EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122013. March 26, 1997]

JOSE C. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GIPORLOS,
EASTERN SAMAR and ALFREDO I. GO, respondents.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and private respondent Alfredo I. Go were candidates for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar in
the election of May 8, 1995. Petitioner was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) on the basis of results
showing that he obtained 1,367 votes against private respondents 1,235 votes.[1]
On May 16, 1995, private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition for the correction of what he claimed was manifest error
in the Statement of Votes (SPC No. 95-198). He alleged that, based on the entries in the Statement of Votes, he obtained 1,515
votes as against petitioners 1,367 votes but that because of error in addition, he was credited with 1,235 votes as shown in the
following recomputation:[2]

Precinct No. Go, Alfredo I. Ramirez, Jose C.

Total 29 Precincts 1,235 1,367

(Should be 1,515)

In his Answer with Counter-Protest,[3] petitioner Jose C. Ramirez disputed private respondents claim. He said that instead of the total
of the votes for private respondent Alfredo Go, it was actually the entries relating to the number of votes credited to him in Precinct
Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7, and 10 which were erroneously reflected in the Statement of Votes. According to petitioner, the entries in
the Statement of Votes actually referred to the number of votes obtained by Rodito Fabillar, a mayoralty candidate, and not to the
votes obtained by private respondent. Petitioner alleged that, as shown in the Certificate of Votes prepared by the Board of Election
Inspectors, the votes cast for Go in the precincts in question were as follows:

Precinct Nos. Per Statement Per Certificate of Votes of Votes..

The addition of the number of votes (reflected in the Certificate of Votes) to the number of votes from other precincts confirms
the MBCs certificate that the total number of votes cast was actually 1,367 for petitioner and 1,235 for private respondent.
On August 1, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its first questioned resolution, directing the MBC to reconvene and
recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar
accordingly.[4]
Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and public respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers filed separate motions for clarification. On
September 26, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its second questioned resolution, reiterating its earlier ruling. It rejected the
MBCs recommendation to resort to election returns:[5]

The Municipal Board of Canvassers is reminded that pursuant to Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is the Statement of
Votes, duly prepared, accomplished during the canvass proceedings, and certified true and correct by said Board which supports
and form (sic) the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of winning candidates. In fact and in deed, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers/Movant had submitted to the Commission, attached to and forming part of the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation a Statement of Votes without any notice of any discrepancy or infirmity therein. To claim now that the proclamation was
not based on said Statement of Votes but on the Certificate of Votes because the entries in the Statement of Votes are erroneous is
too late a move, considering that by the Boards act of submitting said Statement of Votes as attachment to the Certificate of
Proclamation and Canvass, it had rendered regularity and authenticity thereto.

Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the annulment of the two resolutions, dated August 1, 1995 and
September 26, 1995, of the Commission on Elections, and the reinstatement instead of the May 10, 1995 proclamation of petitioner
Jose C. Ramirez as the duly elected vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar. Petitioner contends that (1) the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction over SPC No. 95-198 because the case was resolved by it without having been first acted upon by any of its divisions,
and (2) the MBC had already made motu proprio a correction of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes in its certification dated
May 22, 1995, showing the actual number of votes garnered by the candidates and it was a grave abuse of its discretion for the
COMELEC to order a recomputation of votes based on the allegedly uncorrected Statement of Votes.
With respect to the first ground of the petition, Art. IX, 3 of the Constitution provides:

3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Comelec en banc. (Emphasis added)

Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC[6] it was said that By now it is settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission [7] and a petition for correction of manifest error in the
Statement of Votes, like SPC No. 95-198 is a pre-proclamation controversy in none of the cases[8] cited to support this proposition
1
was the issue the correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes under 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
or 15 of R.A. No. 7166. On the other hand, Rule 27, 5 of the 1993 Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation
controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en
banc, thus

5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. (a) The following pre-proclamation
controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:

. . . .2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing as
where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election
returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the
copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts
were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due
diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.

....

(e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.

. . . .Accordingly in Castromayor v. Commission on Elections,[9] and Mentang v. Commission on Elections,[10] this Court approved the
assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc over petitions for correction of manifest error directly filed with it. Our decision
today in Torres v.COMELEC[11] again gives imprimatur to the exercise by the COMELEC en banc of the power to decide petition for
correction of manifest error.

In any event, petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc. Not only did he participate
in the proceedings below but he also sought affirmative relief from the COMELEC en banc by filing a Counter-Protest in which he
asked that entr[ies] in the statement of votes for Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7 and 10, be properly corrected for the petitioner,
to reflect the correct mandate of the electorate of Giporlos, Eastern Samar. [12] It is certainly not right for a party taking part in
proceedings and submitting his case for decision to attack the decision later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the decision
turns out to be adverse to him.[13]
Petitioner next contends that motu proprio the MBC already made a correction of the errors in the Statement of Votes in its
certification dated May 22, 1995, which reads:[14]

CERTIFICATION

To whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that the hereunder candidates for Municipal Vice Mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar during the May 8, 1995 National
and Local Elections got the number of Votes on the precincts listed hereunder in tabulation form based in our Canvassing of Votes
per Precincts.

Name of PRECINCT NUMBERS

candidate : 11 : 11-A : 6 : 1 : 17 : 7 : 10
GO, Alfredo I. : 32 : 18 : 65 : 61 : 48 : 37 : 28

RAMIREZ, Jose C. : 18 : 32 : 98 : 52 : 15 : 67 : 13

This certification is issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose this may serve him.

Giporlos, Eastern Samar.

May 22, 1995

To begin with, the corrections should be made either by inserting corrections in the Statement of Votes which was originally
prepared and submitted by the MBC, or by preparing an entirely new Statement of Votes incorporating therein the corrections.[15] The
certification issued by the MBC is thus not the proper way to correct manifest errors in the Statement of Votes. More importantly, the
corrections should be based on the election returns but here the corrections appear to have been made by the MBC on the bases of
the Certificates of Votes issued. Thus, in its motion for clarification, the MBC said:

a. The proclamation of Jose C. Ramirez was based on the results of the certificate of canvass and tally of votes garnered by both
petitioner and private respondent which showed Jose C. Ramirez garnering 1,367 as against 1,235 by Alfredo I. Go, or a winning
margin of 132 in favor of Jose C. Ramirez;

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b. Based on the certificate of votes in Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7, and 10,, Alfredo I. Go garnered only 32,18, 65,61,48,37 and
28, respectively, and the votes ascribed to the latter shown in the statement of votes are clear typographical errors and were
erroneously copied from the votes garnered by mayoral candidate Rodito P. Fabillar from the same seven (7) precincts in Giporlos;

c. Because of typographical errors in the statement of votes, Alfredo I. Go balooned (sic) by 280 votes, such that instead of losing by
132 votes to Jose C. Ramirez, Alfredo I. Go acquired an unwarranted margin of 148 votes;

d. The recomputation based on the statement of votes alone without including the correct votes on the Election Returns on the Seven
(7) precincts aforesaid will frustrate the will of the people who unquestionably voted for Jose C. Ramirez by a clear majority of 132
votes;

e. In the preparation of the certificate of canvass and proclamation, only the certificate of votes of each candidate were considered
by reason of the fact it was prepared and signed only on May 11,1995 or one after (sic) the proclamation of the winning munic ipal
candidates on May 10, 1995.

Certificates of Votes are issued by Boards of Election Inspectors (BEI) to watchers, pursuant to 215 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC). While such certificates are useful for showing tampering, alteration, falsification or any other irregularity in the
preparation of election returns,[16] there is no reason for their use in this case since the integrity of the election returns is not in
question. On the other hand, in the canvass of votes, the MBC is directed to use the election returns.[17] Accordingly, in revising the
Statement of Votes supporting the Certificate of Canvass, the MBC should have used the election returns from the precincts in
question although in fairness to MBC, it proposed the use of election returns but the COMELEC en banc rejected the proposal. The
Statement of Votes is a tabulation per precinct of votes garnered by the candidates as reflected in the election returns.
The Statement of Votes is a vital component of the electoral process. It supports the Certificate of Canvass and is the basis for
proclamation.[18] But in this case the Statement of Votes was not even prepared until after the proclamation of the winning
candidate. This is contrary to the Omnibus Election Code, 231 of which provides in part:
....

The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the
thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place
and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the
province, city, municipality or barangay.

Indeed, it appears from the Comment of the MBC that the MBC prepared its Certificate of Canvass simply on the basis
of improvised tally sheets and that it was only after the termination of the canvass, the proclamation of petitioner Jose C. Ramirez,
and the accomplishment of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation, that its clerk, Rosalia Abenojar, prepared the
Statement of Votes (C.E. Form No. 20-A). In a sworn report, Ms. Abenojar herself stated that she was tired and drowsy at the time
she prepared the Statement of Votes for the mayoralty and vice mayoralty positions. Although this circumstance may support
petitioners claim that the number of votes credited to private respondent Alfredo I. Go are actually those cast in Precinct Nos. 11, 11-
A, 6, 1, 17, 7, and 10 for mayoralty candidate Rodito Fabillar, it is equally possible that Go and Fabillar obtained the same number of
votes in those precincts. That the clerk who prepared the Statement of Votes was tired and drowsy does not necessarily mean the
entries she made were erroneous. But what is clear is that the Statement of Votes was not prepared with the care required by its
importance. Accordingly, as the Solicitor General states, what the COMELEC should have ordered the MBC to do was not merely to
recompute the number of votes for the parties, but to revise the Statement of Votes, using the election returns for this purpose.[19] As
this Court ruled in Villaroya v. Commission on Elections:[20]

[T]he COMELEC has ample power to see to it that the elections are held in clean and orderly manner and it may decide all questions
affecting the elections and has original jurisdiction on all matters relating to election returns, including the verification of the number
of votes received by opposing candidates in the election returns as compared to the statement of votes in order to insure that the
true will of the people is known. Such a clerical error in the statement of votes can be ordered corrected by the COMELEC. (Emphasis
added)

Petitioners final contention that in any event SPC No. 95-198 must be considered rendered moot and academic by reason of
his proclamation and assumption of office is untenable. The short answer to this is that petitioners proclamation was null and void
and therefore the COMELEC was not barred from inquiring into its nullity.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED by annulling the resolutions dated August 1, 1995 and September 26, 1995
of the Commission on Elections. The COMELEC is instead DIRECTED to reconvene the Municipal Board of Canvassers or, if this is
not feasible, to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers in Giporlos, Eastern Samar and to order it to revise with deliberate
speed the Statement of Votes on the basis of the election returns from all precincts of the Municipality of Giporlos and thereafter
proclaim the winning candidate on the basis thereof.
SO ORDERED.

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 RAMIREZ vs. COMELEC
270 SCRA 590, 1997

Facts: The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Gipolos, Eastern Samar proclaimed petitioner Ramirez winner in the vice-
mayoralty race over another candidate, private respondent Go based on the results showing that Ramirez obtained more votes than
Go.

Go petitioned COMELEC for correction of manifest error claiming that owing to error in addition, he was credited with lesser votes.
The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and
proclaim the winning candidate. Acting on separate motions filed by Ramirez and Go, the COMELEC en banc affirmed its earlier
resolution.

Ramirez petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the 2 COMELEC en banc resolutions and to reinstate his proclamation as the duly
elected vice-mayor. He alleged that the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over the controversy since it was not yet acted upon
by a division of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act directly on the petition for correction of manifest error filed by private
respondent Go?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, citing Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules which provides correction
of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing as one of the pre-proclamation controversies which
maybe filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.

The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolutions but directed COMELEC to reconvene the MBC or if this is not feasible, to
constitute a new MBC in Gipolos, Eastern Samar and to order it to promptly revise the Statement of Votes based on the election
returns from all the precincts of the Municipality and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120318. December 5, 1997]
RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
CALAMBA LAGUNA and SEVERINO LAJARA, respondents.
DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995
elections. After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes [1] Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On
15 May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare
Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes,
preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of
election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred
that: (a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate
registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually
received; (d) control data of the election returns was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of
election returns. But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a
declaration of failure of election.
Indeed, the grounds cited by Canicosa do not warrant a declaration of failure of election. Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, reads:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of

4
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those enumerated.
Canicosa bewails that the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not appear in their respective lists of
voters. But this is not a ground to declare a failure of election. The filing of a petition for declaration of failure of election therefore is
not the proper remedy. The day following the last day for registration of voters, the poll clerk delivers a certified list of voters to the
election registrar, election supervisor and the COMELEC, copies of which are open to public inspection. On the same day, the poll
clerk posts a copy of the list of registered voters in each polling place. Each member of the board of election inspectors retains a
copy of the list which may be inspected by the public in their residence or in their office during office hours. [2]
Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the final list of voters was posted in each precinct pursuant to Sec.
148 of RA No. 7166. Based on the lists thus posted Canicosa could have filed a petition for inclusion of registered voters with the
regular courts. The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote [3] which is not within the power
and authority of COMELEC to rule upon. The determination of whether one has the right to vote is a justiciable issue properly
cognizable by our regular courts. Section 138, Art. XII, of the Omnibus Election Code states:

Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. - The municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters of inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their respective municipalities or cities. Decisions of
the municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be appealed directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional trial court within five
days from receipts of notice thereof, otherwise said decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall decide the appeal within
ten days from the time the appeal was received and its decision shall be immediately final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts (Sec. 37, PD 1896, as amended).

On the other hand, Canicosa could have also filed with the COMELEC a verified complaint seeking the annulment of the book
of voters pursuant to Sec. 10, of RA No. 7166:

Sec. 10. Annulment of the List of Voters. - Any book of voters the preparation of which has been affected with fraud, bribery, forgery,
impersonation, intimidation, force or any other similar irregularity or which is statistically improbable may be annulled after due notice
and hearing by the Commission motu propio or after the filing of a verified complaint: Provided, that no order, ruling or decision
annulling a book of voters shall be executed within sixty (60) days before an election.

If indeed the situation herein described was common in almost all of the 557 precincts as alleged by Canicosa, [4] then it was more
expedient on his part to avail of the remedies provided by law in order to maintain the integrity of the election. Since Canicosa failed
to resort to any of the above options, the permanent list of voters as finally corrected before the election remains conclusive on the
question as to who had the right to vote in that election, although not in subsequent elections. [5]
Canicosa also avers that more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were not able to vote, instead, strangers
voted in their behalf. Again, this is not a ground which warrants a declaration of failure of election. Canicosa was allowed to appoint
a watcher in every precinct. The watcher is empowered by law to challenge any illegal voter. Thus, Secs. 199 and 202, Art. XVII, of
the Omnibus Election Code, provide:

Sec. 199. Challenge of illegal voters. - (a) Any voter, or watcher may challenge any person offering to vote for not being registered,
for using the name of another or suffering from existing disqualification. In such case, the board of election inspectors shall satisfy
itself as to whether or not the ground for the challenge is true by requiring proof of registration or identity of the voter x x x x

Sec. 202. Record of challenges and oaths. - The poll clerk shall keep a prescribed record of challenges and oaths taken in connection
therewith and the resolution of the board of election inspectors in each case and, upon the termination of the voting, shall certify that
it contains all the challenges made x x x x

The claim of Canicosa that he was credited with less votes than he actually received and that the control data of the election
returns was not filled up should have been raised in the first instance before the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers. Section 179, Art. XV, of the Omnibus Election Code clearly provides for the rights and duties of watchers -

Sec. 179. Rights and duties of watchers. - x x x x The watchers x x x shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of the
proceedings of the board of election inspectors x x x to file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they believe may
have been committed by the board of election inspectors or by any of its members or by any persons, to obtain from the board of
election inspectors a certificate as to the filing of such protest and/or of the resolution thereon x x x and to be furnished with a
certificate of the number of votes in words and figures cast for each candidate, duly signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and
all the members of the board of election inspectors x x x x

To safeguard and maintain the sanctity of election returns, Sec. 212, Art. XVIII, of the Omnibus Election Code states -

Sec. 212. Election returns. - x x x x Immediately upon the accomplishment of the election returns, each copy thereof shall be sealed
in the presence of the watchers and the public, and placed in the proper envelope, which shall likewise be sealed and distributed as
herein provided.

Furthermore, it is provided in Sec. 215 of the Omnibus Election Code that -

5
Sec. 215. Board of election inspectors to issue a certificate of the number of votes polled by the candidates for an office to the
watchers. - After the announcement of the results of the election and before leaving the polling place, it shall be the duty of the board
of election inspectors to issue a certificate of the number of votes received by a candidate upon request of the watchers. All members
of the board of election inspectors shall sign the certificate.

