EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
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2014, 15, 7–10 NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2014)
Introduction
The Future of Behavior Analysis–Part of
Psychology, or a Separate Discipline?
The core of the present special issue of
the European Journal of Behavior Analysis
consists of two articles that were originally
published in the premier issue of the journal
Behaviorology in 1993. These two articles are
J.D. Ulman’s article titled “The Ulman–Skin-
ner Letters” and B.F. Skinner’s posthumously
published article titled “A World of Our
Own.”  The letters presented in Ulman’s ar-
ticle are concerned with the status of the be-
havioral science that Skinner proposed and,
specifically, its relation to psychology: Should
we put more effort into refined approaches
aiming to reform psychology–or should we
separate and proclaim the natural science of
behavior as a discipline distinct from psychol-
ogy? As is perhaps evident from the title of
Skinner’s article, he ended up in favor of the
second alternative.
The two target articles are followed by
invited commentaries. Twenty-one distin-
guished colleagues were invited. They were
selected because prior publications or public
utterances, suggested that they might be par-
ticularly interested in these questions. Hop-
ing to get a wide variety of arguments pro and
con the “declaration of independence” of a
natural science of behavior from psychology,
we made an effort to invite colleagues with
supposed different leanings in these matters.
On the formalistic side, we requested that
“comments be around 1000 words in length,
Thanks to J.S. Vargas for the permission to quote from
Skinner’s letters and to L. Fraley for permission to draw mate-
rial from his letters to Skinner.
Correspondence concerning this introduction should be
addressed to per.holth@hioa.no
7
prepared according to standard APA 6th ed.
format as indicated in our journal” and “us-
ing your professional judgment as you select
the basis for your comments, you may want
to comment on particular issues raised in one
or both articles.” No procrustean editorial
efforts were made to control the contribu-
tors’ professional judgment. Nineteen out
of twenty-one agreed to comment, and their
commentaries are arranged in alphabetical
order by author. Ulman’s replies follow each
of the commentaries and are distinguished by
a heading with his initials, JDU’s Reply to X.
The planning of the current special is-
sue was initiated when a colleague emailed
the editorial troika and urged us to reprint
Ulman’s letter exchange with Skinner. After
the original journal, Behaviorology, was dis-
continued, he was concerned that “a relevant
document on the history of our science might
not be accessible to current readers, or worse,
even lost (except to some hard working his-
torian of science).” It was an easy decision
to make, and it soon became clear to us that
in addition to the Ulman—Skinner letters,
Skinner’s last published article may also be
deserving of more attention.
As was made clear in the original publica-
tion of A World of Our Own (Skinner, 1993),
the article was based on an address presented
at the annual convention of the Association
for Behavior Analysis, Milwaukee, WI, May,
1989. The details of how the paper finally
ended up as a published article became clear
when I searched the letter archives in the B.
F. Skinner Foundation. Lawrence Fraley con-
tacted Skinner shortly after the annual ABA
 8 Per Holth
meeting on behalf of the newly formed or-
ganization, The International Behaviorology
Association (TIBA). Fraley was preparing the
journal of the new organization and invited
Skinner to contribute the text of his ABA talk
to the first issue. Untypical of Skinner, he had
not prepared a written version for that address,
and Fraley offered to have the talk transcribed
from a tape recording. Early in July 1989,
Fraley sent his transcribed copy of the talk to
Skinner and announced that the first issue of
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Behaviorology would appear next year. In Oc-
tober, Skinner wrote back to Fraley, explaining
that he would not be able to do the ABA talk
in time for the first issue. His wife had had
a knee replacement and other assignments
could not wait. However, Skinner promised
to get back to working on the transcript after
December 1. In spite of the fact that he was
diagnosed with leukemia around that time, by
the end of January 1990, he had submitted his
manuscript titled “A World of Our Own” to
Fraley. The final edits to the proof of the paper
were listed in a letter from Skinner to Fraley,
dated March 22, 1990. Thus, by the end of
March, the article was ready for publication
in the premier issue of Behaviorology. Skinner
died on August 18th. Curiously, yet another
three years would pass before that first issue
was published–with “The Ulman–Skinner
Letters” (Ulman, 1993), along with “A World
of Our Own” (Skinner, 1993).
Although this was Skinner’s last article
(thus far) to be published, it was not the last
one he wrote. During the spring of 1990,
Charlie Catania told me about Skinner’s
terminal illness but that, in spite of the
illness, he was working on another paper.
His working title was “Why I Am Not
and Never Really Have Been a Psycholo-
gist,” thus taking a giant step further than
“Why I Am Not a Cognitive Psychologist”
(Skinner, 1977). In a letter the following
summer, I asked Skinner about the title of
his new paper. In a reply, dated July 12th,
he wrote: “I don’t think I will use the title,
‘Why I Am Not and Never Really Have
Been a Psychologist,’ but that is the gist of it.
I am working hard on the final version and
hope to have time to finish it.” During a
recent search in the archives at The B. F.
Skinner Foundation, I had his working
title confirmed. In a letter to Jack Michael,
dated January 25th Skinner had written: “If
I have time, I’m planning to write a paper,
also, called “Why I Am Not and Never Re-
ally Have Been a Psychologist.” He made
the final edits to the manuscript on August
17th, 1990, on his very last evening (Vargas,
1990), and it was published in the American
Psychologist in November that year. Hav-
ing used the manuscript as the basis for his
keynote address when he received the un-
precedented Citation for Outstanding Lifetime
Contribution to Psychology at the opening
session of the American Psychological As-
sociation’s 98th Annual Convention eight
days before he died, he must have found it
slightly awkward to use the working title
for the article. The final title became “Can
Psychology Be a Science of Mind?”
Thus, Skinner remained in psychology
until the very end, but his doubts on whether
it was the appropriate home for the science he
was trying to establish emerged very early. In
a letter to his parents in December 1928, the
young Skinner wrote: “But my fundamental
interests lie in the field of Psychology, and
I shall probably continue therein, even, if
necessary, by making over the entire field to
suit myself ” (Skinner, 1979, p. 38). Regard-
ing his relation to psychology at the time he
finished his postdoctoral work at Harvard,
he later wrote,
I spent those five years in the biological labo-
ratories and was really out of touch with psy-
chology. I don’t think Boring or Stevens did
anything to keep me out of the department.
There just wasn’t any room for a person with
my interests (Letter from Skinner to Daniel
Wiener dated August 7th, 1989).
Although Skinner’s clear view on whether
behavior analysis belonged within psychol-
ogy became explicit only during his last
couple of years, there were hints much earlier
 Introduction
of what now may appear to have been inevi-
table. In About Behaviorism, Skinner (1974)
had written:
The first explicit behaviorist was John B. Wat-
son, who in 1913 issued a kind of manifesto
called ‘Psychology as the Behaviorist Views
It.’ As the title shows, he was not proposing
a new science, but arguing that psychology
should be redefined as the study of behavior.
This may have been a strategic mistake. (Skin-
ner, 1974, p. 5)
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The point was picked up by Epstein
(1984) who referred to Watson’s attempt to
reform psychology as “a historical blunder.”
Arguing for “the establishment of a science
of behavior outside the confines of psychol-
ogy,” and for the term “praxics” to denote
that science, Epstein (1984, p. 114) wrote
that “psychology, in short, has not been re-
formed, and . . . it is probably unreformable.”
Further, he quoted Pennypacker: “Never try
to teach a pig to sing. It wastes your time,
and it only annoys the pig.” In a letter to
James M. Espinosa in the summer of 1987,
Skinner wrote:
Praxis is the right Greek word but some-
thing more like praxology is what we need
. . . I don’t think there is a chance that any
university will open up a new department
of praxology or anything else at the present
time. We are part of psychology so far as the
administration are concerned, and I prefer
to remain a branch of psychology for that
reason only.
Around this time, Skinner seemed to be-
come increasingly concerned about how psy-
chology remained focused on internal expla-
nation and resisted “the experimental analysis
of behavior as a function of environmental
variables and the use of that analysis in the
interpretation and modification of behavior
in the world at large.” In spite of the fact
that these “have reached into every field of
traditional psychology . . . they have not be-
come psychology. . .” (Skinner, 1987, p. 782).
A year later, he seemed even more concerned.
9
In a letter to Charlie Catania, dated Decem-
ber 12, 1988, he wrote:
I got a long letter from Jerry Ulman, who is
now on the Board of Behaviorology. I wonder
whether some of us shouldn’t get together and
see what is to be done about (1) Division 25,
now that we are all dropping out of the APA,
(2) solving the parallel problem of too much
applied work in the ABA membership with
very little experimental data reported, and
(3) whether something in the new American
Pschological Society might be the way to
strike a new blow.
What do you think? I’ve never been a good
empire builder, and this kind of thing is sim-
ply too much for me. Why don’t you younger
chaps take over?
In a letter to Daniel Wiener the following
summer, dated June 2nd 1989, Skinner’s in-
terest in the American Psychological Society
had already dropped:
I will not be at the meeting of the American
Psychological Society. I am not at all sure it is
really a thing we need. The meeting at ABA
was very reassuring. The Association no longer
needs Fred Keller or me [and is] shaping up
in a very specific way as the right organization
for the future of behavior analysis.
The letter exchange between Skinner and
Ulman is well documented in “The Ulman–
Skinner Letters” (Ulman, 1993/2014), and
Skinner's position in 1989 is clearly stated in
“A World of Our Own” (Skinner, 1993/2014).
That position was underscored in Skinner’s
reply to a letter from Sam Leigland on July
10th, 1989: “Yes, I’ve finally come around to
it, behavioral analysis is not psychology and
Watson was wrong and so was I.”
Many of us started out in psychology and
were naturally inclined towards reforming
that field. My enthusiasm for that approach
took a hard blow when I was teaching
a developmental psychology class in a
psychology department. One student ap-
proached me after class one day and said
that she really thought that this behavioral
stuff was what they really needed to learn.
 10 Per Holth
However, in every other class, they were
taught stuff that conflicted with those be-
havior principles. Her conclusion was that
learning about behavior analysis was simply
too exhausting in between psychology classes.
A kinship between psychology and behavior
analysis is sometimes proclaimed because
they are both concerned with why behavior
occurs. This, however, is a very superficial
resemblance, because their Why questions
are very different (Holth, 2013).
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Inspired by the Behavioral Department
at The University of North Texas, many of
our colleagues at Akershus University Col-
lege in Norway, including Ingunn Sandaker
and Erik Arntzen, have worked to shape up
a behavioral department. Hence, we do have
some limited experience on how behavioral
departments can be established and thrive
separated from psychology. Certain benefits
are obvious. For instance, very little effort is
required to correct misunderstandings result-
ing from conflicting teaching. On the other
hand, when recruiting students, the term
“psychology” is very valuable. Our bachelor
program in behavior analysis at Oslo and Ak-
ershus University College is titled “Bachelor
in Learning Psychology–with an Emphasis
on Behavior Analysis.” In fact, very few of
our newly recruited bachelor students report
knowing anything at all about behavior analy-
sis. “Psychology” is still a student magnet that
may be hard to let go of in the near future.
Thus, the question of whether to put
additional effort into attempts to reform
psychology–or separate and proclaim the
natural science of behavior as a distinct dis-
cipline is important, but it is not an easy one.
A main goal of the present special issue of the
European Journal of Behavior Analysis is to il-
luminate the pros and cons very broadly–in
order to guide us in making well-informed
decisions for the future of our field.
Per Holth
Guest Editor
References:
Epstein, R. (1984). The case for praxics. The
Behavior Analyst, 7, 101–119.
Holth, P. (2013). Different sciences as
answers to different why questions. Eu-
ropean Journal of Behavior Analysis, 14,
165–170.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About Behaviorism.
New York, NY: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cogni-
tive psychologist. Behaviorism, 5, 1–10.
Skinner, B. F. (1979). The shaping of a behav-
iorist. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1987). Whatever happened
to psychology as the science of behavior?
American Psychologist, 42, 780–786.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman–Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
Vargas, J. S. (1990). B. F. Skinner–the last
few days. Journal of Applied Behavior
Analysis, 23, 409–410. doi: 10.1901/
jaba.1990.23-409
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 2014, 15, 11–19 NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2014)
11

The Ulman–Skinner Letters1

Jerome D. Ulman2
Ball State University

Over the course of several years, I exchanged letters with B. F. Skinner about behaviorology.
Although Skinner spent much of his professional career attempting to reform psychology–to
persuade psychologists to study behavior rather than mind or cognition–in his last two years–he
became increasingly disenchanted with the prospect, relating at one point (1993) that he was
wrong to say that the study of behavior was the concern of psychology. He remained undecided
about this historically crucial question, however, ending his final paper (on August 17, 1990, the
day before his death) with the statement, “whether behavior analysis will be called psychology
is a matter for the future to decide” (p. 1210). The letters he wrote to me express some of his
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doubts about this Sisyphean effort to reform psychology as a science of behavior. Here are the
letters, unedited.
Key words: behaviorology, science of behavior, radical behaviorism, behavior analysis, natural
science, cognitive, mentalistic, psychology, psyche, cultural contingencies

Letter from Ulman to Skinner Dated
June 20,1986
Dear Fred:
Thank you for your sustaining subscrip-
tion to Behavior Analysis and Social Action.3
You should receive your copy in about a
week.
1
The personal letters written by B. F. Skinner are
copyrighted by and printed with permission of the B. F.
Skinner Foundation. I wish to express my gratitude to the
foundation for this courtesy and thank its president, Julie
S. Vargas, for her comments.
2
Correspondence about the Ulman-Skinner letters
should be addressed to Jerome D. Ulman, Department of
Special Education, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306.
3
Behavior Analysis and Social Action was the journal
of Behaviorists for Social Action, a special interest group of
the Association for Behavior Analysis. The journal is now
entitled Behavior and Social Issues.
4
Address given at the annual meeting of the Associa-
tion for Behavior Analysis (Skinner,1986). He prefaced this
address by informing the audience that he would be giving a
talk at the upcoming meeting of the American Psychological
Association and invited suggestions about what he might say
to psychologists to pursuade them to make their discipline
more scientific-thus prompting my reply.
I enjoyed your invited address.4 Please
send me a copy. It caused me to reconsider
my view on whether radical behaviorists
should continue to be associated with
psychology or strike out on our own and
establish a separate discipline (“behaviorol-
ogy”–or whatever). I’ve reached the conclu-
sion that you are entirely correct. We should
continue our struggle for the establishment
of a scientific psychology. Why leave the field
of battle and let the mentalists and cognitiv-
ists claim the title psychologist? We should
hit them hard.
Our BFSA Symposium on “Radical
Behaviorism and Materialism: The Hand
in the Glove” went well and the audience
evaluations were very favorable. I thought
you might like a copy of my discussion.
Cordially,
Jerry Ulman

Thanks to Behaviorology and to the B. F. Skinner Foundation for the permission to reprint this article in the current
issue of the European Journal of Behavior Analysis. The article was originally published in the inaugural issue of Behav-
iorology in 1993.
Correspondence about the Ulman-Skinner letters should be addressed to Jerome D. Ulman at julman2@bsu.edu.

