CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (4th BATCH)
1.) MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare),
FACTS: In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the
entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment The Office of the President said that that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to
his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt
the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason
of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited.The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power
from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral
risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post
as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
2.) DENNIS FUNA vs. EXEC SEC ERMITA, DOTC Sec Mendoza, DOTC
USec/MARINA OIC Bautista
GR 184740, 11 February 2010
THE CASE: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent
USec Maria Elena H. Bautista as MARINA OIC.
FACTS: In 2006, President Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena Bautista as
DOTC Usec. Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Suazo, Jr. in
2008, Bautista was designated as MARINA OIC, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
USec. Petitioner, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed a
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment and designation,
which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office
or employment. During the pendency of petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties in 2009.
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Petitioner’s arguments: (1) Bautista’s concurrent positions violate the Constitution,
saying that the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of
DOTC USec; (2) Temporary designations must not violate a standing constitutional
prohibition; (3) The positions are incompatible for there is no more checking and
counter-checking of powers and functions; (4) If the case is rendered moot by
revoking the temporary designation, a similar violation can be committed in the
future, hence supervening events should not prevent the Court from deciding the
case.
Respondents’ arguments: (1) Lack of actual controversy in view of the appointment
of Bautista as MARINA Administrator and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC
Usec; TRO or preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic; (2) Lack of legal
standing as taxpayer for neither alleging any personal or substantial interest in the
case nor claiming that public funds were actually disbursed in connection with
respondent Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC, as Bautista did not receive any
salary while she was MARINA OIC; (3) The designation was constitutional, as it was
only temporary and it falls under the exceptions to the rule against multiple offices;
(4) No incompatible offices because admin and policy recommendations of the
MARINA Administrator is submitted to the Board, not the Undersecretary.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of respondent violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies
and assistants.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional
prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding
two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a
concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such
illegal act by public officials.
In Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec Secretary, SC held that since the evident purpose
of the framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants, the
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.
ART. VII, SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
ART. IX-B, SEC. 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
As DOTC Usec, Bautista, she is thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Sec.
13 and cannot invoke the exception in Sec. 7. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil
Liberties Union. Respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that Bautista’s
designation as OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of MARINA, the
designation of Bautista as OIC was not merely an imposition of additional duties
related to her primary position; she is not even a member of the Maritime Industry
Board. Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. Where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold
the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. However, the Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the
same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the
actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification in Sec.
13 is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials
As to the contention on incompatible offices, the SC ruled that it is irrelevant in this
case.
Therefore, the designation of Bautista as MARINA OIC in her concurrent capacity as
DOTC Usec is unconstitutional. The petition was granted and the designation is null
and void.
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3.) ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25,
2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions
or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of
the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
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15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to
the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted
a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
4.) PORMENTO vs. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 191988, 31 August 2010
THE CASE: Petitioner, Atty. Evillo Pormento, filed before the Supreme Court this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to
review the COMELEC’s decision denying his petition for disqualification against
former President Joseph Estrada.
FACTS: Former President Joseph Estrada was seeking reelection when he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the May 2010 Presidential Election. Prior to this,
Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general
elections held on May 11, 1998.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed
a petition for disqualification on the ground that Estrada is prohibited from seeking
reelection as provided for by Art. 7, Sec. 4(1987 Consti.)
However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
On May 7, 2010, Pormento filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban
on the President from any reelection.
RULING: Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be
premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
5.) MAKALINTAL vs. PET
FACTS: A petition was filed by Atty. Macalintal questioning the constitution of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.”
While SC is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the
creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a
seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional
mandate. He also contends that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of
the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section
12, Article VIII, which prohibits the designation of Members of the SC and of other
courts to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
ISSUE:
I. Whether the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7, section 4 of
article vii of the 1987 constitution.
II. Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as
members of the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of section 12, article viii of the 1987 constitution.
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HELD: A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
I method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-
ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We
presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),37 which we have affirmed on numerous
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
occasions.38
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the
parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable
conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but not separate therefrom.
make the words idle and nugatory.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should
Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET
be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel
was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption
Representatives.
of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the
act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not
restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
II
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that
the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

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The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all
courts,48 the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative
of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct
line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription
found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to
acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI,
explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the
Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which
Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of
Maryland49 proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The
vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions
on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the
petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power.