Supplementing the preceding provisions, Secs. 16 and 17 of RA No. 6646 also require -

Sec. 16. Certification of votes. - After the counting of the votes cast in the precinct and announcement of the results of the election,
and before leaving the polling place, the board of election inspectors shall issue a certificate of votes upon request of the duly
accredited watchers x x x x

Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The provisions of Secs. 235 and 236 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the
certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or anomaly committed in the election
returns concerned x x x x

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that in case of inconsistency as to the number of votes written in the election returns
and the certificate of votes, a petition for correction of election returns must immediately be filed with COMELEC by all or a majority
of the members of the board of election inspectors or any candidate affected by the error or mistake. In order to make out a case for
correction of election returns, there must be an error and at least a majority of the members of the board of election inspectors agrees
that such error existed. Canicosa never mentioned that he petitioned for the correction of the election returns before the COMELEC
Canicosa complains that the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals. These bare allegations cannot impel us to declare failure of
election. Assuming that the election returns were delivered late, we still cannot see why we should declare a failure to elect. The late
deliveries did not convert the election held in Calamba into a mockery or farce to make us conclude that there was indeed a failure
of election.
In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code. In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections [6] we ruled that before COMELECcan act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must concur: (a) no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and, (b) the votes that were not cast would
affect the result of the election. From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an election took place and that it did
not result in a failure to elect.[7]
Canicosa finally insists that it was error on the part of COMELEC sitting en banc to rule on his petition. He maintains that his
petition should have first been heard by a division of COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration,
pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution.[8]
But this provision applies only when the COMELEC acts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not
when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. To reiterate, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition are that: (a) the
names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their respective precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate
registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually
received; (d) the control data of the election returns was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i. e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of
election returns.
Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987
Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Likewise, Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, states:

Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections x x x x

Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and
decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional. In
the instant case, as aforestated, the issues presented demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions.
The COMELEC exercises direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including
members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. Its power of direct supervision and control includes the power to review, modify or set aside any
act of such national and local officials. [9] It exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the boards of election
inspectors and canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control includes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the action
of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should have done, even if questions relative thereto have not
been elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself such steps or
actions as may be required pursuant to law.[10]
Specifically, Canicosa alleged that he was credited with less votes than he actually received. But he did not raise any objection
before the Municipal Board of Canvassers; instead, he went directly to the COMELEC. He now claims, after the COMELEC en
banc dismissed his petition, that it was error on the part of COMELEC to rule on his petition while sitting en banc.

6
 We have already disposed of this issue in Castromayor v. Commission on Elections [11] thus should be pinpointed out, in this
connection, that what is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct
of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in computation, the MBC will be
acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the
proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.
Moreover, it is expressly provided in Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party dissatisfied with the
ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc:

Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. - (a) Where it is clearly shown before
proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying or election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the
canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were tabulated
more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in
the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election
returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any
candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed x x x
x (h) The appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.

In Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections [12] it was made to appear in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
the Winning Candidates that respondent therein received 4,951 votes or more than what he actually obtained. In resolving the case
we ruled that the correction of the manifest mistake in mathematical addition calls for a mere clerical task of the board of
canvassers. The remedy invoked was purely administrative. In Feliciano v. Lugay [13] we categorized the issue concerning registration
of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground in his petition for declaration of failure of election, as an administrative question.Likewise,
questions as to whether elections have been held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured and therefore should be
excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to vote. Such questions are properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
COMELEC, [14] hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC en banc without having to pass through any of its divisions.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent Commission on Elections, the petition is
DISMISSED and its Resolution en banc of 23 May 1995 dismissing the petition before it on the ground that the allegations therein
did not justify a declaration of failure of election is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985
CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO G.
LIRIO respondents.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1 (which dismissed his petition to set
aside respondent Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July 31, 1980 denying his petition for annulment of the proclamation
of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and for his proclamation instead as such elected vice-
mayor for having received the clear majority of the votes cast), the comments of public and private respondents and petitioner's
consolidated reply and manifestation and motion of June 25, 1985 (stating that respondent abandoned his claim to the office and
accepted and assumed on June 10, 1985, the position of municipal trial judge of Lucban and Sampaloc, Quezon, as verified from the
records of the Office of the Court Administrator), the Court Resolved to RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to
GRANT the petition at bar.

The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of
the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting
withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon
learning of his companion Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the
said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. ... The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent
with a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent Lirio's 2,660 votes). But the Municipal Board of
Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous
opinion that since petitioner's name does not appear in the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could be
presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so that his votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The
canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor
of the municipality of Dolores.

Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two grounds after citing the
pertinent legal provisions, as follows:

The 1978 Election Code provides:

7
 SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with
the office which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...

SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed
should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for which ...
the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of election ...

Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength of Section 28 of
the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath,
as required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal was
made not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of
the Code, but on that very same day. (Emphasis copies)

Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will of the electorate
instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal or technical defects. (De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil.
211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918) Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969]; Yra vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380
[1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522 [1963], Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA
11 [19721; and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72 SCRA 170 [19761).

The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy, i.e. that
Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath," should be rejected. It is not seriously contended by
respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a reality, so much so that no votes were cast
for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even though his candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was not in the
Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn withdrawalfiled later on the same day had been accepted by the election registrar
without protest nor objection, On the other hand, since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of registered
candidates, because the election was only four days away, petitioner as substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his
candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens election committees in compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law
Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.

The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor
of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this
Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly
sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the
fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As
likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be
held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."

As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the very same day that he filed his certificate
of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for filing of certificates of candidacy shows that he was not serious
about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not be done to would be bonafide candidates, like petitioner who had not filed his
candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his " co-planners " with "some concerned citizens ... (who) held
causes to put up a slate that will run against the erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."

The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the
substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death.
withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the
last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes,
such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the
literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his dissent that
"the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be successfully
assailed. It follows that the votes cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient justification for
his proclamation as Vice Mayor...

ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the proclamation of
respondent Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. This resolution is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949
JOSE P. MONSALE, protestant-appeal,
vs.
PAULINO M. NICO, protestee-appellant.

OZAETA, J.:
8
This is appeal by the protestee from a decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo declaring the protestant elected municipal mayor of
Miagao as a result of the general elections held on November 11, 1947.

It appears that the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on November 7, attempted to revive it
by withdrawing his withdrawal. The commission on Election, however, rules on November 8 thatthe protestant could no longer be a
candidate in spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received
2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote
cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed
elected.

The pivotal question presented in this appeal is whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it,
either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the
filling of such certificate.

Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed
by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election
and thirty days at least before a special election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal
secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling place concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to
the Commission on Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling certificate of candidacy, a
candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate
of candidacy for the office for which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding section
on or before midday of the day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and the midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate
or in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission on Elections."

In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and requested the Commission on
Election that it "be considered as though it has never been filed at all." There is no question as to the right off a candidate to withdraw
or annul his own certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-
on days before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of facts the boards of
election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao we duly notified of his letter to the Commission on Election dated November 6, 1947,
which subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of
candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election, could
not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at sixty days before the election.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable
the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to
avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter
to duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for
unknown or fictitious person as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.

The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when
a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.

The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his
desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In the case Clutario vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-1704, this court sustained the ruling
of said commission upon similar facts that "by own voluntary act and deed petitioner has nullified his certificate of candidacy and in
the light of the election laws such certificate of candidacy has been definitely withdrawn hence nonexisting."

Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a petition contesting the election of a provincial or municipal officer-elect shall be
filed with the Court of First Instance of the province by any candidate voted for insaid election and who has presented a certificate of
candidacy." This clearly implies that a candidate voted for who has not presented a certificate of candidacy has no right to contest
the election. In other words, the herein protestant, not being a registered candidate, has no standing before the court.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the protest is ordered dismissed with costs against the appellee. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136351. July 28, 1999]
JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION

MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case No. 98-288 which disposed:

9
 ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:

1. AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) in SPA No. 98-019 promulgated
on May 5, 1998, to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE PEMPE
MIRANDAs certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election
and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued therefor;

3. DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, PREPARE a new certificate of canvass & proclamation
and PROCLAIM the winning candidate among those voted upon as the duly elected mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998
election; and

4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines;
the Department of Interior and Local Government; the Department of Finance, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
Santiago City.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 90-91, Rollo.)

The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First Division of the
Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing private respondents petition to declare the substitution of Jose Pempe Miranda by petitioner
as candidate for the City of Santiagos mayoralty post void.
Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:
On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution
dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose Pempe Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering
22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20, 336 votes.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification
of petitioners certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda, whom
petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
On May 16, 1998, Comelecs First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private respondent
moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision
aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his
father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City.
On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Courts intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On December 11, 1998, the Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order and to require respondents to comment on the petition. On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his
Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-234, Rollo) and on February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor General, filed
its Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days from notice, but petitioner
twice asked for an extension of the period. Without granting the motions for extension of time to file consolidated reply, the Court
decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.
Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

10
 The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution and
proclamation of petitioner.
On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Baretto (25 Phil. 245 [1913]), this Court had occasion to apply the following principles:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a causethe right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it
does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction
should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered
therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

(p. 251)

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelecs action nullifying the
substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.
Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

SEC. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging
to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the
entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose Pempe Miranda in the May 5, 1998 resolution and he
heavily relies upon the above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a candidate who has been disqualified for any cause.
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a
candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of
candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted,
there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a
nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the
lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have
been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only an official candidate of
a registered or accredited political party may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this
Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy (p.13).
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who
has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:

SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed herein.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any person who attempts
to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult
him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period
fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no
certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due
course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to
enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the choice,
and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election
by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be
cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same
election. (Monsale vs. Nico, 83 Phil. 758 [1949])
It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. It cannot
be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and denial
of due course to certificates of candidacy.
11
 After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista we ruled that
a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77
of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there
demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due
course.
Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as disqualification for any cause in this case) follows
an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the words dies and withdraws in the instant case) or
where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or
cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 [1979]). A
deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be allowed
to field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing
candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate
in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an
indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just
as it is in the two previous instances.
Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut eviatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning, where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be adopted. To include those disqualified
candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may be
substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of
somebody who had not been a candidate in the first placea person who did not have a valid certificate of candidacy prior to
substitution. Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no
one can give what he does not have.
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the
existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The
Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election code, the existence
of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if
the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a
person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called
substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of
unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple case of hair-splitting. A candidate may
not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. Another candidate may likewise be not qualified
and at the same time not have a valid certificate of candidacy, for which reason, said certificate of candidacy is also cancelled and/or
denied due course. Or, a third candidate may be qualified but, his certificate of candidacy may be denied due course and/or
cancelled. This is possible because the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus Election Code, Section 68 Disqualifications) are
totally separate and distinct from the grounds for cancellation and/or denying due course to a certificate of candidacy (Ibid., Section
69 nuisance candidates; and Section 78 material misrepresentation). Only the candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy may
be substituted.
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel Pempe Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5,
1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of
Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the following
manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE Pempe
MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

12
 From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently
clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter
whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. It may be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences of this May 5, 1998
resolution are independent of the issue of whether or not the Comelec was correct in reviving SPA No. 98-019 by consolidating it
with SPA No. 98-288 in its December 8, 1998 resolution.
As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following considerations are also in point:
It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over decisions of the Constitutional Commissions,
in general, and the Commission on Elections, in particular, were rather particularly defined and limited by the 1987 Constitution, as
they were also circumscribed in the 1973 Constitution, to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison (176
SCRA 84 [1989]), the Court held:

. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]) as regards recourse to this Court with respect
to rulings of the Civil Service Commissionwhich is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In Aratuc, we declared:

It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate
the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and
honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission subject to review by the Supreme Court. And since instead of maintaining that
provision intact, it ordained that the Commissions actuations be instead brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, We cannot insist
that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is
well known in remedial law.

xxx

It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, which, as Aratuc tells us, technically connotes something less than saying that
the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court, which in turn suggests an appeal by review by petition for review under
Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.

(pp. 111-112)

To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished Member of this Court, Mr. Justice
Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas query during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution thusly:
FR. BERNAS. So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the Committee? What are the grounds for certiorari?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review by certiorari would be relying on the provision
of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the Rules of Court that laid down the three grounds.

(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited in Bernas, S.J, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 903.)

Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule 65. Generally, certiorari lies where a
court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Without jurisdiction refers to an absolute want of jurisdiction; excess of jurisdiction refers to the case where the court has
jurisdiction, but it transcended the same or acted without any statutory authority; grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present
case, such is not within the province of certiorari, as a remedial measure, to correct. The only issue that may be taken cognizance of
in the present case is whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when
the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility (Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 170 SCRA 246 [1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon
Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988]; Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error of judgment committed
in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by
itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was
exercised arbitrarily and despotically (Soriano vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284 [1989]).

13
 Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution by and proclamation
of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to substitute for disqualified the candidate Jose
Pempe Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an act of grave abuse of discretion for the Comelec to direct the proclamation
of private respondent as the winning candidate in the May 11, 1998 election.
Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution in SPA No. 98-019, which was not
elevated to it on review, the same having already attained finality by then.
While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it motu proprio took
cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in which was by then already final, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec also
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to grant private respondents motion for reconsideration by nullifying the substitution
of petitioner Joel G. Miranda. Evidently, what is under review before us in this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and not SPA
No. 98-019.
The question to answer is: will the Comelecs act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-019 be tantamount
to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and distinct case of SPA No. 98-288 as well? Clearly, non
sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its own accord, and not under the shadow of SPA No. 98-019.
Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. As earlier pointed
out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is
correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is
not, still, this supposed error does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present petition
for certiorari.
As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelecs disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the fact that former candidate Jose Pempe
Mirandas certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by
private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda
(Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather
clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact
remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda was denied due
course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even necessary for the Comelec to reiterate this in its December 8, 1998 resolution. At
best, the Comelecs motu proprio act of resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that the
certificate of candidacy of Joel Pempe Miranda was denied due course and cancelled did not depend on the en banc resolution dated
December 8, 1998 of the Comelec. It stems from the fact that the May 5, 1998 resolution GRANTED private respondents Petition to
Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.
Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the instant case and that it was a valid
ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-019. Also, there appears to be sound basis to rule that a certificate of candidacy
which has been denied due course on account of misrepresentation is, in every legal contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there
is nothing to substitute. If this judgment, rendered in the Comelecs rightful exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-288 may, at all,
be considered flawed, this blemish would only constitute an error of judgment and definitely not grave abuse of discretion. And, of
course, errors of judgment may not be corrected by certiorari.
It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting opinion (pp. 93-99, Rollo). However, her
legal opinion failed to convince the majority of the collegiate body and was not adopted by the Commission en banc. This Court in
the present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Comelec without violating the Constitution and the
Rules of Court on the matter. The Comelecs decision is not subject to appeal to this Court.We may only strike out a Comelec decision
if it was rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the sovereign will of the
electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should always be reminded that ours is a government of laws not of men. If this Court
should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every clamor of the majority of the supposed constituency, where shall order and
justice lie? Without the least intention to degrade, where shall people power end, and where shall law and justice begin? Would the
apparent results of the canvassing of votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the law instead? The answers to the foregoing are
obvious. The Court cannot choose otherwise but to exercise its sacred duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
for and under which it exists. Besides, only history will discern whether Jose Pempe Mirandas filing of a certificate of candidacy for a
4th term and the intended substitution by his son was a ploy to perpetrate the Mirandas in power by way of a political dynasty
disdained and abhorred by our Constitution which declared:

SEC. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law.

(Article II, 1987 Constitution)

The invalidation of petitioners supposed substitution of Jose Pempe Miranda brings about the disqualification of petitioner in the
mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections (275 SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:

Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case
Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent
case of Reyes v. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]), viz.:

xxxxxxxxx
14
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcias petition to be
proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the
question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind
of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality
of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Garcias plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast
in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can be treated as stray, void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that
he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant
of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

(pp. 782-783)

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled ruling consistently
applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes
vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).
Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to petitioner as the electors
choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the matter,
nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to the fact that private respondent was not then the choice of
the people of Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago
City to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on succession under section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, would then apply. Said provision relevantly states:

SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member, or, in case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion
of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding
local election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election and proclamation of
petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is, however, hereby GRANTED so as to MODIFY the resolution of the Comelec in SPA
No. 98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from
among those voted upon during the May 11, 1998 elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the restraining
order issued in this case is forthwith LIFTED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 130681 July 29, 1999

JOSE V. LORETO, in representation of his minor child JOSE P. LORETO, III, petitioners,
vs.
RENATO BRION, RODOLFO BUTALID and REYNALDO ATIENZA, in their capacity as Chairman and Members respectively
of the Board of Election Supervisors, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

15
In this petition for review on certiorari Jose V. Loreto, III questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte
in Special Civil Action No. B-1302 dismissing his petition for mandamus to compel the chairman and members of the Board of Election
Supervisors of the Pambansang Pederasyon Ng Mga Sangguniang Kabataan of Baybay, Leyte Chapter to proclaim him as the winner
in the elections of July 5, 1996 for President of the Pambayang Federasyon Ng Mga Sangguniang Kabataan, Baybay, Leyte Chapter.