11
 12 Jerome D. Ulman
Letter from Ulman to Skinner Dated
November 30, 1988
Dear Fred:
Greetings from Middletown.5 We hope
all is going well for you. I am writing to
share with you a conclusion I have reached
after considerable thought about the future
of our discipline.
Shortly after your address at the 1986
Association for Behavior Analysis Con-
vention I wrote to you in support of your
position regarding psychologythat is, to
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continue efforts to reform it (in your words,
“to bore from within”). I subsequently read
your article in the American Psychologist,
“Whatever Happened to Psychology as the
Science of Behavior?”,6 an eloquent argument
for building a scientific psychology. After
discussing your position with several other
radical behaviorists and weighing various
alternatives, I have had to conclude that I
no longer share that position. It has become
increasingly apparent to me that trying to
reform psychology is not only a great waste
of our time and effort, but sidetracks us from
the mainline of establishing a natural science
of behavior.
If reforming psychology were simply a
matter of reasoned argument and empiri-
cal demonstration, we should have made a
substantial impact in psychology many years
ago. But what do we find today? Division 25
of the American Psychology Association is
moribund; the misrepresentation of behav-
iorism in psychology textbooks continues
unabated7 and is even increasing; notwith-
standing its development as an advocacy
organization, the Association for Behavior
Analysis is not growing as we had anticipated
as a scientific professional organization;
relative to behavior analysts, the number of
5
Middletown is the fictional name Robert and Helen
Lynd gave to Muncie, Indiana, in their classic sociological
studies of 1929 and 1937. Muncie is the home of Ball State
University were Skinner was awarded an honorary doctoral
degree in 1983.
6
Skinner (1987)
7
See Todd & Morris (1983)
cognitive/mentalistic psychologist receiving
doctoral degrees is accelerating; and due to
the unrelenting and often escalating curricu-
lar compromises forced upon us by the sheer
number of mentalists (all putatively in the
interest of “proper” eclecticism, of course),
our students are being taught less science
from one generation to the next.
In fact, things appear to be going from
bad to worse. When ABA was formed I had
hoped that our discipline finally had a sup-
portive community for its future growth.
But over the years what I have observed in
that organization is an increasing “techno-
cognitive drift” away from the basic science
of behavior and its guiding philosophy of
radical behaviorism. It seems that more and
more students in behavior analysis programs
are being taught how to apply a given set of
intervention strategies with different kinds of
behaviors in various settings while the train-
ing in the basic science is being neglected.
For the most part, the latest generation of
behavior analysts appear to be more techni-
cian than scientist. Perhaps most disturbing
of all, I see cognitive notions being accepted
into the behavioral literature, both basic and
applied, with increasing casualness. Overall,
my perception is that we can no longer rely
on the ABA community as the best protec-
tive social environment for nurturing the
science of behavior.
I suggest that we need to reassess the
situation. You pointed out in your article
that the three obstacles blocking our path-
humanistic psychology, psychotherapy, and
cognitive psychology–are formidable. Indeed
they are! We must then ask, Why are they
so formidable and what can we do about
it? A clue to the answer, I believe, is what
they share in common: the perspective that
behavior is caused by hypothetical internal
processes. Concomitantly, we must ask why
the growth of the experimental analysis of
behavior, in spite of the wealth of research
demonstrating the effectiveness of its prac-
tical applications, seems to have reached a
plateau far short of our earlier expectations.
 The Ulman-Skinner Letters
The answer to this question, it seems to me,
is but the obverse of the other answer. That
is, the science of behavior directs attention
to the external environment, both past and
present, as the cause of behavior.
Finally, we must ask why the culture
in which we live selects an ineffective if
not fantastic hodgepodge of psycholo-
gies over an effective science of behavior.
To my way of thinking, the answer would
apply equally to the question–Why do New
Age mysticism, fundamentalist religions,
cults, and other cultural practices associated
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with belief in supernatural phenomena thrive
in our culture? (Have you browsed through
the psychology section of a shopping mall
bookstore lately?)
In other words, what thematic control-
ling relationship is common to much of
traditional psychology as well as to cultural
practices associated with a belief in the su-
pernatural? All of these orientations instruct
us to look elsewhere than to the environment
to understand our feelings, thoughts, and
actions. Without presupposing a conspiracy
theory, these otherworld orientations serve
to support the status quo. In effect, if people
come to accept the proposition that the
problems they experience in their everyday
lives reside in their psyches rather than in
the social environment, the malfunctioning
social order is not implicated.
Regardless of one’s political predilections,
I think it is useful for us to consider Marx’s
contention that in any given society the ruling
ideas are those of the ruling class. Here Marx
was positing a process of cultural selection,
not a conspiracy theory. One does not need
to be a Marxist, however, to see that in any
exploitative culture the questioning of the
status quo is reviled as biased if not subversive
while any view that supports it tends to be
regarded as neutral. In our society, mental-
istic and cognitive disciplines have achieved
great respect. But this same cultural context
has not been conducive to the development
of a science founded on the philosophy of
radical behaviorism, a philosophy that points
13
to the environment as the cause of behavior.
Do these facts not speak for themselves? I
believe that we often fail to recognize the fact
that our philosophy of science constitutes an
uncompromising challenge to the ideologies
of the status quo and consequently to the
powers that be. When people stop looking
in the direction of other worlds (mental,
spiritual, etc.) and begin to analyze the cur-
rent social environment as the cause of their
problems, the powers that be are in trouble.
In short, it seems that we have not yet appre-
ciated to the full extent the radical implica-
tions of radical behaviorism.
Getting to the main point of this letter, I
have become convinced that if we are to pre-
serve those scientific practices we designate
as the experimental analysis of behavior and
if we are to maintain the integrity of radial
behaviorism, we must first acknowledge that
we never really have been part of psychology
except in terms of our historical origin (nor
could we have been, once we began demon-
strating control over behavior). And so now
we must unambiguously distance ourselves
from psychology and all of its pervasive
antibehavioral and eclectic influences. The
construction of a natural science of behav-
ior is not only a steep and thorny way, as
you have observed, but is equally a political
struggle in which–unfortunately–empirical
evidence and reasoned argument matter all
too little. I believe that the best we can do
for the time being is to protect our discipline
from the predominant counter-posed cul-
tural contingencies until such a time as the
culture undergoes a fundamental change for
the better, one in which an independent sci-
ence of behavior could make great contribu-
tions. (Meanwhile, perhaps, we might have
the good fortune of discovering a hitherto
overlooked social environment in which our
science will prosper.)
Fred, I have actually just shared with
you my reason for joining The International
8
I photocopied and enclosed pp. 157-61 from Dilling-
ham and Carneio (1987).
 14 Jerome D. Ulman
Behaviorology Association; I hope you will
forgive my temerity for doing so. As I recall,
you did not like the sound of the term behav-
iorology. Historically, I think it is interesting
to note that very similar objections were
made when Leslie White tried to popularize
culturology and earlier when Herbert Spen-
cer introduced sociology (see enclosure).8
After a while, however, I have rather grown
fond of referring to myself as a behavior-
ologist. The name has the virtue of clearly
communicating to the populace what we are
about and how we differ from those profes-
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sionals who give themselves other labels.
Euphonies aside, I believe the critical
issue is what we tact when we say “behavio-
rology.” Quoting from the TIBA brochure
(enclosed),9 it is “the name that emerged
in the 1980s for a science that originated
in the 1930s and which is concerned with
the behavior of organisms.” Of particular
significance in this regard is TIBA ‘s first
statement of purpose: “to foster the scientifi-
cally informed and developing philosophy of
science known as radical behaviorism.” To
my knowledge no other organization in the
world–including ABA-can honestly make
that claim.
All things considered, here is the bottom
line of my letter to you: At the time, I agreed
with your brief comments at the end of your
1986 ABA talk. I have since read some new
and, to me, compelling conclusions on this
matter. Upon weighing these additional
factors, I am wondering whether or not you
might be coming to these same conclusions
as well. If so, I would like to add my voice to
those of the other TIBA members and invite
you to share, even join, our endeavor to bring
about full recognition of behaviorology as
9
The brochure was put out by The International Behav-
iorology Association (TIBA) in 1988. A copy of the current
TIBA brochure may be obtained from the author
10
APS was the group of roughly 4,000 psychologists
that broke away from APA in January1989 and formed the
American Psychological Society. In March 1989 Skinner
opined, ‘’The Psychological Society seems to me to be the
natural next step in the furtherance of psychology as a
science” (p. 8).
the natural science of behavior, the discipline
that emerged out of but is now irrevocably
separate from the discipline of psychology.
Cordially,
Jerry
Letter from Skinner to Ulman Dated
January 23, 1989
Dear Jerry:
I’ve kept your long letter for a long
time partly because I wanted to wait to
see how the APS10 shapes up. There is no
doubt that behavior analysis is spread over
too much territory at the present time.
Division 25 is open only to members of the
APA, and one of the virtues of ABA was that
younger people could come and participate.
APS will be cheaper but still, I suppose, not
open to younger people without advance
degrees. We do need a strong organization
and particularly one which doesn’t fall into
the same trap the AP A fell into and be con-
verted into a professional society rather than
a psychological one.
I don’t like the word behaviorology
[emphasis added] and haven’t gotten used
to it yet when I hear Julie and Ernie use it. I
don’t think there is a chance that colleges and
universities will open departments of behav-
iorology at least for a long time to come. At
best it will have to be a branch of psychol-
ogy. I imagine there would be no chance to
get the National Science Foundation to take
it seriously either, again for a long time to
come. I prefer to remain a psychologist on the
grounds that it can be defined as Watson did
in 1913. It should be taught as a specialty in
departments of psychology, as ethology, for
example, is taught as a special part of biology.
What is needed, I think, is not so much
reorganization or a new organization but
more active experimental work. There are all
kinds of issues that have not been properly
explored. In addition, the implications of
a behavioral analysis for a great many areas
are not yet being very effectively discussed.
 The Ulman-Skinner Letters
That is the sort of thing I am trying to do
myself these days.
I’m afraid this isn’t what you wanted to
hear, but it seems to me to be all that I shall
be trying to do for the rest of my life.
Sincerely,
Fred
Letter from Ulman to Skinner Dated
February 24, 1989
Dear Fred:
Downloaded by [University of Cambridge] at 12:47 21 August 2015
Thank you for your carefully considered
reply to my letter. As briefly as I can, I would
like to share my thinking about the critically
important points you raised.
You may be right about colleges and
universities not opening departments of
behaviorology in the foreseeable future and
the NSF not taking our discipline seriously
anytime soon. I will even concede that when
I first heard it, “behaviorology” sounded a bit
strange. (If I may suggest a remedy: in the
privacy of your bath, try saying behaviorol-
ogy aloud at least 50 times.) Would that the
problem was only nominal!
In a more serious vein—if you will allow
my bluntness, for it is impelled by what is at
stake—I think your confidence in the Ameri-
can Psychological Society is badly misplaced.
In my view, APS is merely a protestant form
of the same old religion, a splinter group
from the Assembly of the Personal Agency,
consummate defenders of “autonomous
man.” What motivates the overwhelming
majority in APS, I suspect, is opposition to
the exclusive guild concerns of the clinical
majority in AP A, not the promotion of a sci-
ence of behavior as you and I understand it.
Given the character of its membership,
the “science” we can expect APS to advance
is exactly the kind you have argued against
throughout your career—hypothico—de-
ductive methodology, statistical inference
rather than experimental analysis, the phi-
losophy of logical positivism, and the type
of theorizing that, as you so aptly stated
15
in 1950, “appeals to events taking place
somewhere else, and measured, if at all, in
different dimensions [e.g., in the real ner-
vous system, the conceptual system, or the
mind].” You added that the continued use of
such methods should be abandoned. Thus, I
do not understand why you now give cred-
ibility to APS. Any behavioral psychologists
in their ranks (if the behavioral constituency
approaches even 10%, I would be greatly
surprised) simply serve to give a behavioristic
veneer to the ersatz science of psychology.
In general, our participation in any psy-
chological organization presupposes at least
tacit acceptance of a common program.
Because psychologists cannot agree on a radi-
cal behavioral program without themselves
becoming something other than psycholo-
gists, a psychological organization must of
necessity abandon radical behaviorism in
favor of theorizing based on mind, cogni-
tion, and/or the conceptual nervous system.
In short, the program of the psychologist is
the defense of the psyche; the program of the
radical behaviorist, its demise.
What must at all cost be defended and
nurtured are those cultural contingencies–as
rare as they are exquisite–responsible for
the development of the natural science of
behavior. By comparison, it matters little to
behaviorologists whether we will soon see
behaviorology departments sprouting up
around the country or receive a nod of ap-
proval from the NSF. That is, the integrity
of the discipline takes precedence over the
number of people who may or may not come
to feel comfortable about recognizing behav-
iorology as an independent life science. What
does matter, I am sure, is that our scientific
work be carried out within that protective
social environment we call the discipline of
behaviorology.
Hence, I was quite saddened to learn that
you plan to devote the rest of your life to try
to reform psychology as a natural science.
I am afraid that this travail is Sisyphean
and will only wear us down and ultimately
exhaust our extremely limited resources.
 16 Jerome D. Ulman
We simply cannot afford to continue our
scientific work as a specialty within the psy-
chology establishment. To remain there any
longer portends to be a recipe, not only for
our continued servitude, but for eventual
extinction of the very contingencies neces-
sary for the survival of our science and the
philosophy upon which it is based. Yes, as
you advise, more active experimental work
is needed, there are many issues that need
to be explored, and there is much to discuss
about the implications of our work. But
psychologists since the time of Watson have
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not merely ignored us, they have contemp-
tuously rejected our experimental research.
And there is no apparent reason to suppose
they will behave any differently in the future.
So with or without your endorsement,
Fred, you can rest assured that your scientific
contributions are in better hands than were
Darwin’s with his “bulldog”, T. H.
Huxley, who–upon reviewing On the
Origins of Species–wrote of being prepared
to go to the stake for it if necessary. Yet Hux-
ley never accepted the principle of natural
selection! The founders of The International
Behaviorology Association, in contrast,
recognize selection by consequences as the
most important causal mode in the life sci-
ences and are committed to “pursue the use
of the contributions to behaviorology found
in the works of B. F. Skinner for integrating
the concepts, data, and technologies of the
discipline’s various subfields.” With rigorous
membership qualifications for its leadership,
a newsletter already in production (our first
issue is enclosed), a journal under develop-
ment, and TIBA chapters forming interna-
tionally, we are prepared to stay the course.
I will close with this metaphoric note,
Fred: As you grow weary of your travels
through that vast and scientifically barren
wasteland called psychology, may you be
comforted to know that a place has been
saved for you around our campfire.
With fond regard,
Jerry
Letter from Skinner to Ulman Dated
March 6, 1989
Dear Jerry:
I agree that behaviorology is not as bad as
otorhinolaryngology, but the word behavior
[emphasis added] falls apart too easily without
having another part tacked on.
I am not taking the American Psycho-
logical Society very seriously but I still believe
psychology is the study of behavior; including
the behavior of the brain as part of the thing
called a behaving body, and as an institution it
has a firm hold on our universities. What both-
ers me most is not the need to have another
organization but to get competent people to
attack what is now being done in the name
of psychology. And behavior analysts are do-
ing a lot of the wrong thing themselves. It is
hard to find an article that doesn’t report on
something going on inside the head. A really
strong advocacy program would reinstate the
study of behavior in psychology as an estab-
lished discipline and could eventually take
over–at about the time when behaviorology
would have gotten itself included in curricula
and support bureaus. We have let cognitive
psychologists, with that soundbite about the
death of psychology [sic]11 more or less take
over the field. I have written three papers at-
tacking cognitive psychology, but who else
has? And who has spoken to the lay public?
There is an article in the last issue of the New
York Review of Books on what could be done
to rescue education in America, and it is one
long example of what is wrong with educa-
tion. I should be writing a letter in reply, but
I simply do not have time. I am writing one
to Science about their complaint that students
are flunking math and science.12
I am not trying to reform psychology so
far as it concerns what is going on in the black
box. Not at all, I am interested inshowing that
the answers to the two answers about what
11
Clearly, Skinner intended to say “the death of
behaviorism”-J.D.U.
12
The letter was not published.
 The Ulman-Skinner Letters
is going on are really the important part of
psychology. They are certainly the part that
makes a practical application possible.
I am grateful for the enthusiasm and loy-
alty of the behaviorologists. I’ll try saying the
word to myself in the bathtub and see how
good a predictor you are.
All the best,
Fred
Letter from Ulman to Skinner Dated
April 28, 1989
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Dear Fred:
Again, I wish to thank you for your
thoughtful reply. I believe that we have reached
agreement on some important points. First,
although not the most pressing of issues, I
was glad to hear that you did not think be-
haviorology sounded as bad as otolaryngology.
I would add that, as a label for our science,
neither is it as bad as behavior analysis nor
the experimental analysis of behavior. Second,
I was quite relieved to learn that you are not
taking the American Psychological Society
very seriously. Third, I could not agree more
that persons calling themselves behavior ana-
lysts, by musing about goings–on inside the
head, are drifting far afield from the natural
science of behavior. Fourth, we agree that as an
institution, psychology has a firm hold on our
universities–for me, a most unfortunate fact of
life and one that we must critically examine.
What we clearly don’t agree on, however, is
your stated belief that “psychology is the study
of behavior.” Because this issue has strategic
implications for the development of the sci-
ence of behavior (i.e., behaviorology), I feel
obliged to explain my objection.
Let me begin by considering the historical
context of this question. For me, as its name
denotes, psychology is the study of the psyche;
it always has been and, I am convinced, it al-
ways will be. True, psychology deals with the
behavior of the individual but so does theology,
which also has a firm grip on higher education.
I fail to see how a paradigm based on the
17
notion of soul (spirit, god, etc.) is any more
in contradiction to the natural science of
behavior than one based on the notion of
psyche. Put another way, if we remove all
that is behaviorological, neurophysiological,
and culturological from psychology, in what
scientifically important way would psychology
differ from theology?
Are not both paradigms inherently in-
compatible with the epistemology of radical
behaviorism?
In The Origin of Consciousness in the
Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, I find
Julian Jaynes’ comparison of psychology with
religion to be quite instructive. Tracing our
cultural roots further back in time, he notes
that in ancient Greece psyche meant whatever
left a warrior when he was slain on the battle-
field. Around 900 B.C., following Pythagoras’
return from Egypt, the term came to be used
in a qualitatively new sense-as a completely
separable and transmigrating soul. Jaynes
writes, “So dualism ... begins its huge haunted
career through history ... to become one of the
great spurious quandaries of modem psychol-
ogy” (p. 291).
Looking across the centuries, then, as the
law of theocracies is gradually supplanted by
the law of commodities, we see supernatural
conceptualizations of human behavior become
increasingly secularized, ultimately culminat-
ing in that academic discipline we call psy-
chology. Consequently, compared with the
other natural sciences, what we now define
as behaviorology has endured a much more
difficult and prolonged prenatal period–a half
century of it within psychology! And probably
for good reason: behaviorology is the exact
point of contact between natural science and
our culture’s conception of human nature.
In Science and Human Behavior, you de-
scribe religion and psychotherapy as control-
ling agencies. Might not the cultural contin-
gencies defining these agencies actually be con-
straining the advancement of the natural sci-
ence of behavior and continue to do so as long
as we remain within organized psychology?
For me, this is the crux of the matter. As I
 18 Jerome D. Ulman
see it, because of such overpowering cultural
contingencies, the more psychologists struggle
to become free from their quandary about the
psyche, the deeper they sink and the more
seductive becomes their sophistry. Hence,
our continued dealings with psychology will
only entangle us further in their metaphysical
morass.
If we are to succeed in convincing our
students to give up the hypothesized ghosts
in evolved matter, we must teach them to
unambiguously discriminate between these
traditional ways of thinking and scientific
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thinking. It seems to me that this end is not
well served by our continued cohabitation
with psychologists and the contingencies
under which they operate. With the establish-
ment of behaviorology, we have finally broken
with that idealistic tradition, an indissoluble
amalgam of religionist and guild interests. And
with the formation of TIBA, the organiza-
tional umbilical cord has at last been severed.
In light of this historical context, I have dif-
ficulty accepting your statement that a “a really
strong advocacy program would reinstate the
study of behavior in psychology... and could
take over–at about the time when behaviology
would have gotten itself included in curricula
and support bureaus.” Given its importance
in maintaining the status quo, I suspect that
psychology will continue to be the favored
one for some time to come (as it always has
been) and that allocation of resources for the
scientific study of behavior will make relatively
little headway under the current cultural con-
tingencies.
There are literally millenniums of tradi-
tional thinking about human nature against
which behaviorology must struggle. We should
anticipate that the path forward will continue
to be a difficult one. In reality, I do not see
any easy routes. Most emphatically, remain-
ing within psychology is no shortcut. Rather,
I submit that maintaining a covenant with
organized psychology will serve only to stultify
our every effort to advance behaviorology, the
science for which you have contributed the
definitive paradigm and guiding philosophy.
In sum, as long as we remain within the
church, for whatever reason, the longer we
must abide by its commandments, chief
among which is an unquestioning respect for
the divinity of the psyche (or any of its cognate
hypostases-mind, cognition, experience, etc.).
I feel that we can best move forward, not by
arguing with psychologists about what may
or may not be going on it in the black box;
writing letters to hostile, psyche–intoxicated
editors; nor playing no-win political games
in psychology departments. We have done
all of that for over 50 years and it has gotten
us nowhere. I say, psychologists made their
own metaphysical bed, now let them lie in it.
We have much more useful things to do;
namely, to advance the independent discipline
of behaviology in all of its facets-philosophical,
analytical, experimental, and technologi-
cal–and, most importantly, disseminate our
successes to the public.
I hope you will forgive my verbosity, for I
seriously did attempt to be brief! I look for-
ward to seeing you at the ABA meeting.
Cordially,
Jerry
Note from Ulman to Skinner Dated
May 29,1990
Dear Fred,
Congratulations on your declaration of
independence!13
13
My congratulatory note on Skinner’s “declaration
of independence” was in reference to his keynote address
delivered May 28, 1989, at the 15th annual convention of
the Association for Behavior Analysis in Milwaukee, Wis-
consin. I had a hint Fred was going to drop the bombshell
about the science of behavior not being part of psychol-
ogy when-just before going into the ballroom to give his
address-he said to me, “Listen to what I am going to say
today, Jerry. I think you’re going to like it” (implying that
whathe was going to say would serve as his reply to my last
letter). I was not disappointed. A moment later he told the
audience: “I tried too long to follow Watson in saying that
psychology is the science of behavior. I am now convinced
that that is wrong. Psychology has always been concerned
with internal explanations” (See Skinner [1993], p.3). As
soon as I returned from the ABA meeting, I sent him my
con-gratulatory note. So ended our correspondence.
 The Ulman-Skinner Letters
References
Dillingham, B., & Cameio, R. L. (Eds.)
(1987). Leslie A. White: Ethnological es-
says. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press.
Holland, J. G. (1986, May). Radical behav-
iorism and philosophical materialism: The
hand in the glove. Symposium presented
at the annual meeting of the Association
for Behavior Analysis, Milwaukee, WI.
Skinner, B. F. (1986, May). We happy few.
Paper presented at the 12th annual con-
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vention of the Association for Behavior
Analysis, Milwaukee, WI.
19
Skinner, B. F. (1987). Whatever happened to
psychology as the science of behavior?
American Psychologist, 45, 1206–1210.
Skinner, B. F. (1989). [untitled letter]. APS
Observer, 2(2), 8.
Skinner, B. F. (1990). Can there be a sci-
ence of mind? American Psychologist, 45,
1206–1210.
Skinner, B. F. (1993). A world of our own.
Behaviorology, 1(1), 3–5.
Todd, J. T. & Morris, E. K. (1983). Miscon-
ception and miseducation: Presenta-
tions of radical behaviorism in psychol-
ogy textbooks. The Behavior Analyst, 6,
153–160.
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
A World of Our Own
B. F. Skinner
Key words: science of behavior, mentalism, contingencies of reinforcement, verbal behavior
Why do people behave as they do? For
more than 2,500 years the answer has been
sought inside the behaving person, in what
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could be seen of an internal controlling self.
Psychology began as an effort to make the
search scientific. So-called “physiological
psychologists,” such as Wundt and Titchner,
trained observers to look at and report their
mental processes. William James remained
a philosopher and continued to look only
casually.
John B. Watson would have none of it.
He began his famous behaviorist manifesto
with the assertion that psychology was the
science of behavior. (He could not make a
convincing case for it because there was, at
the time, no such science. There was little
more than some studies of habit formation
in the maze and, somewhat later, Pavlov’s
conditioned reflexes. For the rest of his life,
Watson spoke only of what would happen
when there was a science of behavior.) But
in the first paragraph of that manifesto he
turned to an attack on introspection, and
there he was completely successful. Psycholo-
gists no longer train observers to look at their
mental processes. Cognitive psychologists do
not claim to be able to observe the processes
they make theories about. Instead, they have
turned to brain science where, presumably,
the processes can be observed in a better way.
Watson took that step too, using physiologi-
cal data where behavioral data were lacking,
Thanks to Behaviorology and to the B. F. Skinner Foun-
dation for the permission to reprint this article in the current
issue of the European Journal of Behavior Analysis.
The article was originally published in the inaugural issue
of Behaviorology in 1993.
21
2014, 15, 21–24 NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2014)
21
but that is the point at which I parted from
him. I wanted a science of behavior that did
not refer to the mind or to the nervous sys-
tem. That was the theme of Chapter 8 in The
Behavior of Organisms. It had been the theme
of two books by Jacques Loeb that I read sev-
eral years before I read Watson. Loeb spoke
of the behavior of the organism as a whole.
I am not sure where the expression “radical
behaviorism” came from, but I have always
used it to mean the study of behavior without
asking about what was going on inside the
organism, mental or neurophysiological.
I have tried too long to follow Watson
in saying that psychology is the science of
behavior. I am now convinced that is wrong.
Psychology has always been concerned with
internal explanations. To show how futile
that is, let us imagine that it has been success-
ful. Let us suppose that all those who examine
mental processes introspectively now agree
on what they see. Let us suppose that what
they see confirms a set of theories upon which
all cognitive psychologists now agree. And let
us suppose that brain science, looking inside
the behaving organism in a different way, has
found what convincingly can be called the
same things. Shall they then have discovered
the causes of human behavior or simply more
about what is behaving? The brain is part of
the body and what it does is part of what the
body does. Brain processes do not explain
behavior until they, too, have been explained.
To explain them, important questions
must be answered: Where has the body as a
whole, brain and all, come from? And why
does it change, as it does, from moment to
moment? We cannot answer those questions
 22 B. F. Skinner
by looking inside the body, no matter how
complete the sciences of psychology and
neurophysiology may be.
Instead, we must look at three processes
of variation and selection. 1. Natural selec-
tion explains the very existence of the spe-
cies that behaves. 2. Operant conditioning
explains how the individual changes from
moment to moment during its lifetime. 3.
The evolution of cultures explains the social
environments that account for a large part
of what members of the human species can
learn to do. Those three processes explain
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not so much behavior as the structure that
behaves, a structure that has never been
properly observed introspectively, but will
eventually be known in a different way
through biology and biochemistry.
The process of variation and selection was
discovered very late in the history of human
thought. Until recently, it played no part in
philosophy. Psychologists like James and
Thorndike were influenced by evolutionary
theory, but never succeeded in applying
variation and selection to the behavior of
the individual. Herbert Spencer’s “survival
of the fittest” was a partial anticipation of
Darwin applied to the evolution of cultural
practices and almost immediately misap-
plied. Strangely enough, brain science also
seems to neglect the origins of the structures
it studies. It turns for its assignments to psy-
chological theories, especially those that have
long been embedded in everyday discourse.
Ethologists study behavior that can be
traced to natural selection. Cultural anthro-
pology studies the evolution of the social en-
vironments that vastly extend human behav-
ior beyond the scope of operant condition-
ing. The “world of our own” in my title is the
field that lies between the two–the analysis of
the behavior of the individual. Selection of
behavior by its consequences was at the heart
of Thorndike’s Law of Effect, but Thorndike
never explored contingencies of variation
or selection. Operant conditioning is not
trial-and-error or goal-directed behavior.
It is a process in which variations selected
by their reinforcing consequences become
part of the repertoire of the individual. That
is our world. What should we do about it?
I am not too happy with much current
research. It seems to be still too often directed
toward discovering what is happening in the
mind/brain. Behavior analysts who claim to
be studying the formation of concepts are in
fact studying ways in which organisms come
under the control of subtle contingencies of
reinforcement. It is tempting to show that we
can handle the facts of cognitive psychology,
but in doing so we are likely to let cognitive
psychology dictate the scope and strategy of
our research.
I was influenced in my early research by
a textbook on thermodynamics, things like
the Gas Laws, Willard Gibb’s Phase Rule, and
Carnot’s Cycle–in other words, interrelation-
ships among variables. I’d like to see more
of that sort of thing done with behavioral
variables. An experiment I did years ago was
an example; it showed how extinction curves
changed when the level of deprivation was
changed.
There are many unsolved puzzles in
the experimental analysis of behavior, the
further exploration of which would pay off
handsomely. I reported one in The Behav-
ior of Organisms. My first experiments on
discrimination began with a baseline under
fixed-interval reinforcement. When I turned
a light on just before preparing to reinforce a
response, the rat continued to respond in the
presence of the light but responding slowly
extinguished in the dark. Discrimination
was a process of extinction. But I also set up
a discrimination without extinction. I rein-
forced the first response the rat made in the
light, and then turned the light off. Possibly
because of the change in the situation, the
rat did not respond in the dark. Five minutes
later I turned the light on again, reinforced
the first response, and turned the light off.
Eventually, the rat responded whenever the
light came on and never responded in the
dark. There was no extinction. But the rat
never responded to the light as quickly as
 A World of Our Own
in the experiment involving extinction.
It waited up to four or five times as long
before responding. One of my four rats
eventually stopped responding altogether
although all responses in the light had
been reinforced. There is a puzzle there that
could have a bearing on “abnormal” human
behavior.
We need to do other things. We should
improve our contacts with the other be-
havioral sciences. The differences between
natural selection and operant conditioning
are perfectly clear and the similarity is great.
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We should work with ethologists in analyz-
ing the extraordinary interaction between
the two. Neuroscientists seem to be flattered
by the attention given them by cognitive
psychologists and many have themselves
emphasized the relevance of their work to
ancient theories of psychology, but we have
the kind of data needed if they are to show
how the body-cum-brain is affected by
contingencies of reinforcement rather than
by thoughts or feelings. Once they have ap-
preciated the value of the operant methodol-
ogy, they are more likely to become allies in
promoting behaviorism as the philosophy
of such a science. What we have done in
pharmacology could be the pattern for the
other medical and biological sciences.
I should like to see a closer association
with the other so-called behavioral sciences–
sociology, economics, political science, and
all the rest. Their data are almost exclusively
behavioral, if historical, but their formula-
tions are still largely mentalistic.
Education and therapy have never
claimed to be behavioral sciences. It is harder
to show that the basic facts are behavioral
and much harder to throw off mentalistic
formulations.
We know how American schools could
be redesigned, at no greater cost, to do the
job they must do. It is extraordinary how
few of the facts clearly established in the
field of learning are familiar to the educa-
tional establishment. Equally extraordinary
is the extent to which those facts are used
23
in industrial education for example, where
those who design educational practices are
under the control of effective contingencies
of reinforcement.
Of course, I like what is being done with
verbal behavior, but I’d like to see more of
it. Most linguists still concentrate on the be-
havior of the listener, who is to say whether
a sentence is meaningful or grammatical, for
example. My book was concerned with the
production of the verbal behavior, and until
we understand the production, questions
about effects are often irrelevant. Logicians
have made the same mistake and have spent
a lot of time considering such a sentence
as: “This sentence is false.” If it is true, it is
false, and if it is false, it is true, but should
that curious fact really concern us? Could
the sentence ever have been uttered as verbal
behavior? What sentence could the speaker
have been talking about? The sentence
itself was not yet in existence. Are there
really sentences, as Godel is said to have
shown, that cannot be proved true or false?
If so, under what circumstances could they
have been said? It is possible to compose
“sentences,” as linguists like Chomsky have
done, by moving words about as separate
objects, but that is not behaving verbally,
and there is no point in considering what
the “sentences” mean.
Philosophers are beginning to consider
some of our problems, but they need help.
Living things originate through variation
and selection. The contingencies of selec-
tion, lying in the past, tend to be spoken of
as if they were to occur in the future. Once
an individual has come into existence, it
shows the causality of physics and biochem-
istry. The world of reasons is our world.
There are other ways in which we can help
a philosopher. We know the difference be-
tween an act as an instance of behavior and
an operant as a probability of behaving, a
distinction that cannot be made by viewing
behavior simply as process.
Human behavior is a fascinating subject,
and that fact is not overlooked by the media.
 24 B. F. Skinner
They talk about it, however, in ways that
are intelligible to those immersed in a lay
psychology.
Anything they might report in the same
way about astronomy, physics, chemistry or
biology would be attacked immediately, yet
we let them get away with it. Newspapers
and news weeklies report that “Chimpanzees
now tell us that they know more than we
think,” that “Optimism helps the body’s
defense system,” that “Brain science reveals
how the mind has been designed,” and so
on. Letters to the editor might make a dif-
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ference.
We have been accused of building our
own ghetto, of refusing to make contact
with other kinds of psychology. Rather than
break out of the ghetto, I think we should
strengthen its walls. No field of science has
ever been more clearly defined than this
world of ours. In no other world are there
more fascinating things to be explored. No
world has a greater potential for solving the
problems that face the world today, above
all saving the planet Earth. Perhaps we have
drifted into this world too easily. I hope we
shall now come under the control of its more
exacting contingencies of reinforcement.
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Commentaries and Replies
Behavior Analysis as a Biological Science:
An Alternate History
A. Charles Catania
Downloaded by [Stockholm University Library] at 10:26 21 August 2015
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
The nature of behavior analysis, its place
among other disciplines and even its name
have been often debated. Does our field be-
long in an academic or professional category
of its own? If so, what should it be called?
If not, which departments should house it?
These have been perennial questions. What
follows from the answers to these questions
may determine whether the field retains a sta-
tus that continues to draw the students who
make up its future generations and whether
it can maintain the resources to educate them
adequately. What parts of the field should
constitute its common core and which ancil-
lary disciplines should be cultivated? How
should its basic and its applied dimensions
be balanced?
We are all familiar with our history, as
our field emerged from and was sustained by
the biological sciences and medicine instead
of psychology. It is difficult to take seriously
the suggestion that psychology, under any
conceivable set of historical contingencies,
could have provided an appropriate scientific
environment to nurture its growth. But some
have speculated that our field would have been
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Charles Catania at catania@umbc.edu
25
2014, 15, 25–116 NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2014)
25
better off if it had started there rather than
within the biological sciences, so it may be
instructive to explore some of the critical his-
torical landmarks of our history in the context
of one possible alternate history.
The field has been called behavior analysis
or the analysis of behavior, but that label gives
short shrift to the synthesis that occurs when
new behavior is generated by the application
of its principles. Names of parent disciplines
such as biology or psychology are inad-
equate. Terms derived from the Greek such
as διαγωγή (diagogí, as conduct or behavior)
or συμπεριφορά (symperiforá, as behavior
or movement or attitude) or πραξισ (praxis,
as action) have not gained much traction, nor
have terms derived from other languages. Be-
haviorology has not taken hold, at least in part
because it jars with its unusual combination
of respective Latin and Greek roots.
It has become more widely accepted that
behavior is fundamental to biology: the mem-
bers of species survive based on the behavior
of which they are capable. They do not last
if they cannot capture prey and avoid preda-
tors and locate mates and so on. All of their
organ systems evolved in the service of that
behavior. That is why behavioral biology has
such a secure place within the larger discipline.
 26 Commentaries and Replies
Growing ties with the neurosciences have
been promising and the linkage with anato-
my as in the behavioral and brain sciences is
valuable, but while we recognize our biologi-
cal roots we must also be aware of and beware
of the inclination to look for the causes of
behavior in nervous systems rather than in
environments.
These debates make it appropriate to re-
consider our history. Given the strong status
of our discipline in these difficult times, it is
hard to imagine what our situation would
have been like if just a very few things had
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gone differently in our earliest years. Our
history seems so powerfully determined that
some may find some suggested alternate
scenarios too far-fetched.
For example, Hamilton College had
given Skinner a solid background in science,
though he was almost diverted by poetry
and creative writing. But what would have
happened if, instead of completing his doc-
toral work in the Department of Biology at
Harvard University, he had followed through
on his initial plan to pursue his studies in the
Department of Psychology? Animal research
would have been acceptable in that depart-
ment, but how nurturing an environment
would it have been?
We still celebrate Skinner’s early work
with rats, which was conducted in a small
area assigned to him in the Museum of
Comparative Zoology and which he was
able to extend when his appointment as a
Junior Fellow allowed him to devote more
time and resources to it. The seminal book
that came out of that work, The Behavior of
Organisms (Skinner, 1938), a fitting succes-
sor to The Behavior of the Lower Organisms
(Jennings, 1906), provided a firm foundation
for subsequent developments of the field.
How different would it have been if instead
of adopting biological precedents he had
been sidetracked by the prevalence within
psychology of scientific practices modeled
after physics and if he had sought laws of
behavior (e.g., Hull, 1943) instead of outlin-
ing a new taxonomy of behavioral processes?
Biology had strong precedents for deriving
principles from research on individual spe-
cies (e.g., Pavlov, 1927; Sherrington, 1906),
but had Skinner conducted his research
within psychology it might well have been
regarded merely as an intensive study of the
behavior of the white rat.
Skinner was of course strongly influenced
by John B. Watson, a psychologist, and
by Bertrand Russell, a philosopher. But
though Ivan P. Pavlov, one of his scientific
heroes, was adopted by the early psycholo-
gists of learning, Pavlov himself was after all
a physiologist. Some of Skinner’s earliest
research was in physiology, with Crozier
and others, so the direction that he took
should not surprise us. If Skinner had gone
on in psychology, he perhaps would have
had even more contact with his long-time
friend and colleague, Fred S. Keller, who did
his doctoral work in that department. But
would psychology have provided him with
the support and contacts and exposure that
would later be so critical in making behavior
analysis a vital component of the biological
sciences?
The second world war interrupted Skin-
ner’s academic endeavors, but a major fringe
benefit was the discovery of shaping in the
course of his project on using pigeons to
guide drones to enemy targets (Skinner,
1960). The analogy between selection at the
level of organisms within species and selec-
tion at the level of responses within operant
classes was a fruitful one. Skinner’s extension
of the selection by consequences (Schneider,
2012) to behavior as it was passed on from
one individual to another within cultures
later provided the precedent for Dawkins’
concept of the meme (Dawkins, 1976). It
was also the basis for the mutual support that
he and E. O. Wilson (1975) gave each other
when their respective approaches were chal-
lenged later in their careers (Naour, 2009),
especially by Noam Chomsky, who did not
respond favorably to commentaries on his
linguistics in a widely read book review by
Skinner.
 Commentaries and Replies
An early surprise came not long after the
war, when Harvard extended to Skinner an
invitation to present the William James lec-
tures. This was a precursor to his subsequent
appointment to a permanent faculty posi-
tion. Decades later, when Skinner shared
his Nobel Prize with Niko Tinbergen, he
acknowledged in his acceptance speech the
significance of these events. Harvard’s Wil-
liam James invitation had earlier been of-
fered primarily to philosophers and psychol-
ogists, so inviting a natural scientist such
as Skinner set something of a precedent.
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By that time, however, he was becoming
known not only for his basic work on non-
human behavior but also for its applications
to human behavior.
Like Darwin, who at first had just a
little to say about relevance to humans in
his primary treatment of the origin of spe-
cies (Darwin, 1859) and who reserved his
extensions to humans to later work (Dar-
win, 1871), Skinner only later extended the
implications of his Behavior of Organisms.
Walden Two (Skinner, 1948), papers on
poetry and literature, eventually includ-
ing Science and Human Behavior (Skinner,
1953), and other works, even including
the air crib, clarified the picture. But the
William James lecture invitation puzzled
many at the time. Fortunately, those who
made the decision recognized that Skinner’s
work, as did Darwin’s, had major implica-
tions for philosophy and psychology as well
as for biology.
In those lectures, Skinner laid out the
three varieties of selection by consequences.
Had he not turned to biology, it might have
taken him much longer to recognize the
parallels among these levels of selection.
He would later flesh out the details and
significance of the third variety, cultural
selection, in his seminal book, Verbal Be-
havior. Some early versions were circulated
in manuscript form (Skinner, 1957), but
Skinner continued to revise the work over
nearly two decades. The published version
of the book did not appear until the 1970’s.
27
In light of Skinner’s earlier assessment of
Chomsky’s transformational grammar, that
linguist attempted a critique of Skinner’s
account. Given that he failed to address the
implications of evolutionary theory for his
grammatical system and did not recognize
that Skinner’s functional account was es-
sentially orthogonal to linguistic structural-
ism, Chomsky’s critique did not fare well.
Many concluded that he did not even regard
language as an evolved system. He did
inspire the emergence of psycholinguistics,
and the subsequent cognitive revolution
impacted many psychology departments.
But an ample bulwark against attacks from
nonbiological quarters was provided by the
burgeoning successes of biology in the mod-
ern synthesis of evolution and genetics (Mayr,
1982), the discovery of the helical structure
of DNA (Watson & Crick, 1953), and the
extensions of these findings to evolutionary
development and epigenetics (Carroll, 2005).
Once Skinner returned to Harvard after
having delivered the William James lectures,
his reputation grew and his laboratory, now
devoted mainly but not exclusively to pi-
geons, extended its findings with research
on reinforcement schedules and varieties of
stimulus control. Inevitably, collaborations
across various units of the university emerged,
especially within departments of the Harvard
Medical School. If Skinner’s work had not
been housed within biology, would he have
set out on the collaborations with Dews that
created the field of behavioral pharmacol-
ogy (Dews, 1958)? Would Lindsley have
undertaken research on both the nonver-
bal and verbal behavior of schizophrenics
(Lindsley, 1956)? Would Ayllon and Azrin
and Michael have created technologies for
working with patients in psychiatric wards
(Ayllon & Azrin, 1968; Ayllon & Michael,
1959)? Would Ferster have set the stage for
work with autism in his demonstration that
children at that time called psychotic were
sensitive to environmental contingencies
(Ferster & DeMyer, 1961)? Would Brady
have extended our science to NASA and
 28 Commentaries and Replies
facilitated the founding of the Institute for
Behavioral Research (Brady, 2007)?
Another fortuitous event strengthened the
position of our field within biology. Psychol-
ogy departments began to move away from
their roots in experimental psychology. What
were once courses devoted to animal learning
and sensory processes and psychophysics soon
became courses devoted almost exclusively to
statistics and hypothesis-testing experimental
designs. In their new incarnation these cours-
es included method rather than substance.
Many undergraduate psychology majors
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moved on having had little contact with
signal detection and other key develop-
ments in what was then called sensation and
perception.
The stimulus in the three-term contin-
gency was a critical component of the science
of behavior, so when the analysis of sensory
processes turned more and more to integrat-
ing behavioral findings about vision and hear-
ing and other senses with physiological and
anatomical approaches, the incorporation of
this field into behavioral biology was a natural
step (e.g., Blough, 1958; Catania & Kaas,
1997). It was not long before it expanded to
include investigations of motor systems (e.g.,
Knapp, Taub, & Berman, 1963), which were
relevant to the response term of the three-
term contingency, and motivational systems
(e.g., Premack, 1962), which were relevant
to the consequence term. Behavior analysis
had established its territory.
Education also benefited from the bio-
logical foundations of the field, which of-
fered a cachet that eased the introduction of
behavioral principles into the classroom. The
applications began with mechanical devices
that Skinner called teaching machines, which
soon began to be used not only in elemen-
tary schools but also in basic college courses
such as Skinner’s own Natural Sciences 114
at Harvard. With the advent of computer
technology, so that large quantities of data
from individual learners could be handled,
teaching has gradually been transformed
from an art into a science (Skinner, 1968).
It is fortunate that from its earliest days the
teaching of general competencies such as
study skills was regarded as more critical
than the teaching of the details of specific
subject matters. Students who had pro-
gressed through these courses from elemen-
tary school on through high school became
independent learners and critical thinkers
who no longer depended on programmed
materials and who were well-prepared for
work at the college level.
Education was just one of many new
behavioral technologies. Given the extensive
proliferation of behavior analytic services,
we now take for granted the central role of
applications and the interaction of basic and
applied aspects of our science. But it was
not always so. As the research grew, it could
not be accommodated in existing biological
journals, and so journals that could focus
more specifically on our discipline were
founded. The Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior (JEAB) was the first.
Inevitably submissions grew, and the applied
work which had until then been included in
JEAB found a home in The Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis (JABA). Distinctions that
had once been unimportant began to matter.
Many of our own early researchers did both
basic and applied work, as was consistent
with the contingencies that operated in
the interaction of biology departments and
medical schools and other academic units,
but with the rise of professional issues such as
credentialing the two directions of the field
began to diverge. It is of interest that the
separation has reached the point where a few
now take the dichotomization for granted
and encourage interaction by calling for
more translational research, in which basic
researchers explicitly seek out applications
of their findings.
The field spread to many universities, at
first mainly in the United States but even-
tually throughout the world. Columbia
University and Indiana University were
pioneers, but they were very soon joined
by many others too numerous to mention.
 Commentaries and Replies
Associations expanded at local and national
and international levels. Soon organizations
devoted to specialized subareas spun off from
their parents (e.g., developmental disabilities,
behavior pediatrics, autism, organizational
behavior, workspace safety, animal training
devoted to detection of landmines or of
dangerous materials at airports–the list goes
on and on). Applied programs emerged at
many sites (e.g., the behavior program at the
Kennedy-Krieger Institute), bringing training
to the postdoctoral level. As journals prolifer-
ated and as the volume of research increased,
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these activities became international. The
European Journal of Behavior Analysis is one
important example.
In a few instances, departments in other
disciplines, and especially in psychology, em-
braced the science of behavior, and created
programs that supplemented those within
biology. In Brazil, for example, Fred Keller
established a behavioral program within a
department of psychology that was created
in the new university at Brasilia. In Norway,
Sagvolden brought converging approaches to
the study of ADHD by creating a network
of researchers whose collaboration crossed
departmental lines and ranged from neuro-
cellular processes to sociological aspects of
parenting in different cultures. Elsewhere
in Europe, behavioral institutes sprang up in
many settings: Wales, Belgium, Italy, Spain,
Poland, to mention only a few. In Japan,
Sato and his colleagues initiated programs in
several universities and founded behavioral or-
ganizations and journals. The list could go on.
Some have questioned whether our
field has been disadvantaged by virtue of
its status as a mere component of biology.
They have suggested that it should divorce
itself from its parent discipline and become
an independent department, so that it will
have more control over its activities and
over professional issues. In connection
with that proposal they have even proposed
different names for the enterprise. If the
parent discipline had been psychology, that
would of course have been a different story.
29
But we must be grateful to the parent dis-
cipline that nurtured us, and in any case, as
this review has shown, we have grown too
large and too diversified to be managed in
any single academic unit anyway.
This has been only a very brief recapitula-
tion of the history of our field. Despite the
risk of important omissions, it is not feasible
here to provide a more substantial overview.
Though a more comprehensive treatment is
beyond the scope of the present account, a
work in progress with colleague Victor G.
Laties (The Evolution of a Science: A Brief
History of Behavior Analysis in the Twentieth
Century) will later fill in more details of the
story.
References
Ayllon, T., & Azrin, N. H. (1968). The
token economy. New York, NY: Appleton
Century-Crofts.
Ayllon, T., & Michael, J. (1959). The psy-
chiatric nurse as a behavioral engineer.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 2, 323–334.
Blough, D. S. (1958). A method for ob-
taining psychophysical thresholds from
the pigeon. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 1, 31–43.
Brady, J. V. (2007). Behavior analysis in the
space age. The Behavior Analyst Today, 8,
398–412.
Carroll, S. B. (2005). Endless forms most
beautiful: The new science of evo devo. New
York, NY: Norton.
Catania, K. C., & Kaas, J. H. (1997). The
mole nose instructs the brain. Somatosen-
sory and Motor Research, 14, 56–58.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species by
means of natural selection. London, United
Kingdom: Murray.
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man. Lon-
don, United Kingdom: Murray.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Dews, P. B. (1958). Analysis of effects of
psychopharmacological agents in behav-
 30 Commentaries and Replies
ioral terms. Federation Proceedings, 17,
1024–1030.
Ferster, C. B., & DeMyer, M. K. (1961). The
development of performances in autistic
children in an automatically controlled
environment. Journal of Chronic Diseases,
13, 312–345.
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior.
New York, NY: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.
Jennings, H. S. (1906). Behavior of the lower
organisms. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Knapp, H. D., Taub, E., & Berman, A. J.
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(1963). Movements in monkeys with
deafferented forelimbs. Experimental
Neurology, 7, 305–315.
Lindsley, O. R. (1956). Operant condi-
tioning methods applied to research
in chronic schizophrenia. Psychiatric
Research Reports, 6, 118–139.
Mayr, E. (1982). The growth of biological
thought. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Naour, P. (2009). E. O. Wilson and B. F.
Skinner: A dialogue between sociobiology
and radical behaviorism. New York, NY:
Springer.
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned reflexes (G.
V. Anrep, Trans.). London, United King-
Jerome D. Ulman's Reply to A. Charles Catania
The purpose of this special section was
to respond to the issue, “Should we put
more effort into refined approaches aiming
to reform psychology–or should we separate
and proclaim the natural science of behavior
as a discipline distinct from psychology”? A.
Charles Catania apparently takes on this ques-
tion forcefully, with nothing less than a “very
brief recapitulation of the [alternate] history
of our field,” which is in fact three times as
long as commentators’ instructions called for.
A natural scientist reading this review would
dom: Oxford University Press.
Premack, D. (1962). Reversibility of the
reinforcement relation. Science, 136,
255–257.
Schneider, S. M. (2012). The science of con-
sequences. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
Sherrington, C. (1906). The integrative ac-
tion of the nervous system. New York, NY:
Scribners.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organ-
isms: An experimental analysis. New York,
NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden Two. New
York, NY: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human
behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New
York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1960). Pigeons in a pelican.
American Psychologist, 15, 28–37.
Skinner, B. F. (1968). The technology of teach-
ing. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.
Watson, J. D., & Crick, F. H. C. (1953).
Molecular structure of nucleic acids.
Nature, 171, 737–738.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new
synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
leave not doubting that the parent disci-
pline of behavior analysis is biology and not
psychology—a theme that clearly emerges
in “The Ulman-Skinner letters” (Ulman,
1993/2014) and in Skinner’s “A world of our
own” (1993/2014). Surprisingly, Catania
neither references nor even mentions these
two works—notwithstanding the instructions
given to the invited contributors.
Why this is so becomes clear at the end of
his “commentary”; the last paragraph provid-
ed a succinct statement of what it’s all about:
 Commentaries and Replies
“This has been only a very brief recapitulation
of the history of our field . . . it is not feasible
here to provide a more substantial overview
. . . though a work is in progress with col-
league Victor G. Laties (The Evolution of a
Science: A Brief History of Behavior Analysis in
the Twentieth Century) will later fill in more
details of the story.”
What we have here, then, is basically a
prospectus for this ongoing work.
Catania’s commentary misses the mark
in neglecting to follow this specific instruc-
tion: “Using your professional judgment as
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you select the basis for your comments, you
may want to comment on particular issues
raised in one or both articles.” Catania raises
only one lone issue: his dissatisfaction with
the term behaviorology. Giving this term
short shift, he then proceeds with a very
weak criticism: “Behaviorology has not
taken hold, at least in part because it jars
with its unusual combination of respective
Latin and Greek roots.” From a conversa-
tion he had with Skinner, Ernest Vargas
(personal communication) shared with me
a cogent retort to such an assertion when
“Fred made the comment about the hybrid
nature of the term to me in conversation.
‘Fred at least had the good grace of dropping
31
his objection to the word “behaviorology”
when I pointed out—and provided ex-
amples—that many words combined Latin
and Greek roots.‘ ”
It should be apparent that nothing more
needs to be said about the supposed jar-
ring effect of an “unusual combination of
respective Latin and Greek roots.” (Note
the etymology of the term terminology.) I
would think that Catania could provide
an objection to “behaviorology” with a bit
more substance. On the other hand, with
due regard for Catania’s sketch of his and
Laties’ book in progress, it holds promise of
serving Skinnerian science well by fortifying
its biological foundation. I would certainly
want to add such a book to my professional
library.
References
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman–Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
 32 Commentaries and Replies
Isolation from the Mainstream:
Recipe for an Impoverished Science
Thomas S. Critchfield and Valeri F. Farmer-Dougan
Illinois State University
We have been accused of creating our own
ghetto.... Rather than break out of the ghetto, I
think we should strengthen its walls. (Skinner,
2014, p. 24)
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Behavior Analysts like to debate whether
they are better off embedded in versus
separate from mainstream Psychology.
A young B.F. Skinner believed the former
(Bjork, 1997), but his intellectual descen-
dants have often perceived that Psychology,
as a potential disciplinary partner, offers little
beyond mentalistic theories and questionable
empirical methods. A common conclusion,
one that Skinner (1993/2014) himself ap-
parently embraced in his later years, is that
“the best we can do for the time being is to
protect our discipline” (Ulman, 2014, p. 13)
from these counterproductive forces. “Just
let Behavior Analysts be Behavior Analysts,”
separation advocates seem to say, “and every-
thing will be fine.”
The irony of separation proposals is
that they target a ship that to a large extent
has already sailed. For more than half a
century Behavior Analysts have been cre-
ating institutions - professional societies
and scholarly journals - that allow them
to interact with one another and avoid
interacting with mainstream Psychology.
For useful guidance during the composition of this
essay we thank Ronnie Detrich, Mike Perone, Derek Reed,
Janet Twyman, and Matthew Weaver.
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Tom Critchfield, Psychology Department,
Campus Box 4620, Illinois State University, Normal, IL
61790-4620. Email: tscritc@ilstu.edu.
The resulting separation could hardly be more
stark, with Behavior Analysts and mainstream
Psychologists participating in each others’
professional organizations and journals to a
very limited degree.
To gauge how the separation is working
out for Behavior Analysis, we focus on an
illustrative case involving punishment. Con-
sequences are the bedrock of behavioral psy-
chology, and punishment is “half of nature’s
arsenal of consequences” (Critchfield, 2014,
p. 38), figuring prominently in disordered
behavior, everyday interpersonal interactions,
and the operation of social institutions and
cultural practices (e.g., Dinsmoor, 1998; Sid-
man, 2000; Skinner, 1953; Vollmer, 2002).
One would expect a science of consequences
to have investigated the punishment process
with particular energy and curiosity, but un-
fortunately this is far from the case in Behavior
Analysis. While isolation from mainstream
Psychology probably is not the sole cause of
this stagnation, it may result in missed op-
portunities to advance punishment science.
A Case History: Punishment Science
Theory and Basic Research
Behavior Analysts usually consider the
prevailing accounts of punishment to be
one factor theory (e.g., Thorndike, 1913)
and two-factor theory (e.g., Mowrer, 1940).
Despite occasional attempts to elaborate these
theories (e.g., Dinsmoor, 1954, 2002) and to
situate them in contemporary contexts like
molar behaviorism (Rachlin & Hernstein,
 Commentaries and Replies
1969) and choice processes (Critchfield, Pal-
etz, MacAleese, & Newland, 2003; Deluty,
1976; de Villiers, 1980), neither is universally
embraced and theory development has been
constrained by a lack of new data. Behav-
ior Analytic research on punishment was
common prior to approximately the 1970s
but became rare thereafter (Critchfield &
Rasmussen, 2007). All told, in their efforts
to develop theory by reference to traditional
operant experiments, “Behavior Analysts be-
ing Behavior Analysts” have not succeeded
in determining how punishment works at its
most fundamental level.
In light of this decades-long theoretical
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stalemate, it would seem reasonable to seek
out additional evidence about punishment
that might spur theory development. The Be-
havior Analysis literature, however, contains
few references to punishment research and
theory originating elsewhere. For example,
reviews of the mainstream Psychology lit-
erature suggest that, in general, “bad events”
have psychologically more potent effects than
“good events (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Assuming a ten-
dency for punishers to be “bad events” and
positive reinforcers to be “good events,” this
suggests that a single punisher should sup-
press behavior more than a single reinforcer
increases its probability. Yet despite the fact
that Behavior Analysts (e.g., Skinner, 1953)
have speculated on the relative efficacy of re-
inforcers and punishers, little contemporary
operant research of which we are aware has
directly examined this possibility (e.g., see
Critchfield, et al., 2003; Magoon & Critch-
field, 2008; Rasmussen & Newland, 2008).
Relevant to attempts to integrate pun-
ishment theories with quantitative models
of choice, a group of social psychologists
has for many years been developing choice-
based punishment models that are explicitly
influenced by the matching law but do not
fit neatly into the one-factor versus two-factor
dichotomy. In some empirical tests, these al-
ternative models have outperformed models
based on one-factor and two-factor theories
33
(e.g., Gray, Stafford, & Tallman, 1991; Gray
& Tallman, 1987; Stafford, Gray, Menke,
& Ward, 1986; Tallman & Gray, 1990).
Unfortunately, we are aware of no published
attempts by Behavior Analysts to test the
relevant models or integrate their underlying
assumptions into Behavior Analytic theory.
A potentially greater oversight concerns
evidence regarding the neural correlates of
punishment effects. Skinner (1966) once
argued that neuroscience was too immature
to guide a science of behavior. Some half a
century later, however, neuroscience has made
considerable progress–its punishment litera-
ture now dwarfs that produced by Behavior
Analysts during the past 50 years -- and a
second look might be merited. Neuroscience
evidence largely supports Behavior Analytic
definitions of consequences, with distinctive
neural activity associated with the occurrence
and omission of appetitive and aversive events
(positive and negative reinforcement and
punishment, respectively), and the magnitude
of the neural changes correlates with the mag-
nitude, certainty of occurrence, and delay of
the consequence (Singer, Seymour, & Dolan,
2007). Importantly, however, it appears that
nonidentical neural circuits form through
and mediate reinforcement and punishment
(e.g., Paton & Louie, 2012; Singer, et al.,
2007; Wachter, Lungu, Liu, Willingham,
& Ashe, 2009), which could raise questions
about the one-factor theoretical assumption
that reinforcement and punishment are part
of a unitary process.
Supporting traditional Behavior Ana-
lytic assumptions, neuroscience data sug-
gest that behavior acquisition occurs more
rapidly with positive reinforcement of “cor-
rect” behavior than positive punishment of
“incorrect” behavior. However, in possible
contrast with Behavior Analytic assumptions,
under some circumstances errors decrease
more quickly under positive punishment
(Wachter, et al., 2009). Neuroscience data
also shed light on counterintuitive situations
in which outcomes that normally function
as punishment appear to strengthen the be-
 34 Commentaries and Replies
havior they follow (Seymour, et al., 2007).
Overall, neuroscience has produced much
food for thought about punishment mecha-
nisms, but we are not aware of systematic
attempts to update Behavior Analytic theories
based on neuroscience findings.
Application
Since basic science helps to establish the
course of application, it is worth briefly con-
sidering the status of knowledge about using
punishment in applied domains. In an exten-
sive literature review, Lerman and Vorndran
(2002) concluded -- not surprisingly given the
state of basic theory on punishment -- that,
Downloaded by [UNSW Library] at 12:50 17 August 2015
“current knowledge about basic processes is
insufficient for translation to application.”
(p. 456).
One important concern in applying
punishment to everyday problems is that it
supposedly causes undesirable side effects
(e.g., Sidman, 2000; Skinner, 1953), includ-
ing antisocial behaviors (e.g., aggression)
and damage to social relationships. Far from
certain, however, is the external validity of the
supporting laboratory evidence, which was
obtained mainly from experiments that were
not designed with translational questions in
mind (e.g., Cipani, 2004; Critchfield, 2014).
As Lerman & Vorndran (2002) observed, it
is currently hard to tell “which findings with
nonhumans and response-contingent electric
shock can be extrapolated to the treatment
of behavior disorders in clinical populations”
(p. 456).
Under the circumstances, evidence from
any quarter that might clarify the role of pun-
ishment in everyday settings might be valued.
It is striking, therefore, that the Behavior
Analysis literature makes little reference to
recent large-scale literature reviews on the use
of mild corporal punishment in child rearing
(Gershoff, 2002; Larzelere & Kuhn, 2005;
Paolucci & Violato, 2004), which do not
point to the dramatic sorts of adverse effects
that Behavior Analysts might predict. Such
findings pose a challenge to those who sug-
gest that punishment is universally toxic, and
deserve to be carefully considered in creating
applied guidelines for the use of punishment.
However, very little of the evidence surveyed
in these reviews is cited in Behavior Analysis
sources (Critchfield, 2014).
Whether justified or overblown, cautions
about the deleterious effects of punishment
derive mainly from studies of individual
behavior. A sizeable body of mainstream Psy-
chology research focusing on inter-individual
cooperation suggests that punishment may
play a critical role in promoting desirable
social relations. In brief, researchers have
found that cooperation is somewhat unreli-
able in situations involving only positive re-
inforcement but increases in frequency when
uncooperative behaviors are punished (e.g.,
Gintis, 2008; Gurek, Irlenbusch, & Rocken-
bach, 2006; for a nontechnical introduction
to this so-called “altruistic punishment,” see
Critchfield 2014).
Neuroscience evidence broadly supports
behavioral observations by suggesting that
punishment may be more effective than
reinforcement in maintaining adherence to
social norms or rules, including those govern-
ing cooperation (e.g., Seymour, et al., 2007).
The preceding addresses the effects of pun-
ishment on social behavior. Neuroimaging
studies appear to shed light on the tendency
of “bystanders” to punish others’ antisocial
behavior: Neuroanatomical structures that
activate when an individual experiences re-
inforcement also activate when an individual
delivers punishment to another person con-
tingent on violations of cooperative standards
(de Quervain, Fischmacher, Schellhammer,
Schnyder, Buck, & Fehr, 2004). Perhaps not
surprisingly, the tendency to punish social
norm violations appears to be fairly consistent
across cultures, whereas other uses of punish-
ment vary in frequency across cultures (Her-
rmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008).
While the relevant effects are complicated
(e.g., Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011),
one possible implication is that strategic
interpersonal use of punishment helps to ce-
ment the many instances in which humans,
 Commentaries and Replies 35

together, accomplish greater good than could Where punishment is concerned, at least one
be engineered by any one individual, which accomplishment can be definitively claimed:
in turn raises the fascinating possibility that Behavior Analysts have managed to avoid
punishment could play a useful role in inter- engaging with mainstream Psychology to a
ventions to teach social behaviors. We are, large extent. Table 1 illustrates by showing the
however, aware of no systematic attempts to number of times Behavior Analysis sources
integrate mainstream cooperation research cited selected mainstream Psychology articles
into basic Behavior Analytic theory or Applied addressing aspects of the punishment process
Behavior Analysis. that were mentioned in the present essay. The
table suggests that mainstream Psychology
Concluding Comments has almost no contemporary influence on
Behavior Analysis. Score one for the separat-
It has been said that, instead of engag- ist movement.
ing with mainstream Psychology, Behavior The years since Behavior Analysts began dis-
Analysts “have much more useful things tancing themselves from mainstream Psychol-
toTable 1
Downloaded by [UNSW Library] at 12:50 17 August 2015

do; namely, to advance the [science of ogy have produced few noteworthy advances
Influence of some mainstream Psychology punishment sources on Behavior Analysis
behavior] in all of its facets–philosophical, in punishment theory and have left Applied
journal articles. Citations of selected mainstream publications by Behavior Analysis
analytical, experimental, and technologi- Behavior Analysts at a loss for translational
articles were determined through a Google Scholar search conducted on June 16, 2014.
cal–and, most importantly, disseminate our guidance regarding the use of punishment
The table excludes the citations of mainstream Psychology sources on the present
successes to the public” (Ulman, 2014, p. 18). interventions (Lerman & Vorndran, 2002).
authors’ own work. “Behavior Analysis articles” are defined as those appearing in
journals featuring primarily Behavior Analysis content. JABA = Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis; JEAB = Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Table 1. Influence of Some Mainstream Psychology Punishment Sources on Behavior Analysis Journal Articles.
Mainstream Punishment Publications
Adverse effects Role of Quantitative Neural
of corporal punishment in models of activation
punishment cooperation punishment during
(Gershoff, 2002) (Gurek et al., (Various*) punishment
2006) (de Quervain,
et al., 2008)
Total times the 1172 490 135 1277
article was cited
Times cited in 2 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Behavior Analysis
articles (% of total
citations)
JABA 1 0 0 0
JEAB 0 0 0 0
Other Behavior 1 0 0 0
Analysis journals

* Gray, et al. (1991); Gray & Tallman (1987); Stafford, et al., 1990; Tallman & Gray
(1990)

Note. Citations of selected mainstream publications by Behavior Analysis articles were determined
through a Google Scholar search conducted on June 16, 2014. The table excludes the citations of
mainstream Psychology sources on the present authors’ own work. “Behavior Analysis articles”
are defined as those appearing in journals featuring primarily Behavior Analysis content. JABA =
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis; JEAB = Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
 Influence of Behavior Analysis articles on mainstream Psychology punishment
publications. Sources cited were determined from the References section of the target
articles. “Behavior Analysis articles”
36 are defined
Commentaries as those appearing in journals
and Replies
featuring primarily Behavior Analysis content. JABA = Journal of Applied Behavior
Analysis;
Table JEAB =ofJournal
2. Influence BehaviorofAnalysis
the Experimental Analysis of
Articles on Mainstream Behavior.
Psychology Punishment Publications.
Mainstream Punishment Publications
Adverse effects Role of Quantitative Neural
of corporal punishment in models of activation
punishment cooperation punishment during
(Gershoff, 2002) (Gurek, et al., (Various*) punishment
2006) (de Quervain,
et al., 2008)
Total sources cited 477 30 244 41
Total Behavior 1 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 29 (11.9%) 0 (0.0%)
Analysis articles
cited (% of total
sources)
JABA 0 0 0 0
JEAB 1 0 29 0
Other Behavior 0 0 0 0
Analysis journals
Downloaded by [UNSW Library] at 12:50 17 August 2015

* Gray, et al. (1991); Gray & Tallman (1987); Stafford, et al., 1990; Tallman & Gray
(1990)

Note. Sources cited were determined from the References section of the target articles. “Behavior
Analysis articles” are defined as those appearing in journals featuring primarily Behavior Analysis
content. JABA = Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis; JEAB = Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior.

