MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON. ANTONIO V.

MENDEZ, SR.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

FACTS:

On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres,
Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of
Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of
San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July
1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this
municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives.”

Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition sought the
declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality and that the
case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for
Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment
referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE:

W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:

Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it
was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot
allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had
been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated.
The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353
but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the
continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed
the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the
1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
 All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be
conceded.

BASCO vs. PAGCOR

 197 SCRA 52 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection
Clause
Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy – Imperium in Imperio
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power
“to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399
was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises
or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law
creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the
equal protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities
like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned;
that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from
paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies
of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for
one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not
prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should
be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the
power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative
powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide
for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Bantangas CATV vs. C.A.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No.
138810. September 29, 2004]

FACTS:
 On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a
CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that
petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the
approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from

P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a
letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for
injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to
regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under
Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE :

May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged
by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?

HELD:

No.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No.
436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion
of other bodies.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to
reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use
of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of
large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators.

x x x

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we
cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed
from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are:
(1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s
deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are
within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.

CASE DIGEST : Lina Vs Pano

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and

HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ
petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,
.
G.R. No. 129093
FACTS:

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a
mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter
dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was
issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent
Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring
Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of
a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated
his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE:

WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD:

As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which
may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise
contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances
that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of
local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a
delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should
not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is
obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Umali vs. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170 (2014) Digest

Umali vs. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170 (2014)

By: G-one T. Paisones
Salient Feature:
2016 Bar Examination; Question No. 3

Facts:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC
subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for
in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed
Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for
purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component
city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City
should participate in the said plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in
Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only
the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the
corresponding plebiscite.

Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion

for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will
necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main
argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question
does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit
of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to
vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC
should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly
affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various
adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material
change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but
also of the province as a whole.

On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No.
12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the
assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.
Issue:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija
or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a Highly Urbanized City
(HUC).

Held:
Entire province of Nueva Ecija

Ratio:
The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into
an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that
the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought
about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound
autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect,
reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva
Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete
terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving
out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the
requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents.

[G.R. No. 146342. October 26, 2001]

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF
BACON, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite
conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No.
8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon
And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.[1]
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,[2] the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC)
proclaimed[3] the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved
by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.[4]
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of
Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for
certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following
grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof;
and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty
(20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted
another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further
implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence,
that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city; and
 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City
of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule prescribed by
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.[5]
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14,
2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its
officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its
corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806
in G.R. No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.[6] This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the
three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each others
acts.[7] The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental
law.[8] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional,
where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one.[9] In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt,[10] for to doubt is to sustain.[11]
Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution which provides, inter alia:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)

The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified

by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No.
8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land
area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a)
of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a
cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has
done.
This contention is devoid of merit.
Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The
phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the mergerof local government units to create a province, city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus,
Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:

Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government
units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation:
Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land
area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of
the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income
classification prior to such division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or
a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed
by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling reason for merging
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon
considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a
component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which
we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,[12] this Court, through
Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power, we are
allowed only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable,[13] and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because
we feel it is unwise or impractical.[14]
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the one subject-one bill
rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. (emphasis ours)

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects
which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the
public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has
been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only
one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of
Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the
creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which
the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of
Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to exclude the incidental
effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the
public of fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.[15] The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect,[16] and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. [17] Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so
as not to cripple or impede legislation.[18]
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing
proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the
plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon
City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted
within 120 days from the approval of said Act per express provision of its Section 54,
viz:
Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the
ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a
plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x. (Emphasis
ours)

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E.
Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1)
day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This
120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself
expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December
16, 2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December
16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:

Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general and local circulation.

The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of
general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of
local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was
completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the
reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite,
not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been
published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the
effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it could only
schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the
December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of
the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance
fixes another date. (Emphasis ours)

Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be
conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its
approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix another date for
conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity
of the law.
 Consequently, the word approval in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be
read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean effectivity
as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with
the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be
read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established
jurisprudence. As we stated in Taada:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold,
that the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. (Emphasis supplied)

To give section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act
effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive
information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled
plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to
substantiate his allegation.Consequently, we sustain the presumption[20] that the
COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting
the plebiscite.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Bagabuyo vs Comelec

573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government – Reapportionment

Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman
Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The
law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo
assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to
enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was
required by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province,
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single
legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide
for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of
them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each
one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better access to their
congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.

AQUINO VS COMELEC
GR no. 189793

FACTS:

Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic
Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."
Said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Art VI,Sec 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the constitution

ISSUES:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and

2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in

Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution

HELD:

Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
The use of the word "or", which is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable
income requirement.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
NAVARRO VS. ERMITA

2011 April 12
URGENT MOTION TO RECALL Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010.

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver
basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local Government
Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish
these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative
weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy
preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent
of the framers of the LGC.

Petitioner:
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte (Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial
Board)

Respondent:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
representing the President of the Philippines Senate of the Philippines represented by
the SENATE PRESIDENT House of Representatives represented by the HOUSE
SPEAKER GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS representing the mother province
of Surigao del Norte GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN representing the
new Province of Dinagat Islands Movants

Facts:
1.Brief Recap
a.2 Oct 1996: President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands
into law
i. Income: 82.69M/year
ii. Population : 106,951
iii. Land Area : 802.12 sq. km
b. 3 Dec 1996: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of
creation of province. People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Dinagat Islands voted.
Affirmative Votes: 69,943
Negative Votes: 63,502
c. President appoints interim set of provincial officials
d. 1 Jun 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office
e.10 Feb 2010: RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. (failed to meet min land area
requirements)
2. Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010
3. This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of movants- intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the
original parties.
4. COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was
declared final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a
non-province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have to be
nullified, and a special election would have to be conducted for various positions
(Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte. Hence the intervenors became
real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the 2010 case decision.
(Cong Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but were declared to have no
standing since at that time, they were still candidates in the May 2010 elections.)

Other Pertinent laws:

LGC. Sec 386. Barangay -no min land area requirement

LCG. Sec 442. Municipality -50 sq km BUT

(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly- created municipality shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands.The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities.—(a) Requisites for Creation—A municipality
shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:(iii) Land area—which
must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed
of one (1) or more islands.The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

LCG. Sec 450. City: 100 sq km BUT(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands.The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities—(a) Requisites for creation—A city shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
"... The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of
one (1) or more islands. ..."

LGC. Sec 461 Province 2000sq km BUT

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces.— (a) Requisites for creation—A province shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:"... The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. ..."

Petitioners
1. Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (did not meet requirements)

Respondents
1. Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (met requirements)

Movants- Intervenors
1. The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461
of the LGC
2. The exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two
or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement
3. The Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case -matter of equity and fair
play, undue burden on those who have relied on the inoperative law.

Issue:

WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land area
requirement?

Held: Yes

SC:
1. Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Province of Dinagat. The acts of Congress, in passing RA 9355, definitively show the
clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement

2. Please see pertinent laws

With respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three
(3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.

But it must be pointed out that when the LGUto be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section
442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively.

This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR.

It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed
in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct
the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC—and to reflect the true legislative
intent.
3. Operative Fact Doctrine not really discussed. It does not apply in this case.
General Rule: An unconstitutional law produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords
no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has
not been passed

Dispositive: Petition granted. RA 9355 and LGC-IRR Art 9 is constitutional.

Excerpt: Debates in congress regarding plebiscite and land area requirements

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. ".... The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers.
So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province,
palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very
clear that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan
natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan
tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To
devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate
growth in their respective areas.So, in every geographical condition, mayroon
sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization."