1.

0 Introduction

Due to the increasing demand of government and other authorities as well as public
bodies for improved safety, various methods to identify hazard has been done. Among them is
the Hazard and Operability Study or HAZOP. HAZOP method is a structured and systematic
approach to evaluate and identify problems that may represent a risk to an individual or
personnel or the equipment or preventing the system to achieve efficient operation.
HAZOP is performed during design process. Usually during the preliminary
completion of basic design. This includes complete process design, P&ID, plant layout, control
and instrumentation and specification of equipment. However, HAZOP is a verification process
and should not be used in design development process.

2.0 HAZOP Preparation

When a certain project or modification work meets the criteria, it is the responsibility
of an officer to start up a HAZOP study. Usually, the responsible officer will appoint a leader
to act as a chairperson during HAZOP meeting. The appointed leader must be trained in
HAZOP methodology and completed a suitable HAZOP leader course. The next step is
selection of other team members to achieve the spread and knowledge and skills required for
engineering which may include a customer representative, a person with process knowledge, a
person with safety and environment knowledge and a person with engineering knowledge as
well as someone experience with operation and maintenance. Other preparation may include:
1. A complete P & ID for the process
2. System design philosophy and process description
3. Plot plans or layouts
4. Process flow diagrams
5. Equipment data sheets and purchase specifications
6. Piping class, relief valve and v specifications
7. Start up and emergency shut-down procedures
8. Emergency depressurizing system functions
9. Electrical area classification
10. . Standards used and applicable operating and maintenance procedures
3.0 Purpose of this Report

The HAZOP Study conducted was to identify, analyse and evaluate the hazard and
operability problems that existed in the oil line of Dulang Platform in Kerteh, Terengganu. This
report consists of suggested improvement to the current design and operation in the system as
well as providing necessary feedback to the developed project.

4.0 Scope of the Studied Platform

For this study, the HAZOP conducted consists of the oil pipeline from production well
head to Dulang B (DL-B). The diagram is as follow:
5.0 Methodology

A HAZOP study is a formal systematic procedure used to review the design and
operation of a potentially hazardous process facility. It is used to identify deviations from
normal safe operation, which could lead, to hazards or operability problems, and to define any
actions necessary to deal with these.
The method involves several repetitive steps which are:
1. Identify a section of plant on the P&I diagram
2. Define the design intent and normal operation conditions of the section.
3. Identify a deviation from design intent or operating conditions by applying a system of
guidewords
4. Identify possible causes for, and consequences of, the deviation.
5. For a meaningful deviation, decide what action, if any is necessary
6. Record the discussion and action

In the HAZOP method, the guidewords are systematically applied to a segment of

process equipment in order to promote discussion on possible deviations from the design
intention. The guidewords represent deviations to the design intent and their use leads to
systematic highlighting of hazards and operability problems.

6.0 HAZOP Guidewords

A guideword provides the team with a starting point to identify issues. Using a
comprehensive list of guideword is important to achieve maximum benefit from the HAZOP
study. A HAZOP checklist shall be used to act as an ad-memoir to identify any hazards that
may have been over-looked during the brainstorming session. For each hazard, the root cause,
the consequence, any safeguards already implemented in the design will be identified.
7.0 HAZOP Parameter, Deviation, Cause and Consequences

Parameter is an aspect of the process that describes it physically, chemically or in terms

of what is happening. While deviation is defined as unreasonable / undesired change in the
parameter. Deviation is formed by a combination of the parameter and guideword. For each
deviation, the possible causes is then determined. Cause for each hazard, will be determined
such that the appropriate safeguards for the causal events are determined.
In assigning a level of consequence to the hazards, the HAZOP team took into
consideration the following factors:
1. The present design status of the safeguards and controls
2. Physical and working environment conditions
3. Levels of training, experience, skills, education etc. of the facilities personnel

8.0 Safeguard and Actions or Recommendations

The study identified the existing design safeguards for each hazard. The types of
safeguards commonly include:
1. Preventive safeguards, which aim to prevent the event cause from occurring
2. Detective safeguards, which aim to improve the response time to an event
3. Protective safeguards, which aim to protect from the escalation consequences and are
always used regardless of whether the event has occurred
4. Mitigation safeguards, which aim to reduce the severity of the escalation consequences
and are activated once the event cause and escalation consequences have occurred

