Supreme Court Rules Citizens Can Compel Publication of Presidential Issuances

6/17/2018 G.R. No.
L-63915
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,
303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,
486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,
802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248,
251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325,
327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473,
486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-
1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107,
120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
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The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind
the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not
exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
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date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
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statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.

The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of
a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles,
11
the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does
not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
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decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I
am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to
this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative
or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
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Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity
or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the
period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the
Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.
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DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does
not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I
am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to
this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
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Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative
or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity
or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the
period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the
Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. L-63915
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized,
access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City
Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA
392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of
the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security
System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the
Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been
submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
6/17/2018 G.R. No. L-63915
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21
of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of all
statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs.
Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 187378
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO
BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as
Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated
March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the
Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization,

founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism,
and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of
indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016
which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are
petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building
Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for
a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,8 otherwise
known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas
Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final
Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still the same remained
unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02,
Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association,
corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or
temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the
subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP),
which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas,
including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress
thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures
it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was
also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, injunction
and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior
vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
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possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said
island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to
their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject
ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The
Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should
be enjoined.17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not the
lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public
domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing requirements for the
passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any
positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on
the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly
approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it
posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish
sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the national government, through the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered,
among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to
remove the structures they built thereon without valid building permits22 since they were found to have no title over
the disputed property.23
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to
declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave
credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places in their
municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted with various groups before
the subject ordinance was passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with
sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of
the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the
subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the
CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the Capayas
Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.34
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. –
(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall
forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving
the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 187378
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to
the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within
a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his
comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its
decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred
upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and
shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage
of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the
SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said ordinance was
submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section
56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, "action." It
is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang
panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x
x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a statute
must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as
contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions
are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the
enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not published nor
posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a
public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare
allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance
was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the publication and posting
requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with
the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise,
petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of
Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance
therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings
were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local
government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence
to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other
hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject
ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for
anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the
Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the
ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore
unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that
said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the
provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different
municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive
proof to the contrary.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 187378
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to
rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no
public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or
legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its possession.
Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without
building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 9-22.
2 Id. at 31-46. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and
Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
3 Id. at 25-29.
4 Id. at 55-71. Penned by Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-Encinareal.
5 Id. at 32.
6 Id. at 11.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 187378
7 Id. at 32-33.
8 "ADOPTING A NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (NBCP) THEREBY REVISING

REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SIXTY-FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE (R.A. NO. 6541)."
9 Rollo , p. 34.
10 Records, pp. 28-29. Entitled "AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING CAPAYAS ISLAND AND ITS
SURROUNDINGS, MANSABAY BAJO AND SIBULA AS BIRDS, FISH AND SHELLS SANCTUARY
LOCATED WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL WATERS OF LOPEZ JAENA WITH A TOTAL AREA OF SIXTY THREE
POINT ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN (63.197) HECTARES, THREE (3) HECTARES AND THREE (3)
HECTARES RESPECTIVELY."
11 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
12 Records, p. 28. See subject ordinance.
13 Rollo, pp. 34-35.
14 Id. at 35.
15 Id. at 36.
16 "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."
17 Records, p. 5.
18 Id. at 76-81.
19 Rollo , pp. 55-71.
20 Id. at 67-68.
21 Id. at 71.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 70.
24 Id. at 31-46.
25 Id. at 39-40.
26 Id. at 40-41.
27 Id. at 43.
28 Id. at 42.
29 Id. at 43.
30 Id. at 42-43.
31 Id. at 45.
32 Id. at 47-53.
33 Id. at 25-29.
34 Id. at 13.
35 See id. at 14-15.
36 Id. at 14.
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37 Id. at 38-39.
38 SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. – (a) ordinances with penal
sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or Barangay hall, as the
case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published
in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned, except in the case of Barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said
ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting,
whichever occurs later.
xxxx
39 Records, p. 60. A "dialogue-consultation" was conducted by the SB on June 13, 2002.
40 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
41 364 Phil. 683(1999).
42 34 Phil. 825 (1916).
43 Figuerres v. CA, supra note 41, at 692-693.
44 Rollo, p. 70.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 46623
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.

Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that
rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the contract
Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners
of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they
are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor,
with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to
the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of the decision; and
absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by
the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of
title No. 325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in
favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all
liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil case to the
end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of
homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No.
325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496,
which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No.
285; that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which he received
from the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to the
respondents; that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or encumbering the
land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu
thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special defense
alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage
contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified
by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent
interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the respondents be declared to have a better
right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the
improvements which he introduced upon the land. lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of
legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial
Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L.,
hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as follows:
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ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of
Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead certificate
of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay
Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E.
307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º
53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning,
"Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on
bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on
the South, by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property claimed by
Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and
in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8,
1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6)
boñga trees.
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the improvements is
P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency,
paid by the party of second part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the
party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements
described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall well and truly
pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th
day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution of this instrument, the
aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage
shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, and
subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs and
also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure. lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or may become
due on the above described land and improvements during the term of this agreement.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party of the first part
shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of
Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a
certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years stipulated in this
mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of
the property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all unpaid interests at the rate
of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved by the Court,
the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated under
Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first herein before
written.
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.

BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her sex, to me known
and known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that she
executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the acknowledgment and
that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the witnesses in their presence and in
the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one parcel.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO

Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
Doc. No. 178

Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was
unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and
the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the
petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the
loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax
declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from
P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that the
contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and
sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect the entire
Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties, ordering, however, the
respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and
that it is void and without any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should
always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this
rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted
in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted
according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show
that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per
annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the
parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties
entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment
of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana
Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in
which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was
covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the
Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another
be issued under the provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the
parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years
and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the
same amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the
motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the
contract of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
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Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect
that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid
and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which
expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the
rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but should
they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal obligation. Under
the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based
upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact
suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of
the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the
nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do several
things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or the
promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made
for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and
for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory
provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. . . . (13
C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97
U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall.
175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal
contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a
homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law. The second, or
the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section
23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted
banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the
mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the loan together with interest, she would
execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest stipulated
and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense
that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he
would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. These
pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into,
converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being
a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is well-founded and that
error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between the parties was one of absolute sale of the
land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of error the petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act because he
entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said
document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already said that certain pacts thereof are
illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement entered into
between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and last
assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in bad
faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of his right
to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements introduced by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into another verbal
contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to
introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he would
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assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land,
considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already
stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because
he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter
could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not expressly define what is
meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the
manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides further,
that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code, covered
by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part
of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same,
and could transmit the title thereto." We do not have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last
article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he
knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be deemed a
possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it
is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found established
by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question
is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in
connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the
acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent
authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies against the
qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private
documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently.
However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and
another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the
interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is
possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain
formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful
doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is
not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section
116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change
of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an
act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to
about which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold
that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having
introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable;
wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner the
value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may elect to compel the
petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be fixed by the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the sum of P650, being
the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as the trial court
that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not established such damages. Under the verbal contract
between the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would take
possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition that he would no
longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at
bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the
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payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements characterizing the
contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that
the value of the fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing remained
after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas
the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached said amount in view of the fact that the
assessed value of said improvements was, according to the decision, P860. To this should be added the fact that,
under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax.
We mention these data here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value of the
fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the
secured indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract
of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed
upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a null and without effect;
(3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have the improvements
introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and
have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court
of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy
the mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by
paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the
value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the petitioner
may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of
his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So ordered.
Diaz, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
According to the contract entered into May 16, 1932, between Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner Marcial
Kasilag, the first, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 given to her by the second, constituted a mortgage on the
improvements only of the land which she acquired by way of homestead. The improvements which she mortgaged
consisted of four fruit bearing mango trees, one hundred ten hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind tree and 6 betelnut
trees, the assessed value of which was P660. The condition of the loan were that if the mortgagor should pay the
mortgage on November 16, 1936, that is, four and a half years after the execution of the deed, said sum of P1,000
with interest thereon at 12% per annum, the aforesaid mortgage would become null and void, otherwise it would
remain in full force and effect and would b subject to foreclosure in the manner provided by law; that the mortgagor
would pay all the land tax on the land and its improvements during the duration of the contract; and that if after the
expiration of the said period of four and a half years the mortgagor should fail to redeem the mortgage, she would
execute in favor of the mortgage an absolute deed of sale of the property described in the contract for the same sum
of P1,000 plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
The principal rule in the interpretation of contracts is that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed. If the words appear to
be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail" (article 1281, Civil Cod). "In
order to judge as to the intention of the contracting parties, attention must be paid principally to their conduct at the
time of making the contract and subsequently thereto." (Article 1282.)
Now, then what is the true nature of the contract entered into between the parties by virtue of the deed of sale
executed by them on May 16, 1932? The Court of Appeals held that it is an absolute deed of sale of a land with a
homestead certificate of title, under the guise of a loan secured by a mortgage upon its improvements in order to go
around the prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517.
Closely examined, the only clauses of the contract which may lead to the conclusion that it is one of the sale are
those which state that if at the expiration of the period of four years and a half the mortgagor should fail to pay the
amount of the loan plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, she would execute in favor of
the mortgagee a deed of absolute sale of the land whose improvements were mortgaged for the amount of the loan
and the interest owing. It will be seen that the sale would not be made until after the lapse of four and a half years
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from the execution of the deed, if the mortgagor should fail or should not wish to redeem the mortgaged
improvements. Consequently, the obligation contracted by said mortgagor was no more than a conditional promise
to sell. Now, then, is this a promise to sell valid? Like any other onerous, consensual and mutually binding contract,
that of promise to sell requires for its legal existence and validity the concurrence of consent, consideration and
subject-matter. The contract before us dos not show what is the cause or consideration for such promise to sell.
Assuming that it was the economic impotence of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged improvements, before she
could be compelled to comply with her obligation to sell, there is need to wait until she should fail of funds or to
abandonment. The cause will come into being only upon the happening of said event after the four and half years
and only then will the said contract of promise to sell have juridical existence. The P1,000 and its interest, should the
mortgagor fail to redeem the improvements upon the maturity of the indebtedness, would be the consideration of the
sale; because the promise to sell is a contract different and distinct from that of sale and each requires a
consideration for its existence and validity.
The terms of the contract are clear and explicit and do not leave room for doubt that the intention of the contracting
parties was to constitute a mortgage on the improvements of the land in litigation to secure the payment of the loan
for P1,000, within interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum. It cannot be said that this contract is simulated
because the assessed value of the improvements is P860 only. It is well known that rural properties are valued for
assessment purposes not less than half of their market value. The true value of the said improvements may
therefore be P1,720, and the mortgagee may have considered that adequate. Moreover, the petitioner could not
have the property whose improvements were mortgaged to him the property whose improvements were mortgaged
to him even should the mortgagor default in the payment of interest. He could only have the mortgaged
improvements in case of foreclosure should he bid therefor at the sale. Neither could the mortgagor sell the same
property to the mortgagee, even after the expiration of five years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of
title, for then the sale would be in satisfaction of an obligation contracted during the five years, which is prohibited by
the oft-mentioned section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517. The fact that after one
year the contracting parties had novated the contract of loan secured by a mortgagee, converting the same into a
contract of anti-chresis because of the mortgagor's failure to pay the accrued interest, does not show that they
intended to enter into a contract of sale, because the conversion in this case of the contract of loan secured by a
mortgage into one of antichresis was accidental, due to the mortgagor's default in the payment of unpaid interest for
the first year. if the parties' intention from the beginning had been to sell the property, the mortgagee would have
immediately entered upon the possession of the land instead of waiting until after the expiration of one year. The
transfer of the Torrens certificate of title to the homestead by the original owner to the mortgagee in 1934 was only a
consequence of the conversion of the mortgage loan into an anti-chretic loan, the parties having such a transfer.
The setting off of the interest on the debt against the fruits of the property given in antichresis finds authority in
article 1885 of the of the Civil Code. There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the terms of the contract warranting the
search outside its four corners for the true intention of the contracting parties other than that of entering into a
contract of loan secured by the said improvements. If the true intention of the contracting parties, as clearly gathered
from the terms of the contract, was to enter into a contract, was to enter into a contract of loan secured by a
mortgage upon the improvements, although they should convert it into a contract of antichresis after one year and
although after the maturity of the loan with interest they may wish to convert it into one of absolute sale — both
conversions being illegal and, hence, void, — 8 the original intention of entering into a contract of loan secured by a
mortgagee upon the improvements would prevail, the said contract of loan being the only one legal and valid, and
the petitioner having acted in good faith in making it.
The verbal contract of antichresis, entered into by the petitioner Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio, being null
and void ab initio and without any legal effect because it is in violation of the express prohibition of section 116 of
Act No. 2874 as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, (article 4 of the Civil Code), the contracting parties should
restore to each other the things which have been the subject-matter of the contract, together with their fruits, and the
price paid therefor, together with interest, pursuant to Article 1303 of the same Code. Marcial Kasilag, therefore,
should return to Emiliana Ambrosio or to her heirs the possession of the homestead and the improvements thereon
with its fruits, and Emiliana Ambrosio or her heirs should pay him the sum of P1,000, being the amount of the loan,
plus interest due and unpaid.
As to the improvements introduced upon the land by the petitioner, having done so with the knowledge and consent
of its owner Emiliana Ambrosio, the former acted in good faith, and under article 361 of the Civil Code, the owner of
the land may have the said improvements upon paying the indemnity provided in articles 453 and 454, or may
compel the said Marcial Kasilag, who introduced the said improvements, to pay the price of the land. If the herein
respondents, as heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio, do not wish or are unable to pay for said improvements, and Marcial
Kasilag does not wish or is unable to pay the land, said petitioner would lose his right of intention over the same
(Bernardo vs. Batalan, 37 Off. G., No. 74, p. 1382), provided that he may remove the improvements which he had
introduced in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I concur in the majority opinion except insofar as it holds that the interest is set off against
the fruits of the mortgaged improvements, because as a result of the nullity of the contract of antichresis the
petitioner should return to the respondents the products of the mortgaged improvements, and the latter should pay
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to the petitioner the amount of the loan plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the
date of the contract until fully paid.
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result:
On August 27, 1918, Emiliana Ambrosio put in a homestead application for lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastre,
Province of Bataan. After complying with the requisite legal formalities, she obtained therefor homestead patent No.
16074, the same having been recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on Juner 26, 1931. On May 16, 1932,
she entered with the herein petitioner, Marcial Kasilag, into a contract, Exhibit 1, inserted in the foregoing majority
opinion.
Sometime in 1933, or a year after the execution of the aforequoted and land taxes, whereupon, the mortgage,
Marcial Kasilag, and the mortgagor, Emiliana Ambrosio, verbally agreed that the former would pay the land taxes
and waive the unpaid interest, enter into the possession of the property in question, introducing improvements
thereon, and thereafter be reimbursed for the value of such improvements. Under this verbal pact, Kasilag went into
possession of the property, planted it with the fruit trees allegedly valued at P5,000, and on May 22, 1934, declared
the same for taxation purposes. In 1934 the original homesteader, Emiliana Rodriguez, Severo Mapilisan, Ignacio
del Rosario and Gavino Rodriguez.
On May 16, 1936, the said heirs, with the exception Gavino Rodriguez who testified for the defendant, sued Marcial
Kasilag in the Court of First Instance of Bataan to recover the possession of the aforesaid property belonging to their
mother. For answer, the defendant put in as was in good faith with the knowledge and tolerance of the plaintiffs, a
counterclaim for P1,000 representing the loan to the deceased homesteader with stipulated interest there on, and a
recoupment for P5,000 allegedly the value of the improvements he had introduced upon the land. On the issues
thus joined, the trial court gave judgment for the defendant couched in the following language:
Resuming all that has been said above, the court find and declares that the deed of combined mortgage and
sale executed by Emiliana Ambrosio in favor of the defendant Marcial Kasilag and dated May 16, 1932, is null
and void as a contract for a future conveyance or sale of the homestead, but valid as an equitable mortgage
on the improvements for the sum of P1,000; and that the possession of the homestead by the defendant
Marcial Kasilag by virtue of said contract or by virtue of any other agreement is null and void, but that the
making of the improvements thereon by him, which the court finds to be valued at P3,000, by virtue of the
verbal agreement entered into after the executing of the original instrument of mortgage, was in good faith,
entitling the said Marcial Kasilag to be reimbursed of their actual value, the above-mentioned amount.
Wherefore, let judgment be entered declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession as owners of the
homestead subject of the present suit, lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey, subject to an encumbrance
of the improvements for the sum of P1,000 in favor of the defendant, ordering the defendant deliver unto the
plaintiffs in turn to pay unto the defendant jointly and severally, as heirs of their deceased mother Rafaela
Rodriguez the sum of P3,000, value of the improvements introduced on said homestead by defendant. Let
there be no pronouncement as to costs." On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals reached a different result and modified the judgment of the trial court as follows:
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the contract, Exhibit "1", is entirely
null and void; that the plaintiffs and appellants are the owners of the lot in question together with all the
improvements thereon in common with their brother, Gavino Rodriguez, and are, therefore, entitled to the
possession thereof; ordering the defendant and appellee to vacate and deliver the possession of the
aforementioned plaintiffs and appellants free from any encumbrance; requiring latter, however, to pay jointly
and severally to the said appellee the sum of P1,000 with the interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from and including the date this decision becomes final; and absolving the said plaintiffs and
appellants from the cross-complaint with respect to the value of the improvements claimed by the appellee.
It is further ordered that the register of deeds of Bataan cancel the certificate of title No. 325 in the name of
the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, and issue in lieu thereof anew certificate of title in favor of the herein