Jose Loreto III ran for president of the Pambayang Federasyon Ng Mga Sangguniang Kabataan, Baybay, Leyte Chapter in the July
5, 1996 elections. The other candidates were Paul Ian Veloso and Ruphil Bañoc.

On July 3, 1996, a pre-election protest against Paul Ian Veloso was lodged before the Board of Election Supervisors composed of
respondents herein for violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 96-115, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2834, prohibiting certain
acts of campaigning in the Sangguniang Kabataan Pederasyon elections.

In the July 5, 1996 elections, Paul Ian Veloso obtained the highest number of votes but his proclamation as winner was suspended
as the evidence of his guilt in the pre-election protest was strong. Jose Loreto, III garnered the second highest number of
votes.1âwphi1.nêt

On August 6, 1996, the Board of Election Supervisors promulgated a Resolution disqualifying candidate Paul Ian Veloso and ruled
that the elected Vice President of the chapter should assume the office of President. The resolution became final and executory.

Petitioner Loreto took his oath of office and discharged the duties and functions of President of the SK Municipal Federation but was
unable to collect the salaries pertaining to the office on account of the absence of the required proclamation papers.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court to compel the Board of Election Supervisors to direct the
local election committee to proclaim him.

The Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner Loreto had lost in the SK Pederasyon elections and the fact that
the winning candidate was later on disqualified and his being a second placer did not entitle him to be proclaimed as President.

Petitioner Loreto filed this petition for review on certiorari on an alleged pure question of law. The lone issue is as follows:

Whether or not the trial court was correct in declaring that petitioner was not qualified to assume the presidency of
the Sangguniang Kabataan Chapter of Baybay, Leyte in lieu of a disqualified candidate since the petitioner is a
mere second placer to the deposed winner.

Petitioner relies on Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides that "any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for and the votes cast for him shall not be counted," and claims that in view of the final judgment
declaring Paul Ian Veloso's disqualification, the votes that were obtained by Veloso fall in the category of stray or invalid votes. When
he was disqualified, it was as if he was no candidate at all in the eyes of the law and the effects of the final judgment of disqualification
retroacts to the time the case was filed.

In its Comment, public respondent cites the doctrine laid down in a long line of cases that a second placer cannot be considered the
winner in place of a disqualified winning candidate.

In his reply, petitioner stresses that nowhere in Section 6 of R.A. 6646 is it mandated that the protestee be disqualified by final
judgment prior to or before the date of election. On the contrary, the fact that the provision mandates that votes cast for a candidate
disqualified by final judgment be not counted presupposes that an election has already been held.

Public respondent counterargues in its rejoinder that it is immaterial whether the petition for disqualification against a candidate was
filed before the elections or after the elections as the subsequent finding that a candidate is disqualified cannot retroact to the date
of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. Hence, the votes cast in favor of the disqualified winning candidate will still
be valid and the second placer does not become the automatic winner.

The question raised in the instant petition is not news. As early as Geronimo vs. Ramos, 1 this Court has held that:

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policies on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless 2

The doctrine was reiterated in Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 3 (which reversed the earlier ruling in Santos vs. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 140)
and in the cases of Abella vs. COMELEC, 4 and Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC. 5 The Court in the first cited case succinctly restated the
principle as follows:

16
 The rule therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office. 6

The rationale for the rule is explained in Benito vs. COMELEC 7 as follows:

For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate
is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice. 8

and more emphatically in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 9 thus:

. . . We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in
which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because
this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English
court decisions. These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up though obviously qualified, could receive
votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection.
Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally
repudiated candidate as the voters' choice. Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second
placer may not be considered numerically insignificant voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and
unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the
disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though neligible
winner among no choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any
mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained the majority or plurality
of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.

The doctrine was last reiterated in the recent case of Reyes vs. COMELEC. 10

We find no cogent reason to reexamine or disturb the rule already firmly settled in the above-cited jurisprudence which rejected the
contention of petitioner herein that he should be considered the first among qualified candidates. The court a quo correctly held that
the second placer lost the elections and was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. To rule otherwise is to impose what
is an unclear expression of the voters' will.

As regards the contentions of petitioner that the votes cast in favor of Paul Ian Veloso should be treated as stray, void or meaningless,
and that the subsequent finding that he is disqualified should retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast
for him, these were squarely rejected in Reyes vs. COMELEC, 11 wherein it was pointed out that the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified.

We find that the court a quo did not err in relying on the doctrine enunciated in the cases cited to support the dismissal of this petition
for mandamus and its refusal to declare that petitioner is the winning candidate in the Sangguniang Kabataan elections in Baybay,
Leyte.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." – Article II, Section 1, Constitution

17
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to
expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.

This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first impression. We are
asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens
— who are not candidates — during elections.

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign Materials 2 dated February
22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27, 2013.

The facts are not disputed.

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. 4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience
Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law.6Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
against it form "Team Buhay":7

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela
Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna
Party List Anak Pawis

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage
of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9

On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied 10 requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin
be allowed to remain.11

On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter 12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it
will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies
available to petitioners. The letter provides as follows:

Dear Bishop Navarra:

It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already given you notice on February 22,
2013 as regards the election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-
list groups with the following names and messages, particularly described as follows:

Material size : six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’)

Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN

18
 Image of : SEE ATTACHED PICTURES

Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM

BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY

Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY

OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY

The three (3) – day notice expired on February 25, 2013.

Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 promulgated on January
15, 2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division of the said tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election
propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’), please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda
material, otherwise, we shall be constrained to file an election offense case against you.

We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections inensuring the conduct of peaceful,
orderly, honest and credible elections.

Thank you and God Bless!

[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV13

Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition
for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 14 They question respondents’
notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding
in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring
the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or
any other similar order.15

After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the
assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013. 16

On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment 17 arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin
is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution.
Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional. 18

During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda within 10 days or by April 1,
2013, taking into consideration the intervening holidays. 19

The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are: 20

I.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013
ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE 65 PETITION[;]

A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL

RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED

JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]

II.

WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR

"ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]

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III.

WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION

PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]

A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE
COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]

B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]

IV.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013
ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;]
[AND]

V.

WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

I.A

This court’s jurisdiction over COMELEC cases

Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or
judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.21

Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a
grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. 22 As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be
no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to review is "limited only
to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power."23 Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article
IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution24 on COMELEC’s power to decide all questions affecting elections. 25 Respondents invoke the
cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,26 Repol v. COMELEC,27 Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29 and Cayetano v.
COMELEC,30 to illustrate how judicialintervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En
Banc.31

These cases are not applicable.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election protest. 32 At issue was the
validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution. 33 No motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before
the COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified:

We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution]34 to mean final orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.The Supreme Court has no power to review
viacertiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. 35 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this general rule. Repolwas
another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan, Samar. 36 This time, the case was brought to this
court because the COMELEC First Division issued a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision
pending appeal.37 This court’s ponencia discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.38However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,39 it
clarified the exception:

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed
over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the

20
decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.40

Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests — despite not being reviewed
by the COMELEC En Banc, if:

1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;

3) The issue involves the protection of labor;

4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or

5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the status quo anteorder issued by the COMELEC Division was
unconstitutional.

Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC.This case was also an election protest case involving candidates for the city council
of Muntinlupa City.41 Petitioners in Soriano, Jr.filed before this court a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the
COMELEC First

Division.42 While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest
case.43 Sorianoapplied the general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court,
however, acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.44

Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the mayoralty candidates of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.45 The COMELEC Second Division ruled that petitioner could not qualify for the 2007 elections due to the
findings in an administrative case that he engaged in vote buying in the 1995 elections. 46No motion for reconsideration was filed
before the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however, took cognizance of this case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The
assailed resolution was a nullity.47

Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the mayoralty candidates of Taguig
City.48 Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition
for lack of form and substance.49 This court clarified the general rule and refused to take cognizance of the review of the COMELEC
order. While recognizing the exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court ruled that these exceptions did not apply. 50

Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to oust this court from taking
jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against
the winning candidate.

In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to
expression.

Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This
case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC
was allegedly enforcingelection laws.

I.B

Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,

and limitations on political speech

The main subject of thiscase is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect" caused by
respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.

Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
notice51 dated February 22,2013 and letter52 dated February 27, 2013 ordering the removal of the tarpaulin. 53 It is their position that
these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state and,
thus, are unconstitutional.54

21
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is
defined as the authority "to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers." 55Definitely, the subject matter in this case is
different from the cases cited by respondents.

Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is
motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the
contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the
Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message.
Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom
of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in practice will define the
quality of deliberation in our democratic society.

COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition. Under the conditions in which it
was issued and in view of the novelty of this case,it could result in a "chilling effect" that would affect other citizens who want their
voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related
issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC. Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such
proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising grave abuse of discretion.

Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this court’s expanded exercise of certiorari
as provided by the Constitution as follows:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.56(Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section
2(3) of the Constitution, provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

....

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are
confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action
effectively abridging meaningful political speech.

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall
under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean
that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and allquestions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional
competencies during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.

The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.This provision provides for this
court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the
court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.

Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of
the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.

During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s
constitutional mandate to protect the people against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional
mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.

It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.

I.C

Hierarchy of courts

22
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before this
court.

Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for
the dismissal of their petition.57 They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor.58 While respondents claim that while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are
present in this case.59

On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this court’s discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly
to it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the issues raised. . . ."61 Petitioners submit that there
are "exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct resort [with] this Court." 62

In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored
without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are
also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to
the policy.64

In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
citing Vergara v. Suelto:65

The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason
or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of
the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. 67 To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily,
they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In
many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a
determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however,
some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the
higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of
Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It
is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues thatmay not necessarily be novel unless there are
factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or
in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the
actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of
such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.68 This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and
assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons 69 or if warranted
by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." 70 As correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have provided
exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality
of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government. 72

23
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case,
but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform
the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To
quote an eminent political theorist:

[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments through democratic
procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened
and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his
prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative,
progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration,
skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities.It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical,
conformist, irrational and stagnant.73

In a democracy, the citizen’s right tofreely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is
recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-building isa fundamental
principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this
court.

A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection.

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which
warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of
speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that
in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental
constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.

Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will
guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of the case as a
matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take
cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.77

This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage includes the
right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence.
Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court held that:

. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgmentof this Court in the consideration
of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority
of those who participated in its discussion.79 (Citation omitted)

In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the
elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain
situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, 80 cited by
petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance ofeach and every
province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that
constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence." 81

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on
their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt
affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be
in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

24
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could
free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify
the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort
to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was consideredas clearly an
inappropriate remedy."82 In the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts included citizens’ right to bear arms, 83 government contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists, 84 and the
status and existence of a public office.85

This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. While
generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved
by this court directly.

I.D

The concept of a political question

Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not within the ambit of this
court’s power of review. They cite Justice Vitug’s separate opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC 86 to support their position:

It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the "State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section
26, Article II, of the Constitution to be all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event,
the latter, being one of general application, must yield to the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression
concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental rights, it is not
without limitations.

The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful" and the "weak" in our society but it is to me
a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance
to media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates’ right of free expression rather than being
viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be
best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives
of the Court to pass upon.87

This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.

The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal opportunities for
media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-
candidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property, asan exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the
political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.

In Tañada v. Cuenco,88 this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political question:

What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by
the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer
of the government, withdiscretionary power to act. 89 (Emphasis omitted)

It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly
the legislature, the creation of the textof the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order
to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts
that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.

Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific case-to-case basis, where
parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts’ understanding of the law.

The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to ensure that the rights of the
general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance, branches of government must afford due respectand
deference for the duties and functions constitutionally delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence
dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts unless we can craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.

25
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon
by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.

A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the
executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify
certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In
such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was
so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner
of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Marcos v. Manglapus90 limited the use of the political question doctrine:

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide.91

How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the timethat it had been first
invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical and social context of the case and the relevance of
pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v.
Singson92 and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.93

Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution involving the removal
of petitioners from the Commission on Appointments. In times past, this would have involved a quint essentially political question as
it related to the dominance of political parties in Congress. However, in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial review
noting that the requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner by which
a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach was again reiterated in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. 94

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,95 this court declared again that the possible existence ofa political question did not bar
an examination of whether the exercise of discretion was done with grave abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the
question of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in the President’s use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent
and suppress lawless violence.

In Estrada v. Desierto,96 this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President resigned was not a political question
even if the consequences would be to ascertain the political legitimacy of a successor President.

Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of constitutional issues as
leverage. But the expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to exercise its power of judicial review expanding on
principles that may avert catastrophe or resolve social conflict.

This court’s understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive Secretary Oscar
Orbos,97 this court held:

While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the
wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or
whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review.
And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with
the functions of the President.98

The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most extensively in Francisco v.
HRET.99 In this case, the House of Representatives arguedthat the question of the validity of the second impeachment complaint that
was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his concurring and dissenting opinion:

To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded
the definition of judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired Justice Isagani
Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted the scope of political question. He opined that the language
luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive and legislative departments including the
President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary powers. 100 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in the following cases:

26
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: The present Constitution limits resort to
the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide. x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a
recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." (Emphasis and italics
supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.x x x (Emphasis and italics
supplied.)

....

In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.101 (Citations omitted)

As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers
or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

I.E

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents insist that petitioners
should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions. 102

Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 103 They add that the proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed issuances
was in the course of an administrative hearing to be conducted by COMELEC. 104 In the event that an election offense is filed against
petitioners for posting the tarpaulin, they claim that petitioners should resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.105

The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of
government] before a court may come into the picture."106

Petitioners’ exercise of their rightto speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during
the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement
of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.

Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales,107 Justice Carpio in a separate
opinion emphasized: "[i]f everthere is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and
among different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top." 108 Sovereignty resides in
the people.109 Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in
order to protect this fundamental right.

27
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current controversy is within the
exceptions to the principle. In Chua v. Ang,110 this court held:

On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe
administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land
in land case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allegethat the assailed issuances
violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question.
Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law
as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.

Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation
when compelling reasons so warrant, or whenthe purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient
cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court". 112Certainly, this case of first impression where
COMELEC has threatenedto prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want
debated by the publicin the manner they feel would be effective is one of those cases.

II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

II.A

COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin.113 However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

II.A.1

First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 4. The Commission may,during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 114 (Emphasis supplied)

Sanidad v. COMELEC115 involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.116 Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting journalists from covering plebiscite issues
on the day before and on plebiscite day. 117 Sanidad argued that the prohibition was a violation of the "constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press. . . ." 118 We held that the "evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility
that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television
time."119 This court found that "[m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates[,]"120 thus, their right to expression during this period may not be regulated by COMELEC.121

Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates. II.A.2

Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows:122

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

....

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
(Emphasis supplied) Based on the enumeration made on actsthat may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects
candidates.
28
Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued by COMELEC. This was followed bythe assailed letter regarding
the "election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups. . . ."123

Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates":

Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster
areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein
candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda: Provided, That the size ofthe poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12)
by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent. Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common
poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or
property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair Election Act, provides as
follows:

SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful campaign material in:

a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the requirements and/or limitations set forth in the next
following section; and

b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.

The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common poster areas and those enumerated under
Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is prohibited. Persons posting the same shall be liable together with the candidates and
other persons who caused the posting. It will be presumed that the candidates and parties caused the posting of campaign materials
outside the common poster areas if they do not remove the same within three (3) days from notice which shall be issued by the
Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful election propaganda are posted or displayed.

Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officeror other officials of the COMELEC shall
apprehend the violators caught in the act, and file the appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of
campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that these are "allowed for all registered political
parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates
seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . ."
Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions show that election propaganda refers
to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the
candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political
parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.

The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party.125 There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of
the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy
against the RH Law. Respondents also cite National Press Club v. COMELEC 126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the
Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech during election period. 127

National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements, limiting political
advertisements to COMELEC-designated space and time. This case was brought by representatives of mass media and two
candidates for office in the 1992 elections. They argued that the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political
advertisements is tantamount to censorship, which necessarily infringes on the freedom of speech of the candidates. 128

This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this case does not apply as
most of the petitioners were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press
Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,129 only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or
television.130 Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision did not infringe upon the right of reporters or broadcasters to air their
commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their qualifications, and program for government. Compared to Sanidadwherein
the columnists lost their ability to give their commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite, National Press Clubdoes not involve
the same infringement.

