsequent commentators will take up and suggests a line of solutions
which will be carried out along the subsequent tradition.
5
R OBERT G ROSSETESTE , Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, pp. 368-369, lin.
87-114.
6
The commentary dates to 1261-1262. See A. C ORBINI , La teoria della scienza nel XIII secolo,
Sismel, Firenze 2001, p. XIV.
According to him, there is a real contradiction between the two different

accounts of definition, for, in the Analytics differences are described as more
general than the defined object, whilst in the Metaphysics the last difference
is conceived as convertible with the species, in the sense that it can be applied
only to the thing defined.
Kilwardby adopts a twofold approach to the problem ␣ : for, on the one side
he considers the real composition of the things and men’s capacity of
understanding it ␣ ; on the other he analyses some types of divisions to be used
in elaborating a definition.
As to the first solution, Kilwardby’s position seems to be that Aristotle in the
Analytics considers the real possibility of formulating a definition, whilst in the
Metaphysics he considers the composition of the thing. On the one side, ‘secundum
veritatem’ the last difference can be only applied to the species defined␣ ; on the
other, ‘secundum usum’ we are required to use some terms which can be applied
to more than one species. The reason way we resort to differences which are more
general than the species is the impossibility of knowing and consequently
naming the last difference. This means that there is a gap between the real being
of things and the possibility of expressing such a being.
« ␣ Cum igitur dixit Aristotiles quod quaelibet pars diffinitionis est in plus, et in
VII Prime Philosophie dicat quod ultima differentia solius rei est, videtur sibi
contradicere. Et nota quod Aristotiles loquitur hic tantummodo secundum
differentias specialissimorum quibus nomina inventa sunt et usitata. Nunc
autem ita est quod propter latentiam ultimarum differentiarum non sunt
nomina imposita ultimis differentiis completivis, sed in veritate omnes
differentiae universalitate (pro ␣ : usitate) in plus sunt, dico quod sunt differentie
completivi et specialissimi. Quia ergo in logica loquitur secundum differentias
usitatas, et considerando usum, dicit quod quelibet pars est in plus, in VII
autem Prime Philosophie loquitur secundum veritatem rei, unde quia in veritate
ita est quod cuiuslibet speciei est aliqua differentia completiva ultima
constitutiva, quia solius rei et convertibilis conferre, licet illa ignota sit, ideo
dicit quod ultima differentia solius rei est. Et ideo dixit in divisione lectionis
quod modus iste assumendi diffinitionem probabilis est. Non enim considerat
differentias ut sunt secundum veritatem, sed ut sunt secundum usum ␣ » 7 .
As to the second type of solution, Kilwardby seems to use a customary

distinction ␣ : the definition can be obtained by resorting to only one division,
or more divisions, and in the case it is made through many divisions, the
7
K ILWARDBY , Notule Libri Posteriorum, in D. C ANNONE , Le Notule Libri Posteriorum di Robert
Kilwardby nella tradizione esegetica latina medievale del XIII secolo, 2 vols., tesi di dottorato,
Università degli Studi di Cassino, A. A. 2003-2004, vol. II, pp. 459, lin. 83 - 460, lin. 97.
334 MARTA VITTORINI
differences can either be gerarchically ordained or not. In the first two cases
it is true that the last difference is convertible with the species, whilst in the
third case it occurs that the differences are each other as excedens and
excessum (in the sense which Grosseteste had introduced), and consequently
they restrict each other’s notions in order to express the species 8 . Therefore,
it seems that the definition which truly expresses the composition of the
things is constructed by resorting to a correct division, whilst the definition
we generally use is obtained by resorting to terms which are not gerarchically
ordained but merely restrict each other. It is so for mortal and rational, for
only if they are taken together can they express the last difference in man.
3. Albert the Great
Albert, whilst considering the two different accounts of definition, seems

to follow Kilwardby’s suggestions 9 .
« ␣ Attendendum autem quod dictum est, quod diffinientia singula sunt in plus
quam diffinita species, et totum collectum in aeque, quod est contra hoc quod
dicitur VII Primae Philosophiae, ubi ostenditur quod ultima differentia est
convertibilis ␣ » 10 .
8
K ILWARDBY , Notule, p. 460, lin. 98-108 ␣ : « ␣ Aliter autem solet dici, scilicet quod quaedam
diffinitio accipitur per divisionem unicam, sicut diffinitio proxime speciei sub genere, quedam
autem secundum plures, et hoc dupliciter ␣ : aut enim per plures consequenter ordinatas, aut non
consequenter ordinatas, sed eque primo se habentes respectu generis ␣ ; dico ergo quod diffinitio<ne>
accepta primo modo et secundo, est verum quod dicit Aristotiles in VII Prime Philosophie. De
diffinitione autem accepta secundo modo est intelligendum quod dicit Aristotiles, et hoc
declarat<ur> per exemplum eius ␣ : numerus enim dividitur per parem et imparem, et iterum
dividitur per utrobique primum, et utraque divisionum que prima est respectu generis, quare illa
diffinitio ternarii ‘numerus impar utrobique’ accipitur tertio modo supradicto. Item cum quelibet
differentia sit in plus specie, et nulla potest contrahere genus in minus quam ipsa sit, videtur quod
nullius differentie additum potest facere totum equale diffiniendo. Prima enim differentia addita
non contrahit in eque ratione predicta, eodem modo vero secundo addita, et sic deinceps. Sed
dicendum quod licet nulla per se contractio potest facere genus convertibile cum specie, plures
tamen differentie possunt eo quod unaqueque differentiarum excedit, et exceditur ab illa.
Excedentes enim sunt et excesse, unde propter mutuam contractionem que est in ipsis sit totum
convertibile, sicut quod rationale est in plus homine et mortale similiter ambo tamen coniuncta
faciunt unum eque convertibile propter mutuam contractionem, que est in illis␣ ».
9
The commentary dates to 1261-1262. See R. A. G AUTHIER , Préface, in T HOMAS A QUINAS ,
Expositio libri Posteriorum, in Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, I 2, Commissio Leonina
- Vrin, Roma-Paris 1989, p. 58* ␣ ; J. A. W EISHEIPL , The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great, in J.
A. W EISHEIPL ed., Albertus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays. 1980, Pontifical institute of
Medieval Studies, Toronto 1980, pp. 13-23, in particular p. 39.
10
A LBERT THE G REAT , Liber II Posteriorum Analyticorum, tract. IV, cap. 1, ed. B ORGNET ,
Parisiis 1890, p. 210.
According to him, the last difference is really convertible with species, but,
since we can not name it, definition is actually constituted by differences
which are more common than the lowest species.
« ␣ Sed hoc quamvis multotiens a nobis sit solutum, tamen hic potest dici quod
si divisio deducitur usque ad atoma quae ulterius secundum formam communem
indivisibilia sunt, oportet quod ultimum praedicatum (quod est, differentia)
cum specie convertibilis sit ␣ : quia differentiae ultimae prout sunt divisivae
innominatae sunt, communiores autem nominatae ␣ : ideo dicitur quod inter
nominatas quaelibet communior est specie specialissima diffinita ␣ » 11 .
It seems, therefore, that Aristotle adopts in the Metaphysics and in the

Analytics two different points of view ␣ : in the Metaphysics he has in mind an
ideal model of definition and correctly describes the last difference as
convertible with species ␣ ; in the Analytics, by contrast, he makes reference to
our real ability of naming the terms of a definition ␣ ; and consequently, he
deals with a certain kind of definition which is made up by terms which are
more common than the species.
Moreover, he gives a further second solution by distinguishing among
different sorts of definition. For, if a definition is constituted by the last
terms, or is obtained by only one division, its terms are really convertible with
the species. On the contrary, if a definition is obtained by more divisions
(whether they are subsequent or simultaneous), its terms are more common
than the species 12 .
« ␣ Dicunt tamen quidam et satis rationabiliter, quod divisio potest esse dupliciter,
scilicet per ultima, vel per ea quae sunt ante ultima. Et si sit per ultima ␣ : tunc
planum est quod dicitur in VII primae philosophiae ␣ : quia illa convertibilia
sunt. Si autem sit non per ultima ␣ : aut accipiuntur una, hoc est, unius divisione,
aut pluribus divisionibus. Si una divisione, iterum est divisio per ultima et
ultimi generis quod divisibile est, et hoc est proximum speciei specialissimae ␣ :
et sic iterum ultima convertibilia sunt. Si autem accipiuntur pluribus
divisionibus ␣ : aut illae divisiones accipiuntur ordinatae a primo ad ultimum, aut
11
A LBERT , Exp. Post. Anal., Lib. II, tract. IV, cap. 1, p. 210.
12
The four types of definition are obtained in the following way␣ : some definitions contain
the last terms (1), and others the terms preceding the last ones (2). The latter, then, can be
divided into those in which only one division is performed (2.1), and those in which more
divisions take place (2.2). Such multiple divisions can be made by means of divise differences
which are gerarchically ordained (2.2.1) or at the same level (2.2.2). Consequently, while in the
cases 1 and 2.1 it is correct to say that the difference is convertible with the species, in all the
other cases it is true that the single parts of the definition are more extended than the object
defined, whilst their conjunction is convertible with the species.
336 MARTA VITTORINI
coaequaevae, ita ut unum per plura coaequaeva dividatur, quorum unum non est
sub alio. Exemplum primum est ut substantia, quae dividitur per corpoream et
incorpoream␣ ; et postea corporea per animatum et inanimatum, et sic decurrit
divisio ␣ : et tunc tales differentiae divisivae acceptae secundum singulas, semper
sunt in plus quam species specialissima quae diffinienda est. Et de talibus est
verum quod dictum est ␣ : quia differentia differentiae nomen habet ab eo quod est
divisivum, et non ab eo quod est constitutivum. Si autem accipiantur plures
divisiones non ordinatae, sed in coaequaevis, tunc plane verum est quod dictum
est, quod singula sunt in plus, et totum in aeque. Cuius exemplum␣ : si dividatur
numerus, ut paulo ante dictum est, in numerum utrobique primum, et non
utrobique primum ␣ ; et iterum numerus dividatur in ex numeris compositum, et
non ex numeris compositum ␣ ; et iterum dividatur in numerum numero
mensuratum, et in non mensuratum␣ : omnes divisiones ex aequo sunt ei quod
dividitur, et non sunt ordinatae per successionem, ita quod id quod superius
dividit subdividatur, et sic ad ultima decurrat divisio␣ : et in tali divisione
acceptae differentiae sunt in plus, totum autem collectum efficitur in aeque
propter abnegationem alterius et contradictionem ad invicem in singulis␣ : sicut
rationale excludit irrationalia, et mortale excludit immortalia. Et hoc modo
quod dictum est, planum esse partes esse in plus, totum autem in aeque ␣ » 13 .
Consequently, the extension of differences depends on which type of

definition they belong to. For, when the terms of a definition are the last, or
are obtained through only one division, the definition contains the last
difference, which is convertible with species, whilst when they are obtained
through many divisions, the notion of the last difference is expressed by more
differences taken together.
Albert deals with the same problem in the commentary on the Metaphysics,
and once again tries to solve it. He proceeds as follows ␣ : first he shows the
metaphysical ground of the last difference in definition ␣ ; then he explains
away the apparent discrepancy between the two texts. I will give an account
of both steps of the argument.
First of all Albert approves a metaphysical point of view, explaining what
the ontological counterpart of definition is ␣ : he introduces the distinction
between the actual formulation of a definition — which contains more terms
— and the very natures that a definition signifies, which are only two␣ : genus
and difference.
« ␣ Quantumlibet enim per multa dicatur, non sunt nisi duae naturae in
diffinitione, generis videlicet primi et differentiae. Et differentia exit de
generis potestate, in qua ipsa est incohata et confusa ␣ » 14 .
13
A LBERT , Exp. Post. Anal., Lib. II, tract. IV, cap. 1, p. 210.
14
A LBERT , Exp. Post. Anal., Lib. VII, tract. 4, cap. 2, pp. 370, lin. 30-33.
Genus is a common and indeterminate form, which does not exist without
being determined as a species. Difference is a determined form which is
potentially contained in a genus and flows from it ␣ ; it determines the genus,
so that it is nothing but the genus insofar as it actually exists in a determinate
manner as a species.
« ␣ Ex his igitur accipitur, quod diffinitio est ex genere et differentia, quae sit
essentialiter in genere per inchoationem et confusionem. Et sic patet, quod
genus, secundum actum differentia terminatum acceptum, ad idem esse
substantiae et quiditatis refertur et quod differentia fluit a postestate generis,
sicut actus exit ex potentia tribuens esse distinctun potentiae ␣ » 15 .
« ␣ Sic enim ex forma communi et confusa et indeterminata et in potentia
existente semper per actum intelligendi educitur forma specificans et distincta
sive distinguens et determinata et quae actu existit. Et sic ex omnibus
superioribus fluit inferius habens in se virtutes et potentias omnium superiorum,
cum tamen essentia una et simplex existat ␣ » 16 .
This account seems to suggest again that when a definition is composed of

two terms (genus and difference), together they are convertible with the
species. For the first term means not a real form, but a general potential one
which can actually exist only insofar as it is seen in a determined form
coinciding with the species ␣ ; whilst the difference – which is the last element
of the process of division – is a simple essence which coincides with the
species and contains all the properties of the superior levels. So, the last
difference is the very definiens, convertible with species, for it is the substance
and the act of the thing.
« ␣ Ex dictis igitur palam est, quia finalis, quae indivisa est differentia, substantia
et actus rei erit et diffinitio hoc modo, quia diffiniens et ultimo terminans
dicimus esse diffinitionem ␣ ; hoc enim non est genus, quod terminatur, sed
differentia terminans. Unde etiam ulterius ex hoc patet, quod differentia
ultima unica est et convertibilis cum specie diffinita ␣ » 17 .
Secondly, Albert resorts to a further argument ␣ : he points again to the

discrepancy between the Analytics and the Metaphysics, and maintains that it
is due to the different contexts of the two texts. For, in the Analytics Aristotle
is dealing with definition within the context of demonstration, and in particular
15
A LBERT , Metaphysica, Lib. VII, tract. 4, cap. 2, ed. B. G EYER , Aschendorff, Monasterii
Westfalorum 1964, XVI, 2, pp. 369, lin. 75 - 370, lin. 4.
16
Ibid., cap. 3, pp. 370, lin. 22-28.
17
Ibid., pp. 370, lin. 45-51.
338 MARTA VITTORINI
in relation to the middle term, which makes the properties of the subject
known. And consequently, the terms which are listed in a definition do not
express the specific form, but rather its potential parts. By contrast, in the
Metaphysics Aristotle is asserting the unity of definition, by showing its
ontological foundation. And therefore he is dealing with a type of definition
which can be identified with only one term expressing the unity and semplicity
of the specific form.
« ␣ Quamvis enim in Posterioribus Analyticis dictum sit, quod ‘partes diffinitionis

