RESEARCH NOTE
Our study investigates the relationship of independent auditor fees, hours and
quality, with particular emphasis on initial audits. Using audits of Texas indepen-
dent school districts, empirical results indicated specific low bailing relationships.
First year independent audits had statistically significant lower audit fees. Despite
the lower fees, quality was higher and more audit hours were utilized.
1. Introduction
Our study investigates the effect of independent auditor changes on fees,
independent audit effort (as measured by audit hours), and independent
audit quality. The empirical analysis is based on audits conducted by local
and regional public accounting firms of independent school districts (ISDs)
in Texas. We found that initial audits were associated with lower fees,
higher quality, and higher audit hours at the .10 level (one tailed). The
results also indicated that both audit fees and audit hours were signifi-
cantly related to audit quality in a manner consistent with the explanation
that audits are product differentiated in the market.
The empirical findings presented in our paper support previous re-
search. Our paper confirms that both audit fees and audit hours are
influenced by audit quality. The evidence suggests that independent audi-
Address correspondence to" Professor Gary Giroux, Department of Accounting, Texas A & M
University, College Station, 'IX 77843.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 15, 55-76 (1996)
© 1996 Elsevier Science Inc. 0278-4254/96/$15.00
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 SSDI 0278-4254(95)00041-0
56 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
tors do not sacrifice quality to obtain a new audit client, though lower
audit fees were detected among initial audit engagements. Audit hours and
audit quality were higher among initial audits, confirming a conclusion
reported by Raman and Wilson (1992, p. 292) in their study of a sample of
U.S. cities over four years (1984-1987).
No previous study has compared audit fees and audit hours with both
audit service quality and independent auditor changes in a single analysis.
Initial audits (commonly associated with low bailing) may result in lower
fees but the relationship to audit effort has not been the subject of a great
deal of research (see Giroux et al. 1995; Davis et al. 1993; Palmrose 1989
for research on the topic) and never in combination with a measure of
audit service quality. If audit effort declines with audit fees on initial
audits, audit quality also should decline. DeAngelo (1981a, pp. 114,
118-120; 1981b, pp. 187-194), however, suggests that audit effort will be
maintained so that incumbent auditors can generate quasi-rents in future
years.
We investigate other issues associated with the independent audit mar-
ket. Our study examines other aspects of audit economics (e.g., brand
name, specialization, and product costs) in the small CPA firm sector. 1 We
also extend Palmrose's (1986) and (1989) studies of the determinants of
audit hours to the public sector.
Further, we build upon the work of Deis and Giroux (1992) and Giroux
et al. (1995). The former study evaluated the potential determinants of
actual independent audit quality using a metric of audit quality based on
nineteen features of the independent auditor's work as documented in
working paper reviews conducted by state auditors at the Texas Education
Agency. The latter study compared the audit fees, auditor hours, and audit
quality of independent audits conducted by audit firms participating in a
voluntary peer review program to those not participating.
2. P r i o r R e s e a r c h o n Initial A u d i t s
Conventional wisdom suggests that when public accounting firms offer
price discounts to capture new audit clients, audit quality may be compro-
mised. 2 A competing explanation advanced by DeAngelo (1981a, pp. 114,
118-120; 1981b, pp. 187-194), however, contends that low balling (i.e.,
bidding below the avoidable costs for the first year audit) represents an
3. Sample
Data from 232 working paper reviews--also called quality control reviews
(QCRs) of public accounting firm audits of Texas ISDs were obtained
through an analysis of the Texas Education Agency (TEA) files. The TEA
regulates Texas school districts. Each QCR culminates in a letter of
findings to the public accounting firm by the agency's audit director. These
letters served as the basis for a comprehensive, direct measure of audit
quality. Additional information used in our study came from the QCR
files, the audit reports, and other reports issued by the TEA. This is the
same data base used by Deis and Giroux (1992a), Deis and Giroux (1994),
and Giroux et al. (1995).
Independent public accounting firms were limited to one observation in
the analysis. In other words, the sample was determined by ISDs having
QCRs. Of 308 QCRs conducted by TEA, 232 were used in this analysis.