In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national elections because of the
COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merelya regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for public office. Thus, National
Press Clubdoes not apply to this case.

29
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an"election campaign" as
follows:

....

(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate
for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate;
or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

The foregoing enumerated acts ifperformed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to a
public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election
activity. Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming electionor on attributes of or criticisms
against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of
any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article. (Emphasis supplied)

True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of
the definition is that the act must be "designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office."

In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on
votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.

II.B

The violation of the constitutional right

to freedom of speech and expression

Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their fundamental right to freedom of
expression.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their regulation pursuant to their
mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed notice and letter ordering itsremoval for being oversized
are valid and constitutional.131

II.B.1

Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. 132

No law. . .

While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied
Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.

In Primicias v. Fugoso,133 respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of Manila for the
public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner Primicias. 134 Section 1119 requires a Mayor’s permit for the use of streets and
public places for purposes such as athletic games, sports, or celebration of national holidays. 135 What was questioned was not a law
but the Mayor’s refusal to issue a permit for the holding of petitioner’s public meeting. 136 Nevertheless, this court recognized the
30
constitutional right to freedom of speech, to peaceful assembly and to petition for redress of grievances, albeit not absolute, 137 and
the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted.138

In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 where the COMELEC
resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys.139 The right to freedom of
expression was similarly upheld in this case and, consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside. 140

. . . shall be passed abridging. . .

All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not
mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling
state interest clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society
framed by our Constitution.

. . . of expression. . .

Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of the
press provided in the US Constitution. The word "expression" was added in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having
a wider scope:

MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says: "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the Committee the change of the word "speech" to EXPRESSION;
or if not, add the words AND EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would
refer to means of expression other than speech.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the Committee say?

FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.

MR. BROCKA: Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?

FR. BERNAS: Yes.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.

FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression or of the press
. . . ."141 Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech
must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought." 142

II.B.2

Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.143 Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others,
uses conventional actions because he orshe reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner
intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions." 144 "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by . . .
either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for justification." 145

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic
speech[,]’"146 such that "‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative
element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’" 147

The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and
even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.

In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,148 students who were members of the religious sect Jehovah’s
Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. 149 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of
expression.150 He adds that freedom of speech includes even the right to be silent:

Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the
liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic
manner of communication that conveys its messageas clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot
be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it

31
on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has
no place in the free society.

The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or
eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or
proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as inthis case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less
than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak
when the soul within rebels.151

Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present Constitution,this court has applied its
precedent version to expressions other than verbal utterances.

In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak,152 petitioners objected to the classification of the motion picture "Kapit sa Patalim"
as "For Adults Only." They contend that the classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint
of artistic expression."153 This court recognized that "[m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas
and the expression of the artistic impulse."154 It adds that "every writer,actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he
may use, should be freed from the censor." 155 This court found that "[the Board’s] perception of what constitutes obscenity appears
to be unduly restrictive."156 However, the petition was dismissed solely on the ground that there were not enough votes for a ruling of
grave abuse of discretion in the classification made by the Board. 157

II.B.3

Size does matter

The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in
point.

It is easy to discern why size matters.

First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages from
greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content.
Compared with the pedestrians, the passengers inside moving vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger
the fonts and images, the greater the probability that it will catch their attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will
understand its message.

Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader. From an ordinary person’s
perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more about their message than those who carry their messages in
smaller media. The perceived importance given by the speakers, in this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message.
The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis put by the speakers and onthe credibility of the speakers
themselves. Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to be more convinced of the point made by authoritative figures when
they make the effort to emphasize their messages.

Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify, explain, and
argue points which the speakers might want to communicate. Rather than simply placing the names and images of political candidates
and an expression of support, larger spaces can allow for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates’ platforms for
governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a
more educated and reasoned electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance and
accountability in our government.

These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too often, the
terms of public discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage by brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling
the character of the candidate. Worse, elections sideline political arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather
than provide obstacles to their speech, government should in fact encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter
have the better incentive to demand discussion of the more important issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the former
have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on appearances and empty promises.

Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. 158 They are fundamentally part of expression protected under Article
III, Section 4 of the Constitution.

II.B.4

There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.

32
Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue isa critical, and
indeed defining, feature of a good polity." 159 This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision
making with the participation of all who will beaffected by the decision." 160 It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every
democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. 161 To ensure order in running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were
delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this note, the
theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes
the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.

Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and
encouraged.

Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression;
that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies." 162

In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs."163 This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide
open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 164

Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice
Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:" 165

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.166

The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider, test, and develop their own conclusions." 167 A free,
open, and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This promotes both stability and change where recurring
points may crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing political beliefs
and economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than
for the thought that agrees with us."168 In fact, free speech may "best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." 169 It is in this context that we should guard against
any curtailment of the people’s right to participate in the free trade of ideas.

Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment,"170 among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc, 171 this court
discussed as follows:

The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.172 (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an] important democratic role [in
providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are
largely immune from [any] governmental interference." 173 They also "provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free space
for the development of individual personality, distinct group identity, and dissident ideas - and a potential source of opposition to the
state."174 Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who have similar and shared values and ideals, to join together
and forward common goals.

Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]."175 Federalist framers led by James Madison were concerned about
two potentially vulnerable groups: "the citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by despotic federal
officials"176 and the minorities who may be oppressed by "dominant factions of the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their
own selfish ends[.]"177 According to Madison, "[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." 178 We should strive to ensure that
free speech is protected especially in light of any potential oppression against those who find themselves in the fringes on public
issues.

Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. 179 This provides that "nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce
the likelihood of violence[.]"180 "[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the ‘banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the
walls of restriction’"181 has been used to describe the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets. 182 In order to avoid this situation and
prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. This includes "free
expression and political participation"183 in that they can "vote for candidates who share their views, petition their legislatures to [make

33
or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting other citizens of their concerns[,]" 184 and conduct peaceful rallies and other similar
acts.185 Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression
of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.

II.B.5

Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Respondents argue that the tarpaulinis
election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted
for it.186 As such, it is subject to regulation by COMELEC under its constitutional mandate.187 Election propaganda is defined under
Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows: SECTION 1. Definitions . . .

....

4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or
exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In
broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped
announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political
advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary
estimation.

On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and
candidates."188 They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of
voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those who voted in its favor. 189It was "part of their advocacy campaign against
the RH Law,"190 which was not paid for by any candidate or political party. 191 Thus, "the questioned orders which . . . effectively
restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared unconstitutional and void." 192

This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values."193 These
rights enjoy precedence and primacy.194 In Philippine Blooming Mills, this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom
of expression:

Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by
the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."195 (Citations omitted)

This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage."196 A similar idea appeared in our jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice
Barredo’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC: 197

I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine democracy thrives only where the
power and right of the people toelect the men to whom they would entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the
language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is
a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office
by their votes. And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it tobe self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful
assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or asa means to enjoy the inalienable right of the
qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of
public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at
all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January
to December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those
who would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time.
I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage,
as the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would
be next to useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time. 198 (Emphasis supplied)

Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to
regulation:

Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be
injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant
interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctionshave

34
therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation ofthe permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of
speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are
not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized. 199 (Citations omitted)

We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue," 200 "foster[ing] informed and civicminded deliberation." 201 On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."202 The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. In Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion, he discussed
that "[t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec
Resolution No. 9615."203 He adds that "[w]hile indeed the RH issue, by itself,is not an electoralmatter, the slant that the petitioners
gave the issue converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the plea to support
one and oppose the other."204

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean
it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.

The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act
No. 9006 as an aid to interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case requires, states:

4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or
exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In
broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped
announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political
advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary
estimation. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:

SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:

1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office, and shall include any of the following:

....

Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered acts of election campaigning
or partisan politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials in the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.

In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters should be deemed narrowly tailored
only in relation to the facts and issues in this case. It also appears that such wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not
similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the law it implements.

We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.

As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,205 this court recognized the need for full discussion of public affairs. We acknowledged
that free speech includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of official dom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of
a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. 206

Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, allowing for criticism, save for
some exceptions.207 In the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People,208 this court noted every citizen’s privilege to criticize his or her
government, provided it is "specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the
entire government set-up."209

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The 1927 case of People v. Titular210 involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision "penaliz[ing] the anonymous criticism
of a candidate by means of posters or circulars." 211 This court explained that it is the poster’s anonymous character that is being
penalized.212 The ponente adds that he would "dislike very muchto see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public
opinion."213

In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing214 discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views. According to this court, "[i]ts value
may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensurea true ferment of ideas."215

Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government contributes to every society’s goal for
development. It puts forward matters that may be changed for the better and ideas that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose.
Necessarily, it also makes the government accountable for acts that violate constitutionally protected rights.

In 1998, Osmeña v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling print space
and air time for campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracy-enhancing measure.216This court mentioned how "discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government
established by our Constitution."217

As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of elections when the free exercise
thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are supporting what issues." 218 At the heart of democracy is every advocate’s
right to make known what the people need to know, 219 while the meaningful exercise of one’s right of suffrage includes the right of
every voter to know what they need to know in order to make their choice.

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,220 this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the freedom of expression
especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage:

We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to
people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and
honest.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is
the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. 221(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.

Justice Brion pointed out that freedomof expression "is not the god of rights to which all other rights and even government protection
of state interest must bow."222

The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subjectto some restrictions.
The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.223 Content-based regulations
can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression.

II.B.6

Content-based regulation

COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was made simply because
petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for lawful election propaganda.224

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies only to political speech and not to
other forms of speech such as commercial speech. 225 "[A]ssuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a
mere time, place, and manner regulation, it’s still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally
sanctioned objective."226

The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based.227 Regardless, the disposition of this case
will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based.

As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order applies only to posters and tarpaulins
that may affect the elections because they deliver opinions that shape both their choices. It does not cover, for instance, commercial
speech.

Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will be adjudged as "election
paraphernalia." There are no existing bright lines to categorize speech as election-related and those that are not. This is especially
true when citizens will want to use their resources to be able to raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what
has happened in this case. COMELEC’s discretion to limit speech in this case is fundamentally unbridled.

36
Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.228 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:

A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger
rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposedare neither
overbroad nor vague.229 (Citations omitted)

Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’"230 "Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality." 231

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech."232 In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.233

This court has attempted to define "content-neutral" restraints starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v. Fugoso. 234The ordinance in
this case was construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to determine the public places that may be used for the procession
ormeeting, but not the power to refuse the issuance of a permit for such procession or meeting.235 This court explained that free
speech and peaceful assembly are "not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not beinjurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society." 236

The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams237 involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that prohibited the passing of animal-
drawn vehicles along certain roads at specific hours.238 This court similarly discussed police power in that the assailed rules carry
outthe legislative policy that "aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public."239

As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado 240 recognized that "more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement. . . ."241 It is with this backdrop that the state is justified in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and
manner of the speech.

In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow which include
informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly.242 This would afford the
public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the
standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the opportunity to be heard. 243 This ruling was practically codified in Batas
Pambansa No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.

Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v.
Ermita,244 this court discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and
manner.245 In 2010, this court found in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza 246 that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave
abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first
affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.247

We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.

II.B.7

Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are content-neutral
regulations as these "restrict the mannerby which speech is relayed but not the content of what is conveyed." 248

If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating
such restraints on freedom of speech.249 "When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity," 250 and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.251

This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases. 252 A content-neutral government regulation
is sufficiently justified:

37
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of
speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.253

On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is
protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be
important or substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify the restrictions made.

Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for example, that "the welfare of
children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, 254 constitute a substantial and compelling
government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV broadcast." 255

Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns among candidates in
connection with the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election. 256

Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that "[s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information
campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and their supporters the incentive to post
larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places candidates with more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against
candidates with more humble financial capabilities." 257

First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely express his choice
and exercise his right of free speech." 258 In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course
would be to "try to resolve the tension in a way that protects the right of participation."259

Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only require that the private property owner’s consent be obtained when
posting election propaganda in the property. 260 This is consistent with the fundamental right against deprivation of property without
due process of law.261 The present facts do not involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner.
Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.

Respondents likewise cite the Constitution262 on their authority to recommend effective measures to minimize election spending.
Specifically, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

....

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
(Emphasis supplied) This does not qualify as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the preferred
right to freedom of expression.

The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2’) by three feet (3’) size limitation under Section
6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the Fair Election Act that provides for the same size limitation.263

This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that "[c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression,
any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance." 264 In fact, speech with political consequences, as in
this case, should be encouraged and not curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not serve the objective of
minimizing election spending considering there is no limit on the number of tarpaulins that may be posted. 265

The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at
the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be
demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.

In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the tarpaulin would render
ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.

The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences.
These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.

The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.

The action of the COMELEC in thiscase is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the stature of petitioners and
their message, there are indicators that this will cause a "chilling effect" on robust discussion during elections.

38
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan, "the medium is the
message."266 McLuhan’s colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted that "the materials on which words were written
down have often counted for more than the words themselves."267

III
Freedom of expression and equality

III.A

The possibility of abuse

Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the endorsement of their electoral campaigns.

On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of tarpaulins, posters, or media
advertisements are made ostensibly by "friends" but in reality are really paid for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the
constitutional value that provides for equal opportunities for all candidates.

However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation that confronts us. In such cases, it
will simply be a matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the part of the COMELEC.

The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage
by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to
hide the candidate’s real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on
the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case.
Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.

On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend their own resources in order to
lend support for the campaigns. This may be without agreement between the speaker and the candidate or his or her political party.
In lieu of donating funds to the campaign, they will instead use their resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party
would have doneso. This may effectively skirt the constitutional and statutory limits of campaign spending.

Again, this is not the situation in this case.

The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in their election posters or
media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical
devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be
determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally
— will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.

The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a "literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and
ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies," 268 and this may target any individual or group in society, private and government alike. It
seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used for "political and social criticism"269 "because it tears down facades,
deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty
lampooned and spoofed."270 Northrop Frye, wellknown in this literary field, claimed that satire had two defining features: "one is wit
or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of attack." 271 Thus, satire frequently uses
exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.

The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese
of Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin
caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the
list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of
petitioners to endorse.

The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia from candidates and
political parties are more declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they
usually simply exhort the public to vote for a person with a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example "Vote for
[x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote for [z], Iba kami sa Makati."

This court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment
that entails evaluation of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech. This is especially true when the expression involved
has political consequences. In this case, it hopes to affect the type of deliberation that happens during elections. A becoming humility
on the part of any human institution no matter how endowed with the secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails
that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.

Humanity’s lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance has always been a
libertarian virtue whose version is embedded in our Billof Rights. There are occasional heretics of yesterday that have become our

39
visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given us pause. The unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and comfortably
disregards provides us with the checks upon reality that may soon evolve into creative solutions to grave social problems. This is the
utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part of human necessity to evolve through being able to express or communicate.

However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions which, taken together with the
guarantee of free expression, enhances each other’s value. Among these are the provisions that acknowledge the idea of equality.
In shaping doctrine construing these constitutional values, this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly
tailored guidance fit to the facts as given so as not to unwittingly cause the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as exercised in reality
and, thus, render them meaningless.

III.B.

Speech and equality:

Some considerations We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving priority to
equality vis-à-vis liberty.272

In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality
prevails over speech."273 This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting,
even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued within society’s ideological ladder. 274 This
view acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have
capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of
the majoritarian world like ours.

The question of libertarian tolerance

This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find one’s authentic self or to participate in the self determination of
one’s communities is not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical problematique.

In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how institutionalized
inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as merely "protect[ing] the already
established machinery of discrimination."275 In his view, any improvement "in the normal course of events" within an unequal society,
without subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those in power and control.276

In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become meaningless if not taken in a real
context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In his words:

Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a whole series of synthetic
judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine one’s own life: to be able to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer
and what not. But the subject of this autonomy is never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or happens to
be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is capable of being free with the others. And the problem of making possible such
a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that of finding a compromise between competitors, or between
freedom and law, between general and individual interest, common and private welfare in an established society, but of creating the
society in which man is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In other words, freedom
is still to be created even for the freest of the existing societies. 277 (Emphasis in the original)

Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the people — "implies a
necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must
have access to authentic information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought." 278 He
submits that "[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no longer compete peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational
grounds: the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and delimited by those who determine the national and the individual interest."279 A
slant toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a ‘natural right’ of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use
extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate." 280 Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality that breaks away and
transcends from established hierarchies, power structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as
"repressive tolerance."