6.) DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO
FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men
and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,[1] placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
Three days later, Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273) transferring
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office
of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy,
petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy filed this petition for prohibition
They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary
to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments powers, in
violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as
the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG
Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control
over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[
Petitioner claimed President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no
critical violent incidents occurred taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation
as well as AOs 2 declared unconstitutional the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
insisted President issued Proclamation to restore peace and order in subject places.
Pursuant to her calling out power[9] as Commander-in-Chief under the first
sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need
to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.[10] She must use her judgment
based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to
call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and
whenever these reared their ugly heads.
President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers
over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. They did not
give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.[11] The delegation
was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. Further, the
assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of
emergency powers.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of
local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article
V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD:
1.NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for
alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor,
petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Article VII, Section 12,[14] of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor
Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.[15] In short, the DILG Secretary did
not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. No.Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers
when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places
mentioned in the proclamation.[16] But such deployment is not by itself an exercise
of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides.[17]
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
As the Court acknowledged
it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President
acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is
a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any
effect at all petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in
the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary
had no basis too.
OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the Presidents decision to call out
the armed forces, as follows:
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the
political control of Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both families have an
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arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM
and the rest of Mindanao.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members
of the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are
members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to
prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and
additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms
and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.[23] Thus, to pacify the peoples fears
and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called
out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the
armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected
places.
Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not
withdrawn the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has
been reported[24] that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still
a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the
presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among
the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the
passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
7.) JAMAR KULAYAN VS GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN
G.R. No. 187298
FACTS: On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga
City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba,
a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed
to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged
kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail.
News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu
Sayyaf.
On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the
Local Crisis Committee. The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan,
the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by
respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen.
The PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido
G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed
male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to
surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the
provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine
National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the
Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the
willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their
services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be
achieved.".
This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the
responsibilities of each of the party signatories, as follows:
Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:
1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed
for the activation of the CEF;
2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units
which shall participate in the operations and to propose them for the
approval of the parties to this agreement;
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3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral
action(s) by the CEF without the knowledge and approval by both parties.
Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):
1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military
operations and law enforcement;
2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the
performance of their assigned task(s);
3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified
areas of operation(s);
4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as
called for in the course of operation(s)/movements of the CEF.
Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
announced to the media that government troops had cornered some one hundred
and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3) hostages.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It
cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing
it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security.
Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder
and lawless violence.
The office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the
"Guidelines for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring
a State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu."These Guidelines suspended all
Permits to Carry.
Petitioners contention: That Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines
were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the
Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces
under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army.
Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts
when they filed the instant petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the
Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) possessed concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether Governor Tan has the power to declare a state of emergency, and
exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct
of general searches and seizures.
RULING: No.
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-
chief of the Republic
i. One executive, one commander-in-chief
As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, it has already been established that there
is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This
means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice
Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one
purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.
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Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they
are exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the
notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed
by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the
bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes
a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only
by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section
23, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s
authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out
powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed
upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional
powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the
civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II,
Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution
does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and
talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations
and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the
actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is
his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval
and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual.
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to
rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-
chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view
of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine
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the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
8.) GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FACTS: There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they raise a
common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove
from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
1st case -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the dismissing
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The
petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the
President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring petitioner Wendell
Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or
omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7,
2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President
the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Cause of 1st case: Hostage Drama involving Rolando Mendoza and Hong Kong
nationals in a tourist bus. Rolando Mendoza demanded his reinstatement.
Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats,
robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed against him and other police
officers.
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission turned over, upon
the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence
in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication
The administrative case against Mendoza was dismissed upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of
Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were
assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor
Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order for appropriate action by his
immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded
said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10)
days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order,
together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S
Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August
23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC): found Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction
is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking
Case was elevated to OP. OP instituted a Formal Charge against petitioner
Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official
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Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for
Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
OP Dismissed Gonzales from his office.