sunt in plus quam diffinitum et totum in aeque’, hic tamen dicimus, quod
ultima differentia est in aeque cum diffinito et non in plus, quia ibi loquentes
de demonstratione diffinitione usi sumus, secundum quod est medium faciens
scire passionem inesse subiecto. Passio autem verius scitur inesse subiecto,
quando scitur secundum singulas formae partes inesse, ut si quaeramus
hominis passiones, dicimus non humanum esse, sed potius esse vegetativum et
nutritivum et augmentativum et sensitivum et huiusmodi ␣ ; et sic accepta forma
secundum partes potentiales ipsius, semper est in plus quam diffinitum. Cum
autem hic consideremus rei diffinitae unitatem et unitas non sit a partibus
potentialibus formae, sed ab ipsa tota, prout est actu et terminus ␣ ; et sic
convertitur cum specie diffinita. Ex omnibus autem his quae dicta sunt, patet,
quod differentia ultima ex omnibus exit ut actus ex potentia et quod actus ille
non est alia essentia a potentia, sed esse eius est aliud et aliud, et non differt
per essentiam, sed est differentia sicut eiusdem indeterminati et determinati et
indistincti et distincti ␣ ». 18
This twofold point of view makes us aware that we can consider the form
either as it actually exists as a determinate one, and so it is simple and not
composed ␣ ; or as it is the actualization of more general forms, which are the
bearers of more general properties and can be regarded as potential parts of
it. And so, Aristotle in the two texts considers definition in two different ways,
i.e. insofar as the definition expresses the actual state of the form or the more
general essential properties which are seen in it.
Albert introduces in the tradition of commentaries on the Analytics this
twofold consideration. On the one hand a definition expresses the real setting
of the world, and consequently it is true that the last difference is really
convertible with the species ␣ ; on the other we are actually able to elaborate a
different sort of definition, which is constituted by more terms, each of them
more common than the species.
18
A LBERT , Metaph., Lib. VII, tract. 4, cap. 3, pp. 370, lin. 51 - 371, lin. 6.
4. Thomas Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas seems to follow Albert’s treatment of the two Aristotelian

accounts of definition 19 . First, he raises doubts on the correctness of the
Analytics account, and explicitly calls the attention to its inconsistency with
the Metaphysics point of view. Secondly, he shows the correctness of Aristotle’s
account in the Metaphysics. Finally, he justifies the Analytics view on definition.
Thomas, therefore, like Albert, remarks that the view in the Analytics — i.e.
that differences express more than the very nature of the thing defined, and
only when considered together in a definition express the exact notion of such
a thing — is in contrast with Aristotle’s point in Metaphysics, where the
Philosopher maintains that the last difference is convertible with the species.
« ␣ Sed uidetur quod non requiratur ad definitionem quod quaelibet particula sit
in plus quam definitum. Dicit enim Philosophus in VII Metaphysice quod
quando pervenitur ad ultimas differentias, erunt equales differentie speciebus ␣ :
non ergo oportet quod differentia sit in plus quam species ␣ » 20 .
Aristotle’s position in the Metaphysics is, according to Thomas, the correct one,
insofar as it is grounded on the metaphysical composition of things. Thomas’s
argument is as follows. According to the Philosopher, differences espress the
notion of the form␣ ; and since each species has its own form which it does not share
with any other one, the last difference must express such a form. Moreover, he gives
one more argument, which is based on the divisive role of differences. According
to Aristotle it is possible to construct a definition constituted by only two terms,
that is, genus and difference. And since the difference divides the genus per se, it can
not be external to its genus, and so can not be more common than the species.
« ␣ Quod etiam ratione uidetur. Dicit enim Philosophus in VIII Metaphysice, quod
ratio que est ex differentiis, uidetur esse speciei et actus, idest forme, quia, sicut
ibidem dicitur, differentia respondet forme␣ ; cuiuslibet autem speciei est propria
forma, que nullo alii conuenit. Videtur igitur quod differentia ultima non excedat
speciem. Dicit etiam Philosophus in VII Metaphysicorum quod nihil est aliud in
definitione quam genus et differentie, et quod possibile est definitionem ex
duobus constitui, quorum unum sit genus, aliud differentia. Differentia autem
non inuenitur extra proprium genus, alioquin non esset diuisiua generis per se,
sed per accidens. Videtur ergo quod differentia non excedat speciem␣ »21 .
19
The commentary dates to 1272. See G AUTHIER , Préface cit., pp. 73*-77* ␣ ; J.-P. T ORRELL ,
Tommaso d’Aquino. L’uomo e il teologo, Piemme, Casale Monferrato 1994, pp. 382-383.
20
T HOMAS A QUINAS , Exp. Post. Anal. cit., Lib. II, lec. 13, p. 221, lin. 94-99.
21
T HOMAS A QUINAS , Exp. Post. Anal. cit., Lib. II, lect. 13, pp. 221, lin. 100 - 222, lin. 114.
340 MARTA VITTORINI
For one thing, therefore, Thomas recognizes the different point of view
which Aristotle undertakes in the Metaphysics, where the Philosopher is
describing a model of definition which mirrors the ontological constitution of
reality, that is, every species has its own form which does not share with any
other species. For another, he suggests a particular model of definition, which
is constituted by two terms␣ : and in such a definition the difference, insofar as
it divides the genus per se, must have the same extension as the species.
After having demonstrated the correctness of Aristotle’s account in the
Metaphysics, Thomas explains the discrepancy with the account of the Analytics
resorting to an argument similar to the one Albert suggests in his commentary.
« ␣ Sed dicendum est quod si accipi posset differentia, quae notificaret ipsam
formam substantialem speciei, nullo modo differentia ultima esset in plus
quam species, ut rationes probant. Sed quia formae essentiales non sunt nobis
per se notae, oportet quod manifestentur per aliqua accidentia, quae sunt signa
illius formae, ut patet in VIII Metaphysicae. Non autem oportet accipere
accidentia propria illius speciei, quia talia oportet per definitionem speciei
demonstrari ␣ ; sed oportet notificari formam speciei per aliqua accidentia
communiora ␣ ; et secundum hoc differentiae assumptae dicuntur quidem
substantiales, in quantum inducuntur ad declarandum formam essentialem,
sunt autem communiores specie, in quantum assumuntur ex aliquibus signis,
quae consequuntur superiora genera ␣ » 22 .
According to Thomas, since we can not grasp the essential form of a thing,
we make it known by means of terms which express some accidental properties
of the thing in question ␣ : these properties do not coincide with the propria of
species, but rather, they follow from genus and are more common than the
species. Therefore, even if they are more common than the lowest species, and
do not express the very nature of it, they are signs indicating the essential form.
It seems therefore that Thomas’s point is the following ␣ : the last difference
signifies the essential form, and consequently is really convertible with the
species ␣ ; but, since we do not know the essential form, a definition is actually
constituted by accidents more common than the species, which are signs of it.
And we call such accidents substantial differences 23 . This solution seems to
follow Albert’s, for both Albert’s and Thomas’s arguments are grounded on the
human incapacity to elaborate a definition whose terms exactly mirror the
metaphysical composition of things. Thomas, however, gives more details on
this point ␣ : the inability of naming things is caused by human ignorance of
22
A QUINAS , Exp. Post. Anal., Lib. II, lect. 13, n. 533, p. 378.
23
Cfr. G ALLUZZO , Aristotele e Tommaso cit., pp. 188-189.
essential forms. Since men can only grasp them by their accidental
manifestations, they use a collection of accidental terms to make them known.
Aquinas comes back to this topic in his commentary on the Metaphysics.
His point seems to be this ␣ : a definition is commonly composed of a term, the
genus, and a term, the difference ␣ ; nevertheless, since the first does not exist
apart from its differences, a definition is the very notion expressed by the
differences. Moreover, although we commonly list more than one difference,
the whole definition consists of only one difference, which is the last one.
« ␣ Primo ponit (Aristoteles) conclusionem ␣ ; dicens quod quamvis in definitione

ponatur genus et differentia, tamen definitio est ratio ex differentiis tantum,
quia genus non est praeter differentias, ut supra dictum est. Et quamvis
ponantur multae differentiae in definitione, tamen tota definitio dependet et
constituitur ex ultima, quando fit divisio « ␣ secundum rectum ␣ », id est a
communiori ad minus commune descendendo secundum per se differentias, et
non accipiendo quasi a latere differentias per accidens ␣ » 24 .
Therefore, Thomas seems to distinguish between the names we commonly

put in a definition and the terms which really constitute it and mean the very
ontological principles of the thing defined. And so, even if a definition
correctly contains genus and differences, the last difference is the very
determining element, and so it can express by itself the whole notion of the
the thing defined.
This theory seems to be based on two main considerations ␣ : first, the
differences which are contained in a definition are like intermediate genera,
that is, they imply the genus insofar as it has a certain degree of determination.
And consequently they are more general than the species defined.
« ␣ Ideo autem dico quod in definitione est primum genus cum differentiis, quia
etsi aliquando in definitionibus ponantur aliqua genera intermedia inter genus
primum quod est generalissimum, et species ultimas quae definiuntur, tamen illa
genera media nihil aliud sunt quam genus primum, et differentiae comprehensae
in intellectu generis medii “cum hoc”, idest cum genere primo ␣ »25 .
Secondly, the last difference is truly convertible with the species only if the
dividing process is performed correctly ␣ : that is, the last difference must be
the final result of a division which has been carried out in recto, that is, from
24
A QUINAS , In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, Lib. VII, lec. 12, n. 1561,
edd. M. R. C ATHALA , R. M. S PIAZZI , Marietti, Roma 1950, p. 375.
25
AQUINAS , Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lec. 12, n. 1543, p. 373.
342 MARTA VITTORINI
the more general form to the less general one, and per se. On the contrary, if
the not knowing the essential differences compels us to use accidental — and
not per se — differences in division, then these accidental ones will be mere
signs of the essential properties.
« ␣ Aliquando enim necessitas cogit, ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum,

differentiis per accidens, inquantum sunt signa quaedam differentiarum
essentialium nobis ignotarum ␣ » 26 .
« ␣ Dicit ergo primo, quod sic se habent differentiae acceptae in definitione
“sicut dictum est”, scilicet quod semper sumantur per se differentiae et non per
accidens, palam est quod ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota
definitio. Includit enim in se omnes praecedentes particulas ␣ » 27 .
This is the same position taken in the commentary on the Analytics␣ : that is,
since we do not know the essential differences, we use some accidental forms
which are more common than species. It seems therefore that Thomas
distinguishes between two types of definition␣ : one constituted by accidental
terms which are more common than species, and one which contains a per se
difference, which espresses exactly the notion of the species. This latter — and
not the former — seems to be the very linguistic counterpart of the real
composition of the object defined. According to Thomas, who rightly follows
Aristotle, the unity of definition is based on the actual existence of only one form,
identified with the last difference of the definition. And therefore, there is a
mismatching between definition — as it is commonly expressed — and ontological
reality. First, with more terms in the definition, which are the prime genus and
the subsequent differences, there does not correspond a plurality of forms in
reality. For, the genus only exists as determined by the forms of species, which
are expressed by the differences in the definition␣ ; and consequently the differences
do not imply any other form than the genus’ one determined by them.
« ␣ Palam est quod definitio est quaedam ratio ex differentiis unitatem habens ␣ ;
ita quod tota essentia definitionis, in differentia quodammodo comprehenditur.
Ex hoc enim animal, quod est genus, non potest esse absque speciebus, quia
formae specierum quae sunt differentiae, non sunt aliae formae a forma
generis, sed sunt formae generis cum determinatione ␣ » 28 .
Second, whilst in a definition differences are successively obtained by

division and ordered accordingly, in the real existing form there is no order,
26
A QUINAS , Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lec. 12, n. 1552, p. 374.
27
A QUINAS , Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lec. 12, n. 1555, p. 374.
28
A QUINAS , Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lec. 12, n. 1549, pp. 373-374.
for substance is all present simultaneously. Therefore the parts of definition

