ARIGO vs SWIFT, September 16, 2014

 petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws
and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the
Tubbataha Reefs.

 In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea,
150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle,
the global center of marine biodiversity.
 In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest
ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The
97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened
and endangered marine species.
 On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of
the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the
"no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the
resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management
Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
 The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the
ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
 On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the
present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A.
Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling,
US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"

 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
 Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No.
10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 );
obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and
destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being
unconstitutional.
 The Court's Ruling
 As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present
petition.
 Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."10 Specifically, it is
"a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized
grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
 To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the
damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has
announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions
 with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha,
based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess
damage and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office,
appropriate Philippine government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts
from Philippine universities."39
 A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major
relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
 RULES
 SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs
which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the
payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the
violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which
shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to
the control of the court.1âwphi1
 In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these
issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests
under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
 On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a
review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
 As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The
VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law
to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the proper
remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance
of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

QUA CHEE GAN vs THE DEPORTATION BOARD, September 30, 1963

 This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037)
denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed
by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:

 On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before
the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00,
without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely
remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua,
and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States
Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt.
A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized
purchase of U.S. dollars.1
 Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued
by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00
and cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.
 Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien
under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.
 It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by
virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the
filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest
of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files
a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed
by the Chairman of the Board.
 As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose
authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief
Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted
him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable.
 In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his
person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.
 3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
 complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine
Constitution).
 As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v.
Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones
Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the
same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to
both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is
found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a
warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath,
etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement — "to be determined
by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine
Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable
cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to
make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of
our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered
by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish
between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.
And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable
cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature
deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final
finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the
purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on
probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of
deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
 The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect
the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order
the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the
alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a
bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized
in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in
this proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the
President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a
definitive order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein
whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien
complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.
 Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise
of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the
curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well
as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the
intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the
existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words,
the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom
the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so
delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by
the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the
fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then
guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the
liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest
precariously on such a shaky foundation.
 We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation
Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was
not squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's
proposition that the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against
him did not constitute ground for deportation. .
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers
the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien
or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is
declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board
is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So
ordered.

TECSON vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, March 3, 2004

 Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,1[1] that cannot
be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
 Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now
one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
 On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
 Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of respondent.
 In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of
FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting
to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the
affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to
the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou
resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
 In Sum
 (1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004
national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his
certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
 (2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.
161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as
the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not
before, the elections are held.
 (3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
 Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to
all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
 (4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether
or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,2[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
 WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

GO, SR vs RAMOS, September 4, 2009

 Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for review on certiorari to
set aside the October 25, 2004 Decision 1 and February 16, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed the Decision 3 dated January 6, 2004 and Order4
dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218
upholding the preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the
corresponding Charge Sheet5 dated July 3, 2001, and the deportation proceedings thereunder
conducted.
 These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit9 for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T.
Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so.