Legal scholars

The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for "stringent protections of expressive liberty," 281 especially
by political egalitarians. Considerations such as "expressive, deliberative, and informational interests," 282 costs or the price of
expression, and background facts, when taken together, produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive
liberties.283

Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that "public discussion is a
political duty."284 Cass Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of his twotier model for freedom of expression, thus,

40
warranting stringent protection.285 He defined political speech as "both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue."286

But this is usually related also tofair access to opportunities for such liberties.287 Fair access to opportunity is suggested to mean
substantive equality and not mere formal equalitysince "favorable conditions for realizing the expressive interest will include some
assurance of the resources required for expression and some guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common concern
will not be drowned out by the speech of betterendowed citizens." 288 Justice Brandeis’ solution is to "remedy the harms of speech
with more speech."289 This view moves away from playing down the danger as merely exaggerated, toward "tak[ing] the costs
seriously and embrac[ing] expression as the preferred strategy for addressing them." 290 However, in some cases, the idea of more
speech may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the need for context and "the specification of substantive values
before [equality] has full meaning."291 Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon adds that "equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather
than a substantive sense."292 Thus, more speech can only mean more speech from the few who are dominant rather than those who
are not.

Our jurisprudence

This court has tackled these issues.

Osmeña v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b) ofthe Electoral Reforms Law of
1987.293 This section "prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections." 294 This court explained that this provision only regulates the time and manner of
advertising in order to ensure media equality among candidates. 295 This court grounded this measure on constitutional provisions
mandating political equality:296 Article IX-C, Section 4

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XIII, Section 1

Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priorityto the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reducesocial, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article II, Section 26

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitution’s guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms that take
equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.

The other view

However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality inthe ability of citizens as
speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own
individual evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas
are best left to a freely competitive ideological market." 297 This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as
well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.

The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative language. It uses ‘speech’ as
its subject and not ‘speakers’.298 Consequently, the Constitution protects free speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or
associations of its speakers.299 Pursuant to this, "government must leave speakers and listeners in the private order to their own
devices in sorting out the relative influence of speech." 300

Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of speech includes "not only the right
to express one’s views, but also other cognate rights relevant to the free communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be
informed on matters of public concern."301 She adds:

41
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters and candidates, education, means
of transportation, health, public discussion, private animosities, the weather, the threshold of a voter’s resistance to pressure — the
utmost ventilation of opinion of men and issues, through assembly, association and organizations, both by the candidate and the
voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect the will of the electorate. 302 (Emphasis supplied)

Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech primacy such that"courts, as a rule
are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail speeches with political content," 303 thus:

the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."304

This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ submission "that the market place of ideas is still the best alternative to censorship."305

Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court in the campaign
expenditures case of Buckley v. Valeo "condemned restrictions (even if content-neutral) on expressive liberty imposed in the name
of ‘enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others’ and thereby ‘equaliz[ing] access to the political arena." 306 The majority did not use the
equality-based paradigm.

One flaw of campaign expenditurelimits is that "any limit placed on the amount which a person can speak, which takes out of his
exclusive judgment the decision of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free speech." 307

Another flaw is how "[a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of public information and runs
counter to our ‘profound national commitment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’"308

In fact, "[c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the plight of those without funds in the
first place . . . [and] even if one’s main concern isslowing the increase in political costs, it may be more effective torely on market
forces toachieve that result than on active legal intervention."309 According to Herbert Alexander, "[t]o oppose limitations is not
necessarily to argue that the sky’s the limit [because in] any campaign there are saturation levels and a point where spending no
longer pays off in votes per dollar."310

III. C.

When private speech amounts

to election paraphernalia

The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human potentiality and the effect
of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee
must also take into consideration the effects it will have in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the
cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect of drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a
sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will
have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less. Those who espouse the more popular ideas
will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters of society.To be really heard and understood, the marginalized view
normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.

The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her expression. This view, thus,
restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message content. This
should still be the principal approach.

However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some expression during
electoral campaigns.

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political parties
or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and
National Press Club v. COMELEC.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members
of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections
is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from
the electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount toan election paraphernalia to
be validly regulated by law.

42
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken
as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation
must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored onthe basis of its content. For this purpose, it will notmatter whether the speech is made with or on private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of
petitioners consists of a social advocacy.

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006
and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for
election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain
distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless.
It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.

IV
Right to property

Other than the right to freedom of expression311 and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage,312 the present case also involves
one’s right to property.313

Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating to election propaganda by
applying such regulations to private individuals.314 Certainly, any provision or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not
confronted with this possibility. Respondents agree that the tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also
agreed, during the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither commissioned nor paid by any candidate or political party to post the
material on their walls.

Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use
their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz: 315

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.316 (Citation omitted)

This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is "so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property."317 Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides thatno person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. This court explained:

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution,
in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of
it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s acquisitions without control or diminution save
by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])318

This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden
of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.

Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, except inthe common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person
cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front dooror on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly
never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or
regulation, may do.319 Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property.
The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.

Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where
the expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

43
Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners’ property
rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property
rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election propaganda in private property
without the consent of the owners of such private property. COMELEC has incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent
with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own
private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to property.

V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech

We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice and letter violated the right of
petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.

At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. 320 This takes many forms. Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution, for instance provides:

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the none stablishment clause.322 Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.323

The second aspect is atissue in this case.

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any
secular regulation.324 The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.

The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious expression. This
notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that "the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH
Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings. . . ." 325

The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated by moral, ethical, and
religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts range from belief, to expressions of these faiths,
to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secular character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same
faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any religious bearing.

Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our powers of adjudication
cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in nature.

Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 326 in claiming that the court
"emphatically" held that the adherents ofa particular religion shall be the ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be
considered ecclesiastical in nature.327 This court in Ebralinagexempted Jehovah’s Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony
"out of respect for their religious beliefs, [no matter how] "bizarre" those beliefsmay seem to others." 328 This court found a balance
between the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling necessities of a secular command. It was an early attempt at
accommodation of religious beliefs.

In Estrada v. Escritor,329 this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically intoaccount not to promote the government’s
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the
"government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." 330

This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative
purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.331

As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic
church."332 That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does
not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
44
The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression onthe tarpaulin is an
ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one
of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission 333 cited by petitioners finds
no application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the
jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the Austriacase such as "proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities withattached religious significance." 334

A FINAL NOTE

We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case. However, it was misdirected.

COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral exercise.

The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.Their message may be
construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.

They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."

But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.

That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue — and a complex piece of
legislation at that — can easily be interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may
agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of
petitioners.

Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and non-judgmental. Some may have
expected that the authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and humility.

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that
prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also
in judgment of the acts of others.

Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can often be expressed by
dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean that
their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that they have been expressed in good taste.

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental
law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation
of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have very real secular consequences. Certainly,
provocative messages do matter for the elections.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate
contemporary issues. This is not speechby candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling
candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.

This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial
right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The
act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared
unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000]
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
45
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible
elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-
fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental
problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en
banc Resolution No. 98-1419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body

"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote
during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately."[2] The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact,
the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

The Issues

Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its
agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections." [3]

In his Memorandum,[4] the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2)
prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition[5] is meritorious.

Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and
done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the
people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. [6]

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here,
we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination
of data derived therefrom.

The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before
the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice,[8] when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, [9] when the decision or resolution sought to
be set aside is a nullity,[10] or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.[11]

The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election
itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only

46
is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari is therefore justified.

Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining
the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they
have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an
advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit
polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to report
balanced election-related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen
administrative regions."

It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and
of the press. It submits that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.

Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It
insists that the issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and
credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the
conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds
of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and
anarchy."

Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots,"
as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; [12] and relevant
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. [13] It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not
immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.

The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in
general be manipulated easily. He insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official
tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.

Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the
Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence
on the freedoms of speech and of the press.

Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press

The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands
on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. x x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political
and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."[14]

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. [15] In the landmark
case Gonzales v. Comelec,[16] this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the
people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.[17] It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. [18] It means more
than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in
the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes,[19] we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.

Limitations

The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such
freedoms could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances.[20] They are not immune to regulation
by the State in the exercise of its police power. [21] While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words
and deeds has limitations.

In Cabansag v. Fernandez[22] this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such
freedoms, as follows:

47
 "These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a
number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against
is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. x x x" [23]

"The 'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, x x x may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create
a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary
that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts
be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent."[24]

Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did in its earlier decisions in Primicias v.
Fugoso[25] and American Bible Society v. City of Manila;[26] as well as in later ones, Vera v. Arca,[27] Navarro v. Villegas,[28] Imbong v.
Ferrer,[29] Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec[30] and, more recently, in Iglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB.[31] In setting the standard or test for the
"clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." [32]

A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to
prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time
element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.[33] The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive
as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.[34]

Justification for a Restriction

Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power
to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. [35] And it is respondent's burden to
overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, [36] so it has been said.

To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. [37] Thus:

"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers
an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest."[38]

Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly, stifle
fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. [39]

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of
information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. [40] We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which
would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." [41] When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a
candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and
free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power
to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to
speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.[42]

True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and accessible.
It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in
order to justify a restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting
must far outweigh them.

These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study
influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively
prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research.[43]

Comelec Ban on Exit Polling

In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure
a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of the results
thereof [are] x x x an exercise of press freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a
clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to
sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The
probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present.
In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

48
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants
are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view
of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited
data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises
that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does
not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification
as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. [44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the
voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither
has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder
or confuse the voters.

Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and
unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived
of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.

In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,[46] the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was to prevent the
broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly
tailored to advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative. Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating
voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper
editorials for the reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll
restriction.[47]

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable
ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit
surveys.

For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to
conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters
that the latter may refuse to be interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further
be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials. [48] Additionally, they may be required to
undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together
with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly election.

For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each province;
(2) residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown
by the indelible ink on their fingers, are interviewed; (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released
to the public only on the day after the elections.[49] These precautions, together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be
undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.

With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment
of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls
-- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for
the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.

Violation of Ballot Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the
real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from
exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks
thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of
disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes,
for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot,
however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for
is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures
may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.

49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9,
1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SENATOR ALAN PETER "COMPAÑERO" S. CAYETANO,Petitioner-Intervenor.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 205374
ABC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 205592
MANILA BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. and NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 205852
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS (KBP) and ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206360
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

"The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a 'fundamental postulate of constitutional law.'" 1

Once again the Court is asked to draw a carefully drawn balance in the incessant conflicts between rights and regulations, liberties
and limitations, and competing demands of the different segments of society. Here, we are confronted with the need to strike a
workable and viable equilibrium between a constitutional mandate to maintain free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections,
together with the aim of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates, 2 on one hand, and the imperatives of a republican and democratic
state,3 together with its guaranteed rights of suffrage,4 freedom of speech and of the press,5 and the people's right to information,6 on
the other.

In a nutshell, the present petitions may be seen as in search of the answer to the question - how does the Charter of a republican
and democratic State achieve a viable and acceptable balance between liberty, without which, government becomes an unbearable
tyrant, and authority, without which, society becomes an intolerable and dangerous arrangement?

Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) relative to the conduct
of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with political advertisements. Specifically, the petitions question the constitutionality
of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto,
such as the need to report the same, and the sanctions imposed for violations.

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
(Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their
right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.

The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that candidates may
use for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise known as
the Fair Election Act. Pertinent portions of said provision state, thus:

50
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. - All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media
time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:

xxxx

6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one
hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by
purchase or donation.

b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty ( 60) minutes
of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs
and certificates of performance for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast
for any candidate or political party.

During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes
"per station."7 For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15,
2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements
from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis.

Petitioners ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development Corporation (ABC), GMA Network, Incorporated ( GMA), Manila
Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC), Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (NBN), and Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) are
owners/operators of radio and television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP)
is the national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and television stations and
said stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the provisions of the aforementioned
Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631
amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence,
the present petitions.

All of the petitioners assail the following provisions of the Resolution:

a) Section 7 (d),8 which provides for a penalty of suspension or revocation of an offender's franchise or permit, imposes
criminal liability against broadcasting entities and their officers in the event they sell airtime in excess of the size, duration,
or frequency authorized in the new rules;

b) Section 9 (a),9 which provides for an "aggregate total" airtime instead of the previous "per station" airtime for political
campaigns or dvertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and
appearances; and

c) Section 14,10 which provides for a candidate's "right to reply."

In addition, petitioner ABC also questions Section 1 (4) 11 thereof, which defines the term "political advertisement" or "election
propaganda," while petitioner GMA further assails Section 35, 12 which states that any violation of said Rules shall constitute an
election offense.

On March 15, 2013, Senator Alan Peter S. Cayetano (Petitioner-Intervenor) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
Admit the Petition-in-Intervention, which was granted by the Court per its Resolution dated March 19, 2013. Petitioner-Intervenor also
assails Section 9 (a) of the Resolution changing the interpretation of candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political
campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis. Petitioners allege that Resolutions No. 9615
and 9631, amending the earlier Resolution, are unconstitutional and issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, for the reasons set forth hereunder.

Petitioners posit that Section 9 (a) of the assailed Resolution provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague
meaning for a proper computation of "aggregate total" airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby defeating the
intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006.

Petitioners contend that Section 9 (a), which imposes a notice requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression, and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern

Also, Section 9 (a) is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast
mass media of monitoring a candidate's or political party's aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and criminal
liability.

51
Further, petitioners claim that Section 7 (d) is null and void for unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and penalized as criminal
offenses by R.A. No. 9006.

Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or political party's "right to reply," is likewise assailed to be
unconstitutional for being an improper exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers; for constituting prior restraint and infringing
petitioners' freedom of expression, speech and the press; and for being violative of the equal protection guarantee. In addition to the
foregoing, petitioner GMA further argues that the Resolution was promulgated without public consultations, in violation of petitioners'
right to due process. Petitioner ABC also avers that the Resolution's definition of the terms "political advertisement" and "election
propaganda" suffers from overbreadth, thereby producing a "chilling effect," constituting prior restraint.

On the other hand, respondent posits in its Comment and Opposition13 dated March 8, 2013, that the petition should be denied based
on the following reasons:

Respondent contends that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available to petitioners, because the writ of certiorari is
only available against the COMELEC's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, while the writ of prohibition only lies against the exercise
of judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions. Said writs do not lie against the COMELEC's administrative or rule-making powers.

Respondent likewise alleges that petitioners do not have locus standi, as the constitutional rights and freedoms they enumerate are
not personal to them, rather, they belong to candidates, political parties and the Filipino electorate in general, as the limitations are
imposed on candidates, not on media outlets. It argues that petitioners' alleged risk of exposure to criminal liability is insufficient to
give them legal standing as said "fear of injury" is highly speculative and contingent on a future act.

Respondent then parries petitioners' attack on the alleged infirmities of the Resolution's provisions.

Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would
truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of
levelling the playing field between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without much. Moreover, the
COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the
COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass
media, to wit:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, and equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.

This being the case, then the Resolutions cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

Next, respondent claims that the provisions are not vague because the assailed Resolutions have given clear and adequate
mechanisms to protect broadcast stations from potential liability arising from a candidate's or party's violation of airtime limits by
putting in the proviso that the station "may require buyer to warrant under oath that such purchase [of airtime] is not in excess of size,
duration or frequency authorized by law or these rules." Furthermore, words should be understood in the sense that they have in
common usage, and should be given their ordinary meaning. Thus, in the provision for the right to reply, "charges" against candidates
or parties must be understood in the ordinary sense, referring to accusations or criticisms.

Respondent also sees no prior restraint in the provisions requiring notice to the COMELEC for appearances or guestings of
candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It points out that the fact that notice may be given 24 hours after first broadcast only proves
that the mechanism is for monitoring purposes only, not for censorship. Further, respondent argues, that for there to be prior restraint,
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression must be done in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Moreover, petitioners are only required to inform the COMELEC of candidates'/parties' guestings, but there is no
regulation as to the content of the news or the expressions in news interviews or news documentaries. Respondent then emphasized
that the Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech and the press may be limited in light of the duty of the COMELEC to ensure
equal access to opportunities for public service.

With regard to the right to reply provision, respondent also does not consider it as restrictive of the airing of bona fide news broadcasts.
More importantly, it stressed, the right to reply is enshrined in the Constitution, and the assailed Resolutions provide that said right
can only be had after going through administrative due process. The provision was also merely lifted from Section 10 of R.A. No.
9006, hence, petitioner ABC is actually attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9006, which cannot be done through a collateral
attack.

Next, respondent counters that there is no merit to ABC's claim that the Resolutions' definition of "political advertisement" or "election
propaganda" suffers from overbreadth, as the extent or scope of what falls under said terms is clearly stated in Section 1 (4) of
Resolution No. 9615.