do not bring the ones of the form, but rather some potential properties which
are determined and actalized by the last difference.
«␣ Ex hoc patet quod illae differentiae, secundum quod sunt multae, habent inter
se ordinem determinatum. Non autem hoc potest intelligi quod in substantia rei
sit aliquid ordo. Non enim potest dici, quod hoc substantiae sit prius, et illud
posterius␣ ; quia substantia est tota simul et non per successionem, nisi in quibusdam
defectivis, sicut sunt motus et tempus. Inde patet quod multae partes definitionis
non significant multas partes essentiae ex quibus essentia constituatur sicut ex
diversis ␣ ; sed omnes significant unum quod determinatur ultima differentia␣ »29 .
Thomas’s arguments, therefore, seem to follow Albert’s solution and give some
more details. Definition, as commonly formulated, does not reflect the real
setting of the world. For, we use a plurality of accidental terms to spell out the very
notion of the species. Therefore, first of all, a definition constituted by many
terms can be reduced to only two, for the conjunction of the prime genus and the
subsequent differences expresses the proximate genus, and the last difference (if
taken correctly) is the real specific one. Moreover, insofar as the genus does not
exist if not in a determinate species, the real and only definiens term is the last
difference. It is the only term which means something which really exists, that is
the form of a thing, whilst all the other terms imply the potential and not the real
parts of the form, in other words, the sum of properties which the form bears.
5. Giles of Rome
Giles of Rome raises the same doubts as Albert and Thomas on Analytics
II, 13 30 . Whilst in the Analytics Aristotle maintains that every part of a
definition is more common than the species, in the Metaphysics he states that
the last difference is convertible with the species ␣ ; this principle, according to
Giles, follows from the assertion that there are as many differences of ‘animal
findens pedes’ as there are ‘animalia findentia pedes’, which means that the
differences of a genus coincide with its species.
29
A QUINAS , Exp. Metaph., Lib. VII, lec. 12, n. 1563-1564, p. 375.
30
The commentary dates between 1287/1288 and 1294, probably to 1291. See S. D ONATI ,
Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I ␣ : Le opere prima del 1285 - I commenti
aristotelici, « ␣ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale ␣ », 1, 1990, pp. 1-112, in
particular pp. 55-65. A doctrinal study of the commentary is in M. B ERTAGNA , La ‘divisio textus’
nel commento di Egidio Romano agli «Analitici Posteriori», « ␣ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione
filosofica medievale ␣ », 13, 2002, pp. 285-371 ␣ ; 14, 2003, pp. 263-326 ␣ ; 15, 2004, pp. 439-486 ␣ ;
C ORBINI , La teoria della scienza cit.
344 MARTA VITTORINI
« ␣ Dubitaret forte aliquis quia videtur hoc falsum quod quelibet pars diffinitionis
se debeat habere in plus et totum in eque. Nam ultima differentia semper
convertitur cum diffinito. Secundum Philosophum enim in Metaphysica si
bene sciremus differentias animalis findentis pedes, tot essent huiusmodi
differentie quot sunt animalia findentia pedes. Numerus ergo differentiarum
propriarum sub aliquo genere equantur numero specierum sub illo genere,
quod non esset nisi differentia ultima converteretur cum specie ␣ » 31 .
Giles’s solution to this difficulty seems to be twofold. For, on the one hand,
he justifies Aristotle’s claim in the Analytics suggesting an argument similar
to that of Albert and Thomas. On the other, he holds that Aristotle in the
Analytics mentions two types of definition, and consequently, when he refers
to the proper type, he gives an account of definition which is consistent with
the one he provides in the Metaphysics.
Giles, then, distinguishes two kinds of definition ␣ : one simpliciter bona,
constituted by the proper genus and the proper difference, and one bona in
casu, constituted by more than one difference, in such a way that each one is
more common than the species, whilst the conjunction of such differences is
convertible with it. Therefore, we express more correctly the definition of a
species through the proximate genus and the last difference, but our ignorance
of substantial differences obliges us to resort to more of these ␣ ; and
consequently, we elaborate a definition which is not absolutely good
(simpliciter bona), but rather accidentally so (bona in casu).
« ␣ Sciendum quod ars ad accipiendum diffinitionem subiecti est duplex ␣ : una

que est bona simpliciter, et alia que est bona in casu. Ars bona simpliciter est
ut accipiatur proprium genus et propria differentia ␣ ; ars autem bona in casu est
ut quando ignoratur propria differentia quod loco proprie differentie accipiantur
aliqua plura quorum quodlibet se habeat in plus et omnia in eque ␣ » 32 .
According to Giles, Aristotle in the Analytics deals with both kinds of

definition. For, when he introduces the rule that the parts of a definition are
more common than the species, he refers to a definition de casu ␣ ; on the
contrary, when he states the rules for drawing the proper genus and the
proper difference, he is referring to a definition which is constituted only by
two terms, that is, an absolutely good definition 33 .
31
G ILES OF R OME , In Posteriorum Analitycorum libros expositio, Venetiis 1496 (reprinted by
Minerva Frankfurt 1967), o8va.
32
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., o8va.
33
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., o8va ␣ : « ␣ Duo ergo facit, quia primo dat artem diffiniendi subiectum
que est bona in casu ␣ : secundo dat artem que est bona simpliciter ibi (Congruum autem est). Circa
quod duo facit, quia primo premittit quandam divisionem, secundo hac divisione premissa docet
nos cognoscere qualia sunt illa que diffinitionem ingrediuntur ibi (huiusmodi autem accipienda) ␣ ».
« ␣ Notandum etiam quod ait Congruum est ut denotet hanc artem datam in
diffinitione, videlicet diffinire aliquid per proprium genus et per propriam
differentiam esse congruam simpliciter. Nam ars data supra quod diffiniatur
aliquid per multa quorum quodlibet sit in plus et totum in eque non est congrua
simpliciter sed in casu, cum non possumus scire propriam differentiam ␣ » 34 .
Such a point implies that Aristotle does not assume two different points of
view in the Analytics and in the Metaphysics, but rather, in the Analytics he
considers two kinds of definition, and in the Metaphysics he focuses on only
one of them, that is the proper one. And, as regards to the correct sort of
definition, in the Analytics Aristotle indicates the correct method of division
for drawing the proper genus and the proper difference of the species defined,
whilst in the Metaphysics he explains both the correct method of division and
the ontological ground of definition.
According to Giles, therefore, Aristotle in the Analytics gives an account of
proximate genus and last difference. The proximate genus is that one which
can be immediately divided into the lowest-level species.
« ␣ Notandum autem quod in hoc Philosophus docuit nos sic dividere genus. Dedit
enim nobis artem accipiendi proprium genus. Quod autem dividitur in species
specialissimas est proprium genus illarum specierum. Genus autem non proprium
sed longinquum non dividitur in species specialissimas sed in species subalternas.
Dividere ergo genus in athomas specie vel in athomas species vel in species
specialissimas est via ad cognoscendum proprium genus ␣ » 35 .
« ␣ Notandum etiam quod ait quod debemus dividere genus in athoma specie
prima vel in athomas species primas quia non est genus proprium ad
diffiniendum speciem specialissimam nisi genus illud quod prima et immedia-
ta divisione dividitur in speciem talem. Unde athome species accipiende per
divisionem generis sunt accipiende per se et immediate sub illo genere, quia
secundum hoc accipietur genus proprium illarum specierum. Nam divisione
non prima et immediata sed remota et per multa media poterit etiam genus
generalissimum dividi in species specialissimas ␣ » 36 .
34
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p1vb-p2ra.
35
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p1vb. And Giles seems to suggest more cases than Aristotle considers,
for he adds that there are three ways of division ␣ : « ␣ Notandum etiam quod genus vel dividitur in
duas species subalternas, vel in duas species specialissimas, vel in unam speciem specialissimam
et in aliam subalternam. Supponimus enim divisionem esse bimembrem. Si ergo dividatur genus
in duas species subalternas, tale genus non accipietur ut proprium in diffinitione speciei specia-
lissime ␣ ; si vero secundum divisionem rectam dividatur in speciem specialissimam et subalternam
poterit accipi ut genus proprium in diffinitione illius unius speciei specialissime ␣ ; sed si dividatur
divisione propria in duas species specialissimas poterit accipi ut genus proprium in diffinitione
utriusque. Via ergo recta atque debita ad cognoscendum proprium genus est facere divisionem in
athoma specie, id est in indivisibilia secundum speciem sive in species specialissimas ␣ ».
36
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p1vb.
346 MARTA VITTORINI
The proper difference must be drawn from the common principles, that is,
those belonging to the highest genus 37 . Such a theory is based on the rule that
the most common principles in a determinate category cause the less common
ones ␣ ; and consequently, the proper principles of a thing which is in a
determinate category must belong to the highest genus itself.
« ␣ Et quia ad diffinitionem non sunt utilia nisi que competunt universaliter,

loquendo de his que universaliter competunt, certum est quod quanto aliqua
sunt magis generalia et magis simplicia, tanto magis competunt eis aliqua
universaliter secundum se et aliis competunt per illa. Quanto autem aliqua
magis sunt infima, tanto eis competunt plura universaliter per alia, quia
quicquid competit universaliter superioribus, competit universaliter omnibus
inferioribus, sed non e converso. Per talia ergo communia et generalia toti
predicamento, eo quod sunt causa omnium eorum que insunt his que sunt in
predicamento, regulamur ad cognoscendum ea que sunt propria cuilibet
existenti in predicamento. Ea enim que conveniunt universaliter omnibus his
que sunt in predicamento substantie et talia etiam communia toti substantie
sunt causa eorum que conveniunt his que sunt in predicamento substantie ␣ » 38 .
The absolutely good definition, therefore, must be constituted by the proper

genus and the proper difference, that is, the genus must be immediately divided
into the lowest species, and the difference must be drawn from the highest genus.
With regard to the correct way of defining, Giles further explains i) the
reason why definition must be constituted by only two terms ␣ ; ii) in which way
the definition de casu is supposed to give an account of the object defined.
37
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p2ra ␣ : « ␣ Dubitaret forte aliquis quid prodest speculari propria
totius generis generalissimi et quomodo per talia communia prima sunt manifesta ea que sunt
convenientia ex diffinitionibus, id est, ad diffinitiones, et quomodo talia communia prima
valent et sunt proficua diffinitionibus compositis ex athomis, id est, ex differentiis propriis que
sunt differentie athome, id est, indivisibiles secundum species, quia tales differentie sunt
convertibiles cum speciebus specialissimis. Dicendum quod hoc modicum quod Philosophus
dixit est principium et regulam ad considerandum essentiales et proprias differentias
uniuscuiusque. Nam facile est videre quid competit ita homini quod non competit alii. Sed
utrum id sit propria differentia que debeat ingredi diffinitiones eius, ad hoc investigandum
regulamur per ea que sunt propria ipsi substantie quod est generalissimum predicamentum, ut,
si videmus quod per risibile differt homo ab omnibus aliis, non statim debemus currere ad
accipiendum risibile tanquam propriam differentiam, sed per ea que sunt propria ipsi generi
generalissimo et ipsi predicamento substantie debemus videre utrum risibile pertineat ad
predicamentum substantie. Quod si per risibile differt homo ab omnibus aliis et risibile pertinet
ad predicamentum substantie, ex hoc poterit colligi et haberi quod risibile non sit propria
differentia hominis. Propria ergo toti predicamento que sunt communia prima sunt regula ad
investigandum ea que sunt essentialia omnibus existentibus in illo predicamento ␣ ».
38
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p2rb.
A definition must be constituted by only two elements in that its unity can
result only from two elements which are related to each other as potency and act.
« ␣ Dicendum quod quia ignote sunt nobis forme substantiales et quia ignote
sunt nobis differentie proprie, ex hoc multa mala incurrimus diffiniendo.
Primo, quia facimus diffinitionem ex pluribus quam duobus. Solum enim duo
deberent concurrere ad diffinitionem quorum unum se haberet ut materia et ut
potentia, videlicet genus, aliud ut actus et ut forma, videlicet differentia.
Numquam enim ex duobus fit unum, nisi unum se habeat ut potentia et aliud
ut actus. Nec oportet dare tertium, quia non requiritur ibi nec colla nec clavus
ad coniungendum actum potentie. Ideo tertium est semper superfluum. Duo
autem solum requiruntur ad constitutionem rei ␣ : potentia et actus ␣ » 39 .
Nevertheless, we use a definition de casu because we ignore either the

proximate genus or the proper difference. And consequently, we can express
the proximate genus by referring to the highest genus and to the intermediate
differences ␣ ; and, we can express the last difference by means of two differences.
« ␣ Attamen quia aliquando innominatum est genus proprium, tunc loco generis
proprii ponimus genus remotum usque ad differentiam ultimam, ut si esset
diffinitio hominis animal mansuetum bipes, totum hoc ‘animal mansuetum’
acciperetur loco generis proprii proximi, et bipes se haberet ut specifica
differentia. Rursus quia aliquando est nobis ignota differentia propria, tunc
loco differentie proprie assumimus duas differentias, quarum quelibet se
habet in plus et ambe in eque. Et si non sufficiunt due accipimus et plures alias
tales, ut puta si esset nobis ignota propria differentia hominis, acciperemus
gressibile bipes loco differentie proprie quorum quodlibet se habet in plus et
totum in eque. Gressibile enim est in plus quam homo eo quod equus et alia
quadrupedia sunt gressibilia, et bipes in plus quam homo, quia volatilia sunt
bipedia. Sed hoc totum ‘gressibile bipes’ forte est solus homo. Quod ergo sic
accipiantur multa que sunt in plus, totum autem non in plus sed in eque, hoc
est ex ignorantia differentie proprie. Quod ergo obicitur quod differentia
propria convertitur, dici debet quod verum est si esset illa nobis nota. Sed quia
non est nobis nota, loco illius accipimus aliqua plura quorum quodlibet se
habet in plus et totum in eque ␣ » 40 .
Therefore, on the one hand the proximate genus can be replaced with the
highest one and some differences, and then the specific difference can be
added to the entire sequence. On the other, the last difference can be
39
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., o8va-b.
40
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., o8vb.
348 MARTA VITTORINI
expressed by differences which only when taken together express the notion
of the last difference and so are convertible with the species specialissima.
As regards to the first account of definition, according to Giles, the entire
series of differences excluding the last is supposed to name the proximate
genus, and is in plus, for the genus potentially contains all the differences and
all the species. On the contrary, the last difference is not in plus, and
consequently it is the element which makes the entire series a definition.
« ␣ Notandum etiam quod si est diffinitio hominis quod est substantia animata
sensibilis gressibilis bipes usque ad ultimam differentiam que adequat
diffinitionem datam homini, semper acceptum se habet ut genus. Substantia
enim animata se habet ut genus ad hominem et substantia animata sensibilis
gressibile ut genus. Quando autem additum est ibi bipes, quia non se habet in
plus, tunc iam est diffinitio. Si enim sciremus nominare totum precedens uno
nomine, illud tanquam genus et bipes tanquam differentia, faceret diffinitionem.
Hoc supponens, Philosophus dicit rationem datam de trinitate vel esse genus vel
diffinitionem. Non est autem genus, quia non predicatur in plus. Relinquitur
ergo quod sit diffinitio eo quod predicatur in eque. Nam quod predicatur in quid
et predicatur in eque diffinitio est. Genus enim non predicatur in eque. Differentia
autem non predicatur in quid, diffinitio autem et in quid et in eque ␣ » 41 .
« ␣ Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo genus secundum potentiam est in plus quam
que sunt in genere. Dicendum quod inferiora non sunt in superioribus actu, sed
potentia. Genus enim potentia habet omnes differentias, actu vero nullam. Et
sicut continet genus omnes differentias potentia, nullam autem actu, sic genus
habet omnes species potentia, actu vero nullam ␣ » 42 .
Regarding the second account, the sequence of two or more differences

makes us aware of the notional content of the last difference. For each
difference indicates the essential principles which the species specialissima
shares with one species but not with another, and so each difference bases at
the same time the convenientia with a certain species and the differentia with
another. Giles gives the following example ␣ : if we include the terms ‘gressibile’
and ‘bipes’ in the definition of man, ‘gressibile’ means both a certain
convenientia with terrestrial animals and a certain differentia with aerial
ones, whilst ‘biped’ signifies a certain convenientia with aerial animals and a
certain differentia with terrestrial ones.
« ␣ Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum iste modus sit conveniens. Dicendum
quod convenientius esset si sciremus differentiam propriam. Tamen, post
41
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p1va.
42
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., p1va.
diffinitionem continentem differentiam propriam, hec est convenientior

