OH lC $0 OPA

Ofl Ce

Angela M. Smith
Un'iversity' f
o Wd5Al
into»

l. INTRODUCTION

One ~f' tbe perennial sources of skeptic>srn toward the view that we are
responsible for our desires, ernotiorrs, and other attitudes is the fact that these
states 0 ften seem to cori flict with our considered judgrrients aboU~t reasons.
Vk desire things that we k,now are bid fo«s, we feel reseritiTient toward
those ~'e know gave been good to us, we tlkklnkless Qf some people o'n the
basis o f stereot j'pesjoe krtio>' a fe not ] ustified. I t is ternptll ng, when faced with
such, attitudinal corIflicts, to say that tl>e person is to be identified '+ith t"e
judgrments she reAectively endorses, and that she is not responsible for or
I%Grill) iITlplic@tedi rn any attitudes that runI contrary to those judgmertits.
Ilndeed, many philosophers seem to regard
cases in which we must adjudicate
among conHicting attitudes is tlhe basic or primary setting in which we exer-
cise our»Iioral agency; it is through such acts of "identificati
on"orendorse-
ment, rejection or disavowal, t'hatwe 6etermine both wko we are and what
we are appropriately held responsible for. As Harry Frankfurt, one of the
leading defenders of this picture of moral agency, eloquently puts it,"It is
tlhese acts vf Ordering and of rejection integration and separation — that
create a self out of the raw materials of'inner life"'
 The~e is soimcthing exceedingly attractive and intuitively compelIling
ab«iut this conception Qf moral agency. For there is no denying that one Gf
the fiundamentall thimgs that distinguisheshum1an beings Rom other creatures
is our capacityto step back tom our own desires, emotions, and belieFs, and
to subject them to reflective scrutiny. And It is very plausible to regard the
exercise Gf that capacity as a tif Aot thc) paradigm expfessioA of Gur Aloral
agency and as a (if mot the) lundaITIental determ1iincrof our moral, identities.
Neverthelessl1 believe that this influential picture of Inoral agency is mis-
taken and IA Acc«l of revision. My aim IA this papcl' ls to critically cva)uate
this picture and to propose an alternative model ofmoral agenqr„which I will
argue does a betteI' job GF capturing Gur intultlons about what lIhings Rre
properly attriibutable to Us as personsand moral agents. Rather than viewing
cases of attitudinal conflict merely as occasions for the exercise of morall
agency, I will suggest, we shoukl instead view them as eases in whi«'h our
moral agency is itself conflicted. If this is cori'ect, them the appropriatewayto
respond to cases Qf attiludinal eonfliet is not to deny that people are respoII
SlMCfor attitudes they «lo not fcflcctlvcly cA«lorsc. Orto deny that such atti-
tudes really " belong" to them as moral agemts, but rather to acknowledge that
their lack of rcflective endorsenient of them can and shoIild make a diEfer-
cllcc wllcl1 lt conies to questions of moral asscssmcmt.
My strategy in this paper willi be as follows. In th ie next section, 1 will say
something about the connectionsamong threekcy notions in thisdiscussio~:
moral agency, moral respomsibility, and moral identity,Thesenotions Form a
tight clUstcr, In nly view, soI will often move &GA1claims alMut n1ofal agencv
directly to claims Rb«IUtmoral responSibility amd moral ideritity. Briefly put,
my lew is that we are mot'ally responsible for anythingIhat reflccts
expresses our mofal agency, S~nd that Only those things that fcAeet Gf express
Qur moral agency, in turn, caA bc attributed to our mora il i«lentity.' In section
three, I will spcH out what I will call "the volitional model" of moral agency.
This m«I«lel, defendedl in thc early work of Harry Frankfurt, and more
recently by Christine Korsgaard and R. Jay Wallace, atnong otbiers, takes the
standpoi~nt of practical «Ielibciration as the fundamental standpoint of moral
agency, and locates the activity Qf the pcI'son in the activity of conscious
deliberative chollcc Gf declsioll. On sucl1 a view, 1'@sires aAd attitudes that arc
not in conformity with Gur deliberative verdicts are not really attrIibutablc to
Us aspersons lcalthough they are, as Frankfurt would say, still part of our
empirical psychol«Igical history). Im section four, I will raise somequestions
and doubts about this model, and will propose am alternativeaccount GF
IAoral agency which tiesour moral agency to the cxcrcis»of evaluative judg-
iMent rather tlhan to thc exercise Gf practical choice or dcclslom. AltlMLlgh
some of Gur desires and Qlihcr' attltud~es may conflict with Gul' deliberative
verdicts, they can still generally be saidto embody anevallluative judgment on
our part,
and therefore shouldbc seem asInside fathei' than Gutsldc Gf Gur
Inora) selfhood for purposes of moral assessment. lFinilly„ in section five, l
will spelll out some of the advantages of this alternatIve model of moral
agency, andi will argue that it does a better job than fhc volitional vieii of
accounting fIIr certain faiTIiliar features Gf ourmoral experience.

ill. MORAL AGENCY, MORAL P.ESPONSIBllLI7V. AND MORAL

lDENTlTY

When wc IJentlfy sufllconc Rs R ITioral agent, w'c attribute to hcr those

capacities, whatcvelr they are„ in virtue of which she is Bppropriafely regarded
*
,is ariswerrib(e for her attitudes and conduct. Tu be the "agent' of one'5 atti-
tudes Rnd conduct is to bc, in a sense yct tu be determined, the author Qf
these things and therefore to be tlhe legitimate taq;ct uf demands fur justi6-
caf ion Ircgal'ding that fhilng. Onc Is Aof thc agcAt uf R foot spasm, because
one does not bear fhe right kind Gf authorial relatiun tu this sort of bodily
inovcmctlf Thi.s Is shoivn by thc fact tlhaf lt would Make Ao sense ful surAc-
Gfie to dcrnatld that R pci.soA justify fnoving hcr foot IA such a way. Onc Is
not the "agent" of a headache for a similar reason. Now just what thuse
capacities al'c IA virtue Qf which wc count Rs O'Ioral agents, Rnd just what
lrange of things we can be saidl to bear an *'authorial'" relation to, is a subject
Qf some dlispute. But 1 tlhink it «BAbe generally agreed that to be B moral
agent~ is lo be the sort of creature who can legitim
ately enter info our prac-
tices Uf lntcrpersGnal justlficRfion Rnd 'that to bc thc ITIufal agcAt Gf SGIITlc
parti«ular thing is to bear an authurial relation to that throng
Bnd hence tu bc
Qpcnl, I'A principle, to dciriands for )usti6cation ill'egardil)g that thing.
Given this understanding of moral agency, it should be clear why the
notion uf moral agency has tended fo be cluscly assuciated with the notion
Qf moral rcspunslblllty. IAdccd, I't Is very colnltTIQIl fGI' philosophers to slIdc
seamlessly between talk of "moral agency" and talk of ' *ATQrally rcspnnsible
agency," The connection between these two notions seems to be this: a pcr-
sun is morally responsible= - that is open tu legitimate moral appraisal — only
for thuse things that can be said fo reflect or express her moral agen«y. lt
secITIs clear that, barring unusual «ircumstanccs, our intentional actions
reflect Qur rnorall agency in the relevant sense. Ãhcthcr things other than Qur
intentional actions can also be said to reflect Qur mural agency is. again, B
subject Gf SQITICdispute.
How. then, are the notions of moral agency and ITIQral responsibility
connected lo thc AotiuII uf moral identity~ ~c n w e r efer to R persons
ITIural ~dentity, l think we are referring to those features or qualities Qf hcr
that can bc said to reflect hci' Molal agency, RAd for which she Is thcK'cfurc
properly regarded as morally respunsible. To siy that something belongs to B
person s morail identity, then, is to say that it belongs to h«I in her status as a
moral agent, and not merely (as Frankfurt puts it) in hef status Rs a "ilocale in
which certain «vents happen to occur. ' We have a special Interest in deter-
IHIAIIIg what tlhlngsbelong LGus ~as Fnoral ag«A'ts, becailM' thIS is jntIIIAately
bound up with our sense of oufMlves as, the active authors of our lives, rather
than as the passive spectators of it. 'This distinction. between those things
that do and those that do,not belong to us as moral agents, is, what Frankfuirt
has In mind when hc' dlstlngulshcs between bodily Atovcmcnts and dcsifcs
that are attributab1« to a person in the strict sense, and those that afc merely
attributable to her body or to her psychological history.'
The basic question ait issue in this paper, then, is this: When can a desire,
emotion, QF Other attitude be atti 1buted to a person In the strict seAsc . lt
seems plausible to suppose that an attitude iis attftbutable to us "In the strict
s«Ase — that is, can bc regarded as a pal't of ouf IMofal identities, Rndhencc
as sorncthtng fGFwhich we afe morally responsible — If aAd Only lF It VCR«cts
Gr expresses our moral agency. The question in dispute, then, is when, if ever,
Qur attitudes can be said to reflect or express our moral agency. In thc next
section, I will examne a very inAuential but, t think, ultimately misguided
answer to thIS question.