52
It is also respondent's view that the nationwide aggregate total airtime does not violate the equal protection clause, because it does
not make any substantial distinctions between national and regional and/or local broadcast stations, and even without the aggregate
total airtime rule, candidates and parties are likely to be more inclined to advertise in national broadcast stations. Respondent likewise
sees no merit in petitioners' claim that the Resolutions amount to taking of private property without just compensation. Respondent
emphasizes that radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals; they are merely given the temporary privilege to use the same. Since they are merely enjoying a privilege, the
same may be reasonably burdened with some form of public service, in this case, to provide candidates with the opportunity to reply
to charges aired against them.

Lastly, respondent contends that the public consultation requirement does not apply to constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC, pursuant to Section 1, Chapter I, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. Indeed, Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of
said Code provides, thus:

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.

However, Section 1, Chapter 1, Book VII of said Code clearly provides:

Section 1. Scope. -This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the
Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed
Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges.

Nevertheless, even if public participation is not required, respondent still conducted a meeting with representatives of the KBP and
various media outfits on December 26, 2012, almost a month before the issuance of Resolution No. 9615.

On April 2, 2013, petitioner GMA filed its Reply,14 where it advanced the following counter-arguments:

According to GMA, a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to question the herein assailed Resolutions, which should be
considered as a "decision, order or ruling of the Commission" as mentioned in Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides:

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari,· and Time to File. - Unless otherwise provided by law, or by any specific provisions in these Rules,
any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days from its promulgation.

GMA further stressed that this case involves national interest, and the urgency of the matter justifies its resort to the remedy of a
petition for certiorari.

Therefore, GMA disagrees with the COMELEC's position that the proper remedy is a petition for declaratory relief because such
action only asks the court to make a proper interpretation of the rights of parties under a statute or regulation. Such a petition does
not nullify the assailed statute or regulation, or grant injunctive relief, which petitioners are praying for in their petition. Thus, GMA
maintains that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.

GMA further denies that it is making a collateral attack on the Fair Election Act, as it is not attacking said law. GMA points out that it
has stated in its petition that the law in fact allows the sale or donation of airtime for political advertisements and does not impose
criminal liability against radio and television stations. What it is assailing is the COMELEC's erroneous interpretation of the law's
provisions by declaring such sale and/or donation of airtime unlawful, which is contrary to the purpose of the Fair Election Act.

GMA then claims that it has legal standing to bring the present suit because:

x x x First, it has personally suffered a threatened injury in the form of risk of criminal liability because of the alleged unconstitutional
and unlawful conduct of respondent COMELEC in expanding what was provided for in R.A. No. 9006. Second, the injury is traceable
to the challenged action of respondent COMELEC, that is, the issuance of the assailed Resolutions. Third, the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy sought in petitioner GMA's Petition, among others, for the Honorable Court to nullify the challenged pertinent
provisions of the assailed Resolutions.15

On substantive issues, GMA first argues that the questioned Resolutions are contrary to the objective and purpose of the Fair Election
Act. It points out that the Fair Election Act even repealed the political ad ban found in the earlier law, R.A. No. 6646. The Fair Election
Act also speaks of "equal opportunity" and "equal access,'' but said law never mentioned equalizing the economic station of the rich
and the poor, as a declared policy. Furthermore, in its opinion, the supposed correlation between candidates' expenditures for TV
ads and actually winning the elections, is a mere illusion, as there are other various factors responsible for a candidate's winning the
election. GMA then cites portions of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the bills that led to the enactment
of the Fair Election Act, and alleges that this shows the legislative intent that airtime allocation should be on a "per station" basis.
Thus, GMA claims it was arbitrary and a grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to issue the present Resolutions imposing
airtime limitations on an "aggregate total" basis.

53
It is likewise insisted by GMA that the assailed Resolutions impose an unconstitutional burden on them, because their failure to strictly
monitor the duration of total airtime that each candidate has purchased even from other stations would expose their officials to criminal
liability and risk losing the station's good reputation and goodwill, as well as its franchise. It argues that the wordings of the Resolutions
belie the COMELEC's claim that petitioners would only incur liability if they "knowingly" sell airtime beyond the limits imposed by the
Resolutions, because the element of knowledge is clearly absent from the provisions thereof. This makes the provisions have the
nature of malum prohibitum.

Next, GMA also says that the application of the aggregate airtime limit constitutes prior restraint and is unconstitutional, opining that
"[t]he reviewing power of respondent COMELEC and its sole judgment of a news event as a political advertisement are so pervasive
under the assailed Resolutions, and provoke the distastes or chilling effect of prior restraint"16 as even a legitimate exercise of a
constitutional right might expose it to legal sanction. Thus, the governmental interest of leveling the playing field between rich and
poor candidates cannot justify the restriction on the freedoms of expression, speech and of the press.

On the issue of lack of prior public participation, GMA cites Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code, pertinent portions of which
provide, thus:

Section 82. Lawful election propaganda. - Lawful election propaganda shall include:

xxxx

All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested
parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's
authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week
after the authorization has been granted.

There having been no prior public consultation held, GMA contends that the COMELEC is guilty of depriving petitioners of its right to
due process of law.

GMA then concludes that it is also entitled to a temporary restraining order, because the implementation of the Resolutions in question
will cause grave and irreparable damage to it by disrupting and emasculating its mandate to provide television and radio services to
the public, and by exposing it to the risk of incurring criminal and administrative liability by requiring it to perform the impossible task
of surveillance and monitoring, or the broadcasts of other radio and television stations.

Thereafter, on April 4, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Supplemental Comment and
Opposition17 where it further expounded on the legislative intent behind the Fair Election Act, also quoting portions of the deliberations
of the Bicameral Conference Committee, allegedly adopting the Senate Bill version setting the computation of airtime limits on a per
candidate, not per station, basis. Thus, as enacted into law, the wordings of Section 6 of the Fair Election Act shows that the airtime
limit is imposed on a per candidate basis, rather than on a per station basis. Furthermore, the COMELEC states that petitioner
intervenor Senator Cayetano is wrong in arguing that there should be empirical data to support the need to change the computation
of airtime limits from a per station basis to a per candidate basis, because nothing in law obligates the COMELEC to support its
Resolutions with empirical data, as said airtime limit was a policy decision dictated by the legislature itself, which had the necessary
empirical and other data upon which to base said policy decision.

The COMELEC then points out that Section 2 (7),18 Article IX (C) of the Constitution empowers it to recommend to Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending and in furtherance of such constitutional power, the COMELEC issued the questioned
Resolutions, in faithful implementation of the legislative intent and objectives of the Fair Election Act.

The COMELEC also dismisses Senator Cayetano's fears that unauthorized or inadvertent inclusion of his name, initial, image, brand,
logo, insignia and/or symbol in tandem advertisements will be charged against his airtime limits by pointing out that what will be
counted against a candidate's airtime and expenditures are those advertisements that have been paid for or donated to them to which
the candidate has given consent.

With regard to the attack that the total aggregate airtime limit constitutes prior restraint or undue abridgement of the freedom of
speech and expression, the COMELEC counters that "the Resolutions enjoy constitutional and congressional imprimatur. It is the
Constitution itself that imposes the restriction on the freedoms of speech and expression, during election period, to promote an
important and significant governmental interest, which is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situation of rich and poor candidates
by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign 'war chests."' 19

Lastly, the COMELEC also emphasizes that there is no impairment of the people's right to information on matters of public concern,
because in this case, the COMELEC is not withholding access to any public record.

On April 16, 2013, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order20 (TRO) in view of the urgency involved and to prevent irreparable
injury that may be caused to the petitioners if respondent COMELEC is not enjoined from implementing Resolution No. 9615.

On April 19, 2013 respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Early Resolution of the
Consolidated Petitions.21

54
On May 8, 2013, petitioners ABS-CBN and the KBP filed its Opposition/Comment22 to the said Motion. Not long after, ABC followed
suit and filed its own Opposition to the Motion23 filed by the respondent.

In the interim, respondent filed a Second Supplemental Comment and Opposition 24 dated April 8, 2013.

In the Second Supplemental Comment and Opposition, respondent delved on points which were not previously discussed in its earlier
Comment and Supplemental Comment, particularly those raised in the petition filed by petitioner ABS-CBN and KBP.

Respondent maintains that certiorari in not the proper remedy to question the Constitutionality of the assailed Resolutions and that
petitioners ABS-CBN and KBP have no locus standi to file the present petition.

Respondent posits that contrary to the contention of petitioners, the legislative history of R.A. No. 9006 conclusively shows that
congress intended the airtime limits to be computed on a "per candidate" and not on a "per station" basis. In addition, the legal duty
of monitoring lies with the COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in
ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits.

Also, as discussed in the earlier Comment, the prior notice requirement is a mechanism designed to inform the COMELEC of the
appearances or guesting of candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It is for monitoring purposes only, not censorship. It does not
control the subject matter of news broadcasts in anyway. Neither does it prevent media outlets from covering candidates in news
interviews, news events, and news documentaries, nor prevent the candidates from appearing thereon.

As for the right to reply, respondent insists that the right to reply provision cannot be considered a prior restraint on the freedoms of
expression, speech and the press, as it does not in any way restrict the airing of bona fide new broadcasts. Media entities are free to
report any news event, even if it should turn out to be unfavourable to a candidate or party. The assailed Resolutions merely give the
candidate or party the right to reply to such charges published or aired against them in news broadcasts.

Moreover, respondent contends that the imposition of the penalty of suspension and revocation of franchise or permit for the sale or
donation of airtime beyond the allowable limits is sanctioned by the Omnibus Election Code.

Meanwhile, RMN filed its Petition on April 8, 2013. On June 4, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution 25 consolidating the case with the
rest of the petitions and requiring respondent to comment thereon.

On October 10, 2013, respondent filed its Third Supplemental Comment and Opposition. 26 Therein, respondent stated that the petition
filed by RMN repeats the issues that were raised in the previous petitions. Respondent, likewise, reiterated its arguments that
certiorari in not the proper remedy to question the assailed resolutions and that RMN has no locus standi to file the present petition.
Respondent maintains that the arguments raised by RMN, like those raised by the other petitioners are without merit and that RMN
is not entitled to the injunctive relief sought.

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, although the subject of the present petit10ns are Resolutions promulgated by the COMELEC relative to the conduct of
the 2013 national and local elections, nevertheless the issues raised by the petitioners have not been rendered moot and academic
by the conclusion of the 2013 elections. Considering that the matters elevated to the Court for resolution are susceptible to repetition
in the conduct of future electoral exercises, these issues will be resolved in the present action.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

Matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are
presented before the Court. So the Court does again in this particular case.

Proper Remedy

Respondent claims that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies that petitioners have taken to question the assailed
Resolutions of the COMELEC. Technically, respondent may have a point. However, considering the very important and pivotal issues
raised, and the limited time, such technicality should not deter the Court from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. "[T]his Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions
despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance of the tile issues raised therein.27

It has been in the past, we do so again.

Locus Standi

Every time a constitutional issue is brought before the Court, the issue of locus standi is raised to question the personality of the
parties invoking the Court's jurisdiction. The Court has routinely made reference to a liberalized stance when it comes to petitions

55
raising issues of transcendental importance to the country. Invariably, after some discussions, the Court would eventually grant
standing.28

In this particular case, respondent also questions the standing of the petitioners. We rule for the petitioners. For petitioner-intervenor
Senator Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since he is a candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by
the assailed Resolutions.

For the broadcast companies, they similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury they may suffer relative to their ability to
carry out their tasks of disseminating information because of the burdens imposed on them. Nevertheless, even in regard to the
broadcast companies invoking the injury that may be caused to their customers or the public - those who buy advertisements and
the people who rely on their broadcasts - what the Court said in White Light Corporation v. City of Manila 29 may dispose of the
question. In that case, there was an issue as to whether owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates may have the requisite
standing on behalf of their patrons' equal protection claims relative to an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibited "short-time"
or "wash-up" accommodation in motels and similar establishments. The Court essentially condensed the issue in this manner: "[T]he
crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
protection rights."30 The Court then went on to hold:

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action
challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of
separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its
co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. The constitutional
component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction,
the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.
In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party
standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. x x
x

xxxx

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-ininterest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the
fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. x x x

xxxx

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the
overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the
rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a
statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a
sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance
suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments
for a "wash-rate" time frame.31

If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason
should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of candidates
and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners
on that basis.

SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS

Aggregate Time Limits

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime
limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media
of broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious
that there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and political parties would be able to
campaign through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds
that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.

56
a. Past elections and airtime limits

The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006 [2001]) 32 - one hundred
(120) minutes of television advertisement and one-hundred· eighty (180) minutes for radio advertisement. For the 2004 elections, the
respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6520 33 implementing the airtime limits by applying said limitation on a per station
basis.34 Such manner of determining airtime limits was likewise adopted for the 2007 elections, through Resolution No. 7767.35 In the
2010 elections, under Resolution No. 8758, 36 the same was again adopted. But for the 2013 elections, the COMELEC, through
Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, chose to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different broadcast
media, thus: Section 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. - All parties and
bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda during the campaign period
subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:

a. Broadcast Election Propaganda

The duration of an air time that a candidate, or party may use for their broadcast advertisements or election propaganda shall be, as
follows:

For Not more than an aggregate total

Candidates/Registered
Political parties for a
National Elective Position
For
Candidates/Registered
Political parties for a Local
Elective Position
of one hundred (120) minutes of
television advertising, whether
appearing on national, regional,
or local, free or cable television,
and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes of radio advertising,
whether airing on national,
regional, or local radio, whether
by purchase or donation
Not more than an aggregate total
of sixty (60) minutes of television
advertising, whether appearing
on national, regional, or local,
free or cable television, and
ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertising, whether airing on
national, regional, or local radio,
whether by purchase or
donation.

In cases where two or more candidates or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos, insignias, color motifs, symbols, or
forms of graphical representations are displayed, exhibited, used, or mentioned together in the broadcast election propaganda or
advertisements, the length of time during which they appear or are being mentioned or promoted will be counted against the airtime
limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and the cost of the said advertisement will likewise be considered as their expenditures,
regardless of whoever paid for the advertisements or to whom the said advertisements were donated.

x x x x37

Corollarily, petitioner-intervenor, Senator Cayetano, alleges:

6.15. The change in the implementation of Section 6 of R.A. 9006 was undertaken by respondent Comelec without consultation with
the candidates for the 2013 elections, affected parties such as media organizations, as well as the general public. Worse, said change
was put into effect without explaining the basis therefor and without showing any data in support of such change. Respondent
Comelec merely maintained that such action "is meant to level the playing field between the moneyed candidates and those who don
i have enough resources," without particularizing the empirical data upon which such a sweeping statement was based. This was
evident in the public hearing held on 31 January 2013 where petitioner GMA, thru counsel, explained that no empirical data on he
excesses or abuses of broadcast media were brought to the attention of the public by respondent Comelec, or even stated in the
Comelec

Resolution No. 9615. Thus –

xxxx

Chairman Brillantes

So if we can regulate and amplify, we may amplify meaning we can expand if we want to. But the authority of the Commission is if
we do not want to amplify and we think that the 120 or 180 is okay we cannot be compelled to amplify. We think that 120 or 180 is
okay, is enough.
57
Atty. Lucila

But with due respect Your Honor, I think the basis of the resolution is found in the law and the law has been enterpreted (sic) before
in 2010 to be 120 per station, so why the change, your Honor?

Chairman Brillantes

No, the change is not there, the right to amplify is with the Commission on Elections. Nobody can encroach in our right to amplify.
Now, if in 2010 the Commission felt that per station or per network is the rule then that is the prerogative of the Commission then
they could amplify it to expand it. If the current Commission feels that 120 is enough for the particular medium like TV and 180 for
radio, that is our prerogative. How can you encroach and what is unconstitutional about it?

Atty. Lucila

We are not questioning the authority of the Honorable Commission to regulate Your Honor, we are just raising our concern on the
manner of regulation because as it is right now, there is a changing mode or sentiments of the Commission and the public has the
right to know, was there rampant overspending on political ads in 2010, we were not informed Your Honor. Was there abuse of the
media in 2010, we were not informed Your Honor. So we would like to know what is the basis of the sudden change in this limitation,
Your Honor .. And law must have a consistent interpretation that [is]our position, Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

But my initial interpretation, this is personal to this representation counsel, is that if the Constitution allows us to regulate and then it
gives us the prerogative to amplify then the prerogative to amplify you should leave this to the discretion of the Commission. Which
means if previous Commissions felt that expanding it should be part of our authority that was a valid exercise if we reduce it to what
is provided for by law which is 120-180 per medium, TV, radio, that is also within the law and that is still within our prerogative as
provided for by the Constitution. If you say we have to expose the candidates to the public then I think the reaction should come, the
negative reaction should come from the candidates not from the media, unless you have some interest to protect directly. Is there
any interest on the part of the media to expand it?