QCRs conducted on 1983 and 1984 independent audits were not utilized
for lack of fee and hour data. Audits conducted by Big Eight, non-Big
Eight national, and regional public accounting firms were eliminated (10
public accounting firms in total were eliminated).4
4 For additional information regarding the agency's process and the m a n n e r in which the QCRs
were coded, see Deis et al. (1990, pp. 37-38), Deis and Giroux (1992, pp. 468-469), Deis and Giroux
(1994, p. 219), or Giroux et al. (1995, pp. 68-69). (The results did not change when Big Eight and
national CPA firms were included.) Most other audit fee studies have included a d u m m y variable to
distinguish auditor size category. In our current study, the Q C R s for large public accounting firms
were associated with very large ISDs which have different characteristics from small ISDs. Also, the
n u m b e r of offices for the public accounting firm ( O F F I C E S ) is similar to brand n a m e in interpreta-
tion.
60 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
where the dependent variables are the natural logs of actual audit fees and
"actual audit hours" (see Deis and Giroux 1992a, p. 468; Giroux et al.
1995, pp. 72-73), and the explanatory variables are (note that the sources
of data are indicated):
Auditee characteristics:
Initial audits:
Product Differentiation:
l n ( Q U A L S C O R E ) = a 0 - B l l n ( S I Z E ) + B 2 ( W E A L T H ) + B3CLIENTS
+ B4OFFICES + B 5P E E R + B6TIME
The quality model is a modified version of Deis and Giroux (1992a, pp.
467-468), substituting YEAR1 and Y E A R 2 for the continuous tenure
variable, adding OFFICES, and omitting three insignificant variables in
that study (see Deis and Giroux 1992a, pp. 467-471 for a description of the
variables). The variables SIZE, CLIENTS, OFFICES, H O U R S , YEAR1,
and YEAR2, are described earlier in the paper. The "assessed property tax
value per student" ( W E A L T H ) "proxies for the financial health" of the
ISD (Deis and Giroux 1992, p. 471). For those independent audit firms
voluntarily participating in a peer review program, the indicator variable
P E E R takes on a value of "1" and "0" otherwise (Deis and Giroux 1992,
pp. 467 and 470; Giroux et al. 1995, pp. 76-77). The timeliness of the
independent audit (TIME) is expressed as the percentage of the 120 day
period following the fiscal year end (i.e., August 31) allowed by Texas state
law to complete the audit (Deis and Giroux 1992, p. 471).
As previously discussed, Giroux et al. (1995, pp. 76-78) analyzed audit
quality using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple comparison tests.
In that analysis audit quality was significantly higher for peer reviewed
ISDs, first year audits relative to those with audit tenure of 20 or more
years, when the audit firm had five or more ISD clients, and when the
audit reports were submitted on a timely basis (Giroux et al. 1995, pp.
77-78).
5This point was made by an anonymous reviewer. Moreover, Ward et al. (1994, pp. 406-407)
found fee premia associated with industry expertise.
62 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
in ISD audits are posited to be more efficient in conducting the audit and,
hence, this efficiency will be reflected in fewer audit hours. Giroux et al.
(1995, p. 75) using the same data found a positive significant relation
between audit hours and the number of clients. However, they (1995, p. 75)
did not find a significant relationship between industry experience (clients)
and audit fees or audit fees-per hour. Assuming a competitive market,
specialists are also expected to share some of the benefits of their lower
production costs in the form of lower audit fees with their clients. 6
6 0 ' K e e f e et al. (1994, p. 65) r e p o r t e d a significant negative correlation between audit fees a n d
the audit firm's industry specific knowledge (i.e., the n u m b e r of school district audits) in their study
of violations o f generally a c c e p t e d a c c o u n t i n g principles r e p o r t i n g s t a n d a r d s d e t e c t e d in 935
California 1986 school district audits. W a r d et al. (1994, p. 407), in contrast, f o u n d higher audit fees
associated with a single regional audit firm responsible for 21% of the s a m p l e d Michigan municipal-
ities. As o u r sample was c o m p r i s e d o f o n e audit p e r firm, we w e r e u n a b l e to test for a similar effect.
Moreover, with nearly 1,200 Texas ISDs it is unlikely for a n y firm to attain a 2 0 % s h a r e of the
market.