It is impossible to know the extent to which In more general terms it is important to

this failure results from disengaging from the
mainstream, but evidence from mainstream
Psychology has been cited that bears on
problems of punishment with which Behavior
Analysts ought to concern themselves. Sadly,
Table 1 provides little encouragement that
Behavior Analysts are terribly interested in
this evidence.
Regarding the goal of disseminating suc-
cesses, one must have successes to disseminate,
and we have already noted the lack of recent
progress regarding punishment. Nevertheless,
due to high demand for behavior analytic
services in certain applied domains, a form
of dissemination (practitioner certification)
is proceeding at an accelerating pace. Because
Behavior Analytic principles of punishment
are based on an aging corpus of basic-research
studies that were not designed with everyday
circumstances in mind (Critchfield, 2014;
Lerman & Vorndran, 2002), one may reason-
ably worry about the accuracy and generality
of what is being disseminated (Cipani, 2004).
consider how dissemination might proceed,
aside from practitioner certification, when
Behavior Analysis has successes to share. For
better or worse, mainstream Psychology has
the public’s ear in a way that Behavior Analy-
sis does not and thus constitutes a possible
conduit of dissemination. For instance, the
American Psychological Association maintains
a vast publishing operation that places jour-
nals and books in research libraries across the
world, and it supports a powerful public rela-
tions operation that injects news about psy-
chological science into mainstream media. By
separating from Psychology, Behavior Analysts
have distanced themselves from a valuable po-
tential sphere of influence. Table 2 illustrates
how Behavior Analysis has had limited influ-
ence on mainstream Psychology scholarship
about punishment: In only one of four cases
shown did mainstream articles cite more than
a tiny handful of Behavior Analysis sources.
If Behavior Analysis is not influencing punish-
ment scholarship in mainstream Psychology,
 Commentaries and Replies
then regular dissemination through main-
stream mechanisms seems unlikely.
Behavior Analysis once incorporated a
robust empirical focus on punishment and
other aversive control phenomena. The pe-
riod in which independent Behavior Analysis
institutions began to emerge (late 1950s
to early 1980s) is the very period in which
aversive control research in Behavior Analysis
virtually ceased (e.g., Critchfield & Rasmus-
sen, 2007). Regarding this correlation, one
thing can be asserted with confidence: For
too long “Behavior Analysts being Behavior
Analysts” have ignored a critical component
of their own subject matter, while mainstream
Downloaded by [UNSW Library] at 12:50 17 August 2015
Psychologists have continued the important
mission of investigating of punishment and
related phenomena.
Science is measured both by its products
(how well it advances theory, application,
and dissemination; Ulman, 1993/2014) and
its process (how flexibly and energetically it
seeks out insights relevant to topics of choice).
The present discussion of punishment finds
contemporary Behavior Analysis wanting on
both fronts, bringing into unexpected focus
the Skinner (1993/2014) quote that began
this essay. Skinner wrote of Behavior Analysts
creating their own “ghetto” (p. 24), a term
that denotes an area housing a minority group
and strongly connotes impoverished living
conditions.1 Based on the present survey,
“impoverished” seems as good a word as any
to describe Behavior Analytic punishment
science. In the days since Behavior Analysis
began formally separating from Psychology, its
adherents have done too little to advance their
own interests and have shown an unsettling
lack of curiosity about mainstream Psychol-
ogy’s relevant scholarly accomplishments, thus
illustrating how the debate about separation
of Behavior Analysis and Psychology may
have been misconstrued. In our view, the
concern is not whether Psychology qualifies
as a worthwhile disciplinary partner. Rather,
following years of potentially damaging isola-
tion, one wonders whether Behavior Analysts,
should they choose to pursue interdisciplinary
37
intellectual alliances, can bring enough to
the table of scholarly discourse to appeal to a
potential disciplinary partner like mainstream
Psychology.
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Bjork, D. W. (1997). B.F. Skinner: A life.
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Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer,
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Cipani, E. (2004). Punishment on trial: A re-
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Coryat, T. (1611). Coryat’s crudities, Vol. 1.
Glasgow, United Kingdom: MacLehose
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Critchfield, T. S., & Rassmussen, E.R. (2007).
It’s aversive to have an incomplete science
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Analysis, 33, 1–5.
Critchfield, T. S., Paletz, E. M., MacAleese,
K. R., & Newland, M.C. (2003). Punish-
ment in human choice: Direct or competi-
tive suppression? Journal of the Experimen-
tal Analysis of Behavior, 80, 1–27.
Critchfield, T. S. (2014). Skeptic’s Corner:
Punishment – Destructive force or valu-
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Practice, 7, 36-44.
Deluty, M. Z. (1976). Choice and the rate
of punishment in concurrent schedules.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 25, 75–80.
de Villiers, P. A. (1980). Toward a quantitative
theory of punishment. Journal of the Ex-
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Dinsmoor, J. A. (1954). Punishment I: The
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Dinsmoor, J. A. (1998). Punishment. In W.T.
 38 Commentaries and Replies
O’Donohue (Ed.), Learning and behavior
therapy (pp. 188–204). Needham Heights,
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Gershoff, E.T. (2002). Corporal punishment
by parents and associated child behaviors
and experiences: A meta-analytic and
theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin,
128, 539–579.
Gintis, H. (2008). Punishment and coopera-
tion. Science, 319, 1345–1346.
Gray, L. N., Stafford, M. C., & Tallman,
I. (1991). Rewards and punishments in
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of choice: Contingent reward and pun-
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Quarterly, 50, 16–23.
Gurek, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach,
B. (2006). The competitive advantage
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108–111.
Larzelere, R. E., & Kuhn, B. R. (2005).
Comparing child outcomes of physical
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Family Psychology Review, 8, 1–37.
Lerman, D. C., & Vorndran, C. M. (2002).
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behavior disorders. Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis, 35, 431–464.
Magoon, M. A., & Critchfield, T. S. (2008).
Concurrent schedules of positive and neg-
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Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
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Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner let-
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Vollmer, T.R. (2002). Punishment happens:
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 Commentaries and Replies
Jerome D. Ulman's Reply to Thomas S. Critchfield &
Valeri F. Farmer-Dougan
At the beginning of their “Concluding
Comments,” Critchfield and Farmer-Dougan
write:
It has been said that, instead of engaging with
mainstream Psychology, Behavior Analysts
“have much more useful things to do; namely,
to advance the [science of behavior] in all of its
facets–philosophical, analytical, experimental,
Downloaded by [UNSW Library] at 12:50 17 August 2015
and technological–and, most importantly, dis-
seminate our successes to the public” (Ulman,
2014, p. 18).
Immediately following this quote, they
state sardonically: “Where punishment is
concerned, at least one accomplishment can
be definitively claimed: Behavior Analysts
have managed to avoid engaging with main-
stream Psychology to a large extent.” The
implication here is clear—Ulman exhibits the
same anti-psychology orientation as others
who are responsible for behavior analysts not
engaging with mainstream psychology. What
Critchfield and Farmer-Dougan don’t do is
quote the preceding part of that paragraph
from my letter:
In sum, as long as we remain within the
church, for whatever reason, the longer we
must abide by its commandments, chief
among which is an unquestioning respect for
the divinity of the psyche (or any of its cognate
hypostases—mind, cognition, experience,
etc.). I feel that we can best move forward, not
by arguing with psychologists about what may
or may not be going on it in the black box;
writing letters to hostile, psyche-intoxicated
editors; nor playing no-win political games
in psychology departments. We have done all
of that for over 50 years and it has gotten us
nowhere. I say, psychologists made their own
metaphysical bed, now let them lie in it. (p. 18)
There is no difficulty in locating a rel-
evant article on punishment appearing a
39
mainstream psychology journal; for example:
“Parental corporal punishment was associated
with all child constructs, including higher lev-
els of immediate compliance and aggression
and lower levels of moral internalization and
mental health” (Gershoff, 2002, p. 539—cited
by Critchfield and Farmer-Dougan). I do have
difficulty with “levels of moral internalization
and mental health,” however. My point is that
there’s nothing preventing behavior analysts
from searching through psychological journals
for pertinent articles. If doing so will help
behavior analysts advance research on the
use of punishment in applied settings, I say:
“Go for it!”
Likewise, whether or not a behavior analyst
is a faculty member in a psychology depart-
ment, and a mainstream psychologist just so
happens to be doing research on punishment
that is relevant to the behavior analyst’s work,
there should be no problem collaborating.
More power to them! Furthermore, being a
behaviorologist does not mean that one is an
anti-psychologist. Nothing I ever said about
psychologists suggests that we should not col-
laborate with them if we find it helpful. And
I oppose comments that disparage psycholo-
gists just because they’re psychologists (e.g., a
rabid behaviorists actually proposed making
a bumper sticker that insult psychologists.
However, I do have two major problems with
psychologists: (a) how they think/theorize,
and (b) how they treat behavior analysts. We
are all familiar with the former—a repertoire
of explanatory fictions. What I mean by the
latter pertains to department chairs’ mistreat-
ment of behavior analysts, but also includes
what they say and write about us. For evidence
of such treatment, read some of the com-
mentaries in this issue. Generally speaking,
given our anti-mentalism and opposition
 40 Commentaries and Replies
to dualistic philosophies, Skinnerians have
been and always will be a threat to psycholo-
gists; consequently, to one degree or another,
they will always be antagonistic towards us.
While I disagree with their conclusion,
I think the rest of Critchfield and Farmer-
Dougan’s commentary is commendable
for its review of the punishment literature
relevant to both basic and applied work. By
the way, I find that Ennio Cipani’s (2004)
book, Punishment on Trial: A resource guide
to child discipline, is quite good. At the time
of this writing, his book is free—simply
Downloaded by [University of Birmingham] at 12:23 21 August 2015
Google and download it. In sum, as far as
Critchfield and Farmer-Dougan’s recipe is
concerned, if the psychology department
treats them decently and they are not both-
ered by the agencyism (appeals to an inner
A Marriage of Convenience
John W. Donahoe
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Behavior analysis differs fundamentally
from almost all of psychology. The central
difference is that behavior analysis is selec-
tionist, not essentialist (Palmer & Donahoe,
1992). That is, the object of study for be-
havior analysis is behavior itself whereas for
mainstream psychology behavior is merely
a means for drawing inferences about pre-
sumed underlying structures and processes.
For essentialist psychology, behavior is akin
to the shadows on the walls of Plato’s cave
that revealed—in partial and distorted fash-
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to John W. Donahoe at Department of Psychological
and Brain Sciences, Tobin Hall, University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003 or by email at jdonahoe@
psych.umass.edu
causal agency to explain actions) around
them, they will be able to have their cake
and eat it too.
References
Cipani, E. (2004). Punishment on trial: A
resource guide to child discipline. Reno,
NV: Context Press.
Gershoff, E.T. (2002). Corporal punish-
ment by parents and associated child be-
haviors and experiences: A meta-analytic
and theoretical review. Psychological Bul-
letin, 128, 539-579.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
ion—the true nature of the forms that pro-
duced them. For mainstream psychology, the
true forms are entities such as memory and
knowledge in cognitive psychology, habits
and associations in learning, attitudes and
traits in social psychology, and so on.
Many specific differences arise from
the selectionist-essentialist distinction.
First among them is that behavior analysis
regards selection by reinforcement as the
key insight into the origins of behavior.
For behavior analysis the following anal-
ogy holds: Reinforcement is to behavior
analysis as natural selection is to evolution-
ary biology (Donahoe, 1983). Mainstream
psychology lacks overarching principles.
 Commentaries and Replies
In their stead, domain-specific inferred enti-
ties are proposed of which behavior is the
reflection. From the selectionist perspective,
the population of variants upon which rein-
forcement acts is the behavioral repertoire
of a single individual. From the essentialist
perspective, the inferred entities are revealed
by averaging measures of performance across
groups of individuals. Individual differences
simply obscure the inferred entities. It is iron-
ic that mainstream psychology has adopted
methods appropriate for studying the effects
of natural selection--average measures of the
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behavior of groups of different individu-
als— and not those appropriate for studying
selection by reinforcement—measures of the
behavior of single individuals.
A second specific difference that flows
from the selectionist-essentialist distinction is
between experimental analysis and scientific
interpretation (Skinner, 1957). In experi-
mental analysis, observations are obtained
under conditions in which all relevant ante-
cedents of a phenomenon are manipulated
or controlled and all relevant effects of those
manipulations are measured. Although no
experiment satisfies these idealized condi-
tions fully, some approximate them closely
and such experiments permit the discovery of
functional relations from which fundamental
principles are formulated. Most of the experi-
ments of mainstream psychology provide—at
most—data for interpretation and not for
uncovering basic principles. Such experimen-
tal and naturalistic observations are the arena
in which the implications of fundamental
principles are evaluated. In behavior analysis,
if observations cannot be reconciled with ex-
tant principles, then new experimental analy-
ses are conducted to refine the fundamental
principles. In contrast, when mainstream
psychology discovers that existing inferred
processes are inconsistent with present obser-
vations, new processes are inferred from those
same observations (cf. Donahoe & Palmer,
1994, pp. 9-10). An additional temptation
to circular reasoning emerges when the
experimental procedures remain basically
41
unchanged: This allows reliability of infer-
ence to be mistaken for validity of principle.
In short, although behavior analysis and
mainstream psychology may address the same
subject matter—the behavior of organisms—
their approaches are irreconcilably different.
What to Do About Irreconcilable
Differences?
In spite of the far-reaching differences
between behavior analysis and mainstream
psychology, I oppose trying to institutional-
ize their separation. Even if successfu—and
I share Skinner’s earlier expressed doubt—an
inordinate amount of time and effort would
be required. Time would be better spent
refining our principles and interpreting
their implications for behavior, especially
the complex behavior of humans. Behavior
analysis now finds itself in much the same
position that natural selection occupied
before its biological mechanisms (genetics)
were discovered (Gayon, 1992). Over 70
years elapsed between publication of The
origin of species and the general acceptance of
natural selection within biology. This period
has been called the eclipse of Darwinism
(Bowler, 1983) and behavior analysis now
regrettably finds itself in a comparable posi-
tion. However, we may hope for our eventual
triumph if the parallel holds.
A few prominent mainstream psycholo-
gists have questioned their approach (e.g.,
Hintzman, 1992) but they are a very small
minority. At present, behavior analysis is “the
voice of one crying in the wilderness” (Mark
1:3). Until the light of experimental analysis
falls on the behavioral landscape un-occluded
by mainstream psychology, what can be
done? Two temporizing solutions occur to
me. First, behavior analysis can be sustained
within psychology departments if programs
in applied behavior analysis recruit some
experimental analysts into their faculty. Un-
like mainstream psychology where the divide
between experimental and applied science is
often problematic, experimental and applied
 42 Commentaries and Replies
behavior analysis enjoy congenial relations.
Indeed, exceptional persons have expertise
in both aspects of the discipline. Medical
schools follow this model when clinical fac-
ulty is supplemented by basic-science faculty
in fields such as physiology. Second, experi-
mental analysis may be preserved within aca-
demia if behavior analysts are also educated
in related disciplines such as neuropsychol-
ogy, neuroscience, and computer science.
Indeed, these disciplines.would benefit if the
selectionism of behavior analysis replaced the
essentialism of mainstream psychology (cf.,
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Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
References
Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003).
Philosophical foundations of neuroscience.
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Bowler, P. J. (1983). The eclipse of Darwin-
ism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to John W. Donahoe
Donahoe points out a number of problems
with psychology, making a convincing argu-
ment that behavior analysis and psychology
are, not just incompatible, but contradictory
disciplines; with many specific differences
arising from the distinction between selection-
ism and essentialism. He clearly explains how
this distinction between the two disciplines is
manifested in many different ways.
Next, Donahoe asks rhetorically: “What
to do about irreconcilable differences?” In the
remainder of his commentary he proceeds to
address this question—commencing with a
shot over the bow: “In spite of the far-reaching
differences between behavior analysis and
mainstream psychology, I oppose trying to
institutionalize their separation.” As men-
Donahoe, J. W. (1983, August). A plausible
analogy: Reinforcement theory : Cognitive
psychology :: Natural selection : Special
creationism. Invited address, American
Psychological Association, Anaheim, CA.
Donahoe, J. W. & Palmer, D. C. (1994).
Learning and Complex Behavior. Boston,
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Gayon, J. (1992). Darwin’s struggle for sur-
vival (trans. Matthew Cobb). Cambridge,
United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press.
Hintzman, D. L. (1992). 25 years of learning
and memory: Was the cognitive revolution
a mistake? In D. E. Meyer & S. Kornblum
(Eds.), Attention and performance XIV (pp.
358-391). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Palmer, D. C. & Donahoe, J. W. (1992). Es-
sentialism and selectionism in cognitive
science and behavior analysis. American
Psychologist, 47, 1344-1358.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New
York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
tioned in my reply to Palmer, depending
upon the academic setting and its institu-
tional arrangements, to be productive it may
be necessary for applied or basic behavioral
researchers to have their own department or
institute, thereby facilitating their teaching
and research efforts. Doing so, however,
deprives students in applied program of the
invaluable experience that an operant lab
offers. In another setting, the psychological
and behavioral faculty may get along just fine
within one department and—as Donahoe
noted—where amenable, collaborate on
shared research projects. But to insist that
this is the only way go is a bit abrupt. By
advocating such an arrangement, Donahue
appears to be contradicting himself.
 Commentaries and Replies
Donahoe goes on to maintain that the
experimental analysis of behavior be situated
within the appropriate academic environ-
ment if the behavioral researcher is suffi-
ciently acquainted with another discipline
such as neuropsychology, neuroscience, or
computer science. Moreover, he adds, it
could be mutually advantageous if these dis-
ciplines worked with behavioral researchers
who are interested in selectionism, replacing
the essentialism of mainstream psychology.
I would concur that such collaboration—
whether it’s with a psychologist who is willing
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to set aside theorizing about homunculi or a
neurobiologist interested in studying behav-
ioral processes at the neuronal level—could
yield amazing results. Perhaps Donahoe is
generalizing from his personal experiences at
his university. Yet, he has not made a global
case for either separating from, or combining
with, psychologists in conducing behavioral
research. It should be apparent that condi-
tions might vary radically from one university
to another.
With regard to the purpose of the com-
mentaries, Donahoe apparently did not grasp
the theme that the Ulman-Skinner letters
convey. My letters to Skinner expostulated
that attempts to reform psychology—to
transform it into a natural science in which
there were no supposed inner agencies postu-
lated to explain behavior—was a futile effort.
Our time would be better spent advancing
the science of behavioral contingencies—
what I prefer to call behaviorology—concep-
tually, experimentally, and technologically.
43
Doing so has nothing to do with whether or
not Skinnerian scientists and practitioners
are housed in separate departments, in a
single department, or elsewhere. What does
matter is the extent of administrative power
that psychologists hold over behavior analysts
under them.
Donahoe appears not to appreciate how
bureaucratic power held by a department
chair or higher-level administrator may not
be exercised in the best interest of behavioral
faculty members or advancement of the be-
havioral program. As an example (details of
which will not be disclosed): In a certain
college of education, a department chair ap-
pointed an influential faculty member as the
director of the graduate program in autism
and applied behavior analysis, even though
that appointee was a psychologist with little
or no formal training in behavior analysis, let
alone not being a Board Certified Behavior
Analyst. It wasn’t very long thereafter that
there was a 30% drop in the number of
online graduate students passing the BCAB
exam. QED.
In sum, Donahoe makes an excellent
case that the two sciences—psychology and
Skinnerian science—are radically different
in conceptual framework such as essentialist
versus selectionist, experimental technique,
and the like and are irreconcilable. But he
ends up by stating that he opposes “trying to
institutionalize their separation.” Too late!
There are already several departments of be-
havior analysis—institutionalized separation
has already occurred.
 44 Commentaries and Replies
Independence for the Natural Science of Behavior
in the Context of Cultural Evolution
Lawrence E. Fraley
West Virginia University (Retired)
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As the natural sciences emerged, roughly
between the 16th and 20th centuries, their
advocates struggled to establish the natural
sciences as tolerated aspects of the culture,
including the naturalistic philosophy that
informed them—a substantial challenge
insofar as those sciences from their outset
resulted in contradictions to the supersti-
tious ideas that pervaded the culture. The
fate of Giordano Bruno implied the kind of
sociopolitical contingencies with which early
members of the natural science community
had to contend. Eventually, products of the
natural sciences proved so practical that those
sciences became invaluable even to people
whose lives were much influenced by super-
stitious alternatives to scientific objectivity.
Over time the two sides tended philo-
sophically to purify their ranks, although
with only partial success. As the seperated
the natural sciences and organized super-
stition were increasingly recognized to be
philosophically incompatible, and they
eventually drifted into what amounted to
a kind of tacit compromise that emerged
as a natural characteristic of their troubled
relation: Human behavior, as a phenom-
enon, was more or less ceded to the forces
of organized superstition, which had long
maintained a kind of cultural strangle-hold
on it anyhow. That was an easy give-away
for the natural science community, insofar as
up to the early 1900s, little scientific progress
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Lawrence Fraley at lfraley@citlink.net
had been made with respect to behavioral
phenomena. As an aspect of that accom-
modation, physics, chemistry, and biology
retreated into their own academic niche,
withdrawing as unthreateningly as possible
from the sociopolitical stage while relying
on the growing utility of their products to
ensure their protection within the culture.
The demarcation of objective and
superstitious forms of inquiry remained
sufficiently blurred for some superstitious
people to remain in the organized natural
sciences via an approach that has been
called “compartmentalization”. Their ob-
jective scientific activities simply pertained
to issues that remained largely irrelevant
to the forces of organized superstition to
which their often more fundamental loyalty
pertained. As long as their professional
scientific operations seemed to be without
adverse implications for the superstitious
ideology that controlled other important
aspects of their lives they could operate
comfortably within a scientific community
that tended to tolerate their presence with
equanimity.
However, when eventually, during the
first half of the 1900s, the natural science
community began to make progress toward
a natural science of behavior, an old if often
latent and quite troublesome ethical issue
began to be highlighted in an increasingly
unavoidable way. Many individuals, who
were superstitious in some very fundamen-
tal ways that pertained to human behavior,
had nevertheless been attempting to claim
 Commentaries and Replies
natural science credentials in some non-
behavioral field of inquiry. However, as a
natural science of behavior emerged, such
people, while openly pursuing their own in-
nocuous natural science specialization, were
more frequently revealed to be completely
disrespectful of the work of natural science
colleagues who were toiling in behavior-
related specializations. A question was thus
raised, in general, throughout the natural sci-
ence community: How are members of the
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natural science community to regard the sci-
entific and professional status of a colleague
who lives a substantial aspect of his or her life
in superstitious disregard of the respectable
work of natural science colleagues in certain
other fields? …Or, what should be the status
within the natural science community in
general, of a colleague who disrespectfully
rejects a whole behavioral field of natural
science in favor of some superstitiously in-
formed alternative that purports to account
exclusively for behavioral phenomena?
During the past century both sides
have moved vigorously to consolidate their
respective cultural domains. Those natural
scientists who focus on behavior have moved
aggressively on two fronts: The neural
physiologists have worked, primarily at the
analytical level of physics and chemistry, to
explain how behavioral events occur within
the bodies that mediate them, while another
group of natural scientists, working from
foundations adduced largely by B. F. Skin-
ner and operating primarily at a correlative
level of analysis, has explained in ever greater
detail why behavior occurs.
At the same time, the forces of organized
superstition, operating with a substantial
majority, have consolidated their grip on
human culture. Throughout the past cen-
tury they have invested heavily in their own
academic institutions, the curricula in which
remain tightly controlled to insure their hew
to a prescribed unobjective ideology. In ad-
dition, their largely successful infiltration of
more secular educational institutions was ac-
complished by acquiring informal academic
45
control of the “social sciences,” in part by
indorsing their preferred secular founda-
tional “science,” which, around the start of
the twentieth century, began to emerge from
philosophy under the rubric of psychology.
In academic institutions Psychology depart-
ments, located among the Social Sciences,
provided a foundational or basic “science”
for the forces of organized superstition and,
within academia, remained somewhat isolat-
ed from the existing natural sciences, which
typically were housed elsewhere on campus
as part of a different administrative chain.
A few decades later the fledgling Skinnerian
science began to develop within psychology,
but with relatively few advocates it remained
politically too weak to disrupt the scheme
of the ongoing sociopolitical arrangement.
The physicists, chemists, and biolo-
gists, while enjoying their organization-
ally protected isolation within academic
institutions, were mostly left alone merely
to grumble ineffectively about the “soft sci-
ences,” a euphemistic phrase that connotes
inferior intellectual quality.
Perhaps the most encompassing charac-
teristic of the developing psychology field
was its multidisciplinary inclusiveness, a
characteristic that precluded disciplinary
integrity in that field. Within academic in-
stitutions, where subject matter has tended
to trump personal philosophy, the typically
few philosophically objective naturalists
who studied environment-behavior rela-
tions were routinely relegated to those dis-
ciplinarily motley psychology departments.
Others, also with an interest in the “causes”
of behavior, whose professional activities
occurred under the control of superstitious
ideology and typically forming a substan-
tial majority, were also placed within the
purview of psychology as fully credentialed
academics. In some cases they entertained
common secular versions of superstitious
foundations, the supernatural aspects of
which went largely unnoticed (as when the
agential soul is replaced by an equally mysti-
cal agential self ).
 46 Commentaries and Replies
This latent strategy of cultural man-
agement was partly concealed by a rather
intense exploitation of the prevailing if indis-
criminate academic ethic of tolerance for “all
pointes of view.” Importantly, for psychol-
ogy departments this institutionalized ethic
offered the advantage of political control
over the scientifically objective minority.
In today’s academic scene, psychology,
instead of representing a field unified around
an integral discipline, is built around a
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collection of theories that respectively are
informed by diverse philosophies. Ongo-
ing scientific operations may be informed
by assumptions derived either mystically
or objectively. But above all, a psychology
department is a political instrument by
which faculty members who operate ac-
cording to objectively informed science are
rather easily kept to a politically ineffective
minority simply by allocating to them their
“fair” number of the available positions,
which translates to “few.” This tactic is
facilitated by relegating the natural science
of environment/behavior relations to the
status of “another psychological theory” the
followers of which are then entitled to their
(small) place among all of the other resident
theorists. This kind of resolution tends to
be enforced by administrators at all levels.
In such settings of philosophical disparity,
the objective arguments that characterize the
natural sciences remain ineffective insofar as
that form of persuasion requires a common
philosophical foundation.
The field of psychology, in which some
natural scientists of behavior have long
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Lawrence E. Fraley
Lawrence Fraley begins by placing the
development of the natural sciences and
their philosophical foundations within the
context of cultural evolution. He alludes to
tried to effect change, is characterized by
far more than mere bad science awaiting the
introduction of some better science. The
field of psychology serves as a sociopolitical
instrument that, so far, has had little diffi-
culty in keeping the interfering influence of
natural science under control by disguising
the nature of the challenges that it poses to
natural science intruders. Furthermore, the
psychological establishment, some time ago,
lulled the naïve natural scientists of behavior/
environment relations into transferring the
long-standing name of their field (behavior
analysis) to organized psychology. Arguably,
that label will not readily be returned to an
independently organizing group of natural
scientists in any divorce settlement with psy-
chology. After all, that name will be needed
for those behavior analysts whose allegiance
is too much to the cultural mainstream to
deviate independently from its course and
therefore will remain cautiously under the
psychological yoke.
Genuine natural scientists of behavior/
environment relations arguably should stop
embarrassing the organized natural science
community and move decisively away from
psychology. They will be welcome to join
those who left years ago to establish a fully
independent natural science field. With
respect to academic affiliation, the natural
science of behavior/environment relations
belongs with the other natural sciences—an
establishment from which it can serve as the
valid and comprehensive foundation for ap-
plied social sciences, which thereby would
become worthy of that categorization.
the struggle to establish the natural sciences
within a culture imbrued with superstition.
This promising beginning suggests a discus-
sion of the conflicts between contemporary
 Commentaries and Replies
psychology and the natural science of be-
havior. But then Fraley proceeds to mention
organized superstition repeatedly, but with-
out giving it much of an account—convey-
ing the impression of some kind of specter
that stymies the development of the natural
sciences. Just how this comes about is not
mentioned. Conversely, he discusses con-
comitant advances in the natural sciences
and their guiding philosophical precepts.
The nature of the culture remains an empty
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abstraction. The focus of this review is to
suggest some content to fill in this abstrac-
tion, something beyond a vague “organized
superstition.”
In general, Fraley’s account of the
cultural evolution of the natural sciences
leaves out their common ground: the ma-
terial conception of the world, an evolving
conception that goes back to the ancient
Greeks—richly expressed in the epic poem
The Nature of the Universe by the Ro-
man poet and philosopher, Lucretius, in
50 BCE. The conflicting coexistence of
organized superstitions are not free float-
ing entities within an evolving culture, but
part of an ideology that supports control
exercised by the rulers of given society,
the antithesis of which is the materialistic
philosophies emerging from the develop-
ment of the natural sciences. In short,
the age-old struggle between materialistic
and idealistic philosophical perspectives.
Marxist materialistic dialectics has an apt
term for this struggle: the interpenetration
of opposites. In this case it is the ongoing
conflict between organized superstition and
knowledge of the real world illuminated by
scientific advancements.
Consider the greatest transformation of
the means of production in human history,
the sanguinary change from feudal to bour-
geois society—from the dominance of the
Catholic Church through the middle ages,
followed by the Renaissance and Protestant
Reformation, to the capitalist society to the
present day. Still notwithstanding the explo-
sion of scientific knowledge, and in spite of
47
low church attendance, the great majority
of people continue to hold supernatural
beliefs (e.g., creationism)—especially in
the United States—irrespective of scientific
evidence to the contrary. With the growth
of capitalism and its ever-expanding drive
for profits—and, hence, increased produc-
tivity—the development of the natural
sciences continues to accelerate. And
concurrently, the social sciences continue
to expand; largely, they help maintain the
status quo (e.g., clinical psychology sees
mental illness largely as a disease rather than
a dysfunctional social system.
Like intelligent-design creationism and
Darwinian theory, the gulf between psy-
chology and behavior analysis/behaviorol-
ogy remains unbridgeable. For psychology,
it is an agency (whether called person, self,
ego, or any such) with its attendant features
of mind, consciousness, intentions, and so
on. For behaviorology, our subject matter
is the contingent relations between proper-
ties of actions and other events. So what
are the basic differences? Examples help.
Here is one that Phillip Hineline (1984)
found: “For cognitivists, functional rela-
tions between environment and behavior
are not explanatory. No amount of order
among observables will satisfy the desire to
discover internal processes, through which
the environment influences behavior (Wes-
sells, 1982, p.75)” (p. 98). Wessells argues
that just as investigations of the relation-
ships between physiology and behavior are
complementary undertakings, so are those
between psychology that supposedly un-
derlie behavior—both are presumed to be
distinctly complimentary. Hineline refutes
this claim without question: “When inter-
preting within one rubric, one is not inter-
preting within the other” (p. 98). While
this obscurantism expands, the character
of the natural sciences becomes more and
more compelling—and the divide deepens.
To conclude, within the community
of behavior analysts there are a variety of
philosophies that purport to be the one
 48 Commentaries and Replies
and only valid guide for the science that
Skinner launched. In reality, it’s a hodge-
podge of contradictions, beginning with
Willard Day’s (Leigland, 1992) argument
that the foundational philosophy underly-
ing Skinner’s science is pragmatism. The big
ideological advantage of pragmatism is that
only practical consequences count regardless
of the objective reality. At the other extreme
is mechanistic version of radical behavior-
ism, essentially a contemporary version of
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methodological behaviorism. Hence, the
term radical behaviorism has become so am-
biguous that it has lost all meaning. Being a
behaviorologist, I opt for an integrated ma-
Looking Backward and Forward: Comments on
Ulman (1993/2014) and Skinner (1993/2014)
Sigrid S. Glenn
University of North Texas
Jerry Ulman’s correspondence with B
F. Skinner during the late 1980’s (Ulman,
1993/2014), ending only months before
Skinner’s death, is on topics of current as
well as historical interest. As one of about
20 people who met at ABA to form The
International Behaviorology Association in
the early 1980’s, I recall the general concern
of attendees about the failure of Skinner’s
science to thrive in psychology and the
need to establish an independent identity.
In the paragraphs that follow, I will com-
ment on three of the topics included in the
Ulman/Skinner correspondence (Ulman,
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Sigrid Glenn at sglenn@unt.edu.
terialistic and selectionistic (contra mecha-
nistic) behaviorism. However, an adequate
explication of behavioral materialism—the
name of the scientific philosophy that guides
behaviorology—must await another time.
References
Hineline, P. N. (1984). Can a statement in
cognitive terms be a behavior-analytic
interpretation? The Behavior Analyst, 7,
97-100.
Leigland, S. (1992). Radical behaviorism:
Willard Day on psychology and philosophy.
Oakland, CA: Context Press.
1993/2014) and the published version of
Skinner’s last address to the Association for
Behavior Analysis (Skinner, 1993/2014). I
will end by suggesting a way forward.
Naming Skinner’s Science
Skinner’s science has been called a sci-
ence of behavior, the experimental analysis of
behavior, operant psychology, behavior analysis,
praxics, and behaviorology. Why so many
names? A cursory look at history offers some
possible reasons.
In the first sentence of The Behavior of
Organisms (1938), Skinner identified his
topic as “a science of behavior”. It was not
the only time he phrased his field that way.
 Commentaries and Replies
In the subtitle of that book, Skinner identi-
fied the method of his science as experimental
analysis. Following publication of the book, a
number of young experimental psychologists
gravitated to Skinner’s science of behavior–at
first, mostly at Teachers College, Columbia
University (Keller, 1986). They were soon
called operant psychologists to distinguish
them from the majority of experimental psy-
chologists and their subfield became known
among psychologists in general as operant
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psychology. The founding of The Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior in 1958
was formal recognition that “Skinnerians”
had chosen the name experimental analysis
of behavior to designate their field.
Skinner’s interest in “making over psy-
chology” (all of psychology) became apparent
with the publication of Science and Human
Behavior in 1953. There he re-interpreted in
his own terms virtually everything covered
in psychology curricula. Whereas Behavior
of Organisms lit a fire among a small group
of experimental psychologists, Science and
Human Behavior attracted people in many
subfields of psychology as well as some in
other disciplines. It offered not only coher-
ence to a splintered psychology but also an
avenue to solving real world problems. Skin-
ner’s experimental analysis of the behavior of
individuals was ideally suited for investigating
solutions to everyday problems of human
behavior. But where would scientists pursu-
ing such investigations publish their results?
Even though the applied research was
experimental, neither the venues nor the
goals of that research were consistent with
JEAB interests. Nor was that research
readily welcomed by applied psychology
journals. Thus, in 1968, the Journal of Ap-
plied Behavior Analysis (JABA) was born.
The title of the new journal may have been
the first institutional recognition of the term
behavior analysis.
The 1974 founding of Midwestern Asso-
ciation for Behavior Analysis (soon to be de-
regionalized as ABA–Association for Behavior
Analysis) and the enthusiasm of its members
49
probably guaranteed that the name behavior
analysis would be used to cover all work in
the Skinnerian tradition: basic research, ap-
plied research, philosophy of that science,
scientific interpretation, history of the field,
and interventions based on operant research.
The annual gathering of people with this
broad range of interests, having in common a
commitment to Skinner’s science, suggested
to many that a new discipline was being born.
Indeed, Nathan Azrin said as much in his 1975
presidential address (Vaughan, 1978).
During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s at-
tendees at ABA conventions debated whether
Skinner’s science was a different discipline than
psychology or one of many fields in psychol-
ogy. The terms praxics and behaviorology were
argued for as the appropriate name for the dis-
cipline that de facto existed, whether its adher-
ents were housed in psychology departments
or not. Some of those who favored separation
met to form The International Behaviorology
Association in order to advance that agenda.
Most of them later concluded that the behavior
analysis moniker was a bird in the hand.
Sorting Out Relations Between
Behavior Analysis and Psychology
The Ulman/Skinner correspondence, as
well as the “name debates”, intermingled dis-
cussion of two issues, which can be considered
separately. The first issue pertained to whether
Skinner’s science was of the same basic nature
as the rest of what was called pscychology. The
second issue pertained to how best to insure
the survival of Skinner’s scientific enterprise.
Regarding the first component, psychology
was and is typically listed as one of the social
sciences, which seems appropriate given its
scientific methods and its philosophical un-
derpinnings. As behaviorologists and other
separatists claimed, Skinnerian methods and
philosophical underpinnings were much
closer to the natural sciences of biology and
chemistry than to psychology. Skinner’s view
(Ulman, 1993/2014) was that psychology
should be a natural science of behavior - do-
 50 Commentaries and Replies
ing Skinnerian-style research and spawning
Skinnerian-style technologies. Ulman’s view
was that psychology was never going to be a
natural science so if Skinnerian style research
and technologies were going to thrive, they
would only do so by distinguishing themselves
from psychology.
The second component of the debate
pertained to the realities of academia. Most