plaintiffs and appellants and their brother, Gavino Rodriguez, as owners pro indiviso and in equal shares free
from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided by law.
Without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The case is before us on petition for certiorari which was given due course, filed by defendant-appellee, Marcial
Kasilag, now petitioner, against plaintiffs-appellants, Rafaela Rodriguez and others, now respondents. The burden of
petitioner's case is condensed in the following assignments of error:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred:
I. In having interpreted that document Exhibit "1" is an absolute sale and declared it entirely null and void, and
in not having interpreted and declared that it is a deed of combined mortgage and future sale which, if void as
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a contract for future conveyance of the homestead in question is, however, valid as an equitable mortgage on
the improvements thereof for the sum of P1,000 loaned by petitioner Marcial Kasilag to the homestead owner
Emiliana Ambrosio.
II. In holding that the petitioner was guilty of the violation of the public land law for having entered into said
contract Exhibit "1".
III. In not giving probative value to the uncontradicted testimony of the petitioner Marcial Kasilag that he was
expressly authorized by the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio to introduction by him of improvements
therein by virtue of the verbal agreement entered into after the execution of the original instrument of
mortgage was in good faith, entitling him to reimbursed of the actual value of improvements he introduced.
Boiled down to the fundamentals, there are only two propositions which stands to be resolved in this appeal: (1)
What is the legal nature of the agreement, Exhibit 1, entered into by and between the parties? and (2) Is Marcial
Kasilag guilty of bad faith in entering upon the possession of the homestead, paying the land tax and introducing
improvements thereon?
The numerous adjudications in controversies of this nature will show that each case must be decided in the light of
the attendant circumstances and the situation of the parties which, upon the whole, mark its character. However, for
the purpose of ascertaining the manner and extent to which persons have intended to be found by their written
agreements, the safe criterion, the time honored test, is their contention which is intimately woven into the
instrument itself. It is true that resort to extrinsic evidence is imperative when the contract is ambiguos and is
susceptible of divergent interpretations; nevertheless, the primary obligation of the courts is to discover the intention
of the contracting parties, as it is expressed by the language of the document itself. We are not authorized to make
a contract for the parties.
In the trial court as in the Court of Appeals, the discussion centered on the nature and validity of the document,
Exhibit 1. This is the correct approach. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the conclusion of the trial court that
it is an absolute deed of sale which is null and void in its entirely because it is banned by section 116, as amended
of the Public land Act. The ruling is now assailed by the petitioner. I share petitioner's view that the deed is not what
it was construed to be by the Court of Appeals.
From Article I to III thereof is a description of the homestead and the improvements existing thereon. By its Article IV
the homesteader, Emiliana Ambrosio, "encumbers and hipothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements
described in Articles II and III" under the conditions set out in Articles V, VI and VII. Its closing Articles VIII and IX,
particularly relied upon by the Court of Appeals, speak, not of a present deed of absolute sale, but of one to be
executed "upon the expiration of the period of time (4½ years) stipulated in the mortgage" if "the mortgagor should
fail to redeem this mortgage". In other words, the redemption of the mortgage by the payment of the loan may bring
about the frustration of contemplated sale, hence, to hold unqualifiedly that the whole of Exhibit 1, or even a part
thereof, is an absolute deed of sale would be to do violence to the terms of the document it self.
Still other tokens drive home the same conviction. The intimation by the Court of Appeals that the petitioner "know,
therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express prohibition of law," is an argument
that the petitioner could not have brazenly disregarded the law by intending Exhibit 1 to be an absolute deed of sale.
Its further observation that "the stipulation under article VIII of the contract, Exhibit '1' . . . clearly indicates that there
was nothing left to be done except the execution of the deed of absolute sale," is a concession that no such sale
has yet been executed. Finally it will be recalled that under Article VII of Exhibit 1, "within thirty (30) days after date
of execution of this agreement the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance of
Balanga, Bataan, P.I., requesting cancellation of homestead certificate of title No. 325 referred to in Article 1 hereof
and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act 496, as
amended by Act 3901." And by its Article IX it provides "That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII
hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and void."
(Underlining is mine.) We have nothing in the record to show that the required motion was filed within thirty days or
thereafter, by Emiliana Ambrosio in life, or by her successors-in-interest after her death. Indeed, Homestead
Certificate of Title No. 325, sought to be substituted by another through the said motion, still stands. It is, evident,
therefore, that the projected sale has and may never come into being, because under Article IX of Exhibit 1, it
became automatically null and void. This view, incidentally, precludes further consideration of the validity or invalidity
of the sale clause of Exhibit 1, as it will purely academic to dwell upon the nature and effect of a contract that has
passed out of existence in the contemplation of the parties.
Having reached the conclusion, upon its plain language and unequivocal import, that Exhibit 1 is essentially and
fundamentally a mortgage upon the improvements found on the questioned homestead, with a conditional clause for
the future sale of said homestead and improvements which has become a "dead twig" still attached to a living tree
because the condition has never been performed, I would, under Articles 1281 and 1283 of the Civil Code, be
otherwise content in resting our decision of this aspect of the case on this interpretation. But I do not propose to so
limit my inquiry in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals points to contemporaneous and subsequent
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circumstances, beyond the four corners of the document, Exhibit 1, allegedly revelatory of petitioner's concealed but
evident intention to circumvent the law. I may state, at the outset, that these circumstances are fairly susceptible of
legitimate explanations. The appealed decision could not conceive of a man, of petitioner's intelligence, who "would
accept improvements valued at only P860 as security for the payment of a larger amount of P1,000." But we are
concerned with an assessed valuation which is not always nor even frequently the value that it can command in the
market. To ignore this is to live in monastic seclusion. The appealed decision would imply from the fact that
petitioner subsequently paid the land taxes and from the further fact that Emiliana never paid stipulated interest on
the one thousand-peso loan, that Exhibit 1 was meant to vest absolute title irretrievably in the petitioner. It could
hardly be supposed at the time of the execution of Exhibit 1 that the homesteader would fail to make these
payments, nor does it seem just to draw from these circumstances, induced by Emiliana's own neglect, deductions
unfavorable to the petitioner. That the petitioner went upon the possession of the questioned property is not proof
that he was even already the would-be owner thereof, for as elsewhere stated, the said possession came practically
at the suggestion of or at least with the consent of Emiliana Ambrosio as a result of her failure to live up to her part
of the bargain. Finally, the Court of Appeals asked: "If the real purpose was to mortgage the improvements only as
specified in article IV of the contract, why is it that in article VIII thereof it was provided that in case of failure to
redeem the alleged mortgage the grantor would be required to execute a de of absolute sale of the property
described therein for the same amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not of" the improvements only'?"
The precaution which the petitioner took to have the sale clause of Exhibit I so phrased that the said sale would not
be affected until after the expiration of the five-year period prohibited by law, at which time the alienation of the
homestead would then have been perfectly legitimate, may not be without significance to show petitioner's respect
for and intention to be on the side of the law. The very mention of the word "sale" in the document in question
argues against any attempt at concealment, for if the said document was intended as a cover and cloak of an illegal
alienation, then the reference to the contract of sale therein was illtimed and foolhardy.
The question next at hand is whether or not the mortgage constituted upon the improvement's of the homestead is
valid. It is, under express provisions of section 116 of the Public Land Act, before and after its amendment, reading
pertinently that "the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations." I find no occasion to dispute this legislative policy however mistaken it may be. It is
sufficient to observe that what the law permits may be done. Upon the other hand, I find no occasion to test the
legality of the sale provisions of Exhibit 1, as I have heretofore said, this question is, in my opinion, moot. Moreover,
the petitioner, technically, is barred from raising this question, as he did not appeal from and, therefore, abided by
the decision of the trial court which outlawed this sale clause as violative of the provisions of section 116 of the
Public Land Act. This part of the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals when the latter
struck down Exhibit 1 in its entirety and, even now, petitioner does not complain against the destruction of Exhibit 1
with respect to its sale clause. In other words, counsel for petitioner concedes all along that the said sale clause
may be properly legislated out. As the mortgage provisions of Exhibit 1 are independent of and severable from the
rest thereof, the same are perfectly enforceable. Where a part of the contract is perfectly valid and separable from
the rest, the valid portion should not be avoided. (Ollendorf vs. Abrahamson, 38 Phil., 585.)
The question yet to be answered is whether the petitioner's possession of the question homestead was in good faith
so as to entitle him to reimbursement for improvements introduced upon the land. The basis of petitioner's
possession was a verbal agreement with the original homesteader whereby, for failure of the latter to comply with
her obligations to pay land taxes and stipulated interest on the loan, the former assumed the said obligations for the
privilege of going into possession of the property, introducing improvements thereon, and thereafter being
reimbursed for the value of such improvements. The petitioner did enter upon such possession, planted the land to
fruit trees valued at P5,000, according to him, and P3,000, according to the trial judge. It should be stated, in
passing, that the Court of Appeals was unable to belie this verbal agreement, although it was of the opinion "that the
trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the appellee with reference to the alleged verbal
agreement". Its reason for the opinion is not because the testimony is untrue, but because even if it were true, "it
only tends to corroborate the allegation that he acted in bad faith when he took possession of the property and
made improvements thereon, because then he knew full well that the homestead owner could not enter into an
agreement involving the future final and absolute alienation of the homestead in his favor." As the said opinion and
the reason back of it does not involve a question of strict fact, it is in our power to inquire into its soundness. The
weakness of the argument lies, first, in its, (a) inconsistency and (b) in the misconception of the legal principle
involved: inconsistency, because it considers entry of possession, payment of land tax as facts tending to show the
real character of the transaction and as evidencing bad faith on the part of the petitioner, but at the same time it
improperly rejects the verbal agreement by which such facts are established. It is clear that we cannot directly reject
the verbal agreement between the parties in so fat as it is favorable to the petitioner. The misconception proceeds
from the erroneous legal conclusion that, upon the facts, the good faith is attributable to the petitioner alone and that
Ambrosio was not to be blamed for the prohibited alienation of the homestead, as I shall presently proceed to
discuss.
In holding that the petitioner was a possessor in bad faith, the decision sought to be reviewed first laid down the
premise that such possession is banned by law at least for five years from the issuance of patent (section 116,
Public Land Act), assumed that the petitioner had knowledge of such law, and then drew the conclusion that the
petitioner was aware of the illegality of his possession. We think that the assumption and conclusion are precipitate.
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As observed in the foregoing majority opinion-citing Manresa-knowledge of a legal provision does not necessarily
mean knowledge of its true meaning and scope, or of the interpretation which the courts may place upon it. In this
particular case, what section 116 of the Public Land Act prohibits is the "incumbrance or alienation" of land acquired
thereunder within the period prescribed therein. We may concede, as assumed by the appealed decision, that the
petitioner was cognizant of said section 116, but this is not saying that petitioner knew that his possession came
under the phrase "incumbrance or alienation" prohibited by law, and that the petitioner, therefore, knew that his
possession was illegal. The import of the phrase "incumbrance or alienation" is a subject upon which "men of reason
may reasonably differ," in the same way that we ourselves have differed in the deliberation of this case. It is not
correct to assume that the petitioner had knowledge of the illegality of his possession. The contrary assumption,
namely, that petitioner had no idea of such illegality, would have been more in accord with the experience of
everyday, for petitioner would not have invested money and labor in the land and assumed obligations incumbent
upon the homesteader if he had even the least suspicion that all his efforts would count for nothing and would in the
end entangle him in a mild scandal. As possession in bad faith does not necessarily mean possession illegal under
the law, it being necessary that the possessor be aware of such illegality, it follows that the petitioner's possession of
the homestead of the respondents was in good faith. (Art. 433, Civil Code.) "Good faith is always presumed, and the
burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the person alleging it" (article 434, Civil Code.)
As a bona fide possessor, and it being unquestioned that the improvements introduced by him upon the land
redounded to its benefit, the petitioner is by law entitled to be paid for the value of such improvements in the amount
of P3,000, as found by the trial judge. "Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in his possession having the option of refunding the amount of
such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the thing has acquired by reason thereof." ( Article 453,
2nd par., Civil Code). The reimbursement in this particular case is the more in order in view of the express
undertaking of respondent's predecessor-in-interest to pay therefor.
Even the equities of the case militate against the respondents and in favor of the petitioner. There is a concession
that the petitioner's possession was neither imposed upon nor wrested from the homesteader; on the contrary, it
came about by virtue of a mutual agreement whereby the said homesteader and the herein respondents were
spared the burden of paying for land taxes and stipulated interest and extended the benefit of having their land
improved on condition that they pay the value of such improvements upon redeeming the land. We also have
uncontradicted fact that P400 of the one thousand-peso loan were given to the herein respondents and the balance
kept by their mother. They may not reap and retain these benefits at the same time repudiate and go back upon
contractual obligations solemnly entered into.
But let grant that the contract, Exhibit 1, is one of absolute sale, as found by the Court of Appeals, what then? As the
land could not be alienated for five years from the date of the issuance of the patent, the sale was illegal and void
because it was entered into in violation of section 116 of the Public Land Act, as amended. By whom was the law
violated? Certainly, not by Kasilag alone but by Ambrosio as well. Both are presumed to know the law, and we
cannot justly charge Kasilag alone with that knowledge on the alleged reason that Kasilag is rich and Ambrosio is
poor. Neither can we proceed on the bare assumption that because Exhibit 1 was written in English it was prepared
by Kasilag as if he were the only English-speaking person in the Province of Bataan where the document was
executed. Are we already living in the midst of a communistic society that we shall have to incline invariably the
balance in favor of a litigant who happens to be well-to-do, regardless of the merits of the case? And to this end,
shall we, by a series of assumptions and deductions, impute to a party malice aforethought dishonesty and bad
faith, in entering into a transaction made in the open sun, publicly recorded and whose effectiveness was even
conditioned by the approval of a court of justice? If so, then I dare say that we have not profited by the admonition of
Aristotle in his Metaphysics centuries ago that "justice is a virtue of the soul which discards party, friendship and
sentiment and is therefore always represented as blind." There is a charm in rhetoric but its value in cool judicial
reasoning is nil.
And if — as we are confidently told — we should relax the legal principle with reference to Ambrosio, because she
was "poor and ignorant," I am reluctant to believe that she was ignorant of the condition against the alienation
inserted in all homestead patents, and my knowledge of the Public Land Law, of the activities of the Department and
bureau charged with the administration of public lands, gives me just the contrary impression. Every homestead
patent contains that condition. Circulars and instructions and general information have been issued in pursuance
with law. (Sec. 5, Act No. 2874; see also sec. 5, Comonwealth Act No. 141.) I must presume that the Government
and its officials charged with the administration of public lands have complied with the law and their duties in this
connection, and I cannot believe that Ambrosio, when she alienated the property, was unaware of the legal
prohibition. Under the circumstances, then, it is reasonable to conclude that on the hypothesis that the document,
Exhibit 1, was a contract of absolute sale between Kasilag and Ambrosio, both of them were guilty of infraction of
the law. If this is correct, what is the legal situation of the parties?
Justinian, who, by his Corpus Juris Civiles, still speaks through practically all the civil codes of Continental Europe,
considers both as having acted in good faith. "Realmente," bluntly observes Manresa, "si los dos que se encuentran
en lucha sobre la propiedad han provocado el conflicto por su voluntad; a ciencia y paciencia del dueno del suelo,
ante cuya vista las obras se han ejecutado, y con conciencia, por parte del que edifica o planta, de que el terreno
no es suyo, no hay razon alguna que abone derecho preferente en favor de ninguno de los dos; deben, por tanto,
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tratarse como si los dos hubiesen obrado de buena fe; la mala fe del uno extingue y neutraliza, en justa
reciprocidad, la del otro." (Manresa, Codigo Civil segunda edicion Tomo III pag. 203.) Article 364 of our Civil Code
then comes into play. "Where there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sewed, or
planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if
they had acted in good faith. Bad faith on the part of the owner is deemed to exist whenever the act has been done
in his presence, with his knowledge and tolerance, and without opposition on his part." ( Article 364, Civil Code; see
also arts. 1303, 1306 ibid.) The codal section is evidently based upon the vulnerable maxim of equity that one who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. A court which seeks to enforce on the part of the defendant
uprightness, fairness, and conscientiousness also insists that, if relief is to be granted, it must be to a plaintiff whose
conduct is not inconsistent with the standards he seeks to have applied to his adversary.
Fundamenta justitiae sunt, ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi serviatur. I therefore concur in the result.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
In view of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are final according to law, I dissent from the majority
opinion as to the legal denomination of the contract really entered into by the petitioners and the now deceased
Emiliana Ambrosio.
The facts according to the decision of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On August 27, 1918, the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio applied for the land in question as a homestead, now
known as lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was approved on
September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on November 10, 1927 which was approved on October 17,
1929. The homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No. 325 were issued in favor of the
applicant on June 11, 1931 which were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of registrar of deeds in
accordance with the provisions of section 122 of Act 496.
"On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the defendant
and appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title found that it was a homestead patent and knew,
therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express prohibition of law, so he devised a
means by which the proposed sale might not appear in any document and had the patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio,
execute a public instrument, Exhibit '1', purporting to be a mere mortgage of the improvements thereon consisting of
four mango trees, fruit bearing; 110 hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind, and 6 boñga trees, with the assessed value of
P860, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 alleged to have been loaned by the said Kasilag to the said patentee,
Emiliana Ambrosio. It was expressly stipulated in that document that the aforementioned amount should be paid
within four and a half years from the date of the instrument (May 16, 1932), the condition being that if she would fail
to redeem the alleged mortgage at the expiration of the stipulated period, she would execute a deed of absolute sale
