Andal vs Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951

FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated
the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January
1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly
move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s
father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria
gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a
legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that
the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during
the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than
the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.
UYGUANGCO VS CA G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989

CRUZ, J.

Facts: In the year 1975, Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-
petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco claims
that he is an illegitimate son of Apolinario and filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners because he was left
out in the extrajudicial settlement of Apolinario’s estate. Graciano alleged he is the son of Apolinario Uyguangco and
Anastacia Bacjao and he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he
eventually graduated. Here He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper
at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973. During the course of the trial, the petitioners alleged that Graciano
failed to present any documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario
Uyguangco. . The petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer
prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code because .

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is allowed to prove his alleged filiation under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the problem of the private respondent is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death
in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows: The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action
may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at
this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his
alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
Petition Granted

MENDOZA VS CA G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991

Cruz, J.
Facts: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the
herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and
defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. The private respondent claimed she was the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. Teopista averred
that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The
appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child under Article 283
of the Civil Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Teopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family
Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the
alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities
of modern medicine and technology.

Petition Denied.
G.R. No. L-39044 January 3, 1985

MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE CARILLO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this petition for review, the petitioner asks that we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate
Appellate Court, which declared respondent Felipe Carillo a builder in good faith with the right to remain in the questioned
premises, free of rent, until reimbursed by the petitioner for the necessary and useful expenses introduced on the land.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified in the sense that the appellant being a builder in good faith is
entitled to the right of retention of the lot introduced thereon, and he is not hable to pay rentals for the occupation thereof
pending payment of the indemnity for such improvements. In all other respects, the appealed judgment is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

The background facts of the case are found in the decision of the respondent court as follows:

There is no dispute that herein appellee is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 2455
and 2456 issued by the City Assessor's Office of Manila with a total assessed value of P3,059,180.00 and by TCT 55125 (Exh.
A) and TCT No. 76130 of the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila. It acquired the aforementioned property from the
Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, being the highest bidder in a sale conducted by the Probate Court (Exhs. C-7
& C-7-A).

After having acquired said property, the appellee subdivided it, but could not take possession thereof because the whole
area is occupied by several houses among which is the one belonging to the herein appellant Felipe Carillo, Lot 143, Block 2
of the subdivision plan (Exh. A-4 Carillo).
Demands to vacate and to surrender possession of the property were made by the appellee verbally and by publication
(Exhs. D, D-1 & D-2) and by circulars served to the appellant. In spite of such demands, the appellant continued to occupy
the disputed lot and refused to surrender possession thereof to the appellee.

On the other hand, appellant's evidence tends to show that he acquired the lot in dispute from a certain Delfin Dayrit on
September 25, 1962, pursuant to a deed of assignment (Exh. 1-Carillo); that Dayrit in turn had acquired the property from
the late Carla Tambunting by virtue of a Contract of Sale on Installment Basis (EXIL 2-Carillo); that Dayrit had religiously paid
the monthly installments as they fell due, his last payment being on May 25, 1954, in the sum of P200.00, then leaving an
unpaid balance of Pl,306.00 when the said parcel was conveyed to defendant Carino, for which receipts were duly issued
(Exhs. 3-Carillo to 24-Carillo); that Dayrit could not continue paying the succeeding installments as they fen due because
Vicente Legarda, the surviving spouse of Clara Tambunting, refused to receive any payment for the same and that it was
only lately, more specifically on September 25, 1962, when Dayrit conveyed the lot to appellant Carillo.

After the petitioner failed in its attempts to take possession of the lot, it filed the reivindicatory action against the
respondent.

The trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

In Civil Case No. 64578:

(1) Ordering defendant Felipe Carino to vacate and/or surrender possession to plaintiff Manotok Realty Inc. of the
parcel of land subject matter of the complaint described in paragraph 2 thereof;

(2) To pay plaintiff the sum of P75.50 per month from January 21, 1961 up to the time he actually surrenders
possession of the said parcel to the plaintiff; and

(3) To pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay costs.

On August 15, 1984, we required the parties to show whether or not the disputed lot falls within the area expropriated
under P.D. No. 1669 and P.D. No. 1670. It appears that the expropriated portion of the Tambunting Estate is the area
located at the east side adjacent to the Chinese Cemetery. The lot is on the unexpropriated and mainly commercial portion
on the west side, across from Rizal Avenue.

In this petition, the petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in considering the respondent a possessor and
builder in good faith. It argues that at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment in favor of the respondent, the
land was already registered in its name; and that if the respondent were really acting in good faith, he should have verified
from the Register of Deeds of Manila who was the registered owner of the land in question.

We agree.

A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. (Caram v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7, Art. 526, Civil Code). One who acquires real estate with knowledge of a defect
or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the
land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claims that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the
title of the vendor. (See Leung Yee v. FL Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644).

The records show that when Dayrit executed the deed of' assignment in favor of the respondent, the disputed lot was
already registered and titled in the name of the petitioner. Such an act of registration served as a constructive notice to the
whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including
Dayrit and. herein respondent, although no personal notice was served on either of the latter. (See Garcia v. Bello, 13 SCRA
769; Demontano v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 286). Therefore, the presumption of good faith in favor of the respondent
cannot apply because as far as the law is concerned, he had notice of the ownership by the petitioner over said lot. It is also
unthinkable that in the big Tambunting Estate beset with one of the most serious squatter problems in Metro Manila, any
tenant or prospective buyer would be unaware that the petitioner acquired the estate as highest bidder at the sale ordered
by the probate court. Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to inquire about the certificate of title covering the
lot in question to verify who was the real owner thereof, despite the fact that his transferor, Dayrit, never showed him any
title thereto; a circumstance which should have put him upon such inquiry or investigation. His failure to exercise that
measure of precaution which was reasonably required of a prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the
title of his vendor precludes him from claiming possession in good faith.

We agree with the following observations of Justice Guillermo S. Santos in his separate concurring and dissenting opinion:

The issue now is whether appellant may be considered as a possessor in good faith of the property in question. Article 256
of the Civil Code defines a possessor in good faith as one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

In this case, it was shown that under the contract of sale on installment basis, Delfin Dayrit had only paid a total of
P4,917.30, leaving an unpaid balance of P3,860.20 as of August 9, 1954 (Dec. RA p. 43). The said contract specifically
provides that ". . . if for some reason or other the purchaser cannot pay a certain installment on the date agreed upon, it is
hereby agreed that said purchaser will be given a maximum limit of two months' grace in which to pay his arrears, after
which the property will revert to the original owner hereof: the Clara Tambunting Subdivision, No. 50 Reina Regente St.,
Binondo, Manila, P.I." The subsequent installment after August 9, 1954, not having been paid, the property, therefore,
reverted to Clara Tambunting and therefore formed part of her estate, which was subsequently acquired by appellee. Thus,
when appellant purchased the parcel of land in question from Dayrit on August 25, 1962—or eight (8) years after the
default—the latter had no more right over the same.

It was incumbent on appellant to inquire into the title of his vendor over the property. Had appellant demanded from his
vendor, Dayrit, the certificate of his ownership of the property subject of the negotiation, he would have learned that the
latter had no right, much less, title over the same because of his default in the payment of the monthly installments. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the behef that there was no defect in the title of the vendor (Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil.
644). Consequently, appellant cannot be deemed a possessor in good faith and is not, therefore, entitled to reimbursement
for the improvements he had introduced in the property in question.

No installments and rentals have been paid for the lot since 1954 or for more than thirty (30) years. While Dayrit
transferred to Carillo whatever rights he may have had to the lot and its improvements on September 25, 1962, the claim
for back rentals was from March 20, 1959 while the trial court ordered payment as of January 21, 1961 or twenty four (24)
years ago. Considering the facts, applicable law, and equities of this case, the decision of the trial court appears to be
correct and is, therefore, reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING
in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 64578.

SO ORDERED.