diffinitio quando loco proprie differentie accipiuntur plura, quorum quodlibet
se habet in plus et totum in eque, quia non est aliquid quod ita nos ducat in
cognitionem proprii sicut convenientia et differentia quam habet res ad alia,
ut si loco differentie proprie hominis acciperetur gressibile bipes, gressibile
diceret convenientiam quam habet homo cum animalibus terrestribus et
differentiam quam habet cum volatilibus ␣ ; bipes autem e contrario diceret
convenientiam ad volatilia et differentiam ad terrestria. In his ergo duobus
continetur convenientia et differentia hominis tam ad animalia volatilia quam
ad terrestria ␣ ; et quia hic est modus maxime deveniendi in cognitionem
differentie proprie, ideo post diffinitionem continentem differentiam propriam
videtur hic modus esse congruentior ␣ » 43 .
Therefore, it seems that according to Giles, the last difference of a species,

insofar as it is the proper one, must express some essential characteristics
which at the same time are the basis for its belonging to a determinate
proximate genus and its difference with respect to each species of that genus.
So, the last difference is made up of two terms, which relate to one another
as excedens and excessum.
« ␣ Quod ergo aliqua duo sic se habeant respectu alicuius quod quodlibet sit in
plus et totum in eque, hoc esse non poterit nisi quodlibet illorum duorum
restringat aliud et si quodlibet vel si utrumque restringat utrumque, utrumque
erit restringens et restrictum, et per consequens utrumque erit excedens et
excessum ␣ ; nam non restringit nisi quod excedit, et non restringitur nisi quod
exceditur. Esse ergo restringens et restrictum est esse excedens et excessum␣ » 44 .
This account of definition (that is, on the one hand the proximate genus can be
replaced by the genus generalissimum and some differences, and on the other the
last difference can be expressed by two or more differences) faces some problems.
First of all, the terms seem to imply accidental properties. Secondly,
differences, as they are in plus relating to one another as excedens and
excessum, do not follow the hierarchical order of the predicamental line.
Giles, however, answers all these objections.
Regarding the first remark, he maintains that terms such as ‘gressibilis’ or
‘pennatus’, even if secundum se mean accidents, when they are included in a
definition, imply essential properties. According to Giles, the very names of
things are taken from accidental properties, as ‘lapis’ for instance is taken
from ‘lesione pedis’.
43
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., o8vb.
44
G ILES , Exp. Post. Anal., o8vb-p1ra.
350 MARTA VITTORINI
« ␣ Dubitaret forte aliquis quia non videtur quod posita in diffinitione ternarii
predicentur essentialiter de trinario, quia esse primum et non mensurari
numero vel non esse primum sed mensurari numero videtur esse quedam
proprietates numeri. Dicendum quod dato quod non sint proprietates hoc non
obstat. Nam, quia ignote sunt differentie essentiales, utimur talibus loco
differentiarum essentialium, sicut ergo bipes ponitur differentia hominis et
differentia essentialis, et tamen figura membrorum corporis quoddam accidens
est. Attamen, cum nescimus differentiam essentialem, significamus eam nomi-
ne alicuius accidentis, ut per gressibile sive per pennatum que, et si secundum
se accidentia nominant, tamen, ut ingrediuntur diffinitionem, ponuntur vice
differentiarum substantialium et assumuntur ad significandum rei essentiam.
Nam et ipsa nomina substantiarum ut plurimum ab accidentibus sunt assumpta,
ut lapis a lesione pedis et petra a tritione pedis secundum grammaticalem
ethimologiam quia dicunt quod petra dicitur quasi pede trita ␣ » 45 .
Secondly, differences should be correctly ordered as superior and inferior,

in such a way that the difference of the inferior genus does not exceed that of
the superior one. This is the reason why a definition constituted by differences
which are in plus is good only de casu.
« ␣ Sed impossibile est secundum veritatem in diffinitione esse aliqua duo sic se
habentia sicut excedentia et excessa. Nam in diffinitione sunt genus et
differentia. Vel si sunt ibi plures differentie, hoc erit secundum ordinem
predicamentalem, quarum una erit differentia generis superioris et alia
inferioris. Genus ergo et differentia non possunt se habere sicut excedentia et
excessa, quia differentia non se extendit extra genus. Rursus due differentie
ordinate secundum ordinem predicamenti non possunt sic se habere si bene
date sint. Nam differentia generis inferioris si bene data sit non poterit
excedere differentiam generis superiori. Talis ergo diffinitio continens plura
quorum quodlibet est in plus et totum in eque non erit diffinitio vera, sed
poterit esse supplens in esse diffinitionis vere. Iste ergo modus diffiniendi
traditus hic a Philosopho non est bonus simpliciter, sed est bonus respectu
nostri et est bonus in casu ut diximus in continuando litteram. Nam quia nobis
sunt ignote differentie proprie ut supradiximus, ideo hic modus est nobis
competens, quia post diffinitionem continentem differentiam propriam, hec
diffinitio est congruentior quod contineat aliqua quorum quodlibet sit in plus
et totum in eque, ut est ex questione prehabita manifestum ␣ » 46 .
It seems therefore that Giles’s point is the following ␣ : Aristotle in the

Analytics mentions two types of definition ␣ : an absolutely good one, constituted
45
46
by the proper genus and the proper difference, and a definition bona de casu,
constituted by the genus generalissimum and a sequence of differences more
common than the species defined. The definition bona de casu includes terms
which by themselves signify accidental properties, but mean essential
properties when included in a definition.
Giles, therefore, takes up and elaborates some arguments of preceding
commentators ␣ : i) he takes from Grosseteste the point that differences are
related to one another as excedens and excessum ␣ ; ii) he takes from Albert and
Thomas the further view that definition, as it is formulated in the Analytics,
corresponds to a common way of defining a species, due to human ignorance
of essential differences. For his part, he adds some new elements. First of all,
he seems to minimize the contrast between Aristotle’s accounts in the Analytics
and that in the Metaphysics, for he remarks that already in the first the
Philosopher gives two different accounts of definition. Second, he draws a
sharp distinction between the two types of definition, introducing the
terminology of definition bona simpliciter and bona de casu. Moreover, he
explains in more detail how a definition bona de casu can be reduced to a two-
term one. For one thing in fact, the first genus plus all the differences excluding
the last can play the role of proximate genus, and the last term is the very
substantial difference ␣ ; for another, two terms which relate as excedens and
excessum can express the last difference. With regards to this latter point, he
explains in which sense the sum of more differences expresses the last difference ␣ :
each term expresses one property which the species shares with one species but
not with another ␣ ; and consequently it is the sum of all the properties the
common terms imply that expresses the peculiar one of a species.
II U NICITY OF FORM AND PLURALISM
In this section I will focus on the different approach to the problem of

definition supporters of the unity of the form and pluralists seem to adopt.
The problem of definition appears to be crucial in the debate on the unity or
plurality of forms, insofar as the supporters of the unity of the form mention
the Aristotelian account of definition in the Metaphysics as an argument for
denying the plurality of forms and supporting the singleness. For, the theory
of the plurality of forms is supposed to imply that the last difference can not
alone be convertible with the species, insofar as the quiddity of the things
consists in the sum of all the forms ␣ : and therefore such a view is inconsistent
with Aristotle’s assertments in the Metaphysics.
In the review of some commentaries on the Analytics (section I) it emerges
that supporters of the unity of the form generally i) justify the apparent
Aristotelian discrepancy by distinguishing between a more perfect definition
352 MARTA VITTORINI
(the Metaphysics one) as it perfectly reflects its ontological basis (that is, the
substantial form) and a less perfect definition (the Analytics one) as it
corresponds to a common way of defining a species, due to human ignorance
of the essential differences ␣ ; ii) claim that Aristotle’s account of definition in
the Metaphysics is based on the ontological doctrine of the singleness of the
substantial form ␣ ; iii) try to explain in which way man can express the last
difference in the definition.
On the contrary, in this section I will show that pluralists i) more or less
implicitly opt for the Analytics’ account of definition, insofar as it mirrors the
formal composition of metaphysical principles ␣ ; ii) show the consistency of
their theory with the Metaphysics account.
The label ‘pluralists’ need to be clarified, insofar as it is generally used to
denominate a group of philosophers who appears not to be strictly
homogeneous.
I will outline the main features these philosophers seem to share. First of all,
they all oppose the theory of the unity of substantial form. Secondly, they
maintain that different actions require different forms, in the sense that the
capacity of performing a certain kind of operation can be explained assuming
a determinate form as an ontological component of the compound. Thirdly,
they assume that different concepts grasped by the mind require different
forms, or more generally, real entities or perfections. Nevertheless, if we look
at the effective ontological account of pluralism, we will see that the philosophers
labelled as ‘pluralists’ show different ways of conceiving their pluralism,
insofar as they consider the formal entities constituting the compound as
forms in a stronger or in a weaker sense. It seems to me that if we consider the
problem of the forms from the point of view of generation of individuals,
medieval philosophers agree on the view that a number of forms is required to
successively inform the same piece of matter. Such a view is shared not only by
the so called ‘pluralists’, but also (in many cases) by the unity of the form
supporters. Instead, it is from the point of view of a static account of the
composition of individuals that different ontological conceptions emerge47 .
47
I mention the case of Aquinas. He distinguishes the point of view of generation (via
generationis) and the point of view of being (via completionis). This means that we can consider the
composite as it comes to be through a process of generation and as it is constituted by some
metaphysical principles. If we consider the process of generation, we can conceive of a plurality of
forms in such a way that a more general form is progressively replaced by a less general one, until
the last form comes up and makes the compound essentially complete. Accordingly, it is correct to
say that the accidents precede the form as dispositions of it in the sense that the accidents of the
preceding, more general form prepare the composite to receive the subsequent form. Instead, if we
consider the metaphysical composition of the compound, that is, essentially and not in its coming
to be, there is only one form which attributes to the matter different grades of perfection, and the
I will start my account i) first by outlining some different views of

pluralism ␣ ; ii) secondly by showing the account of definition pluralists conceive,
in spite of their differences.
We can regard as a strong type of pluralism the view that in every
composite there are a number of forms which are really distinct. This is the
opinion which Jean of Jandun opposes to the theory of the ‘grades’ or
‘formalitates’. According to him, concepts need something real to root them,
otherwise they are to be considered ficta 48 . Therefore, every composite is
informed by a number of forms ␣ : the intermediate ones are formae potentiales
and diminutae and prepare the matter to receive the final form 49 .
The target of Jandun’s criticism seems to be Duns Scotus, and more
generally a theory which conceives the form to be a sort of unity consisting of
different grades.
As to Scotus, his theory of the formal distinction let him conceive a lighter
form of pluralism. The Doctor Subtilis explicitly rejects a strong pluralism
accidents do not absolutly precede it, but inhere in it ␣ ; and only secundum rationem we can grasp
the different grades of perfections and regard the accidents of a more universal genus as
something preceding the less general formal perfection. Cfr. T HOMAS A QUINAS , Summa contra
Gentiles, III, 71␣ : « ␣ In via autem generationis dispositiones ad formam praecedunt formam in
materia, quamvis sint posteriores in essendo ␣ » ␣ ; Summa Theologiae, I, 76, a. 6 ␣ : « ␣ impossibile est
quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante formam substantialem ␣ ;
et per consequens neque ante anima ␣ » ␣ ; ad 1 ␣ : « ␣ Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque genus
consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante
intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis ␣ ; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia qaue sunt propria entis,
ante corporeitatem. Et sic praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum
ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem ␣ » ␣ ; ad 2 ␣ : « ␣ Quamvis enim eadem forma sit
secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit [..] tamen secundum
considerationem rationis differt ␣ ». See also A QUINAS , De veritate, q. 5, a. 9, ad 6 ␣ ; Quodlibet, I, q. 4.
48
J OHN OF J ANDUN , Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae, Venetiis 1553, II, q. 10, f.
31ra ␣ : « ␣ Item alius est conceptus hominis et alius animalis ut animal. Et hoc non solum
secundum ponentes plures formas in una re, sed etiam secundum negantes pluralitatem
formarum. Ex hoc arguitur ␣ : isti conceptus accipiuntur a diversis formis substantialibus in re,
si non, sunt ficti, vel a diversis modis essendi. Si accipiatur a diversis formis substantialibus
habetur intentum quod alia sit forma in homine dans esse animal et alia forma dans esse
hominem. Si a diversis modis essendi hoc non potest esse ␣ ».
49
J OHN OF J ANDUN , Quaest. Metaph., II, q. 10, f. 32vb ␣ : « ␣ Unde omnes medie forme ut
substantie corporis et cetera dant esse dispositivum et disponunt materiam primam ad formam
finalem, quia materia prima est debilis entitatis et indisposita per se quod non posset recipere
ultimam et finalem formam nisi mediantibus illis formis precedentibus, quia materia prima
primo recipit formas universales et post mediantibus illis recipit minus universales usque ad
individuales, ut Commentator primo Metaphysice de erroribus. [..] iste forme medie, scilicet
generales et universales, sunt potentiales et diminute, unde etiam ordinantur ad illam formam
specificam, sub qua illud subiectum stans erit perfecte actuatum ␣ ».
354 MARTA VITTORINI
grounded on a strong conception of the real difference ␣ ; according to him, the