7 O u r study focuses on r e p o r t e d b r e a c h e s in the c u r r e n t y e a r which is consistent with earlier
studies (e.g., B a b e r et al. 1987, p. 303; R o b e r t s a n d Glezen, 1990, p. 140; a n d R u b i n 1988, p. 223).
A n alternative is to use the p r i o r y e a r r e p o r t s on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t r e p o r t e d b r e a c h e s f r o m the
previous y e a r w o u l d have i n c r e a s e d audit risks, driving u p b o t h fees a n d hours. Predictions are the
s a m e in either case, as a r e results.
64 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
reporting system" (1990, p. 135). Since both OPIN and IAC capture
potentially time consuming aspects of the audit engagement, a positive
relationship is predicted for both report-related variables on audit fees and
audit hours.
weighted - 1; the most severe (audit program: major) by - 19. The weights
were summed, resulting in the metric Q U A L S C O R E . 8 Both audit fees
(FEE) and audit hours ( H O U R S ) are projected to be directly related to
Q U A L S C O R E . This measure is similar to Deis and Giroux (1992a, pp.
468-469). They divided the deficiency code by its assigned rank. Under
their measure, a zero was the highest possible value and a higher quality
audit had a lower quality score. Q U A L S C O R E is the same measure as
" S C O R E " , the quality measure used by Giroux et al. (1995, p. 70-71) in
their A N O V A model.
The analysis of audit quality ( Q U A L S C O R E ) on audit fees and audit
hours raises certain econometric issues. It is evident from previous studies
that audit hours and audit fees affect audit quality (Deis and Giroux
1992a, p. 476; O'I(eefe and Westort 1992, p. 65; O'Keefe et al. 1994,
p. 261; Copley et al. 1994, pp. 253-254). Our current study proposes to
reverse the order and investigate the effects of audit quality on audit fees
and audit hours. Therefore, QUAI_SCORE may be an endogenous vari-
able which is not independent of the error term in the proposed empirical
m o d e l s - - t h u s violating OLS assumptions and suggesting simultaneous
equation estimation (SEE) would be appropriate (Maddala 1988, p. 293).
However, use of such an approach is inefficient when the error terms are
independent. Fortunately, Hausman (1978) provided a specification test to
determine whether OLS or SEE is most appropriate. Hausman's specifica-
tion error test is asymptotically equivalent to a test of the covariance
between the error terms produced from OLS and SEE. The test statistic is
(Maddala 1988, pp. 435-439):
M = qZ/var(q) (3)
where
q = B 1 - Bo
and
var(q) = var(B 1) - var(B 0)
using B 1 indicates estimators from SEE and B 2 estimators are from OLS.
The test statistics, m, has X z distribution with k degrees of freedom (k
number of parameters). The calculated m statistics for our study were
0.825 for the audit hours model and 0.693 for the audit fee model. Neither
of these m statistics were significant ( p > 0.10, two tailed) ( X0.90
2 d.f.
5. Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 1 and a correlation matrix for all
variables appears in Table 2. Thirty-two independent auditors in our
sample were referred to the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy for
particularly low quality audits (see Deis and Giroux 1992a, p. 472). These
audits were considered so deficient relative to professional standards, that
actions by the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy were deemed
necessary. Board action can include imposing additional professional edu-
cation, other remedial actions, or punitive actions. The Board can revoke a
CPA's license in an extreme case (Deis et al. 1990, pp. 37-38). Most of the
correlations among the independent variables were low, with the largest
correlation between SIZE and CLIENTS at .32 (Table 2).
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the audit fee and audit hours
models. Several diagnostic procedures were used to assure that the results
were not unduly influenced by outliers, multicollinearity, or heteroskedas-
ticity. 1° The full model estimating In (FEES) was significant at .0001
( F = 41.26, two tailed test) and has comparable explanatory power (ad-
justed R 2 = 0.64) to Roberts and Glezen's (1990, p. 142) model of 356
Texas ISDs (adjusted R 2 = 0.66) and Giroux et al. (1995, p. 75) using the
same data (R 2 = .599). The full model estimating audit hours was also
significant at .001 ( F = 22.63, two tailed test) and explains about half the
variation in audit hours (R 2 = 0.47), compared to Giroux et al. (1995, p.