Where the associated safeguards are not adequate, further recommendations are
proposed. The method identifies the causes of a deviation from the design intent by application
of the guidewords. The consequences are then compared with the safeguards and the HAZOP
team then decides whether the current safeguards are adequate. If the team considers them
inadequate, then a recommendation is made to consider or add further safeguards.
9.0 HAZOP Guideword list

The main guideword used in HAZOP are listed in the table below:

NO GUIDEWORD DEFINITION
1 NO or NOT Negation of intention

2 MORE or HIGH Quantitative Increase

3 LESS or LOW Quantitative Decrease

4 PART OF A qualitive decrease with a part of design parameters

being released

5 AS WELL AS Qualitative increase

6 REVERSE Logical opposite of intention

7 EARLY Operation performed too early

8 LATE Operation performed too late

9 OTHER THAN Other deviation in design intent not included in above

guidewords

The application of these guide words may be illustrated by the example already
described: TRANSFER A, The guide words may be applicable to either the word TRANSFER
or the word A. Thus for this case, the meaning might include the following examples:

1. NO or NOT - Flow of A.
2. MORE Flow of A- more than design flow.
3. LESS Flow of A- less than design flow.
10.0 HAZOP Technique

The flow of HAZOP study can be seen in the flow chart below:

Selection of HAZOP Preparation of necessary

Leader and Team items [E.g.: Plant layout.
Members P&ID, specification of
equipment]

Apply a guideword (E.g.

Select a node and apply a
No, More, Less) to the
property word (parameter
parameter chosen such as
such as flow, pressure,
No Flow, More Pressure
temperature)
etc.

Identify the causes Identify the

consequences

Identify the existing

Decide actions or
safeguards
recommendation to
eliminate or mitigate the
identified problem Repeat for other property
words, guide words and
also for other part of the
system
11.0 HAZOP Worksheet

Plant: Dulang Oilfield Development Project, Kerteh Terengganu Date: 5/5/2018

Time:2 PM

Node: FSV (300VC-193) Parameter:

FLOW

Process Line/ Equipment: Pipeline from production well to DL-B

No Parameter Guideword Deviation Causes Consequences Existing Action

Protection
1 Flow No/Less No/ Less flow Big leakage or  Loss of N/A Periodically
broken pipes production / monitoring of
due to corrosion material the production
 Formation of header &
explosive gas pipelines by the
around leakage operator
point
 Fire and
environmental
hazard

Rupture in Process Upset

production
header line

Ball valve stuck No feed to DL-B

closed
Plant: Dulang Oilfield Development Project, Kerteh Terengganu Date: 5/5/2018
Time:2 PM

Node: FSV (300VC-193) Parameter:

FLOW

Process Line/ Equipment: Pipeline from production well to DL-B

No Parameter Guideword Deviation Causes Consequences Existing Action

Protection
2 Flow More More Flow Failure of FSV,  Pipe rapture,  Had FSV Install FT, FI,
excess oil flow oil spillage 1030 and FSH, FAH,
more than  Fire & have more FAHH
necessary explosion than one
quantity  Process upset FSV
 Pipelines
have PI,
PSH, PAH
and PT

3 Flow Reverse/Back Reverse Flow/  Process

Back Flow upset
 Pipe rupture
Plant: Dulang Oilfield Development Project, Kerteh Terengganu Date: 5/5/2018
Time:2 PM

Node: FSV (300VC-193) Parameter:

FLOW

Process Line/ Equipment: Pipeline from production well to DL-B

No Parameter Guideword Deviation Causes Consequences Existing Action

Protection
4 Corrosion  The damage of  Pipelines rupture N/A  Periodically
pipelines coating due to  Release of oil inspection of
excavation inspection  Ignition, fire pipelines (including
damage leads to  Environmental hazard regular patrol and
corrosion Property damage pigging)
 Construction damage  Visual and sound
coating flaw and faulty indicators if leaks.
material  QA during
production,
installation and
construction of
pipelines.
 Pipelines are
constructed to
facilitate internal
(pigging) inspection

5 Mechanical Non through wall damage, Injury and property Automatic shut
Impact i.e. part wall or delayed damage. down through
failure damage automatic line
break detection and
valve closure if
large hole in pipe.