Atty. Lucila

Well, our interest Your Honor is to participate in this election Your Honor and we have been constantly (sic) as the resolution says
and even in the part involved because you will be getting some affirmative action time coming from the media itself and Comelec
time coming from the media itself. So we could like to be both involved in the whole process of the exercise of the freedom of suffrage
Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

Yes, but the very essence of the Constitutional provision as well as the provision of 9006 is actually to level the playing field. That
should be the paramount consideration. If we allow everybody to make use of all their time and all radio time and TV time then there
will be practically unlimited use of the mass media ....

Atty. Lucila

Was there in 2010 Your Honor, was there any data to support that there was an unlimited and abuse of a (sic) political ads in the
mass media that became the basis of this change in interpretation Your Honor? We would like to know about it Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

What do you think there was no abuse in 201 O?

Atty. Lucila

As far as the network is concern, there was none Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

There was none ..... .

Atty. Lucila

I'm sorry, Your Honor ...

58
Chairman Brillantes

Yes, there was no abuse, okay, but there was some advantage given to those who took ... who had the more moneyed candidates
took advantage of it.

Atty. Lucila

But that is the fact in life, Your Honor there are poor candidates, there are rich candidates. No amount of law or regulation can even
level the playing filed (sic) as far as the economic station in life of the candidates are concern (sic) our Honor.38

Given the foregoing observations about what happened during the hearing, Petitioner-Intervenor went on to allege that:

6.16. Without any empirical data upon which to base the regulatory measures in Section 9 (a), respondent Comelec arbitrarily
changed the rule from per station basis to aggregate airtime basis. Indeed, no credence should be given to the cliched explanation
of respondent Comelec (i.e. leveling the playing field) in its published statements which in itself is a mere reiteration of the rationale
for the enactment of the political ad ban of Republic Act No. 6646, and which has likewise been foisted when said political ad ban
was lifted by R.A. 9006.39

From the foregoing, it does appear that the COMELEC did not have any other basis for coming up with a new manner of determining
allowable time limits except its own idea as to what should be the maximum number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion
as to how to level the playing field. The same could be encapsulized in the remark of the COMELEC Chairman that "if the Constitution
allows us to regulate and then it gives us the prerogative to amplify then the prerogative to amplify you should leave this to the
discretion of the Commission."40

The Court could not agree with what appears as a nonchalant exercise of discretion, as expounded anon.

b. COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis for changing the interpretation and implementation of the airtime limits

There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot
exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels
that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must
be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has
consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be
properly explained with sufficient basis.

Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after it had already promulgated the Resolution, the respondent
did not fully explain or justify the change in computing the airtime allowed candidates and political parties, except to make reference
to the need to "level the playing field." If the "per station" basis was deemed enough to comply with that objective in the past, why
should it now be suddenly inadequate? And, the short answer to that from the respondent, in a manner which smacks of overbearing
exercise of discretion, is that it is within the discretion of the COMELEC. As quoted in the transcript, "the right to amplify is with the
COMELEC. Nobody can encroach in our right to amplify. Now, if in 2010 the Commission felt that per station or per network is the
rule then that is the prerogative of the Commission then they could amplify it to expand it. If the current Commission feels that 120 is
enough for the particular medium like TV and 180 for radio, that is our prerogative. How can you encroach and what is unconstitutional
about it?"41

There is something basically wrong with that manner of explaining changes in administrative rules. For one, it does not really provide
a good basis for change. For another, those affected by such rules must be given a better explanation why the previous rules are no
longer good enough. As the Court has said in one case:

While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that the NTC slavishly follow precedent.
However, we think it essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently
with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or ?f need be, why the previous standards should
no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational
basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.42

What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and accountability which elevates administrative
rules to the level of respectability and acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and
rational basis for any changes in those rules by which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the
previous ones.

c. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting "aggregate" basis in the determination of allowable
airtime

The law, which is the basis of the regulation subject of these petitions, pertinently provides:

59
6.2. (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one
hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by
purchase or donation.

(b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes
of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation; x x x

The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality of possible
broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime
allowed - that it should be on a "per station" basis.43

This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the previous provision, Section ll(b)
of Republic Act No. 6646,44 which prohibited direct political advertisements -the so-called "political ad ban." If under the previous law,
no candidate was allowed to directly buy or procure on his own his broadcast or print campaign advertisements, and that he must
get it through the COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, R.A. No. 9006 relieved him or her from that restriction and allowed him or
her to broadcast time or print space subject to the limitations set out in the law. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 9006, felt that the
previous law was not an effective and efficient way of giving voice to the people. Noting the debilitating effects of the previous law on
the right of suffrage and Philippine democracy, Congress decided to repeal such rule by enacting the Fair Election Act.

In regard to the enactment of the new law, taken in the context of the restrictive nature of the previous law, the sponsorship speech
of Senator Raul Roco is enlightening:

The bill seeks to repeal Section 85 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sections 10 and 11 of RA 6646. In view of the importance of
their appeal in connection with the thrusts of the bill, I hereby quote these sections in full:

"SEC. 85. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. - It shall be unlawful:

"(a) To print, publish, post or distribute any poster, pamphlet, circular, handbill, or printed matter urging voters to
vote for or against any candidate unless they hear the names and addresses of the printed and payor as required
in Section 84 hereof;

"(b) To erect, put up, make use of, attach, float or display any billboard, tinplate-poster, balloons and the like, of
whatever size, shape, form or kind, advertising for or against any candidate or political party;

"(c) To purchase, manufacture, request, distribute or accept electoral propaganda gadgets, such as pens, lighters,
fans of whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, shirts, hats, bandannas, matches,
cigarettes and the like, except that campaign supporters accompanying a candidate shall be allowed to wear hats
and/or shirts or T-shirts advertising a candidate;

"(d) To show or display publicly any advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate by means of
cinematography, audio-visual units or other screen projections except telecasts which may be allowed as
hereinafter provided; and

"(e) For any radio broadcasting or television station to sell or give free of charge airtime for campaign and other
political purposes except as authorized in this Code under the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission pursuant thereto;

"Any prohibited election propaganda gadget or advertisement shall be stopped, confiscated or tom down by the representative of the
Commission upon specific authority of the Commission." "SEC. 10. Common Poster Areas. - The Commission shall designate
common poster areas in strategic public places such as markets, barangay centers and the like wherein candidates can post, display
or exhibit election propaganda to announce or further their candidacy.

"Whenever feasible, common billboards may be installed by the Commission and/or non-partisan private or civic organizations which
the Commission may authorize whenever available, after due notice and hearing, in strategic areas where it may readily be seen or
read, with the heaviest pedestrian and/or vehicular traffic in the city or municipality.

The space in such common poster areas or billboards shall be allocated free of charge, if feasible, equitably and impartially among
the candidates in the province, city or municipality. "SEC. 11. Prohibite,d Forms of Election Propaganda. - In addition to the forms of
election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write,
post, display or puolicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private or public, except in common poster areas
and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters
of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three
(3) feet in area; Provided, further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two
(2) feet and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and
shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; and

60
"(b) For any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media
to sell or give for free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Big. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign."

The repeal of the provision on the Common Poster Area implements the strong recommendations of the Commission on Elections
during the hearings. It also seeks to apply the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Blo Umpar Adiong vs.
Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712, 31 March 1992. Here a unanimous Supreme Court ruled: The COMELEC's prohibition on
the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except [in] designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

For the foregoing reasons, we commend to our colleagues the early passage of Senate Bill No. 1742. In so doing, we move one step
towards further ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections" as mandated by the Constitution. 45

Given the foregoing background, it is therefore ineluctable to conclude that Congress intended to provide a more expansive and
liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be
given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a
chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates. In this regard, the media is also given a very important part in that
undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an interactive process. All of these would be undermined
and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the respondent came up with.

The respondent gave its own understanding of the import of the legislative deliberations on the adoption of R.A. No. 9006 as follows:

The legislative history of R.A. 9006 clearly shows that Congress intended to impose the per candidate or political party aggregate
total airtime limits on political advertisements and election propaganda. This is evidenced by the dropping of the "per day per station"
language embodied in both versions of the House of Representatives and Senate bills in favour of the "each candidate" and "not
more than" limitations now found in Section 6 of R.A. 9006.

The pertinent portions of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742 read as follows:

House Bill No. 9000:

SEC. 4. Section 86 of the same Batas is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 86. Regulation of Election Propaganda Through Mass Media.

xxx xxx xxx

A) The total airtime available to the candidate and political party, whether by purchase or by donation, shall be limited to five (5)
minutes per day in each television, cable television and radio stations during the applicable campaign period.

Senate Bill No. 1742:

SEC. 5. Equal Access to Media Space and Time. -All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media
space and time. The following guidelines may be amplified by the COMELEC.

xxx xxx xxx

2. The total airtime available for each registered party and bona fide candidate whether by purchase or donation shall not exceed a
total of one (1) minute per day per television or radio station. (Emphasis supplied.)

As Section 6 of R.A. 9006 is presently worded, it can be clearly seen that the legislature intended the aggregate airtime limits to be
computed on per candidate or party basis. Otherwise, if the legislature intended the computation to be on per station basis, it could
have left the original "per day per station" formulation.46

The Court does not agree. It cannot bring itself to read the changes in the bill as disclosing an intent that the COMELEC wants this
Court to put on the final language of the law. If anything, the change in language meant that the computation must not be based on
a "per day" basis for each television or radio station. The same could not therefore lend itself to an understanding that the total
allowable time is to be done on an aggregate basis for all television or radio stations. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went
beyond its legal mandate when it provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to implement. As we
held in Lakin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:47

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the
law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issued for that purpose should always be in accord with the law to be
61
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself
cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 48

In the case of Lakin, Jr., the COMELEC's explanation that the Resolution then in question did not add anything but merely reworded
and rephrased the statutory provision did not persuade the Court. With more reason here since the COMELEC not only reworded or
rephrased the statutory provision - it practically replaced it with its own idea of what the law should be, a matter that certainly is not
within its authority. As the Court said in Villegas v. Subido: 49

One last word. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is
merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted
with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers
from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be
conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." Neither the high dignity of the
office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an
eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.50

So it was then. So does the rule still remains the same.

d. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes against the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
expression, of speech and of the press

The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And where there is a
need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the
press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a
token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the
audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime
limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. "[F]reedom of speech, of expression,
and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy."51 Accordingly, the
same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest.

In regard to limitations on political speech relative to other state interests, an American case observed:

A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally
necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media
for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.

The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial, rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and
diversity of political speech. The $1,000 ceiling on spending "relative to a clearly identified candidate," 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l) (1970
ed., Supp. IV), would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from
any significant use of the most effective modes of communication. Although the Act's limitations on expenditures by campaign
organizations and political parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they would have required restrictions
in the scope of a number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by
candidates who raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling.52

Section 9 (a) ofCOMELEC Resolution No. 9615 comes up with what is challenged as being an unreasonable basis for determining
the allowable air time that candidates and political parties may avail of. Petitioner GMA came up with its analysis of the practical
effects of such a regulation:

5.8. Given the reduction of a candidate's airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA estimates that a national
candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period
of 88 days, or will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his political advertisements
in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have 27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely
translates to 1 advertisement spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.

5.9. With a 20-hour programming per day and considering the limits of a station's coverage, it will be difficult for 1 advertising
spot to make a sensible and feasible communication to the public, or in political propaganda, to "make known [a candidate's]
qualifications and stand on public issues".
62
 5.10 If a candidate loads all of his 81.81 seconds per day in one network, this will translate to barely three 30-second
advertising spots in television on a daily basis using the same assumptions above.

5.11 Based on the data from the 2012 Nielsen TV audience measurement in Mega Manila, the commercial advertisements
in television are viewed by only 39.2% of the average total day household audience if such advertisements are placed with
petitioner GMA, the leading television network nationwide and in Mega Manila. In effect, under the restrictive aggregate
airtime limits in the New Rules, the three 30-second political advertisements of a candidate in petitioner GMA will only be
communicated to barely 40% of the viewing audience, not even the voting population, but only in Mega Manila, which is
defined by AGB Nielsen Philippines to cover Metro Manila and certain urban areas in the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite,
Laguna, Rizal, Batangas and Pampanga. Consequently, given the voting population distribution and the drastically reduced
supply of airtime as a result of the New Rules' aggregate airtime limits, a national candidate will be forced to use all of his
airtime for political advertisements in television only in urban areas such as Mega Manila as a political campaign tool to
achieve maximum exposure.

5.12 To be sure, the people outside of Mega Manila or other urban areas deserve to be informed of the candidates in the
national elections, and the said candidates also enjoy the right to be voted upon by these informed populace. 53

The Court agrees. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped
its wings.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that
the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens
across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might
also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more
readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate
to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.

Respondent itself states that "[t]elevision is arguably the most costeffective medium of dissemination. Even a slight increase in
television exposure can significantly boost a candidate's popularity, name recall and electability." 54 If that be so, then drastically
curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail his freedom to speak as a means
of connecting with the people.

Finally on this matter, it is pertinent to quote what Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion in the landmark Pentagon Papers
case: "In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our
democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished
so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of
government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government." 55

In the ultimate analysis, when the press is silenced, or otherwise muffled in its undertaking of acting as a sounding board, the people
ultimately would be the victims.

e. Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage

Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the
choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people
to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright. It was said that:

x x x As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form
devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far
as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever possible it is
the solemn duty of the judiciary, when called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This,
fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. x
x x56 It has also been said that "[ c ]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms."57 Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space - including the means to disseminate
their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which the respondent implemented the time
limits in regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media.

f. Resolution No. 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption

63
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up with a public hearing on January 31, 2013 to
explain what it had done, particularly on the aggregate-based air time limits. This circumstance also renders the new regulation,
particularly on the adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limit, questionable. It must not be overlooked that the new Resolution
introduced a radical change in the manner in which the rules on airtime for political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there
is a need for adequate and effective means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this regard, it is not
enough that they be published - or explained - after they have been adopted.

While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative agency under the Executive Department,
rules which apply to the latter must also be deemed to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of administrative convenience
but as a dictate of due process. And this assumes greater significance considering the important and pivotal role that the COMELEC
plays in the life of the nation. Thus, whatever might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 58 should
also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to promulgating rules and regulations which adversely affect, or impose
a heavy and substantial burden on, the citizenry in a matter that implicates the very nature of government we have adopted:

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force
and effect of law.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular
cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely
as construing Section 142(c)(l) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope
Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to
thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally
manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. x x x In so doing, the BIR
not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. 59

For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule
on aggregate airtime is declared defective and ineffectual.

g. Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry

It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically in relation to its substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation
must be reasonable in its operations and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to the
purpose or objective of the government in a manner that would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry.
Petitioner GMA assails certain requirements imposed on broadcast stations as unreasonable. It explained:

5.40 Petitioner GMA currently operates and monitors 21 FM and AM radio stations nationwide and 8 originating television
stations (including its main transmitter in Quezon City) which are authorized to dechain national programs for airing and
insertion of local content and advertisements.

5.41 In light of the New Rules wherein a candidate's airtime minutes are applied on an aggregate basis and considering that
said Rules declare it unlawful in Section 7( d) thereof for a radio, television station or other mass media to sell or give for
free airtime to a candidate in excess of that allowed by law or by said New Rules:

"Section 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda -During the campaign period, it is unlawful: x x x x x x x x x

(d) for any newspaper or publication, radio, television or cable television station, or other mass media, or any person making
use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or election propaganda purposes
to any candidate or party in excess of the size, duration or frequency authorized by law or these rules;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

petitioner GMA submits that compliance with the New Rules in order to avoid administrative or criminal liability would be
unfair, cruel and oppressive.

x x x x.

5.43 In the present situation wherein airtime minutes shall be shared by all television and radio stations, broadcast mass
media organizations would surely encounter insurmountable difficulties in monitoring the airtime minutes spent by the
numerous candidates for various elective positions, in real time.

64
 5.44 An inquiry with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) bears out that there are 372 television stations
and 398 AM and 800 FM radio stations nationwide as of June 2012. In addition, there are 1, 113 cable TV providers
authorized by the NTC to operate within the country as of the said date.