 In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same
has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no
preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he
cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case.
 There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation
case against a deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by
him.60 However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the
primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation
Board61 wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. 62 Moreover,
when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings.63
 While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the
sound discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings.64 After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is
not divested by the mere claim of citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and
not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts,
after the deportation proceedings.66 The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not
final but subject to review by the courts.671avvphi1
 After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was
sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings
considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those
of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore,
like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as
additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.
 We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of
whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular
courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of
facts.68 None of the exceptions69 in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to
exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented once again,
the same conclusion will still be reached.
 One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus
soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We
agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s
citizenship.70 However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan
Chong v. Secretary of Labor.71 Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually
declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of
jus soli.72
 Neither will the Philippine Bill of 190273 nor the Jones Law of 191674 make Carlos a citizen of the
Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time
of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
 It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. 75
Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself.76 However, it is our considered view that absent any
evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established
rule could not be applied to him.
 As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino
citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not.
 Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." 77
 However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that
the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the
time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority.78
 It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as
when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered
view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year
period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate
such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the
other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of
Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent
himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.79
 It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 80
 As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented
substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Board’s jurisdiction over the
deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is
not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship
only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial
determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be enjoined.
 In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not observed in the
deportation proceedings must likewise fail.
 Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. 81 The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.82 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 83 Although Jimmy was not furnished
with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found
that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus:
 x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI
Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his
representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced upon the
Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3,
2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum"
and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days to submit his
required memorandum. x x x84
 This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.
 As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate tribunal erred in
enjoining Jimmy’s deportation.85
 Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the existence of the remedy
of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the petition for certiorari as was done in this case.
They point out that the appeal period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that
an ordinary appeal is the more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one
availed of.86 Since the decision of the trial court was not properly appealed, the same may be said
to have attained finality, and may no longer be disturbed. 87
 They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A
petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a
lawful ground for Jimmy’s apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of
the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already attained finality by
reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the
Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said
decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and
detention.88
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he
was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is
still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the
Board.89 Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the
petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper
once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. 90
Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is
no longer being detained.91
 On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the
most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal
considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the
avails of the extraordinary writ.92 Contrary to the petitioners’ stand, Jimmy argues that the April
17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various
remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without
due process.93 He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final
determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. 94 Moreover, he maintains that the
petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s
detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. 95 As in his petition in G.R. No.
167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead
therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court
where he can prove his citizenship.96
 Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No. 171946
meritorious.a1f
 We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or
where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. 97
 The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more
plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such
remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102
of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 98 of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application. 99
 Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through
a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context
 includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. 100 Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.101
 Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other
arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
 WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The Decision dated
October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.

BAR MATTER No. 914 vs CHING, October 1, 1999

 Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
 The facts of this case are as follows:
 Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.
 On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
 In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
 1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter
of the said place; and
 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching
was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
 On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
 The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for
the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person
Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the
election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the
age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority:"
 The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s.
 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
 In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
 On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:
 1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
 2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and
other official documents;
 3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
 4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
 5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992
to 1995;
 6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
 7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;
 8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of
Tubao La Union, and
 10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
 Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
 When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of
the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be
noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person
was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
 C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
 However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period
on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching
the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:
 It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to
elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may
be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13
 However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:
 Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is
clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
 In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter
and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
 Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15
the pertinent portion of which reads:
 And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of
April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
 Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for
electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an
obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino
mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
 Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb.
16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is
rightfully entitled. 17
 The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:
 We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
 In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
 Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
 The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to
disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached
the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly
way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
 Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
  SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, January 13, 2004

 This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition
for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
 In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City.
Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and
Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
 The trial court then issued an Order,3[1] which reads:
 WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of this
case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan
City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any interested person may
appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.
 Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and the
Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the
petitioner.
 Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill.,
Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan
City.
 SO ORDERED.
 During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
 First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all her
school records and in her marriage certificate.4[2] She presented a clearance from the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI)5[3] to further show the consistency in her use of the surname Yu.
 Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian)
when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
 Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that
her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother
is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino
citizen.
 Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when
she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
 Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both
Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because
the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
 In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage
between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
 The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it
actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent
and her witnesses.
 On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner straight and
in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed
to make the following corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
 1. Her family name from YO to YU;
 2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
 3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the question
LEGITIMATE?; and,
 4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
 SO ORDERED.6[4]
 The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
trial courts decision.7[5]
 Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
 I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF
RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM CHINESE TO FILIPINO DESPITE THE FACT THAT
RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
 II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER
FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD.8[6]
 To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in
entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said
rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia9[7] where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule
108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.10[8]
 As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error
amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
 Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with
the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.11[9] Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
 said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines.12[10]
 Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As
such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
 In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,13[11] citing In re Florencio Mallare,14[12] we
held:
 Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb.
16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is
rightfully entitled.15[13]
 This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old.16[14] The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.17[15]
 In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing
respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
 The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she
has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname.
 We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
 Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers
surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would
only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is
to avoid confusion.
 Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a
person is allowed to use a name by which he has been known since childhood.
 Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the
Phils.,18[16] we held:
  Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use
a name by which he has been known since childhood (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795;
People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot
enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez,
84 Phil. 222).19[17]
 While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,20[18] there is no such
requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since
childhood.21[19]
 The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family
relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or
to the community in general.22[20] In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in
China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the
change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her
community in general.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of
respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
 1. Her family name from YO to YU;
 2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
 3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the question
LEGITIMATE?; and,
 4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.