III. THlE VOLITIONAI. MODEL OF MORAL AGENCV

What 1 have calHcd the volitional Fnodel of moral agency arises, naturally from
within the standlpoint of an agent at the time of action. From this standpoint,
and at this IIFne, it may wcllI appear that what one essentially is is a detached
andundetermined will, deciding what to do in light of (GFin spite of) a given
psychological con6gufation. The so-called "Fecessiveness Qf I "" the fact that
wc have thc capacity 'to step back~ fI'GIA any par'tlcu llaI' Intentional AI«ntal
stalle and sllbject it to crItlcal evaiuBtion, sllggcsts that oui' pl'oper self ls not
to bc identified with any one of them. As Christine Ko fsgaafd puts it,"'A%«n
you deliberate, it is as if there were something Over and above all of your
desires, soinething which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on."'0
Th«expefl4'ncc Gf choosing to act mntfafy to all of Guf col ilsclous dcsIFcs.
moreover, can, present itself' in deliberation as one of the most sublime
expressions of Our own agency." From the standpoint of practical delibera-
tion, therefore, it is tempting to view "ouf moral self" as so~ething wholly
dIistirlct from thc dcsifcs and 1ITlpulses 'to which wc arc (passhvclyIi subject.
These reflections 1ead naturally to a certain picture of moraj agency, one
that is implicit inmuchGf tlhe historical and contemporary writing on this
subject. AccordIAg to this picture, the role of the person Is to act as an Inter =

Fncdlafy between her passIV«ly gIVCAdcslfcs GII fhe One hand 81Idthe Rctlorls
shc bf1ngs about, on thc Gthcf. Kofsgaard, again, pfovlcles 8 Alee statcnlenl of
this view:
/M lillins, isself ca-urcioarrcausality, causalrty thar operates in the
light Gf r»flectrorr. To wIH ls no't Just 'lo b» a caus», or ev»n to
allow arr IllnpUIS» IA rn» "lo op»rale iLS a caus» but so to speak to
consciously pick up the reins, and makemyself the cause of what
ii do. And if ll am ro constitute myse(
f as the cause of an action,
them l must be able to distin0uish betw»»rl my causing the actiorl
and some desireor irupuls» thar is 'irr me'causing, my body to
fas
act. I nrust bc abl» to s»» mysel something
thai is distrnct from
any of my par ticu4F, f~rst-ofd»r, impulses and motiv»s, as the
F»H»ctive standpoint in anv case requires. Minirrlally, then, I am
not the mere location of a causall~ effective desire but rather am
lh» agent who acts On the desif».

I. l3Rvrd Vcllclnan suggc'sts,a sifnilaf RccoUAt of Fnoral agency w'hen hc

wfrtcs li IIthat makes us agcA'ts father than nil»re sub]ccts of ~behavroF — InQUF
conccptron Qf Gufsclvcs, at least, r fAG'trn reality — rs Gur perceived capacity
llo rntcrpose Ourselves into the course of events in such8 way that the behav-
ioral outcome is traceable directly to us."" And the "events" into which he
says we interpose ourselves include both psychological states and bodily
rnoverncnts. Thus wc can distinguish, he thinks, beItween behavior that is due
"to me" and behavior thai is due "to my attitudes, but not to me."" The lat-
ter he takes to 1Ix cxentpliRed by 8 case in which I form 8 subconscious inten-
tion to do something (c.g., to sever a &icndship), which in tul'A causes certain
behavior (e.g., the ~aking of hurtful remarks to my friend). In such8 case,
lhe says, the behavior that occurs, though rnotivatcd by my desires neverthe =

less takes place withoMf rrry partrcipflfrorr: When fny destfcs and beliefs
engendered an intention to sever the friendship, and when that intention
triggered my nasty tone, they were exercising the same causal powers that
they exercise lrl ordinary cases Rnd yct they wcfc dorng so Ãrthout Rrly con-
tfrbutron Prom me. "
~Vh8t ls stflIklIng abo~ut both of these Rccoun'ts rs thc crnphasls they place
Qn the dislinction between the person and hcr attitudes. To say that a par-
ticular bit of behavror can bc motivated by " my attitudes" artd yet occur
without any contribution from me rs to claim, sur prisinglly, that there is Ao
AofnlIatively signiltcant connection bchveen me' and my attitudes. A sirn-
rlaf Schism rs Bt 1east suggcstcd by tile claim that I Bllust bc able to dlstrngursh
between "my" causing an action and some desire or impulse that is merelyin "
Alc cRUslng Fny body to act. Ifl both of tllcse accounts, tile agcflcyof fhcpcf
sorr r5 RctUally contrlstcd wvrth thc agency (Ar cau'%81 cScacv) Qf fnefe psy-
chollogical forces at work within the person.
My point In crtlrlg these discussions, llowcvef, rs Aot to cfltlcrxe these
views as Bccollnts uf thc nature Qf action. My collccl'n, Father, rs'orth thc way
in which these accounts conceptualize our relation to Gur Own psychological
states amd with the implications this conceptualization has fof a more gen-
eral account of the nature of moral agency. Once we think of our own atti-
tudes as fnefe causal fofces actlAg upofl us, themft sccms we nlust 'tell 8 spec Mf
sto~y about how Ilt is that these states can come to be attributable fo us, as
persons and lnoral agents. Frankfurt tries to provide such a story when he
suggests that what makes a nlental state attributable to a person Ifather than
mmrcly,fo her PNC'ff rfll4$rorJ') ls that she has consciously choseA to identify
hcl'self with IL IIIItc have tllc abllllty to MNke8 psychic glvcA oui' own, accofd-
lrlg to Frankfurt, by jolnlng u'urselves to It. Al nd when 8 person fnakes
such a decision, he claims, "h» is responsible f' or the fact that the desire has
become Ills own ln 8 way lIA which l'twas no't umcquivoc81ly his Gwn bcfofe.
1 should be clear why, given this conception of moral agency, it would
seem plausible to lcstrict 8 person's moral respomsibHity for what goes on in
her mental life to these attitudes she has reflectively endorsed of identiIfied
with. Tl1Cperson, QAthc volitional view, srdFrsoff 'disconnected frofn hcr
desires andI emotions. These are states she confronts in deliberation,, and shc
expresses her distinctive mora) agemcy amd activilIy by choosing whether or
mot to endorse of identif
y', with then1. Such states become properly hers,
moreover, only in virtue Uf this choice. lf, then, onc of these attitudes should
persist or recur, despite a person's non-endorsement of it. then there would
seelm to be no grounds fof claiming that she is nevert'heless morally Fespori-
sible for it, or that it irnplicates her as a moraII agent in any way. Why is 8 per-
SGAany' mofc fcspAnslble for thc unwanted sollcitations of 8 fecalcltrant
desirc Itlhafl shels fof thc unwanted sollcltatlons of 8 pefslstefl't tc1emafkctcf~
Im both cases, il mild be argued "the person" is a victim of forces beyond her
Bgcflcy 80d control.
The vo1itional model certainly captures one important strand in our
thinking about moral agency. Our abihty to stand back from our intentional
attitudes alid to choose whether to endorse QFac't upon thcfn pl'Gvidcs us
with 8 very distinctive and tangible sense of Gur own agency. Nevertheless, in
the next section 1 will suggest that the sense of agency we experience in the
process of practical deliberation is just one, father marrovI, manifestation Gf
Guf status as llAoral agcAts.

OIF MORAL AGENCY

Thc volltlonal IMGdel of KIoraj agency gRAs sonte Gf its apparcA t plauslbHlty
f'fom a common feature of everyday practical deliberation. Ilt often happens
that we experience desires, emotions,— and other attitudes that run directly
contrary to Qur «onsidcred judgments about what we have most reasQA to do.