Skinnerians had appointments in psychology
departments and that is where most of the ex-
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perimental analysis of behavior was conducted.
Faculty were obtaining research funding under
the name of “psychology” and applied work
derived from behavior principles was ongoing
in various “subfields” of psychology (clinical,
educational, etc.). In short, the Skinnerian
program was being kept alive mostly by psy-
chologists, and psychology departments were
the academic homes of most of them. Skin-
ner’s points in Ulman (1993/2014) recognized
these realities.
Academic Homes for Behavior Analysis
Circa 2014
Although behavior analysis has features of a
coherent discipline, it is a long way from being
recognized as such in higher education. Rather
than having a home of its own in academia,
parts of the discipline have been adopted by
a variety of other academic homes including
education, clinical psychology, behavioral
medicine, social work, rehabilitation, and
special education. On the positive side, this
has the effect of increasing the number of
graduates with at least rudimentary knowledge
of behavior analysis. On the negative side,
the drift that Ulman already saw in 1993
may continue in this potpourri of academic
homes until nothing but the name of behavior
analysis remains.
One way to nudge self-identified behavior
analysis programs to offer a disciplinary curric-
ulum is to develop criteria for such programs.
The Association for Behavior Analysis be-
gan such a program in 1993 by establishing
minimal accreditation standards, and those
standards have been revised and improved
since that time. From the perspective of this
writer, a well-established accreditation process
may be the best way to insure behavior analysis
continues its march toward disciplinary status
in higher education.
A few universities have established Depart-
ments of Behavior Analysis, which may be
the beginnings of the academy’s recognition
of behavior analysis as a discipline. It must
be said that institutional resistance to new
disciplines in general, and perhaps to behavior
analysis in particular, means that opportunities
to establish such departments may be few, at
least in the near future. However, opportu-
nities do arise and awareness (or creation) of
them requires openness to the possibilities.
There will likely be fewer such opportunities
in the conservative bastions of Tier 1 univer-
sities than in institutions with less to lose by
investing in controversial upstarts.
A Path Forward
In the 1993/2014 posthumous publica-
tion, Skinner declared his acceptance that
psychology was not going to be “made
over”. His solution was to reverse course:
“We have been accused of building our
own ghetto, of refusing to make contact
with other kinds of psychology. Rather than
break out of the ghetto, I believe we should
strengthen its walls” (p. 24). Note that he
still refers to “other kinds of psychology.”
Earlier in the same paper, he recommended
“a closer engagement with the other so-called
behavioral sciences–sociology, economics,
political science, and all the rest” (p.23). It is
hard to believe that Skinner imagined any of
those “other behavioral sciences” were more
likely to be made over than psychology was.
As he pointed out, “Their formulations are
still largely mentalistic” (p.23). Wasn’t that the
problem he (and Ulman and behavior analysts
in general) had with psychology?
I think that the solution to the problem
of how (and whether) to engage with non-
behavior analysts is to seek relations with
 Commentaries and Replies
scientists in any discipline whose work can
be integrated into the behavior analytic world
view. A recent and outstanding example of
such an approach is Susan Schneider’s “The
Science of Consequences” (2012). Finessing
the problem of naming Skinner’s discipline,
Schneider has made good on Skinner’s admo-
nition to “improve our contacts with the other
behavior sciences” (Skinner, 2014, p.X). Even
better, she has positioned the fundamental
feature of behavior analysis as the centerpiece
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in a broad array of scientific work on selection
by consequences, including evolutionary biol-
ogy, epigenetics, and neuroscience.
Because the social sciences–psychology,
anthropology, economics, political science–are
actually less coherent as disciplines than is
behavior analysis, behavior analysts can engage
discriminatively with particular scientists and
particular works. Those (and there are many)
who eschew internal explanations of behavior
are natural allies of behavior analysis, whether
they know it or not. It may not be necessary
to force recognition of that fact but it is surely
important to engage those allies along that
particular line of fracture.
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Sigrid S. Glenn
My reply to Glenn’s commentary was a
pleasure to write. She has provided what I
would recommend as an excellent introduc-
tion to this special issue in the European
Journal of Behavior Analysis. By combin-
ing information from the Ulman-Skinner
letters and from Skinner (1993), plus her
own contribution in this commentary, she
has produced a comprehensive account of
the development of Skinnerian science, the
milestones, and issues along the way.
Upon reading her commentary, it oc-
curred to me that we could imagine the
evolution of this science as a new, abstract
51
References
Keller, F. S. (1986). A fire in Schermerhorn
Extension. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 139-
146.
Schneider, S. M. (2012). The science of conse-
quences: How they affect genes, change the
brain, and impact our world. Amherst,
NY: Prometheus Books.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organ-
isms. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human
behavior. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
Vaughan, M. E. (1978). The Midwestern
Association on Behavior Analysis: Past,
present, future. The Behavior Analyst, 1,
3-15.
mega-species in the form of changing institu-
tional arrangements vis-a-vis environmental
changes, including our social environment
(i.e., society). The causal mode responsible
for its progress is, of course, selection by
consequences as Skinner (1981/1988) has
described. We begin with operant selection
and expand to cultural selection. Skinner
describes how the practices of a culture are se-
lected and shaped through social contingen-
cies. That is, cultural evolution is largely de-
termined by changes in its infrastructure. So,
as I read it, Glenn has described the evolution
of our science very well—albeit, whether it’s
 52 Commentaries and Replies
called behavior analysis or behaviorology, or
whatever. Undoubtedly, Skinnerian science
will sooner or later become characterized as
the natural science of contingent relations
between actions and events. To follow this
evolution as Glenn describes, we need to
take into consideration a dominant feature
of our culture, one that has had a profound
influence on it’s evolution: the continued
contradictions between materialistic and ide-
alistic views of the world, ideological conflicts
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that go back to the ancient Greeks (Novack,
1965). When we refer to Skinnerian science
as a natural science, it implies that it is a
materialistic science; whereas, because of its
inherent agencyism (behavior under the con-
trol of hypothetical homunculi), mainstream
psychology is an idealistic science (“science”
in the sense of its methodologies). lab experience—due most likely to a lack of
Suggestion: Return to Glenn’s commentary
now and try reading it from the foregoing
standpoint. Doing so should clarify the
“behind the scene” role these two perpetually
clashing ideologies exhibit, the psychology
versus Skinnerian science enmity. One addi-
tional point: Throughout history, the power
of the state has—for the most part—been
supported by idealistic philosophies along
with its repressive apparatus. And that is not
going to go away anytime soon.
Glenn’s commentary begins with the for-
mation of The International Behaviorology
Association, the purpose of which was, in
her words, concern “about Skinner’s science
failing to thrive in psychology— and need to
establish an independent identity.” When we
take into account the origin of psychology—
a residual theme from earlier times when
psyche was synonymous with soul—it estab-
lishes an independent identity that makes
eminent sense. From there on, we see our
science gradually, step-by-step, evolve into
an independent discipline; to wit: its own
basic and applied research journals (largely
due the fact that psychology journals repeat-
edly rejected behavior analytic research), its
separate and independent organization (be-
cause the American Psychology Associations
would not accommodate the convention
needs of the Skinnerians), and a continuation
of the proper name for our science. What
was definitely not considered was behavioral
psychology (a term still commonly used in
departments where the psychologists rule).
In Glenn’s second section, Academic
Homes for Behavior Analysis circa 2014, she
notes that, with a few exceptions, Skin-
nerian science does not have a home of its
own. Glenn herself has been responsible for
creating one of these exceptions: the Depart-
ment of Behavior Analysis at the University
of North Texas—one of a very few such
departments in the world (fewer than fingers
on my left hand). Although the program
includes a course in the experimental analysis
of behavior, I didn’t find mention of operant
funding; unfortunately, an endemic problem
that is chronic across graduate program in
behavior analysis. In my doctoral program I
had the good fortune of having this operant
lab experience. What a shame these labs are
so rare today! Something else I noted about
the UNT program: two behavioral courses
on autism. I mention this because I think
it’s another important factor adding to the
continued growth of our science—making
the public aware of the effectiveness of our
technology and, hopefully, its underlying
discipline. But we still have a long way to
go from here, just as Glenn observed about
being recognized by higher education (i.e.,
the administrators and the politicians who
control the institutions). Relatedly, I agree
with Glenn’s statement: A “well-established
accreditation process may be the best way
to insure behavior analysis continues its
march toward disciplinary status in higher
education.”
In the third (last) section, A Path Forward,
Glenn makes another important point, with
which I also agree: We should seek and join
forces with scientists in other disciplines
whose work can be integrated with our
behavior analytic framework. Glenn ends
by referring to Schneider’s The Science of
 Commentaries and Replies
Consequences (2012): “She has positioned the
fundamental feature of behavior analysis as
the centerpiece in a broad array of scientific
work on selection by consequences, includ-
ing evolutionary biology, epigenetics, and
neuroscience.” For an exemplar, see Hull,
Langman, and Glenn (2001)—the collab-
orative product three authors from three
different natural science disciplines: concep-
tual immunology, evolutionary theory, and
behavior analysis, respectively. Given the
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uncontestable reality of operant processes as
the subject matter of our science, along with
the effectiveness of its technology, its con-
tinual evolution should come as no surprise.
Furthermore, why wouldn’t scientists in those
related natural science areas be interested in
our science?
What Is “Our World”?
Iver H. Iversen
University of North Florida
and
Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences
The letter exchange between B. F. Skin-
ner and J. D. Ulman (Ulman, 1993/2014),
leading up to Skinner’s keynote address at
the Association for Behavior Analysis in
Milwaukee in 1989 (Skinner, 1993/2014),
documents how Skinner’s long held view
that Psychology is the science of behavior
eventually gave way to the view that behav-
ior analysis is or should be separate from
Psychology. Skinner succinctly defined the
“world of our own” as “the analysis of the
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Iver Iversen at iiversen@unf.edu
53
References
Hull, D. L., Langman, R. E., & Glenn, S.
S. (2001). A general account of selection:
Biology, immunology, and behavior. Be-
havioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 511–573.
Novack, G. (1965). The origins of material-
ism. New York, NY: Pathfinder Press.
Skinner, B.F. (1988). Selection by conse-
quences. In A. C. Catania & S. Harnad
(Eds.), The selection of behavior (pp.
11–20). New York, NY: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. (Original work published
1981)
Ulman J. D. (2009). Behaviorology in the
postmodern period. Bulletin of Novosi-
birsk State University. Series: Psychology,
3, 2–40.
behavior of the individual” (Skinner, 2014,
p. 22). In addition, Skinner specified that
Operant conditioning is not trial-and-error
or goal directed behavior. It is a process in
which variations selected by their reinforcing
consequences become part of the repertoire
of the individual. That is our world. (Skinner,
2014, p. 22)
In the Department of Psychology, at Uni-
versity of North Florida, where I have worked
for nearly 30 years, there is a huge poster in the
corridor that says “Department of Psychology.”
A drawing under the title is a human head
 54 Commentaries and Replies
with an open skull featuring an intact brain
with odd lines radiating out from the brain.
The message conveyed by the image is that
Psychology is about the mind and the ner-
vous system. The radiating lines seem to
suggest that the mind or brain controls or
explains behavior. Skinner wanted a science
of behavior without such reference, a science
where the focus is on relating behavior to
controlling variables in the environment of
the individual. With only few exceptions,
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modern behavior analysts have a degree
in Psychology and work at a Department
of Psychology. Given the historically well-
established view that Psychology is the study
of the mind, a possible universal separation or
break of behavior analysis from Psychology is
probably unrealistic in the foreseeable future
because academic politics at universities are
rooted in tradition and serve mainly to main-
tain status quo. Instead, a more universal
science of behavior may over time grow from
cumulative strength created by scientific find-
ings that eventually may necessitate separate
departments or even colleges.
The continuing hegemony of brain con-
trol in Psychology came close to home some
years ago when I was invited to participate
in an interesting project to teach totally
paralyzed ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis)
patients to communicate using their brain-
waves. The patients were outfitted with scalp
electrodes, and their EEG (electroencepha-
lograph) signals were translated by software
to up-down movements of a computer
cursor. The patients could, with individual-
ized training over time, learn to control the
movement of the cursor by altering their
EEG and thereby select information on the
computer screen, such as letters; this learned
ability enabled them to write sentences, al-
beit very slowly. As part of a large research
team, composed of people with very diverse
backgrounds, I had to adapt to their way of
talking about the brain; the team in turn had
to adapt to what I could bring from behavior
analysis such as information about method-
ology, single-case designs, and data analysis.
The project was eventually very successful
(Birbaumer et al., 1999). However, debate
ensued about the terminology used for the
method. Professor Birbaumer had coined the
term “the thought-translation device” as an
easy, short-hand expression for the whole,
fairly complex situation of converting EEG
signals to letters (after substantial patient and
staff training). I objected to the term because
of the unclear reference to thoughts. But even
to friendly colleagues it was not possible to
convey the core of behavior analysis and that
in spite of the success that the methods of
behavior analysis had brought to the project.
Essentially, by conditioning the EEG signals
we were treating the brain activity as a depen-
dent variable (the letters on the monitor or
on paper were an incidental outcome hard-
wired by the methodology), but in publica-
tions and presentations, the brain was offered
as the independent variable that controlled
the letters–the paralyzed patient’s thoughts
made the letters appear on the monitor. Be-
cause I had worked hard to enable infusion
of single-case methodology to the project, I
proudly joined as a coauthor on a paper by
the team even though I reluctantly had to
swallow the title: “The thought-translation
device (TTD) for completely paralyzed
patients” (Birbaumer et al., 2000). I learned
that it was necessary, temporarily, to adapt
to unwanted terminology in a complex aca-
demic situation to have some part of behavior
analysis methodology contribute positively to
that same situation (Iversen, 2013a). Indeed,
methodology and vocabulary from behavior
analysis was eventually adopted by several of
the colleagues. Similarly, a recent interview
with Dr. E. Taub, who developed refined be-
havioral methods for rehabilitation of stroke
victims, illustrates how he had to adopt
terminology from neuroscience to have his
purely behavioral methods accepted within
that area of application (Iversen, 2013b).
Contemporary behavior analysis is a high-
ly diversified field of study within which one
finds several seemingly conflicting approaches.
Just two examples are provided here.
 Commentaries and Replies
One example is the contrast between the ad-
vocates for the use of response-independent
reinforcement delivery to suppress undesir-
able behavior and the advocates for the use
of response-dependent procedures to create
desirable behavior, which in turn may sup-
press undesirable behavior. Using response-
independent procedures actually fly in the
face of Skinner’s long held view that the
ethical treatment of children with disability
is to provide them with behavior that can de-
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liver the goods they need (Skinner, 1975; see
also Iversen, 2005). Another example is the
growing molarization of behavioral choice
data where huge amounts of data collected
over differing environmental conditions are
condensed to single numbers of theoretical
interest. This approach contrasts with Skin-
ner’s frequent reminders that “operant condi-
tioning explains how the individual changes
from moment to moment during its lifetime”
(Skinner, 2014, p. 22). Many additional
contrasting, if not irreconcilable, examples
could be listed from both basic and applied
work. While contrasting, these approaches
still have the common core of single-case
methodology, the science for the individual
subject. Behavior analysis is not just the col-
lective, rivaling preferences or pet theories of
the particular scientists or practitioners in the
area. More broadly, behavior analysis is a set
of methods to study and modify behavior.
Those methods get refined and strengthened
with use and eventually transcend individual
people and particular contemporary issues
and survive past the short life of theories (Sid-
man, 1960). Skinner suggested that: ”once
they [neuroscientists] have appreciated the
value of the operant methodology, they are
more likely to become allies in promoting
behaviorism as the philosophy of such a sci-
ence” (Skinner, 2014, p. 23). Indeed, a recent
two-volume handbook of behavior analysis
(Madden et al., 2013) published by the
American Psychological Association, which
Ulman and Skinner exchanged comments
on (Ulman, 1993/2014), features as many as
nine chapters on single-case research designs.
55
While it is unlikely that any new depart-
ment will be named “Department of Single-
Case Designs,” it is through development of
sound single-case methodology that behavior
analysis advances. Eventually, through col-
laborations between behavior analysts and
scientists in other disciplines, as the example
above suggests, behavior analysis methods
become better known and find use in diverse
areas of application. And that is maybe the an
effective way to present Our World to others.
References
Birbaumer, N., Ghanayim, N., Hinterberger,
T., Iversen, I., Kotchoubey, B., Kuebler,
A., Flor, H. (1999). A spelling device for
the paralyzed. Nature, 398, 297-298.
Birbaumer, N., Kuebler, A., Ghanayim,
N., Hinterberger, T., Perelmouter, J.,
Kaiser, J., Flor, H. (2000). The thought-
translation device (TTD) for completely
paralyzed patients. IEEE Transactions on
Rehabilitation and Engineering, 8, 190-
193.
Iversen, I. H. (2005). Basic research, ap-
plication, ethics, and recommendations
regarding non-contingent reinforcement
procedures. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 6, 83-88.
Iversen, I. H. (2013a). Single-case research
methods: An overview. In G. J. Madden
et al. (Eds.), APA handbook of behavior
analysis, volume 2: Methods and principles
(pp.3-32). New York, NY: American
Psychological Association.
Iversen, I. H. (2013b). Constraints-induced
therapy as behavior analysis neuroreha-
bilitation: An interview with Dr. Edward
Taub. European Journal of Behavior Analy-
sis, 14, 361-384.
Madden, G. J. et al. (Eds). (2013). APA
handbook of behavior analysis, volume 2:
Methods and principles. New York, NY:
American Psychological Association.
Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of scientific re-
search. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Skinner, B. F. (1975). The ethics of help-
 56 Commentaries and Replies
ing people. Criminal Law Bulletin, 11,
623–636.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Iver H. Iversen
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Iver Iversen begins where Skinner left off,
concurring with Ulman’s (1993/2014) view
that the science Skinner began will inevitably
separate from psychology and become an
independent science, standing on its own ma-
terial foundation. Meanwhile, because of its
history, Skinnerian science exists for the most
part as an adjunct discipline, most commonly
in psychology departments. We don’t speak
the same language, manipulate the same
kinds of independent variables, measure the
same kinds of dependent variables, or even
have the same conceptions of causation. There
are a couple of reasons to remind ourselves
of the parallels we have with biology; better
yet, remind ourselves that our science in fact
derived from biology. First, it will keep us
going in spite of the alien environment in
which we may have to work—again, typi-
cally in psychology departments. Second, be
assured that eventually—although there is not
crystal ball to let us know as to when—what
I prefer to call behaviorology will stand on its
own, just as biology does.
It may require profound social changes,
but because behaviorology is the study of rela-
tions between actions of living organisms and
events, such study will be ongoing. Further-
more, these relational actions, the combined
result of natural selection and contingency
selection (including verbal relations), will
persist as long as the human species exist.
On the other hand, there is nothing assur-
ing us that psychology and the related social
science will continue to exist as disciplines.
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
Remember that the psych in psychology
comes from psyche, a term from ancient
Greece meaning whatever left a warrior
when he was slain on the battlefield (see
Jaynes, 1976). Thus, by understanding
the role ideology plays in maintaining the
status quo in this society, we may come to
comprehend why psychology as well as the
psychological content in present-day social
sciences continue to exist as they do.
Similar to Iversen’s view, I think that
eventually, through collaborations between
Skinnerian scientists and other natural
scientists, we will become better known
and more widely accepted by the popula-
tion. What will pave the way is that we
all are natural scientists and essentially
speaking the same language—that is, the
variables that control operant behavior
may be physical, chemical, biological, and
even sociocultural, if they are conceptually
grounded materialistically. Of course, when
the variables we are investigating happen to
be the subject matter of a given natural sci-
ence, we will be employing that discipline’s
scientific terminology and knowledge of the
phenomenon of interest. That means Skin-
nerian science and these other sciences are
naturally interrelated—the interpenetration
earlier mentioned in another commentary.
Perhaps this is the most effective way to dis-
seminate Our World to others who would
appreciate what we do.
Equally important would be a wider
recognition within our society of the mag-
 Commentaries and Replies
nitude of the behavior-change technology
that derives from our science. To illustrate,
the three-volume Encyclopedia of Behav-
ior Modification and Cognitive Behavior
Therapy (Gross & Drabman, 2005; Herson
& Rosqvist, 2005; Sugai & Horner, 2005)
covers 1,611pages, with each intervention
ranging from 1 to 9 pages (with an estimated
mode of 3 to 4 pages each). Iversen makes
the import point that
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Behavior analysis is not just the collective
rivaling preferences or pet theories of the
particular scientists or practitioners in the
area. More broadly, behavior analysis is a set
of methods to study and modify behavior.
Those methods get refined and strengthened
with use and eventually transcend individual
people and particular contemporary issues
and survive past the short life of theories
(Sidman, 1960)
Iversen also emphasizes the importance
of our methodology (e.g., single-subject
experimental designs) in achieving these
outstanding achievements. I will end here
with a question worth pondering: Why
is it that the scientific and technological
advances such as those of the NASA space
program receive such notoriety, while so
many people require an explanation when
we tell them we are behavior analyst or
behaviorologist? Ironically, the application
of our science and technology to everyday
problems can offer so much to the public, yet
the public knows so little about it. We should
ask, what are the primary sources from
which the public “learns about” Skinner
and the science he brought into existence.
A significant factor to consider is that
57
mainstream psychologists commonly have
animosity toward Skinnerians. For these
psychologists, Skinnerian science is a defi-
nite threat. For compelling evidence of this
fact, see Burgess and Jensen’s (1997) review
of psychology textbooks (available online:
http://bit.ly/1icGpIL; also see the authors’
interview in Yabuki, 2014).
References
Gross, A. M., & Drabman, R. S. (Eds.).
(2005). Encyclopedia of behavior modifica-
tion and cognitive behavior therapy, Vol.2:
Clinical child applications. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage
Herson, M., & Rosqvist, J. (Eds.). (2005).
Encyclopedia of behavior modification and
cognitive behavior therapy, Vol.1: Adult
clinical applications. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage
Jaynes, J. (1976). The origin of consciousness
in the breakdown of the bicameral mind.
NY: Houghton Mifflin.
Jensen, R., & Burgess, H. (1997). Mythmak-
ing: how introductory psychology texts
present B.F. Skinner’s analysis of cogni-
tion. Psychological Record, 47, 221–232.
Sugai, G., & Horner, G. (Eds.). (2005). Ency-
clopedia of behavior modification and cog-
nitive behavior therapy, Vol. 3: Educational
applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
Yabuki, K. (2014). Skinner’s science and
psychology. Operants, Quarter 1, 12–16.
 58 Commentaries and Replies
Collaboration not Isolation
Brian D. Kangas
McLean Hospital, Harvard Medical School
As a student of behavior I had the good
fortune to train in a range of academic envi-
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ronments. I was first introduced to behavior
analysis studying under the lone behaviorist
in a department of psychology. My world
changed dramatically when I left to pursue
a master’s degree in the first accredited de-
partment of behavior analysis, which was
completely divorced from the department of
psychology. After that, I returned to a psy-
chology department to complete my Ph.D.
but was largely protected within an area of
behavior analysis. Most recently, I assumed
a junior faculty role in a highly productive
and dynamic medical school. Each experi-
ence has shaped my repertoire in unique and
important ways, which forms the basis of my
concerns regarding an isolationist approach.
In short, we need a strong presence in all are-
nas that involve behavioral science including,
but not limited to, departments of behavior
analysis, economics, education, ethology,
evolutionary biology, pharmacology, psychol-
ogy, special education, and medical schools.
As readers of this journal will surely agree,
basic behavioral processes are ubiquitous
and, therefore, behavior analysis should be
everywhere. But this sentiment alone does
not quite capture the deliberations within
the target articles by Ulman (1993/2014)
and Skinner (1993/2014).
If the pointed question is whether be-
havior analysis is a part of psychology or a
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Brian D. Kangas, Ph.D. Harvard Medical School,
McLean Hospital, 115 Mill Street, Belmont, MA 02478,
USA, Phone: (617) 855-2148, bkangas@mclean.harvard.edu
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by grant
K01-DA035974 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.
separate discipline, my contention is that it
should be a part of psychology. However, my
reasons are based primarily on contemporary
circumstances and pragmatism. Actually,
I am of the belief that a natural science of
behavior generally, and operant conditioning
specifically, is probably best placed within
the realm of physiology. After all, operant
behavior is a physical/biological process. As
the story goes, it was merely an accident of
history (and a superior workshop) that led
Skinner, while a graduate student at Harvard,
to make his initial discoveries of operant
conditioning in E.G. Boring’s department
of psychology rather than W.J. Crozier’s de-
partment of physiology (see Skinner, 1979).
Since then, operant conditioning has always
found a suitable, albeit sometimes uncom-
fortable, home within psychology, much in
the same way as Pavlovian conditioning and
psychophysics. And I’ll argue here that given
recent advancements in neuroscience, there
are more reasons today for behaviorists to
stay aboard than ever before.
My biggest concern with an isolationist
approach is not that it will impede specialized
behavioral research or clinical endeavors. The
first half of my graduate training convinced
me of the profound benefits of a singly-
minded environment. My worry is if we in-
tentionally divorce ourselves from the wider
establishment (i.e., psychology), we will
miss opportunities to engage and influence
the current zeitgeist of behavioral science
which, whether we like it or not, maintains
a significant emphasis on neuroscience.
To be clear, I am not suggesting the role of
behavior analysis is to follow the latest whims
of neuroscience, rather the other way around.
 Commentaries and Replies
Skinner clearly recognized the important in-
terplay between behavior and physiology (re-
viewed in Morris, Lazo, & Smith, 2004; see
also Skinner, 1966) but, more importantly,
he understood the trailblazing role behavior
analysis would command in this relationship.
Unlike other approaches, including highly
speculative cognitive science, basic operant
principles are steadfast in delivering highly
replicable, quantitative, and material units
of behavior that are particularly amenable to
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functional neural analysis. Toward the end
his autobiography’s final volume, Skinner
(1983) stated,
Direct observation of the nervous system
called for special techniques, and I was con-
tent to leave it to the physiologists. Meanwhile
an experimental analysis of behavior would
give them a correct assignment, whereas
cognitive science sent them looking for things
they would never find (p. 367).
These special techniques for direct ob-
servation of the central nervous system have
improved dramatically over the past few
decades and continue to be refined. Electro-
physiology and single-neuron recordings,
ultra high field imaging and spectroscopy
techniques, precision gene editing, optoge-
netics, etc. provide increasingly sophisticated
means to manipulate and measure biological
substrates of behavior. And neuroscientists
have recently, in increasing numbers, be-
gun to recognize the empirical advantages
of studying basic behavioral processes and
contingencies operating on simple organisms
that behavior analysts have long been focused
on. The most obvious example is work by
Eric Kandel, recipient of the 2000 Nobel
Prize in Physiology. His prize-winning re-
search on the physiological basis of neuronal
learning in the Aplysia was first demonstrated
using standard Pavlovian arrangements and,
more recently, standard Skinnerian operant
arrangements (reviewed in Kandel, 2001; see
especially Hawkins, Clark, & Kandel, 2006).
It would be a mistake to let frustrations
of the past temper our collaborative efforts
59
and drive us towards academic isolationism.
As the inventor and entrepreneur Charles F.
Kettering (1876-1958) once remarked,
“First they tell you you’re wrong, and they
can prove it. Then they tell you you’re right,
but it’s not important. Then they tell you it’s
important, but they’ve known it all along.”
More often than ever before, when I visit
elite neuroscience laboratories I observe seas
of white cubes they refer to as Skinner Boxes.
And I listen to earnest discussions of condi-
tioning processes that, although established
and well-studied in the behavioral literature,
have been re-discovered by researchers un-
aware of the experimental analysis of behav-
ior. I am left with the feeling that behavior
analysis is currently somewhere between
Kettering’s second and third stage. We must
not let this opportunity pass.
Behavior analysts have made many of
their most important advances through the
empirical validation of behavioral methods
and apparatus development which directly
resulted in the identification of powerful
environmental contingencies. To compete
successfully in these times of scant support
and funding, indeed no small feat, we must
continue in this tradition and with a strong
emphasis on collaborative endeavors. We
have a lot to offer, and perhaps even more to
gain, by collaborating with neuroscience and
beyond. Endeavors of this sort not only serve
to expand the purview and authority of the
behaviorist through collaborative work but
also, importantly, offer additional opportuni-
ties to study and understand basic behavioral
processes. Again, there is enormous value
in the experimental analysis of behavior in
its own right, and pure behavioral research
should continue. However, communication
and collaboration should also be encour-
aged to better inform the functional units
of substrate needed to be accounted for at
the neural level. I am of the opinion that
this is paramount, not only for discovery of
behavior-brain relations but, ultimately, for
important public health concerns that will be
ameliorated by these advancements.
 60 Commentaries and Replies
References
Hawkins, R. D., Clark, G. A., & Kandel, E.
R. (2006). Operant conditioning of gill
withdrawal in Aplysia. Journal of Neuro-
science, 26, 2443-2448.
Kandel, E. R. (2001). The molecular biology
of memory storage: A dialogue between
genes and synapses. Science, 294, 1030-
1038.
Morris, E. K., Lazo, J. F., & Smith, N. G.
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(2005). Whether, when, and why Skin-
ner published on biological participation
in behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 28,
169-179.
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Brian D. Kangas
Brian Kangas’ commentary advocates
that behavior analysts need a strong presence
in all kinds of behavioral science settings;
or, as he puts it, “behavioral processes are
ubiquitous and, therefore, behavior analysis
should be everywhere.” His particular inter-
est lies in interdisciplinary collaboration in
the field of neuroscience. He expresses in-
creasing interest in behavioral research at the
neurological level; specifically, involving the
study of respondent and operant processes
at the level of neurons—undoubtedly, an
intriguing area of investigation.
However, my reply begins with Kan-
gas’ research perspective: “If the pointed
question is whether behavior analysis is a
part of psychology or a separate disciple,
my contention is that it should be a part
of psychology.” He adds, “My worry is if
we intentionally divorce ourselves from
the wider establishment (i.e., psychology),
we will miss opportunities to engage and
influence the current zeitgeist of behavioral
science which . . . maintains a significant
emphasis on neuroscience.”
Skinner, B. F. (1966). The phylogeny and
ontogeny of behavior. Science, 153,
1205-1213.
Skinner, B. F. (1979). The shaping of a behav-
iorist. New York, NY: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1983). A matter of conse-
quences. New York, NY: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19 (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
Contrary to his view, I would argue that
our contact with neuroscience should not
be conjoint with cognitive/mentalistic psy-
chologists. We must critically evaluate what
it means when a psychologically oriented re-
searcher “maintains a significant emphasis on
neuroscience.” Just how would that emphasis
advance the integration of neuroscience and
Skinnerian science? Ironically, Kangas cites a
review by Morris, Lazo, and Smith (2004) to
support the fact that Skinner was well aware
of the interrelationship between behavior and
physiology. The review discusses a wealth of
concrete evidence that such is the case. The
authors subsequently published an article
titled “Why Morris, Lazo, and Smith (2004)
Was Published in The Behavior Analyst.” These
authors attempted to submit their paper to
five different journals, four published by the
American Psychology Association and one
nonhuman animal behavior journal. Not only
were their manuscripts rejected, but also the
editors didn’t even send then out for review.
The comments by the editors of these presti-
gious psychology journals are quite revealing:
 Commentaries and Replies
An editor offered, “We can accept only
articles that are of interest to a broad range of
psychologists and have broad consequences
for the science and practice of psychology”
(p. 170). Continuing, “A likely question
for a reviewer or reader would be, ‘Now,
that we know Skinner thought more about
biology, how does that change the nature of
his theories and their ability to contribute
to comparative psychology” (p. 171). The
editor then asserts: “The paper also assumes
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that the reader is fully familiar with the na-
ture of the charges that Skinner’s work was
un-biological” (p. 171). Morris, Smith, and
Lazo also found that the editors were imply-
ing that Skinner was no more than history:
A still more general source of the view that
Skinner is history may lie in today’s norma-
tive scientific and professional psychology.
Among the accepted views is that behavior-
ism was overthrown by a cognitive revolution
. . . . in part because Skinner denied biology.
This view appears in books, journals, and
journals by psychology’s leading associations
and societies. (p. 175)
We shouldn’t fret about separating our-
selves from psychologists. Unless there is
convincing evidence to the contrary (which
there is not), we should be doing exactly that.
Just glancing at the titles of neuroscience
articles by psychologists (e.g., “Controlling
robots with the mind”) would make any
Skinnerian scientists wary that the territory
is vitiated by agencyism.
Julie Vargas’ commentary provides a
revealing example of a psychologist’s ap-
proach to a neuroscience investigation of
the bar-pressing behavior of rats (Nicolelis
& Chapin, 2002). The researchers shaped
a bar press in rats, using water delivered
by a robotic arm as reinforcement. With
electrodes inserted into the rats’ brains, it
was found that a set of neurons would im-
mediately fire just prior to overt bar presses.
Then water delivery was made contingent
solely on the neuronal firing—discon-
necting the bar had no neuronal effect.
61
The psychologists’ explanation: The rats
learned to “think through” pressing the bar.
But what, prey tell, are thinking-through rats?
Vargas provides a behaviorological answer:
“They are fictional agencies inserted as ante-
cedent independent variables to explain the
firing neurons. The psychologists fail to credit
the postcedent water-delivery as the crucial
independent variable.”
In preparing my reply, my first step was to
become more familiar with the work behav-
ior analysts have done in the area of neurosci-
ence. What proved enormously helpful is a
special section in the November 2005 issue of
the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Be-
havior; especially the introductory article by
Timberlake, Schaal, and Steinmetz (2005);
and the closing piece by Schaal, (2005), a
review of a book on the “conceptual analy-
sis to appraise the theoretical language of
modern cognitive neuroscientists” (p. 683).
Both articles provide a general, nontechni-
cal treatment in relating behavior analysis
and neuroscience. Here is the highlight of
the parts I found most relevant to this re-
ply: Skinner’s goal—as Timberlake, Schaal,
and Steinmetz put it—was “to establish
an independent science of the control and
dynamics of behavior, separate from neural,
physiological, and cognitive references and
speculations; and then, to bridge the gap
between behavior and neurobiology by a
comprehensive integration” (p.305).
What is most relevant here is that Skin-
ner’s experimental methodology has been
and is widely used within the neuroscience
community, some influenced by Skinner
directly and others indirectly. In short, Tim-
berlake, Schaal, and Steinmetz state, “there
is considerable evidence for the existence
of independent sciences of behavior and of
neurobiology, and there is research that com-
bines aspects of both. What is missing is the
broad conceptual integration. . . . Further,
the potential for integration will be greater
as experimenters use causal manipulations
and analyses that consider both neuroscience
and behavior.”
 62 Commentaries and Replies
On the other hand, Schaal (2005) re-
lates: “For behavior analysts interested in
neuroscience, the current state of neuro-
scientific theory is unfortunate [emphasis
added]. Despite a pleasing ring to the phrase
‘behavioral neuroscience,’ what exists instead
is a thoroughly cognitive neuroscience. He
notes, “the central error of cognitive neu-
roscientists is to commit the mereological
fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain
psychological concepts that only make sense
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when ascribed to whole animals” (Schaal,
2005, p. 683). With humans, they typically
ascribe psychological attributes (e.g., reasons,
intentions, purposes, goals, values, and rules)
to the brain and its parts so as to explain the
possession of these attributes and the exercise
of cognitive power. As one philosopher put
it, “Stomachs don’t eat lunch // . . . [and]
brains don’t think. They don’t learn, imagine,
solve problems, calculate, dream, remember,
hallucinate or perceive [People do that.]”
(A. Brown, http://andersonbrownphiloso-
phy.blogspot.com/2011/10/mereological-
fallacy-and.html).
To conclude, neuroscience is in itself
an interdisciplinary field of science. The
point here is not to cast aspersions on
psychologists, but to be circumspect about
teaming up with neuroscience researchers
whose specialty area is in another disci-
pline—keeping in mind that mainstream
psychology continues to dominated the
culture in which we live and do our research.
In doing interdisciplinary research, not only
must we avoid wasting our valuable time
on those who have a dualistic (mind-body)
perspective on behavior, but also be leery of
agencyism creeping into one’s own work. For
behaviorologist, anti-agencyism is at the core
of our philosophy of science.
References
Morris , E. K., Smith, N. G., & Lazo, J. F.
(2005). Why Morris, Lazo, and Smith
(2004) was published in The Behavior An-
alyst. The Behavior Analyst, 28, 169–179.
Morris, E. K., Lazo, J. F., & Smith, N. G.
(2004). Whether, when, and why Skin-
ner published on biological participation
in behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 28,
153-169.
Nicolelis, M. A. L. & Chapin, J. K. (2002).
Controlling robots with the mind, Scien-
tific American, 287, 46–53.
Schaal, W. D. (2005). Naming our concerns
about neuroscience: A review of Bennett
and Hacker’s Philosophical Foundations of
Neuroscience. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 84, 683–692.
Timberlake, W., Schaal, W. D., & Steinmetz,
J. E. (2005). Relating behavior and neu-
roscience: Introduction and synopsis.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 84, 305–31.
 Commentaries and Replies
Strengthening the Case Against the Cognitivist
Consensus
Julian C. Leslie
University of Ulster
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Many of the points made by Ulman in the
Ulman-Skinner letters (Ulman, 1993/2014)
are well-expressed and incisive; it is thus de-
pressing that, 20 years on, they seem so topi-
cal. In my view, however, the best solution is
not to abandon the debate with mainstream
psychology about a possible agreement on a
framework for a shared discipline. Rather,
we should find new ways to advance that
debate and seek to integrate our views with
those of others.
There are many academic disciplines
concerned with human behaviour, and they
are mostly easily distinguished by the central
research questions they address. In one of the
target papers, Skinner (1993/2014) starts
with the question, “Why do people behave
as they do?” and we can readily agree that this
is the central question for us, as behaviour
analysts. However, it could also be said to
be the central question for the discipline of
psychology, typically described as the science
of mind, or mental events, and behaviour, or
human behaviour. Scientific disciplines are
