D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 275, Las Pi�as City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with
her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac
and not of Las Pi�as City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent�s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pi�as City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual
and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo�s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that
the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pi�as City, thereby discrediting
the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo�s last residence was in Capas,
Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued
to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a
bond in the amount of ?100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November
2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able
to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing
a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pi�as
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo�s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of Eliseo�s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pi�as City.
The petitioners� Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PI�AS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS
PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PI�AS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate
of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pi�as City. It is evident from the records that
during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pi�as City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Ni�al that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and
it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father�s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to
the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo�s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent�s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners� contention that Elise
has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo�s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners� pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent�s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her
right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after
the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution
of Eliseo�s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justic
Chairpersone
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation be
lore the case was assigned to the writer or the opinion or the Court�s Division.
ATONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer or
the opinion of the Court's Division.
Footnotes
2 Id. at 105.
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id. at 40-44.
6 Id. at 11.
9 Id. at 38.
10 Id. at 94-106.
11 Id. at 118-119.
13 Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-40502 and L-42670, 29 November
1976, 74 SCRA 189, 199.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
19 Id.
20 Quiazon v. Garcia, Civil Case No. Q-43712. Records, Vol. II, pp. 234-240.
22 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637, 656-657
citing Ni�al v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 673.
25 Id.
26 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default of the testamentary heirs, the law vests
the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and
in the State.
New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants,
the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
27 Old Civil Code. Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
29 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default or the testamentary heirs, the law, vests
the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and
in the State.
New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants,
the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.