of the property therein described for the same amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000) including all unpaid interest
at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the alleged mortgagee. It was further stipulated therein that the said
Emiliana should pay all the taxes and assessment which might become due on the land and improvements during
the term of the agreement and that within thirty days after the date of the execution thereof she should file a motion
before the Court of First Instance of Bataan requesting the cancellation of the homestead certificate No. 325 above
referred to and the issuance in lieu thereof a certificate of title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act 496,
as amended by Act 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in the name of the homestead (owner)
Emiliana Ambrosio, and assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was
raised to P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or paid taxes on the land since the
execution of the contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellant entered upon the actual possession of the land and had
been holding the same up to the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued according to
him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for his own exclusive benefit.
Relying upon the foregoing facts, the majority contends that the contract executed by the parties was one of
mortgage, as per Exhibit 1, with a promise to sell the land in question. I cannot hold to these rulings of the majority,
because the nature of the contract of mortgage is inconsistent with the idea that the creditor should immediately
enter upon a possession of the mortgaged land; that he should pay the land tax; that he should accept as security
something whose values does not cover the amount of the loan sought to be secured, for in this case the supposed
loan was P1,000, and what were mortgaged were only the improvements consisting of 4 mango trees, 110 hills of
bamboo trees, 1 tamarind tree and 6 betelnut trees, assessed at P860.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 46623
I believe that the contract which the parties intended to execute is a promise to sell the land, for which reason
Ambrosio retained the right of ownership of the land and its improvements while the deed of the promised sale had
not been executed. Under the terms of the deed Exhibit 1, Kasilag could not be considered the owner of the land,
nor could he execute any act promised upon the assumption of ownership, nor could he alienate the same as he
had no title to it. But the parties, in consideration of the fact that Kasilag paid in advance the price of the land and
assumed the obligation to pay the tax thereon, which Ambrosio could not pay, agreed that Kasilag may enter upon
the enjoyment of the land until the promise to sell is converted in fact into an absolute sale by the execution of the
corresponding deed by Ambrosio. It was stipulated, however, that if the sale is not approved by the Court, Kasilag
would collect the amount of P1,000 paid him as a mortgage credit, with all the interest due and payable.
Under these circumstances, the conclusion of law that Kasilag acted in bad faith is not supported by the established
facts.
Wherefore, the plaintiffs are bound to comply with the contract as heirs of Ambrosio, by executing in favor of Kasilag
the deed of sale of the land, but should the sale, for any reason, be not approved, Kasilag may collect the amount of
P1,000 with all the interest thereon, and may execute the judgment obtained by him upon the land and all its
improvements, deducting, however, in his favor the value of the improvements which he introduced upon the land in
good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and that
another should be entered against the respondents, requiring them to execute the deed of sale of the land in favor
of the petitioner, provided that if the sale, for any reason, be not approved by the court, the petitioner may execute
his credit upon the land and all its improvements, after deducting the value of the improvements introduced by him
upon the land.
MORAN, J., dissenting:
According to section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, "lands acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period."
About June 11, 1931, homestead patent No. 16074 was issued to Emiliana Ambrosio, now deceased. On May 16,
1932 Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale of the said homestead to the herein petitioner, Marcial Kasilag, and in view
of the above-quoted legal prohibition, the parties executed the document Exhibit 1, copied in the majority decision.
The heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio filed a complaint for the annulment of the contract in the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, and from the judgment rendered by said court an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, which held that
the true contract between the parties is one of absolute sale, wherefore, it is null and void under the already cited
legal prohibition. Marcial Kasilag comes to this court on certiorari, and this court reverses the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The only question is as to the true contract between the parties at the time of the execution of the deed Exhibit 1;
Kasilag contends that the contract is that set out in the document Exhibit 1, that is, a mortgage of the improvements
of the homestead to secure a loan of one thousand pesos given to Emiliana Ambrosio; and the latter's heirs, in turn,
contend that the contract is one of the absolute sale of the homestead, wherefore, it is null and void. The findings of
the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the evidence of record are as follows:
On August 27, 1918 the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, applied for the land in question as a homestead, not
known as Lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was approved on
September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on November 10, 1927 which was approved on October 17,
1929. The homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No. 325 were issued in favor of the
applicant on June 11, 1931 which were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of the register of deeds in
accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496.
On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the
defendant and appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title found that it was a homestead
patent and knew, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express prohibition of
law, so he devised means by which the proposed sale might not appear in any document and had the
patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit 1, purporting to be a mere mortgage of the
improvements thereon consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; one hundred ten hills of bamboo trees,
one thousand and six boñga trees, with the assessed value of P860, in consideration of the sum of P1,000
alleged to have been loaned by the said Kasilag to the said patentee Emiliana Ambrosio. It was expressly
stipulated in that document that the aforementioned amount should be paid within four and a half years from
the date of the instrument (May 16, 1932), the condition being that if she failed to redeem the alleged
mortgage at the expiration of the stipulated period, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 46623
therein described for the same amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000) including all unpaid interest at the
rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the alleged mortgagee. It was further stipulated therein that the said
Emiliana should pay all the taxes and assessment which might become due on the land and improvements
during the term of the agreement and that within thirty days after the date of the execution thereof she should
file a motion before the Court of First Instance of Bataan requesting the cancellation of the homestead
certificate No. 325 above referred to and the issuance in lieu thereof of a certificate of title under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in the name of the homestead owner,
Emiliana Ambrosio, and assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was
raised to P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or paid taxes on the land since the
execution of the contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellee entered upon the actual possession of the land and had
been holding the same up to the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued according to
him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for his own exclusive benefit.
Construing the contract, Exhibit 1, in the light of all the foregoing facts and circumstances under which it was
executed in relation to the subsequent acts of the contracting parties, we are led to the inescapable
conclusion that their real intention was to execute an agreement of absolute sale of the homestead together
with the improvements thereon. The stipulation concerning an alleged mortgage in the instrument is a mere
devise to circumvent the law which expressly prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of the homestead
during the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the homestead patent. (Sec. 116 of Act No.
2874 as amended by Act No. 3517.)
It is inconceivable, and, therefore, we refuse to believe that the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, being an intelligent
man far above the average, would accept improvements valued at only P860 as security for the payment of a
larger amount of P1,000, the alleged loan. We entertain no doubt that at the time the execution of the
contract, Exhibit 1, the appellee knew that the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio, a poor ignorant woman,
was badly in need of money and that she was determined to dispose of and alienate definitely her
homestead, as evidenced by the fact testified to by Gavino Rodriguez as witness for the said appellee that
she actually offered to sell the land to the latter. He also knew that she would not be able to pay back to him
such a large amount with interest of 12 per cent per annum because she had no other income except what
she would derive from the homestead. Under such circumstances, there is reason to believe that she was no
longer concerned with the form in which the contract would be drawn, as long as could obtain the amount of
P1,000 which was agreeable to her as the price of the homestead she offered to sell to the appellee. This
conclusion is supported in part by the subsequent action of Emiliana in not paying any interest on the alleged
loan of P1,000 or the land taxes thereon since the execution of the contract and by the action of the appellee
in declaring the land for tax purposes in his own name as owner thereof, notwithstanding that he had no
interest in the land, as he alleged, except in the improvements only.
The contract of absolute sale was consummated, because the grantor, Emiliana, received full payment of the
purchase price disguised as a loan of P1,000 and placed the grantee, Marcial Kasilag, in absolute possession
and control of the land conveyed to him with all the improvements thereon. The stipulation under article VIII of
the contract, Exhibit I, to the effect that the grantor would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property
herein described for the said amount of this mortgage including all unpaid interest at the rate of 12 per cent
per annum in favor of the mortgagee', clearly indicates that there was nothing left to be done except the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, which is merely a matter of form in contracts of this nature, which was
postponed until after the expiration of four and a half years because by that time the period of five years
within which the property could not be alienated nor encumbered in any way, as provided by section 116 of
Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517, supra, would have already expired. If the real purpose was to
mortgage the improvements only as specified in article VIII thereof it was provided that in case of failure to
redeem the alleged mortgage the grantor would be required to execute a deed of absolute sale of the
property described therein for the same amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not of 'the
improvements only'? It is clear, therefore, that the real contract under Exhibit 1, was one of absolute sale and
not a mortgage with future sale.
In other words, although the document Exhibit 1 states that it is a mortgage of the improvements, with a stipulation
regarding a future sale of the land in case of failure to comply with the mortgage obligations, in reality the true
contract between the parties is one of absolute sale in the light of the circumstances of the case, among them the
following:
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 46623
First, Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale, not the mortgage, of her homestead to Marcial Kasilag, and it is a fact
found established by the Court of Appeals that she was agreeable to the sum of one thousand pesos as the price of
the sale offered by her. If this is so, it is unlikely that Kasilag would refuse the offer of sale of the homestead and
would accept in lieu thereof a simple mortgage of the improvements, for the same sum of one thousand pesos;
Second. In the deed it is stipulated that, if at the expiration of the period of four and a half years, the debtor should
fail to redeem the mortgage, she would execute in favor of the creditor, Marcial Kasilag, a deed of absolute sale not
only of the mortgaged improvements but also of the land for the same amount of the loan of one thousand pesos.
This magic conversion of the mortgage of the improvements into an absolute sale of the land at the expiration of
four and a half years and without any additional consideration can only mean that the two contracts are one and the
same thing, and that the first has been availed of to go around the legal prohibition. The scheme is very obvious,
and to make any attempt to reconcile it with good faith is simply to fall into it.
The mortgage of the improvements could not have been intended because the supposed loan which it guaranteed
was the same price of the stipulated sale to be later executed, and further because Kasilag knew, according to the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, that Emiliana Ambrosio was a poor and ignorant woman who was not in a
position to return to one thousand pesos;
Third. Kasilag had always considered the contract as one of sale of the land and not as a mortgage of the
improvements, because he put the tax declaration of the land in his name, paid the corresponding land tax, took
possession of the land, received the fruits thereof for his exclusive use, and introduced thereon permanent
improvements, one of them being a summer house, all of which were valued at about five thousand pesos. It is not
an attribute of a contract of mortgage that the creditor should take possession of the mortgaged property, or that he
should pay the taxes thereon. Kasilag would not spend five thousand pesos for permanent improvements if he knew
that his possession was precarious.
Fourth. In the document it is stipulated that the debtor would pay interest, but she did not pay any, and the alleged
mortgage was not foreclosed thereby, which shows that the stipulation was nothing but a ruse.
Fifth. The deed Exhibit 1 was drawn by Kasilag, because it is in English, and the other party is a poor and ignorant
woman, wherefore, all doubts and uncertainties arising therefrom should be resolved against Kasilag. It is to noted
that in this document are phrases indicative of the real contract between the parties. For instance: in clause IV the
word paid and not loaned is used in referring to the loan of one thousand pesos; and clause IX of the document
states "the foregoing contract of sale."
Under all these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that the real contract between the parties is an absolute
sale, and that the contract of mortgage was made to appear in the document Exhibit 1 for the sole purpose of
defeating the legal prohibition. Nevertheless, the majority of this Court, brushing aside the findings of fact made by
the Court of Appeals without stating its reasons therefor, holds as to the document Exhibit 1, that "as the terms
thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its
clauses." I have already shown in speaking of the second circumstance, that the context itself of the document
Exhibit 1 discloses strong tokens that the contract between the parties was one of the sale and not of mortgage.
Moreover, the rule relied upon by the majority is only applicable in the absence of any allegation that the document
does not express the real contract between the parties. Under section 285, No. 1, of Act No. 190, a document,
however clear its conditions may be, may and should be rejected when it is alleged and shown by evidence aliunde
that it does not express the true intent of the parties. We have often considered as document, by its terms a contract
of absolute sale, as one of mortgage because it has been so alleged and established by convincing oral evidence.
(Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil., 100; Villa vs. Santiago, 38 Phil., 157; Laureano vs. Kilayco, 34 Phil., 148; Cuyugan
vs. Santos, 39 Phil., 970; Rodriguez vs. Pamintuan, 37 Phil., 876; see also Manalo vs. Gueco, 42 Phil., 925;
Gatmaitan vs. Nepumuceno, 42 Phil., 295.)
The majority decision does not only pass over the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, but further, gives
weight to certain facts which said court finds not to have been established. For instance, we have the following
passages the majority decision:
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was
unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and
the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. . . . .
. . . This stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense
that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that
he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. .
...
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 46623
These two paragraphs state as an established fact the supposed verbal contract between the parties which Kasilag
tried to prove by his testimony. However, the Court of Appeals expressly held: "We believe, however, that the trial
court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the appellee (Marcial Kasilag) with reference to the alleged
verbal agreement with the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, and based thereon the conclusion that the appellee acted
in good faith," (Words in parenthesis are mine.)
Rule 47, paragraph (b), of our Rules, provides expressly that in appeals to this court on certiorari, "only questions of
law may be raised and must be distinctly set forth." And we have held in various decisions that in passing upon the
legal conclusions of the Court of Appeals, we shall abide by the findings of fact of said court.
I, moreover, find certain ambiguities in the majority decision, for while it states on the one hand that the verbal
contract had for its purpose the "alteration of the mortgage contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a
contract of antichresis," (underscoring mine) thereby implying that the mortgage contract was abandoned by the
parties and ceased to exist, in the dispositive part of its decision, the majority holds that the mortgage of the
improvements is valid and binding, and gives to the respondents the right to "redeem the mortgage of the
improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000 . . . ." It, therefore, requires
compliance with a contract that has ceased to exist.
While on the one hand the majority states that the aforesaid verbal contract is one of antichresis and that it is void,
on the other hand, it gives force thereto by holding that the interest on the loan of one thousand pesos is sufficiently
"set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which the petitioner received." And, furthermore,
why should the interest be set off against the fruits of the improvements only and not against those of the entire
land? And if the verbal contract of antichresis is void, why is Kasilag not required to render an accounting of the
fruits of the land received by him which may exceed the total amount of interest, taxes and even the principal itself?
The majority states that Kasilag, in taking possessions of the homestead, receiving its fruits and introducing
improvements thereon, did so under the void contract of antichresis, and did so in good faith as he was excusably
unaware of the legal provision which prohibits the incumbrance of the homestead within the period of five years.
Whether Kasilag was aware or unaware of the legal prohibition is again a factual question resolved by the Court of
Appeals as follows: "the appellee ( Marcial Kasilag) was also aware of these provisions which were incorporated in
the homestead patent shown to him at the beginning of the transaction" (Words in parenthesis are mine). I do not
understand how we can disturb this factual finding.
I found, moreover, that in the majority decision it is ordered that, if the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio cannot pay the
value of the permanent improvements introduced by Marcial Kasilag, the latter may have the homestead by paying
to them its price in the market. The improvements were appraised by the trial court at three thousand pesos, and as
the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio probably inherited nothing from the latter but poverty, they will eventually be unable
to pay the said amount and, in the last analysis, will lose the homestead of their mother. The practical effect,
therefore, of the majority decision is that the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio will be deprived of the homestead by virtue
of a void antichretic obligation contracted by her within the period of five years from the granting of the homestead.
And this, at least, is in violation of the spirit of section 116 of the Homestead Act.
I have other reasons which I need not set out to bring this dissent to a close. But before I conclude, I should like to
state that the Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy
citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for
subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of
comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a
duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. Moreover, a man with a home and a means of subsistence is a
lover of peace and order and will profess affection for his country, whereas one without a home and in penury is not
only a social parasite but also a dangerous element in the social order. The Homestead Act at once aims at the
promotion of wholesome and happy citizenship and the wiping out of the germs of social discontent found
everywhere.
Considering the social and economic ends of the Homestead Act, the courts should exercise supreme care and
strict vigilance towards faithful compliance with all its benign provisions and against the defeat, directly or indirectly,
of its highly commendable purposes. And it is my firm conviction that where, as in the present case, a rich and
clever man attempts to wrest a homestead granted to a poor and ignorant woman, the slightest tokens of illegality
should be enough to move the courts to apply the strong arm of the law.
I dissent from the majority decision and vote for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AVANCEÑA, C.J., dissenting:
I concur in this dissenting opinion of Justice Moran.
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6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF EDUARDO G.R. No. 157547