usually defined by such central questions,
rather than the methods they use or the type
of theory that is typical. Mature sciences,
however, are more cohesive with a current
overarching theoretical framework and a
range of typical methods. “Mature science”,
is of course a term borrowed from Kuhn’s
account of how sciences develop and change
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Julian C. Leslie at School of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Ulster, Coleraine BT52 1SA , Northern Ireland,
UK, email: jc.leslie@ulster.ac.uk
63
(Kuhn, 1970) through having a paradigm,
a conventional framework which determine
the issues addressed by practitioners and
the type of theoretical model employed in
explanation, which in due course is replaced
by a new, quite different paradigm with its
own typical or normal science. In promot-
ing the idea that we need a new paradigm
within behaviour analysis, Baum (2002)
says, “Every scientific paradigm includes
both epistemological claims—claims about
knowledge, such as what it is and how it is
obtained—and ontological claims—claims as
to what we are to know about (Kuhn, 1970).
In paradigm clashes, ontological claims often
matter most.” He goes on to point out that
there are never critical experiments which
settle the competing claims of alternate para-
digms. What we are concerned about here is
not the paradigm within behaviour analysis,
but whether we should continue to dispute
with psychologists whether a behavioural
or cognitive framework or paradigm is ap-
propriate for psychology as a whole. Raising
that question confirms that psychology is not
a mature science, but our claim is that the
cognitivist’s alternative framework is not ac-
tually scientific, so it seems intellectually im-
portant that we should continue the debate
and seek to contribute to the establishment
of a scientific discipline of psychology, even
though that goal seems far off.
Although winning, or at least progressing
with, the debate is important for intellectual
reasons, I also agree with view of Ulman,
shared implicitly by Skinner within Ulman
 64 Commentaries and Replies
(1993/2014), that there are also key consid-
erations of professional politics and strategy.
We need to decide whether it is professionally
worthwhile to prolong this debate. Clearly,
we have used up time and energy on this
over many years, but I don’t agree with
the conclusion that we should concede that
there are two incommensurable paradigms
and that we should let the psychologists and
neuroscientists get on with being cognitiv-
ists, while we do our own thing. The stakes
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are too high: we have spent many years
complaining about being ignored as well as
misrepresented in those two very large and
ever-growing disciplines. If we announce
that we are not interested in resolving our
conceptual differences with them, this will
simply be grounds for our views seeming
to be even more irrelevant to them. Rather,
we should spend time identifying linkages.
That is, areas of existing research that are
not contested (i.e., not necessarily written
up within the behaviour analysis paradigm)
should be interpreted to make it clear that
psychologists–and people in general–tend to
unreflectively use ineffective explanations ap-
pealing to internal causes of behaviour, and
that real progress can be made by identifying
and correcting this flaw.
Exemplary work of this kind has been
done by Hineline (e.g., 1980, 1992, 2010;
Field & Hineline, 2008), developing his
account of how the social psychology of at-
tribution reveals our bias towards appealing
to internal causes. The term, “fundamental
attribution error” refers to the tendency for
people to overestimate the importance of
dispositional factors relative to contextual
influences when determining and explaining
the causes of another’s’ behaviour and, since
Jones and Nisbett’s (1971) classic paper, it
has been extensively studied in social psy-
chology. Hineline’s careful analyses reveal
many ways in which we neglect external
influences in everyday language and even
when, in attribution theory, we are en-
gaged in scientific analysis of biases towards
internal or intrinsic causes of behaviour!
As Hineline (e.g., 2010) points out, we are
dealing with a multifaceted phenomenon
with many subtle and often unperceived
aspects. We should cast our net as widely as
possible in finding common cause with those
in other disciplines that share our concerns
or write popular science that addresses these
usually neglected issues. Some candidates
are:
1. Noë (2009), a philosopher who
maintains that consciousness can only be
understood in terms of the interaction of
the individual with their social environ-
ment and that consciousness is not located
in the head (see also much recent work on
so-called embodied cognition, e.g., Borghi
& Cimatti, 2010).
2. Barrett (2011), an anthropologist who
rejects our tendency to view the abilities of
other species as inferior versions of human
intelligence, and who shows how different
species are adapted through their bodies and
behaviour to succeed in diverse environmen-
tal niches.
3. Schenider (2012), who writes for a
popular science audience, and illustrates the
power of selection by consequences across
many domains.
Finally, we should develop our capacity to
write “outside the box” ourselves (see Morris,
2014). Diversity brings strength.
References
Barrett, L. (2011). Beyond the brain: How
body and environment shape animal and
human minds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Baum, W. M. (2002). From molecular to
molar: A paradigm shift in behavior
analysis. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 78, 95-116.
Borghi, A. M., & Cimatti, F. (2010). Em-
bodied cognition and beyond: Acting
and sensing the body. Neuropsychologia,
48, 763-773.
Field, D. P., & Hineline, P. N. (2008). Dis-
positioning and the obscured roles of time
 Commentaries and Replies
in psychological explanations. Behavior
and Philosophy, 36, 5-69.
Hineline, P. N. (1980). The language of
behavior analysis: Its community, its
functions, and its limitations. Behavior-
ism, 8, 67-86.
Hineline, P. N. (1992). A self-interpretive
behavior analysis. American Psychologist,
47, 1274-1286.
Hineline, P. N. (2010). Reply to commentar-
ies on Field & Hineline’s” Dispositioning
Downloaded by [Ecole Hautes Etudes Commer-Montreal] at 12:29 21 August 2015
and the obscured roles of time in psy-
chological explanations”. Behavior and
Philosophy, 38, 61-81.
Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1971). The
actor and the observer: Divergent percep-
tions of the causes of behavior. In E.E.
Jones et al. (Eds.) Attribution: Perceiving
the causes of behavior (pp. 79-94). Mor-
ristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Julian C. Leslie
Julian Leslie raised an interesting issue:
The best solution is not to abandon the debate
with mainstream psychology about a possible
agreement on a framework for a shared dis-
cipline. Rather, we should find new ways to
advance that debate and seek to integrate our
views with those of others.
But I see this proposal as an invitation to
walk a tightrope. At a minimum, unless one
is well acquainted with Skinner’s (1974) About
Behaviorism, it’s just too easy to fall into a
tangle of explanatory fictions.
I agree with Leslie that Skinner (1993/2014)
is correct—our central question is: “Why do
people behave as they do?” And to some degree,
Leslie and I concur that this is also the central
question for the discipline of psychology.
65
revolutions, (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL.: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Morris, E. K. (2014). Stop preaching to the
choir, publish outside the box: A discus-
sion. The Behavior Analyst, 1-8.
Noë, A, (2009). Out of our heads. Why you
are not your brain, and other lessons from
the biology of consciousness. New York, NY:
Hill & Wang.
Schneider, S. M. (2012). The science of conse-
quences: How they affect genes, change the
brain, and impact our world. Amherst,
NY: Prometheus Books.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
But given that the definition of psychology
is the study of mind and behavior—this
discipline’s conception of behavior, usually
accompanied by the mental, is not at all
comparable to that of Skinnerian science.
For mainstream psychology, which is almost
all of it, behavior is merely a means to get at
its subject matter—the mind and all its attri-
butes. (Even institutionally, is there a depart-
ment of behavior analysis within psychology,
or something comparable—or merely a few
behavior analysis perspectives scattered here
and there among all its multitude of depart-
ments throughout the world?)
Earlier, Skinner (1971) wrote about the
worsening world conditions, that we may
not survive if we continue on our present
course; expanding population, environ-
 66 Commentaries and Replies
mental pollution, and possibility a nuclear
holocaust [and let us not disregard climate
change—JDU]—will put an end to it all.
What we need, he adds, is a science and
technology of behavior enabling us to deal
with the behavioral aspect of our problems,
on par with effectiveness of the physical
and biological technologies. However, the
behavioral sciences—including psychology,
sociology, anthropology, political science,
and economics—are plainly inadequate.
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Skinner asks: Why are the behavioral sciences
not more effective? (The title of his article.) He
avers that to come to grips with the world’s
problems, all that the behavioral sciences in
general have to offer is: “There is something
wrong with people who behave that way” (p.
468). From my perspective, there is a superior
way to combat the worsening of world condi-
tions, one that incorporates both Skinnerian
and Marxist theories: see Ulman’s (1991)
“Toward a synthesis of Marx and Skinner.”
In Skinner’s view, this is the problem with
the behavioral sciences:
The traditional view misrepresents our task.
It suggests that by changing an environment
we first change feelings or states of mind, and
that these, in turn, determine what a person
does. The feeling or state of mind seems to
be a necessary link in a causal chain, but the
fact is that we change behavior by changing
the environment, and, in doing so, change
what is felt. Feelings and states of mind are
not causes, they are by-products. (p. 469)
Leslie, of course, has no fantasies about
psychology. He writes: “It is clear that psy-
chologists—and people in general—tend to
unreflectively use ineffective explanations
appealing to internal causes of behaviour, and
that real progress can be made by identifying
and correcting this flaw.” To say that he has
work cut out for him is a huge understate-
ment.
Leslie then brings into the discus-
sion Kuhn’s (1970) Structure Of Scien-
tific Revolutions so as to enter into debates
with psychologists in an effort to, in his
words—“contribute to the establishment
of a scientific discipline of psychology, even
though that goal seems far off.” Some time
ago I attempted to apply Kuhn’s theory to
the distinction between behaviorology and
psychology (Ulman, 1991). According to
Kuhn, scientific revolutions are suppose to
follow three states: (1) formation of a scien-
tific community that selects a paradigm that
appears best suited for “normal” functioning
of scientific activity; (2) breakdown of the
old paradigm with a crisis ensuing in scien-
tific explanations; and (3) a new paradigm
emerges as the scientific community strives
to resolve the crisis. I went on about psychol-
ogy’s paradigm being transformational, based
on a Cartesian dualistic assumptions about
reality—that is, the conceptual transforma-
tion of behavioral data into mental or cogni-
tive processes existing in some non-spatial-
temporal dimension within the individual.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid difficulties,
to some degree Kuhn’s theory is still useful
here, even though historians of science have
largely trashed it. (If it were possible today,
I would probably expunge Kuhn’s stuff from
my 1991 article.)
From a contemporary perspective,
however, we can view Kuhn’s theory in a
somewhat different light: First, psychol-
ogy is still in the stage of discussing proper
procedures, so no revolution could have oc-
curred. Second, as Holth (2013) observe, if
incommensurable paradigms
boil down to asking, and replying to, different
Why questions, there should be little reason
for conflict. As long as everyone recognizes
that explanations are only appropriate for
the Why question with which one started,
cognitive, neurophysiological, and behav-
ioral perspectives might coexist as different
perspectives, or as different sciences. (pp.
169–170)
Holth ends with this sound conclusion:
“Perhaps all of the disciplines would be
better off by, instead of insisting that those
other explanations are not explanations at
 Commentaries and Replies
all, simply accepting that they are answers
to different Why questions” (p. 170). And so
shall I—and thus, simply continue to make
the point that, therefore, they are different
disciplines; that is, different aggregates of sci-
entists working together to foster the answer
to their particular Why questions. How keen
would any of these aggregates be to another
kind of answer? Much less, and show—as
they have—even less enthusiasm for another
kind of question. We can easily observe the
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answer to the prior question (even in some
of the commentary).
References
Holth, P. (2013). Different sciences as
answers to different why questions. Eu-
Association with Psychology Extends the
Reach of Behavior Analysis
David C. Palmer
Smith College
I often daydream that Massachusetts,
perhaps in common with a few other like-
minded places, might secede from the rest
of the United States and form a new and
progressive country. The politicians repre-
senting various other corners of the land
hold a world view informed by bronze-age
myths rather than modern science, and
the power they wield is exasperating. How
refreshing to be rid of them at a stroke!
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to David C. Palmer at dcpalmer@smith.edu
67
ropean Journal of Behavior Analysis, 14,
165–170.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific
revolutions, (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1971).Why are the behavioral
sciences not more effective? In B. F. Skin-
ner, Cumulative record (Definitive ed.,
pp. pp. 467–474). Acton, MA: Copley.
Skinner, B. F. (1974) About Behaviorism.
New York, NY: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, J. D. (1991). Toward a synthesis of
Marx and Skinner. Behavior and Social
Issues, 1(1), 57-70.
(I am aware that a comparable scheme was
tried once, and failed, but it has an enduring
appeal.) I sympathize, then, with Jerry Ul-
man’s more realistic dream of seceding from
the field of psychology. But there is an im-
portant difference: Psychology has no power
to tax, regulate, control, or interfere with
behavior analysis. Nor is psychology even a
coherent entity from which on might mea-
sure administrative or intellectual distance.
In the 1940s, in the supposed heyday of
behaviorism, the American Psychological
Association had only a few hundred mem-
 68 Commentaries and Replies
bers, divided among 19 divisions, or areas of
specialization. Since then, the organization
has exploded in size and in the number of
topics embraced. Its members now number
over 130,000 divided among 56 areas of
specialization, ranging across topics as diverse
as psychology law, hypnotism, aesthetics,
and public service. Psychology, then, is not
a coherent discipline, a bossy monolith that
stands for or against any one position; it is
an amorphous mélange of disciplines, and
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it is not surprising that behavior analysis
shares little with many of the other divisions.
Nevertheless I see no advantage to making a
formal break with psychology, nor am I clear
what such a break would look like or what
purpose it would serve. We are already free
to hold our own specialized meetings and
to publish journals that provide a forum
for our empirical, applied, and conceptual
endeavors. To the contrary, I believe that it
is to our advantage to be associated with psy-
chology. Psychology does not tax us, restrain
us, or meddle in our affairs, but it is a con-
duit through which we get some adherents,
through which we exert some influence, and
from which we occasionally get good ideas.
People discover behavior analysis in
several ways. A few of us come to the field
by stumbling upon the books of Skinner or
other influential authors; many others dis-
cover the field by seeing it in action in applied
settings; but others come to the field because
of their experiences as undergraduates in our
classes. Psychology is a popular major—at
Smith College, it is the second largest (after
government). It is fair to assume—and it
is certainly my experience—that students
reflect the society from which they are drawn
and therefore tend to explain behavior by ap-
pealing to vague autonomous events inside
the individual. It is natural, then, for them
to be drawn to psychology as a major. They
would be unlikely to be equally attracted
by a field they never heard of that explicitly
rejects their comfortable assumptions. But
as a consequence of their choice of majors,
many students take classes in learning or
behavior analysis for no other reason than
that it is convenient and fulfills a distribution
requirement—or perhaps because they have
heard from their fellows that the course is
effectively taught. Only a small proportion
of our students go on to become behavior
analysts, but the remainder leave our courses
with altered repertoires, almost invariably
altered in ways that we would regard as an
improvement. The opportunity to influence
these students is psychology’s gift to behavior
analysis.
Membership in a psychology department
can have other beneficial effects. To the
(usually large) extent that other members
of the department have misconceptions of
behaviorism, one can serve as a counterex-
ample. To do so, one must look on one’s
task as a shaping enterprise. It is no small
achievement just to get them to stop tell-
ing their students that behaviorism is dead.
But perhaps the most important reason for
remaining within a psychology department
is that one is more likely to encounter work
that is compatible with a behavioral perspec-
tive and may even directly advance the sci-
ence of behavior. Psychologists who have no
philosophical commitment to behaviorism,
and who may even be nominally opposed
to it, nevertheless sometimes conduct good
behavioral research. They usually interpret
their work in ways we would not endorse,
but we can profit from the work itself. To
cite just a few examples, cognitive psy-
chologists frequently use response latency
as a dependent variable in experiments with
well-controlled stimulus conditions. The
literature on semantic priming, for example,
is enormous, and much of it reports pure
behavioral data. It is true that data from indi-
vidual subjects are seldom reported and that
the interpretation of the results often appeals
to hypothetical constructs, but I have found
much of the work to bear on a behavioral
understanding of response strength and the
additivity of stimulus control (Palmer, 2009).
The cognitive literature on “embodiment”
(e.g., Bergen, 2012) suggests that overt be-
 Commentaries and Replies
havior is often affected by incipient or latent
response tendencies. Hineline has found
that work in social psychology helps explain
why behavioristic locutions are alien to the
naïve ear (Field & Hineline, 2008). John
Donahoe and I have attempted to provide a
behavioral interpretation of complex behav-
ior that draws in part on the literatures of
neurophysiology, cognitive psychology, and
adaptive network simulations (Donahoe &
Palmer, 2004). In each case, we have prof-
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ited from our association with professionals
in related fields, usually fellow members of
psychology departments.
Like retrograde politicians, psychology
may sometimes embarrass or exasperate us,
but while asking for little in return, it pro-
vides us with a steady stream of students and
a supply of colleagues who greatly extend
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to David C. Palmer
Dave Palmer relates that associating
with professionals in different fields—psy-
chologists in particular—has proven to be
profitable in helping him advance his work
in his area of interest: exploring the extent to
which basic operant principles of can explain
complex human behavior. Although he does
not identify himself as a behaviorologist, he
is keen about giving no quarter to agency-
ism; that is, rejecting all hypothetical inner
agencies purported to explain behavioral
phenomena. I think it is quite admirable
that he can learn from his colleagues who are
psychologists as well as search psychological
research and discover concepts and empirical
reports that lend themselves to investigation
within the operant framework.
Although neither “The Ulman-Skinner
letters” (Ulman, 1993/2014) nor “A world
of our own” (Skinner, 1993/2014) are cited,
69
our reach into the vast literature of behavior
in all its forms.
References
Donahoe, J. W., & Palmer, D. C. (2004).
Learning and complex behavior. Rich-
mond, MA: Ledgetop Publishing (Origi-
nally published in 1994).
Bergen, B. K. (2012). Louder than words:
The new science of how mind makes mean-
ing. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Field, D. P. & Hineline, P. N. (2008).
Dispositioning and the obscured roles
of time in psychological explanations.
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69.
Palmer, D. C. (2009). Response strength
and the concept of the repertoire. Eu-
ropean Journal of Behavior Analysis, 10,
49-60.
Palmer does commiserate with “Ulman’s
more realistic dream of seceding from the
field of psychology.” This statement, however,
is misleading. I said nothing about withdraw-
ing from psychology as an organization; but
rather, giving up the “Sisyphean effort to
reform psychology as a science of behavior”
(Ulman, 1993/2014). Palmer goes on to
explore a difference between our viewpoints.
He states, “Psychology has no power to tax,
regulate, control, or interfere with behavior
analysis. Nor is psychology even a coherent
entity from which one might measure ad-
ministrative or intellectual distance.” I agree
with the second sentence but not the first.
Granted, psychology is not a government
institution with the power to tax, etc. How-
ever, psychology is a powerful force within
this society, its power issuing from its reac-
tionary ideology—an unceasing torrent of
 70 Commentaries and Replies
homunculi—not at the institutional level as
much as at the cultural level. For example, by
promoting the notion that criminal behavior
is due to some kind of inherent badness, la-
beled accordingly (adjustment disorders, so-
ciopathic, conduct disordered, intermittent
explosive disorders, antisocial personality
disorder, etc.), and transmitted via forensic
psychologists, criminal acts are therefore
caused by psychological problems—thereby
letting a dysfunctional society off the hook.
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Additionally, I do not concur with
Palmer’s assertion that psychology does not
interfere with behavior analysis. This may be
the case at Smith College—but is it? One per-
son cannot teach the totality of our science,
encompassing its conceptual, experimental
(which should require a laboratory) and
applied (which requires a clinical setting)
components. Has Palmer been able to bring
in other behavior analysts to teach a further
complement of courses in our science? If
not, students are being short-changed. Two
or three courses in physics, all taught by the
same person, does not begin to address the
understanding of that science.
Palmer’s complaint about his academic sit-
uation is that psychologists in his department
have misconceptions about behaviorism and
are sometimes embarrassing or exasperating.
But is emotional distress at the “embarrass-
ing” or “exasperating” or “misconceiving”
behavior of psychologists as much as we can
do for our science? Clearly, other behavior
analysts think differently, as if there are not
several degree-granting programs—at the
Masters and Doctorate levels—in Massachu-
setts. As E. A. Vargas has pointed out, there
is no issue of an independent discipline of
behavior analysis. It is a done deal, and these
degree-granting programs are alive and well
and flourishing right around the corner from
Palmer and his psychology colleagues.
In sum, not to detract in the slightest
from how he has gained from his interactions
with his psychologist colleagues—what we
have here, I’m afraid, is a case of making the
best of a hopeless situation and one behind
the curve of current disciplinary occurrences.
References
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
 Commentaries and Replies
Back to the Future
Henry S. Pennypacker
University of Florida and MammaCare Corporation
In the first edition (1980) of Strategies
and Tactics of Human Behavioral Research,
Jim Johnston and I advanced the notion that
major scientific advances gain acceptance
by the general public only after, often long
after, their technological consequences have
European Journal of Behavior Analysis 2014.15:71-76.
bestowed significant benefits to the culture
at large. In the interim, the discoverers are
often maligned and even ostracized (e.g.,
Semmelweiss). We cite as examples Galileo
and Darwin, but many more can be brought
forth from history to illustrate the point.
For example, Alexander (2014) recounts the
history of the mathematics of the infinitely
small, first explored by Galileo, Toricelli
and Cavalieri in the early 17th century. The
Church so strenuously objected to this ap-
parent contradiction of the order imposed
by Euclidian geometry and Aristotelian
physics that they barred further teaching
of the concept. The preeminence of Ital-
ian science thus yielded to the north as
Leibnitz and Newton went on to develop
the calculus.
A corollary observation was that the de-
gree of calumny heaped upon the innovator
varied directly with the extent to which the
scientific advance collided with or called
into question established practices or the
foundations of authority for management
of the culture. (see above) Thus, Galileo
and Darwin endured more lasting denigra-
tion than did, say, Einstein although the
latter’s contribution may eventually lead
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Henry S. Pennypacker at hsp@mammacare.com
71
to a greater revolution of thought than
did those of either of the former. Similarly,
the English mathematician Wallis is not
widely known, but he introduced the idea
of continua to England and was thus in vig-
orous disagreement with his better known
adversary, Thomas Hobbes. Wallis went on
to found the Royal Society of London and
his mathematical contributions set the stage
for Newton and Leibnitz
B.F. Skinner clearly belongs on the
aforementioned company. He transgressed
in both domains: his work challenged not
only the prevailing assumptions regarding
the role of the mind in determining behav-
ior, but the methodological orthodoxy of
establishment psychological science. Small
wonder that he is assailed by both phi-
losophers and social scientists. As Ullman
(2014) observed, (p.13), “…our philosophy
of science constitutes an uncompromising
challenge to the ideologies of the status
quo and consequently to the powers that
be.” But, as we suggest, with the passage of
time, the intensity of the derision should
diminish in proportion to the absorption
by the culture of the practical implications
of his work.
We are fortunate to have in these docu-
ments durable testimony to the intellectual
anguish which Skinner surely endured dur-
ing his lifetime. As his following slowly
grew, so did the opposition to his ideas as
manifested by the actions of the academic
community in particular. It was Psychology
that was most acutely offended by Skinner’s
work since he was one of its own, after all.
It may be argued that had Skinner found
 72 Commentaries and Replies
a home in, say, zoology, most of the furor
would have been obviated.
From the publication of Behavior of
Organisms in 1938, Skinner’s, natural sci-
entific approach to the study of behavior,
one organism at a time, was not accepted by
the community of psychological scientists.
His growing group of followers was finally
obliged to form their own journal in 1958.
Already, however, his methods were extended
into such fields as pharmacology and animal
training where their effectiveness led to com-
mercial success. In the late 1950s Ayllon
extended Skinner and Lindsley’s laboratory
demonstrations of operant conditioning
of the behavior of psychotics to practical
European Journal of Behavior Analysis 2014.15:71-76.
application in a psychiatric setting. By the
early 1960s behavior modification began to
emerge as a challenge to traditional clinical
practice by psychiatrists and psychologists.
Again, the greater effectiveness led to com-
mercial application, especially in the care of
the developmentally disabled.
We can trace the beginnings of Skin-
ner’s influence on the larger culture to the
last half of the 20th century, beginning with
the publication of Walden II in 1948 and
Science and Human Behavior in 1953. The
criticism these works received was largely
from the traditional literary and social scien-
tific community. The publication of Verbal
Behavior in 1957 was especially upsetting
to the social scientific and humanistic
communities because it demonstrated that
Skinner’s approach was not, as they were
fond of asserting, limited to animals and the
intellectually disabled. It could confront that
most uniquely human activity -speech- as a
subject matter amenable to the methods of
the natural sciences.
It has been 75 years since B of O was
published. The materials we are consider-
ing appeared roughly 2/3 of the way along
that time line. These documents provide an
enriching and entertaining glimpse into the
dynamics of a conversation that has been
ongoing since the early 1950s if not before.
It is useful to project the state of affairs from
that time to the present and draw a few
conclusions concerning the issues they were
wrestling with.
By the time the Ulman-Skinner exchange
occurred, Skinner’s influence on contem-
porary thought was already evident. As we
noted above, fledgling applications and
technologies were already beginning to ap-
pear. During the period since the exchange,
however, there has been an explosion of ap-
plication in a variety of areas. Let us consider
a few:
Human Services
By the mid 90s, behavioral programs
were normative in the treatment of the de-
velopmentally disabled. As autism grew as a
specific developmental problem, so did the
numbers of behaviorally oriented programs
and specialists. The rapid expansion of the
Behavior Analysis Certification Board and
its credentialing process gave economic
value to the specialized training required for
certification. This led to pressure to expand
educational resources to meet the growing
training needs of these individuals. Recog-
nition by insurance companies that Applied
Behavior Analysis was the best method of
treating autism only intensified the demand.
Education
Behavioral approaches to education began
to emerge and encounter intense resistance
from the educational establishment. Such
innovations as Programmed Instruction, Pre-
cision Teaching and Direct Instruction were
beginning to produce results that could no
longer be ignored and many people adopted
these technologies as central to the operation
of private or charter schools. Again, the Skin-
nerian emphasis on direct measurement of
behavior change fueled their success as people
have begun to realize the potential of these
approaches to education to produce more
effective results than traditional methods.
Concurrently, military trainers were discov-
 Commentaries and Replies
ering that these methods were producing
superior performance at less cost than tradi-
tional classroom approaches. In particular,
Programmed Instruction developed in part
by Frances Mechner and adopted by trainers
in industry, opening the door to additional
applications in that realm (Hain & Holder,
1962).
Business and Industry
Beginning in the 1960s a small number
of people began applying Skinnerian prin-
ciples to problems of management and pro-
ductivity in business and industry. Pioneers
like Tom Gilbert and Aubrey Daniels showed
European Journal of Behavior Analysis 2014.15:71-76.
that it was possible to recast management
problems traditionally framed in terms of
constructs like motivation into systems of
contingencies of reinforcement. The results
of this approach were immediate and richly
rewarded, thus opening a new field known
as Organizational Behavior Management
(OBM) which quickly became crowded
as the technology spread rapidly. A special
application of these principles focuses on
behavioral safety in industry. Here, the
Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
has taken a leading role in certifying large
organizations as a result of their imple-
mentation of behaviorally oriented safety
training programs that produce measurable
reductions in industrial accidents, injuries
and deaths.
In all of these cases, the contributions
of the behavioral practitioners translate im-
mediately in economic benefit for the cor-
porations who retain their services. As is the
case throughout history, once the economic
benefit of an innovation begins to become
evident, widespread adoption soon follows.
It should be clear that by the time Ul-
man and Skinner had their exchange, the
impact of Skinner’s work was already being
felt throughout society. The technological
fruits were being harvested. As was the case
with earlier major scientific advances, the
institutions of the society were slower to
73
recognize and accommodate the implica-
tions of his contributions. Thus we have
Ulman and Skinner agonizing over the dis-
ciplinary identification of those who would
profess allegiance to the new science and its
technology.
I have elsewhere (Pennypacker, 1992)
discussed the contingencies that prevail in
various organizations. As is the case with
single organisms, the contingencies respon-
sible for survival of an organization are of
foremost importance in the management of
that organization.. Skinner’s contributions
were as disruptive to the security of main-
stream Psychology as were Galileo’s to the
Church. As adoption of the technological
consequences of Skinner’s science became
more widespread, the need for training in-
stitutions to produce qualified practitioners
is slowly being recognized. Although Skinner
and Ulman would probably not have an-
ticipated the appearance of formal programs
within Departments of Psychology and even
the emergence of separate Departments of
Behavior Analysis (a term they seemed to
eschew), that is the situation that now exists.
From our perspective today, Ulman
and Skinner were perhaps a little overly
pessimistic regarding the future attitude of
Psychology toward behavior analysis. If the
belief that behaviorism is dead were truly
widespread, the APA would probably not
have gone to the trouble and expense of
publishing the two-volume Handbook of
Behavior Analysis (Madden, 2013) which
totals 1174 pages. On the other hand, their
assessment of the likelihood that radical be-
haviorism will become the dominant world
view any time soon was probably accurate.
Creationism is alive and well 155 years after
the publication of Origin of Species. From a
selectionist perspective, there is little or no
pressure on any of the variety of mainstream
religious beliefs with the possible exception
of radical Islam.
Skinner’s rejection of metaphysical
dualism strikes at the heart of virtually all
religious dogma and thus makes for an
 74 Commentaries and Replies
actuarially difficult philosophical challenge.
There is hope though. Discoveries in behav-
ioral neuroscience are of the kind Skinner
anticipated from the beginning and may yet
render superfluous the cognitive and dualistic
underpinnings of contemporary world views.
References
Alexander, A. (2014) Infinitesimal. New
York, NY: Scientific American/ Farrar,
Straus and Giroux.
Hain, C. H. & Holder, E. J. (1962). A case
study in programmed instruction. In S.
Margulies & L. D. Eigen (Eds.), Applied
programmed instruction. New York, NY:
European Journal of Behavior Analysis 2014.15:71-76.
Wiley & Sons.
Johnston, J. M. & Pennypacker, H. S.
(1980). Strategies and tactics of human
behavioral research. Hillsdale, NJ: Erl-
baum
Pennypacker, H. (1992). Is behavior analysis
undergoing selection by consequences?
JDU‘s Reply to Henry S. Pennypacker
Hank Pennypacker’s commentary is fo-
cused primarily on the sociocultural context
within which the exchanges between Ulman
and Skinner (Ulman, 1993/2014) took place
(June 1986 through May 1990). I agree with
some of his comments and will amplify on
the implications of what he describes. He
starts with a discussion of how, after benefi-
cial effects have been experienced for a while,
scientific advances come to gain acceptance
by the general public. Granted. He then
writes, “In the interim, the discoverers are
often maligned and even ostracized (e.g.,
Semmelweiss [sic]).” We can add to this story:
According to the Semmelweis Society
International website (http://semmelweis.
American Psychologist 47, 1491-1498.
Pennypacker, H. (1993). A selectionist view
of the future of behavior analysis in edu-
cation. In R.Gardner, D. Sainato, J.O.
Cooper, T.E.Heron, W.L. Heward, &
J.W. Eshleman (Eds.), Behavior analysis
in education: focus on measurably superior
instruction. (pp. 11-18). Pacific Grove;
CA: Brooks/Cole.
Mace, F. C. and Critchfield, T. S. (2010).
Translational research in behavior analy-
sis: Historical traditions and imperative
for the future. Journal of the Experimen-
tal Analysis of Behavior, 93, 293-312.
Madden, G. J., Dube, W. V., Hackenberg,
T. D., Hanley, G.P., and Lattal, K. A.,
(Eds.)(2013). APA Handbook of Behavior
Analysis. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Ulman, J. D. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
org/about/dr-semmelweis-biography/), this
physician—called the savior of mothers—
discovered in 1847 that having interns wash
their hands with chlorinated lime solutions
before physically contacting the new moth-
ers reduced the incidence of fatal puerperal
fever from 10% to 2% or less. Semmelweis
hypothesized that the results were solely due
to cleanliness, whereupon it was immediately
rejected and ridiculed by the medical profes-
sion. Outraged by his subsequent dismissal
from the hospital, Semmelweis began writing
angry letters, calling medical staff members
who ignored his finding irresponsible mur-
derers. He was then thought to have lost his
mind and was committed to an insane asy-
 Commentaries and Replies
lum (as they were called then) whereupon,
a few days later, he died—apparently the
result of a severe beating from the guards.
On this medical hero’s website I found
this gem: The  Semmelweis reflex (effect)—
“a metaphor for the reflex-like tendency
to reject new evidence or new knowledge
because it contradicts established norms,
beliefs or paradigms.” An experience not
unknown among Skinnerians! Hence, the
acceptance of a scientific advance may be
delayed, not only by the length of time
required for the general public to begin en-
joying its benefits, but even more so when it
contradicts the dominant ideology pervad-
ing one’s sociocultural milieu. As additional
European Journal of Behavior Analysis 2014.15:71-76.
examples, need we any more than mention
the Church’s treatment of Giordano Bruno
and Galileo Galilei in 1600 and 1633, and
others as mentioned by Pennypacker.
What about our sociocultural context?
One might assume that significant ad-
vance in applied behavior analysis would
be widely accepted by the general public,
such as parents learning to employ contin-
gency management in raising their children.
Unfortunately, this behavioral technology
is largely ignored. Worse yet, for example,
John Rosemond, a public icon who, writes
a weekly syndicated column that advises
parents on how to manage their children’s
misbehavior (rarely does he target desired
behavior). He not only recommends
aversive measures, but also spurns the use
of positive reinforcement—the spare-the-
rod-and-spoil-the-child way of thinking.
Fundamental Judeo-Christian (we could
also add Islamic) ideology continues to be
influential in our culture—the very anthesis
of the applications of Skinnerian science.
Resuming our discussion of the so-
ciocultural context within which Ulman
and Skinner exchanged letters, lets follow
Jaynes’ (1976) study of our cultural roots
as it relates to psychology. Going back to
ancient Greece, he establishes how psyche
came to be synonymous with soul. From
here, this is what I shared with Skinner:
75
For me, as its name denotes, psychology is
the study of the psyche; . . . and, I am con-
vinced, it always will be. True, psychology
deals with the behavior of the individual
but so does theology . . . . I fail to see how a
paradigm based on the notion of soul is any
more in contradiction to the natural science
of behavior than one based on the notion of
psyche. (Ulman, 2014, p. 17).
Jaynes’ discovery is in accord with Penny-
packer’s description of the spread of behavior
analysis, despite the ideological odds. Penny-
packer notes the various institutional settings
such as business and education where the
application of Skinnerian science (however
named) has made an impact; which, to some
extent, induces its public acceptance—irre-
spective of how much it disturbs the status
quo of pervasive superstitions. Pennypacker
even notes that psychology is hopping on the
bandwagon—a blatant act of opportunism,
given Jensen and Burgess’ (1997; also see
their interview: Yabuki, 2014) description of
what is currently being taught about Skin-
nerian science in introductory psychology
textbooks. In any case, Pennypacker makes
it clear that the bandwagon has left the old
corral. I would agree, and so would anyone
who gives but just a glance at the increasing
number of master’s and doctoral programs
in behavior analysis, plus departments of
behavior analysis (e.g., in Norway at Oslo
and Akershus University College with Arn-
tzen and colleagues, and in the US at the
University of North Texas with Glenn and
colleagues). Given the analysis Pennypacker
makes of the socio-cultural milieu, he more
than hints of the continuing triumph of
behavior analysis.
At the time Skinner and I exchanged let-
ters, the trends were not as clear, either within
or outside of psychology departments. Skin-
ner’s problem was clearly expressed in the let-
ters he sent to me; that is, “his doubts about
this Sisyphean effort to reform psychology as
a science of behavior” (Ulman, 2014, p. 11).
(He certainly was correct about the Sisyphaen
problem.) This problem was resolved in 1989
 76 Commentaries and Replies
when he declared publicly, “I tried too long
to follow Watson in saying that psychology is
the science of behavior. I am now convinced
that that is wrong. Psychology has always
been concerned with internal explanations”
(Skinner, 2014, p. 21). I agreed, “It has be-
come increasingly apparent to me that trying
to reform psychology is not only a great waste
of our time and effort, but sidetracks us from
. . . establishing a natural science of behavior”
(Ulman, 2014, p. 12).
I identify myself as a behaviorologist for
three reasons: (1) it unambiguously specifies
the domain of endeavor—which is not the
psyche; (2) behavior analysis seems still too
attached to the institutional arrangements
European Journal of Behavior Analysis 2014.15:71-76.
of psychology, which presents a dead end to
Skinner’s science; and (3) behavior analysis
seems too focused on the technology part of
the science, with insufficient attention to its
conceptual and experimental foundations
and formulations. Now, the degree granting
behavior analysis programs (such as those of
Psychology as Nonbehavior
Kurt Salzinger
Hofstra University
They tell the story about Nat Schoenfeld,
the co-author with Fred Keller (1950) of Prin-
ciples of Psychology, the book that was used
to educate freshmen in psychology taught
from the point of view of behavior analysis.
At a party of psychologists, someone went
over to him saying, “I understand you’re
a behaviorist.” Schoenfeld is said to have
replied, “Yes, I am a behaviorist and you?
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Kurt Salzinger at kurt.salzinger@hofstra.edu
Norway and Texas mentioned earlier) are in-
stitutionally independent of psychology and
seem to be striving to encompass the overall
power of Skinnerian science. It is gratifying
to see this. I am pleased that Pennypacker
provided part of the story of how we got
where we are.
References
Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origin of Consciousness
in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.
Jensen, R., & Burgess, H. (1997). Mythmak-
ing: how introductory psychology texts
present B.F. Skinner’s analysis of cognition.
The Psychological Record, 47, 221–232.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman–Skinner let-
ters. European Journal of Behavior Analysis,
15, 11–19. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 47–54).
Yabuki, K. (2014). Skinner’s science and
psychology. Operants, Quarter 1, 12–16.
You’re a nonbehaviorist, you study nonbe-
havior?” It is my contention that to leave
psychology by adopting a special name
for what we study is to suggest that cogni-
tive psychologists are getting by in their
career without having to involve behavior.
I’m as eager as the next behavior analyst
to make fun of cognitive psychologists,
but, when they do their memory studies
or problem solving, etc. are we suggesting
that they are getting data in their stud-
ies without having their subjects behave?
 Commentaries and Replies
Whether that is by repeating words they
heard before or pointing to them with their
fingers or being able to solve a problem by
having the words they emitted earlier emitted
at the right time or whether they respond to
some other stimulus? To be sure, cognitive
psychologists insist on speculating about
what’s inside the behaving organism and that
grates on (the nerves of?) all of us behavior
analysts (not “behaviorologists” a term that
grates on our nerves, pace Skinner), but the
cognitive psychologists who seceded from