real difference has three grades ␣ : a maximum grade between «suppositum»
and nature, a medium one between one and another nature, and a minimum
grade between some formal perfections (perfectiones unitivae contentae). This
grade of difference is conceived by him as a ‘formal distinction’ and regards
formal entities which are the real counterpart of genus and difference, and
are included in a unitarian way in the specific form. Scotus’s pluralism,
therefore, consists in conceiving a number of perfections which jointly
constitute the formal principle of compounds 50 .
The idea that the form is a sort of total unity, consisting in some ‘grades’
or parts, is to be found among some XIIIth century pluralists. The general
thesis is that during the process of generation or transmutation the forms
follow one another, from the more general and incomplete to the more
specified and actualized ␣ ; and the result of such a process is a sort of formal
entity which at the same time is unitarian and maintaines a sort of plurality.
I mention some peculiar views.
i) There is only one form containing a number of esse substantialia,
acquired through the process of transmutation. This view is stated by Roger
Marston, who seems to follow Pecham’s opinions. During the process of
transmutation the preceding, more general form becomes ennobled and can
acquire a more perfect grade 51 .
50
D UNS S COTUS , Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, edd. R. A NDREWS , G.
E TZKORN , G. G ÁL , R. G REEN , F. K ELLEY , G. M ARCIL , T. N OONE , R. W OOD , The Franciscan Institute,
St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1997, VII, q. 19, nn. 43-44, p. 370, lin. 2-13 ␣ :
« ␣ Alia est opinio quae, propter praedicta motiva — ne ponat conceptus simpliciter diversos
generis et differentiae esse fictitios, sed cum utroque illorum aliquid in re concipiatur (cum
illorum actuum sint obiecta in quantum obiecta ita formaliter diversa sicut si essent res omnino
diversae) —, ponit quod illis correspondeant aliqua in re realiter diversa ␣ ; ita realiter quod,
circumscripta omni operatione intellectus agentis vel possibilis, et omni esse in intellectu
praesupposito vel concomitante, erit in re illa differentia. Sed realis differentia ponitur habere
gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum ␣ ; media naturarum in uno supposito ␣ ;
minima diversarum perfectionum sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum in una
natura ␣ »␣ ; n. 49, pp. 371, lin. 20 - 372, lin. 3␣ : « ␣ Sed ista est minima ubi potest salvari fundamentaliter
ratio generis et differentiae. Hae autem perfectiones distinctos formant conceptus, et distincta
sunt obiecta illorum conceptuum sicut si essent separate ␣ ; quemadmodum alibi habetur quod
quicquid perfectionem aliquam consequitur ex propria ratione, etiam eam consequitur quando
unitive cum alia continetur, sicut actio propria et cetera huiusmodi ␣ » ␣ ; n. 50, p. 372, lin. 4-9 ␣ : « ␣ Et
per hoc potest forma specifica unitive continens formas generum intermediorum esse principium
multarum operationum illis contentis correspondentium, si illa intermedia ex se sint activa ␣ ».
51
R OGER MARSTON , Quodlibeta quatuor, edd. G. ETZKORN, I. C. B RADY, Quaracchi, Grottaferrata
1994, II, q. 22, p. 255, lin. 12-21 ␣ : « ␣ Nec tamen pono hic plures formas, sed unam tantum habentem
diversa esse substantialia quae per transmutationem acquiruntur. [..] haec, inquam, forma in qua
stat resolutio per agens extrinsecum nobilitatur et magnificatur ut acquirat esse substantiale
ii) The formal principle is a sort of total quiddity resulting from the
progressive actualization of the preceding, incomplete forms. This is to say
that the more general form, insofar as it is incomplete and imperfect, requires
the subsequent form in order to arrive at a completion, until the last form
completely actualizes the composite. And therefore these different grades of
actualization are in some way parts of the total quiddity. This is Richard of
Middleton’s opinion 52 .
iii) The formal principle is a total form, in the sense that the more specific
one which actualizes the composite through the progressive process of
transmutation or generation becomes itself the total form, and the preceding
form (having the state of total form) becomes a partial one. In other words,
the progressive actualization of the composite consists in a number of
intermediate states ␣ : in each of them the preceding form becomes a part of the
subsequent to be considered the total form. This is Olivi’s view, and it implies
that the last form is a total one, giving the composite its total being. Therefore,
the preceding forms no longer give its essence to the composite, whilst the last
one gives it by means of the preceding ones 53 .
After this brief presentation, I restrict the analysis to some assertions on
definition which appear to be strictly connected to a pluralist approach 54 .
One problem pluralists have to face is the assertion in Metaphysics, VII that
the last form roots the unity of the compound and the last difference the unity
perfectius, puta esse forme mixti, non amittendo esse quod prius habuit, sed illo magnificato per
transmutationem, acquirit esse virtuosius ␣ »␣ ; see also q. 22, p. 273 ␣ : « ␣ Sic igitur patet quod rationes
superius tactae non cogunt negare pluralitatem formarum, quamvis probabiliorem credam opinionem
quae dicit unam tantum formam in quolibet individuo habentem gradus diversos secundum esse
diversa substantialia acquisita per transmutationem et nobilitationem formae quae generatione
non corrumpitur, sed manet acquisito nobilior esse». See J OHN PECHAM, Quodlibet romanum, ed. P.
F. M. D ELORME, Typis Cuggiani, Romae 1938, II, p. 64, lin. 20-22 ␣ : « ␣ unde sunt in homine formae
plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam ultimam perfectionem et ideo formatum est unum ␣ ».
52
R ICHARD OF M EDIAVILLA , De gradu formarum, ed. R. Z AVALLONI , in R. Z AVALLONI , Richard de
Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes, Éditions de l’institut supérior de
philosophie, Louvain 1951, pp. 35-180, in particular p. 131, lin. 40-43 ␣ : « ␣ unde debes scire quod
compositum ex materia et omnibus formis quae ad completivam disponunt, comparatur ad
formam completivam quasi in ratione propriae materiae, ita quod hoc totum substantialem
completionem recipit a forma completiva ␣ ».
53
P ETER J OHN O LIVI , Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. B. J ANSEN , II, qq. 49-
71, ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventure, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi)1924, q. 50, p. 36 ␣ :
« ␣ sicut forma adveniens alteri formae, quae post adventum eius existit rei forma totalis sicut
prius, est accidentalis, non autem si ex suo adventu prima amittat rationem totalitatis, ut iam
non sit forma rei sed potius pars formae, quin immo ista quae advenit erit potius forma quam
prima, quanto est actualior et completior ␣ : sic similiter forma adveniens post esse completum,
si illud esse cui advenit adhuc est esse rei totale, ipsa est accidentalis ␣ ».
54
I defer a more systematic examination to another contribution.
356 MARTA VITTORINI
of definition ␣ ; and the point that the last difference is the entire substance of
a thing. The unity of the form supporters put forward such statements in
order to demonstrate on the one side that only one form constitutes the
composite, on the other that only one term (the last difference) can express
the quiddity in the definition.
As to this objection, Richard of Middletown maintains that Aristotle’s
assertions can be understood in the sense that the forma completiva gives the
complete actualization to the compound, uncomplete and potential with respect
to it 55 . Even if the last difference is drawn from a part of the form, it means the
entire formal principle per modum qualitatis and modo determinativo.
« ␣ Ad illud quod arguis septimo per Philosophum VII Metaphysicae, qui videtur
velle quod finalis differentia est tota substantia rei, dico sic quod ex hoc non
potes concludere unitatem formae in composito, quia, sicut dixi tibi superius
quod genus significat totam quidditatem rei per modum substantiae, modo
tamen indeterminato, et species significat totam quidditatem rei per modum
substantiae, sed modo determinato, ita dico tibi quod differentia completiva
significat quidquid est formale de quidditate rei per modum qualitatis, modo
determinativo, et differentiae priores significant idem per modum qualitatis,
modo tamen non plene determinativo. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicere
voluit, quando dixit quod finalis differentia est tota substantia rei ␣ ; unde ex
dicto Philosophi non potes concludere unitatem formae in composito, quia,
etsi forte differentia accipiatur ab aliqua forma, quae est pars totius quod
formale est in quidditate compositi, tamen imponitur ad significandum totum
formale in quidditate ipsius compositi, vel totam quidditatem compositi per
modum formae qualificantis ␣ » 56 .
Analogously, Peter Olivi maintains that the last form is not the entire
quiddity of the thing, since it is connected to the preceding ones (which
become parts of the form) ␣ ; and consequently it can be conceived as the entire
substance of the thing only insofar as it is connected to the preceding forms.
« ␣ differentia ultima non est tota forma rei, nisi prout est aggregata et accepta
cum praecedentibus formis seu naturis formalibus. In adventu autem eius
forma praecedens amittit rationem formae totalis, et ens praecedens amittit
55
R ICHARD OF M EDIAVILLA , De gradu formarum, p. 161, lin. 32-40 ␣ : « ␣ ex uno existente in actu
incompleto et ex aliqua forma completiva potest fieri unum per essentiam, eo quod illud ens
incompletum se habet per modum materialis et potentialis respectu illius formae completivae,
et illa forma se habet ad illud potentiale et materiale per modum complentis et dantis actualitatem
completam. Et hoc forte voluit dicere Commentator Super VII Metaphysicae, ubi dicit quod
unitas compositi est per formam ultimam et unitas definitionis per ultimam differentiam ␣ ».
56
R ICHARD OF M EDIAVILLA , De gradu formarum, p. 141, lin. 93-10.
rationem totius et per se entis ␣ ; aut enim totaliter destruuntur aut assumunt
rationem partis ␣ » 57 .
The point that the last form alone can not be the entire quiddity suggests
the idea of a multiple terms definition, that is to say, a definition must include
the intermediate differences expressing the different formal grades constituting
the entire quiddity of the composite.
A more detailed picture of such a view is to be found in Scotus’s theory of
definition.
Scotus explicitly rejects Aquinas’s positions on definition. The last difference
is not the entire substance of the thing ␣ : since it is a part of the definition, it
expresses a part of the thing. It can be correctly considered as the entire
substance of the thing only in the sense that it accomplishes and completes the
quiddity of the compound 58 . According to him, if the last difference included
the intermediate ones, they will be contained twice in the definition 59 . Therefore
Scotus, following an Avicennian suggestion, conceives genus and difference as
external to one another, in the sense that difference does not include genus.
This means that the last difference can express the entire quiddity only as a
qualitative determination bringing forth the genus in a species.
« ␣ Et sicut in re, natura materiae extraneatur naturae formae, ita quod neutrum
est dicibile de altero, ita apud rationem, intellectus generis extraneatur
intellectui differentiae, licet eadem res importetur per utrumque. Idem enim
significat ‘animal’ quod ‘homo’, praeter determinationem ultimae formae ␣ ; et
hoc significat per modum quid et per se entis ␣ ; et ideo secundum Porphyrium
praedicatur in quid. ‘Rationale’ autem idem significat cum determinatione
57
O LIVI , Quaest. Sent., 50, p. 42 ␣ : « ␣ differentia ultima non est tota forma rei, nisi prout est
aggregata et accepta cum praecedentibus formis seu naturis formalibus ␣ ».
58
D UNS S COTUS , Quaest. Metaph., VII, q. 17, nn. 11-12, p. 330, lin. 8-14 ␣ : « ␣ Item, quod ultima
differentia non est tota substantia rei, quia de substantia huius non solum sunt omnes differentiae,
sed etiam genus ␣ ; ergo genus erit de per se intellectu differentiae ultimae. Item, ultima
differentia non est tota substantia rei, quia ‘omnis ratio habet partes’ ␣ ; et sicut ‘tota definitio
exprimit totam rem, sic pars partem’. Cum ergo differentia sit pars definitionis, exprimet partem
rei, et non totam substantiam rei ␣ » ␣ ; n. 26, p. 334,17-20 ␣ : « ␣ Ad aliud, quod differentia est tota
substantia ␣ : supra patet quod non est intentio Philosophi, sed completive et perfecte est
substantia rei, quia ab illa differentia est completive tota substantia re ␣ ».
59
D UNS S COTUS , Quaest. Metaph., VII, q. 17, n. 13, pp. 330, lin. 16 - 331, lin. 6 ␣ : « ␣ Omnis
definitio vel dabitur per genus primum et per differentias intermedias usque ad ultimam, vel per
genus proximum et differentiam specificam. Si primo modo, differentia intermedia ponetur in
definitione ␣ ; et ultima includit omnes, per te ␣ ; ergo omnes intermediae dicentur bis, quia et in
se et in differentia ultima. Si secundo modo, cum genus proximum includat differentiam suam,
et ultima includit eam, dicetur bis ␣ ».
358 MARTA VITTORINI
ultimae formae, sed tamen per modum qualis et denominantis, et ideo apud
rationem, conceptus generis et differentiae sunt extranei ␣ » 60 .
Such a brief account shows that a pluralist theory is the basis for a peculiar
view on definition, which can hardly be reconciled with Aristotle’s assertions
in the Metaphysics ␣ : the last difference does not include the intermediate ones
and the genus, but need them to be expressed in the definition in order to
imply the entire quiddity of the defined object. According to Richard of
Middletown, and Scotus after him, the difference is a sort of qualitative
determination which expresses the total quiddity but is not to be equated to
it. On the one side, in a large sense, the last form can be regarded as the entire
substance of the thing, for it accomplishes and actualizes the more general
and potential forms ␣ ; on the other it does not include all the quidditative
properties of the thing, for they lie in the formal entities which gradually give
reason to the coming into being of the thing.
III A VICENNA ON GENUS AND DIFFERENCE IN THE M ETAPHYSICS
Before dealing with Burley’s position on definition, I will present some

aspects of the Avicennian doctrine on genus and difference, which Burley is
supposed to accept and make use of in his questions on the Analytics.
Avicenna has a twofold role, for, on the one hand he states some principles
Latin commentators will elaborate and use as arguments in discussing
difference ␣ ; on the other, he seems to give Burley a model for understanding
the relation between genus and difference.
As to the first point, Avicenna introduces the idea that we formulate definitions
which do not express exactly the ontological composition of things. He suggests
two reasons for his view␣ : i) the lack of names, that is, our incapacity to name
things␣ ; ii) the difficulty in grasping the differences. Consequently, according to
him, our attention shifts from the difference to the concomitant. Therefore, it
can happen either that we know the differences but we name them by the name
of their concomitant or that we ignore them and grasp only their concomitant.
« ␣ Sed defectus nominum et parvitas percipiendi differentias, aut hoc, aut illud,
facit necessario deviare a vera differentia ad comitans ␣ ; aliquando autem
60
DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge, edd. G. ETZKORN, R.␣ ANDREWS, G.␣ GÁL,
R.␣ GREEN, T.␣ NOONE, R.␣ WOOD, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.
1999, I, q. 20, n. 5, pp. 128, lin. 21 - 129, lin. 3. See also Quaest. Metaph., III, q.unica, 7, p. 288, lin. 13-17␣ :
«␣ Ad istud Avicenna, V Metaphysicae␣ : licet genus et differentia praedicentur de toto per se, non tamen
significant totum per se, sed genus materiale, differentia formale. Sed utrumque significat partem speciei
per modum totius, et sicut materiale est extra formale, sic conceptus generis extra rationem differentiae␣ ».
denominatur eius nomen a suo comitanti, sicut intelligimus sensibile id quod