SIMON,
Petitioners, Present:
BRION, Acting Chairperson,**

-versus - BERSAMIN,
ABAD,***
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE Promulgated:
COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent. February 23, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance
of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a
violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.
The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to
apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to
cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/157547.htm 1/17
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the
amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
[1]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in
the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00,
coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No.
[2]
915-00). He alleged in his complaint the following:
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation
encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring
the latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex A;
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the
ground that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed
contrary to his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said
check was duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value
of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex B, but despite such
demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs valid demands,
plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as
reasonable attorneys fees the amount of P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per
appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER

FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation
upon which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in
this action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing
account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the
time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under
Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the
amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of
preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of
damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of
[3]
preliminary attachment.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment,
which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of
[4]
Simon.
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
[5]
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action
between the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X (10) entitled People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, docketed thereat as Criminal
Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said
Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of
the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a
charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in
plaintiffs hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No.
0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff
by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex 1.
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is the alleged
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among
others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo Simon renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not
contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file
a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22
in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private
complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not
represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit
demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil
action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant
overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as
follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is
based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right
to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the
negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as
drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of
the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check
payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be
negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid
and effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances
relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been
aware that such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering
that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case
without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this
instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are
created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action
may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiffs complaint the application for damages against
[6]
the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss
[7]
with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, dismissing the complaint
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to
Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as Sum of Money and the criminal
case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also
the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No.
0007280 in the amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiffs claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case
owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no
private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic
that when a complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages
and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for
them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has
instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the
waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under
Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be
logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from
recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his
right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum
of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiffs submission that the herein case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior
reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of litis pendentia;

6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiffs bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the
damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of
attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the
defendants physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
[8]
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000, viz:
Considering that the plaintiffs arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous
submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account
the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited
as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil
action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of
[9]
Chans complaint, disposing:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
[10]
review, challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia.
[11]
In his comment, Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter
embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the
valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure was warranted.
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[12]
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury
produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime
which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus,
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission
of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the
criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only
the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the
Supreme Court held:
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of
the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
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The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to

independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and

undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its
filing.
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint
was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the
respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court,
despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it
may be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given
retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may
be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages
in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the
complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[13]
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its
decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees
[14]
Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was
contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a
simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of
[15]
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[16]
In his comment, Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the
petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did
not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check
(Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give
[17]
rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the

offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay
forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v.
Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime
gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil
action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses
(United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to
receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused
the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave
the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having
to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the
face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of
the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1,
2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
[18]
shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
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case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
[19]
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,
[20]
considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that
in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
[21]
Constitution.
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97
that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules
and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check
without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action
[22]
separately shall be allowed or recognized.
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered
as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-
94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the
accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he
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shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in
the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the
proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall
take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial
[23]
Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation, thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer
needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states
that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the
inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment
of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee
uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes,
upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil
action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before
the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the
disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the
policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The
Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of
recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome
and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the
case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover
civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for
violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the
[24]
case at bar.
[25]
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez to give due course
to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was
unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with
this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the
issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
[26]
violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these
two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended
party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent
[27]
action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, as DMPI Employees has
allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to
prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising
from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the
prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both
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Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City
on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites,
[28]
the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows
that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action
involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon,
are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed
for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all
respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res
judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-
00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the
RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and
set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay
City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo.

** Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on leave per Special Order No. 925 dated January 24, 2011.
*** Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January 24, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, p. 31.
[2]
Id., pp. 35-37.
[3]
Id., pp. 35-36.
[4]
Id., p. 24.
[5]
Id., pp. 38-46.
[6]
Id., pp. 47-49.
[7]
Id., pp. 50-54.
[8]
Id., p. 56.
[9]
Id., pp. 76-79.
[10]
Id., pp. 80-88.
[11]
Id., pp. 89-97.
[12]
Id., pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V.
Cosico (retired) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria.
[13]
Id., pp. 29-30.
[14]
G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 72.
[15]
See note 19, p.16.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 105-109.
[17]
G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
[18]
Bold emphasis supplied.
[19]
Cheng v.Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.
[20]
Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197.
[21]
Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooleys Principle of Constitutional Law, p. 313.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 157547
[22]
[23]
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.
[24]
[25]
Supra, note 14.
[26]
E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos.155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338, 343.
[27]
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
[28]
Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 735.
6/17/2018 Francisco vs CA : 102330 : November 25, 1998 : J. Quisumbing : First Division
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998]
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and

CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA;
ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V.
FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate courts decision[1] promulgated
on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court which ruled,[2] thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described in paragraph eight (8)
of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage.
Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by
his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the
following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz
St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them.
Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of
attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney,
and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the
properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that
the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second
conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those
properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/nov1998/102330.htm 1/5
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI OF
THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE
(SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.[3]
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue whether or not Article 116 of the Family Code applies to this
case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.[4]
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error
in affirming the trial courts ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 158[5] and 160[6] of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the
Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New
Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article 254[7] (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her
petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without
impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256[8] in relation to Article 105[9] (second paragraph) of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in
force.[10] Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal.[11] We
shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer these on account of
the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in controversy
claimed by petitioner as conjugal are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the
latter either through inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that
Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioners allegation.
We find petitioners contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the
party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage.[12] Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[13] The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.[14]
Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing
evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.[15]
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be
conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of
Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought
into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential.
The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148[16] of the
New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is
considered his or her separate property.[17] Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired
gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
donation.[18] Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebios acquisition by succession of the land took place during
his second marriage, the land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him, during the
marriage, by lucrative title.[19]
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these properties were
either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists
that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building
permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also
invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were
acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the
issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly noted:
x x x. And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of the sari-sari store
(Exhibit F-3; Exhibit G, pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed applicant for a building permit does not
establish that these improvements were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco,
especially so when her exhibits (D-1, E, E-1, T, T-1, T-2, U, U-1 and U-2; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record;
TSN, January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all described
Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129,
Revised Rules on Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio Francisco has
thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the
expense of their partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code). Normally, this absence
of evidence on the source of funding will call for the application of the presumption under Article 160
of the New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case again,
by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez
Roman 840-841; 9 Manresa; cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1, 1983
Edition, page 421).[20]
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father purchased
it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the
title thereto is registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco.
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The
fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that
the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts.[21] It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
[22] The phrase married to preceding Teresita Francisco is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio
Francisco.[23]
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have been without valid
basis in affirming the lower courts ruling that the properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall retain
control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his capital.[24] Even assuming for the sake of argument
that the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness
so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a
bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional
quarrels, did not render him, in the Courts view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own
properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Jose A.R. Melo and concurred in by JJ.
Regina G. Ordonez-Benitez and Felimon H. Mendoza.
[2] RTC Decision, p. 6; CA Rollo.
[3] Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[4] Reply, p. 1; Rollo, p. 61.
[5] Art. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to
the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
[6] Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
[7] Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of
the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
[8] Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
[9] Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern
their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.(n)
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.
[10] Villones vs. Employees Compensation Commission, 92 SCRA 320 (1979) at p. 328 citing 82 Corpus Juris Secundum 1010.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Jocson vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 333 (1989) at p. 344 citing Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 23 SCRA 637 (1968).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Cuenca vs. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335 (1988) at p. 344 citing Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 (1987);
Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 (1986); and Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474 (1967).
[15] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1985, p. 427, citing Magnolia Pet. Co. vs. Crigler, (La. App.) 12 So. (2d) 511;
Succession of Burke, 107 La. 82, 31 So. 391.
[16] Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
[17] Tolentino, supra at p. 395.
[18] Tolentino, supra at p. 396.
[19] Villanueva vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 192 SCRA 21 (1990) at p. 26.
[20] CA Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27.

[21] Jocson vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 345.
[22] Ibid., citing Torela vs. Torela, 93 SCRA 391 (1979).
[23] Ibid., citing Litam vs. Rivera, 100 Phil. 354 (1956); Stuart vs. Yatco, 4 SCRA 1143 (1962); Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282
(1986).
[24] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 71.
6/17/2018 Pesca vs Pesca: 136921 : April 17, 2001 : J. Vitug : Third Division
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001]
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R.
CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which
has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an
inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975.
Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a
seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months
later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house
in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the
year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old
Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with
friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to
at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with
a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her
sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to
forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so
turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an
hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven
days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually,
they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her
minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal
service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary
period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/apr2001/136921.htm 1/3
Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that
there was collusion between the parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although
filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner
and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the
conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically
incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred,
particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion
to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity
as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the
Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet
his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity
has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."[1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis
that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997, should
have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case,
petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is
absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so
defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.[4] The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute
is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of
the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[2] 240 SCRA 20
[3] 268 SCRA 198.
[4] People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.
[5] Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada vs. Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures,
Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.
[6] See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057

Supreme Court
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
NERWIN INDUSTRIES G.R. No. 167057

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
* BRION,
BERSAMIN, and
PNOC-ENERGY VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and Promulgated:
ESTER R. GUERZON,
Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, April 11, 2012
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
[1]
Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from
issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or
any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a)
acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government
project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c)
commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d)
terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other
lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a
TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government
contract or project acts contrary to law.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/april2012/167057.htm 1/13
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
Antecedents

The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
[2]
promulgated on October 22, 2004, viz:
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-

qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about
sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms
needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4)
components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs
projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders,
such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility together
with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass
the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit their financial bids.
Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders,
including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract.
Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin]
emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a
pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and facilities, including
its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs
requirements.
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the]
Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator
Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to private
respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries
(lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of
$1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and
extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs.
of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-
State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967
pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the
bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by
50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the
materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching. In turn, it resolved to
award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin].
Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a
complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of
the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of
private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier
opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to
prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private
respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an
injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No.
01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of

Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden
poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project,
Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled
Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon,
as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an
attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that
a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint
averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be
subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the
[3]
corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents reply, the RTC granted a
[4]
TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.
[5]
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order, as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps
from appearing as counsel for the defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
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5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and
its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the
subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any
damage or damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is
not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount
of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is
enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside
the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside
[6]
order of default, and to admit answer.
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for
certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from
the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents counsel from
[7]
representing them.
[8]
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and December 29, 2003
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents
complaint for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005.
[9]
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the
Supreme Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act
8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final
remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether
dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a
preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary
injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining
petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which
was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the
assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and

Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the
following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined
under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private
party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights
through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when
the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier
underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities
operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by
the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same
embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or
writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government
Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards
the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador
Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term infrastructure projects means construction,
improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection,
power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other related
construction projects that form part of the government capital investment.
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would
justify respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of
PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects.
Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls
under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he
should not have given due course to private respondents complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[10]
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners.
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when
it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby
contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its
seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it
issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary

Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue
any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against
the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or

project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may,
if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order
a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under
existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void
and of no force and effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to
do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have
been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000,
to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding
Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was
in fact already found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as
the result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The
Court could only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his
intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133
[11]
entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in
its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban
imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the
rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Courts
various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government
infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v.
Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or
execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia
faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project
thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly
manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear
mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance
therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration
of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order
extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain

the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to
keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme
Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the
performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable
terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to
administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently
in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to know and
apply properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are
serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service,
a fine in the amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of
[12]
Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension.
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwins
other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly
appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses
the Court to use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has
set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them
by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case
No. 03106921 be avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to

the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a
[13]
particular act or acts. It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is
established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of

during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is

procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
[14]
render the judgment ineffectual.
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government
[15]
of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., the Court elaborated on this
requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who
possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper
only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must
aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum
constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for
the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the
act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not
in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which
does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by
statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or
[16]
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the
[17]
Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals, it is enough that:
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right
which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the
right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to
be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete
but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since
our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of
the case still pending with the trial court.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to
[18]
show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that
conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a
[19]
factual determination that is not the function of the appellate courts. Nonetheless, the exercise of
such discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon
[20]
the grounds and in the manner provided by law. When that is done, the exercise of sound
discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is
[21]
manifest abuse.
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of
improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the
merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is
[22]
judicially impermissible, for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to
[23] [24]
determine the merits of a case, or to decide controverted facts. It is but a preventive remedy
[25] [26] [27]
whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm
[28]
or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief
[29]
only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision. Foremost in
their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the
[30]
granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits. It is well worth remembering that the writ of
preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable
[31]
injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
* Vice Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo who concurred with the decision of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the raffle of April 11,
2012.
[1]
An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts
from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for
Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 11-21; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (later
Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court).
[3]
Id., p. 14.
[4]
Id., pp. 14-15.
[5]
Id., p. 15.
[6]
Id., p. 16.
[7]
Id., p. 60.
[8]
Supra, note 2.
[9]
Rollo pp. 67-69; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal De Leon, and concurred in by Associate Justice Brawner and Associate Justice
Del Castillo.
[10]
Bold underscoring is part of original text.
[11]
561 SCRA 38.
[12]
Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 38, 48-50.
[13]
Sec. 1, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[14]
Sec. 3, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[15]
G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 320.
[16]
City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (BS), Inc., G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 320, 336-
337 (Bold emphasis supplied).
[17]
Saulog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 51.
[18]
Id., p. 60 (Bold emphasis supplied).
[19]
Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117964, March 28, 2001,355 SCRA 537, 548.
[20]
Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135074, January 29, 1999, 302 SCRA 403, 409.
[21]
Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 628; S & A Gaisano, Inc. v. Judge
Hidalgo; G.R. No. 80397, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 224, 229; Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79303, June 20, 1989, 174
SCRA 124, 133.
[22]
Searth Commodities Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 629-630; Rivas v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 53772, October 4, 1990,190 SCRA 295, 305; Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, G.R.
No. 48603, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 76, 88-89; Ortigas v. Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, No. L-79128, June 16, 1988, 162
SCRA 165, 169.
[23]
43 CJS Injunctions 5, citing B. W. Photo Utilities v. Republic Molding Corporation, C. A. Cal., 280 F. 2d 806; Duckworth v. James, C.
A. Va. 267 F. 2d 224; Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Free Sewing Machine Co., C. A. Ill, 256 F. 2d 806.
[24]
43 CJS Injunctions 5, citing Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 229 N. E. 2d 536, 37 Ill. 2d 599; Compton v. Paul K. Harding
Realty Co., 285 N.E. 2d 574, 580.
[25]
Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., C. A. Ill., 195 F. 2d 356; Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, C. C. A. Minn., 168 F. 2d 694;
Spickerman v. Sproul, 328 P. 2d 87, 138 Colo. 13; United States v. National Plastikwear Fashions, 368 F. 2d 845.
[26]
Career Placement of White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 764, 77 Misc. 2d 788;Toushin v. City of Chicago, 320 N. E. 2d 202, 23
Ill. App. 3d 797; H. K. H. Development Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 196 N. E., 2d 494, 47 Ill. App.
46.
[27]
Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., C. A. La., 441 F. 2d 560; Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v.
Panama S. S. Co., C. A. Wash., 362 U.S. 365.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 167057
[28]
City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Association of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. Of America, 81. N. E. 2d 310, 84
Ohio App. 43; Slott v. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 167 A. 2d 306, 402 Pa. 433.
[29]
Meis v. Sanitas Service Corporation, C. A. Tex., 511 F. 2d 655; Gobel v. Laing, 12 Ohio App. 2d 93.
[30]
United States v. Adlers Creamery, C. C. A. N. Y., 107 F. 2d 987; American Mercury v. Kiely, C. C. A. N. Y., 19 F. 2d 295.
[31]
Republic v. Silerio, G.R. No. 108869, May 6, 1997, 272 SCRA 280, 287.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 137873
Custom Search
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25,
1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the
same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie
Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of
the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8
meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked
at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block
with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the
basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of
death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which
was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/apr2001/gr_137873_2001.html 1/10
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 137873
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled
otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44,
Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the
requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not
present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court. In
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report
also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the
officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the
portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties
based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been
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included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be
admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances
were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of
Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who
made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying
reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from
official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found
devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before
an officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business with
officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is
accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec.
1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty
may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature
and circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In
that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court
would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third
requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to
qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give
the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge
suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s
remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed
that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to
bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the
lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion.
Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The
effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury
will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part,
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in
one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an
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injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care,
there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge
of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care
exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar
circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there
was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with
negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the
exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any
accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On
the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule
of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites
are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged
with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,]
the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased
husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the
accident which befell respondent’s husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s
negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not
for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by
the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established. 1âwphi1.nêt
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In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain
block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private
respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for
being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence
under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of
this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine
the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care
any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does
not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res
ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the
Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil
Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this
Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or
anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended,
and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing
to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the
Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil
Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation.
Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against
Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the
rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code
despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
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With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional
Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967,
except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the
lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules
and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The
case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring
supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation
vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the
Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The
Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims
under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may
invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation
under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for
the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating
that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in
the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as
November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn
statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and
her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide"
against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his
supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for police
investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned
in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit:
"Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor
as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified
pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the
public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom.
Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be an
afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office
dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is
not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this
case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe
appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the
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benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in the
Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational
attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and that
she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that
her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an
issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the
action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient
evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her
receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also
knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final
and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other
party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for
their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that
a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action
under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of
all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by
a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that
she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages
2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial
court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights
pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it
was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
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violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It
appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in
Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is
dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her
behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the
ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the
Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in
Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount
private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received
P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial
monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40.
Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total
damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received
by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent
with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that
awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnote
1
Exhibit "A," Records, pp. 60-61.
2
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
3
Id., at 19.
4
Sec. 36, Rule 130.
5 People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 (1983).
6 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 194. See also Philippine Home Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA
479 (1996).
7 5 J. H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 3 (3rd
Ed.).
8 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 (1991).
9 See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 37-47.
10
16 SCRA 448 (1966). See also People vs. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84 (1996).
11
273 SCRA 607 (1997).
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12
TSN, December 20, 1991, p. 9.
13
Id., at 28; TSN, January 6, 1992, p. 29.
14
Id., at 29; Ibid.
15
Id., at 33.
16
Id., at 34.
17
Id., at 24 and 28.
18
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 49-50.
19
Id., Sec. 48.
20
Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988). See also Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals,
258 SCRA 334 (1996); Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657
(1986).
21
57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 1819.
22
Id., at 1824.
23
Id., at 1914.
24
Rollo, pp. 87-88.
25
Whether the doctrine raises a presumption or merely an inference is subject to debate. See 57B Am Jur 2d,
Negligence §§ 1925-1928.
26
Id., at 1920.
27
Id., at 1947.
28
People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); People vs. Quidato, 297 SCRA 1 (1998).
29
People vs. Ramos, supra.
30
136 SCRA 141 (1985).
31
Justices Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez dissented.
32
151 SCRA 333 (1987).
33
157 SCRA 446 (1988).
34
164 SCRA 317 (1988).
35
Rollo, pp. 90-91. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
36
Id., at 90. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
37
Id., at § 5.
38
Id., at § 2.
39
Castro vs. Del Rosario, et al., 19 SCRA 196 (1967).
40
28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 202.
41
Records, pp. 17-18.
42
I Tolentino, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 19 (1995).
43
Records, p. 100.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 137873
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 151258

Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME
MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO,
ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL
B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and
RONAN DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
x-------------------------x
FIDELITO DIZON, G.R. No. 155101

Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
GERARDA H. VILLA, G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA SERENO, and
II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN REYES, JJ.
RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO Promulgated:
ADRIANO, February 1, 2012
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10
[1]
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special
[2]
law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. The intent of the law
was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority,
[3]
fraternity, organization, or association. Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation rites by
[4]
making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.
[5]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country. Within a
year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang
of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of
Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training
Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of
[6]
the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle
[7]
in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law. Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as
immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its
commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist
being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the
offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
[8] [9]
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the trial court,
are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez
III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny
Villa (neophytes).
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the
pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them.
The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites
included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on
their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round,
in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
[10]
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought
he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of
the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping
bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.
[11]
On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-
[12]
38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide,
[13]
penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few
weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No.
[14]
C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
[15]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then
passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,

Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were
acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as
indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional
amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
[16]
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the
[17]
respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25
[18]
October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial courts Orders
and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
[19]
violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated
10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction
[20]
absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died
on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.
[21]
Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served
[22]
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to
present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier
date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the
hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites
[23]
and were not tainted by evil motives. He claims that the additional paddling session was part
of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that
the chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the
[24]
initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling. Further, petitioner echoes the
argument of the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal
[25]
could not have resulted in Lennys death. The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on
the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered
fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.
[26]
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims
that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did
not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of
the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and
[27]
that he was just making it up.
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes,
who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places
with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with
Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to
petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
[28]
lesser crime of slight physical injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been
upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny.
Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are
criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal
[29]
Code. The said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal
liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal
of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P.
[30]
Nos. 89060 and 90153. The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon
(Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court
found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993.
For various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or
almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution
cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its
disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of due
process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this
Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for
pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term
[31]
personal penalties refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term
[32]
pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including civil liability
[33]
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
[34]
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for
both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him
deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence
for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[35]
October 1993. The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain any postponement and that
all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times
down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence
[36]
when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that
his client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
[37]
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.
Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should be
ready at all times down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next
trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were
[38]
supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993. Counsel for accused Dizon was
not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a
Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case,
and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.
[39]
The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a
[40]
motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a
[41]
waiver of that right.
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when
the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the
25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned
trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also
points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence,
thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
[42]
itself. Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel This constitutional right
[43]
includes the right to present evidence in ones defense, as well as the right to be present and
[44]
defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
[45]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and
upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued
an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of
his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence
because of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the
Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court,
Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right
to be present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been
deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be
waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel
the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the
court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding
hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature
and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply
went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing
Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a
grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.
[46]
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General
had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates;
and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court
pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its
Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent
denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
[47]
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court. In People v. Bodoso, we
ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
[48]
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case
at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would substantially
prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to
decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law
to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the
hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of the
traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official
[49]
activity of the fraternity. He even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension and he
[50]
participated only after the activity was sanctioned.
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or
justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the
case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on
the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue.
Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed
to decide it.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not
have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of
the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this
case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these
[51]
were in the Court of Appeals.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
[52]
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from
[53]
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is
[54]
allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
[55]
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The
[56]
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are
factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice
[57]
wrought upon the defendant.
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to
[58]
the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. As a consequence, an
appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of
[59]
double jeopardy. As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case
[60]
is capricious, certiorari lies. The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
[61]
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof. Rather,
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents
[62]
double jeopardy from attaching.
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following
factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to
secure certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to
the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to
speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case
were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order
of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring
from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an
Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete
records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December
27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such
order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records
were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the
said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a
period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo.
Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which
was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August
17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
[63]
constitution frowns upon x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[64] [65]
On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately, the initial trial of the
[66]
case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of