the APA and formed the Association for Psy-
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chological Science or those that stayed put,
do in fact all follow scientific protocols even
though they are not ours and their specula-
tion or interpretation does indeed follow ob-
serving behavior on the part of their subjects.
They also use complicated statistical analyses
for groups of subjects but occasionally study
single subjects, (viz. , an early cognitive psy-
chologist, Ebbinghaus) and although they
often do not understand radical behavior-
ism or think it dead, they are the ones who
use methodological behaviorism religiously
for all their studies. They measure behavior
by examining reaction time or frequency of
response or ability to match stimuli, etc., and
they collect all of these measures in precise
ways. They obtain reliability measures on all
the responses that they collect. Do the sta-
tistics that these cognitive (methodological)
behaviorists (for that is what they are before
they start leaving the responses that they col-
lect so reliably) employ, invalidate the data
that they collect? Does the speculation that
they engage in make their behavioral data
“nonbehavioral”?
Towards the end of his life, Skinner
lamented the absence of the cumulative
curve in JEAB but he too has not always
employed it, e.g., Skinner’s (1959) examina-
tion of Gertrude Stein’s writing, his study
of Shakespeare’s sonnets (Skinner, 1939)
with respect to alliteration. Schoenfeld and
Cummings (1973) worked on information
theory and word guessing. These studies
sound very much like cognitive studies un-
77
til you become aware of the absence of the
cognitive speculation.
On the other hand, I managed with
my colleagues, e.g., Salzinger and Pisoni,
1958, 1960, to publish a number of papers
with cumulative curves and the behavior
analysts’ often disparaged group statistics
in APA journals, running each individual
subject for a period of time but proving the
point we wanted to, both for the individuals
and the groups we were comparing. Both
normal and schizophrenic subjects could
have their verbal behavior conditioned but
schizophrenic subjects extinguished faster.
No cognitive speculation was engaged in,
nor required, to have the papers published
in the “nonbehavioral” literature.
Ulman’s (1993/2014) pessimistic view of
the place of behavior analysis in psychology
appears to be buttressed by a development
that should have made him more optimistic
about it, namely what he calls the “techno-
cognitive drift” away from the basic science
of behavior when in fact that development of
applied behavior analysis has shown increas-
ingly that basic behavior analysis applied is
not only effective with some very difficult
and seemingly unchangeable behaviors as
in autism but stands out as the only form of
therapy to be so effective! Basic and applied
science interact in a productive manner
when the principles can be shown to be not
only relevant to their application but to be
so relevant as to produce an effective thera-
peutic result!
The exchange of letters between Ulman
and Skinner unfortunately confuses the
clinical experimental disagreement with the
cognitive behavioral controversy. Skinner is
bothered by the fact that articles in psychol-
ogy all refer to the insides of the behaving
organism but what he dismisses because there
is so much discussion of all that is the fact
that most, if not all, experimental papers do
in fact start with the measurement of behav-
ior. Indeed, there is no alternative to that.
That is what I started with at the beginning
of this article and that is what I must end on.
 78 Commentaries and Replies
No matter how much speculation each psy-
chologist engages in, he or she cannot escape
from the fact that in order to do what they
believe is the important part of what they
do, they must study behavior. It is up to us,
the behavior analysts, to sift the literature
of psychology and to find the behavior that
gives rise to all the physiological and cogni-
tive speculation. We must sift the dross to
find the behavioral gold that constitutes our
interest and our definition of psychology as
the study of behavior.
It will not do to cry over all the dross; we
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must review the literature and find the gold
that is hidden there. Using that gold, we can
then go on to study psychology as we define
it, namely as the study of behavior.
References
Keller, F. S. & Schoenfeld, W. N. (1950).
Principles of psychology: A systematic text
in the science of behavior. New York, NY:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Salzinger, K. & Pisoni, S. (1958). Reinforce-
ment of affect responses of schizophrenics
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Kurt Salzinger
Kurt Salzinger provides the reader with
a valuable service by reminding us that psy-
chologists engage in all the protocols of sci-
entific work. They observe behavior, count
it in natural settings, and experiment with
it in laboratories. At least, many of these
actions occur in psychology’s nonclinical
side. In short, though, at least one set of its
professionals—cognitive (methodological)
behaviorist—could be designated as hav-
inga science. I would agree with Salzinger.
Why, then, all the fuss? Why did Skin-
ner and I originally debate—or perhaps
more accurately—discuss the merits of an
during the clinical interview. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 57,
84-90.
Salzinger, K. & Pisoni, S. (1960). Reinforce-
ment of verbal affect responses of normal
subjects during the interview. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60,
127-130.
Schoenfeld, W. N. and Cummings, W. W.
(1973). Verbal dependencies in the analy-
sis of language behavior: Experiment 1.
In K. Salzinger & R.S. Feldman (Eds.),
Studies in verbal behavior: An empirical
approach. (pp. 246–274) New York, NY:
Pergamon Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1939). The alliteration in
Shakespeare’s sonnets: A study in literary
behavior. Psychological Record, 3, 186-192.
Skinner, B. F. (1959). Has Gertrude Stein a
secret? In B. F. Skinner (Ed.) Cumulative
record. (pp. 261–271) New York NY:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner let-
ters. European Journal of Behavior Analysis,
15, 11–19. (Reprinted from Behaviorol-
ogy, 1993, 1, 47–54).
independent science, named differently
and based on his analysis of contingent
behavioral phenomena? Why has there been
such an extraordinary exodus by so many
from the discipline of psychology? Whether
trained in its scientific or clinical aspects,
now renamed professionals, they left to
start and currently to maintain and expand
their own science and discipline—behavior
analysis. It is not a question of whether
it will happen. It has happened. There are
degree-granting programs in behavior
analysis throughout the world, and there
is legal recognition, certification boards,
 Commentaries and Replies
and disciplinary organization, along with
professional journals. To put the original
question forward again but more gently,
why? Such splits do and have occurred in the
past, such as the Galileans and Aristotelians.
Both studied physical phenomena. But they
differed in how it was to be interpreted.
Through his delightful story about Shoen-
field and “nonbehavior,” Salzinger points to
the reason why. With Salzinger’s help, I shall
make the reason a bit more explicit. As with
the early natural philosophers (as physicists
were then called), the difference between
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psychology and behaviorology (or behavior
analysis) is the difference in interpretation of
a subject matter that starts out in common,
but becomes non-common—a non-behavior
interpretation, one of contingency analysis.
As an opening statement, Salzinger of-
fers William N. Schoenfeld’s exchange with
a psychologist as follows: Psychologist: “I
understand you’re a behaviorist.” Schoenfeld:
“Yes, I am a behaviorist and you? You’re a
nonbehaviorist, you study nonbehavior?”
Salzinger then states: “It is my contention
that to leave psychology by adopting a special
name for what we study is to suggest that
cognitive psychologists are getting by in their
career without having to involve behavior”
(p. 1), that they are collecting their data
without having their subjects behave. Ac-
cording to Salzinger, because psychologists
follow scientific protocols, record behavior,
and analyze the behavior with complex sta-
tistical analyses; we should therefore value
and even mine their behavioral data. To
elucidate this perspective: In response to
three research psychologists’ assertion that
“it is most productive to review Rorschach
as a projective tool” (Aronow, Rezikoff, &
Moreland, 1995, p. 213); another research
psychologist counters, “Their argument is
seen as giving insufficient emphasis to the
importance of information obtained from
empirically based, quantified methods of
Rorschach interpretation” (Ritzler, 1995, p.
229). Well, even psychologists, within their
own framework of analysis, apparently have
79
difficulties with some of the data their col-
leagues collect. But that is an issue within
psychology. The larger issue here is between
the two sciences: that of psychology with its
interpretation of behavior as a convenient
inference to mental states, and that of behav-
ior analysis with its study of action as only
a part of a contingency relation that is the
focus of concern.
There certainly is no problem using re-
spectable data from whatever sources and
whatever science. But returning to what
Schoenfeld said, it certainly wasn’t just any
kind of non-nonbehavior (i.e., behavior)—it
would have to be a functional relation. Such
meaning fits what Keller and Schoenfeld
(1950/1995) hold as the basis for a science
of behavior:
The psychologist studies behavior in its rela-
tion to environment [emphasis in the original].
Behavior alone would hardly constitute the
subject matter of science. Imagine for a mo-
ment, the senselessness of a motion-picture
record of an organism’s behavior from birth
to death, with every indication of the world
in which it lived carefully blotted out! Only
when we begin to relate behavioral to envi-
ronmental happenings does the possibility of
a scientific psychology make its appearance.
(p. 3)
With the exception of contingency relation
in the quote, what Keller and Schoenfeld
describe as scientific psychology does not differ
conceptually from how Ernest Vargas and I
define behaviorology; that is, “the science of
contingent relations between actions and
other events. . . . Behaviorology’s unit of
analysis is the relation between action and
event.” (Ulman & Vargas, 2005, p. 175)—
it is not specifically the study of behavior.
Behavior is the domain of study, as it is for
all the behavioral sciences—anthropology,
sociology, political science, economics, and
so on—and they differ as much from each
other as they do from psychology.
Lastly, I do not suggest, imply, hint, inti-
mate, or insinuate that cognitive psycholo-
gists don’t study behavior—or any rate, start
 80 Commentaries and Replies
their analysis of mental events by observing
actions. Or put another way, cognitive psy-
chologists do not notice nonbehavior. That
said, how do behaviorologists (in name and/
or practice) view cognitive psychologists?
There is no better source for the answer than
Skinner’s (1977) article, “Why I am not
a cognitive psychologist.” A major reason
behaviorologists find cognitive psychology
problematic is because appealing to cognitive
states is a diversion from advancing Skinner-
ian science. Thus, consider the cognitive term
intention. As Skinner notes:
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Consequences are what cognitive psycholo-
gists are really talking about when they speak
of intentions. . . . I go to a drinking fountain
‘with the intention of getting a drink of water’
in the sense that I go because in the past I have
got a drink when I have done so.
So much for cognitive internalization of
behavior. Far more damaging to an effective
analysis [of behavior] is the internalization of
the environment. The Greeks invented the
mind to explain how the real world could be
known. . . . Having no adequate physics of
light and sound nor any chemistry of taste or
odor, the Greeks could not understand how
a world outside of the body . . . could be
known. There must be internal copies. Hence,
cognitive surrogates of the real world. (p. 5)
It is the framework of analysis that dis-
tinguishes the sciences, not the domain of
study.
References
Aronow, E. , Rezikoff, M., & Moreland, K.
L. (1995). The Rorschach: Technique or
psychometric test? Journal of Personality
Assessment, 64, 213–228.
Keller, F. S., & Schoenfeld, W. N. (1995).
Principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA:
The B. F. Skinner Foundation. (Original
work published 1950)
Ritzler, B. (1995). Putting your eggs in
the content analysis basket: A response
to Aronow,, Rezikoff, and Moreland.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 64,
229–234.
Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a
cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism,
5, 1–10
Ulman, J., & Vargas, E. (2005). Behav-
iorology. In M. Herson & J. Rosqvist
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of behavior modi-
fication and cognitive behavior therapy:
Volume I, Adult clinical applications (pp.
175-176). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
 Commentaries and Replies
The Language of the Tribe: Comments on B. F.
Skinner’s “A World of Our Own”
Ingunn Sandaker
Oslo and Akershus University College
As Skinner points out, verbal behavior, like
other behavior is selected by its consequences,
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and so is the verbal behavior of scientists.
So far, the variation of verbal behavior by
cognitive psychologist seems to have a better
fit with the selecting contingencies than the
verbal behavior ofa our scientific community.
The one notable exception is the treatment of
autism. I will not comment on the reason why
experimental and applied behavior analysis
within the field of autism has been such a
global success, but it is thought-provoking.
I will, however, comment on whether or not
we should break out of the so -called ghetto
or strengthen its walls, as Skinner formulates
it in the article “A World of Our Own”
(1993/2014).
The premise seems to be that the behavior
analyst community is more or less a closed
system. Like all living organisms and systems,
the behavior analysis community is dependent
on energy. Closed systems that do not match
the complexity of their environments will die
(Bar-Yam, 1997). Thus, whether behavior
analysis should become an open system is
not the issue. The complexity of our societal
challenges calls for variation. Closed systems
that do not interact with their environment
will not be selected. The question is rather; in
what kind of habitat can the endangered species
best survive and expand? The editors raise the
question of whether that should be together
with psychology, or as a discipline on our own.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Ingunn Sandaker at ingunn.sandaker@hioa.no
81
It is strange position for a selectionist
scientist to accuse the contingencies or the
environment for not selecting their science.
A variation is selected by the current contin-
gencies, or it is not. I do not think writing
correctional letters to editors who publish
stories from lay psychology is a viable strategy
for making behavior analysis more influential.
Punishing leading representatives in the en-
vironment for lacking the technically correct
vocabulary is a very bad idea for anyone pre-
tending to be specialist in behavior analysis.
In What Kind of Ecology Will Behavior
Analysis Survive and Expand?
The obvious answer to the general question
of whether a species or a system can survive
lies in the strength of the functional relations
between the system and its environment.
Either the system adapts (changes) to its en-
vironment, get extinct or the species or the
system moves to another habitat where the
system–environmental contingencies, offer
matching levels of complexity.
The question of strengthening the walls or
coming out of the ghetto, addressed by Skin-
ner, is a question of whether to adapt to the
verbal community in which we are a part, or
looking around for a better fit in some other
ecology.
Adjusting to our current ecology by
adapting parts of the cognitive approach is
a risky business. Our empirically based con-
ceptual framework from the philosophy of
radical behaviorism is our scientific heirloom.
 82 Commentaries and Replies
I completely agree with Skinner that we shall
not compromise when it comes to the rigor
of the philosophy and science of behavior.
Skinner refers to research on thermodynam-
ics, which might serve as an example on
classical conceptual framework refined and
adapted to the study of new phenomena. The
concepts of classical mechanics were initially
used to describe quantum phenomena that
were far beyond the scope of classical physics,
developed to answer very different questions
(Bohr, 1954/1990, p. 88).
In contrast to many social sciences, be-
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havior analysis offers a technical conceptual
framework that is generic in the sense that it
is valid in different contexts and for a variety
of organisms. Facing societal challenges,
the contribution from behavioral sciences
should be substantial. As Skinner points
out, we should improve our contact with
other behavioral sciences. An obvious field
of joint effort may be the rapidly expanding
field of epigenetics.
Skinner also would like to see a closer
association with what he calls “the other
so–called behavioral sciences–sociology,
economics, political science and all the rest.
Their data are almost exclusively behavioral”
(Skinner, 2014, p. 3)
While the so-called natural sciences have
technical terms that make it possible to com-
municate precisely across physics, chemistry
and biology, etc., social sciences have no such
common conceptual framework (Wilson,
1998). Each discipline has its own language.
Political science, sociology, social anthropol-
ogy and psychology have no common basic
conceptual framework although they all
address behavioral phenomena. The social
sciences not only have different languages, to
a certain degree incompatible to each other,
but you can find different “dialects” within
the same discipline. In psychology you will
find different conceptual and explanatory
approaches in social psychology, trait psy-
chology and cognitive psychology.
In my comments on Skinners “A World
of Our Own” I argue for the traditional
rigor of behavior analysis, the philosophy
and the science. I will also strongly support
Skinner in his view on expanding the scope
of behavior analysis. He takes the position
that we should improve our contact with
the other behavioral sciences. In an increas-
ingly complex world, societal challenges calls
for complementary solutions rather than
antagonistic or fragmentary approaches.
Instead of asking whether behavior analysis
should be part of psychology or a discipline
on its own, we should ask: How do we con-
tribute to and strengthen a unified science
of behavior? In my opinion, this can be
done along two vectors. First, to offer our
empirically based conceptual framework,
making it possible to communicate across
disciplines. Secondly, assist in monitoring
change processes. Behavior analysis can
offer strategies for managing the behavior
that drives results. Common conceptual
frameworks make cross- and multidisci-
plinary interchange possible. While different
disciplines will present their findings and
solutions in terms of their areas of interest,
and thus along wildly varying dimensions
of measurement, behavior analysis presents
the behavioral data that are relevant for these
other dimensions. Educational research has
analytical units relevant to access to educa-
tion, teaching methods, classroom manage-
ment and so on; performance improvement
consultants will usually have an eye on the
business’ bottom line, and sociologists may
be interested in social equality and mobility.
In all these cases, behavioral science can help
identifying the behavior that drives the desir-
able results and arranging the contingencies
that makes that behavior occur.
Since behavior analysis, as a small sci-
entific discipline, is embedded in a variety
of academic environments like education,
social science or psychology, there are ob-
vious pragmatic reasons for not starting a
war against psychology. The strategy for
expanding, however, will be the joint scien-
tific enterprise of strengthening the science
of behavior.
 Commentaries and Replies
References
Bar-Yam, Y. (1997). Dynamics of complex
systems. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Bohr, N. (1954/1990). Unity of knowledge.
In N. Bohr (Ed.), Essays 1932-1957 on
atomic physics and human knowledge. The
philosophical writings of Niels Bohr vol.
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Ingunn Sandaker
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Ingunn Sandaker takes a unique approach
in writing her commentary: complex system
theory—where a complex system is a group
or organization made up of many interacting
parts (e.g., global climate, economies, ant
colonies, immune systems, and evolution).
Thus, in terms of complex system theory, she
begins by referring to her understanding of
Skinner’s perspective on our science:
The behavior analyst community is more or
less a closed system. Like all living organisms
and systems, the behavior analysis community
is dependent on energy. Closed systems that
do not match the complexity of their envi-
ronments will die (Bar-Yam, 1997). Thus,
whether behavior analysis should become an
open system is not the issue. The complexity
of our societal challenges calls for variation.
Closed systems that do not interact with their
environment will not be selected. The ques-
tion is rather; in what kind of habitat can the
endangered species best survive and expand?
According to Sandaker, the authors
(Skinner, 1993/2014; Ulman, 1993/2014)
raise the question of whether we should be
together with psychology, or as a discipline
on our own. Well, we certainly don’t want to
be a closed system that does not match our
environment! She offers, “Supposing that the
behavior analyst community is somewhat
of a closed system, and as such, like living
83
II (pp. 67 - 82). Woodbridge, CT: Ox
Bow Press.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience. The unity
of knowledge. New York, NY: Knopf.
organisms, does not match the complexity
of its environment.” She emphasizes that
whether our science should be an open or
closed system is not the question. Noting
that a closed system not interacting with its
environment will not be selected—she asks,
“As an ‘endangered species,’ should we ‘be
together with psychology, or as a discipline
on our own?’ ” Moreover, “Does being a
discipline on our own mean not participating
in any interdisciplinary research?”
While I appreciate how Sandaker has
applied her specialty—complex systems
theory—to the issues discussed in the
Ulman-Skinner letters and in Skinner
(1993/2014), I am not very well acquainted
with complex system theory. Nonetheless,
there are statements in her commentary that
need to be addressed from a behaviorological
standpoint. First, there are some statements
that I just don’t understand, and would be
remiss for not mentioning them. Starting
with the first paragraph, in what ways do
cognitive psychologists, through variation
in verbal behavior, “have a better fit with
the selecting contingencies than the verbal
behavior of our scientific community”? What
is the mystery about why the “field of autism
has been such a global success”? In the third
paragraph, Sandaker exclaims, “It is strange
position for a selectionist scientist to accuse
 84 Commentaries and Replies
the contingencies or the environment for
not selecting their science.” Behavior analysts
and behaviorologists are certainly selectionist
scientists. But we don’t accuse contingen-
cies of anything. Contingency relations are
the subject matter of our science, what we
systematically investigate. However, the ques-
tion posed is at the cultural level, at which
metacontingencies and macrocontingen-
cies apply; but I am not aware of any such
an investigation. An excellent preliminary
way to explore this issue, though, is in your
hand—this special issue of the European
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Journal of Behavior Analysis.
Now let’s move on to Sandaker’s consid-
eration of the social sciences. Sandaker sup-
ports Skinner’s view on expanding the scope
of our science: to improve our contact with
the other behavioral sciences. She writes:
“Instead of asking whether behavior analysis
should be part of psychology or a discipline
on its own, we should ask: How do we con-
tribute to and strengthen a unified science of
behavior?” I would in part agree. We should
work to bring about a unified science of be-
havior. And it should be a unified behavior
science working within Skinner’s framework
of contingency analysis. I think that since
Sandaker has helped start a program in
behavior analysis, she would agree with me.
I look forward to that program attracting
students from other behavioral disciplines,
such as anthropology or political science or
economics. That should help start the unified
objective that both she and I hope for.
Following from her question above,
Sandaker mentions two strategies: (a) offer
our conceptual framework and (b) assist in
monitoring change processes. Speaking from
my personal experience, I can affirm that
attempting to contribute to the behavioral
sciences literature is more challenging that it
may first appear. As a case in point, my first
publication dealing with another behavioral
science (Ulman, 1998)—titled “Toward a
more complete science of human behavior:
Behaviorology plus institutional econom-
ics”—focused on institutional economists,
assuming that such a community of hetero-
dox economists would have an evolutionary
understanding of culture, and therefore a
close affinity with the behaviorological view
of culture. In my initial reading of the in-
stitutional economics literature, I remember
becoming quite excited when I read in one
book (Dugger, 1992): “The institutional
approach takes the psychological perspective
of behaviorism . . . . Behaviorism grounds
the roots of human action in institutional
structures rather than in individual prefer-
ences” (pp. 77-78); assuming, of course,
that institutions maintain contingencies
that effectively control the behavior of in-
dividuals within them. Unfortunately, after
repeated attempts to make contact with this
institutional economist failed, and I eventu-
ally gave up.
The second strategy Sandaker men-
tions—monitoring change processes—fits
in with my work on the macrocontingency
concept, the most recent being “Macrocon-
tingencies and institutions: A behaviorologi-
cal analysis” (Ulman, 2006). My most recent
interaction with institutional economists
was last year (Ulman, 2013, October). The
context for this interaction came from an
invitation to participate in a blog based on a
newly published book, Darwin’s Conjecture:
The Search for General Principles of Social and
Economic Evolution (Hodgson & Thorbjørn,
2010). Geoffrey Hodgson— the first author
organized the blog, divided the book into
nine weekly sections, each with a set of
questions. I thought this would be a prime
opportunity to bring behaviorology to the
attention of these behavioral scientists; espe-
cially in that both disciplines are selection-
istic disciplines. It would seem reasonable
to suppose that they would therefore have
a close affinity with our science. However,
even though I participated in several discus-
sions, I got absolutely nowhere! To give an
idea of the nature of our interactions, here
is an example. Question: “What are good
examples of generative replication in social
systems [one being habit—JDU]?” My reply:
 Commentaries and Replies
In the glossary, habit is described as “a dis-
position to engage in previously adopted or
acquired behavior . . . that is triggered by
an appropriate stimulus or context. Habits
are—in effect—behavioral repertoires . . . A
storage metaphor is not needed. Contingen-
cies of reinforcement change behavior, and in
doing so the organism is changed.
Hodgson’s reply:
Thanks Jerry for your thoughts on habits. . .
. [Aristotle] argued that the essence of some-
thing cannot simply lie in its behavior, . . .
when the behavior (temporarily) ceases, then
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the behavioral description would be invalid.
But a postman is still a postman even when he
does not deliver letters. . . . If we define him
as someone posting letters, then he ceases to
be a postman when he takes lunch.
I will conclude with one more example:
this one taken from an article in the Journal
of Institutional Economics:
We discuss how . . . rationalist philosophy
(e.g., Chomsky, 1986; Popper, 1972) might
theoretically provide a more fruitful way to
understand and overcome the endogeneity
problems associated with the behaviorist and
empiricist foundations of the extant routines
and capabilities literatures. (Felin & Foss,
2010, p. 232)
Irrespective of the ignorance of Skinnerian
science that permeates the behavioral sciences,
it may well be worth our labor to reach out
to them such as by submitting manuscripts
to selected behavioral science journals—for
example, the institutional economists Felin
and Foss (2010) champion Chomsky’s attack
on Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1957/1992).
Clearly, rationalistic philosophizing cannot
stand up to the contributions of a natural
science; namely, the operant analysis of verbal
behavior.
In conclusion, for now perhaps we
shouldn’t get our hopes up too high about
having a significant positive impact on
the behavioral sciences. Historically, the
behavioral sciences (e.g., sociology, an-
thropology, and political science) have
85
been strongly influenced by psychology.
But there are important exceptions—one in
particular is Marvin Harris’ cultural materi-
alism (see Kangas, 2007). In the long run,
behavioral principles will continue to follow
from generation to generation. Sooner or later
the basic behavioral sciences will find them-
selves adopting the framework of Skinnerian
science. Lastly, we should take cognizance of
the impact our science will inevitably have
on the other behavioral sciences, advanced
by such efforts as Sandaker’s in setting up an
independent department of behavior analysis.
References
Felin, T., & Foss, N. J. (2011). The endog-
enous origins of experience, routines, and
organizational capabilities: the poverty of
stimulus. Journal of Institutional Econom-
ics, 7, 231–256
Hodgson, G., & Thorbjorn, K. (2010).
Darwin’s conjecture: The search for general
principles of social and economic evolution.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press.
Kangas, B. D. (2007). Cultural materialism
and behavior analysis: An introduction to
Harris. The Behavior Analyst, 30, 37–47.
Skinner, B. F. (1992). Verbal behavior. Cam-
bridge, MA; B. F. Skinner Foundation.
(Original published 1957)
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, J. D. (1998). Toward a more complete
science of human behavior: Behaviorology
plus institutional economics. Behavior and
Social Issues, 8, 195-217.
Ulman, J. D. (2006). Macrocontingencies and
institutions: A behaviorological analysis.
Behavior and Social Issues, 15, 95– 100.
Ulman, J. D. (2013, October). Toward a
more complete science of behavior, revisited.
Paper presented at the meeting of Hoosier
Association for Behavior Analysis, India-
napolis, IN.
 86 Commentaries and Replies
B. F. Skinner, Psychologist
Henry D. Schlinger, Jr.
California State University, Los Angeles
For his entire professional career B. F.
Skinner behaved as a psychologist. He earned
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his Ph.D. in psychology from Harvard; and
he was a member of the American Psycho-
logical Association (APA) until his death,
having not only given talks at their annual
conventions, but also published many of his
articles in the American Psychologist (and other
psychology journals), including his very last
one. (The APA also bestowed upon Skinner
numerous awards over the years, including its
first lifetime achievement award.) He always
taught in psychology departments (Harvard,
University of Minnesota, and Indiana Uni-
versity, where he was also chair). And he was
president of the Midwestern and Eastern
Psychological Associations. But, despite being
solidly ensconced as a psychologist, Skinner
always directed his behavior at achieving Wat-
son’s (1913) desire that psychology should be
a natural science whose theoretical goal is the
prediction and control of behavior.
Ulman (1993/2014) wrote several letters
in which he tried to persuade Skinner that
no amount of reasoning or empirical findings
would ever convince psychologists to adopt
a natural science perspective, and that a new
discipline—behaviorology—was called for.
Skinner’s response to Ulman suggested that
he believed that psychology would eventu-
ally come around and that he did not like the
term behaviorology, despite the fact that his
daughter and son-in-law had adopted it. These
Ulman-Skinner letters (which are mostly Ul-
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Henry D. Schlinger, Jr., 5151 State University
Dr., Los Angeles, CA, 90032. Email: hschlin@calstatela.edu
man’s letters) are intended to make Ulman’s
case that because psychology is forever mired
in dualism, it will never become a natural
science of behavior.
Skinner (1993/2014), in an article titled,
“A world of our own,” finally agreed with Ul-
man that psychology is not a natural science
of behavior. Skinner conceded that although
Watson was successful in purging introspec-
tion as the main method in psychology,
neither he nor Watson had been successful in
purging psychology of its reliance on internal
events both as objects of study and as explana-
tions of behavior. He seemed to suspect this
failure fairly early on when he wrote:
Those committed to sequestered faculties and
thought processes are not likely to feel at home
in the analysis of behavior itself and may,
therefore, find it inacceptable as an alternative
explanation (Skinner, 1963, p. 507).
And, he was not too happy with recent de-
velopments in his own field. After delineating
the subject matter of operant learning—the
“process by which variations selected by their
reinforcing consequences become part of the
repertoire of the individual,” the “world of
our own”—and placing it between ethology
and cultural anthropology—the other two
disciplines which study variation and selec-
tion—Skinner (1993/2014) bemoaned the
fact that recent research in behavior analysis
had been directed at answering questions
framed by cognitive psychology (e.g., concept
formation).
Without commenting on the value of
replacing the name behavior analysis with
behaviorology, Skinner (1993/2014) stated
 Commentaries and Replies
that behavior analysts should strengthen
the walls of their own self-made ghetto and
rather than continuing to make contacts
with “other kinds of psychology,” they
should build alliances with other behavioral
sciences, including ethology, neuroscience,
sociology, economics and political science,
and they should return to basic experimen-
tal analysis to address the many remaining
“unsolved puzzles.” But until the end, he
maintained that behavior analysis would
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reside in departments of psychology.
The main issue for this set of commentar-
ies is nothing less than the future of behavior
analysis, whatever we call it. Of course, it
is a question that has been addressed many
times over the last 30-plus years mostly in
behavior analysts’ in-house journal, The
Behavior Analyst (e.g., Baer, 1981; Branch,
2013; Branch & Malagodi, 1980; Brown &
Hendy, 2001; Coleman & Mehlman, 1992;
Foxx, 1996; Friman, 2010; Madden, Platt,
Jewett, & Morse, 2004; Michael, 1980;
Neuringer, 1991; Palmer, 2010; Pierce,
2012; Pierce & Epling, 1980; Poling, 2010;
Schlinger, 2010; Skinner, 1983; Slocum &
Butterfield, 1994; Vyse, 2004, 2013). For
the purpose of this project, the question is
whether behavior analysts should continue
to operate within the literal and figurative
walls of psychology or stake out a new terrain
and hope that the family of natural sciences
and the institutions in which they operate
begin to recognize it. The answer is not an
unambiguous one.
Let me begin by commenting on the term
“behaviorology.” The term has several advan-
tages. First, it is etymologically appropriate
for what we behavior analysts study; it is lit-
erally “the study of behavior,” and should be
preferred over “psychology,” the study of the
mind (or soul). Second, it is consistent with
the names of other disciplines (e.g., biology,
sociology, anthropology, although there are
other scientific disciplines without –ology
in their name [e.g., chemistry, physics]).
It also has the advantage of being only one
word as opposed to two: behavior analysis
87
is somewhat awkward, and usually needs to
be explained. However, the disadvantages,
some mentioned by Skinner (1993/2014),
are practical ones and still outweigh the
advantages.
Those disadvantages relate to the profes-
sional contingencies that operate for behavior
analysts. For one, most doctoral-level behav-
ior analysts have degrees in psychology. If
they are interested in pursuing an academic
career, then they will most likely work in
departments of psychology. Up until very re-
cently, there were no institutions that granted
Ph.D.s in behavior analysis. But even the few
that now exist are in traditional departments.
(The only actual department of behavior
analysis, at the University of North Texas,
took decades to come to fruition.) Secondly,
as Skinner (1993/2014) noted, there are no
departments of behaviorology, and none
are likely to open up any time soon. Also,
granting agencies are not likely to recognize
a brand new discipline. Of course, Skinner
pointed these practicalities out in his letters
to Ulman before he agreed in his 1993/2014
article that psychology was not likely to ever
become a natural science of behavior.
Given these realities, let us examine what
behavior analysts can do to further their
discipline wherever they reside. To begin
with, the autism epidemic has increased
demand for behavior analysts in academic
departments within colleges and universities
(Schlinger, 2010). We can take advantage of
this expansion by making sure that we hire
behavior analysts with a broad range of train-
ing, in particular in the experimental analysis
of behavior (EAB) and the theoretical and
philosophical analyses of behavior (TPA).
People whose primary training, research, and
experience are in applied behavior analysis
(ABA) should not teach EAB and TPA
courses. A strong case can be made for profes-
sors with expertise in EAB and TPA because
both the Behavior Analysis Certification
Board (BACB) and accreditation by the As-
sociation for Behavior Analysis International
(ABAI) require coursework in EAB and TPA.
 88 Commentaries and Replies
If faculty with EAB training can also set up
experimental laboratories, then perhaps they
can tackle some of the “unsolved puzzles”
noted by Skinner. ABA students need quality
instruction in all facets of behavior analysis,
not just its application, so that they may be
more effective as applied behavior analysts.
An unintended dividend of more be-
havior analysts in universities is that other
academicians will learn more about behavior
analysis, which can hopefully change their
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(mis)perceptions of the field. Moreover, be-
havior analysts who are instructors in general
psychology courses can teach undergraduates
to think critically and scientifically about
nominal psychology so that once they are
introduced to a behavioral perspective, they
will find it to be an attractive alternative.
To compete effectively with psychology, we
need to populate colleges and universities,
especially large prestigious ones, with more
behavior analysts. Then it will not matter
what we call ourselves.
References
Baer, D. M. (1981). A flight from behavior
analysis. The Behavior Analyst, 4, 85-91.
Branch, M. N. (2013). A look back at
“Where Have All the Behaviorists Gone?”
The Behavior Analyst, 36, 173-177.
Branch, M. N., & Malagodi, E. F. (1980).
Where have all the behaviorists gone? The
Behavior Analyst, 3, 31-38.
Brown, J. F., & Hendy, J. (2001). A step
towards ending the isolation of behavior
analysis: A common language with evo-
lutionary science. The Behavior Analyst,
24, 163-171.
Coleman, S. R., & Mehlman, S. E. (1992).
An empirical update (1969-1989) of D.
L. Krantz’s thesis that the experimental
analysis of behavior is isolated. The Be-
havior Analyst, 15, 43-49.
Foxx, R. M. (1996). Translating the cov-
enant: The behavior analyst as ambassa-
dor and translator. The Behavior Analyst,
19, 47-61.
Friman, P. C. (2010). Come on in, the water
is fine: Achieving mainstream relevance
through integration with primary medi-
cal care. The Behavior Analyst, 33, 19-36.
Madden, G. J., Platt, K. P., Jewett, D. C., &
Morse, L. A. (2004). A forgotten resource
critical to the future of behavior analysis:
Undergraduate psychology majors. The
Behavior Analyst, 27, 33-41.
Michael, J. (1980). Flight from behavior
analysis. The Behavior Analyst, 3, 1-21.
Neuringer, A. (1991). Humble behaviorism.
The Behavior Analyst, 14, 1-13.
Palmer, D. C. (2010). Behavior under the
microscope: Increasing the resolution of
our experimental procedures. The Behav-
ior Analyst, 33, 37-45.
Pierce, W. D. (2012). Commentary on
“What Happened to Analysis in Applied
Behavior Analysis?” The Behavior Analyst,
35, 275-276.
Pierce, W. D., & Epling, W. F. (1980). What
happened to analysis in applied behavior
analysis? The Behavior Analyst, 3, 1-9.
Poling, A. (2010). Looking to the future:
Will behavior analysis survive and pros-
per? The Behavior Analyst, 33, 7-17.
Schlinger, H. D. (2010). Perspectives on the
future of behavior analysis: Introductory
comments. The Behavior Analyst, 33, 1-5.
Skinner, B. F. (1963). Operant behavior.
American Psychologist, 18, 503-515. doi:
10.1037/h0045185
Skinner, B. F. (1983) Can the experimental
analysis of behavior rescue psychology?
The Behavior Analyst, 6, 9-17.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Slocum, T. A., & Butterfield, E. C. (1994).
Bridging the schism between behavioral
and cognitive analyses. The Behavior Ana-
lyst, 17, 59-73.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
 Commentaries and Replies
Vyse, S. V. (2004). Stability over time: Is
behavior analysis a trait psychology? The
Behavior Analyst, 27, 43-53.
Vyse, S. (2913). Changing course. The Be-
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Henry D. Schlinger, Jr.
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Hank Schlinger has written a well-
developed reply, smoothly integrating the
Ulman-Skinner letters (Ulman, 1993/2014)
with Skinner’s (1993) article, “A world of our
own.” Rather than recapitulate what he has
composed so well, I will instead select parts
where—as I see it—providing brief a brief
review would be helpful. In other words,
this will be a commentary on a commentary.
Schlinger: “For his entire professional ca-
reer B. F. Skinner behaved as a psychologist.”
While open to interpretation, I think this
statement is not quite accurate. There is no
doubt about Skinner being a faculty member
in psychology departments, participating in
several psychology organizations (and receiv-
ing recognition for his contributions), and
publishing in psychology journals. (And as
almost a curious aside, not one of his books
had the word psychology in its title.) But was
he really behaving as a psychologist? Well, yes
and no—depending upon what one means
by “psychologist behavior.” This same ambi-
guity applies to my teaching career. For the
first two years at Ball State University, I was
a contract faculty member in the educational
psychology department, and then moved
on to a tenure line position in the special
education department where I stayed for the
remaining 37 years of teaching. At the onset,
in addition to teaching a couple of behavioral
courses, I also taught the typical educational
psychology and special education courses.
Whenever the opportunity arose to discuss
behavioral issues in these courses, I would
89
havior Analyst, 36, 123-135.
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the be-
haviorist views it. Psychological Review,
20, 158-177. doi: 10.1037/h0074428
explicate in terms of contingency relations,
emphasizing the advantages of being able
think about behavioral problems scientifi-
cally; that is, to think critically in regard to
behavior. Of course, there were the other
usual responsibilities of a faculty member.
All of my publications are behavioral. In the
last few years of my career, my entire time
was consumed by designing, implementing,
and teaching courses in an online masters
program in applied behavior analysis At no
time during my career did I think I was doing
anything other than behaving as a behavior-
ologist—even if it meant doing so as a “sub-
versive activity.” Was there ever a time when
I was behaving as a psychologist instead of a
behaviorologist? Not as I see it. I think the
same could be said of Skinner (although he
never called himself a behaviorologist). When
did he ever behave more like a psychologist
(as opposed to merely being call one)? Again,
it depends upon what it means, exactly, to be
“behaving as a psychologist.”
Schlinger: “Skinner’s response to Ulman
suggested that he believed that psychology
would eventually come around and that he
did not like the term behaviorology (emphasis
added), despite the fact that his daughter and
son-in-law had adopted it.” As this son-in-
law shared with me, Skinner’s reason for not
liking the term was a dodge (E. A. Vargas,
personal communication). Skinner knew
well that there are many words in the English
language that combine Latin and Greek.
He subsequently shrugged off his opposition
 90 Commentaries and Replies
to the term when I advised: “If I may sug-
gest a remedy: in the privacy of your bath,
try saying behaviorology aloud at least 50
times”(Ulman, 2014, p. 15); he replied: “I
am grateful for the enthusiasm and loyalty of
the behaviorologists. I’ll try saying the word
to myself in the bathtub and see how good
a predictor you are” (p. 16-17).
Schlinger: “The main issue for this set of