5.45 Given such numbers of broadcast entities and the necessity to monitor political advertisements pursuant to the New
Rules, petitioner OMA estimates that monitoring television broadcasts of all authorized television station would involve 7,440
manhours per day. To aggravate matters, since a candidate may also spend his/her broadcasting minutes on cable TV,
additional 281,040 manhours per day would have to be spent in monitoring the various channels carried by cable TV
throughout the Philippines. As far as radio broadcasts (both AM and FM stations) are concerned, around 23,960 manhours
per day would have to be devoted by petitioner OMA to obtain an accurate and timely determination of a political candidate's
remaining airtime minutes. During the campaign period, petitioner OMA would have to spend an estimated 27,494,720
manhours in monitoring the election campaign commercials of the different candidates in the country.1âwphi1

5.46 In order to carry-out the obligations imposed by the New Rules, petitioner OMA further estimates that it would need to
engage and train 39,055 additional persons on an eight-hour shift, and assign them all over the country to perform the
required monitoring of radio, television and cable TV broadcasts. In addition, it would likewise need to allot radio, television,
recording equipment and computers, as well as telecommunications equipment, for this surveillance and monitoring
exercise, thus imputing additional costs to the company. Attached herewith are the computations explaining how the afore-
said figures were derived and the conservative assumptions made by petitioner OMA in reaching said figures, as Annex
"H".

5.47 Needless to say, such time, manpower requirements, expense and effort would have to be replicated by each and
every radio station to ensure that they have properly monitored around 33 national and more than 40,000 local candidates'
airtime minutes and thus, prevent any risk of administrative and criminal liability. 60

The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions of the petitioner appear more to be the result of a
misappreciation of the real import of the regulation rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The Court is more
in agreement with the respondent when it explained that:

The legal duty of monitoring lies with the Comelec. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the
Comelec in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. These documents include: (1) certified true
copies of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and certificates of acceptance, or other analogous record on specified dates
(Section 9[d][3], Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 6.2, R.A. 9006; and (2) copies of all contract for advertising, promoting or
opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five (5) days after its signing (Section 6.3, R.A.
9006).

*****

[T]here is absolutely no duty on the broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. GMA grossly exaggerates
when it claims that the non-existent duty would require them to hire and train an astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on
eight-hour shifts all over the country.61

The Court holds, accordingly, that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the Reporting Requirement for the COMELEC's monitoring is
reasonable.

Further, it is apropos to note that, pursuant to Resolution No. 9631, 62 the respondent revised the third paragraph of Section 9 (a). As
revised, the provision now reads:

Appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news documentary, if the
appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or on-the-
spot coverage of bona fide news events, including but not limited to events sanctioned by the Commission on Elections, political
conventions, and similar activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election propaganda within the meaning of this provision.
For purposes of monitoring by the COMELEC and ensuring that parties and candidates were afforded equal opportunities to promote
their candidacy, the media entity shall give prior notice to the COMELEC, through the appropriate Regional Election Director (RED),
or in the case of the National Capital Region (NCR), the Education and Information Department (EID). If such prior notice is not
feasible or practicable, the notice shall be sent within twenty-four (24) hours from the first broadcast or publication.1awp++i1 Nothing
in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under Sections
10 and 14 of these Rules."63

Further, the petitioner in G.R. No. 205374 assails the constitutionality of such monitoring requirement, contending, among others,
that it constitutes prior restraint. The Court finds otherwise. Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the COMELEC to
ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities to promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive
aggregate-based airtime limits, the directive to give prior notice is not unduly burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it be
characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of information before broadcast. Additionally, it is relevant
to point out that in the original Resolution No. 9615, the paragraph in issue was worded in this wise:

65
Appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news documentary, if the
appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or on-the-
spot coverage of bona fide news events, including but not limited to events sanctioned by the Commission on Elections, political
conventions, and similar activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election propaganda within the meaning of this provision. To
determine whether the appearance or guesting in a program is bona fide, the broadcast stations or entities must show that (1) prior
approval of the Commission was secured; and (2) candidates and parties were afforded equal opportunities to promote their
candidacy. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of
newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them
under Sections 10 and 14 of these Rules.64

Comparing the original with the revised paragraph, one could readily appreciate what the COMELEC had done - to modify the
requirement from "prior approval" to "prior notice." While the former may be suggestive of a censorial tone, thus inviting a charge of
prior restraint, the latter is more in the nature of a content-neutral regulation designed to assist the poll body to undertake its job of
ensuring fair elections without having to undertake any chore of approving or disapproving certain expressions.

Also, the right to reply provision is reasonable

In the same way that the Court finds the "prior notice" requirement as not constitutionally infirm, it similarly concludes that the "right
to reply" provision is reasonable and consistent with the constitutional mandate.

Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No. 9631, provides:

SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the
right to reply to charges published or aired against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio
station which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or in the same page or section or in the same time slot as
the first statement.

Registered political parties, party-list groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates may invoke the right to reply by submitting within
a nonextendible period of forty-eight hours from first broadcast or publication, a formal verified claim against the media outlet to the
COMELEC, through the appropriate RED. The claim shall include a detailed enumeration of the circumstances and occurrences
which warrant the invocation of the right to reply and must be accompanied by supporting evidence, such a copy of the publication
or recording of the television or radio broadcast, as the case may be. If the supporting evidence is not yet available due to
circumstances beyond the power of the claimant, the latter shall supplement his claim as soon as the supporting evidence becomes
available, without delay on the part of the claimant. The claimant must likewise furnish a copy of the verified claim and its attachments
to the media outlet concerned prior to the filing of the claim with the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, through the RED, shall view the verified claim within forty-eight ( 48) hours from receipt thereof, including supporting
evidence, and if circumstances warrant, give notice to the media outlet involved for appropriate action, which shall, within forty-eight
( 48) hours, submit its comment, answer or response to the RED, explaining the action it has taken to address the claim. The media
outlet must likewise furnish a copy of the said comment, answer or response to the claimant invoking the right to reply.

Should the claimant insist that his/her right to reply was not addressed, he/she may file the appropriate petition and/or complaint
before the Commission on Elections or its field offices, which shall be endorsed to the Clerk of Court.

The attack on the validity of the "right to reply" provision is primarily anchored on the alleged ground of prior restraint, specifically in
so far as such a requirement may have a chilling effect on speech or of the freedom of the press.

Petitioner ABC states, inter alia:

5 .14 5. A "conscious and detailed consideration" of the interplay of the relevant interests - the constitutional mandate
granting candidates the right to reply and the inviolability of the constitutional freedom of expression, speech, and the press
- will show that the Right to Reply, as provided for in the Assailed Resolution, is an impermissible restraint on these
fundamental freedoms.

5.146. An evaluation of the factors set forth in Soriano (for the balancing of interests test) with respect to the present
controversy will show that the Constitution does not tilt the balance in favor of the Right to Reply provision in the Assailed
Resolution and the supposed governmental interest it attempts to further.65

The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to
the COMELEC to provide for a right to reply.66 Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law
itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not
merely to see the equation as purely between the press and the right to reply. Instead, the constitutionallymandated desiderata of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections would necessarily have to be factored in trying to see where the balance lies
between press and the demands of a right-to-reply.

66
Moreover, as already discussed by the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission
on Elections.67

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is
a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service. x x x68

Relevant to this aspect are these passages from an American Supreme Court decision with regard to broadcasting, right to reply
requirements, and the limitations on speech:

We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 US 495, 502-503, 96 L Ed 1098, 72 S Ct 777. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although other speakers cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define
and narrow official discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission decides that such an
action would serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Similarly, although the First Amendment protects newspaper
publishers from being required to print the replies of those whom they criticize, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 US 241,
41 L Ed 2d 730, 94 S Ct 2831, it affords no such protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time to the victims
of their criticism. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US. 367, 23 L Ed 2d 371, 89 S Ct 1794.

The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance to the present case. First, the broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484. Because
the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from
unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is
like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that
option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.

Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen's written message might
have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant. Other forms
of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture
theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York, 390
US 629, that the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own
household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast
material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting. 69

Given the foregoing considerations, the traditional notions of preferring speech and the press over so many other values of society
do not readily lend itself to this particular matter. Instead, additional weight should be accorded on the constitutional directive to afford
a right to reply. If there was no such mandate, then the submissions of petitioners may more easily commend themselves for this
Court's acceptance. But as noted above, this is not the case. Their arguments simplistically provide minimal importance to that
constitutional command to the point of marginalizing its importance in the equation.

In fine, when it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of expression and of the press, the latter must be properly
viewed in context as being necessarily made to accommodate the imperatives of fairness by giving teeth and substance to the right
to reply requirement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED, Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615, as amended
by Resolution No. 9631, is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, therefore, NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is upheld and remain in full force and effect.

In view of this Decision, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 16, 2013 is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994

SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUMBA-BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR, and
DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

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The turnout of voters during the 11 May 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, was abnormally low. As a result, several
petitions were filed seeking the declaration of failure of election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate managed to cast
their votes. But a special election was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned and conducted actual voting during election day, low voter turnout
would not justify a declaration of failure of election. We are now called upon to review this ruling.

Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were among the candidates for
the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during the 11 may 1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the municipality.

As was heretofore stated, voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49) precincts where the average voter turnout was
22.26%, i.e., only 2,330 out of 9,830 registered voters therein cast their votes. Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual voting
at all.1

Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election on 30 May 1992 in the five (5) precincts which failed to func tion
during election day. On 30 July 1992 another special election was held for a sixth precinct.2

In the interim, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election conducted on 30 May 1992 alleging various
irregularities such as the alteration, tampering and substitution of ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the petition
moot since the votes in the subject precincts were already counted. 3

Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC
by other mayoralty candidates, to wit:

1. SPA No. 92-324: On 6 June 1992, private respondent Datu Gamba Dagalangit filed an urgent petition praying for the holding of a
special election in Precinct No. 22-A alleging therein that when the ballot box was opened, ballots were already torn to pieces. On 14
July 1992, the petition was granted and a special election for Precinct No. 22-A was set for 25 July 1992.4

2. SPC No. 92-336: On 16 June 19992, Datu Elias Abdusalam, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to declare failure of
election in twenty-nine (29) more precincts as a result of alleged tampering of ballots 5 and clustering of precincts.6 On 16 July 1992,
the petition was dismissed. COMELEC ruled that there must be a situation where there is absolute inability to vote before a failure of
election can be declared.7 Since voting was actually conducted in the contested precincts, there was no basis for the petition.

3. SPA No 92-368: On 20 June 1992, private respondent filed another petition, this time seeking to exclude from the counting the
ballots cast in six (6) precincts on the ground that the integrity of the ballot boxes therein was violated.8Again, on 14 July 1992,
COMELEC considered the petition moot, as the issue raised therein was related to that of SPA No. 92-311 which on 9 July 1992 was
already set aside as moot.9

4. SPA No. 92-347: On 1 July 1992, Datu Bagato Khalid Lonta, a fourth mayoralty candidate, filed a petition which in the main sought
the declaration of failure of election in all sixty-seven (67) precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, on the ground of massive disenfranchisement of voters. 10 On 9 July 1992, COMELEC dismissed
the petition, ruling that the allegations therein did not support a case of failure of election. 11

On 8 July 1992, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions. 12 But COMELEC treated the same as a motion for
reconsideration and promptly denied it considering that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a prohibited
pleading. 13

Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election set for 25 July 1992. Petitioner impugned
the creation of this Board. Nevertheless, on 30 July 1992, the new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes. Finally, on
31 July 1992, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

On 3 August 1992, petitioner instituted the instant proceedings seeking the declaration of failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts
where less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin private respondent from assuming office.

On 10 August 1992, petitioner lodged an election protest with the Regional trial Court of Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only
of some but all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao, del Sur. 14

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that with the filing of an election protest, petitioner is already deemed to have abandoned
the instant petition.

It may be noted that when petitioner filed his election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, he informed the trial
court of the pendency of these proceedings. Paragraph 3 of his protest states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your protestant filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 106270 assailing the validity of the proclamation of the herein protestee. . . ." 15 Evidently,
petitioner did not intend to abandon his recourse with this Court. On the contrary, he intended to pursue it. Where only an election
protest ex abundante ad cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear the petition seeking to annul an election. 16

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The main issue is whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the
precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. After all, petitioner argues, he has meritorious grounds in support thereto, viz., the
massive disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts, which COMELEC should have at
least heard before rendering its judgment.

Incidentally, a petition to annul an election is not a pre-proclamation controversy. Consequently, the proclamation of a winning
candidate together with his subsequent assumption of office is not an impediment to the prosecution of the case to its logical
conclusion.17

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of a verified petition to declare a failure to
elect, notices to all interested parties indicating therein the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means
available. 18 The hearing of the case will also be summary in nature.19

Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature must be acted upon with dispatch only after hearing
thereon shall have been conducted. Since COMELEC denied the other petitions 20 which sought to include forty-three (43) more
precincts in a special election without conducting any hearing, it would appear then that there indeed might have been grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitions.

However, a closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from Sec.
6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, indicates otherwise. It reads —

Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes
the election in any precinct has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting
has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in
failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. 21

In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is
missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since
actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place, the results thereof cannot be
disregarded and excluded. 22 COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions
outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief
sought. For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a special election. 23

Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing on the case will be held before COMELEC
will act on it. The verified petition must still show on its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the absence
thereof, the petition must be denied outright.

Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions seeking to declare failure of election in forty-three
(43) more, precincts, there is no more need to receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.

Instead, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better ventilated in an election contest. These
irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through the misdeeds
of a relative few. 24 Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of innocent voters as losers
will always cry fraud and terrorism.

There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it
can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. 25 Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private respondent was elected through a plurality of valid
votes of a valid constituency.

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

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 EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Br. 29, Toledo City, ELSIE RAGO LUMANGTAD, VIVENCIA
ABARIDO, AVELINA BUTASLAC, ROSELLANO BUTASLAC, HAYDELISA LUMANGTAD, SILVESTRE LUMANGTAD,
MAXIMO RACAZA, NENA RACAZA, VICTORIANO/ VICTOR RAGO, EDNA TEJAS, MERCEDITA TEJAS, TEOFISTO TEJAS,
BERNABE TOQUERO, JR., and PEDRO RAFAELA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The authority of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to review the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation
and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court is the center of controversy of this petition.

On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City,
against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr.,
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.

After conducting such preliminary investigation, Oyson submitted a report on April 26, 1989 finding a prima facie case and
recommending the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for violation of Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the
Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc in minute resolution No. 89-1291 dated October 2, 1989 as amended by resolution
No. 89-1574 dated November 2, 1989 resolved to file the information against the private respondents as recommended.

On February 6, 1990, fifteen (15) informations were filed against each of private respondents in the RTC of Toledo City docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234. In three separate manifestations the Regional Election Director of Region VII was
designated by the COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.

Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. On February 22, 1990 an order was issued by
respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said
cases and to submit his report within ten (10) days after termination thereof. The Toledo City INP was directed to hold in abeyance
the service of the warrants of arrest until the submission of the reinvestigation report. 1

On March 16,1990 the COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation
alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC.
This was denied in an order dated April 5, 1990 whereby the respondent trial court upheld its jurisdiction over the subject matter. 2

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition wherein the following issues are raised:

(a) Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority to order the Commission on Elections through
its Regional Election Director of Region VII or its Law Department to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Cases
Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234;

(b) Whether or not the respondent court in issuing its disputed order dated April 5,1990 gravely usurped the
functions of the Honorable Supreme Court, the sole authority that has the power to review on certiorari, decisions,
orders, resolutions or instructions of the Commission on Elections; and

(c) Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority to order the Comelec Law Department to furnish
said respondent the records of preliminary investigation of the above criminal cases for purposes of determining a
probable cause. 3

The main thrust of the petition is that inasmuch as the COMELEC is an independent constitutional body, its actions on election
matters may be reviewed only on certiorari by the Supreme Court. 4

On the other hand, the respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and
not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.

Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall

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 (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective baranggay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions,
or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission in addition to other penalties that
may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusions or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidates.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, or recall. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 52, Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) provides among the powers and functions of the
COMELEC as follows-

Sec. 52. Power and functions of the Commission on Elections.-In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of securing free, orderly and honest elections ....
(Emphasis supplied.)

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution reads thus —

SEC, 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law any decision,
order, of ruling or each Commission may bebrought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the aforementioned provisions of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution the powers and functions of the COMELEC may be
classified in this manner —

(1) Enforcement of election laws; 5

(2) Decision of election contests; 6

(3) Decision of administrative questions;7

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 8
(4) Deputizing of law enforcement agencies;

(5) Registration of political parties; 9 and

(6) Improvement of elections. 10

As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, unless otherwise provided by law, any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

In Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, 11 this Court held that "what is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings
and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."
Thus, the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it are subject to judicial review
only by this Court.

However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." Under Section
265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."

Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote
which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in
other criminal cases."

From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public
prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable
under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper
court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject
to the approval of the court. 12 The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless
so ordered by the court. 13

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court
may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require
that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. 14

The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in
this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions
is certainly untenable.

One last word. The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Only the Solicitor General can represent the
People of the Philippines in this proceeding. 15 In the least, the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should have been secured
by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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