the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a
[67]
speedy disposition of cases. Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition
of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it
must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on
[68]
for a decade already. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060
that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that
when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again
[69]
be charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of
[70]
reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found
[71]
in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own
[72]
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, viz:
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional
[73]
right, provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order
to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
[74]
Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following:
(a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express
[75]
consent.
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as
an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a
[76]
greater penalty. We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
[77]
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.
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This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
[78]
and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding
[79] [80]
of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
[81]
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the
review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law;
[82]
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;
or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
[83]
power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
[84]
double jeopardy.
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of
(1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According
to the Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because
private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
[85]
and c) the petitioners Comment x x x. Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted
the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and
[86]
failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor General also assails the
finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the
[87]
appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
[88]
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. In People v. Maquiling, we held
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
[89]
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for
[90]
a writ of certiorari. Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained
to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
[91]
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
[92]
it of its very power to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of grave
abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug,
the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal
wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a
result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason
of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of
the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must
likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged
[People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is
absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De
los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is
constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug,
[93]
Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature. (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
[94]
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of
the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
[95]
or medical attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of
that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries,
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.
[96] [97] [98]
Furthermore, he did not die. His injuries were not even serious. Since Penesa
involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling
cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact.
According to the court, the four accused were found to have inflicted more than the usual
[99]
punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then adopted
the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
[100]
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA
[101]
found that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature, it
was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty
in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of
a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two
types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused
[102]
cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[103]
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,
the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have
been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition
in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles
263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found
that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were
guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries
[104]
they had intentionally inflicted.
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the
conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were
liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or
to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven
by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically
strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand
how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary
to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on
the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[105]
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. The classical
theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to
[106]
choose between good and evil. It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held
[107]
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. The basic postulate
of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their
[108]
actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. They refrain from criminal
acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in
[109]
committing the crime. Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
[110]
blame of the actor. The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
[111]
purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do
[112]
what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act
[113]
be committed by means of dolo or malice.
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
[114]
intelligence, and intent. The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation
[115]
and with power to choose between two things. The second element, intelligence, concerns
the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish
[116]
between a licit and an illicit act. The last element, intent, involves an aim or a
[117]
determination to do a certain act.
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
[118]
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and
[119]
the resolve with which a person proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter
[120]
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act. While motive is the moving
power that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular
[121]
means to produce the result. On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia,
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[122]
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements
taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent,
which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done
[123]
willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. The maxim
is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
[124]
performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a
[125]
felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase
coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an
element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the
injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act
[126]
performed without malice or criminal design. Here, a person performs an initial lawful
deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results
[127]
in a wrongful act. Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in
[128]
conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
[129]
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the
[130]
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
[131]
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot
[132]
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
[133]
suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple
[134]
negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
[135]
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations
[136]
ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes. Some say that elements of hazing can be
traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European
[137]
universities worked as servants for upperclassmen. It is believed that the concept of hazing
[138]
is rooted in ancient Greece, where young men recruited into the military were tested with
pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.
[139]
Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient
[140]
Greek civilization. According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a
tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty
[141]
to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to
join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.
[142] [143]
The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long. During the program,
neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to
learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified
grade point average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and
[144]
respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.
Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the
[145]
entire neophyte stage.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as

[146]
prerequisite for admission to an organization. In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte,
initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is
generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly,
[147]
foolish, or other similar tasks or activities. It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
[148] [149]
organization. These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century
ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
[150]
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation). The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a
small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
[151]
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church. The Katipunans ideology
[152]
was brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual. It is said that
initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a
series of
[153]
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. They were made to go
[154]
through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon. It would
seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to
[155]
endure a matalas na punyal. As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was
[156]
made to sign membership papers with the his own blood.
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[157]
drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves. In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy
[158]
during his second year at West Point.
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured
during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
[159]
membership. The ritual involved what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.
[160]
It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto
[161]
connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.
Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle
[162]
candidates en route to the barrel.
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings
[163]
directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests. The victims were shown writhing and
crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of
[164]
the victims.
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of
[165]
Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program. The fraternity
members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes
at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to
the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands
and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which
active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.
[166]
The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical
[167]
abuse.
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
[168]
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama. The hazing
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3)
being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and
other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity
house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2
a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running
the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway
[169]
and descended down a flight of stairs.
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was
[170]
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity. He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and
[171]
torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered
[172]
injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites. Kenner and the other
initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the
[173]
buttocks for more than 200 times.
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the
[174]
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year. The
pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four
nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on
[175]
his face and buttocks. In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two
[176]
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks. During the last two days
[177]
of the hazing, the rituals intensified. The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during
[178] [179]
the four-night initiation. Jones and several other candidates passed out.
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through
[180]
which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth. Some
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process
enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures
[181]
the future of the organization. Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and
[182]
the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.
[183]
The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress
[184]
prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not. It was not until 1901 that Illinois
passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury
[185]
to his [or her] person therefrom.
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the
Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
[186]
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing. As of 2008,
[187]
all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing. Most anti-hazing
laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even
[188]
the most severe situations. Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a
[189]
felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
[190]
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
[191]
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.
Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a
[192]
Class D felony.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[193]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.
As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death
[194]
falls under the category of serious bodily injury. A person who commits a Class C felony is
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
[195]
being four (4) years. Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it
[196]
becomes a Class C felony. A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to
[197]
exceed seven years.
[198]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of
[199]
not more than two years or not less than 180 days. Under Utah law, if hazing results in
[200]
serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony. A person who has been
convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed
[201]
five years. West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed
[202]
a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.
In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.
[203]
A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or
[204]
both.
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there
[205]
was no hazing statute. This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General
Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since
[206]
there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not

proven beyond reasonable doubt
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a
contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the
animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer
disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found
that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to
inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that
he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his
[207]
fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father. As to Villareal, the court said
that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had
[208]
a hand in the death of Villareals brother. The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death
of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts,
[209]
that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine
the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what to
expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the
fraternity and their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van and
we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be
the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us
inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay
ka and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were
the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of
the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there
any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging
others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta
atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas pa yan, kayang-
kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not
really pin point who uttered those words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say
that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so
that would in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me.
So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on was
Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa
and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family
have his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So
he said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the
Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in
turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father
stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were
within hearing distance when that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villas
father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny
Villas turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and he
kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made by Dizon you or your family had his brother killed, can
you inform this Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that
were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family
who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I
knew that it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew
nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another
incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the
pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer,
and he said and I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo
diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa
akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?
[210]
Witness No, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there
was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as
regards to what to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked
at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no
thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body
but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
[211]
Witness Combination, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I
repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the
initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for
the killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did
not believe him because that is not true, correct?
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into
quitting the initiation, this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those
things was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation
by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run
on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only
on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a
neophyte, was also administered by another master on the other neophyte,
this is correct?
[212]
Witness Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon
[213]
and Villareal were baseless, since the statements of the accused were just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
[214]
members during their initiation rites.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial

proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that
Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional
felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced
above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who]
stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while saying, [T]his
guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we find that the
CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire
factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the
testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be
subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be
mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto,
Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo,
[215]
patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect. While beating the neophytes, Dizon
accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny
Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General,
these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological
[216]
initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so
that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation
and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and
made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact,
during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations
on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the
Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or
recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar
organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking
him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be
made to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are the mental or psychological
tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration,
[217]
that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not
even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each
other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-
neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true
[218]
and that [Dizon] was just making it up. Even the trial court did not give weight to the
utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were
not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity
[219]
initiation rites x x x. The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
[220]
such intent. Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part,
insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
[221]
Villa.
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to

injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries
on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that
since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa
and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
[222]
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury
arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no
criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of
[223]
the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
[224]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
[225]
felony. In Bagajo v. People, the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her
students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability
for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the
means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any
malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law,
petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v.
[226]
Carmen, the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our
Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a
barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him
on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by expelling through
those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability
for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should
be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365
thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical
pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In
People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and
[227] [228]
external acts of the accused. What persons do is the best index of their intention. We
have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on
[229]
which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator. The
Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny
Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement
of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On
their first night, they were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol
Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at
the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to traditional
initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The
auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from
[230]
those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates. It was
their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their
legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical
activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them
whatever they needed.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[231]
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. A few days before the rites, he
[232]
asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity. His father knew that
[233]
Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days. The CA
found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the
initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before
admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and
other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time
they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that
after a week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden
paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed,
[234]
there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes. (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious
intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case.
Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical
pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of
freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven
was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second
night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially
reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members
still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to
tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The
targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles,
including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same
process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
[235]
different from common crimes. The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken
into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted
may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the
method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-
Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the
Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge
would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or

serious physical injuries.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,

fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted
in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group
or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition?
Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment
of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered
crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive
hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person
or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide,
mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called hazing. Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that
acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is
need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay
magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa
iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong
patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan
na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang
penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished
Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to
prove the intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that
resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful
intent of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel
situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one
of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there
is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What
are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized
because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they
conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it
stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to
kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
and say, We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is
normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with
the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a
difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a
person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there
is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
[236]
President. (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion
of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However,
the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into
another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the
phrase without consent for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept
that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot
of concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that
matter, it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person
joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical
hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a
fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he
joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of
the victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there
was consent on the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished
Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores,
traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals
when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples.
They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by
the mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may
even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done
with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he
allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was
done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There
will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim
allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the
defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or
psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death
or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is
not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law
will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The
[237]
Chair hears none; the same is approved.
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on
hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a
[238]
possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact
an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of
mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as
an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents
[239]
would not have consented to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
[240]
harmless by custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum,
the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through
physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly
considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws,
all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against
the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being
no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of
his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
[241]
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this
[242]
case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
[243]
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened
[244]
harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
[245]
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
[246]
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
[247]
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.
If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great,
the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very
[248]
careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor,
[249]
not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution
or diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most
[250]
vigilant effort. The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend
[251]
upon the circumstances of each particular case.
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
[252]
multiple traumatic injuries. The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[253]
the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.
In the present case, the victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was
[254]
deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. The deprivation was due to the channeling of
the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules,
and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple
[255] [256]
hematomas or blood clots. The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,
indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist
[257]
blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like. Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to
gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished
[258]
as to produce death. The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas,
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs,
[259]
were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms. It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a
[260]
previous cardiac arrest or disease.
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed
on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny,
they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their
[261] [262]
arms, legs, and thighs. They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs; and
[263] [264]
slapped on their faces. They were made to play rough basketball. Witness Marquez
[265]
testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine. The NBI medico-legal officer
explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered
[266]
by the latter. The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the
deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually
by themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am
going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these
injuries marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for
us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At
the same manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the
more humane in human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and
[267]
not in part.
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking
[268]
during the initiation rites.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to

recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered
that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.
[269]
With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the
cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in
the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation
rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the presence of
alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the
fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court
submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of
hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to
establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to
[270]
avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations. Another
initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he
[271]
felt he did not have a choice. Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they
left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives
were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-
Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been
[272]
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).
Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to
rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.
[273]
As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his
death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability
of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability
from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only
with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱50,000
as civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the
[274] [275]
victim. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, we sustain the CAs award of
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including
expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported
[276]
by tangible documents. Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is
prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General
[277]
does not interpose any claim for actual damages.
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of
[278]
the victims death. This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
[279]
deceased. Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of
₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In
addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
[280]
Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal
case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally,
pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9th Congress,
1st Regular Sess. at 21-22 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].
[2]
Id.
[3]
Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter
Senate TSP No. 47].
[4]
Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate
TSP No. 62].
[5]
Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.
[6]
Id.
[7]
U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil 599 (1914). The Court declared, In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the
United States and England as common law crimes; id. at 604.
[8]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 62-66.
[9]
RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 1-57; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 109-167.
[10]
As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, resident brods are those fraternity members who are currently students of the
Ateneo Law School, while alumni brods are those fraternity members who are graduates or former students of the law school; see
Villareals Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 5-7; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 17-19.
[11]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9; rollo, p. 110.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.
[14]
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 131.
[15]
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los
Santos (with Concurring Opinion).
[16]
RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 1114.
[17]
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 139-141.
[18]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim
S. Abdulwahid.
[19]
[20]
Villareals Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 13; rollo, p. 25.
[21]
Dizons Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 1; rollo, p. 3.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[22]
Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
Id. at 23-24; rollo, pp. 25-26.
[27]
[28]
Peoples Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954), p. 2; rollo, p. 13.
[29]
Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.
[30]
Villas Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080), p. 1; rollo, p. 84.
[31]
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 644.
[32]
People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 122, citing J. Aquinos Concurring Opinion in People v. Satorre,
G.R. No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
[33]
People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010,
630 SCRA 445.
[34]
People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.
[35]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Id.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
[40]
[41]
Id.
[42]
People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123 (1996), citing People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957
(1980); and People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).
[43]
People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585 (1999).
[44]
People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354, 360 (1997).
[45]
Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).
[46]
Id.
[47]
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
[48]
Id.
[49]
Dizons Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.
[50]
[51]
Villas Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo, p. 102.
[52]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
[53]
People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil.
820 (1970).
[54]
People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.
[55]
People v. Tampal, supra.
[56]
Id.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[57]
Id.
[58]
People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra; Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94,
107 (2005); People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994); People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 (1989); and People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516
(1988).
[59]
See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id.
[62]
Id.
[63]
[64]
[65]
Id.
[66]
Id.
[67]
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).
[68]
Id.
[69]
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).
[70]
Id.
[71]
Id.
[72]
Id.
[73]
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
[74]
Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).
[75]
People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No.
103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January 1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v.
Maquiling, supra note 74.
[76]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA 383, 397, citing People v. Serrano, 315
SCRA 686, 689 (1999).
[77]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207, 240 (2000).
[78]
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985); Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA
693 (1985); People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 (1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975).
[79]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People v. Tria-Tirona, 463 SCRA 462, 469-470 (2005); and People
v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000)]; People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra,
citing People v. Bocar, supra.
[80]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People v. Serrano, supra note 76 at 690; People v. De Grano, G.R.
No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
[81]
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 506.
[82]
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.
[83]
People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra note 74 at 704.
[84]
Id.
[85]
Peoples Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.
[86]
Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.
[87]
Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[88]
See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 50, citing First Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 171989, 4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.
[89]
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10
(1997).
[90]
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 276 SCRA 133, (1997); Jamer v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 278 SCRA 632 (1997); and Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 252 SCRA 387 (1996).
[91]
De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420 (2002); People v. Leones, 418 Phil. 804 (2001); People v.
Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955), citing People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954).
[92]
See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76; and People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, supra note
79.
[93]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
[94]
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).
[95]
[96]
People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[97]
Id.
[98]
Id.
[99]
[100]
[101]
Id.
[102]
See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).
[103]
[104]
[105]
RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE VOLUME ONE 3 (1961); see People v. Estrada, 389 Phil. 216 (2000);
People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
[106]
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: ANNOTATED AND COMMENTED BOOK ONE 4 (3rd ed.
1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.
[107]
FRANCISCO, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.
[108]
AQUINO, supra note 105 at 3.
[109]
Id.
[110]
GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PENAL SCIENCES AND PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1974).
[111]
People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
[112]
FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 33.
[113]
Id. at 33-34.
[114]
MARIANO A. ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (ACT NO. 3815) 21-24 (1946).
[115]
Id. at 21.
[116]
Id. at 21.
[117]
Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.
[118]
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 670 (8th abr. ed. 2005); see People v. Regato, 212 Phil. 268 (1984).
[119]
Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.
[120]
ALBERT, supra note 114 at 23.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[121]
People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176 Phil. 20 (1978), citing People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297;
61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.
[122]
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 118 at 520.
[123]
See FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 34; ALBERT, supra note 114 at 23-25.
[124]
U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
[125]
U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521 (2002), citing Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966);
People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes,
53 Phil. 323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614 (1937); and People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[126]
People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943); FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 51-52,
citing People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).
[127]
See generally FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 51.
[128]
Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232 (1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15
(1931).
[129]
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737, citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January
2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196-197.
[130]
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[131]
Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.
[132]
Dado v. People, supra note 125.
[133]
People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW VOL. 1, 473-474 (12TH ED., 1932).
[134]
See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v.
Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).
[135]
A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 407 (2000)
[136]
Id.
[137]
In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010) (U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino
Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31 MCGEORGE L REV. 1087, 1088-1089 (2000); and SYMPOSIUM, THE
WORKS OF PLATO (THE MODERN LIBRARY 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ...
and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC.
[138]
In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
[139]
Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We'll Never Tell): How the Federal Educational Rights and
Privacy Act May Help Colleges and Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 477, 480 (2004), citing Rutledge, supra.
[140]
Id.
[141]
Id.
[142]
Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How
Broad is the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 147-8 (1997).
[143]
Id.
[144]
Id.
[145]
Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).
[146]
See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
[147]
Id.
[148]
In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1041 (1986); and People v.
Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[149]
See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining
and Understanding Psychological Damages, 2 ANN.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
[150]
REYNALDO C. ILETO, THE DIORAMA EXPERIENCE: A VISUAL HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES 84 (2004).
[151]
Id.
[152]
Id.
[153]
Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 Cartilla del Katipunan, quoted in LUIS CAMARA DERY,
ALAY SA INANG BAYAN: PANIBAGONG PAGBIBIGAY KAHULUGAN SA KASAYSAYAN NG HIMAGSIKAN NG 1896, 16-
24 (1999).
[154]
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 17.
[155]
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 18.
[156]
ILETO, supra note 150.
[157]
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF WEST POINT 222 (1999).
[158]
Id.
[159]
Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.). (The South Carolina Supreme Court held,
inter alia, that (1) evidence supported the jury finding that the manner in which the association carried out mattress-rotating barrel
trick, a hazing event, was hazardous and constituted actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate was not barred from recovery by the
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)
[160]
Id.
[161]
Id.
[162]
Id.
[163]
CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony, January 31, 1997, available at<http://articles.cnn.com/1997-
01-31/us/9701_31_hazing_1_hazing-incident-camp-lejeune-marines?_s=PM:US> (visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E.
Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C.
& U.L. 361, 364 (1998).
[164]
CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.
[165]
State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges Michael Davis blacked out and never regained
consciousness. He died the following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial courts conviction of hazing. Id.)
[166]
Id.
[167]
Id.
[168]
Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated
the risks inherent in hazing; and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity's assumption of the risk
defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which
entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the victims negligence claims. The case was remanded as to
the other matters. Id.)
[169]
Id.
[170]
Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL 47153 (Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The
plaintiff filed a law suit against Cornell University for the latters liability resulting from the injuries the former sustained during the
alleged hazing by the fraternity. The New York district court granted defendant Cornells motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint. Id.)
[171]
Id.
[172]
Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct. 2002). (The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1)
the fraternity owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity was not established; (3) individual
fraternity members owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; and (4) the evidence raised the genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the fraternity's chapter advisor breached the duty of care to initiate. Id.)
[173]
Id.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[174]
Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction
for felony hazing and remanded the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury instruction. Id.)
[175]
Id.
[176]
Id.
[177]
Id.
[178]
Id.
[179]
Id.
[180]
Rutledge, supra note 137.
[181]
Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, September 1991, at 63.
[182]
Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's Duty to Provide A Safe
Learning Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261
(1994); Jennifer L. Spaziano, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions of
Student Organizations, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 213 (1994); Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at
63; and Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and Custodial Liability of
National Fraternities, 7 REV. LITIG. 191, 210 (1988)].
[183]
Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61 MISS. L.J. 111,
117 (1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent 154, 155 (1906). According to Lewis, the 1874
statute outlawing hazing was directed specifically at the United States Naval Academy.
[184]
Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey's Anti-
Hazing Act, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.
[185]
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.
[186]
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.
[187]
Acquaviva, supra at 313.
[188]
Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 377, 377 (2002).
[189]
Id.
[190]
Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).
[191]
730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
[192]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
[193]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
[194]
Ind. Code Ann. 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.) citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008)
(U.S.).
[195]
Ind. Code Ann. 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
[196]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).
[197]
Mo. Stat. Ann. 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary Gen. Ass. Sess.).
[198]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 37.152 (Vernon 1996) (U.S.).
[199]
Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Legis. Sess.) (U.S.).
[200]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.).
[201]
Utah Code Ann. 1953 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.).
[202]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).
[203]
See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[204]
Wis. Stat. Ann. 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).
[205]
Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.
[206]
Id.
[207]
[208]
Id.
[209]
Id.
[210]
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.
[211]
TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43.
[212]
TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
[213]
Peoples Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; rollo, p. 626; Peoples Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No.
151258), p. 120-3; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[214]
Peoples Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; Peoples Comment (Villareal v. People,
G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[215]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
[216]
Peoples Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; Peoples Comment (Villareal v. People,
G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
[217]
Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess., pp. 12-13.
[218]
TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May
1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp.
24-28.
[219]
[220]
Dado v. People, supra note 125.
[221]
[222]
The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on Physical Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art.
262 Mutilation; (b) Art. 263 Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264 Administering Injurious Substances or Beverages; (d) Art. 265 Less
Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.
[223]
Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272 (2006).
[224]
Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564 (2001); People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v.
Sara, 55 Phil 939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil 204 (1925).
[225]
176 Phil. 20 (1978).
[226]
People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
[227]
People v. Regato, supra note 118.
[228]
Id.
[229]
Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
[230]
[231]
[232]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case
No. C-38340), p. 108.
[233]
No. C-38340), p. 109.
[234]
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[235]
[236]
[237]
Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.
[238]
[239]
No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.
[240]
Vedaa v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).
[241]
Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW BOOK
ONE 995 (15th ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil 107 (1921), citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, 17 January 1919 (unreported);
U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil. 560 (1914).
[242]
People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.
[243]
Id.
[244]
Id.
[245]
Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460 (1988).
[246]
Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[247]
Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra note 241.
[248]
Id.
[249]
Id.
[250]
See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).
[251]
Id.
[252]
[253]
Id.
[254]
[255]
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-67.
[256]
[257]
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-69.
[258]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case
No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.
[259]
[260]
TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.
[261]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 18-21, supra note 9; rollo, p. 127-130.
[262]
[263]
[264]
[265]
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-176.
[266]
[267]
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 92-93.
[268]
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 110-111.
6/17/2018 G.R. No. 151258
[269]
Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. App. 1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of
Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
[270]
[271]
[272]
Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
[273]
[274]
Brias v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, 3 October 2011, citing People v. Del Rosario,
G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011.
[275]
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, 25 August 2010; People v. Lindo,
G.R. No. 189818, 9 August 2010; People v. Ogan, G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010; and People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July
2010].
[276]
Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.
[277]
Peoples Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 144; rollo, p. 1709.
[278]
Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March 2011, citing Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil.
574, 592-593 (2004).
[279]
Id.
[280]
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
6/17/2018 Thornton vs Thornton : 154598 : August 16, 2004 : J. Corona : Third Division : Decision

THIRD DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS Present:

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,
and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ.
Petitioner,

- versus -

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 16, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501

dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of substance. The dispositive portion[2] read:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a)
this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient
in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in
the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later,
respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle
Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife.
She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in a nightclub, with the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/aug2004/154598.htm 1/8
freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the
househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter
Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing
Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati
City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in
Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and
their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification[3] that respondent was no longer residing
there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills
showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other
provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court
of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not
have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of
1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus,
it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction
of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation

to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of
this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer
is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the Family
Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also
possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent
and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus
involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on
him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has
territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law
conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or
necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that
matter to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the
legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the
courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule
provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,[4] Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines.[5]

The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129
since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To
the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation,
leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their
children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not
have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children. The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three
major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original
jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater
sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee
that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule
therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to
quote the Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a
minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that
the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional
well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be
avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive as not foreclosing
resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs.
Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were
allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation Act,
the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners
submission that the word exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same
manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals
can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of
the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof
in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof,
or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any
day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to
the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was
merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the
well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the
law:

Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth
life.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more
than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately
reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it
meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal

interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to
protect the rights and promote the welfare of children[8] under the Constitution and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over
legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA
8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not
favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted
and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament
is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not
have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal,
and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.[9]
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of

the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with
RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is
not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a
ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:[10]

That the serving officer will have to search for the child all over the country does not represent
an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult
than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in
CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

W E C O N C U R:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice

Chairman

(on leave)
GELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution and the Division Chairmans
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion A. Aquino and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Regalado E. Maambong.
[2] CA Decision, p. 3.
[3] Rollo, p. 49.
[4] Article VIII. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus.
xxx xxx xxx.
[5] Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Courts belong.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforecebale anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be returnable to a Family Court or any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
[6] 136 SCRA 141 [1985].
[7] Agpalo Statutory Constitution, 1986, p. 98.
[8] SEC. 2. State and National Policies.- The State shall protect the rights and promote the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of the
Constitution and the precepts of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. xxx
[9] Republic vs. Marcopper Mining, 335 SCRA 386 [2000].
[10] Ibid. at 120.

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6/17/2018 G.R. No.

Today is Sunday, June 17, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

I shall explain why.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

I shall explain why.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

11 129 SCRA 174.

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Sunday, June 17, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization,

The RTC Ruling

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

1 Rollo, pp. 9-22.

4 Id. at 55-71. Penned by Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-Encinareal.

8 "ADOPTING A NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (NBCP) THEREBY REVISING

11 Rollo, pp. 33-34.

12 Records, p. 28. See subject ordinance.

13 Rollo, pp. 34-35.

16 "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."

19 Rollo , pp. 55-71.

35 See id. at 14-15.