75) where R 2 = .427. As results for the reduced models are similar to
those of the full models, the discussion to follow will address the results in
the full models.
Most of the variables were significant in the expected direction to both
audit fees and audit hours. As found in previous studies (e.g., Rubin 1988,
p. 230; Giroux et al. (1995, p. 75)), large clients (SIZE) had higher audit
fees and more audit hours. ISD financial strength (PCI) was negatively and
significantly associated with both audit hours and fees, confirming Baber et
al. (1987, p. 303). The larger local CPA firms (OFFICES) received fee
9 We are grateful to R. Carter Hill for help in conducting the H a u s m a n test. The S H A Z A M
statistical package was used to conduct this test.
10 No important violations were detected. Plots of the residuals against the predicted value in
each model depict a cloud-like pattern. Univariate statistics on the residual terms from each model
indicated a m e a n of zero ( p = 1.0) and the assumption of normality, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test, could not be rejected at the 0.15 level. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were low, ranging from
1.03 to 1.17 for each model. Condition indexes were 1.64 or less in both models, considerably less
than the lowest threshold of 15 suggested by Belsley et al. (1980, p. 157) over which multicollinearity
becomes a problem. Based on these diagnostic procedures, the results of both regression models
can be interpreted without concern that they are influenced by violations in OLS assumptions.
The Effect of Auditor Changes 67
HOUR .76*
SIZE .75* .62*
PCI -.00 -.01 .14"**
OFFICES .15"** .12 .11 -.08
CLIE .24** .10 .32* .02 .24**
CAFR .29** .24** .28** .08 --.06 -.02
IAC -.01 .01 -.13 -.24** .08 .08 -.15
OPIN .07 .09 -.00 -.10 --.02 .09 - . 0 1 .21"*
YR1 -.09 .05 -.04 -.03 --.05 --.04 - . 1 1 .09 -.00
YR2 -.06 -.03 -.06 -.06 -.02 -.07 - . 0 6 .02 .00 - . 1 0
QUAL .27** .33* .15"** -.07 .15"** .17"** .00.10 .03 .12 .02
* Significant at .0001.
** Significant at .01.
*** Significant at .10.
(All significance tests are two-tailed.)
68 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
n = 232
Full M o d e l Reduced Model:
Parameter Parameter
Predicted Estimate Estimate
Description Sign (t-Value) (t-Value)
audit fees in the full model but not in the reduced model with quality
omitted. The reduced model result is similar to the fee model result
reported by Giroux et al. (1995, p. 75) which suggests that quality is an
important omitted variable in that study in regards to industry experience
(CLIENTS). As expected, audit efficiency was a benefit produced from
investments in industry expertise, with economies passed on to clients as
The Effect of Auditor Changes 69
lower costs, t~ Moreover, both Deis and Giroux (1992a, p. 476), O'Keefe et
al. (1994, p. 261), and Giroux et al. (1995, p. 77) found higher audit quality
associated with increases in industry-specific knowledge (i.e., the number
11 Both OFFICES and CLIENTS are potential ex ante proxies for audit quality demanded. Both
are significantly correlated with QUALSCORE. Additional analysis (using Duncan's Multiple
Range Test) indicated that auditors with five or more ISD clients had significantly higher quality
than those with fewer clients (Huck et al. 1974, pp. 68-69). Offices was not significant using
Duncan's Multiple Range Test.