2nd case: the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian
Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown
persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap
in the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power
to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and
from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall
require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there
is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office
of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution
itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are
not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under
Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members
of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by
Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only
by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on
Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2),
Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed
only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman
himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the
people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of
office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office"
are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians." And so it was that Section
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5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are
described as "protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under
Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section
11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides
strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and
ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of
independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional
strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government,
constitutional watchdog and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to
extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape
administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive,
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the
grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may
be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it
cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise
the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a
measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and
Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be
had on grounds provided by law.
9.) FORTUN vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR no. 190293 | 20 March 2012
The President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS: On Nov. 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried 57 innocent civilians in Maguindanao.
On Dec. 4, 2009 Pres. Arroyo issued PD Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. She
submitted her report to Congress stating that she acted based on her finding that
lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the
government. The Congress, in joint session, convened to review the validity of the
President’s action. However, two days later or before Congress could act, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners challenge the
constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
HELD: The Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of
beating a dead horse. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the Congress
act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on
its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does
not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the SC the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it
is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers,
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the SC step in as its final
rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Since Pres. Arroyo withdrew her proclamation before the joint Houses of Congress
could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same, then
the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.
The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.
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10.) ALMARIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028 | July 16, 2013 | 701 SCRA 269
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee and the NCCA decided to team up
and jointly administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for
determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was
agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents,
the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the
Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received
nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing
private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring
Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-
Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting
her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of
discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to
be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they
were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and
conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction
between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify
deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position. In view of the foregoing, there was a
violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.
11.) FUNA vs. AGRA
FACTS: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the
resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional
seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra
as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the
petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer,
commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno
S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on
August 5, 2010.
Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January
12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run
for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections;
that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and
that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties
as the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which
is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises
herein.
ISSUE: WON the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting
Solicitor General is unconstitutional
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HELD: At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13,
Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence,
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.
The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members
of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government
or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In
this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the
actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of
Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the
Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the officials’ offices. in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
Secretary, whereby the Court held that the phrase "the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants" found in Section 13, supra, referred only to the
heads of the various executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, and did not extend to other public officials given the rank of Secretary,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of
Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office
being the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the stricter prohibition
embodied in Section 13, supra, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad
exceptions provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the Constitution
("Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position") to justify
his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as
Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa.
To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the
other office was "allowed by law or the primary functions of his position." To claim
the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, supra, he needed to establish herein that his
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he did
not do so.
To be sure, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and
Acting Solicitor General did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity.
Had either of his concurrent designations been in an ex officio capacity in relation to
the other, the Court might now be ruling in his favor.
The import of an ex officio capacity has been fittingly explained in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary as follows:
x x x. The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office."
An ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
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certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. The ex officio position
being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for
and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to all
elective and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, thereof applies in particular
to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. In the Resolution
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court already clarified the scope
of the prohibition provided in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Citing
the case of US v. Mouat, it specifically identified the persons who are affected by
this prohibition as secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; and
categorically excluded public officers who merely have the rank of secretary,
undersecretary or assistant secretary.
Another point of clarification raised by the Solicitor General refers to the persons
affected by the constitutional prohibition. The persons cited in the constitutional
provision are the "Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants." These
terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the
heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the
Solicitor General affected thereby. (Italics supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as
neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the
former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still
comply with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein; failing which,
his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution.
Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that
the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both an incompatibility
between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation
as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
12.) VINUYA vs. ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the
Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the
“comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to
the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.
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On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs
for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would
be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the
to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment
of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle,
where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s
conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to
assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from
the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and
decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking
up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf
it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are
available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the
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Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was
signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-
vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former
are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens
norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
13.) RISOS- VIDAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR 206666, 21 January 2015
FACTS: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency,
by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored
to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None
of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate
of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who
garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for
the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed
as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
HELD: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office,
the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted
by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is
restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend
to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article
IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
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Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued
that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by
final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of
an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment
of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada
14.) PRESIDENTATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL vs. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT
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FACTS: Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Venturanza) 2010
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several government offices.