336
I desirc tu stay In bcd even though I have concluded I must gct up; I desire to
spend the evening «vatching television even though I have judgcdl that I must
work; I desire to lrlai«e a cutting remark to an obnoxious colleague even
though I have decided that it would be inappropriate to do so; ctc. Conflicts
uf this Sort, between our desires and ~ther attitudes, on the onc hand, and
our deliberative vcr'diets about what to «lo, Qn the otllcl', arc sornctlfBcs cited
as evidence fot' thc fact that our dcslfcs arid othct' attltu~dcs aire Aot rcflcct1vc
of our moral agency.
R. Jay W8118cc, for cxanlplc, dra«vssuch 8A IAfcrcAcc IA
his article "Moral Responsibility and the practical point of View":
(Given desires) are rather like sensations, in that they are pre-
sented to us in experience rather than being things lhat weour-
selves do. Of collrsc, Cesll'es and sensations d1lfel ln a BulIIher ot
respects. Most importantly, desires, are conceptually slructured in
a way sensations are not; they hav» propositional objects, for
instance, and are typically accompanied by evaluative thoughts.
The concephIzl strucilure of given desires makes it pii~ssiible for
them to respond to our deliberated
have reason Io do, much as Aristotle lhought thai appetitive and
olher desires ol' the virtuous woulld obediently faH in linewith
theiir rational verdicts about the good. But as Arist otle «would be
the first to admit given desires are not IIecersorily sensitive to
judgments about Ihe good in this «vay. Furthermore, even when
our given desires respond to our reamned verdicts about action,
thei~ doing so is IIotsomething that is directly under our conlrol.
ln this respect, given desires are not to be classified as voluntary
phenomena.'5

While I quite agree with Wallace that desires are Aot tu be c1assihcd as volun-
tary phcnf3~mcna ( they iafc Ao't chosen or uitdcf ollr immediate voIuntary
colltfol3i, I waint ito fallsc solve questions about solrlc of thc othcl' cla1ms llc
Awakes in tlhis passage. Wallace appears to treat the expressions "dchbcratcd
judgmcr its about whait we have reason to do," "ratiollal vcrdicts about thc
good,"'and "judgments about the good" as equivalent in his discussion, which
is what aHows him to conclude from thc fact that (I) our dcsil'es «lo riot
always respond to Qur deliberated j udgments about what we have reason ro
do, that '(2) they are not necessarily scnsltlvc to ouf )udgmcnts about rIlcgQNL
But thc expressions ln question al'c lnot c«lulvalcnt. LPelllbcrrIred jIIdgPICIIts
about what we have reason ro aloare different from rrrriorlgJverdips about the
good, which ln turn are different from judgrrlerlrs about the good. I can judge
that staying in bed would bc good (e.g., pleasant), yet came to the rational
vcrdicfi that getting up and going tu work Is 8 morc important good, and
therefore come to the deliberated practical judgment that I do Ilot have suf-
hcient reason to stay In bed. In this case, I Nay wclll continue to desire to stay
in bed and this may ruII contrary both to irlyrational verdict about the good
and to my deliberated judgment about what I have most reason to do; but
such a conflict does not license theclaim that the desirc In question docs Imt
reflect any judgm»nt on my part about the good. Te the contrary, it seems to
me that my desire to stay in bed itself depends upon my evaluative judgiment
thaI doing so would. be pleasant; were l to lose or to abandon that evaluative
jL dgnlcAt (c.g., by becofALng bored with loungLng aroUAd), I would also
cease to llavc thc desirc ln qucstIGA.
Anoth»r way cf puttmg this peint wouldbc to draw 8 distinction bctwc»LI
pl'Rctlc81 rca5ofls (I'casonste act) and evaluative r»Rsons (reasons 'to fccl).-
Although there Rrc very close cennectIons between cv81uatlvc reasons RAd
practical reasons, w» can have r»asens to desire certain things (e.g., the pleas-
ure Qf stRylAg LA bcd) even tlteugh wc do Aot have feasolls to act SGasfo
bTL1Ig thcscthLAgs about, RAd wc caA have reasons te Rct so Rs tobrlAg cer-
ta'A things about even though wc do not have reasons to d'esirc that they
come about. To Lllustrate the latte~, consider cases ln which we judge t ihat we
have a duty to de san1»thing thatviill cause another person pain, distress, or
inconvenience (e.g., to getour child vaccinated, to tell 8 friend some unwel-
cGITLc news, fo bFc'ak 8 pfoITIlsc IA Rn cmcfgcllcy SLtURtlQA,»tc. ). ln 'thesecases,
wc lllRvc good rcasoAS to act ln 'thc ways wc do, but we do 'not have gMKl rea-
sons to desiIC th» pain or inconvenience our actIQAS will bring about.
Ther»for» we will probably Aot d»sire to do what we have judged we have
good and suAicient reason to do. But here the fact that Qur desires do not
conform to our deliberative judgments about what to de would net provide
o'vldcncc Gf t alc&Ldcp»ABCAA'of desire from judglYlent >O'Ut GAIy of thc fa'ct
that our paiticglai desires do Aot always track our all-things-considcied
judgments about what we have most reason to de. And it is a good thing they
do Aet: in cases ef this sert, it would be quite disturbing if our desires did
conform to these 811-thIngs-considered judgments, for then we woujd have
no way of registering and expressing the fact that we care about the othe~
person Rnd regret having to cause her pain.
It is i'Ilegitimate then to conclude kern the mere fact of conflict between
GIIe'5dc«rcs and Qnc s dcllbcratLve conclusLens aboLIt what to do that the for-
mer Bo not involve, Gr arc Aot scnsitLvc to, onc 5 judgITL»nt. Of course, 'thc
deeper worry is about desires th.at do not seem te be sensitive to Gnc 5 judg-
ments about thc goodl in any sense and I wLld consider cases of this sort in 8
inoment. But fer new, l sin1ply want te Aag the fact that thc RppcaraILcc of
IYlasslve disorder and unrullncss Ln Gur' affective Ilfc Ltse'lf presupposes 8 ccI'-
taiII picture of ALeral agency, Gnc which p rivileges practical Rll-things-consid-
ered judgments andi Interprets Rny deviation &em them as a sign that aratlonal
psychologlcalll forces Rrc at work. The t»IYIptatIQA tocltaractcrlze confllctlng
*'
desires as forces that do no t really belong" te a person,then, is itself a prod'LIer
of, ratlher than cvkkllce for, the volit l'Gnarlmedeil ef ALoralagency.
A second point I want te make about ~LI/allace'5 passage — which is Iep-
rescntativc Gf much of the literature Qn desires and practical reasoning — is
that it appears to portray desires as alien entities im our mental lives even at
th» level of phenomenological description. Given desires, he says, are "rather
like sensations," except that they happen to have a "conceptual structure"
that. Ilnakes it "possible for them to respomd to uur deliberated judgments
about what we have reason to do." Implicit in this description, again, is a
picture uf the person RfifiAfAeomc who stands outside of hcr desll'es Bnd
«onfronts them Rs objects to be cuntro11edl and rnanipuiatcd. Om such a pic-
tu ire, desires will always scerm llcss "ours" tham uur choices amd decisions,
simply because they are treated from lhe start not as states that already
in>plicate our agency in some way, but as slates that can to some extent be
coll carol'fed
b«'it.
But what, if anything, is wrong with this picture. After all, we ha«c all
had the experience of "struggling"' against desires that we do not endorse Bnd
do mot want to acl upon, and it ca in sceim quite natural to describe such
episodes as battles between thc pcl'son Bnd psychologKBI forces external to
her that are competing with her for control over her behavior, Phenomcmo-
logically, however, I do noi believe this accurately captures the true nature of
our experience in the majority of such cases. Tlhat is, I do Aot think most of
us experience uur desires, ermotions, and other attitudes as "alien forces"
external to our moral selves against which we must contend, as we may have
tu contend against tiredness in order to keep ou~selves awake at the cnd of B
long day or against palA lm order to keep oui'Mlvcs runnllIlg al tile cnd of a
long race. For even when we disapprove of an altitude and do not «vant to act
Upon it, it is hard to regard il as something that simply lhappens to us, in the
way that feelingfi of pain or tiredness may simply happen to us. This is
because oui' Rltlltl1dcs, umllkc scn'Rations BAd feelings, by their very Aatul'c
embody our evaluative responses to thc world Bl'GUnd UslIiiIJ hen we desire
son>ething, for example, «ve sec sumething as good about that thing; per-
hapss ««e sce it as pleasant, fun, lelaxing, beautiful, admil able, or noble. %hthcm
we resent someone «ve see hcr Bs having wronged us in flum «vay or as hav-
ing received an undeserved bcncIflt. These BssesslMemts, lrl tun, seem essen-
tially to involve lhe exercise of oui evaluative capacities. But evaluatoon of
this sort is, argua'bly, a form of moral agency. To evaluate is lo judge the
valUc, worth, or slgnlgcan~cc of soAllethlllg, whlch i rcqull'c's the active engage-
ment uf our rational faculties. This cam lake place spontaneously amd unre-
flectively, of course; but it is mot, for that reason, any less R f orm uf agency.
Thus, even if we end up rejecting the evaluations i mplicit inourattitudes,
uponi reAection, wc caiinot, ll think, regard uur attitudes afi things that just
happen to us; for, however much it may distress us, these attitudes depend
upon evaluations that are essentially expressive uf uur status as mora1 agents.
This ls why stl'uggler agalAst unwanted attltudc5 Brc often so dlScult RAdso
panful: LA such cases, wc BIl'cIA fact struggling against oursclvefi.