habet principium ex quo emanat sensus et alia huiusmodi ␣ ; aliquando vero
differentia est ignota penes nos et non percipitur nisi ex suo comitanti ␣ » 61 .
The conclusion medieval commentators will draw from these statements is

that we formulate a definition which contains accidental terms, and therefore
which does not express the ontological components of the object defined.
As to Avicenna’s influence on Burley, it concerns the relation between
genus and difference, and in particular i) the fact that both of them are
quidditative parts of the species, ii) and the further point that both of them
are indeterminate and so mutually restrict each other’s notion.
According to Avicenna both genus and difference are parts of the quidditas
of the species. Such a point is the basis of his overall account of difference.
For, even if both genus and difference are quidditative parts of the species
there is no essential relation between them, so that the genus is not a
quidditative part of the difference. Therefore, the difference does not share
the same quidditas as genus, and differs from it for its very being (per
seipsam). Moreover, insofar as the species is concerned, the difference has
both something in common with the species and something different from it.
For, on the one hand it is a quidditative part of the species, whilst on the other
it is different from it in that the species is constituted by another quidditative
part, which is the genus.
« ␣ Dicemus etiam quod genus praedicatur de specie, ita quod est pars quidditatis
eius, et praedicatur de differentia, ita quod comitans eam, non pars quidditatis
eius ␣ : verbi gratia, animal praedicatur de homine quoniam est pars quidditatis
eius, et praedicatur de rationali, quoniam est comitans ipsum <…>. Non enim
intelligimus rationale, nisi quod est habens rationalitatem et quod est habens
animam rationalem, ita quod hoc nomen rationale non significat an illud sit
substantia an non, sed comitatur ipsum non esse nisi substantiam et nisi
corpus et nisi sensibile ␣ ; haec igitur praedicantur de illo, sicut praedicatur
comitans de suo comitato ␣ : non enim continentur in intellectu rationalis,
scilicet rei habentis rationalitatem. Dicemus ergo nunc quod differencia non
convenit in quidditate cum genere quod de se praedicatur ␣ ; differt igitur ab eo
per seipsam ␣ ; convenit autem cum specie in eo quod est pars suae quidditatis ␣ ;
differt igitur ab ea per naturam generis quod est intra quidditatem speciei, non
intra quidditatem differentiae ␣ » 62 .
61
A VICENNA , Liber de philosophia prime sive de scientia divina, V, ed. S. V AN R IET , Peeters -
Brill, Louvain - Leiden 1980, p. 267, lin. 5-10.
62
A VICENNA , Liber de philosophia prima, V, pp. 281-282, lin. 94-99.
360 MARTA VITTORINI
Moreover, genus and difference must not to be considered as parts which

go together. On the contrary, both of them are indetermined and potential,
and mutually specify each other’s being, so that they become something
actual, possessing more determinate properties.
« ␣ Cum nos definimus dicentes, verbi gratia ␣ : « ␣ homo est animal rationale ␣ », non
volumus in hoc quod homo sit coniunctio ex animali et rationali, sed volumus
in hoc quod ipse est animal quod est rationale, quasi enim animal in se
quoddam est cuius esse non est terminatum, sicut prediximus, nisi cum ipsum
animal fuerit rationale, ita ut, cum hoc quod dicimus habens animam
apprehendentem simpliciter quod est non terminatum fit habens hanc animam,
iam sit terminatum, nam eiusmodi est quod eius anima est sensibilis rationalis␣ :
haec igitur determinatio est eius quod est animam apprehendentem. Corpus
ergo habens animam apprehendentem non est aliquid, sed ipsum esse habens
animam rationalem est aliquid quod accidit ei extrinsecus, et hoc quod est
animal non est nisi id quod est habens animam apprehendentem ␣ ; esse vero id
cuius est anima apprehendens est quiddam interminatum, quorum nullum
habet esse in actu ullo modo, sicut iam scisti, sed fit per illud terminatum ␣ ;
haec autem dubitatio non est nisi in intellectu, eo quod dubium est ei de
certitudine animae apprehendentis quousque possit designari et dici quod est
apprehendens sensu et imaginatione et ratione ␣ » 63 .
Avicenna’s text suggests some considerations on the role of difference in

definition ␣ : i) since difference is an indetermined element in definition, it can
be predicated of more than only one species ␣ ; ii) since it is a part of the species,
it can not express the entire notion of it, but only some properties which the
species possesses insofar as the difference is a quidditative part of it.
IV B URLEY ON DEFINITION AND THE ROLE OF DIFFERENCE
In this section I will examine Burley’s works. Burley wrote two works on
the Analytics, that is, an expositio and some quaestiones 64 . While the Expositio
seems to be strictly dependent on Grosseteste’s and Thomas’s commentaries,
the Quaestiones more directly express Burley’s view on the relation between
genus and difference in definition. Moreover, other works — such as the
treatise on definition and the commentary on Porphyry — even if they are not
commentaries on the Analytics, contain an explicit reference to this text in
relation to the problem of definition.
63
A VICENNA , Liber de philosophia prima, V, pp. 265-266, lin. 73-90.
64
The date of these works is uncertain. We can likely attribute them to the Oxford period,
that is, the years 1301-1307.
This part of my paper is divided into four paragraphs. In the first, I will
examine the Expositio, and point out Burley’s debt to his sources. In the
second, I will carefully analyse the Quaestiones, and try to reconstruct
Burley’s peculiar position. In the third, I will analyze the treatise De diffinitione
for what it has to say about the Analytics. In the fourth paragraph, finally, I
will examine the Expositio super Isagogen and try to outline Burley’s general
account of the role of differences in definition.
1. The commentary on the Posterior Analytics
Burley’s commentary on the Analytics follows the tradition I have sketched

in the first section. The definition, according to Aristotle, must be constituted
by the genus generalissimum and the differences ␣ : the latter must be added to
the genus until all it and differences is convertible with the species. And
consequently a definition contains an indefinite number of terms ␣ : each of
them is in plus, that is, more common than the species, but the conjunction
of them expresses the very notion of the species 65 .
Burley, while examining this account of definition, raises two types of
objection. First of all, this account is different from Aristotle’s statement in the
Metaphysics that the last difference is convertible in species ␣ ; secondly, such a
definition does not mirror the ontological setting of things. The second objection
seems to be taken from Aquinas ␣ : since the difference is drawn from the form,
and each thing has its own form, which it does not share with any other thing,
the difference in a definition can not be in plus, that is, can not be predicated
of more subjects than the species defined. And consequently, it seems to be
wrong to say that every term in a definition is more common than the species.
« ␣ Dubitatur quia non videtur quod quelibet particula posita in diffinitione rei
debeat dici esse in plus quam diffinitum, quia ultima differentia convertitur
cum specie per Philosophum VII Metaphysice. Similiter differentia accipitur a
forma, sed species habet formam propriam que nulli alii conveniet ␣ ; ergo non
quelibet pars diffinitionis est in plus quam ipsum diffinitum ␣ » 66 .
65
WALTER BURLEY, Expositio super libros Analyticorum Posteriorum, l. II, c. 4, ms. Città del
Vaticano, Vat. lat. 2146, f. 109ra ␣ : «␣ Unde hec est conclusio vigesima secunda huius libri quod ad
investigandum diffinitionem accipiendum est genus rei diffiniende cum differentiis ordinatis
convenientibus rei diffiniende quousque accipiantur tot quorum unumquodque sit in plus, et omnia
simul collecta non sint in plus sed convertibilia (ms␣ : convertibile). Hec conclusio probatur, quia illud
aggregatum predicatur in quid de diffinito, ergo est genus eius vel diffinitio eius. Sed non est genus,
quia <si> sic non esset convertibile␣ ; ergo est diffinitio, ergo aggregatum ex genere et differentiis
quorum quodlibet est in plus quam diffinitum et totum convertibile est vera diffinitio rei␣ ».
66
B URLEY , Exp. Post. Anal., l. II, c. 4, Vat. lat. 2146, f. 109ra.
362 MARTA VITTORINI
Then, Burley has two arguments supporting Aristotle’s account of

definition ␣ : these are taken respectively from Thomas and Grosseteste.
Thomas’s argument is that since we have no direct grasp of the essential
forms, we can have some knowledge of them only through their accidental
manifestations ␣ ; and consequently, we define species through accidents.
Moreover, since the propria of a species follow from its definition, we are
forced to take common accidents, which are more common than the species.
« ␣ Ad istud dicunt aliqui quod, si (ms ␣ : licet) posset accipi aliqua differentia que
notificaret formam substantialem speciei, differentia ultima non esset in plus
quam species. Sed quia forme essentiales non sunt per se nobis note, oportet
quod manifestentur per alia accidentia que sunt signa illius forme, ut patet ex
VIII Metaphysice. Sed accidentia propria speciei non debent accipi, quia talia
debent demonstrari per diffinitionem speciei ␣ ; ideo oportet accipere accidentia
communiora. Tales dicuntur essentiales diffinitiones que inducunt ad
declarandum essentiam rei ␣ ».
Grosseteste’s argument is that, since we perform a twofold division of the

genus, that is, ex parte materiali and ex parte formali, we express the last
difference by means of a couple of differences which are for one another
excedens and excessum. And consequently each difference we include in a
definition will be more common than the species.
« ␣ Lincolniensis dicit ad istud quia natura cuiuslibet generis non generalissimi

aliquo modo componitur ex parte subiecti sibi materiali et ex parte sibi formali,
unde ei accidunt ad minus due divisiones prime, quarum una fit ex parte forme
et alia ex parte materie, sicut, posito quod corpora celestia sunt animalia, accidit
animali una prima divisio ex parte forme, scilicet rationale et irrationale, et
accidit ei alia divisio ex parte corporis, scilicet mortale et immortale. Verumtamen,
due differentie que accidunt generi ex parte formali sunt magis essentiales et
prius ordinate in diffinitione ␣ ; et has quatuor differentias necesse est esse
excedentes et excessas. Cum autem omne genus subalternum compositum sit ex
genere superiori et differentia vel differentiis superadditis, necesse est ipsum
compositum recipere viam divisionis primam ex parte generis, in quantum
ipsum habet sibi admixtam naturam (de add. ms.) differentie, et aliam divisionem
primam ex parte differentie constituentis, secundum quod ipsi (ms. ␣ : ipse)
differentie admixta est natura generis superioris, velut in predicto exemplo␣ :
mortale enim et immortale accidunt animali ex parte corporis, secundum quod
ei admixta est animatio, et iterum animali accidit rationale ex parte anime,
secundum quod ei coniuncta est corporeitas (ms ␣ : corporietas). Dicit etiam quod
alicui generi generalissimo, eo quod ipsum habet in se naturam multiplicitatis
(109rb) accidunt due divisiones prime, sicut manifestum est quod huic generi
‘quantitas’ accidunt due divisiones prime, continuum et discretum, et iterum
habere positionem partium vel esse sine positione␣ ; et forte in aliis generalissimis
idem accidit, licet non sit nobis ita manifestum. Quod si est, manifestum est
quod diffinitiones fiunt ex partibus quarum quelibet est in plus quam diffinitum,
totum autem in eque. Hec Lincolniensis ␣ » 67 .
In the Expositio, therefore, Burley does not express his own position on
definition, but rather seems to collect material from the preceding tradition,
as is clear from the fact that he follows word by word Grosseteste’s commentary
and adds Thomas’s arguments.
2. The questions on the Posterior Analytics
In the questions on the Posterior Analytics, Burley presents his own view
on definition, and in particular on the last difference.
The seventh question is the following ␣ : « ␣ Queratur de veritate, et hoc est
quaerere utrum propositio sit per se vera in qua praedicatur genus de
differentia ␣ ». Burley distinguishes two ways of considering such a question ␣ :
it can concern ␣ : i) the content of the proposition, and so the relation between
genus and difference or ii) the truth of the proposition 68 . The truth of the
proposition ‘rationale per se est animal’ depends on the supposition of terms.
According to Burley, an indefinite proposition is true if the predicate inheres
to something the subjet stands for. ‘Rational’ stands in personal supposition
for Socrates or ‘this man’. And therefore, since animal is predicated ‘per se’ of
either of them, it is predicated ‘per se’ of ‘rational’ as well.
« ␣ Istis suppositis, si quaeratur de veritate huius ‘rationale per se est animal’,

esset dicendum quod haec est absolute vera nec permittitur in proposito nisi
sensus divisionis ␣ : nec potest subiectum in proposito habere nisi suppositionem
personalem. Nunc autem omnis terminus supponens personaliter supponit pro
eo cui inest, et ‘hoc’, si accipiatur pro hiis quae sunt. Et terminus concretus
acceptus personaliter, supponit pro subiecto. ‘Rationale’ ergo in proposito ex
quo supponit personaliter, supponit pro quolibet quod est rationale ␣ ; et ideo
supponit pro homine et pro Socrate et pro Platone et sic de aliis. Sed ad veritatem
indefinitae <propositionis> sufficit quod praedicatum insit alicui pro quo
subiectum supponit. Cum ergo Socrates per se sit animal, sequitur quod rationale
per se sit animal. Similiter, hoc rationale et iste homo sunt totaliter idem, si idem
67
B URLEY , Exp. Post. Anal., l. II, c. 4, Vat. lat. 2146, f. 109ra.
68
B URLEY , Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum, ed. M. C. S OMMERS , Pontifical Institute of
Medieval Studies, Toronto 1980, q. VII, 7.63, p. 111␣ : «␣ Circa istam quaestionem sciendum est
primo quod aliud est quaerere de veritate huius ‘rationale per se est animal’, et aliud est quaerere
an propositio sit per se in qua praedicatur genus de differentia␣ : et aliter est respondendum ad
unum quaesitum et ad aliud␣ ».
364 MARTA VITTORINI
demonstretur utrobique. Cum ergo iste homo per se sit animal, sequitur quod hoc
rationale per se sit animal␣ ; et ulterius, ergo rationale per se est animal␣ »69 .
As to the relation between genus and difference, Burley follows Avicenna’s

account, for he draws a distinction between two ways of considering genus
and difference, that is, within themselves and their interrelationship.
« ␣ Animal dupliciter consideratur ␣ : uno modo ut est actu perfectum et terminatum