209138 4 May 13 April
3 March 2010
For purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid (Villanueva) 2010 2010
appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight
appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an 18
209138 13 May
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to 5 March 2010 March
(Rosquita) 2010
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or 2010
endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall 25
under this exception. March
212030
2010
The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. (Atty. 1 March 2010
and
Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Tamondong)
6 July
Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 2010
206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed
Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with
Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath
Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President
Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the National Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by
Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight
with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of appointments.
the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as
petitioner. All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) The CA consistently ruled that EO 2 is constitutional. The CA, however, issued
for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. different rulings as to the evaluation of the circumstances of petitioners'
appointments. In the cases of Attys. Velicaria-Garafil and Venturanza, the CA stated
To summarize, the pertinent dates for each petitioner are as follows: that the OP should consider the circumstances of their appointments. In the cases
of Villanueva, Rosquita, and Atty. Tamondong, the CA explicitly stated that · the
revocation of their appointments was proper because they were midnight
G.R. No. Date of Date of Date of Date of Assumption appointees.
Appointment Transmittal Receipt Oath of of Office
Letter Letter by MRO Office ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the
203372 1987 Constitution; (2) Whether EO 2 is constitutional. Ruling of the Court
22
(Atty. 8 March 13 May
5 March 2010 March 6 April 2010
Velicaria- 2010 2010 RULING: All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void
2010
Garafil) for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

206290 23 February 9 March 12 March 15 15 March This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that
(Atty. 2010 2010 2010 March 2010 "none of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal

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letters) have been issued (and released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by
the MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of
the appointment papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling
during the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all
the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EO 2
Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an
appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper
by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced
by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
During the deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, then Constitutional Commissioner
(now retired Supreme Court Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. referred to this
Court's ruling in Aytona and stated that his proposal seeks to prevent a President,
whose term is about to end, from preempting his successor by appointing his own
people to sensitive positions.
[T]he well-settled rule in our jurisprudence, that an appointment is a process
that begins with the selection by the appointing power and ends with
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee, stands.
The dissent's assertion creates a singular exception to the well-settled doctrine that
appointment is a process that begins with the signing of the appointment paper,
followed by the transmittal and receipt of the appointment paper, and becomes
complete with the acceptance of the appointment. The dissent makes the singular
exception that during the constitutionally mandated ban on appointments,
acceptance is not necessary to complete the appointment. The dissent gives no
reason why this Court should make such singular exception, which is contrary to the
express provision of the Constitution prohibiting the President from making
appointments during the ban. The dissent's singular exception will allow the
President, during the ban on appointments, to remove from office incumbents
without cause by simply appointing them to another office and transmitting the
appointment papers the day before the ban begins, appointments that the
incumbents cannot refuse because their acceptance is not required during the ban.
Adoption by this Court of the dissent's singular exception will certainly wreak havoc
on the civil service.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should
be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint
and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment
paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of
appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during
the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur
and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks
even one step. And, unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further
distinguish between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an
appointment is valid.
15.) RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE
TANON STRAIT vs REYES
FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio
(Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as
"the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization,
established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D.
Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in
their personal capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
In 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The
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studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite RULING:
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-
In 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
Petitioner
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we
In 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-
quote:
channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done
to determine the area's underwater composition.
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident
of Malacañang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the
happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally
project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express
Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,
declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental
co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur
Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related
hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of
Measures And For Other Purposes."
her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political
law.
In 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental
This is incorrect.
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
The EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November
plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor
16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters,
shall be stated in the complaint.
near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until
February 8, 2008.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a
plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case.
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for
This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can
redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein
properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's name
they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for,
cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent,
among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
as such would be a denial of due process.
In 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former
President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an
ISSUE/s: Whether PGMA is correctly impleaded in the present case.
unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner,
Whether the Service Contract is constitutional.
for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to

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the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.”
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the
petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Ruling of the Court On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a vis Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still
allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the
words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the
deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show
that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually
referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial
law regime, to wit:
Summation of the ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the
ConCom deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the
term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or
financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973
Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or
eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would
eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief,
they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors,
but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm
established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves
or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60 percent of which is owned
by such citizens — the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
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This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and
the felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals and petroleum
resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be
considered adequate and reasonable. But some of them, having more "radical"
leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for them, the provision would
permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's natural resources, which they
felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the
entire body. They sounded off their individual opinions, openly enunciated their
philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's
viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony — including
paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to
the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article — was
resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service
Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in
fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the
other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service
contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-
how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR,
MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that
paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1,
Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated
in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among
which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will
set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null
and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted
to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the
President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that: It is basic that the
law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between
the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed
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written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties, x x x.
(Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum.
SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its
then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their
acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case.
In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
16.) GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC
FACTS: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May
2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the
natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE:
WON Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
WON Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
WON the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing
material misrepresentations in her COC
HELD:
1. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For
that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-
born Filipinos may run for presidency. First, there is a high probability that
Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such
province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’
nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm. Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that
foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show
that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there
is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
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Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born
citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of
international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of
these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
2. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled
with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace Poe’s domicile
had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI.
COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa
or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe
presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
3. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she
misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because such
facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding
that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications.In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is
now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence,
there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her
citizenship and residency
17.) SAGUISAG vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before
the SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement),
an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on
June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and
use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the
following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation
exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief
activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of
agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since
the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the
country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate,
through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs
congressional ratification.
ISSUE 1: W/N the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the requirements of legal
standing in assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as
citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal
interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from general
statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their
constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any
specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the
enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be
considered by the Court as citizens’ suits that would justify a disregard of the
aforementioned requirements.
ISSUE 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as “taxpayers”
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax
measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those
challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to
this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there
has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
ISSUE 3: W/N the petitions qualify as “legislator’s suit”
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislator’s suit, the
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injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members,
as it is the Senate’s constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here,
none of the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain
the suit.
ISSUE 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental
importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The
challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII,
Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign
military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of
paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
18.) REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR
C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope
of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety
simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their
transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the
determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from
arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining
the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace
and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it
extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It
is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City,
but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from
different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the
place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring
martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with
the passing of time. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City
and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a
whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once
Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No.
216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same
Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the
same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full
support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216.
Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various
citizens filed several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216;
and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it
lacks sufficient factual basis.
ISSUES:
1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?
2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus,:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of
National Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation,
even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately
reported?
3. Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly
or separately?
4. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
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a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration
of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within
the entire Mindanao region?
RULING:
1. YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly
indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those
enumerated in Article VIII.
Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant
therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said
provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual
period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5
of Article VIII is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII considering the limited period within which the Court has to promulgate its
decision.
In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
2.
A.) NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality
of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court
expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the
written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and
veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
3. YES. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a
requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to
confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only
the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
B.) NO. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of
National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for
the President to declare martial law.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except
for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is bestowed.
C.) YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President,
the determination of the Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for
the exercise of the power to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts or information known by
or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension
which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written
Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the
past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which
are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened
after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be
used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the
sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the
factual basis itself.
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proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the
other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to,
or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to “undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of
the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and
further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a
petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are
not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although
concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
4. YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the President to
believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being
committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A.) Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual
invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must be struck down.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending
to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was
an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from
the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was
reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
B.) After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable
cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
C.) What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause
for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
5. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain
of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.
6.
A.) NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all
vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the
text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in
Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
B.) NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and
other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review.
Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution
and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be
resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades
into these areas, it would be deemed a trespassing into the sphere that is
reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
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19.) DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR
[G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012]
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A.
Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA
from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to
serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until
the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February
2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to
his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue,
in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22,
2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step
down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar
vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia
Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this
petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and
the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four
exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following
requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition,
viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and
must be the very litis mota of the case
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body
and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as
COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under,
and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since
it obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules
that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus,
assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the
so-called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
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On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold
office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point
being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to
another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to
chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the
word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed
by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then
he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same
vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise
served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman
or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no
longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The
obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the
Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec.
1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional
appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the
service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made
under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While
there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,”
there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA
member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for
an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a
circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the
rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-
year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be
invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose
of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first
set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7)
years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a
result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such
appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be
allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser
period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten
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the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result
in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as
this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed
for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in
the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by
the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position
of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a
different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under
the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
20.) DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al.