339
 >s should Ibe clear &om these obpcctlons. my dlsagrecmIcnt with the voli-
tional model of moral agency is atbase a disagreeme
nt over how we should
un«lerstand our relation to our own desires, emotion», and other attitudes. If
is a dispute, in other vl ords, over the correct model of our moral psychollogy,
GIld lt ls this dcc'pcf d lspUtc that Iles Rt thc heart of Hly oblcctlorl to the voli-
tional view. There is, it seems, a handf'ul of psychological states that do ht the
descriptiion assumed by the volitional view: states such as hunger,thirst, andi
perhaps some physiologically based addictive cravingsIcc.g., for tobaccoor
for «lrugs), fof example, sccIYJI to ariseRIMl pcl'sist independently of GI11r
rational Gr evaluative judgment.States of this sort comm RAG go in sequence
with thei~ associated biologicaI or physiological need, andi, though they often
grol md certain evaluative judgments IIe.g., that satislfyulg the needl ln question
wouM be plcasantl, they do not themselves seem to dcpelld,@poll our evalu-
ativejudgment. But the great mijority of the desires we experience Rre llot at
Rill 4ke this. 'h%»nI Rrn "struck" by a desire to see R Cary Gran) movie+ or to
saysomething unkind fo a rival, or to withhold somIc unwckorne news from
a frien«il, l am not overcome by a physical urge that arises independently of
my judgment and evaluative commitments. Rather these desires themselves
f»st Qn,and can only bc Und»rstood ln lh» light of certain evaluative Rsscss-
mcnts, such as that a Grant movie would be fun andi relaxing, that RAulIlkind
word fo my rival would be deserved and gratifying, tlhat withholding bad
news would spaIre my friend pain. Ãe may indeed reject the evaluations
impllci't ln our desires UpoA rcflcctloA, or wcmay simply dcclde that they do
nol provide suf6clent reasons for action, given the other conslderatlons we
take fo bc relevant IA fhc circumstances. But I have bccA suggesting fhaf lf ls
a mistake fo think that our evaluative judgment, and henceour moral agency,
mmes onto the scene on/y when we issue such deliberative verdicts. For,
Unlike physical Urges these desires themselves already depend upon oureval-
uativeRctivitv,,and therefore wc arc already implicated in them Rs moral
agentS even b»fOle w» 1.OmetO r»ACCfUpon them.
My c/aim, then, is this: we need a richer conception of moral agency
fhaA thc onc provided by thc vol lltlonal model. Though lIhc RctllvltlIcs of
reflective evaluation endorsement and rejection highlighted by the vol~'i-
flonal Model Rrc lmportRAt cxpresslonsof GIIlr nlofal agency, Ithc rc'Rl core of
our moral agency res1dcs ln OUr Hllofc basic cRpacllty to cvaluatc — ln coln-
plex, spontaneous, andI sometimes even contradictory ways — the world
around us. This evaluative capacity ls manifested ln what we unreflecflvcly
think, feel, desire, and notice, as well as in what wc reflect
ively
choose.
endorse or reject I wHIcall this alternative model of moral agencythc eval-
uative model. ln fhe next section, I will spell out some of the advantages this
model has over tlhe volitional model in explaining certain famihar features
of our moral cxpcl'lcncc.
 V. SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE EVALUAT1VE MODEL

The theoretical grip Gf the volitional model is such that it carI sound coun-
terin l tuitive to say that we are still morally implicated in, and thus morally
responsible for, attitudeswe do not reflectively endorse or that we reflectively
reject. IA'hen we turn to our actual moral practices, however, 1 think we will
see that the evaluative model does a bette~ job Gf accounting for certain
familiar kinds of moral experience than does the volitional model. In partic-
ular. the evaluative model can explain why it is that we still ~ega~d people as
morally answerable foi. Subconscious or unacknowledged attitudes, why wc
still scc ourselves as morally Implicated ln oulr spontaneous and unrcflcctivc
attitudes, and why we tend to regard those who are struggling with unwanted
attitudes as deserving of less s»rious moral «riticism than those who either
do not realize they have objectlionable attiltudcs Qr do nlot scc any reason to
struggl» against them.
Beginning with the first of these points, 1 think it is signihcant that wc
do not accord absolute authority 'to fhc explK)t i avowals Gf Others when it
comes to deterniining what attitudes are appropriat»ly attributable to them as
moral agents. A person mav explicitly and sincerely commit herself to certain
attitudes ce.g., attitudes of tol»rane», forgiv»ness, trust, etc.II and cxplil cltly and
sincerely disavow certain Gtheis (e.g., attitudes of prejudice, resentmcnt„dis =

trust„etc. I; but, despite what the VGIitional model would have us do, we do
not generally take such acts of explicit endorsement and rejection to settle the
question of what attitudes b»long to her as a moral agent. The answer to that
questionfnust generally await a mGM prolonged evaluation of thc person s
ovcraIII pattcrll$ Gf thGUght and feeling.
Consldei', for cxan'iple, a person who explicitly endorses egalitarian val-
ues, makes and accepts cgalitaf lian pronouncements, and genuinely Jisap-
prov»s ofblatant forms Gf racism or sexism. Ac «aii assiime thit this person
reHectively endorses attitudes of respect and toleration aisd would reflectively
disavow any prejudiced thoughts or attitudes that might Occur to him.
Nevertheless, his actual behavior refIccts subtle attitudes Of prejudice that are,
in their way, as deeply offensive and pernicious as those of' his more explic-
itly racist or scxisII counterpart. AdriaA M. S. Piper has referred to t4is kind
of prej tudice as "higher-order discrimination," which she says is "peculiarly
hc sickness of thoughtful, well. Intentiol1cdl, and CQnscicntlous 1AdivMUals
who nevcrthel'ess have failed adequately to coitfront and work through their
own prejudices oi pcrhips have been too quickly satishcd lby theii ibi/ity to
marshal arguments GA,behalf Af doing so" Unlike "6rst-order discrirnina-
tors," however, whose prejudices tend to be expressed in the usc of familiar
stereotypes, Piper notes that the attitudes of higher=order discriminators usu-
ally take a morc insidious E orm: such a, person may, for instance, expect a
higher degree of dcfcrcllcc or genuflection froin m1~norltics arid wollncn and
triay 1'caclwi'tll anger OFdisapproval when these cxpcctatioAs afe riot A1et; hc
may unreflectivcly discount lhc contrkutlons Gf wolIlcn and lninof ilies in
collaborative settings, or feel insultedI by constiuctivc criticism thathe would
accept gladly from ether white inen whom he regarded as his peers. Now, the
fact that these UnderlyiIAg attitudes, un4kc thc cga4tarlan GIMs, have not been
explicitly endorsed or even BcknowIedged does not seem to show that they
bclorig lo hlnI Rny Jess ol' that hc is BAy less FcspoAsiblc for theHll. Indccd,
the unexarnincdI attitudes here seem, if anything, morc truly his own, because
they arc the ones that actURHy scclTl to bc structuring arid Fnotivatllng his pat-
ternsof thought Bnd fc'cling. OUF familiarity with thcsc forms of hypocrisy
Bnd self-deception, both in oursc1vcs and in others, should inake us hesitant
to draw Bny conclusions about R pcl'sQAs owncrslMp of Rn attitude from thc
degree to which she explicitly endorses it.
ln response, ll might bc ciailTled that what this case really shows is not
that these underlying attitudes "belong" to the person as much as (or even
more than) his explicit ones, but rather that "the person" is letting his behav-
ior be directed 'by forces that Rre Aot fully his own. What is really wrong with
this person, ln other words, 1s pi'cciscly thc fact that hc lMs not FCAcctcd on
what is moving him, and therefore that he is not the true author of his
conduct."
The first thing that sllllould be said Rbolll 'this slIlggcsthon is iha'i 1'i ls CM-
rect in claiming that thc higher-order discriminator is open to criticism for
Aol adequately reflecting on his, underlying beliefs and commitinents. Ilndeed.
as piper po1flls GUll, part of what FTl'akes
this case so frustf Rtkng, 1s that the per-
son clearly has the capacity to engage in this kindl of reAcction and has, actu =

aHy engaged in it to B certain extent, bui not far enough to uncover some of
IIC might »y, then,
the really deep prejudices shaping his evaluative out1ook. 'It|I
thathe has failed in certain duties of self-reflection. The question, however,
is whctlhcr we can accountfor his failure solely as a failure of silf-reAection.
llf we interpret the higher-order kscriniinator s failure in the way suggested
abovewe , wW have to see hin1 as negligently allowing himself to be governed
by "external" forces that do not really belong to hiin.
This type of a~alysis seems most plausible when the desires in quest ion
fall into the narrow class of appetitive desires l mentioned above, c.g., biolog-
ically or physiologicaHy based desires of hunger, thirst, Bnd addict Iion.
Someone who UnreAectivcly follows the lead Gf such desires does, seem to be
surrendering Ihimself to "natura1" forces i in a way that mikes it t empting
to
describe his behavior Rs "heteronomous." Since such desires do not them-
selves reflect his evaluative judgment, following them without sufficierit
reflection can bc regarded as negligently allowing his actions to be deter
mined by forces "out~idc" of his moral self." But this analysis seems much