per rationalitatem, et sic est pars ␣ ; alio modo consideratur secundum quod est
indifferens ad rationalitatem et irrationalitatem, scilicet considerando ipsum
in communi habens in sui potestate rationale et irrationale, et sic est genus.
Eodem modo de differentiis. Nam considerando rationale ut actu terminat et
perficit animam sensitivam, sic est pars formalis ␣ ; sed tamen considerando
ipsum secundum quod est indifferens ad determinandum hoc vel illud,
inquantum non determinat sibi nec corpus nec substantiam, et sic de aliis, sic
est differentia. Et sic manifestum quod ‘animal’ significat quoddam totum,
scilicet habens sensum, quod tamen natum est determinari per aliud. Et
‘rationale’, similiter, significat quoddam totum, ut habens rationalitatem, non
determinando sibi quid est habens rationalitatem. Unde genus significat totum
determinando materiale, sed expectando formale ␣ ; sed differentia, ut rationale,
significat totum determinando formale, sed expectando materiale ␣ » 70 .
The point is that both genus and difference, if considered as they are in
themselves, are indeterminate. However, when they are taken together, they
mutually specify each other’s being. Consequently, each of them, insofar as
undifferentiated, is a whole, whilst if considered in relation to the other, it is
a part of a quidditative composite ␣ : the genus is the material part, insofar as
it is determined by the difference, and the difference is the formal part,
insofar as determined by the genus.
According to Burley, therefore, both genus and difference are more common
than species and do not include one another.
«␣ De significatis generis et differentiae dicit Avicenna, quinto Metaphysicae capitulo

quinto, quod animal significat primo habens sensum, non determinando in suo
significato an illud sit habens rationem. Nam hoc est totaliter accidens significato
animalis. E contra ␣ : rationale significat habens rationem, non determinando an
illud sit habens sensum vel non ␣ ; sed hoc ei accidit. Nunc autem sensus
quodammodo est materiale in homine, et ratio, formale. Ideo genus de suo primo
significato importat materiale in specie absque determinatione sui formalis␣ »71 .
69
B URLEY , Quaest. Post. Anal., q. VII, 7.78, p. 114. I have changed the punctuation in order
to make the text more intelligible.
70
B URLEY , Quaest. Post. Anal., q. VII, 7.69-7.70, p. 112.
71
B URLEY , Quaest. Post. Anal., q. VII, 7.66-7.68, pp. 111-112.
This implies that each of them can be the definiens of a species only in
conjunction with the other. According to Burley, a definition must be constituted
at least by two terms ␣ ; and a perfect and most explicit definition must contain
more differences which specify the partes quidditativae of the species defined 72 .
Such an account is evidently in contrast with the convertibility of the last
difference. Neither the genus nor the difference, if considered independently
of one another, has a more restricted meaning than their indeterminate one.
« ␣ Ad aliud principale concedendo quod contingat definire per genus supremum

et per ultimam differentiam. Et dicendum quod animal per se includitur in
substantia rationali, et tamen in neutra parte per se includitur ␣ » 73 .
The last difference, so, can not be convertible with the species, for it is just
the formal part of a definition. And consequently, it can correctly express the
essence of a species only in conjunction with the genus.
« ␣ Ad ultimum, quod ultima differentia non significat idem quod species, nec
propter hoc dicitur quod ultima differentia est tota substantia rei ␣ ; sed hoc
dicitur quia ultima differentia est formale in specie ␣ » 74 .
Therefore, whilst in the Expositio Burley seems to agree with the preceding
commentators, and cites them word by word, in the Quaestiones he seems to
72
B URLEY , Quaest. Post. Anal., q. VII, 7.123, p. 125 ␣ : « ␣ Ad aliud in contrarium, quod idem est
dicere ‘substantia rationalis’ et dicere ‘substantia animata sensibilis rationalis’, et tamen sic
dicto ‘substantia animata et caetera’, non est nugatio ␣ ; sed eadem res importatur per istud
explicite quae importatur per ‘substantiam rationalem’ implicite ␣ ». See also B URLEY , Expositio
super octo libros Topicorum, l. VI, tr. II, pars I, ms. London, Lambeth Palace 70, ff. 241vb-242ra ␣ :
« ␣ Intelligendum quod Philosophus loquitur hic de diffinitione potissima et de esse quiditativo
totali et de cognitione que est scientia propissime dicta, que scilicet est habitus conclusionis per
demonstrationem concluse. Sic enim intellectis dictis Philosophi, sunt omnia que dicit ibi
Philosophus indubitabiliter vera. Unius enim rei est tantum una diffinitio potissima que
exprimit totam quiditatem diffiniti, quamvis unius rei possint esse plures diffinitiones
explicite ␣ indicantes diversas partes quiditatis diffiniti, cuiusmodi sunt diffinitio materialis et
diffinitio formalis. Similiter unius rei est tantum unum esse quiditativum totale includens
omnes partes quiditatis rei sint (pro ␣ : sive) plura ␣ esse parcialia, quia unius et eiusdem rei sunt
partes et plura predicata indicantia partes quiditatis et omne predicatum de aliquo mediante
hoc verbo ‘est’ dicit aliquod esse, ut dictum superius ␣ » ␣ ; f. 243ra ␣ : « ␣ Ad quartum dubium, cum
dicitur quod eiusdem sunt multe diffinitiones, dicendum quod unius et eiusdem est tantum una
diffinitio perfectissima que est ex genere et differentiis aut illa que datur per omnes causas.
Verum tamen partium eiusdem bene possunt esse plures diffinitiones date per diversas causas,
sed nulla talis diffinitio est perfectissima que non indicat distincte totam quiditatem diffiniti ␣ ».
73
B URLEY , Quaest. Post. Anal., q. VII, 7.120, pp. 124-125.
74
B URLEY , Quaest. Post. Anal., q. VII, 7.127, p. 126.
366 MARTA VITTORINI
disagree both with Aristotle’s point and with the commentators’ interpretation
by explicitly denying the convertibility of the last difference with the species.
3. The De diffinitione
The treatise on definition gives a general account of definition by following

the Analytics treatment of such a topic. Burley explicitly cites the Analytics in
relation to its peculiar views on the perfect and complete definition. For,
according to Burley, a definition is perfecta and completissima if it expresses
the quiddity of all the parts of the definitum, and consequently that of the
entire definitum.
« ␣ Diffinitio est oratio indicans quidditatem rei ␣ ; ergo ista diffinitio que
completissime indicat quidditatem rei completissima diffinitio. Sed illa
diffinitio que indicat quidditatem diffiniti per genus supremum et omnes
differentias medias et cum hoc exprimit quidditates omnium partium diffiniti
specifice distinctarum completissime indicat quidditatem totius diffiniti ␣ ; ergo
talis est completissima diffinitio ␣ » 75 .
Such an account of definition, which Burley also holds in the commentary on

the Topics76 , is identified with Aristotle’s account in the Analytics␣ : a definition
contains the genus and the intermediate differences, which express the
quidditative parts of the species, that is, the parts which are predicated in recto
of the thing defined, but not the physical parts, which are predicated in obliquo.
« ␣ Intelligendum de illis que sunt in diffinito sicut pars in suo toto et sic patet
ad rationem predictam. Aliter posse dici quod in diffinitione completissima
hominis debet poni divisio carni et ossi et cuiuslibet partis specifice distincte
ab aliis, ut patet primo Physicorum ubi Aristoteles dicit contra Anaxagoram
quod nihil cognoscatur nisi cognoscatur ex quibus compositum et ex quot. Sed
contra illud obicitur sic ␣ : si talis esset completissima diffinitio et Aristoteles
secundo Posteriorum tradit artem diffiniendi et docet diffinire rem per genus
ens supremum et differentias medias et non per diffinitiones nec quidditatem
partium, ergo non dat artem completissime diffiniendi et per consequens est
diminutus. Dicendum quod est duplex diffinitio. Quedam que componitur
tantum ex partibus in recto que per se predicantur in recto de diffinito et talem
artem docet Philosophus secundo Posteriorum. Alia est diffinitio habens partes
75
B URLEY , De diffinitione, in H. S HAPIRO , F. S COTT , Walter Burley’s text, De diffinitione,
« ␣ Medieval Studies ␣ » 27, 1965, pp. 337-340, in particular p. 339.
76
See note 72.
in obliquo, ut si homo diffiniretur isto modo, ‘homo est compositus ex carne et

osse’. Talem artem diffiniendi non tradit Aristoteles ibi ␣ » 77 .
Burley, therefore, in the De definitione opts for the account of definition

Aristotle offers in the Analytics according to which a definition expresses all
the quidditative parts which constitute the species.
4. The Expositio super Isagogen
In the last commentary on the Ars Vetus, which dates to 1337, Burley deals
with the problem of definition and presents his own view on the last difference.
The passage he is analyzing is Porphyry’s account of difference according
to which it is predicated of more subjects which are different in species 78 .
Such an account is commonly supposed to be wrong in that it does not include
the last difference 79 .
Burley replies to this objection in two ways. On the one hand, he resorts to
Thomas’s argument he already mentions in the Expositio, that our ignorance of
the essential differences obliges us to formulate a definition whose terms are
more common than the species. By such a move he can maintain that Porphyry’s
account of difference trats them only insofar as they can be the actual terms of
a definition, and is consistent with Aristotle’s account in the Analytics.
« ␣ Dicendum quod ultime differentie specierum sunt nobis ignote, nec habemus
eis nomina imposita. Ideo per huiusmodi differentias non diffinimus, sed loco
differentie ultime multa accipimus nomina quorum aggregatio convertitur
cum differentia ultima, ut loco differentie ultime hominis accipimus totum
hoc rationale mortale, quod convertitur cum differentia ultima, quia auctor
77
B URLEY , De diffinitione, p. 339.
78
B URLEY , Expositio super Isagogen, tr. I, de differentia, Venetiis 1497, f. b4ra (M. V ITTORINI ,
Predicabili e categorie nell’ultimo commento di Walter Burley all’Isagoge di Porfirio, Tesi di
dottorato, Università degli Studi di Salerno, A. A. 2004-2005, Appendix, p. 460, lin. 26-31) ␣ :
« ␣ Secunda descriptio differentie est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod
quale, ut rationale et mortale predicantur de homine in eo quod quale ␣ ; sed genus predicatur de
specie in eo quod quid, quia si queratur quid est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est
animal, ideo animal convenienter predicatur de homine in eo quod quid ␣ ; sed differentia
predicatur de specie in eo quod quale ␣ ».
79
B URLEY , Exp. Isag., tr. I, de differentia, f. b4ra (Appendix, p. 461, lin. 9-13) ␣ : « ␣ Contra
predictam descriptionem differentie arguitur sic ␣ : diffinitio, et etiam descriptio, debet compe-
tere cuilibet contento sub diffinito. Sed hec descriptio, ‘quod predicatur de pluribus et cetera’
non competit cuilibet differentie, quia non competit differentie ultime que convertitur cum
specie specialissima ␣ ; ergo non est bona descriptio ␣ ».
368 MARTA VITTORINI
hic non loquitur, nisi de differentiis per quas nos possumus diffinire. Cum ergo
dicitur quod hec descriptio non competit omni contento sub diffinito, dicendum
quod immo (pro ␣ : sic), quia illud quod hic diffinitur non est commune omnibus
differentiis per se, quia non est commune differentiis ultimis. Et ideo bene
competit hec descriptio omnibus contentis sub differentia hic diffinita. Unde
hec descriptio differentie concordat cum dicto Aristotelis, secundo
Posteriorum 80 , qui dicit quod quelibet pars diffinitionis debet se habere in plus
quam diffinitum, et totum in eque ␣ ; et per consequens quelibet pars diffinitionis
predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie ␣ » 81 .
On the other hand, he introduces his own view on the relation between genus
and difference, which he already defends in the Quaestiones, in order to
demonstrate that such a definition — that is, one whose terms are more common
than the species — is in fact able to give an exact account of the species.
According to Burley, the reason why such a definition is exactly convertible
with the species is that both genus and difference take on the role of
distinguishing species, in that the difference distinguishes the species which
belong to the same genus, whilst the latter distinguishes the species which
share the same difference. Consequently, the very role of distinguishing one
species from another is not to be carried out by adding differences ␣ : in the case
of man, for instance, what distinguishes him from an angel is not a further
difference we add to rational, but rather the genus ‘animal’.
« ␣ Et si dicitur quod per rationale non distinguitur homo ab angelis, et

species per differentias suas distinguitur ab omni alia specie, ergo in
diffinitione hominis oportebit addere aliam differentiam per quam homo
distinguitur ab angelis, huiusmodi autem est mortale, ergo mortale est
differentia hominis, dicendum quod species non distinguitur per differentias
suas ab omni alia specie, sed per differentias suas distinguitur ad omni alia
specie contenta sub suo genere proximo, et per genus suum distinguitur ab
omnibus speciebus que non continentur sub illo genere. Verbi gratia, posito
quod hec sit diffinitio hominis ‘animal rationale’, tunc homo distinguitur
per rationale ab omni alia specie contenta sub animali, scilicet asino, leone,
capra, sed per rationale non distinguitur ab angelis, quia angeli non
continentur sub animali ␣ ; sed per hoc genus animal distinguitur homo ab
angelis. Unde per animal, tamquam per medium, potest demonstrari quod
nullus homo est angelus, sed illud quod est medium concludendi quod hoc
non est hoc est illud quo hoc distinguitur ab hoc ␣ » 82 .
80
A RISTOTELES , Anal. Post., II, 13, 96a23-96b14.
81
B URLEY , Exp. Isag., tr. I, de differentia, f. b4ra (Appendix, p. 461, lin. 14-27).
82
This view is based on a broad sense of the term «difference», which means
in this instance «something able to distinguish one thing from another» 83 .
Consequently we can say that the genus, exactly like the difference, plays a
distinguishing role in a definition, in that it distinguishes the species which
share the same difference.
Such a role genus and difference play in a definition implies that there is
no need for a difference which is convertible with the species. The argument
is as follows ␣ : the role of differences is to distinguish one species from
another, and such a role can just as well be accomplished by a difference
which is superior to the species. And consequently, there is no need to
introduce a difference convertible with the species, for a species is
distinguished from the species which are under the same proximate genus by
the superior difference, and from the species which belong to a different
genus by the genus itself.
« ␣ Quod autem non sit possibile talem differentiam esse convertibilem cum
specie specialissima potest sic probari ␣ : differentia non ponitur nisi ad
distinguendum speciem ab (interl.) aliis speciebus et ad costituendum
diffinitionem speciei ␣ ; sed propter neutrum illorum oportet ponere differentiam
convertibilem cum specie specialissima ␣ ; ergo frustra est ponere talem
differentiam convertibilem cum specie specialissima. Maior patet, et probo
minorem quantum ad utramque partem. Non enim oportet ponere talem
differentiam ad distinguendum speciem a specie, quoniam per differentiam
superiorem ad speciem distinguitur species sufficienter ab aliis speciebus
contentis sub eodem genere proximo, ut homo sufficienter distinguitur per
rationale ab omni alia specie contenta sub animali, et per suum genus distinguitur
ab aliis speciebus que non continentur sub illo genere. Et ita non oportet ponere
differentiam convertibilem cum specie specialissima ad distinguendum unam
speciem ab aliis speciebus, neque oportet ponere unam differentiam convertibilem
cum specie specialissima ad costituendum diffinitionem, quia diffinitio
sufficienter constituitur ex genere et differentiis superioribus ad speciem, ut
patet per Philosophum secundo Posteriorum, qui dicit quod quelibet pars
diffinitionis est in plus quam diffinitum ␣ ; patet etiam in diffinitione hominis in
qua non ponitur aliqua differentia convertibilis cum homine ␣ » 84 .
83
B URLEY , Exp. Isag., tr. I, de differentia, f. b5ra (Appendix, p. 463, lin. 10-28) ␣ ␣ : « ␣ Ad aliud,
cum dicitur quod illud quo aliquid differt ab alio est differentia, dicendum quod differentia
potest accipi dupliciter quantum spectat ad propositum, uno modo large pro omni eo quo
aliquid distinguitur ab alio, et isto modo posset concedi quod genus est differentia, quia est illud
quo aliquid distinguitur ab alio ␣ ; alio modo stricte pro eo solum quo genus per se dividitur in
species, et per quod una species differt ab alia specie contenta sub eodem genere proximo, et sic
negat Philosophus genus esse differentiam ␣ ».
84
370 MARTA VITTORINI
Burley’s position, therefore, is that no difference is convertible with the

