LANTO v.

COA Lanto, one of the respondents in the case, having become aware of the
(18 APRIL 2017|Bersamin)
ACTION: Special Civil Action
The petitioner seeks to annul the COA Decision No. 2009-121 dated
October 29, 2009 that affirmed the Notice of Disallowance dated January 18,
2006 as well as the Notice of finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010 and
the Orders of Execution dated OCtiber 26, 2011 and November 25, 2013
where she was held personally liable in her capacity as Director II of the
Administrative Branch of the POEA to refund the amount representing the
P1,740,124.08.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the then Director II of the Administrative Branch (now
Director IV of the POEA) in the case of Dimapilis-Baldoz v. COA. In that
case, the POEA was charged by COA of illegally disbursing the salary of one
Labrador despite the promulgation of a Sandiganbayan decision terminating
his employment. Dimapilis-Baldoz, as Director of POEA, along with petitioner
Lanto, was deemed directly responsible in a Notice of Disallowance and thus
liable to refund the salaries.
Petitioner, along with other officers, was held personally liable based
on Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 9, Sec. 52, EO 292 and Sec. 103, PD
1445 which provides that “expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefore.”
 In a letter dated May 31, 2000, the COA, no longer entertained their
MR since the COA Secretary issued a Notice of Finality of Decision
dated January 7, 2010, stating that the COA Decision had already
become final and executory since no motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
foregoing developments, wrote a letter dated January 2, 2014 to COA
Chairperson Grace Pulido-Tan seeking the reconsideration of the November
25, 2013 Order of Execution on several grounds, namely: lack of due
process as far as she was concerned; regularity in the performance of
her official duties; and her good faith.
 Denied
 She filed a special civil action of certiorari
Lanto’s Arguments
1. COA GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction finding her
personally liable despite the fact that she acted in good faith and with
due diligence in the lawful exercise of her duties and functions as the
former Director II of the POEA Administrative Branch in certifying that
the payroll is correctly stated and services rendered by Labrador (he
came back to work despite the SB Order)
2. COA GAD in disallowing the payments and making Lanto personally
liable. Such would result in a denial of due process on the part of the
petitioner as SHE WAS NOT DULY NOTIFIED OF THE CRMINAL
PROCEEDINGS VS. LABRADOR NOR DID SHE RECEIVE ANY
NOTICE/ORDER MR. LABRADOR WAS DISMISSED. MORE SO,
PETITIONER WAS NOT FURNISHED COPIES OF THE DECISION
DATED OCTOBER 29, 2009 AND NOTICE OF FINALITY OF
DECISION DATED JANUARY 7, 2010 AND RESPONDENT COA’S
ORDER OF EXECUTION DATED OCTOBER 26, 2011.
 She acted in good faith as there were records from Labrador’s
supervisors he arrived and attended to his work
 Moreover, she had no information showing there was a pending
criminal case against Labrador nor did it receive the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan

POEA moved for reconsideration. On January 26, 2010, POEA

COA: Petitioner was not denied of due process because the Notice of
Administrator Jennifer Jardin-Manalili took over the post of Dimapilis-Baldoz.
Disallowance forwarded by POEA Administrator Cacdac to the Audit Team
 When Jardin-Manalili’s second MR was denied, Dimapilis-Baldoz
Leader contained her signature across her name, thus she was properly
filed a petition for certiorari. The COA issued the Order of Execution
served.
on October 26, 2011. On July 16, 2013, the Court promulgated the
ruling in Dimapilis--Baldoz v. Commission on Audit on July 16, 2013.
On April 14, 2015, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
The entry of judgement was made August 13, 2013. On November
to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the assailed Orders of Execution
25, 2013, the COA issued the assailed Order of Execution to enforce
dated October 26, 2011 and November 25, 2013.
its decision against other responsible officers of the POEA except for
Dimapilis-Baldoz.
ISSUE: Did the COA commit gad in holding the petitioner personally liable to
refund the disallowed salary payments?

RULING OF THE COURT: PARTLY MERITORIOUS.
The petitioner is essentially assailing the Decision of COA and the
Order of Execution dated November 25, 2013 she had received on
December 18, 2013.
The time within which an aggrieved party may seek the review of an
adverse judgment or final order or resolution through the special civil action
governed by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is 30 days from notice of judgement
or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
She filed the petition assailing the Order of Execution 31 days
beyond the reglementery period. Generally such is dismissible for being filed
out of time resulting in the Order of Execution dated November 25, 2013
unassailable and immutable to her. Also, and more significantly, Decision No.
2009-121 had by then attained finality and become immutable. As such, the
present recourse might not avail her anymore, for a decision or final order
that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
whether by the court that rendered or the SC.
General Rule: Any act that violates this principle of immutability must be
immediately struck down.The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment or
order serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies,
at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
This principle, however, is not without exceptions. The only
exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause
no prejudice to any party; and (3) void judgments (Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,
G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362, 373).
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several justifications to
suspend the strict adherence with rigid procedural rules like the doctrine
of immutability, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of
the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other
1Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October
12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 761, citing Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, September
30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675, 686-687.
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby 1.
CASE AT BAR: Justifications (a) (b) and (c) apply in this case.
First of all, the adverse result would surely make her personally
liable for a substantial sum of monetary liability from which she had not
directly benefited, thereby prejudicing her right to property.
Secondly, her good faith as she caused the distribution of the
salaries based on her absolute lack of knowledge regarding the case
and the presence of valid records constituted compelling circumstances
that justified applying the exception in her favor. Only convincing proof of the
petitioner’s malice or bad faith in the performance of her duties could have
warranted the rejection of her plea of good faith.
 It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the
presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties, such
that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with
malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability
for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty.
Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary
bears the burden to convincingly show that malice or bad faith
attended the public officer’s performance of his duties (Dimapilis-
Baldoz v. Commission on Audit)
Thirdly, she was on a foreign assignment overseas when the COA
rendered the assailed issuances. Even if POEA filed in her behalf a MR
during her absence from the country on a foreign assignment without
indication she expressly authorized POEA do not preclude her from being
heard. Only she could have exercised the right to be heard upon a
matter that would subject her under the law to personal liability.
As to the validity of COA’s issuance
In light of the circumstances, the COA directives are void and of no
effect. Thus, a void judgement has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any
action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take
any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be
ignored2.
Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
2Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla (G.R. No. 194168, February 13, 2013, 690
SCRA 610, 618-619)
final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: “x x x it may be said to be
a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”

DISPOSITIVE: COA’s directive to withhod her salary is void and produces no

legal effect. As such, the assailed COA issuances did not attain finality and
immutability as to her.