70 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
6. Conclusions
For nearly twenty years widespread concerns have been expressed that
aggressive price competition within the market for audit services erodes
the quality of work provided by auditors. Based partially on these con-
cerns, federal and state agency oversight of the audit profession has
increased dramatically and continues to expand. A central tenet behind
this heightened regulation is the purported detrimental relationship be-
tween 'low-ball' audit pricing and audit quality. Under this scenario, when
the initial year audit is conducted at a substantial price discount (i.e., a
'low-ball' fee) audit quality suffers because audit firms (1) expend less
effort so as to maintain profit margins in light of the fee reductions or (2)
they fail to report problems in order to protect "receivables" in future
audit engagements. The 'low-bailing' part of this scenario has been well
documented in academic studies and by the business media. Heretofore
research on the critical link between 'low-bailing' and audit quality,
n = 232
Predicted Parameter
Description Sign (t-Value)
Intercept -- 3 . 2 9 8
Ln(SIZE) - - 0.124
( - 2.67)**
WEALTH - - 0.091
( - 1.32)* **
CLIENTS + 0.018
(1.32)***
OFFICES + 0.121
(2.55)**
PEER + 0.353
(2.96)**
TIME - - 0.588
( - 2.66)**
HOURS + 0.368
(4.18)*
YEAR1 + 0.227
(1.37)***
YEAR2 + 0.072
(0.42)
Adj. R 2 0.175
F statistic (two-tailed test) 6.43*
* Significant at .0001.
** Significant at .01.
*** Significant at .10.
(All significance tests are one-tailed--except when noted to be two-tailed.)
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American
Accounting Association, Washington, D.C., August 11, 1992 (see Deis and Giroux 1992b). We
thank R. Carter Hill for help with certain econometric issues. We appreciate the helpful
comments of workshop participants at Louisiana State University, St. Louis University and
Texas A & M University, Robin Roberts, and two anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of
this paper. We are grateful for the support of Tom Canby and Ed Randall at the Audit
Division of the Texas Education Agency.
References
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1978. Commission on
Auditors' Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations. American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1994. Audits of State
and Local Governmental Units. American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants.
Baber, W. R., Brooks, E. H. and Ricks, W. E. Autumn 1987. An empirical
investigation of the market for audit services in the public sector. Journal of
Accounting Research 25(2):293-305.
Banker, R. D., Cooper, W. W. and Potter, G. July 1992. A perspective on research
in governmental accounting. The Accounting Review 67(3):496-510.
Belsley, D. A., Kuh, E. and Welsh, R. E. 1980. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying
lnfluencial Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Copley, P. and Doucet, M. Spring 1993a. The impact of competition on the quality
of governmental audits. Auditing." A Journal of Practice and Theory 12(1):88-98.
Copley, P. and Doucet, M. Fall 1993b. Auditor tenure, fixed fee contracts, and the
supply of substandard single audits. Public Budgeting and Finance 13(3):23-35.
Copley, P., Doucet, M. and Gaver, K. Jan. 1994. A simultaneous equations analysis
of quality control review outcomes and engagement fees for audits or recipients
of federal financial assistance. The Accounting Review 69(1):244-256.
Davis, R., Ricchiute, D. and Trompeter, G. Jan. 1993. Audit effort, audit fees, and
the provision of nonaudit services to audit clients. The Accounting Review
68(1):135-150.
DeAngelo, L. E. Aug. 1981a. Auditor independence, 'low bailing,' and disclosure
regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3(2): 113-128.
DeAngelo, L. E. Dec. 1981b. Auditor size and auditor quality. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 3(4):183-199.
Deis, Jr., D. R., and Giroux, G. A. July 1992a. Determinants of audit quality in the
public sector. The Accounting Review 67(3):462-479.
Deis, Jr., D. R. and Giroux, G. A. 1992b. Determinants of audit fees and audit
hours using a direct audit quality measure. In Collected Abstracts of the American
Accounting Association's Annual Meeting, August 9-12, 1992 Washington, D.C.
Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, p. 98.
The Effect of Auditor Changes 75
Deis, Jr., D. R., Giroux, G. A. and Canby T. Nov./Dec. 1990. Auditing the
auditors. Today's CPA 16(3):36-39.
Deis, D. R. and Giroux, G. A. 1994. The size of budgets and audit quality of
independent school districts. In Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Aceount-
ing, Vol. 8 (J. L. Chan, ed.) Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., pp. 213-227.
Ettredge, M. and Greenberg, R. Spring 1990. Determinants of fee cutting on initial
audit engagements. Journal of Accounting Research 28(1):198-210.
Francis, J., Andrews, W., and Simon, D. Summer 1990. Voluntary peer reviews,
audit quality, and proposals for mandatory peer reviews. Journal of Accounting,
Auditing & Finance Summer 1990 5(3) (New Series): 369-378.