MA vs FERNANDEZ, July 26, 2010

 Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?

 Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma
(Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma
(Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, 1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.2
 Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the
1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. 3
 They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years;
they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the
country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and
do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already
raised their respective families in the Philippines.4
 During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates
of Registration (ACRs). 5
 Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose
 whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed
his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge
Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. 6 On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo
did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. 7 In
1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of
Surigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005. 8
 Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall
be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more
than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. 9
On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement.
 The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate
states:
 Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 (1) xxx;
 xxxx
 (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.37
 In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the manner of electing Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
 Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1,
Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
 The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
 In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, 38 we determined the
meaning of the period of election described by phrase "upon reaching the age of majority." Our
references were the Civil Code of the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the
case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice.39 We pronounced:
 x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years.40 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period
on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. 41 The phrase "reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority.42 However, we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice, 43 that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
 It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to
elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may
be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino.
 However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite.
 Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is
clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority. 44
 We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 45 a case in which we adopted the findings of
the appellate court that the father of the petitioner, whose citizenship was in question, failed to
elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of
majority; and that "the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and
oath of allegiance x x x was defective because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of
allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not
satisfactorily explained."46
 In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the
requirements. The acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all done
beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
 The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of
election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
 We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has
not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
 Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In
Re:Florencio Mallare,47 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 48 and
Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching. 49
 In Mallare, Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 50 The Court of Appeals, however, said that the case
cannot support herein petitioners’ cause, pointing out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural
child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would be necessary to confer on him the rights and
privileges of a Filipino citizen,51 and that Esteban was born in 192952 prior to the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625. 53
 In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life
here in the Philippines.54 Again, such circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners’, was
not appreciated because it was ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong
would have resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship
for him55 as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization was issued to his
father.56
 In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar
because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were complied with only
fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the late
election of Philippine citizenship. 57
 In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners’ argument of good faith and "informal election"
unacceptable and held:
 Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar,
Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1 October 1999], is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis
that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio
Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that "the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines
and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. 58
 We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where,
as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the
frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently,
and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century
by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal
registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
 For what purpose is registration?
 In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,59 we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:
 To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the
meaning of the term "to register" as "to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to
enroll; to enter in a list."60 In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the
registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation,
and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry
which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. 61 Simply
stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification.62
 Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge
thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of
the deed, contract, or instrument to others." 63 As pertinent is the holding that registration "neither
adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties." 64 It
lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.
 Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
 In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third
parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the
partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure affect the partnership’s juridical
personality.65 An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it
has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third
parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their
contract.66 The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration
 is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of
registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. 67
 Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an
analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration
is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
 Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means
of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.68
 Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is
the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election,
although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine
citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
 Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. 69 Thus, has it been
admitted through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not
erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the
failure to have the marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency.
 Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious
undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their
identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
 Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that
which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.
 Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR
presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present an
E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly documented. 70 On the contrary, petitioners should not
be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of
citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among others, their
exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners’
election of Philippine citizenship.
 The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been
indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the requirement on time of election, and
recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship.
 The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional
provision on Philippine citizenship.
 Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching their age of majority,71 upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
they automatically become Filipinos72 and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:
 Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 (1) xxx.
 (2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 73
 Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as
natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof
provides:
 Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof 74 shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
 The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
 MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.
 xxxx
 x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the
option to choose Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if the
father were an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under the 1973 Constitution, children of
mixed marriages involving an alien father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens, thus
liberalizing the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution by dispensing with the need to
make a declaration of intention upon reaching the age of majority. I understand that the
committee would further liberalize this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The Committee
seemingly proposes to further liberalize the policy of the 1935 Constitution by making those who
became citizens of the Philippines through a declaration of intention to choose their mother’s
citizenship upon reaching the majority age by declaring that such children are natural-born
citizens of the Philippines.75
 xxxx
 xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that of the
1935? 76
 xxxx
 FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship
was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose
of remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was that we should not penalize the
mother of a child simply because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what
citizenship the child would prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing the preference of the
infant. But if we recognize the right of the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches
the age of majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our
control. But certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine government to require that [at] a
certain point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think we should penalize the child before he
is even able to choose. I would, therefore, support the retention of the modification made in 1973
of the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution. 77
 xxxx
 MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino citizen by election, which the
Committee is now planning to consider a natural-born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts for
Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into account the fact that at the time of birth, all he
had was just an inchoate right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing
Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice retroacted to the date of his birth so much
so that under the Gentleman’s proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen?78
 FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born who lost his status is that the
natural-born who lost his status, lost it voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation
contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose. 79
 xxxx
 [on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]
 MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him
to run for Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x x. 80
 We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under
the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens
under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the
right to Philippine citizenship.1avvphi1
 Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure
to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the
permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied
with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they
submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry,
although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this
case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and
other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied
with within a reasonable time.
 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the
Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-
04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix
Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice
within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its
Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements,
including the payment of their financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with
subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by
the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION vs ERMITA, July 3, 2007

 petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

 Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes
aimed at protecting the people’s rights to self-governance and justice.
 Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of
releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.
 Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in
this Court.
 Petitioners allege that:
 On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President,
announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by
the major daily publications.
 The petition has merit.
 First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s organizations and
taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance,
namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this
Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances. 10
 Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary
since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in
fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from
extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong
from accepting the same.
 Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong’s qualification for
memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with
a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting
claims under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the
JBC has the initial competence to do so.
 Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
 On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong’s petition to be
admitted to the Philippine bar.
 In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on
September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is
qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and
that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too,
thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted
his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate 12 states that he
was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and
his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
 Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
 It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization
that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
 It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino
citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
 Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a
civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship
status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:
 Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and
should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted.15
 Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to
correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.
Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.16
 The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s
ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this
reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory
S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office,
until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of
his birth and citizenship.
 This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC, March 8, 2016

 Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December
2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

 Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental
care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar
(Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered
petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
 When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-
Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On
4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.4
 Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
 On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and
DD156616.7
 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of
the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of
America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
 On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen
of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10
Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the
U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
 While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in
the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
 On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
 Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S.
passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to
the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their
dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July
2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in
the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American
Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium
 was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
 The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
 However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as
of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but
maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all
the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that
petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral
arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that
these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains
a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a
balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident
visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7
July 2006 cannot be counted.
 But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured
by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the
issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In
Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he
only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to
be an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or
had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence,
the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted
with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency."
 It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she
decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from
U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
 In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known
as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat
balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former
Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law
institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to
enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to
the country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans
are not ordinary transients.
 Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into
society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must
leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his
life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal
requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by
enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then
applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
 No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation
 where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.
 To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9
May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period
of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC,
she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
 As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that
she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold
and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in
2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
 Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the
change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the
query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
 That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house
and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.
 It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period
was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from
24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the
2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
 The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC
took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had
returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to
have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
 For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August
2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of
her senatorial candidacy.
 Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point.
From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
 Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood
the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a
matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October
2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012
COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
 The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her
side this Court's pronouncement that:
 Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his
COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.168
 In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home
was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's
"sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration
and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in
November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency
requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence
that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President.
It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided
favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a
primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which
declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator.
When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a
period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally
had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her
declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the
time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for
the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or
action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which
was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be
false, and these, to repeat include:
 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in
the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
 Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner]
enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in
Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she
was already old enough to go to school.
 In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
 Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who
handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are
"Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
 In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006.
 In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.
 The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
 In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
 In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they
eventually built their family home.170
 In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall
under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned
by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
 All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc
are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
 1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
 [T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is
hereby GRANTED.
 2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled
Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating
that:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
 3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Second Division stating that:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.
 4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and
Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
 SO ORDERED.