342
less conIpelling when the desires or attitudes in question are themselves eval-
Uativcly grounded ln the way the higher-order discrlmlnator's attitudes seem
tobe. HIS reactions do not seem to bc blind physicalurges cerning from out-
side his moral sclnIond, but quite sophisticated ratioiIBl responses to the peo-
p le and situations hc confronts. For this reason, I thirik it w o uld b e
misleading, ind fir too easy on the higher-ordIer discriminater, to say that in
unrcficctively followIing the llead of such attitudes he Is allowing himself to be
governed by external forces that do not really belong to him. For this would
distort the true nature and signijI1cance ef lhls moral failure. KVhat is wrong
with the higher-order discriminator, ii seems, is Aot simply that he hasn' t
reflected adequately on his Un«lcrlyingattitudes„butrh«Ir hc has these objec-
tionablle underlying attitudes. ®hat makes his responses particularly offen-
autonomy,
sive Is Aol that tllev leflcct a fallufc of self-I cflcctlon, of a failure of
but that they reflect his objectionable judglnent that women and minorities
arc inhcrcntly II1 fcrlell because of their scx or race."
AlthoUgh l have bcctl focusling herc OA cases ln which a pcl'soA reflcc =

tlvcly endvrMS Inorally Rppfopriatcvalues bu'I Whose UnrcAectivc attItudes

express morally pernicious ones, structurally similar cases could bc cited in
which these
judglnents Bre reversed. The much-discussed caseef Huckleberry
Finn provides an example of this kind of evaluative reversal.' Huck has been
helping his slave friend llrn to rull away from J'im's owner, when it suddenly
dawns on him that v hat he is doing is contrary to every "moral" principle he
accepts: Itt hadn t ever come horne to IIIC, before, what this thing was that 1
divas doing. But now it «lid; and it stayed with mc, and scorched Inc mole and
lnore."'s Buck is haunted by his conscience to the point wher» he finali
ty
deci«les thai lhc must turn Ilirn in to the authorities. But when he is given the
opportunity to do se, he finds that lhe does not have the strength of will to do
lt. His colYlpasslol1 Bn«l fricndSlllpfof f Irn Rlc toodeeply rooted folhim t'o act
ori the basis of the morally repugnallt values he explicitly endorses. Of
course. Huck himself'regards his own action as weak and wicked, since he
believes the values he has acted against are themselves morally correct. 8ut
thc Illnportant point, fol' my purposes herc, Is what this failure seem%to
show about Huck and his true evaluative cornrnitments: we feel good about
Huck precisely because wc see his Unreflective, Unendorsed response as a true
Rnd accurate reflection of what he really
values and cares
about. Far from
showing that theseattitudes dlo not really "belong" to him, then, the fact that
they persist even IA 'thcface of hilsexplicit rejection scen1s to be R sign Qf thc
very depth of his corn'mil fncnt to them
Tllle evaluative model, thcA, scclns to do a better- jell of cxplalnllng ollf
fnofal reactll)ns to cases in which there Is a coAAlct between~ the atlitUdcs a
per%oil cxplIcltly cA«lofscs and thc attitudes thRl afc revealed in Qthcr aspccls
of that person's th«IUglIIt and behavior. ln such cases there is a terision within

343
the agent's own evaluative outlook: considerations he ls apt to sce as irrele-
varit when engaged Ln reflective deliberation he takes as significant when
engaged in ordinary interpersonal interactions, and i vice versa. His attitudes,
therefore, display an odd sort of inconsistency, and our moral reactions are
scnsltlvc to this fact. Thc evaluative model docs mot force us Loclmosc just
one of these attitudes to attribute to "t4» person," but blather Billows Us to
regard all of them as expressive of his moral agency.
lln addition to its abii4ty tu explaim our morilI reactions to these cases of
umrcllcctlvc Imofal fallu if e amd achlcvclnent, thc cviluatlvc model cam also
account for certain familiar exaniples of moral self-discovery Bmd insight. If
our "truest" or "deepest" attitudes werc thc ames we have Iteflcctlvcl endorsed,
then it would be Unclear why we so often feel as if we learn things about our-
sclvcs throLLgh olli' spontaneous amd UnrcAcctlve reactions. Amd Lt would also
be unclear why we so often take these reactions to provide occasions fur mural
self-Lmproverment. But we do not gene~ally view spontaneous attitudes Chat
conflict with our consldcfcd JudglHIIcnts as merc g]Iltchcs or IAQIIlentaI'y aber-
rations — things to be regretted, perhaps, but which dLI not call into question
our fundamental evaluative coimlmitlIlcnts. Instead, wc ofteli take our spom =

tameous reactions to provide a Inore accurate picture of our true judgments,

and we are sormctimes shocked Binddismayed
by what we And.
Consider, for example, the case of tlhe good liberal, who thinks there ls
absolutely nothing morally objectionable about Ihomoscxual re/atiomships
Bnd who takes an explicit stand against what she sees as the ignorance and
honlophobLB surrounding this lssuc ln many parts of oui' society. Never-
theless, when someone inquires about her own sexual orientation, she reacts
with alarm and feels thc need to rmake very clear that, though she supports
gay rights she is definitely Ilot the kind of person who wouM ever pursue a
same=sexr
elatio
nshipherself
Rcactlons of this sort, though spontaneous and unrcAcctlvc, arc often
deeply self-levelatory, The good Iihcral in this case, if she is thoughtful, willi
probably be disappointed by hcr owm reactions Bmd what they reveal about
lher true attitudes toward homosexuals amd homosexuality. Again, if she is
thoughtful amd well meaning she will probably take this as am opportunity
fof Imol'alrcAcctlon Bmd will cllgage ln a cfl'tlcal reassessment of hcr owm
evaluative assurnptioms and cormmitmcnts. But netl ike that im order'Lo b» dis-
appointed Bt herself; and to,~ee this is caHing for rmoral change, she must
believe that Lkc umdcrlylAg attltudcs rcvcalcd Lm hcl' spontaneous reactions
"belong"' toher im a deep sense. If she considered Ihcr consciously endlsed
attitudes to be "Imore truly her owm" than these underlying ones, she would
have no reason to feeII challenged by her own reactions or to view thcmL as
callling for this kindl of self-criticism and, revision.
This is not to say that Bll of our spontaneous reactions have this kind
weight or sigmi6cancc. If Iam very tired or have ibad an especially trying day,
I may feacr with impatience of BAAoyBAceto B friend»)r loved UAe, with»)ut
th»s calling, if»to question )Y»y fundallnental cotnlYI»'trnent to the»TI of to our
relationship, I am still responsible for my reaction, and it says something
about me and how I deal (of do Aot deal) with stress. 8ut it need Aot reveal
any deeper attitudinal failure on»t»sy part. If, however, I Bllways react to this
si»Y»e loved one with lmpat»ence and anfloyance, it seems there would be
g»QUAR% fof
deeper concern. Barbara Herman g»vesa nice exaAhple ut such a
case, BAdof sonic of the d»fhcultles that can attend our Btten)pts to deal w)th
them, in hef aftilcle Agency, AttaclilllelAt, and Difference:
")Vhen, for exasnple, I hear my n)other's parental anxieties in my
owr) voice as I criticize»ny son, I cannot resolve the problen) I
discover just by abandoning som» end or disowning so»ne desire„
however much distressI feel aboui what I am doiiig. Part of what
I discover in these moments is)vho I am —or whu I am as a par-
ent. I listen and I)nd out what I desire. IIut then it is not enough
to say that I do not want to act i)n these desires and also noi
enough to say thai I do not want to hive the»A. I want them r»ot
to have aplace in the complex of desires andi thoughts that con-
stitutemyselfas a parent. This may be no easy»jhing. for the very
desires I would d»savow may hold logether thi~gs I like about
ll)yself as a parent,"

The point here is that there seems to be no simple or detefm)nate relation

between the depth Gl' central»ty of BA attitude and t ltl'e deg'fe'e to 'which w' e
consciously endorse or reject it. Some of'the att)tudes that belong to Us A)ost
deeply, it seems, nlaybe ofles we fefJect»vei) reject, and soMC of the attitudes
we endorse n)ost enthusiastically»nay have rather shallow moral roots.
But what entitles me to tulle of deep and shallow ))»or»»( rootshere rather
than just deep and shallow I»sycI»»)logic»»I roots) Frankfurt, Korsgaard, Wallace,
and others rniglht well agree that the attitudes with the deepest psychological
hold on UsmayAot be the ones we explicitly endorse; but. they might say, that
is precisely )vhy we should identify "the person" with the attitudes she explic-
itly endorses and not with these Unruly and often intractable psychological
propensities. Am I not conflat)ng a psycholog»cal question with a moral one )