Giroux, G., Deis, D., and Bryan, B. 1995. The effect of peer review on audit
economies. In Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 9 (G. J. Previts, L. M.
Parker, and R. Eskew, eds.) Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., pp. 63-82.
Hausman, J. A. Nov. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica
46(2):1251-1271.
Huck, S., Cormier, W. and Bounds, W. 1974. Reading Statistics and Research. New
York: Harper & Row.
Klein, B. and Leffler, K. B. Winter 1981. The role of market forces in assuring
contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89(4):615-641.
Maddala, G. S. 1988. Introduction to Econometrics. New York: Macmillan.
Mautz, R. K. and Sharaf, H. A. 1961. The Philosophy of Auditing. Sarasota, FL:
American Accounting Association.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR). 1987. Report
of the National Commission on Fraudulent Reporting. National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
O'Keefe, T. B., King, R. D. and Gaver, K. M. Fall 1994. Audit fees, industry
specialization, and compliance with GAAS reporting standards. Auditing: A
Journal of Practice and Theory 13(2):41-55.
O'Keefe, T. B. and Westort, P. J. 1992. Conformance to GAAS reporting standards
in municipal audits and the economics of auditing: The effects of audit firm size,
CPA examination performance, and competition. In Research in Accounting
Regulation, Vol. 6 (G. J. Previts, L. Parker and O. Johnson, eds.) Greenwich, CT:
JAI Press Inc., pp. 39-77.
Palmrose, Z. Spring 1986. Audit fees and auditor size: Further evidence. Journal of
Accounting Research 24(1):97-110.
Palmrose, Z. July 1989. The relation of audit contract type to audit fees and hours.
The Accounting Review 64(3):488-499.
Raman, K. and Wilson, E. Winter 1992. An empirical investigation of the market
for "single audit" services. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 11(4):271-295.
Roberts, R. W., Glezen, G. W. and Jones, T. W. Spring 1990. Determinants of
auditor change in the public sector. Journal of AccountingReseareh 28(1):220-228.
Roberts, R. W. and Glezen, G. W. 1990. Determinants of school district audit fees.
In Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting, Vol. 6 (J. Chart and J.
Patton, eds.) Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., pp. 127-147.
76 D.R. Deis, Jr. and G. Giroux
Rubin, M. A. April 1988. Municipal audit fee determinants. The Accounting Review
63(2):219-236.
Shockley, R. Oct. 1981. Perceptions of auditors' independence: An empirical
analysis. The Accounting Review 56(4):785-800.
Shockley, R. and Holt, R. N. Autumn 1983. A behavioral investigation of supplier
differentiation in the market for audit services. Journal of Accounting Research
21(2):545-564.
Simon, D., and Francis, J. R. April 1988. The effects of auditor change on audit
fees: Tests of price cutting and price recovery. The Accounting Review
63(2):255-269.
Simunic, D. A. Spring 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence.
Journal of Accounting Research 18(1): 161-190.
Simunic, D. A. and Stein, M. 1987. Product Differentiation in Auditing: Auditor
Choice in the Market for Unseasoned New Issues. Research Monograph No. 13.
Canadian General Accountants Rcsearch Foundation.
The Single Audit Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C., pp. 7501-7507.
Turpen, R. A. Spring 1990. Differential pricing on auditors' initial engagements:
Further evidence. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 9(2):60-76.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1984. U.S. Bureau of the Census Tape STF-3F.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 1992. Financing Fraud Detection
and Disclosure Act: Report to Accompany H.R. 4313. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the
Committee on Government Operations. 1977. The Accounting Establishment.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Ward, D., Elder, R. and Kattelus, S. April 1994. Further evidence on the determi-
nants of municipal audit fees. The Accounting Review 69(2):399-411.
Wallace, W. A. 1986. The timing of initial independent audits of municipalities. In
Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting, Vol. 2 (J. Chan, ed.) Green-
wich, CT: JAI Press Inc., pp. 3-51.
Yardley, J., Kauffman, N., Cairney, T. and Albrecht, W. 1992. Supplier behavior in
the U.S. audit market. Journal of Accounting Literature 11:151-184.