FACTS: The independence of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly
mandated under Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits its Members, during their tenure, from holding
any other office or employment.
Facts: On January 11, 2010, then President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman
of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment on
February 3, 2010. Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the following government-owned or government-
controlled corporations (GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH;(c) ECC; and (d)
HDMF.
Petitioner: Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known
as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of
the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being
clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner asserts that these provisions violate the independence of the CSC, which
was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political
pressures due to the significance of its government functions. Such independence is
violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of
Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the
Executive Branch of the Government. In this situation, the President may exercise
his power of control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits
as Board member are attached to the Executive Department.
It violates the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions
from holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the
event that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning
personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs
have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and
regulations.
Respondents: Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, as well as the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, are consistent with each other. While the charters of these GOCCs do not
provide that CSC Chairman shall be a member of their respective governing Boards,
there islikewise no prohibition mentioned under said charters. EO 864, issued in
conformity with Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, could not have
impliedly amended the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
because the former relates to the law on the CSC while the latter involve the
creation and incorporation of the respective GOCCs. As their subject matters differ
from each other, the enactment of the subsequent law is not deemed to repeal or
amend the charters of the GOCCs, being considered prior laws.
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ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity,
impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition
against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions?
HELD: The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of
Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provide:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications
upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way
may be affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or – controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the
disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duque’s tenure
as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this
disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution
Section 7, paragraph (2),Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so
that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of
the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section
7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the
Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position.
The Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form
of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position
by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is
not part of the Executive Branch.
The Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective
as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification
is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the
public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duque's
official actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance
of Board resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to positions in the
concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and
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employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of
the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF.
Notes:
Power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by
supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public
interest;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and
qualified and whose term of office has not expired. A de facto officer is one who
derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office
is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be
one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.
21.) DELA LLANA vs. COA
FACTS: COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of
government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular
affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed,
expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded
against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to
ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government.
Further, the circular emphasized that the responsibility to ensure faithful adherence
to the policy rested directly with the chief or head of the government agency
concerned. The circular was also designed to further facilitate or expedite
government transactions without impairing their integrity.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave
irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were
uncovered. Hence, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-
audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to
be an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the
pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and
government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs). The rationale for the
circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in
management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines;
and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and
improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and
ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and
protect the integrity of these transactions. Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit
of government transactions of NGAs and GOCCs, Circular No. 89-299 mandated
the installation, implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control
system, which would be the direct responsibility of the government agency head.
Circular No. 89-299 further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA
as therein outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the implementation or
prosecution of projects and the payment of claims. The COA aimed to henceforth
focus its efforts on the post-audit of financial accounts and transactions, as well as
on the assessment and evaluation of the adequacy and effectivity of the agencys
fiscal control process. However, the circular did not include the financial transactions
of local government units (LGUs) in its coverage.
The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 and Circular No. 95-006 Both circulars
clarified and expanded the total lifting of pre-audit activities on all financial
transactions of NGAs, GOCCs, and LGUs. The remaining audit activities performed
by COA auditors would no longer be pre-requisites to the implementation or
prosecution of projects, perfection of contracts, payment of claims, and/or approval
of applications filed with the agencies.
Dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an
internal pre-audit service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing
him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299. The reply of the COA emphasized
the required observance of Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992, which
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directed the strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through
the installation of an internal audit service (IAS).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He
alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section
2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack
of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-
million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and
many others.
ISSUE: Is COA allowed to pre-audit?
RULING: The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds,
vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenues
and expenditures and the use of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to establish the
techniques and methods for the review; and to promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Its exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in
our form of government.
Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct
pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are
present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other
specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the
proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended
balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire
amount of the expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper
authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence.It could,
among others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their
face prior to their implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.
Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2.
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as
a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary
or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining
thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties. (Emphasis supplied)
He claims that under the first paragraph quoted above, government transactions
must undergo a pre-audit, which is a COA duty that cannot be lifted by a mere
circular.
We find for public respondents.
Petitioner’s allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision.
There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of
all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
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reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which

provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with
state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited
entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the
scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and
explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of
the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.

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