In one sense, this is exactly what I am doing. Or, to be »nore exact, I a»Y»
suggesting thai these so=called psychological propensities essentially reflect
our evaluative activity, s») there is Ao way tn draw this distinction between the
att»tudes with wh~ch the person is»dent»fied BAGmere psychological propen-
s»t»es with which she is l)ot. The exafAples discussed above are Illeallt 'to illus-
trate this very point: The attitudes and reactions of the lhigher-order
d»sell»Y»»nator, though AQ't consc»ousIy endorsed, afe alsoAot mere psycholog-
ical forces corning from "outside" his moral self. They are rational responses
that depend for their' existence QAthe person s evA~Gat»ve ludgfnent, wh»ch is
precisely why they are experienced as offensive by those to whom they are
directed. If such )ttitudeswere like hunger pangs or headlaches, things that
happc'n fo lIhe person buf which do nof klnpll icafe' his /UdgfAIAt iAl Bn v way
wc woul J have Fio reason fo attach th)s kin J of lMGFB1 signi6ciRnce to them.
Thc same things can bc saM about thc goodl liberal s fcsporisc to her o%vn
sponfancous attitudes and Herman% response 'to hcf parental anxieties. In all
nf these cases, what makes the attitudes in question morally signi6cant is pre-
cisely the fact that they FCAect the pcrson i s evaluative activity. And it is
bccBUSC wc see such evaluative activity Bs 1 iinanifcstatlon of a person s moral
BgenCy> 1 Suiest, that We regard
he'f' Bs FesponSiblC Bn J BASWCFable foi' these
attitudes, even when these atfitudcs are In conAicf wllth hef njiorc reflective
cnnsidered judgments.
This is why l am attracted to whatmight b e called a strict attribufabil-
ity" view when it comes to responsibihity for attitudes, back@ J up by flexible
assessments of the variety of attitudes that can bc Rtfrilbuted to R person in
the rellevanf sense. Our different Fnoral reactions to cases involving endorsed
versus unen Jorscd attitudes, or' rejective veFsus uni'cflcctlvc Btfltu Jes, sccm
to me best accounted for at the 1level of assessfnenf rather than in terms of
aftribuflons Qf Fespons)bilify. Reflectively cndQFsed BttitUdcs Jo not belong
any more fully fo us: wc Rre Aot more fully responsible for them, Aor are thev
morc fully expressive Gf our fnori) agency But our conscious endorsement
shows that wc are prepared fo stand by the evaluations iniplicit in our atti-
tudles and fo defend them if challengedl. If the evaluations in question are
fnorally Qb)cctio~nablc, th~is kind of explicit endorsefncnt provides additional
grounds for criticism that would not apply in the UAFCAective case. ln the
unreflective case. however, there may bc additional grounds for criticism in
the very fact that the person has nof engage J in adequate rcAcction upon his
Gwn attitudes: his attitu Jes still FCAect his evaluative ju Jgrnenfs, but these are
judgmentse has
h never bothered to examine or seen the need to ratiionallly
jusfil'y. Finally, in cases in which the person explicitly rejects lher own attitudes
and is already st~uggling against them, we may have very little grounds for
caddirioiiifl crificisin Bt alll. But this is Aof because she is not really responsible
for her attitudes,or because they do nof reaHy rcAect her moral agency; it is
because she is already responding to them in an Bppropriiatc way, and there-
forefwNhel critlcisfA on GUFpal t woulldl bc unwari'RAfcd. We Aced not deny
a person responsibility for recalciitrant altitudes in orde~ to acknowledge how
difhcult it can be fo ovcrcornc dccp-seated assumptions Rnd prejudices' wc
Aced Only bc Femin Jed that human beLAg5 arc col11plex crcRf Urcs, so when lt
corncs to questions Qf Moral assessmcnt we FAUstbc' sure to tRkc in fo accouAt
all of a person's attitudes when forming a moral judgment about hcr.-"
This 1ast poiint is impoftaAt because it bnngs out Gne 6nal Bdvaflfagc thc
cva1uatlvc lllnodcl has over thc vohtlonal view Onc of thc apparent BttfactNAS
of the voilitional view is that it allows Us to escape moral criticism for atti-
tudes that do Aot conforin fo out considered ju Jgments. Ther» may seem to
bc something unfair about holding someone responsible for Bn attitude she
does not endorse and would like to be rhd of,,and the volitional viehv can
accornnlodate this intuition. The RIip side of this accommodation, however,
Is that tlat vo1lhtional view allows us tG e'scape fAora1CI'Itlcllsnl Only by trcatlllg
us as If we arc the passive victims of Guf unendorsed attlhildcs. And this lhas
Implications for our understanding of ourselves andi for our treatment of
others that 1 suspect few of us wouM be happy to embrace.
1n our own case, the main problenh is that accepting this view Qf the mat-
ter would cut us offfrom a very valuable soirt of self-knowledge. ltf we view
any attitude ithat we do not reRcctively endorse as something that simply hap-
peAs IA our iITlental history — as ITIerely psychic raw'material, as Frankfurt
recently put the point'-' — then we wi/I not be open to the possibility that
these at(it«es Alight actually teach us important things about ourselves and
about Qur mast basic values and commltrnents. IIIc may also bc less llficlIncd
Iu critically question Qur reflectively endorsed attitudes when faced with atti-
tui des that run cQAtrat'y to Ilt. But, as thc Huck Finn caM brings out, sonlc-
times our unendorsed attitudes reflect a wisdom that we have not yet
achieved at the reflective level. Final'ly, treating unendorsed attitudes as if they
were outlaw forces -" rather than as stales that are expressive Qf our moral
agency, may itselfbe something Qf a self-fulfilling prophecv: if I do not sec
myself' as the agent of these attitudes, then I will be unlikely to engage in the
soi t of deep critical self-reflection that is ohcn necessary to uncover the fun-
dIBAhentalpresuppositions shaping my evaluative outlook. As a result, these
attitudes are likely to recur or persist and I may well feel like the passive vic-
tim of forces external ta my ~oral self. But this, ironhcBHy, would be because
I started out witlh an overly narrow conception of thc reach Qf llTIv IlYlofal
agency in the first place."
The clai~ that persons are not responsible — and thus not open to nhoral
cr iticIsfA fol' BttltUdcs they reflectively reject has soIYlc sinlilarlv troubling
lthhplications for' our treatnhcllt of others. Denying 8 pcfsoA responsibll'Lty fof
some aspect of her mental life is, at best, a double=edged shh Qrd. Khille it may
scelTI to bc 8 I&if BAd cornpasslonate I'csponsc to someone who is sthugglllTlg
hvithout success against an objectionable attitude, to take up such 8 stance is
essentiaHy to say that this person is not to be regarded as a responsible agent
in tllis area of her 1if» and that our treatmeilt of her should reAect this fact, lt
Is to view her tlat as sorncGAc to be F'Msotled N'IrII,but ITlcrely as so1Tleone to
be understoud, tr»atedl, managed, Qr coihtrolled. + Taking this stance toward
soineone witlh regard to aihattitude tlhat does seem tIh rellect her evaluative
judgment is the~efore deeply disrespectful, because it involves an ohen-
patronizing refusa) to accord to these attitudes their usus) nonnative Bnd
expressive' slgnlIllcancc. It Is much Aloi'c rcspcctfllll to criticize 8 person for
a recurring Ihbjectionabl'e attitude thar) it is to treat her as a victim of psycho-
logical forces that do not really lb»long to hcr. Ãhi)e we may have to resort ta
such B stance in some circumstances, I do not think we slhould wekome the

347
vol)ttonal fnodel s suggestion thla't thts should be our default rcactloA to cases
of altttUdlnal rcca'Icttf811ce,

Vl. tc:ONCLUSl[ON

One of the most fasclnatlng BAdethically stgntftcant fac'ts albout hut%an

beings is our capacity to sustain multiple and ohen conflicting attitudes
toward lhe world aroundus. When facedlwith such, attitudinal conAicts, it is
templing to want to know w4efc "the person" really stancls and equally
tempting to think that the answer tothis question must be determined by the
person s own actsof feflccttvecndofscfncnt. 1A thts pa~per, 1I have 'lilr1ed to
argue against lhc picture of moral agency underlying this resporise to attilu-
dinal conflict and to explain why 1 think thc conception of moral agency pro-
vided bv the evaluative view does a better job of capturing the richncss and
complexity of our moral identities. Unlike thevolitional model,which priv-
i)eges the standpoint of practical debberation and identiftcs "the person"
onjy
with those aIItitudes she has reflectively chosen or endorsed, the evaluative
model extends the scope of' moral agency and moral responsibility to include
any attitudes ithal impltcate a person s evaluative judgment. This means that
1fI caMs of attttudtnal confltct wc Aced not and shoulld Aot lfy to dcctdc
where the pefsoA really stands: thc pcfson, ln sUc4 cases, 1s confll tcd.
This reflects a convictio~, which l think is borne out in our actualmoral
practices, thatwc express our moral agency not only in what we deliberatively
endorse, bul also lA what wc unfcflccttvcly thlAk,,feel, dcsl1'c, and Aottcc.
ttVhtle this docs fnean that wc arc ltablc to Enofal crtttclsm for 8 wtdcf lfangc
of failings it also clocs justice to t4c sense many of us have that our affective
and emotional lives form an essential and indispensable part of ouf fnoral
identities.