species and so Aristotle’s account of difference in the Analytics should be
considered correct.
« ␣ Ex veritate iam dicta posset probabiliter poni quod nulla est differentia ultima
convertibilis cum specie specialissima, immo quelibet differentia est in plus
quam species specialissima per dictum Philosophi secundo Posteriorum quod
quelibet pars diffinitionis est in plus quam diffinitum, et totum in eque␣ » 85 .
Nevertheless, he tries to reconcile his main point with Aristotle’s theory. To

this effect he remarks that i) his view is not to deny the existence of the last
difference, but rather its convertibility with the species␣ ; ii) that the role of the last
difference is to end the series of terms in definition, and consequently to avoid an
infinite regress in differences␣ ; iii) finally, Burley proposes a reading of the
Metaphysics passage which is different from the other commentators’␣ : the last
difference is convertible with species only if it is added to the other differences.
« ␣ Et si dicitur quod secundum hoc non sunt differentie ultime, quod est contra
Philosophum, sed per Philosophum 86 differentia ultima convertitur cum spe-
cie, cuius contrarium tu dicis, ad primum dicendum quod bene sunt ponende
differentie ultime, quia aliter procederetur in infinitum in differentiis, sed ex
hoc non sequitur quod differentia ultima convertitur cum specie. Verbi gratia,
ponamus quod mortale sit ultima differentia posita in linea laterali
predicamentali substantie, aut in diffinitione hominis ␣ : ex hoc non sequitur
quod mortale convertitur cum homine aut cum alia specie. Et cum dicitur per
Philosophum 87 ultima differentia convertitur cum specie, dicendum quod
Philosophus intelligit sic quod ultima differentia posita in diffinitione cum
differentiis precedentibus est quid convertibile cum specie specialissima, non
quod ipsa sola convertatur cum specie, sed aggregatum ex ultima differentia
posita in diffinitione cum precedentibus differentiis facit unum convertibile
cum specie specialissima ␣ » 88 .
Burley, therefore, considers the Analytics account of definition correct,

and rejects the convertibility of the last difference with the species which
85
86
A RISTOTELES , Metaphysica, VII, 12, 1038a18-20.
87
Ibid.
88
B URLEY , Exp. Isag., tr. I, de differentia, f. b5ra (Appendix, p. 464, lin. 1-16). Vedi anche De
definitione ed. cit., p.338 ␣ : « ␣ Et quia ista differentia mortale competit homini, coniungatur cum
priori aggregato sic dicendo ␣ : substantia, corporea, animata, sensibilis, rationalis, mortalis et
haec est vera et completa diffinitio hominis, quia quaelibet pars illius aggregati est in plus et
totum in equale ␣ ».
Aristotle defends in the Metaphysics. For a definition whose terms are more
common than species can as well express the notion of the species. Finally, he
also gives his own solution to the apparent contradiction between the two
Aristotelian texts by denying that Aristotle in the Metaphysics is actually
asserting the convertibility of the last difference.
C ONCLUSION
In the tradition of the commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, II, 13,

Aristotle’s view that the terms of a definition are in plus than the species
defined gives rise to the problem of reconciling his account of differences in
the Analytics with that in the Metaphysics.
Burley deals with this topic not only in his works on the Analytics, but
also in other texts such as the treatise on definition and the commentary
on Porphyry.
We can notice different treatments of the problem in the works mentioned.
For, in the Expositio super libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Burley mentions
Thomas’s and Grosseteste’s views, and seems implicitly to share the latter’s
theories. In the Quaestiones, instead, he cites a source which is extraneous
to the tradition of commentaries, that is, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, and
elaborates an original position on the role of genus and difference in a
definition. In De definitione Burley re-proposes his views on the perfect
definition he also holds in the commentary on the Topics. Finally, the
commentary on the Isagoge seems to offer the more mature treatment of the
topic, for Burley gives a clear explanation of the relation between genus and
difference and sharply rejects the principle of the convertibility of the last
difference with the species.
It is worthwhile to note that Burley deals with the topic of definition in a
different way from the other commentators. The latter try to solve the apparent
discrepancy between Aristotle’s views in the Analytics and in the Metaphysics
by distinguishing between two sorts of definition, and judge the Metaphysics
account as the more correct, for it mirrors the ontological composition of
things. On the contrary, Burley i) regards the Analytics’ account of definition
(and not the Metaphysics’ one) as more perfect, in that it makes manifest all the
quidditative parts of species, and consequently all its more general properties␣ ;
ii) seems to suggest that the reason why there is no contradiction between the
two texts, is not to be found in the distinction between two sorts of definition,
but rather in the correct reading of the Aristotelian words, for Aristotle’s view
in the Metaphysics would be that the last difference is convertible with species
only in conjunction with the other terms of a definition ␣ ; iii) finally, he
explicitly rejects the convertibility of the last difference with the species.
372 MARTA VITTORINI
The logical and metaphysical basis of his peculiar positions is the following.
According to Burley, who seems to follow Avicenna, genus and difference
both take on the role of difference, in such a way that the difference
distinguishes the species which belong to the same proximate genus, while
the genus distinguishes the species which share the same difference. The
genus, according to Avicenna, is not an essential component of difference, but
rather a concomitant of it, that means, the difference ‘rational’, insofar as its
concomitant is the genus ‘animal’ or ‘unmaterial substances’, is determined
into different species, that are ‘man’ or ‘angel’. Therefore genus and difference
mutually specify each other in such a way that each one is concomitant to the
other. Such an account is in contrast with a single term definition, for in the
definition of the species at least two terms are required, the one meaning the
generical component and the other the differential one of the species. For, the
difference, insofar as genus is something external to it, can not alone express
the notion of the species. Such a mutual role that genus and difference carry
out seems to recall Grosseteste’s concept of the relation between two things
regarded as excedens and excessum, insofar as the two terms are not
gerarchically ordered and essentially related, but rather on the same level.
Moreover, even if Burley supports the uniqueness of the substantial form
theory, he seems to introduce in some way a certain substantial form
composition, regarding the universal form as constituted by quidditative parts
which seem to have somehow an ontological being as res. Burley’s peculiar
ontology seems to be based on the central principle that every concept or term
must have an ontological counterpart. And therefore, not only the specific
term must have a species as its real counterpart, but all the predicamental line
terms must have their counterparts in the quidditative parts of the lowest
species. That is, every kind of supposition of terms — whether it is personal or
simple, and, in this latter case, whether it is general or special — has its basis
in some real entities. Regarding the parts of the definition, namely genus and
difference, according to Burley these are two res.
Such an account is very close to the pluralists views on definition, for both
Burley and the pluralists regard the formal principle of the things as constituted
by parts — whether they are conceived as formal parts of the total form or
quidditative parts — and therefore opt for the Analytics account of definition as
it better reflects such an ontological composition of things. Moreover, both of
them base their position on the same Aristotelian principle namely that, since the
definition is a notion, there exists the same relationship between the notion and
the thing, as between the parts of the notion and the parts of the thing.
Therefore, the Avicennian views and the pluralist approach to the problem
of definition seem to go together and base Burley’s peculiar view on definition.
According to Burley, the quiddity of the things is a whole including its

quidditative parts. Therefore, following the pluralists’ approach, he maintains
that all the quidditative parts are to be listed in the definition ␣ ; following
Avicenna’s suggestions he states that these quidditative components are not
essentially related, for they mutually specify each other’s being in such a way
that each one is as a concomitant to the other. In a certain way, every
quidditative part is a res and therefore, even if it is existentially dependent on
the other, it has an autonomous ontological being. And therefore the last
difference can not include all the quidditative components of the species, for
every difference can be related to more than one genus and can be the
quidditative component of more than one species.
ABSTRACT
Burley formulates a theory of definition which is consistent with his peculiar

ontology. It is in particular in the Questions on the Analytics and in the Commentary
on Porphyry that his views are widely and explicitly maintained. The most relevant
source seems to be Avicenna’s treatment of the relation between genus and difference,
and the model of definition Burley asserts is analogous to the one pluralists defend.
Therefore, the Avicennian views and the pluralist approach to the problem of definition
seem to go together and ground Burley’s peculiar view on definition. According to
Burley, the quiddity of the things is a whole including its quidditative parts. Therefore,
following the pluralists’ approach, he maintains that all the quidditative parts are to
be listed in the definition ␣ ; following Avicenna’s suggestions he states that these
quidditative components are not essentially related, for they mutually specify each
other’s being in such a way that each one is as a concomitant to the other. And
therefore the last difference, if taken alone, cannot include all the quidditative
components of the species, but rather has to be added to the preceding ones.

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BURLEY ON THE LAST DIFFERENCE IN DEFINITION 329

The Last Difference in Definition ␣ : Burley and the

The apparent contradiction between the account of difference Aristotle

I. T HE TRADITION OF THE COMMENTARIES ON THE P OSTERIOR A NALYTICS

Medieval philosophers who comment on the Analytics tackle Aristotele’s

Grosseteste’s commentary marks the beginning of the Latin tradition of

« ␣ Propter quid autem contingat omnem differentiam divisivam esse in plus

Robert Kilwardby in his Notulae Libri Posteriorum 6 explicitly emphasizes

According to him, there is a real contradiction between the two different

As to the second type of solution, Kilwardby seems to use a customary

3. Albert the Great

Albert, whilst considering the two different accounts of definition, seems

It seems, therefore, that Aristotle adopts in the Metaphysics and in the

Consequently, the extension of differences depends on which type of

This account seems to suggest again that when a definition is composed of

Secondly, Albert resorts to a further argument ␣ : he points again to the

« ␣ Quamvis enim in Posterioribus Analyticis dictum sit, quod ‘partes diffinitionis

Thomas Aquinas seems to follow Albert’s treatment of the two Aristotelian

« ␣ Primo ponit (Aristoteles) conclusionem ␣ ; dicens quod quamvis in definitione

Therefore, Thomas seems to distinguish between the names we commonly

« ␣ Aliquando enim necessitas cogit, ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum,

Second, whilst in a definition differences are successively obtained by

for substance is all present simultaneously. Therefore the parts of definition

« ␣ Sciendum quod ars ad accipiendum diffinitionem subiecti est duplex ␣ : una

According to Giles, Aristotle in the Analytics deals with both kinds of

« ␣ Et quia ad diffinitionem non sunt utilia nisi que competunt universaliter,

The absolutely good definition, therefore, must be constituted by the proper

Nevertheless, we use a definition de casu because we ignore either the

Regarding the second account, the sequence of two or more differences

diffinitionem continentem differentiam propriam, hec est convenientior

Therefore, it seems that according to Giles, the last difference of a species,

Secondly, differences should be correctly ordered as superior and inferior,

It seems therefore that Giles’s point is the following ␣ : Aristotle in the

II U NICITY OF FORM AND PLURALISM

In this section I will focus on the different approach to the problem of

I will start my account i) first by outlining some different views of

grounded on a strong conception of the real difference ␣ ; according to him, the

III A VICENNA ON GENUS AND DIFFERENCE IN THE M ETAPHYSICS

Before dealing with Burley’s position on definition, I will present some

denominatur eius nomen a suo comitanti, sicut intelligimus sensibile id quod

The conclusion medieval commentators will draw from these statements is

Moreover, genus and difference must not to be considered as parts which

Avicenna’s text suggests some considerations on the role of difference in

IV B URLEY ON DEFINITION AND THE ROLE OF DIFFERENCE

1. The commentary on the Posterior Analytics

Burley’s commentary on the Analytics follows the tradition I have sketched

Then, Burley has two arguments supporting Aristotle’s account of

Grosseteste’s argument is that, since we perform a twofold division of the

« ␣ Lincolniensis dicit ad istud quia natura cuiuslibet generis non generalissimi

2. The questions on the Posterior Analytics

« ␣ Istis suppositis, si quaeratur de veritate huius ‘rationale per se est animal’,

As to the relation between genus and difference, Burley follows Avicenna’s

« ␣ Animal dupliciter consideratur ␣ : uno modo ut est actu perfectum et terminatum

«␣ De significatis generis et differentiae dicit Avicenna, quinto Metaphysicae capitulo

« ␣ Ad aliud principale concedendo quod contingat definire per genus supremum

The treatise on definition gives a general account of definition by following

Such an account of definition, which Burley also holds in the commentary on

in obliquo, ut si homo diffiniretur isto modo, ‘homo est compositus ex carne et

Burley, therefore, in the De definitione opts for the account of definition

4. The Expositio super Isagogen

« ␣ Et si dicitur quod per rationale non distinguitur homo ab angelis, et

Burley’s position, therefore, is that no difference is convertible with the

Nevertheless, he tries to reconcile his main point with Aristotle’s theory. To