commentaries is nothing less than the future
of behavior analysis, whatever we call it.”
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He goes on to ask, rhetorically: “whether
behavior analysts should continue to oper-
ate within the literal and figurative walls of
psychology or stake out a new terrain and
hope that the family of natural sciences and
the institutions in which they operate begin
to recognize it.” He adds: “The answer is not
an unambiguous one.” It may not be unam-
biguous for Schlinger, but it is for me. First,
I’m assuming he means behavior analysts
should stay right where they are within the
walls of psychology, and not risk moving in
with natural scientists. What makes his as-
sertion ambiguous is his failure to consider a
third alternative: to operate within the walls
of behavior analysis (or behaviorology when
the time is ripe) by succeeding in establishing
our own departments; to wit—the Depart-
ment of Behavior Analysis at the University
of North Texas; Department of Behavior
Analysis at Simmons College, Boston; the
Department of Behavioral Science at Oslo
and Akershus University College; and En-
dicott College (soon to be a university with
a Ph.D. program in behavior analysis). My
point: There’s no debate about behavior
analysis separating from psychology—it has
already happened! Hopefully, more will be
on the way soon.
Schlinger: “Let me begin by commenting
on the term ‘behaviorology.’ ” He starts with
a discussion of the advantages of the term,
with which I hardily agree. Then he discusses
the disadvantages, with which I take issue.
First, Slinger writes, “until very recently, there
were no institutions that granted Ph.D.s in
behavior analysis.” I wager that there will
be more to come, and in the near future.
(Schlinger did not mention doctoral degrees
in behaviorology, so I’m adding it here.)
Second, he correctly notes that there are no
departments of behaviorology, nor is it likely
that granting agencies would “recognize a
brand new discipline”—issues that Skinner
also raised in his letters. In my letters, the
term behaviorology was never promoted as a
“brand name.” Rather, I take the long view
of history and project that sooner or later the
term will come to replace behavior analysis.
It has so much going for it, as Schlinger so
astutely observes.
Ending his commentary, Schlinger
examines “what behavior analysts can do
to further their discipline wherever they
reside”—which I also fully endorse. Addi-
tionally, I would urge that we should work
toward decreasing the “techno-cognitive
drift”: (a) the unintended use of cognitive
terms in clinic settings when describing
their clients’ responding to behavior-change
programs; and (b) where graduates from
behavior analysis programs know too little
about the experimental analysis of behavior.
Although the recent addition of “Functional
Knowledge” to the Behavior Analysis Certifi-
cation Board’s BACB Fourth Edition Task List
is a definite improvement; albeit, not having
the experience of working with nonhumans
in an operant chamber is an unfortunate loss
(an experience I valued highly in my doctoral
work at Southern Illinois University in the
mid-1970s).
So ends my commentary on Schlinger’s
commentary. It was an enjoyable read.
References
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman–Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
 Commentaries and Replies
APA or ABA?
Murray Sidman
Sarasota, Florida
The basic question asked by Skinner
(1993/2014) and Ulman (1993/2014) is
whether or not the study of behavior should
be part of Psychology. A long time ago, based
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on personal experiences, I came to a quite
definite conclusion about where the study
of behavior belongs. No matter what one
believes the place of an analysis of behavior
should be, it has actually never been nor will
it ever be in Psychology. The best justification
I can give for my position will be to relate
some aspects of my own history which I
believe have been the most relevant of the
variables that have determined my own be-
havior with respect to the question at issue.
When I took one of the earliest versions
of Keller and Schoenfeld’s introductory
Psychology lab course (Keller & Schoenfeld,
1949), I realized quickly that I was seeing
things I had not seen before in any lab course
in any traditional science. The little animal I
worked with did everything the lab manual
(which was still being developed) said it
would do if I also did what the manual told
me to do. The animal behaved in particular
ways under particular environmental condi-
tions more reliably than I had become ac-
customed to seeing in my physical, chemical,
biological, and psychological laboratories.
When I did what Skinner (1938) had done,
my little subject did exactly what Skinner’s
had done.
This was new and thrilling to me: pre-
dictable behavior of a living organism under
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Murray Sidman at 3435 Fox Run Road, Unit
347, Sarasota, FL 34231. Email: murraysidman@comcast.
net. Phone: (941) 923 7525 ext. 347
91
specifiable conditions. I was, however, just a
young student. I was seeing new aspects of
behavior determined by new kinds of variables
but this was happening in a course labelled
Psychology 1-2, which was taught by profes-
sors in the Psychology department of a great
university. Although what I was seeing was
new to me, I was seeing it under the guidance
of people who called themselves psychologists.
I knew I was seeing new developments but
I thought, naively, that these were advances
in an already established scientific field. I as-
sumed that we were not only learning new
things about behavior but that we were
actually changing the science of Psychology.
Although we had strong support from
some of the Psychology faculty, it became ap-
parent quickly that most of the pychologists
would have preferred us to go away. They tried
to restrict our access to the department’s ani-
mal care facility and to remove the laboratory
from the elementary course, returning it to the
standard lecture format. The opposition to a
behaviorial orientation also received consid-
erable support from faculty in other depart-
ments. To them, behaviorism was a threat to
the deeply entrenched conception that human
behavior was only a manifestation of assumed
internal entities like the mind, cognitions, the
intellect, the inner person, and for some, even
the soul. Behaviorism had no place in it for a
mind or a soul. It was therefore assumed to be
empty; students were not to be exposed to it.
Well, I was a brash young man and I just
assumed that these opponents of behavioral
analysis were just a few old-timers who were
not keeping up with progress. I was really
brought up short, however, when I submit-
ted my dissertation to a psychology journal.
 92 Commentaries and Replies
I begin to realize that psychology’s opposi-
tion to behavior analysis was widespread,
deep, and merciless. The initial editorial
reactions to my dissertation were so strongly
negative that I reacted in a way that I am
sure the editors did not expect from an un-
known. I even accused them of personally
insulting my dissertation sponsors, whose
theories my data were supporting. I made
a folder of this correspondence that I called
my poison-pen file.
The journal editors initially accepted nei-
ther what I had done nor how I had done it.
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After much back and forth correspondence,
it became clear to me that my work was be-
ing rejected because the editors—powerful
determiners of what was to become part of
the science of Psychology—did not want to
inform others about either my data or my
data gathering procedures. Eventually, how-
ever, I agreed to a compromise, part of which
required me to eliminate the introduction
that described the new avoidance procedure
I had developed. I had no problem publish-
ing the introductory procedures and data
instead in the prestigious journal, Science
(Sidman, 1953).
My difficulties with the principal psy-
chological journals continued, but probably
because of my refusals to accept rejection, I
did publish additional papers there. But it
soon became apparent that I was almost the
only radical behaviorist who succeeded in
doing so. It turned out that the journal, Sci-
ence, was receptive to our work and several
of us published there. Eventually, however,
that changed; Science began rejecting our
work. This was coincident with the rise of
cognitive psychology from which Science
began to draw its reviewers. They rejected
everything behavioral, succeeding so well in
their opposition that they eventually boasted
that behaviorism was dead.
Publication was, of course, essential. A
group of us therefore founded the Journal
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
(JEAB), which was joined later by the Jour-
nal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA).
These were highly successful and were joined
later by many other journals with behavioral
orientations. People ask me sometimes why I
publish only in those journals. They make the
good point that non behaviorally oriented psy-
chologists need to know what we are accom-
plishing. My reply was—and remains—that
even if the standard psychology journals did
accept my work, none of their readers would
pay any attention to it. Behavioral research
deals with variables, procedures, concepts, and
goals that most psychologists find unfamiliar
and to which they react with hostility. The
founding of the behavioral journals was the
product of necessity. Without publication,
which permitted us to build on each other’s
research and theorizing, our work would have
remained essentially undone.
There are, of course several fine behavioral
researchers who still call themselves psycholo-
gists and publish in psychological journals.
This is inevitable because if a researcher is to
have a paying job that allows him/her to live a
reasonably comfortable life and to raise a fam-
ily, there are very few university departments
of behavior analysis. To do behavioral research,
they must give themselves labels like “behav-
ioral psychologist” and then, some university
departments of Psychology are willing to have
one of them as a member, just as they have one
of each of many psychology subdivisions, each
quite independent of the others. They remain
together only by refraining from dealing with
each other’s subject matter.
An example: After twenty years during
which I was required only to do research, I
joined the Psychology department of a non-
medical college. There, I was assigned the di-
rection of the graduate proseminar, which took
up successively each of the types of psychology
in the department. I made the mistake of at-
tending all the proseminar sessions and taking
part in the discussions. As a consequence,
the faculty attempted to deny me the tenure
they had promised to give me at the end of
my first year. They did not want their subject
matters to be infected by behavioral thinking.
Because of the turmoil this caused among
 Commentaries and Replies
the students, the dean eventually fired the
department head and gave me the promised
tenure. From then on, I made no attempts to
display interest in the various nonbehavioral
forms of psychology that were represented
in the department.
Psychology is well established in posi-
tions of power in most universities. Where
applied behavior analysis has been obvi-
ously effective, psychologists keep trying
to get laws established that would require
behavior analysis to be practiced only by
psychologists, even though psychologists
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get no training in applied behavior analysis.
Academic Psychology will never recognize
Behavior Analysis except as a threat. I be-
lieve that attempts by behavior analysts to
change Psychology are doomed. The energy
of behavior analysts should be directed in-
stead to establishing behavior analysis as an
independent discipline.
As for what that discipline should be called,
Behaviorism represents a philosophy, and Be-
haviorology is so general that it could include
almost anything. Behavior Analysis, however,
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Murray Sidman
Murray Sidman titles his commentary
APA or ABA? His answer is unequivocal,
and he provides good reasons for it being
so—both with respect to his personal career
and the history of Skinnerian science. The
treatment Sidman received from psycholo-
gists early in his career is outrageous, but
clearly a manifestation of the anti-behavioral
perspective endemic to mainstream psychol-
ogy. Since Sidman is a first rate scientist and
an amiable person, such treatment points to
an ideology fostering the ill treatment he
received. Hence, as I read the various com-
mentaries, I’m more than a little surprised
to find a number of the authors making
93
names what we do: We analyze behavior.
I usually tell people who ask that I am a
behavior analyst. That sometimes requires
explanation but it is more truthful than to
call myself a psychologist.
References
Keller, F. S., & Schoenfeld, W. N. (1949).
The psychology curriculum at Columbia
College. Americal Psychologist, 4, 165-
172.
Sidman, M. (1953). Avoidance conditioning
with brief shock and no exteroceptive
warning signal. Science, 118, 57-58.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organ-
isms: An experimental analysis. New York,
NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
statements supportive of psychology.
Curious! Anyhow, I think Sidman hit the
mark on why psychologists are more or less
hostile to Skinnerians: “To them, behavior-
ism was a threat.” Indeed it is! And it’s never
going to change. (For further compelling
evidence in support of this fact, see Burgess
& Jensen, 1997, available online: http://
bit.ly/1icGpIL; also the authors’ interview:
Yabuki, 2014.) Moreover, I’m in complete
agreement with his solution to this perpetual
problem with psychology: “The energy of
behavior analysts should be directed instead
to establishing behavior analysis as an inde-
pendent discipline.”
 94 Commentaries and Replies
Now I must move on to discuss a state-
ment Sidman made that needs further
consideration, especially since it requires
guessing what may be best for the future:
“As for what that discipline should be called,
Behaviorism represents a philosophy, and Be-
haviorology is so general that it could include
almost anything. Behavior Analysis, however,
names what we do: We analyze behavior.” A
reasonable position, but one problem with
the term behavior analysis is that it connotes
our methodology, not our subject matter.
Another problem is that there is such a
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variety of “behavior analysts” (contextualist,
methodological behaviorists, Kantorians,
cognitive behaviorists, etc.), so much of an
assortment that the term is rather meaning-
less, and now—to some extent—it even has
cognitive overtones, at least as practiced in
some procedures. The term behaviorology
distinctly denotes the domain of a basic sci-
ence: the study of behavior relations. And
it plainly eschews the study of mind. What
behaviorology means is intelligibly delineated
in Ulman and Vargas (2005). To the asser-
tion that behaviorology could include most
anything, one might say the same thing about
biology—but it would be wrong unless it
strayed from the framework of Darwinian
evolution. Furthermore, would bioanalysis be
a better name for that discipline? I think not.
What Sidman points out exceedingly
well is that Skinnerian science is completely
a natural science. As defined in Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate (2003), a natural science
is “any of the sciences (as physics, chemistry,
or biology) that deal with matter, energy,
and their interrelations and transformations
or with objectively measurable phenomena”
(p. 826). I’m confident that the day will
come when that dictionary definition will be
revised to read: “any of the sciences (as phys-
ics, chemistry, biology, or behaviorology . .
. .” Why my confidence? These four natural
sciences have more in common than “that
deal with matter, energy, and their interrela-
tions and transformations or with objectively
measurable phenomena.” Viewed from the
perspective of the cosmos, the natural sci-
ences explain the emergence of the material
world. Taken together, these natural science
disciplines specify how one phenomenon
emerged from the preceding phenomenon—
physics, chemistry, biology, behaviorology,
and—we might add—cultural/historical
materialism. The net outcome is an emergent
materialism, free of the notion of mental
causation (a work in progress—JDU).
As a closing note, I wish to underscore
Sidman’s substantial contribution to our sci-
ence, not only for his tremendous scientific
work but also for his uncompromising com-
mitment to our natural science’s integrity.
References
Jensen, R., & Burgess, H. (1997). Myth-
making: how introductory psychology
texts present B.F. Skinner’s analysis of
cognition. The Psychological Record, 47,
221–232.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th ed.) (2003). Springfield, MA:
Merriam-Webster
Ulman, J., & Vargas, E. A. (2005). Behav-
iorology. In M. Herson & J. Rosqvist
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of behavior modi-
fication and cognitive behavior therapy:
Volume I, Adult clinical applications (pp.
175-176). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Yabuki, K. (2014). Skinner’s science and
psychology. Operants, Quarter 1, 12–16.
 Commentaries and Replies
The Future of Behavior Analysis–Part of
Psychology, or a Separate Discipline?
Zuilma Gabriela Sigurðardóttir
University of Iceland
The question for discussion in this issue
of EJOBA is appropriate as well as important
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and needs discussion. Of course, noone can
know exactly what the future of behavior
analysis will be, it will depend on so many
variables, but we who work in the field today
must have a vision of what we want it to be
in the future without forgetting our past. If
we don´t have a vision of where the field is
heading and of possible consequences of our
choices, both good and bad, we might not get
anywhere. Having a clear vision we can per-
haps, if and when possible, take steps towards
that end. If our efforts are coordinated, we are
more likely to achieve our goal or at least get
closer to the vision we have for our field. First
we need to discuss the matter, then create a
vision that we agree on, and then we can start
taking steps towards that end.
I have often speculated about the correct
path to follow with regard to this issue in the
past almost 30 years and have not yet arrived
to a final conclusion that I feel very strongly
about. Ulman (1993/2014) makes a strong
case for Behaviorology. I see both pros and
cons to both remaining part of psychology and
to divorcing psychology, I do however share
the dream with many colleagues of seeing be-
havior analysis recognized, accepted, credited,
well represented, correctly understood and
growing. Will this remain a dream or can we
make it happen by parting from psychology?
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Dr. Zuilma Gabriela Sigurðardóttir, zuilma@
hi.is or Faculty of Psychology, Oddi, University of Iceland,
101 Reykjavík, Iceland.
95
The first time I heard about the idea of
behavior analysis becoming a separate field of
study, separate from psychology, was in 1985
when I heard and read about praxics (Ep-
stein, 1984). The case for Praxics was a very
convincing one indeed, I found it so then and
I still do today. However, the attempts and
steps reported in the article as having been
taken in order to establish the new scientific
field of praxics did not flourish. Some years
later, I think in 1991, I came across the term
Behaviorology. I did not however, become
familiar with the writings on Behaviorology
until more than a decade later. The ideas
behind both Praxics and Behaviorology are
very similar, give or take a few issues. The ar-
guments for the establishment of a new field
with a new name are the same, namely that
psychology still offers mystical explanations
of behavior and is therefore not a natural sci-
ence and that a science of behavior, namely
the science established by B. F. Skinner, does
offer explanations of behavior that are built
on a natural science approach. I don´t think
there are any basis for disagreement here.
It is interesting that in a recent article by
Ledoux (2012), he writes about the field of
Behaviorology as an already established field
which is remarkable in light of the fact that
Behaviorology has had very few followers
among the thousands of behavior analysts.
I am not sure why. It is indeed impressive
how many books have been written about
Behaviorology, the fact that a journal has
been regularly published for many years, the
yearly meetings, and the fact that courses
 96 Commentaries and Replies
on behaviorology have been and are being
taught at a university. I applaud the efforts
but wonder about the effect it has had.
What Has Been Done?
Both Epstein (1984) and Ledoux (2012)
emphasize the need to establish depart-
ments of praxics/behaviorology in natural
science departments, for example in biology
(Ledoux, 2012). I wholeheartedly agree with
them. In a way, one could argue that with the
developments that have taken place in the last
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15 years with the Behavior Analyst Certifica-
tion Board (BACB) and board certification
of behavior analysts (BCBA), which in some
states of the United States has now become
the basis for licencing of behavior analysts,
a movement towards a new dicipline has
already started. The number of university
programs with pre-approved courses by the
BACB that have the purpose to prepare
students for taking the certification exam,
has grown tremendously, and they are not
found only in the United States as was the
case prior to the establishment of the BACB,
but around the world. I recently had the
experience of hearing about a young man in
Massachusetts, who was about to finish his
college degree and was considering becom-
ing a behavior analyst. He had even applied
for a summer internship at a place where he
could work with BCBAs and get to know
their jobs. He did not aim to be a psycholo-
gist, he wanted to become a behavior analyst!
This young man was looking for graduate
programs that would allow him to become
one and had found several. This is surely a
sign that a new field is born. Likewise, in
my position as teacher of behavior analysis,
I work with students who graduate with a BS
in psychology and some do not want to be-
come licenced psychologist but wish instead
to work with behavior- or learning problems.
Those come to study with me and finish a
research MS degree in psychology instead
of the typical Scandinavian Cand.Psych.
degree required for licencing as psychologist.
MS graduates of mine select jobs in the
pre- and elementary school system or social
welfare system with families. They don´t see
themselves as traditional pedagogues or social
workers, they see themselves as behavior ana-
lysts. Nevertheless, except for the formal de-
velopments that have taken place in applied
behavior analysis by establishing the BACB,
later licencing efforts, and by establishment
of the Association of Professional Behavior
Analysts, very few formal and massive at-
tempts have been made to establish behavior
analysis as a separate dicipline from psychol-
ogy, so many of us still work within the realm
of psychology, trying to reform it, as Watson
and Skinner did for so long (Epstein, 1984;
Skinner, 1993/2014; Ulman, 1993/2014). It
so often feels like a waste of time.
What Do We Need to Do?
The establishment of study programs
in behavior analysis around the world that
offer courses that have been pre-approved
by the BACB has been amazingly success-
ful and has had a very rapid growth. Most
likely this is mostly due to the great and
growing demand for BCBAs globally. This
is key. BCBA programs of study are not
necessarily in psychology departments, they
are also in education departments (where
we are not popular either and where we also
struggle for reform) and research institutes.
The focus of these programs, however, is in
applied behavior analysis, mostly in the area
of developmental disabilities. Their focus
is not on research, i.e., on producing new
knowledge about behavior. Thus, despite the
unprecedented dissemination and increase
of study programs in behavior analysis in
universities in the last 15 years, these efforts
will not suffice for the survival of behavior
analysis in universities, without a science,
i.e., search for new knowledge, the field
will perrish. If behavior analysis is going
to survive, instead of disolving slowly into
other fields due to lack of knowledge about
its breath, depth, and its philosophy, due to
 Commentaries and Replies
misuse and misunderstandings, and mix and
match with other incompatible approaches
to behavior, we need to establish university
programs in the science of behavior, under-
graduate and graduate programs. We have
more than enough material to teach at all
levels both in the experimental analysis of
behavior and the other fields of behavior
analysis. We need to educate future behavior
scientists about the philosophy behind the
science of behavior and how that philosophy
is different from other philosophies about
human nature and human behavior. We
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have to educate them about the history
of both the philosophy and the science,
about the different research fields of the
experimental analysis of behavior, about
methodology, about how that methodology
differs from other methods commonly used
in other behavioral sciences, about applied
behavior analysis and the fields of applica-
tion that have been developed but also about
possible new fields of application that do
not yet exist. We have to talk to students
not only about what we know and can do
in applied settings but more importantly
about what we don´t know and have yet to
discover. In this way we may create demand
for graduate education in the experimental
analysis of behavior. This can be done as
praxics, behaviorology, or behavior analysis.
Funding is of course an issue, it always is.
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Zulima G. Sigurðardóttir
Capturing the thrust the this special issue
of the European Journal of Behavior Analy-
sis, Zuilma Gabriela Sigurðardóttir raises
important questions about what the future
of behavior analysis may hold. Recognizing
that a multitude of variables are involved,
she perspicaciously advises that we must,
without forgetting our past, have a clear
97
But it may become available when students
will be in long lines waiting to be able to
enter a program of study where they will be
able to search for and produce themselves
new knowledge about behavior. We can
start small and then grow. Of importance
is the education of students in order to give
them the necessary background to create
motivation for the future. Ledoux (2012)
even encourages teaching behaviorology
at the pre-university level. We can divorce
psychology and go our own way, create our
own path, put our efforts there, but if and
when we do we have to have a plan of action
that must be carried on by our coordinated
efforts, not concentrate on a new label that
only a few know about.
References
Epstein, R. (1984). The case for praxics. The
Behavior Analyst, 7, 101-119.
Ledoux, S. F. (2012). Behaviorism at 100.
American Scientist, 100 (1), 60-65.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
vision of what we want for our future. But
without a vision of where the field is heading,
she observes,“ we might not get anywhere.”
Perhaps true, but problematic.
Whether we are treating children with
autism, conducting applied behavioral re-
search in a clinic, teaching students about
behavior analysis in the classroom, carry-
 98 Commentaries and Replies
ing out basic research in an operant lab, or
writing articles on the conceptual analysis of
behavioral phenomena—the subject matter
with which we deal (the behavioral deficits
of our clients, the progress of our students,
analysis of the data we collect in the lab, or the
behavioral literature we peruse and critically
evaluate) keep us going, not just reliance on
a vision—however substantial that many be.
Whether a “plan of action . . . must be carried
on by our coordinated efforts,” or whether or
not to “concentrate on a new label that only
a few know about” are issues by the wayside.
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Unless the professional work we do has rein-
forcing effects, little or perhaps none of the
rest matters. In everyday terms, “It’s not a
matter of needing to, but wanting to.” The
rest flows from that.
To approach the many problems that Sig-
urðardóttir raises, we need to consider them
globally within the context of the history of
the natural sciences; as an exemplar, the sup-
posed eclipse of Darwin’s theory of evolution.
For the next decade or so, can we rule out with
assurance the possibility of an eclipse of Skin-
nerism? Yes. In spite of the fact that Skinner’s
achievements are not as widely recognized as
they once were. Some will recall the annual
conventions of the Association for Behavior
Analysis in those years when Skinner spoke
in the hotel’s largest meeting room, always
so crowded that the audience spilled out into
the hallway provided with a speaker system. It
was also a time when leading magazines such
as Times featured Skinner’s picture on their
front cover.
Today many graduate students in programs
emphasizing behavior analysis have had little
or no exposure to the rigor of basic operant
research. We should also be concerned about
how today’s students in behavior analysis
programs are being taught about Skinnerian
science. An outrageous event directly encoun-
tered will illustrate this point only too well.
At the annual conference of a state chapter of
the Association for Behavior Analysis Interna-
tional (ABAI), I was participating on a panel
about the future of the science when, out of
the blue, another participant—who just hap-
pens to be the chair of a graduate program in
behavior analysis—said, and these are his exact
words: “Skinner’s dead, get over it!” I would
like to think that such a bias is one in a hun-
dred among instructors in behavior analysis.
But I wouldn’t bet on it, especially with those
having backgrounds primarily in psychology.
What, then, can we learn from the eclipse
of Darwinism? In his review of The Eclipse of
Darwinism, Catania (1987) explores some
parallels between natural selection and be-
havior analysis suggested by The Eclipse of
Darwinism (Bowler, 1992). At the beginning
is an overview of what, in the history of science
literature, is called the eclipse of Darwinism—a
term coined by Julian Huxley, a proponent of
natural selection—to describe the situation
at the end of the twentieth century when
biologists came to ignore selectionism. That
period ended in the 1940s with the “modern
synthesis,” the combining of natural selection
and Mendel’s theory of genetics. Catania ad-
duces: To the extent that Bowler’s book “paral-
lels the history of behavior analysis, it merits
our attention” (p. 249). However, the term
“eclipse” is ill-suited for either Darwinism or
Skinnerism.
In his scholarly chapter titled “The So-
Called Eclipse of Darwinism,” Largent (2009)
recommends that we abandon the metaphor
of eclipse as grossly inappropriate.
A vestigial structure of the modern evolu-
tionary synthesis, and the historians who
unquestionably adopted the term from their
historical subjects have not yet adequately
challenged their subjects’ depictions of the
research that preceded them. The term is a
lingering relic that is no longer necessary . . . to
depict twentieth-century evolutionary biology
. . . We need a new term and a new concep-
tion of the work done in evolutionary biology
between 1880 and 1940, one that analyzes early
twentieth-century evolutionary biology on its
own terms, not merely in the context of what
followed it. (p. 18)
By the same token, then, we should not adopt
the metaphor the eclipse of Skinnerism. Largent
 Commentaries and Replies
suggests replacing eclipse with interphase.
Coming from biology, the term refers to an
interphase cell, one that carries out all the
innumerable activities of a living, function-
ing cell. The so-called eclipse of Darwin was
not a time when little productive work took
place, a time of little or no progress. It was
“in reality, a time of tremendous activity, all
of which was vital to later developments that
took place in evolutionary biology” (p. 18).
And the present is definitely not a time of a
Skinnerian eclipse; this is a time of tremen-
dous activity for our science in all three areas:
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conceptual, experimental, and technological.
It is precisely our participation in this vast
activity that will keep both our science and
ourselves moving forward.
Reforming Behavior Analysis: The Third Way
Frode Svartdal
University of Tromsø
In the invitation to submit reflections
on the Ulman-Skinner Letters (Ulman,
1993/2014), two strategies for further devel-
opment of behavior analysis were outlined:
Put more effort into refined approaches
aiming to reform psychology, or separate and
proclaim the natural science of behavior as
a discipline distinct from psychology. There
is, however, a third way, neatly summarized
by Skinner (Ulman, 2014, p. 14) as follows:
“I prefer to remain a psychologist on the
grounds that is can be defined as Watson did
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to F. Svartdal, Department of psychology, Uni-
versity of Tromsø, 9037 Tromsø, Norway. E-mail: Frode.
svartdal@uit.no
99
References
Bowler, P. J. (1992). The Eclipse of Darwinism:
Anti-Darwinian Evolution Theories in the
Decades around 1900. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press
Catania, A. C. (1987). Some Darwinian les-
sons for behavior analysis: A review Of
Bowler’s The Eclipse Of Darwinism. Journal
of the Experimental Analysis Of Behavior,
47, 249–257.
Largent, M. A. (2009). The so-called eclipse of
Darwinism. In J. Cain & M. Ruse (Eds).
Descended from Darwin: Insights into the
history of evolutionary studies, 1900–1970
(pp. 3–21). Philadelphia, PA: American
Philosophical Society.
in 1913. It should be taught as a specialty
of psychology, as ethology, for example, is
taught as a special part of biology.
What is needed, I think, is not so much
reorganization or a new organization, but
more active experimental work.”
This strategy actually redefines the
problem raised by Ulman and suggests
that the position in need of reform may
be behavioral psychology itself. As Skinner
noted, perhaps the most important change
relates to more active experimental work,
e.g., in empirical support of the plethora of
hypotheses formulated in Verbal behavior
(1957). But there are others. Four areas are
briefly outlined here.
 100 Commentaries and Replies
Ideological Limitations
Further development of behavior analy-
sis requires that the position refines what it
is good at, i.e., to identify environmental
variables important in the control behav-
ior. Behavior analysis does so primarily by
identifying variables in terms of operant and
classical conditioning, but we should ask
whether the conceptual framework provided
by conditioning is sufficient. Admittedly,
conditioning is a powerful tool in analyz-
ing behavioral control, and has proved to
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be successful in the history of behaviorism.
Conceptual and empirical developments
within behavior analysis (e.g., rule control,
motivating operations, the analysis of verbal
behavior, stimulus equivalence) indicated
the need for additional analytical tools.
However, surprisingly little has been added
to the behavior analytic toolbox during the
last decades. Compared to research in other
psychological sub-fields, behavior analysis
does not seem to foster the creative, original
research necessary for progress. One obvious
reason for this is the strict ideological regime
within radical behaviorism regarding the
subject matter and its measurement (rate of
response), design (N=1), data analysis (visual,
qualitative inspection, no statistics), and so
on. No other psychological sub-field provides
comparable constraints on the researcher.
Behavior
We should take a closer look at the
meaning of “behavior”. In his Behaviorology
paper Skinner (1993/2014) emphasized that
behavior should be understood as behavior
in the organism as a whole, and further that
“radical behaviorism” studies such behavior
“without asking about what is going on
inside the organism, mental or neurophysi-
ological” (p. 21). Such a view was perhaps
legitimate in the 1930-ies, it was peculiar
in 1993, but it is simply wrong today.
The living organism is extremely complex,
and neglecting established knowledge within
relevant sub-disciplines in psychology (e.g.,
cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience)
about that complexity excludes important
knowledge from the analysis. Given a lib-
eral understanding of what behavior is (i.e.,
what living organisms do), all psychologists
study behavior, but they do that in very dif-
ferent ways. Behavior analysis has a history
of criticizing knowledge coming from other
sub-disciplines of psychology because it is
not framed within functional analysis, but it
is time to ask if that practice is scientifically
sound.
A closer look at the meaning of “behavior”
in behavior analysis also reveals that whereas
behavior analysts tend to focus on observ-
able behavior, Skinner made an important
extension in including the “world within the
skin” (Skinner, 1945, 1974). Importantly, this
opened for interaction with other research
fields. In fact, the 1945 Skinner paper has
been included on the top 100 list of im-
portant contributions to cognitive science
(http://web.mnstate.edu/schwartz/cogsci100.
htm), and Skinner’s analysis was a main inspi-
ration in the development of self-perception
theory (Bem, 1965, 1972). Unfortunately,
despite the belief expressed by Skinner (1974,
p. 212)–“What is inside the skin, and how do
we know about it? The answer is, I believe,
the heart of radical behaviorism.”–behavior
analysis has a long way to go to empirically
support that belief.
Part of this issue relates to causal analysis.
If important environmental variables are
found inside the skin, they should be in-
cluded in causal analyses. One problem here is
that behavior analysis at the outset rejects the
idea that behavior can be explained in terms
of internal factors (Skinner, 1974). However,
most psychologists readily admit that causal
analysis in the living organism must be con-
ceptualized in terms of interaction of variables
over time, making the search for internal
(or external) initiating causes unimportant.
In this perspective, causal analyses focus on
moderating and mediating variables in ways
that are compatible with functional analyses.
 Commentaries and Replies
Theory and Hypothesis Testing
Skinner favored an inductive approach
to research, but time has come for a closer
examination of effective strategies for con-
ducting research within behavior analysis.
Hypothesis testing is an effective way of
shaping beliefs by bringing them in contact
with reality. In contrast, inductive reason-
ing may be more susceptible to errors in
inference because there is no good mecha-
nism for correction. Of course, theories
and models may divert “… attention from
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specific properties of behavior in the context
which it occurs, obscuring relations actu-
ally taking place by focusing on relations
assumed to be taking place” (Chiesa, 1994,
p. 153). However, behavior analysis may be
particularly prone to this problem because
analysis is framed within the reinforcement
vocabulary only, with no rival theories or
hypotheses. Functional analysis is equivalent
to theory construction (Staddon, 2001), but
with the important exception that it does
not state alternative conceptualizations. As
a consequence, incorrect beliefs may remain
uncorrected for decades (cf., Skinner, 1948;
Staddon, 1992).
The belief that an inductive approach
and focus on behavior increase the sensi-
tivity of the researcher to “events actually
taking place” is probably reinforced by the
fact that behavioral analysis refrain from
formulating hypothetical constructs (Skin-
ner, 1956) and instead deals with behavior
in a more “direct” way. However, this may
be a misleading assumption. The concepts
found in behavior analysis, e.g., “operant”,
are never observed in a direct way but rather
reflect interpretations on the part of the ob-
server. In this perspective, Skinner’s rejection
of theories in psychology may be a myth.
Even his basic terms–the operant is the prime
example–are hypothetical in the sense that
they are not observable; they are, as are all
scientific concepts, constructs formulated to
organize observations over time.
101
Statistics and Research Design
N=1 designs have a strong foothold in
behavior analysis. Unfortunately, that ap-
proach has often been favored at the expense
of more traditional group designs, and as
a consequence, the use of statistics. There
is no reason why this practice should con-
tinue. Group studies are necessary in some
circumstances (e.g., randomized trials) and
preferable to single case studies in others.
Also, statistics is a powerful tool in describing
and summarizing data (including data from
many separate studies, as in meta-analyses),
simulation, inference, and so on.
None of the suggestions outlined here
would compromise behavior analysis as an
independent and powerful sub-discipline of
psychology. Being a sub-discipline of psy-
chology, behavior analysis should relate to
other psychological sub-fields, empirically,
theoretically, and methodologically. Further
development of behavior analysis should take
place in interaction with the general field of
psychology, not in opposition to it. Behavior
analysts share a number of research topics
with other branches of psychology, and dif-
ferences in conceptual, methodological and
theoretical tools may actually be beneficial
rather than harmful.
References
Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An
alternative interpretation of cognitive
dissonance phenomena. Psychological
Review, 74, 183-200.
Bem, D. J.(1972). Self-perception theory.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in ex-
perimental social psychology, (Vol. 6, pp.
1-62). New York, NY: Academic Press
Chiesa, M. (1994). Radical behaviorism: The
philosophy and the science. Sarasota, FL:
Authors Cooperative.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). Behavior of organisms.
New York, NY: Appleton-Century Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1948) «Superstition» in the
 102 Commentaries and Replies
pigeon. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 38, 168–172.
Skinner, B. F. (1950). Are theories of learn-
ing necessary? Psychological Review, 57,
193–216.
Skinner, B. F. (1956). A case history in
scientific method. American Psychologist,
11, 221–233.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism.
New York, NY: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
Downloaded by [University of Cambridge] at 12:43 21 August 2015
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Frode Svartdal
At the onset, I believe it will be helpful if
I state that Frode Svartdal and I both write
in English but our scientific dialects hardly
overlap. I also think it will be helpful if I
begin by stating precisely what I mean when
I use the term behaviorology. Below is the
abstract from my article, “Behaviorology: The
natural science of behavior” (Ulman, 2004):
Behaviorology is the natural science of con-
tingent relations between actions and events.
Filling the gap between biology and the
materialistic study of sociocultural phenom-
ena, behaviorology investigates the genetic,
physical, and cultural variables that determine
behavior, both human and nonhuman. Like
that of evolutionary biology, behaviorology’s
paradigm is selectionistic: certain consequent
events select (reinforce) behavior. Behaviorol-
ogy’s guiding philosophy, behavioral material-
ism, holds that (a) no inner agency initiates
actions and (b) all actions relate contingently
to physical, biological, and behavioral events.
(p. 79).
Thus, it should now be clear where I’m
coming from. I will then proceed with my
perspective on psychology: “Ever since psy-
chology emerged from philosophy in the
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
Staddon, J. E. R. (2001). The new behavior-
ism. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Staddon, J. E. R. (1992). The «superstition»
experiment: A reversible figure. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 121,
270–272.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
latter part of the 19th century, psycholo-
gists have debated about whether its proper
subject matter consists of behavioral events
or mental events” (p. 79). Svartdal titles his
commentary “Reforming behavior analysis:
The third way.” So, what is the third way?
He begins by quoting Skinner where he
states that he would “prefer to remain a
psychologist . . . as Watson did in 1913. It
should be taught as a specialty of psychology,
[just] as ethology [is taught as a] special part
of biology” (Ulman, 2014, p. 14). Skinner
continues: “What is needed, I think, is not
so much reorganization or a new organiza-
tion, but more active experimental work”
(p. 14). Svartdal then relates that Skinner’s
strategy actually redefines the problem raised
by Ulman and suggests that the position “in
need of reform may be behavioral psychol-
ogy itself.” Granted, in my initial letter I did
write: “We should continue our struggle for
the establishment of a scientific psychology”
(p. 11). About four months later I made a
complete about-face: “It has become increas-
ingly apparent to me that trying to reform
psychology is not only a great waste of our
 Commentaries and Replies
time and effort, but sidetracks us from the
mainline of establishing a natural science
of behavior” (p. 12). Thereafter I have
consistently referred to myself as a behav-
iorologist.
The purpose of all the foregoing quotes
and discussion is to set the stage for replying
to Svartdal’s argument. In the interest of co-
herency, I will reply with my understanding
of the meaning of his third way as eclecti-
cism; that is, the theory or practice of an
eclectic method: “selecting what appears to