NOTES

1 am very' grateFul to Sarah Buss, Pamela Hieronymi, Christine Korsgaard,

Richard Moran, T. M. Scanlon, and Alee thtalcn for their helpful comments
on previous dfsAIs.Special tl1anks go to Sandra Rettcf and )can Roberts fof
especiallly helpful discussion and support.

irt, )dentif1cationand 'LAioleheartedness, Ul Frallkhlrt„7he INporfaNceof

l. Harry FralitkfU
'LArtt 4c C~re About (Cazribridge: Catttbridge Universit~ Press, I9ttS), II59-76, 1 70.
2. This claim about moral identity is controversial. Ittniitht be thought that soloe thittgscan
be attributed to our mora) identity thatdo oot, in fact, reAect or express our,rmoralasency.
Unfortunately, a preper defense of this agency-based construal of moral identity is beyond
the scape of this paper,
See Harry Frankfurt, identification and Ex)»ma/ity, in T)t» Anportanc» of N'hatW» Citr»
About, 58&8, 61.
For example. lehn Martin F jscher and Mark Ravizza describe the prucess uf "becominga
fAoral iigerlt as a nllatter Qf becoming ill fu)l-fledged participant Ill 'tlliecon6gllratlon Qf
practices «Gnstitutiv» Qf mora) responsibility. SeeResponsibtlity Qnd Control ( Cambridge:
Can1bridge University Press, 1998), 2O8- I o. R. )ay +'allace, likewise. understands moral
agency as the kind of agency required for ascriptions of moca1 reiponsibihty, See
Responri) nfl''ottd r)ie Mol'ol 5enr>Indents(Canlbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1996),)3-15.
Fra~nklbrl, T)i» lliinportonc»of 'A%AltIri» Ciol i» Aibout„Lx.
In a similar veiB, Richard Moran writesthat the distinction between what hap peris
to us
and what we do is "intimately connected with seeing oneself as a person living a life at all,
ra'ther than simpl) as a thing wl'th a pal'ticullar career tllrough tiAle, Richard h1oraiA,
"Frankfurt on Identification: AmbiguitiesGf Activity jn Mental Life," in Contoiirso
f
Agency. ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton ( Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 189-217,
190.
A hLlnlan bod)tv moverllerl'f, e'ven when lli'Ls a tnefe happening jn the )Ljsterv iof the per-
son whosebody moves. can for certam purposes be identified apprup r Late)y ai a move-
BMBt Qf that person and of no one else. iHowever„weftnd jt useful to reserve a seAM jn
whicha movement of this kind isstrictly attributable not to the person at all but only to
his body. We acknowledge that in this strict sense there is no personto whom it can be
attributed — no perso~ of whotn it is'Iust as much part of him'as his actions and his activ-
1'ties are. Now wkly may a desire BolLn a similar way, be an event Irl the lIMstory Gf a per-
son's mind mthout being that person's desire?'Why way not certain mental movements,
like certainmovements ef human bodies in this sense belong to no one™ Harry
Frank furt, "Ideniihcation a BdlExternality," 61 (emphasis
in Original).
Stuart ) Iampsh jr» uses this expression in his bookFreedom of the indii idea)(New York:
Harper and Row„19$5) • 90. IHe netesthat the phrase is taken from a passage in Gilbert
Ryle'sTh» Concept foMind I Chicago: University Qf ChicagePress,1949).
Immanuel Kant providesan early statement Qfthis view when he writes " [I jncitemcnts
froni inclinations and impulses (and hence from the whole nature of the world of sense)
cannot Lmpair the laws of (a wan's] wj)ibad'Bg jnsofar asi he Ls uitej)igence, Indeed hie does not
even holdl himself responsible for such jnc)inations andimpulses Gr ascribe them to his
proper self, j.e., his will, although h» does ascribe te his will any indulgence which he
might extend tothem ifhe aj)owed them any inALLenceQBhis maxjms to the detriment Gf
the rational laws, of his wi)l." lmmanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morab
(1785), trans. Jarmes K EIILngton (Indianapolis.' Hackett Publishing Compan~y, 1983), A)L
457-58,
ChrjstjAe Kersgaard, TheSauraawo f¹ r m o nvity(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
l 99b), 106. See also Christine KGrsgaard, Persona'I Identity alld 'the Unity of Agency: A
Kantian Response to ParRt," in Creating the Kingctotn of &>dk(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, l996). 353-97, 370.
See Karu'i description of this «xperjence in th» Ccitiq>ie of'Practical' Reason (1788), trans.
Lewis VAmte He»'k, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), Ak. 7 1-89.
R. Iay Wallace, likewise. argues that Gurmost prim'itive experience of agency comes from
our capacity to "choose what we shal) do in wap not I»d dev il by the desires to which we
are passive)ysubject" See "Moral Responsibility and the Practical Paint Qf View" iA Morft)
Respoaeibi)i' and Ontology; ed.A. Van den Beld (I3ordrecht: VJewer Academic Publishers,
2000), 25-47„33.
Korsgaard, The Soarces fo¹rmatr vity 227 — 28 emp'hasis in original. For similar state =

ments of t)tjs view„see her The Normatjvjty Qf Instruments) Reason, in ~r)itchyond

Practica)Reavow, ed, Garrett CRlity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1997).
 2I 5-54, 24tL-47; arid "'5»If-Constitution in fh» KtliiCS Of Plato and Kant,"fournrLI of Ethics
3 (luly II999): 1-29, esp. 26.
l3avid veil»man, "N'hat Happens NVhen Someone iLLcts?" in Perspecti'yeson Merel
Rcsponsibi»tp',ed. Inhrl Martin Fischer and l4ark Itaviaaa (Ithaca, M.V,: Corn»II University
Press, 1993):188-210, 193. It should be mated, howler, that V»II»man»venriially comes
to id»ntify a person s agency with a particular attitude — namely,with tlie desire to actin
accordance with reasoris. So he does Aot ultimately count asa defender of the vo}itiomal
model of moral agency as I have construed it.

