BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

WHAT HAPPENED
What really happened that fate full night is an enigma and is a matter of many a debate. But
the accepted fact is that in the early hours of December 3, 1984, an estimated 43 tones of
deadly Methyl-Iso-cynate (MIC) Gas leaked out of tank No. 610C of the carbide plant and
escaped into the atmosphere. The immediate cause was the building up of pressure in tank
610-C, containing the deadly MIC, due to an exothermic reaction caused by water in the tank.
This pressure caused the safety valve to rupture and the gas to escape. Such leakage of gas
into the atmosphere was a contingency for which the plant should have been prepared. This
catastrophe happened because the attendant and essential safety systems either failed or were
in operable and the safety procedures were not strictly complied with. Some causes that have
been identified are: -
(a) MIC as a gas has to be stored in a liquid form. The refrigeration unit designed to cool the
liquid was known to have been shut down as an economy measure.
(b) Water leaked into tank 610C causing a build- up of pressure and temperature. To prevent
the tank from exploding the safety valves opened.
(c) The possibility of release of gas into the air was a contingency known to the factory
management. Safety systems that had been planned became ineffective as follows:-

a. A caustic soda scrub could neutralize the gas. However the scrubber
was not designed for the release of such a large amount of gas and got overwhelmed
b. The gas can also be neutralized by incineration and therefore there was a flare
system, however the pilot flare flame was inoperable and efforts to ignite the gas failed.
c. The plant had water curtains to knock down toxic vapors but again the
water cannon could not reach the height of 33 meters from where the gas was escaping.
d. The management then probably panicked and abandoned all efforts to contain
the leakage.
e. Methyl Iso-Cyanate in gaseous from is heavier than air and has a
tendency to settle down. It is thus subject to wind dispersal. The geographical
characteristics and wind velocity in the area controlled the rate of dispersal and spread
of MIC. Between 12 AM and 03.30 AM a gentle wind moved this deadly cloud over
densely populated areas of Bhopal causing an unimagined loss of life.
f. The incident took place on a cold winter night when most of the people
where indoors, they woke up with a burning sensation in their eyes, they rushed
outdoors only to breathe greater concentrations of the gas, in panic they ran, breathing
even greater volumes of the gas ultimately choking themselves to death.

The Union Carbide plant was set up in 1968. It started the manufacture of 'Carbaryl', a
pesticide in 1979. Methyl-Iso-cynate was an intermediate compound required for the
manufacture of Carbaryl. However the plant had no long-term permission for the storage of
MIC. The safety record of the unit had suffered due to:-
1. December 1981- a worker killed while handling phosgene
2. February 1982- 25 workers hospitalized following leaks in pipes
carrying chlorine, MIC and Hydrochloric acid.
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3. December 1982- a massive leak of Chlorine affecting 16 workers.
Neighboring shanties of Jaiprakash Nagar affected.
The issue of danger to Bhopal from this pesticide plant was raised in the Legislative
Assembly of the State. An accident investigation committee examined the issue and
concluded that the plant was safe and opined that, there was no danger to Bhopal nor will
there ever be?
Mr. J. Mukund, Union Carbide's works manager exhibited a rather chilling overconfidence.
He is believed to have expressed that the gas could not have leaked from his plant as the plant
shuts down automatically. Once the leak was confirmed the Medical Officer opined that the
gas was not fatal but was just a minor irritant. And yet people choked to death on the streets
of Bhopal.
It will not be out of place to describe, briefly, the sequence of events of that fateful night. This
could be the likely course the events: -
December 02/3, 1984

 10.30 pm-the late night shift at the plant starts

 12.00 am (midnight) the operator checks MIC tank 610C and finds that
the rupture disc has burst; the gas is leaking into the atmosphere.
 12.06 am MIC vapors starts to leak into the atmosphere.
December 03, 1984 (12.06 am - 12.15 am)
 Safety systems fail and efforts to ignite the gas unsuccessful as the
pilot flare system is inoperable
 Water cannon too are unable to contain the escaping gas.
 Workers panic.
 Police Inspector on routine patrol duty gets affected.
December 03, 1984 (12.15 am- 01 30 am)
 Police Inspector immediately notified city Police Control Room. Police Control
Room informed me.
 Union Carbide Plant activated public siren for a few minutes.
 I arrived at the City Police Control Room after visiting the UC facility and its
neighborhood.
 I called the UC to enquire what had gone wrong.
December 03, 1984 (03 30 am onwards)
 U.C. informed the police, medical and civil officials that the leak was plugged.
 Press starts calling about the accident.