be the best in various doctrines, methods, or
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styles (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate, 2003,
p. 394).” On the plus side of eclecticism is
variation, the core of selectionism. Just as
with natural selection and survival of a spe-
cies, the greater the variation, the better the
chance of obtaining the adaptive end result.
Okay, let’s see how this third (eclectic)
way works. In his Ideological limitations sec-
tion, Svartdal writes, “Compared to research
in other psychological sub-fields, behavior
analysis does not seem to foster the creative,
original research necessary for progress.”
With eclecticism, the criterion for success
is determined by the eclectic—in this case,
Svartdal. So, what is the criterion? Because
“creative, original research necessary for
progress” is not specified, this assertion is
meaningless. For me, examples of progress
are the plethora of research-based interven-
tions available for our use, such as those that
were so effective when I worked as a clinical
director in a center for children with autism.
Next, Svartdal writes: “the strict ideological
regime within radical behaviorism regarding
the subject matter and its measurement (rate
of response), design (N=1), data analysis
(visual, qualitative inspection, no statistics),
and so on. No other psychological sub-field
provides comparable constraints on the re-
searcher.” From an electic standpoint, any
pre-specified outcome could be seen as a
constraint. Without single-subject designs
and visual data analyses, we wouldn’t have
the effective behavioral technology that we
have today. So, for me that’s a good thing.
103
In his Behavior section, Svartdal writes:
“We should take a closer look at the meaning
of ‘behavior’.” He mentions Skinner’s state-
ment that behavior should be understood
as behavior in the organism as a whole,
which he deems as peculiar in 1993, but it
is simply wrong today. Of course, there was
very little collaboration between behavior
analysis and neuroscience then in compari-
son to today. Svartdal’s assertion that “radical
behaviorism” studies don’t ask about what
is going on inside the organism, mental or
neurophysiological; oddly, he doesn’t men-
tion how the mental is investigated. Again,
no criterion is specified. Curiously, in the
same section, he refers to the “top 100 list
of important contributions to cognitive sci-
ence” that lists Skinner twice: in 16th place
(“A review of Skinner’s ‘Verbal behavior’ by
Noam Chomsky, 1959) and 94th place (“The
operational analysis of psychological terms”
by B. F. Skinner, 1947).
Going on in the same section, he asserts
that one problem with “behavior analysis at
the outset [is that it] rejects the idea that be-
havior can be explained in terms of internal
factors” (which is false). But again, Svartdal’s
third (eclectic) way fails us; he doesn’t say how
the third way would do it.
In the Theory and hypothesis testing sec-
tion, he writes: ‘Skinner favored an inductive
approach to research, but time has come for
a closer examination of effective strategies. .
. . Hypothesis testing is an effective way of
shaping beliefs by bringing them in contact
with reality. In contrast, inductive reasoning
may be more susceptible to errors in inference
because there is no good mechanism for cor-
rection. His third way neither explains why
hypothesis testing is better to shape beliefs or
why inductive research has no good mecha-
nism for correction.
In the last section, Theory and hypothesis
testing, we are to believe that there is no good
reason why single-subject designs should
continue to be preferred over the more
traditional group designs with statistical
analysis. The third way does not explain this.
 104 Commentaries and Replies
But there is one statement that makes sense
for Skinnerians: “Group studies are neces-
sary in some circumstances.” When there is
a large body of behavior analytic research on a
specific intervention (e.g., group contingen-
cies), a statistical meta-analysis would be the
appropriate methodology. I must say that I
was taken aback by Svartdal’s ending:
None of the suggestions outlined here
would compromise behavior analysis as an
independent and powerful sub-discipline of
psychology. Being a sub-discipline of psychol-
ogy, behavior analysis should relate to other
Downloaded by [University of Cambridge] at 12:43 21 August 2015
psychological sub-fields, empirically, theoreti-
cally, and methodologically.
This last quote definitely calls for a behav-
iorological reply, and I could not do better
than this quote from Skinner:
The reasons for the popularity of cognitive
psychology … have nothing to do with sci-
entific advances but rather with the release
of the floodgates of mentalistic terms fed
by the tributaries of philosophy, theology,
history, letters, media, and worst of all, the
English language. (In Catania & Harnad,
1988, p. 447)
References
Hineline, P. N., & Wanchisen, B. A. (1989).
Correlated hypothesizing, and the dis-
tinction between contingency-shaped
and rule-governed behavior. In S. C.
Hayes (Ed.), Rule-governed behavior:
cognition, contingencies, and instructional
control (pp.221-268). New York, NY:
Plenum.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th ed.) (2003). Springfield, MA:
Merriam-Webster.
Skinner, B. F. (1988). Comment. In A. C
Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.). The selection
of behavior: The operant behaviorism of B.
F. Skinner—Comments and consequences
(p. 447). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Ulman, J. D. (2004). Behaviorology: The
natural science of behavior. In A. A. Shu-
meiko & V. P. Balov (Eds.), The far east:
Science, education, XXI Century: Materials
of the 2nd International Scientific-Practical
Conference (Vol. 3, pp.79-83). Komso-
molsk-on-Amur, Russia: Komsomolsk-
on-Amur State Pedagogical University.
 Commentaries and Replies
An Integrative Behavior Analysis: Skinner’s
Old Man and the Sea
Travis Thompson
University of Minnesota
The character Santiago in Ernest Hem-
Downloaded by [University of Cambridge] at 12:44 21 August 2015
mingway’s Old Man and The Sea, reminds
the reader of B. F. Skinner’s commentary in
his 1986 correspondence with Jerry Ulmann
regarding the future of behavior analysis
published in EJOBA.  From the very first
paragraph of The Old Man and The Sea, San-
tiago is struggling against defeat. He has gone
eighty-four days without catching a fish—he
will soon pass his own record of eighty-seven
days. Almost as a reminder of Santiago’s
struggle, the sail of his skiff resembles “the
flag of permanent defeat”.
But the old man refuses defeat at every
turn: he resolves to sail out beyond the limits
of other fishermen to where the biggest fish
promise to be. He lands the marlin, tying
his record of eighty-seven days after a brutal
three-day fight, and he continues to ward off
sharks from stealing his prey, even though
he knows the battle is useless.  Hemingway’s
Santiago like the version of B.F. Skinner por-
trayed in this question and answer document
are deeply saddening. Skinner and Santiago
chose to fight to the bitter end.
As he was approaching the end of his
career and life Skinner appeared to feel that
the science he had created was fighting a los-
ing battle and he seemed utterly perplexed
with the reasons.  In particular he seemed
to take the continued widespread popularity
and acceptance of inner causes of people’s
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Travis Thomoson at travisthompson2@
comcast.net
105
actions puzzling and almost offensive.
He appeared to misinterpret this fundamen-
tal epistemological tenet as a form of personal
rejection singularly directed at him.
Skinner never adequately reconciled the
fact that every major writer in literature, from
the Han Dynasty and Homer to Shakespeare,
and to Wislawa Szymborska and Maya An-
gelou, in every language has taken mental
and emotional causes for granted, as long as
there has been written language, with his own
(and many of our) preference for external
causes human behavior. It is not unreason-
able for the intellectually inquisitive reader
to ask, “Can B. F. Skinner be right and every
other significant writer throughout human
history be wrong about the role of private
causes?”  It is possible the answer is “yes,”
but I think not.  Many of today’s scientists
point out that most major writers throughout
humankind have been wrong about their no-
tions of a deity and hereafter, aptly pointing
out epistemological verity is not a popularity
contest.  But striking is the fact that many
noteworthy philosophers of science empiri-
cal scientists have accepted the premise that
thoughts and feelings can be causally related
to people’s overt measurable actions (Russell,
1912).  Moreover, many have argued there is
no empirical reason to reject the plausibility
of private cases within an objective scientifi-
cally based analysis of behavior.
Second, Skinner calls upon each of us to
accept a premise that fails the sniff test.  It
just doesn’t smell right, and is not consistent
with our own experience, namely that we do
 106 Commentaries and Replies
things not because we think about them and
because of our emotional reactions to our
circumstances. Skinner wants us to have the
ability in our daily lives to a analyze our ac-
tions in terms of remote Aristotelian original
causes (our histories in the external world that
made our reactions what they are) rather than
ascribing currently temporally antecedent and
consequent events as comprising immediate
causes (our thoughts and feelings). Each of us
knows we do things because we think about
them and sometimes act because of our feel-
ings. To say otherwise defies common sense.  direction. In rejecting religions’ immaterial
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Skinner set a requirement for acceptance of
his theory that could not be achieved. Not
surprisingly, B.F. Skinner was disappointed.
Many historians assert that “THE cause,”
of Hitler’s annihilation of European Jews
beginning in the late1930s is to be found in
the terms of the WW1 Treaty of Versailles,
which created an unsolvable economic crisis
for Germany leading to hyperinflation (Ho-
locaust Museum, 2014). As the argument
goes, thee economic crisis made it possible for
Hitler to incorrectly blame the Jews to a re-
ceptive German populace, and scapegoat the
Jews, which once unleashed led to their mass
murder. While it is likely true hyperinflation
served as an Establishing operation, making
aggression more probable, the proximate
cause was the existence of large paramilitary
and military forces which overwhelmed any
limited countervailing political or social re-
course that might have succesfully prevented
the mass muder of millions of European Jews.  being cleaved from philosophy’s rib. Thanks
By the time average European civilians real-
ized what was happening throughout Europe,
it was much too late.  Skinner would have
had us focus our attention on the Treaty of
Verssailles as the cause of the genocide of
European Jews, not the armed racist para-
military Brown Shirts as “the cause” of the
Holocaust during WW2.  When the Allied
military forces eventually defeated Hitler’s
military apparatus, it did not do so by ad-
dressing hyperinflation.
An analysis of the reasons Skinner object-
ed to inner causes suggests he had his own
intellectual as well as less rational reasons. 
He was doing intellectual battle with German
introspectionism and ascendent psychoana-
lytic theory of which he was rightfully critical. 
But in addition, Skinner was an atheist
(Moore, 2005). He personally struggled with
religion and its inherent tenets that were in-
consistent with his objective science, as had
Copernicus. Moreover, he sought solace from
his own despair during that “dark period”
in 1924 when his grandfather and younger
brother died and his life seemed without
solutions, young Skinner sought an objective
reality that led him on an alternative pathway
consistent with his objective analytic way of
thinking, he set upon a scientific approach
that seemed to offer answers, an environmen-
talist functional analysis of behavior. Having
done so, he found it difficult to accept any
incursions of the mental and physiological
into his science that seemed to him incom-
patible with his theoretical position, even
when they made intellectual sense, as they do
sometimes. His functional analytic approach
borrowed from Claude Bernard, W. J. Cro-
zier and L. J. Henderson, was robust, and not
tarnished in the least by reference to proximal
mental nor physiological causes rooted in in
principle, independent observables. It could
make his science more effective and provide
a more complete account.
In the United States an empirical natural
science of psychology was in the process of
to what some viewed to be an untimely birth
of this new scientific discipline, Richard
Maurice Elliott had convinced the University
of Minnesota Administration to create an
exciting new academic department emphasiz-
ing the revolutionary natural science field of
Behaviorism (in the old fashioned sense, not
the Skinnerian sense).  Among the first hires
were J.R. Kantor, John Dewey, Karl Lashley
and B.F. Skinner (Thompson, 2014).  But
Behaviorism was only a small part of the
new academic field of psychology and B.
F Skinner had made the serious mistake of
 Commentaries and Replies
setting about converting all of the remain-
ing remnants of European experimental and
theoretial psychology making up the Ameri-
can discipline, to abandon their misguided
ways, and to join him and his small band of
proto-behaviorists to remake psychology in
the theoretical framework of behaviorism…
not only old fashioned behaviorism, but B.F.
Skinner’s new fangled Radical Behaviorism.
In due course, he wisely gave up on re-
forming psychology, and concluded the field
of applied behavior analysis which his theory
spawned, was turning into training minimally
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skilled technicians. In that he was partially
correct. A large piece of the professional field
IS turning into creating a corps of minimally
trained technicians with little quality control.
He wanted a movement devoted to his epis-
temology, the science of behavior, not what
he saw as either mystical mental wizardry
involved in mixing cognitive psychology
with behavior analysis, or on the other hand,
training minimally qualified practitioners in
techniques as if they were a bag of tricks. His
concern was people lacking an understanding
of the underlying principles of analysis of his
science being unleashed on a populace badly
needing assistance, without realizing their
own limitations in what they were doing. His
concern was legitimate.
Former Harvard Herrnstein students from
the same laboratory (Baum, 2002; Rachlin,
1992; Staddon 2014) have sought to improve
on Skinner, wishing he had been a different
scientist from the one he was. Fortunately
he was the Skinner of 1938, 1945 and 1957,
and not the apparition for which others have
wished (Thompson, in press).
In this pluralistic world in which most
genuine change and assimilation of new
ideas occurs incremental, he actually had
helped create such a science-rooted move-
ment within the Association of Behavior
Analysis International, but not with the
purity of commitment he demanded,
nor which could realistically be expected.
107
While forty years since ABAI was established
seems a long time, in comparison with the
Copernican or Darwinian revolutions, per-
haps reasonable progress has been made.  It
is unfortunate that B.F. Skinner could not
accept a glass half or three-quarters full. 
References
Baum, W. M. (2002) From molecular to molar:
A paradigm shift in behavior analysis. Jour-
nal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
78, 95-116.
Hemingway, E. (1952). The old man and the sea.
New York, NY: Scribner and Sons.
Moore, J. (2005). Some historical and concep-
tual background to the development of B.
F. Skinner’s “radical behaviorism” – Part 1.
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 26, 65-94.
Rachlin, H. (1992) Teleological behaviorism.
American Psychologist ,47, 1371-1382
Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy.
London, United Kingdom: Williams &
Norgate.
Skinner, B. F. (1938)The behavior of organisms,
New York, NY: Appleton-Century Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1945) Operationaly analysis of
psychological terms. Psychological Review,
52, 270-277.
Skinner, B. F. (1957) Verbal behavior, New
York, NY: Appleton-Century Crofts.
Staddon, J. E. R. (2014) The new behaviorism
(2nd ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Thompson, T. (2014). Noteworthy dates in the
history of behavior analysis. Unpublished
book.
Thompson, T. (in press) Unfinished business:
John E. R. Staddon's The New Behavior-
ism, 2nd edition. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior.
Treaty of Versalilles, 1919: Impact of World
War I (n.d). In Holocaust encyclo-
pedia of the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum. Retrieved from
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article
php?ModuleId=10005425
 108 Commentaries and Replies
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Travis Thompson
Thompson describes a person I do not
recognize in B. F. Skinner. Further, Thompson
appears to reject the notion of behavior analy-
sis/behaviorology being a separate science (too
late!) but nevertheless blames Skinner’s faults
of character for the separation. Thompson
posits a set of emotional and mental attributes
of Skinner’s, draws conclusions from these
(with respect to their social effects!), and
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then “proves” the validity of is conclusions
by his initial premises. (Was he trying to il-
lustrate how psychology works?) Other than
The Ulman-Skinner Letters: The Coming of an
Independent Discipline—Fait Accompli
Ernest A. Vargas
B. F. Skinner Foundation
In the second part of his autobiography
(1979), Skinner notes that as a graduate
student he wrote the following note: “I have
almost gone over to physiology, which I find
fascinating. But my fundamental interests
lie in the field of Psychology, and I shall
probably continue therein, even if neces-
sary, by making over the entire field to suit
myself.” (p. 38) He made a strenuous effort
to make over the field. He conducted a set
of experimental operations which estab-
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Dr. E. A. Vargas, B. F. Skinner Foundation,
18 Brattle Street, Suite 451, Cambridge, MA 02138. Office
phone: 617-661-9209. Office fax: 617-218-9906. Email:
eavargas@mac.com.
indirectly through his personal psychoanaly-
sis of Skinner, he does not address directly
what the editors of the European Journal of
Behavior Analysis asked him to write about
in their invitation. That is, “Should we put
more effort into refined approaches aiming to
reform psychology–or should we separate and
proclaim the natural science of behavior as a
discipline distinct from psychology?” Because
there is little in Thompson’s commentary that
deals with this question, there is little I can
write about in this reply.
lished a new unit of behavior—the operant.
He formulated the philosophical frames of
reference that asserted an independent science
of behavior based on selectional contingencies
and that excluded the homunculus which was
the do-it-all explanatory agent of psychology.
He applied his science’s principles to solve so-
cial problems of practical import, initiating in
some institutions a whole new approach such
as that of programmed instruction. He even
addressed the ethical and utopian implications
of his novum scientiarum. The degree to which
he thought he had been successful can be
judged by his final comments to a meeting of
the professional organization of psychologists.
Here he explicitly stated that psychology,
 Commentaries and Replies
with its agency imbued approach, was a form
of creationism. It acknowledged the failure
at making over psychology.
Later he implied that maybe “behavior
analysis” was the new label under which his
science could prosper. Many behavior ana-
lysts were proclaiming a fervent commitment
to Skinnerian science. In the applied area, the
disciplinary label was establishing itself as a
distinct one. Behavior analysts were grow-
ing in numbers. Behaviorology was another
possibility. In conversation and in correspon-
dence, Skinner was dubious about the name
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“behaviorology”. He contended strongly
that a department was needed. Part of his
uncertainty might have been an unease that
“behaviorology” was not as well established as
“behavior analysis”. But there was no doubt,
for him and for others, that his new science
required a new discipline with a new name.
Shifts in name, with their attendant dif-
ficulties, are not uncommon in the history
of the sciences. The physical sciences provide
more than one example: from “natural philos-
ophy” to “physics”; “alchemy” to “chemistry”;
“astrology” to “astronomy”. The biological
sciences present a more complex example.
The term “biology” is of recent coinage, dat-
ing from the 18th century. The label stuck
but the discipline shifted in how it dealt with
its subject matter. It obtained its scientific
status by repudiating essentialism, adopting
a basic unit of analysis the cell, and rejecting
a creating agent that formed species ad hoc
and substituting the Darwinian process that
shaped species through natural selection. For
both the physical and biological sciences, such
changes took place over centuries. In such
shifts, many of the agitations resembled those
over the current disciplinary transmutation.
No doubt the changes in the behavioral sci-
ences will continue to be lengthy and conten-
tious. The population of behavioral scientists
exhibit a vast variety of repertoires within
many preferred ecologies.
With so much smoke and the fire that
produces it, predicting outcomes from the
current differences over the independence
109
of Skinnerian science is a hazardous affair.
It is much like predicting the weather, and
for the same reasons. Too many variables
dynamically interact with each other over
time, reciprocally changing values and pitch-
ing events awry. At least climatologists have
a rigorous underpinning science. Not so
with social scientists. Historians even argue
as to whether their discipline can ever be
a science. But if only a guess can be made
then nevertheless a guess must be made. It is
certainly made by those who work to achieve
a desired outcome and turn their guess into
that outcome. Engaged in this effort they can
celebrate their vision of the uncertain future
by being able to point to the certain trends
of the present. What are these?
Professionals practicing Skinnerian sci-
ence operate under many labels and in many
venues, but primarily in three disciplines: psy-
chology, behaviorology, and behavior analysis.
What seems to be happening? Briefly, three
matters must be addressed: academic status,
legal recognition, and professional activity.
Psychology (mostly non-Skinnerian) and its
clinical aspect receive legal recognition. In ac-
ademic psychology, Skinner’s science is by and
large deemed a perspective and in the many
thousands of psychology departments world
wide, not all even have a “Skinnerian”. And
Skinner’s so-called “perspective” apparently is
not even accurately portrayed, as evidenced
by introductory textbooks (Yabuki, 2014,
March). Skinnerian scientists form only a
small division in psychology’s organizational
sprawl. The conclusions are easy to draw as
to whether psychology would ever become
the science of Skinner’s. He certainly drew
them. Behaviorology has an active profes-
sional organization that holds conventions
and publishes its own journal. Currently a
few behaviorology courses in one university
are taught under a shared designator (BEHG/
ABAP). Its professionals are few and its course
offerings fewer. There is no legal recognition
for practicing behaviorologists as it is not
germane. Behaviorology denotes itself as a
basic science.
 110 Commentaries and Replies
Behavior analysis exhibits a convoluted
tableau in its academic status. Psychology de-
partments, a few, provide programs in what is
called “behavior analysis”, though whether all
behavior analysts would agree on the common
nature of these programs is problematic. At
the State University of New York in Canton,
New York (SUNY-Canton), behavior analysis
shares its designator with behaviorology. But
currently, many academic programs indepen-
dent of behaviorology and psychology and
other disciplines title themselves as “behavior
analysis”. Many grant a masters degree. Doc-
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torate programs now make their appearance,
for example in the United States (three in
Massachusetts alone) and in Europe (one in
Norway). Degree granting in a subject area
powerfully demonstrates disciplinary status.
Legal recognition exemplifies another pow-
erful indicator of independent disciplinary
status relevant for such important matters
as protecting the public and such mundane
ones as third party insurance payments. The
legal practice, especially its applied or clini-
cal side, of behavior analysis is so recognized.
These facts make it clear that there is no issue
as to whether there should be an independent
discipline based on Skinner’s science. Already,
there is one.
As plain as the degree on one’s wall, the in-
dependent discipline currently calls itself “be-
havior analysis”. As well as academic programs
and legal status, many professional activities
occur under the disciplinary title. Current
professional endeavors by behavior analysts
range from providing small-scale personal
benefits (clicker training dogs) to engaging in
large-scale social efforts (conserving natural re-
sources). Behavior analysts in many countries
hold many conferences throughout the year
with papers presenting the latest behavior an-
alytic findings, forums discussing what these
findings imply scientifically and socially,
and workshops bringing professionals up to
speed on the fundamentals of the discipline.
With the words “behavior analysis” or
“behavior analyst” in the title (for example,
the title of this journal), behavior analysts
publish journals in different languages
and in every area of science—theoretical,
experimental, and practical. In engaging
in these activities, behavior analysts do not
ask a byyour-leave from any other set of
professionals in any other discipline. These
further facts establish its independence as a
discipline.
Despite the facts, the issue of disciplin-
ary independence of Skinner’s science from
its accidental expression in psychology
will continue to be argued with passionate
conviction. Such argument will not change
the further consolidation of the discipline
of behavior analysis. More professional
behavior analysts at all degree levels will be
produced, more will be hired with a variety
of titles with “behavior analyst” in them,
more will be credentialed by the behavior
analyst’s own credentialing board, and more
will be licensed under a variety of bureaus in
differing venues in different countries. The
only problematic issue and rather murky one
is whether the science Skinner started will
continue to thrive under its current name of
“behavior analysis”. Or whether, as natural
philosophy did, behavior analysis will split
into a basic science labeled “behaviorology”
with its various engineering fields designated
by their behavior analytic specializations.
In any case, the Skinnerian eyas has flown
its original roost. Skinner would have been
pleased.
References
Skinner, B. F. (1979). The shaping of a behav-
iorist. New York, NY: Knopf.
Yabuki, K. (2014). Skinner’s science and
psychology. Operants, Quarter 1, 12–16.
 Commentaries and Replies
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Ernest A. Vargas
E. A. Vargas provides a broad perspec-
tive on the complex issues arising from the
interrelationship between psychology and the
science that Skinner (1938/1991) initiated.
The issue over whether there should be a new
behavior science based on Skinnerian prin-
ciples is now settled. There is one—behavior
analysis. The question remains, what shall we
call this discipline? Whatever it comes to be
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called is, of course, for history to determine.
But just as “a rose by any other name would
smell as sweet,” the systematic observation
and manipulation of contingent relations
between actions and events will remain its
subject matter regardless of what the disci-
pline may come to be called. As Vargas notes,
however, what a science ends up being called
is not an arbitrary matter; alchemy becomes
chemistry, astrology becomes astronomy, and
so on. Nor can we prejudge how long it
may take.
To throw some light on this issue, Vargas
examines the current circumstances within
which this debate is manifested: the three
extant disciplines that study the same phe-
nomena: psychology, behavior analysis, and
behaviorology (notwithstanding the size of
its constituency, behaviorology has all the
defining features of a discipline). He then
considers each designated discipline with
respect to academic status, legal recogni-
tion, and professional activity. I would add
another matter or happening to consider:
the discipline’s theoretical, experimental,
and technological output. One feature in
particular deserves careful consideration:
the scientific/technological concepts, their
names, and their implications.
Some problems with nomenclature beset
the behavioral practitioner’s work. For ex-
ample, when I worked in an autism center
as clinical director, some of our behavior
therapists referred to a child’s motivation
in an ambiguous manner; sometimes it was
111
about the implementation of a motivating
operation, other times about how the child
supposedly felt inside. Perhaps Israel Gold-
iamond’s potentiating variable (see Goldia-
mond & Dyrud, 1968) might have been a
better choice of terms. In any event, this is
not a major terminological problem. We can
teach students and therapists to sharply dif-
ferentiate between homunculi and the effects
of behavioral procedures.
Beyond the occasional problem of agency
suppositions, there are certain perspectives
deliberately formulated to accommodate in-
ner agent notions, a much greater problem.
They attempt to provide a bridge between
Skinnerian science and mainstream psychol-
ogy via a philosophical underpinning that
just happens to be ambiguous with respect to
the difference between mental and material
ontologies. A particularly slippery variation
of pragmatism called contextualism provides
an example. The basic idea here is that the
truth of a conception is its practical conse-
quences; the meaning of which is found in
its practical bearings—where “practical” is
whatever it’s claimed to be. Essentially, it
promotes the acceptance of a gray area that
admits agency concepts such as self, cogni-
tion, and the like; concepts at one or another
level of abstraction that are assumed to affect
behavior—in short, what Skinner called ex-
planatory fictions. From a behaviorological
perspective, to the extent that a behavioral
term is vulnerable to hosting an inner agency
notion, it must be shed. Those schools of
thought that generate today’s pantheon of
homunculi—terms that impede the develop-
ment of concrete scientific and technological
advances—are, to that extent, bound to fall
by the wayside. In short, the very nature of
behavioral phenomena set the criteria estab-
lishing an effective science and technology of
behavior relations. As it was at the onset, the
challenge of Skinnerian science (or whatever
 112
name it may end up being called) is to dis-
cover the material postcedent variables that
control the actions of an organism.
References
Goldiamond, I., & Dyrud, J. E. (1968).
Some applications and implications of
The Ulman-Skinner Letters: Variables Defining
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Behavioral Science
B. F. Skinner Foundation
“Psychology, indeed, is to-day hardly
more than what physics was before Galileo,
what chemistry was before Lavoisier” wrote
William James in 1892 (p.151). Nearly one
hundred years later, B. F. Skinner echoed
James’s pronouncement, saying, “Cognitive
science is the creation science of psychology”
(1990). James wanted psychology to become
a “natural science of the correlation of
mental with cerebral events.” (James, 1892,
p.151). Even if psychology could meet
James’s criteria, it would not be Skinner’s
“world of our own.” Due to incompatible
ontological positions, psychology and the
science Skinner began, (behavior analysis or
behaviorology), have parted ways.
Sciences are identified by the relations
between their dependent variables (what
they study), and their independent variables
(where they look for possible causes). Skin-
ner looked for variables affecting the behav-
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Julie S. Vargas at julie.vargas@bfskinner.org
Commentaries and Replies
behavioral analysis for psychotherapy.
In J. M. Shlien (Ed.), Research in psycho-
therapy (Vol. 3, pp. 54–89). Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
Skinner, B. F. (1938/1991). The behavior
of organisms. Cambridge, MA: The B.
F. Skinner Foundation. (Original work
published 1938)
Julie S. Vargas
ior of the “organism as a whole.” When he
discovered actions that were clearly controlled
by postcedents, he realized this kind of behav-
ior differed from the respondents explained
by Pavlov’s stimulus-response analysis.
Skinner defined his dependent variable
as the “probability of behavior” measured
as “responses” per unit of time. These “re-
sponses” were not “responses to stimuli”
(respondents), but rather operants defined
in part by their effects. Operant actions do
not require any specific antecedent stimu-
lus. In his analysis, Skinner (1993/2014)
included actions inside the skin: “The
brain is part of the body and what it does
is part of what the body does” (p. 21). The
Behavior Analysis Certification Board lists
ways in which actions are measured as “rate,
duration, latency, or inter-respond times”
(BACB, 2014). These measures are based
upon counts as they occur within a specific
time frame.
What is the dependent variable of
psychology? The most behavioral division
 Commentaries and Replies
of the American Psychological Association
(APA) is named Behavior Analysis. Its
webpage states “Among the APA divisions
that advance psychology as a natural sci-
ence, the Division of Behavior Analysis is
perhaps unique in its emphasis on behavior
as a subject matter in its own right” (Home
page of the American Psychological Associa-
tion Division 25: Behavior analysis, 2014). If
behavior is not psychology’s usual dependent
variable, what is? The APA website lists topics
psychologists study, indicating popularity by
font size. The five most popular topics are
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“Addiction”, “ADHD”, “Bullying”, “Mar-
riage & Divorce”, and “Personality.” (Home
page of the American Psychological Associa-
tion Division 25: Behavior analysis, 2014).
Psychologists measure most, if not all, of these
with verbal report on tests or questionnaires,
not with counts of actions as they occur over
continuous time.
A search on Wikipedia finds that psy-
chology “involves the scientific study
of mental functions and behaviors.”
(Wikipedia, 2014). These dependent vari-
ables are assessed (under “Research”), by
interviews, questionnaires, tests (including
personality tests), and raters’ judgments. Only
raters’ judgments might include counts of
actions per unit of time, the main dependent
measure in Skinner’s “world of our own.”
Skinner’s independent variables center
around the relation between individual ac-
tions and postcedent stimuli that increase
the probability of similar actions. The ways
in which these postcedents (reinforcers) can
be scheduled and the resulting behavior
occupies a whole book (Ferster & Skin-
ner, 1957/1997). Antecedent stimuli gain
control over operants too, but only when
different postcedents occur during respond-
ing in their presence versus their absence.
Skinner (1938) talked of other antecedent
control, such as deprivation procedures that
affect the control of a postcedent (p. 23,
341-376), and the antecedent control in
respondents such as emotional responding.
Respondents are under antecedent control.
113
But for operant behavior the critical indepen-
dent variables lie in postcedents and when
and how they are related to actions. Among
these independent variables, no agent inside
an organism determines behavior.
The contrast with psychology is stark.
Even in the experimental lab where you
might expect overlap in independent vari-
ables, little exists. Here is an example: Re-
searchers shaped a bar press in rats, using
water delivered by a robotic arm as rein-
forcement. Hooking up electrodes to the
rats’ brains, the researchers discovered 46
neurons that fired just before the overt bar
press. Then, disconnecting the bar so pressing
it had no effect, the researchers made water
delivery contingent on the neuronal firing
alone. While behaviorologists would applaud
this experiment, they would not agree with
the psychologists’ explanation: “Over time,
four of six rats … learned that they had to
“think through” the motion of pressing the
bar” (Nicolelis & Chapin 2002, p.50). This
sounds reasonable until one asks about the
location of these “thinking through” rats.
They were not noted as other neuronal
activity in the brain. In fact, no “thinking
through” rats exist. They are fictional agencies
inserted as antecedent independent variables
to explain the firing neurons. The psycholo-
gists fail to credit the postcedent water-
delivery as the crucial independent variable.
A similar focus on antecedents by psycholo-
gists shows when traits like “personality”,
grit”, “habit”, or “self-image” are offered as
explanations of behavior that ensues. As Ul-
man (1993/2014) puts it, other behavioral
sciences have “the perspective that behavior
is caused by hypothetical internal processes”
(p. 12). Even recorded neuronal activity,
which is not hypothetical, occurs before the
overt actions psychologists use it to explain.
Psychology and behaviorology as sciences
thus share little in their dependent measures
of behavior and practically nothing in where
they look for causes. It would be of little con-
cern that psychologists and behaviorologists
differ in their analysis of behavior if it were
 114 Commentaries and Replies
not for the practical treatments that each
field recommends. An agency analysis at-
tributes the cause of harmful, inappropriate,
or non-adaptive behavior to a dysfunctional
individual. In contrast, our science attributes
harmful, inappropriate, or non-adaptive
actions to dysfunctional contingencies. A
psychological diagnosis results in treatment
of the individual, often by drugs or talk
therapy-antecedent procedures. A behavioral
analysis recommends a change in contingen-
cies, especially by adding reinforcers follow-
ing desired actions in critical settings - post-
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cedent procedures. All practitioners rely on
scientific formulations. By clearly delineating
our defining principles we show that we do
have “a world of our own”, a unique science
that offers an effective technology for a more
just and peaceful world.
References
American Psychological Association (n.d-a).
Home page of the American Psychological
Association Division 25: Behavior analysis.
Retrieved April 21, 2014 from http://
www.apadivisions.org/division-25/index.
aspx
American Psychological Association (n.d-b).
Psychology topics. Retrieved April 28,
2014, from https://www.apa.org/topics
index.aspx
Ferster, C. B., & Skinner, B. F. (1997).
Jerome D. Ulman’s Reply to Julie S. Vargas
I share with Julie Vargas the view that the
primary difference between behaviorology
and psychology is how these two separate
disciplines do science. On the American
Psychological Association’s website (http://
www.apa.org/news/press/video/this-is-
Schedules of reinforcement: Cambridge,
MA: B. F. Skinner Foundation (Original
work published 1957)
James, W. A. (1892). A plea for psychology
as a “natural science”,The Philosophical
Review, 1, 146-153.
Nicolelis, M. A. L. & Chapin, J. K. (2002).
Controlling robots with the mind, Scien-
tific American, 287(4), 46-53.
Psychology. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved
May 5, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Psychology
Skinner, B. F. (1991). The behavior of organ-
isms. Cambridge, MA: The B. F. Skinner
Foundation. (Original work published
1938)
Skinner, B. F. (1990). Keynote address for the
1990 annual convention of the American
Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
Skinner, B. F. (2014). A world of our own.
European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15,
21–24. (Reprinted from Behaviorology,
1993, 1, 1–5).
The Behavior Analyst Certifications Board
(n.d.). BACB fourth edition task list:
Measurement concepts. Retrieved April 28,
2014 from http://www.bacb.com/Down-
loadfiles/TaskList/BACB_Fourth_Edi-
tion_Task_List.pdf.
Ulman, D. J. (2014). The Ulman-Skinner
letters. European Journal of Behavior
Analysis, 15, 11–19. (Reprinted from
Behaviorology, 1993, 1, 47–54).
psychology/introduction.aspx) psychology
is defined as “the study of the mind and
behavior”—the typical definition found in
psychology textbooks. The mind (or its alter
ego, the brain) is psychology’s hypotheti-
cal locus for inner agencies (e.g., attitudes,
 Commentaries and Replies
cognitions, selves, obsessions, impulses, and
the like). We know only too well how agency-
ism plays out; for example: Bill is hitting his
peers due to his “behavior disorder”; thus,
the behavior disorder is the cause of his ag-
gressive behavior. Likewise, we could frame
“attention deficit” or any other diagnostic
psychological label in the same way.
In contrast, behaviorology—defined as
“the science of contingent relations between
actions and other events” (Ulman & Vargas,
2005)—is not defined as the study of behav-
ior; its unit of analysis is contingency, the rela-
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tions between actions and events. Following
this natural science paradigm, for example,
what we might see as the cause of “aggressive
actions” would not be attributed to a label,
but to a consistent action–event relationship;
that is, a controlling variable found by con-
ducting a functional analysis. In teaching the
next generation of behavioral practitioners, it
is important that they understand the legacy
of this behavioral technology, one stem-
ming from the experimental manipulation
of non-human behavior within the oper-
ant chamber. An example here is Skinner’s
(1957/1997) work on multiple schedules and
discrimination where “the organism reacts in
a different way to two stimuli when they are
appropriate to the schedules having different
effects” (p. 525). My dissertation research
(Ulman, 1973) employed this schedule as
a single-subject experimental design in a
special education classroom to analyze the
possible differential effects on the arithmetic
performance of young adults. Employing
this schedule entailed the multielement
manipulation of three treatment condi-
tions: extinction, individual reinforcement,
and collective reinforcement, with each
daily condition arranged in an unpredict-
able order in the presence of one of three
signs: No Pay Today, Earn for Yourself Today,
and Earn for Your Class Today. Admittedly,
my initial goal was to finish my research as
expeditiously as possible (another instance
of necessity being the mother of invention).
While the differential performance effects
115
were insufficient to justify publication as an
applied behavioral experiment, the practi-
cal value of this single-subject design was
subsequently elucidated in a chapter (Ul-
man & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1975) in which I
expressed my indebtedness to a notable basic
operant researcher, Don Hake, “for sharing
his ideas regarding the use of the design in
educational research” (p. 377). In a landmark
investigation seven years later, Brian Iwata et
al. (1982/1994) reported on exposing nine
children with developmental delays “to each
of four different analogue conditions in an
experimental design that used multielement
manipulations” (p.201) to analyze the self-
injurious behavior within these conditions.
The outcome illustrated how to empirically
identify variables controlling problematic
behavior, thereby efficiently demonstrating
the selection of effective treatments, instead
of relying on “best guesses.” This transla-
tion of Skinner’s multiple schedule into a
practical functional analysis methodology
for identifying contingencies that produce a
wide range of behavior problems produced
a sea change in the development of effective
treatment programs—a profound shift of
focus in behavior analysis toward determin-
ing the variables responsible problematic
behavior, while coincidentally implicating
effective interventions. This advancement is
extensively exemplified by behavior analysts’
phenomenal success in treating autism; a
technological descendent of basic operant
methodology. The way we do science pro-
duces an effective technology.
References
Iwata, B. A., Dorsey, M. F., Slifer, K. J.,
Bauman, K. E., & Richman, G. S.
(1994). Toward a functional analysis of
self-injury. Journal of Applied Behavior
Analysis, 27, 197–209. (Reprinted from
Analysis and Intervention in Developmental
Disabilities, 2, 3–20, 1982)
Skinner, B. F. (1997). Schedules of reinforce-
ment. Boston, MA: B. F. Skinner Foun-
 116 Commentaries and Replies

dation. (Original work published 1957)
Ulman, J. D. (1973). Collective versus
individual monetary reinforcement of
arithmetic performance in a special class
of retarded adults, Southern Illinois
University, (1972). Dissertation Abstracts
International, 34, 4958A-4959A. (Uni-
versity Microfilms No. 73-6254)
Ulman, J. D., & Sulzer-Azaroff, B. (1975).
Multielement baseline design in educa-
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tional research. In E. Ramp & G. Semb
(Eds.), Behavior analysis: Areas of research
and application (pp. 371-391). Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ulman, J., & Vargas, E. A. (2005). Behavior-
ology. In M. Herson & J. Rosqvist (Eds.),
Encyclopedia of behavior modification and
cognitive behavior therapy: Volume I, Adult
clinical applications (pp. 175-176). Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage.

"My thanks to Ernest A. Vargas for his helpful comments on the replies."
Jerome Ulman