Ibid~., 192.
16. +%at couiits, even with rcspcct 'to a moving principletha't operates as an clcmicnt of his
psychic ILfc, ls whe'ther of Aotthc agcilt Iias comstirut»I8~ himself to uic)ud» Lt. Qri th» Qii»
hand, the princip)e may be uit»rnaI, Ln thc sense pertinent to whether fhc behavior to which
lit Ieads is voluntary, by tb» fact that r)L» perln tuu joined hinis»i
f ro what nriivcs him by a
commitmemi through which he takes r»sponsibility for it. On, the other hamd, the moving
princLpl» of his behavkof may remain <xtcrmalto the person ln thc pcftlnciii sense bccausc
h» has notmade it part of himself." Harry Frankfurt, "IdcmtiILcat iowan
and Wholchearted-
mess," 17I (my emphasis).
17. Ibid., 170. 1 should makeclear h«re that I am foossing on th» account of moral agency and
moral r»sponsibility Frankfurtdef»nds im a number of his iAI)ucntial early articleson
identification and agency. This view is particularly»vident in the following articles:
"Freedom of th» ALIIand lih» Concept of the Person" (1971), "ThreeConcepts of Free
Action" {1975)."Id»notification and IExt»ma)ity" ( l976), and "Identi6cation and >>'hol»-
heartedneSs" (19II7} all of which are reprintedim his collection The ELAILOrranC»foWhet
We Care About. These articles do not appear to represent Fra rlkfurt s Iatesl views om this
issue. however. He seems
much less inclined now to think that we cam deterrmime what
bCIOAgs lo Ailf moral identity through acts of choice' or decision. Indeed, hc no%if tiikcs ihe
notion of volitional necessity to be central to the notion Of Aioral identity. For his mor»
recent viewssce ,the articles in his collection )LL»ccssii);Volition, and LOLA (Cambri'dge:
Cainbridg» University Press, 1999), and his responses to the articles discussing his work
iaaf
ili Biiss afld Ovcrton, cdsgCottsdi,if' Agency.
18. R. Iay thta1)acc,
")L'Ioralll Responsibility and the Practical Point of View," 3 I.
19 IFor a recept defense of the view that desires should be regarded as judgment-sensitive
states„see T. M. Scanlon, Blued 4» O Lvero Kge)L Ot)ter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni •
v»rsity Press, 1998), «h. I. See «lsoVj'air»A Quinn, "Pu tting Rationality im Its Plare," in
Aforiihty NndArrion (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,1981).
20 Iohn Skorupski draws this distinctiom in his artL'de "Reasons and Reason" in Cullity and
Gaut, «ds.,Bkcs LsndProcticai Reason, 345-67,
21 It give a tu}ler explication and defense of theclaim that our attitudes r»tl»ct our evaluative
Iudgments Lii my artie)e R»sponsibility fof Attitudes: Activity arid Passivity in M»nial
ILife,"Ethics 115:2 (J'anuary 2M5): 236-71.
22. G. F.Schueler uses this example to distmguish genuine cravings, which harv a distinct iv»
phenoimenological character and intensity, from ttungs term»times call'ed ciavings" (e.g.,
to see a Cary Grant rmovie), wluch do not. For a he)phLI gem»ral taxoriomy of dilffer»mt
kinds of desires, see Schueler, A»sire:fts Roi» in Pr itrti'citl R»ason and i)L» ZxpIanation of
Action (Cambridge, Mass.:)4IT Press, 1995), 9-15.
23 Adrian M. S. Piper, Higher-Order Disci'imination„" in J'd»Arity, Chariictrr.ririd Moritlity,
ed OvLms .Flanagan and Am»lie Rorty (CambriLdge, Mass.:tIIT
IL Press, 1990), 286-3II9, 299.
24 Kofsgaard suggeststhat this Ls precLMIy how Ksllt understood a fafA~LILaf fof Al 6'f het-
cromomous" action."Kant does not envision the person who acts from self-love as actively
r»II»cting on what he has mason to do and arrivingat the conclusion that he ought to do
what he wants. Instead Kant envisions him as one who amply follows the lead of desire,
without sufILCL»nt r»I)ection. He s h»teronomous, attd gets his 4w from natur», Aotim ihe
sense that it causes bis actions, bui in the sense that h»allows himself to be governed by
 its suggestions" SeeChristine Korsgaard,' *Self-Constitution iA the Ethics Gf Plato and
Kant, l6-17. FQI'another defense of this claim, sce hcf FroAl Duty and fof thc Sake Gf
thc Mob]e: Kant RBdAristotlc OAMorally Good Action, IB Aristotle, AAlitr, AIIdI'h»Sro'Ic$;
R»r)iiIIkiAgHuppin»ssi Ad duty, ed. Stephen Engstrorn Riid ]ennjfer Whiting (Cambridg»:
Cainbridg» UniversityPress. 1996), 209-36, esp. 2(M-I2.
25. IA her article "Another Problem of Akrasja„"Sir»rrianonrII gourIIIIt of PhitosophirII!'Studies
2:2 (1994). 229'-42, Sa rah Broad i» argues that Aristotlepavs special a
ttentionto. and is
particularlycritical of, cases of akrasia involving biological]y based urges precisely because
the "surrender" in such cases(un]jkc cases involving, sav temptatjons for honor or wealtli)
seems to Involve R "reversion to thepre-rational state," 238. I ammaking the related sug-
gestion that unreII»ctjve action on a physical urge can be treated as "heteronomous" ina
way that unrci]ective actioti on a ratlorlally structured desir» oi' attitude cannot. since jn
the ]atter case the attitude in question still reflects our own judgmental activity.
26. I am grateful to pame]a Hieronymi for helpfu] discussion on this point.
27. For an interestiiigdjscussjun of this «ase andsome others involving a conflict between a
person's unref]»ct jve fee'I ings and the principles of a bad IBor Rhty, see Io nathan Hennett.
"The Conscience of Huck]eb»rr)Finn P »»apII y 49 (1974): )2~34. Bennett thinks it
important that we Aot confuse these "f»e]jngs with moral j udgments, contrastjug "gen.
»ral mQIR]pnncjpl»5 Rnd partjcu]af Unr»ason»d»motjonai pulls, 127. Kf M'»IBsto m»,
&os'cvcf, that tht cmotloARI PUB%Ill qgc$fk@A Rfc' Aof 'UAfc'8$QBc'0, 4f Hf BAc'tl fMkK5 bp
this "v ithout reason" or "nonrational," but only unr»flectiv» — thai js tosay, not based on
a pcrMAis cIJnscjous deljberatjv» judgment. For anoth»rdcfcns» Qf this clajfn, with sp»-
«ific reference to th» Huck Finn case, see Ahson Mclntyre, "Is Akratic Action Always
Irrational." in Flanagan Rnd Rnrty, »ds.,fd»rititp, Character, arid Morollry, 379-400.
28 Thc epMKI» lnqucstIGA OccursIfl chapter 16 Gf MRI'k 7w3jn 5 TII»AIdlvIIfur»$of Huckl»Softy
Fl'NN,
29. Huck experienc»s real puzzl»rB»ntover his own reactions„aIId seemsbaf(]ed by his inabil-
ity to do what hc cl»arIy Rnd distinctly secsso bc IAQrally right. Qlarlcs Taylor sllgges't5
that th ais fc»ling of pcrplcxlty 15, R commonf»3tur» Of Quf encounters with QUr Clecpest
evaluations": "For it is precisely thc de»pest evaluations which are least clear, 'least articu-
lated, must easily subject to iillusjonand distortion. ltt is those which are cl'Qsest to
VIhar I
am as a subject, inthe sense that shorn of them I would break down as a person,which
are among the hardest for me to be dear about." See"Responsibility for SCIf," in The
Id»nrjri»5of Pers»AI,ed. Aln»lie Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles. Unjversjty Gf California
Press,— 1976), 28 I-99, 296.
30. Barbara Herman."Agency, Attachment, and Djfcrence," in 771» Pre'tI're ef iMornl /IIdgIA»At
{Canibrjdge, Mass.: Harvard University Pr»55„1993), l$4-207„ I 95-96,
31. For a similar discussion of the releva nc» ofa person's own reflectiveendorsement or re jec=
tioll of hier attjlIudes to questions Qf lYIBral Rssesslm»AII•,s»e Rob»i't Adams,"Involuntary
Sins," PhII65IIphicaIR»view94:I (J anuary )985): ~3I, 17.
32. In his article, "lust ]aking. TheEthics Rnd Acsthet jets of Humor," Phi(OMPby and Kireratur»
22:I (April ) 998): 51 — 68, BerysGant endorSeS a Siriiilar RPprARCh to qU»Stions of attrib-
utabiljty and assessment:"[Attitud»s] can be manifested in R wide variety of uttentjonal
mental states: wants, Ijkjngs, prefernngs, emotions, ctc. VA» should be hioljstlc aboUt
them. When an attitude js attributed to a speaker, one n»eds to exalnile whether there are
cIIAtljctjmg attjtud»5 that should h» ascribed Rs v ell (I may both like ice cream, because it
is tasty.Rnd also Avt like it, because it is Unhealllhy), and also whether any higher-order
Rttinldcs arc present, I.»., attitudesthat take Other attitudes as thclr ~obj»M: I Bia)' want to~
do drugs, Rnd also want not to want to do them. What mattersfor purposes of Inora]
asM5Smcnt is theArrir@diIIa] srrr~rtIIremanifeated in a context {54-55).
3R. "Our most clem»ntary desjr»5 came to us as Urges or jmpuls»5; we are moved by th»m, but
thev do not as such aff»ct our thinking at Rll. They are rn»re]y psychic raw materiaL A
desire provides us Bot with a reaMIA butwith a problem — thc prob]»IB of how to respond
fo jt. Harry Frankfllrt, R»ply t'6 T. M. Scan]>A, IB Ituss and Overton„edt., Corf!»trr$ P
f
.4ggn<y, )84-88, ) 84,
34 Frankfurt describes decisively rejected desires as "outlaws" in "Identif'ication amd
Whoieheartedmess," I70.
35. This point is defended very « electiv
elyin G. ILymn
Stephens and George Graham."Psycho-
pathology,— Freedosn, and the Experience of ExterIIality," Philosophical Ta~pics24:2 (FaII
I996): I5~2. Cf. George Graham and G. Lynn Stephens, "Mind and Mine," im George
Graham and G. Lynn Stephems, eds.. PhiIcssoPhicrsl Psychoparholtsgy (Catnbridge, Mass.:
MIT Press. 1994), 9 I -l 69.
36. These are the features Peter Strawson takes to characterize the"purely objective view of
the agent."
See PeterStrawson,"Freedom and Resentment,"inFischer and Itavizza.eds.,
Perspectives 0nMorcsl ResPssnsibility. 45 66 =, 59.
37. I do mol mean to suggest Rat ~ st~ e i s ne~ a p p ropriate, or that there c~ot be atti-
tudesthat fail to rellect an agent"s evaluative judgments Sortie obsessive or coeipulsive
desires, and some phobic attitudes, for exasnple,rnlght well be disconnected frotn a per =

son's evaluativ» judgsnents im sucha way that we wiill want to say that sh» is not responsi-
ble for them My point is only that this does not seem liUae an ac'curate description of most
recurring attitudes, such as lealousy, resent ment, amd prejudiced thoughts amd feelings that
a person is strugglsng to overcome. Although a person may sntmedsately d~srniss these atti-
tudes when they occur thev are not norrnaHy unintelligible to her in the way that an irra-
tional phobia or cosnpulsion may be unintelligible to her; she can cite the (bad) reasons
that she initially took to support the objectionable attitude, which she had to consciously
overrule. Amd when they persist even after disavowaI, this is normally because the person
still 6nds the rejected considerations rationally cotnpeiling in some way. Repeated rejec-
tion in these cases is normally a sign of rational ambivalence rather than psychological
pathology. So there is no reason to say that the person, in such cases, is a victim of"exter-
nal" psychological forces.