The environment of the city of Bhopal was so badly damaged that the trees in the vicinity of
the Union Carbide plant and on the path of the Gas became totally leafless.
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To the outside world the tragedy seemed to have occurred and was being looked at in terms
of relief and aid to be provided. The local administration was more than aware that there was
still residual MIC gas in the Union Carbide plant and that had to be neutralized. The people
were jittery and in no mood to forgive, hence “Operation Faith” was launched.
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OPERATION FAITH
December 16, 1984
This involved the disposing off of the left over MIC in the Union Carbide Plant. After
consultation with Scientist and Experts of National and International repute it was decided
that the safest course would be to convert this MIC into the Pesticide produced by the
Carbide. This process was code named “Operation Faith” and was commenced on the
morning of 16th December 1984. The most remarkable yet worrying factor during this
operation was the fact that the Chief Political Executive of our state decided to and stayed
within the carbide plant till the entire process involved in Operation Faith was completed. To
some it was politics but to most of the citizens it was a confidence building efforts. To us it
was a cause of concern for security of the personality.

After 17 years in July 2001, Supreme Court ordered that I-cards be issued to gas victims, and
permanent cards given to those who need lifelong medical aid.

In June 2010, seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman Warren Anderson,
were convicted of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment.
Anderson died on 29 September 2014.

SHORTCOMINGS
One of the first things that struck us when the gas leak took place was our total lack of
preparedness and ignorance about how to deal with such a situation.
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The immediate medical fraternity seemed unaware about the effects of the gas on humans and
also the treatment. Since the experts considered the leaking gas as being of the cyanide
family, Sodium Thio Sulphate was administered as a probable antidote. Some other factors
that seemed to be contributing to this catastrophe were: -

 The information about the storage and handling of hazardous and dangerous materials
was not adequately available.
 Effect of the gas on humans and the treatment was not known.
 There was a lack of co-ordination between the factory and the emergency services.
 There was an inadequacy of warning systems and related mock drills for such
contingencies.
 Union Carbide probably had never anticipated the 'worst case scenario'.
 The plant maintenance practices seemed inadequate and inventory of vital spares was
depleted.
 The exodus of some of the experienced engineers and operating personnel.
 Economy measures, overriding safety concerns.

Apart from these, we noticed some other difficulties all inextricably linked up with the
developmental process in the country.

 Densely populated areas around the plant

 Absence of a proper road network. Rescue workers had to move on foot through
densely populated areas
 Poor communications.
 Lack of effective emergency medical facilities.
 Inadequate transport for emergency evacuation.
 Cattle living in residential areas, a peculiar Indian problem.
 People sleeping on pavements/ railway platforms.
 Unidentified dead bodies. Creating difficulties in identification of religion and also
creating medico-legal problems.
 Along with humans a large number of animals, mostly cattle perished in the
disaster. Their disposal became a serious health problem.
 Relief operations became difficult as the disaster caused enervation.

IT STILL LINGERS
The harrowing experience of this tragedy is not and shall never be over for the citizens of
Bhopal. The uncertainties and insecurities that may they be physical, emotional, medical or
social still are writ large on the faces and livelihoods of the Bhopal. We can understand that
merely reading and discussing about the continued suffering of these people may be one
aspect of our social commitment but the sufferings are manifold. The medical fraternity did
not believe in chemical asthma but after Bhopal Gas Tragedy they have started believing and
realizing that chemicals can cause asthma. Similarly nowhere in the world are there more
people with the disease called Pulmonary Fibrosis leading to pulmonary cripples. Thousands
of Bhopalies have pulmonary Fibrosis and live with capacity to just lie down. Young mothers
even today are giving birth to still born or deformed fetuses, cancer cases are multiplying,
mental retardation is getting more manifest, yet life in Bhopal goes on with the hope that
some day they will live as normally as they would have – had December 1984 not happened.
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THE FUTURE
The Administration and other essential services must know the location and exact nature of
any hazardous chemical that is stored by any industrial establishment. The procedure to be
followed in case of exposure and the antidotal treatment should be known to the aforesaid.
Adequate quantity of antidote should be available with the industry, which stores such
hazardous chemical.