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The Constitution of the Philippines ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.


Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda Issued by respondent OIC Gov designating
FACTS: respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal
On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987,
the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, therefore, the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have
Province of Rizal in a Barangay election HELD under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2,
known as Barangay Election Act of 1982. Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. While
the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x xx."
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which 2. ANGARA vs. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and
shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine FACTS:
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
designate their successors. National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; that the On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it
Provisional Constitution. will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the B. The Concept of the State
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE: Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? FACTS:
Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court in Manila.
RULING: During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the parties, National
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking Coconut Corporation(NACOCO), requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied with the request
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to said counsel their bills for the payment of their
fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative for said transcripts at the rate of P1 per page. However, in January 1953, the Auditor General
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department
of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any of Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the
manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor payment of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; that the NACOCO is a
prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging Court.
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. xxx. ISSUE: WON NACOCO may be considered as included in the term “Government of the
Republic of the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitaterei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
[W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the HELD:
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status of being
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the part of the government because they do not come under the classification of municipal or public
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose of
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. utilization of coconut by-products“, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to

promote the coconut industry, it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct HELD:
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people.
4, Commonwealth Act No. 518 – the law creating NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is
same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern
government. society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the
consideration. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency.
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms
As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA
through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or
case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between
other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not
constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile.
include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from
It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct
liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters.
respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage
of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
2. PVTA vs CIR
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the
differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be
FACTS: borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of
responsibility to provide for the general welfare.In 1966 private respondents filed a petition personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such
seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent
compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of Court must be sustained.
a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez Issued an order, directing
petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising 3. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. MONTE DE PIEDAD
governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. PVTA
contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental FACTS:
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the
Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3, 1863 in the
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of respondent, the Philippine government
directed its treasurer to turn over to the respondent the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in

instalments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now bring suit to recover said amount with interest During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and
against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of the persons and heirs to whom the relief jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission,
was intended. Defendant contends that the amount was given as a donation and that the court and in the laws they administered and enforced.
erred in stating that the Philippine Islands hassubrogated the Spanish government in its rights.
ISSUE: Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing
ISSUE: prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may
Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the respondent? continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied
and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the
HELD: Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities
of public nature. The court further asserted that said amount was not a donation and that HELD:
respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended
States. It is said that there is total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
of the ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the case are not political in nature. usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts
The great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continue in force or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
until abrogated or changed by the new ruler, as such, the government has the authority to file a prevented, to respect. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to
suit in behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens patriae. the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
4. CO KIM CHAM v EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and
conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the
FACTS: Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation Issued by continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a
General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the whole fibre and content.”
of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.


The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He filed a petition for habeas corpus contending
is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the
that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that
Mayor’s Office and some neighbours, she demolished the house standing thereon without
time and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of
acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged
the Philippine Republic.
by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure
permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation
thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
WON the absolute allegiance of the citizens was suspended during
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign
Japanese occupation (NO)
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. The absolute
and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory, occupied by the enemy of their
HELD: legitimate government or sovereign is NOT abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. occupier. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that
Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government,
there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What
exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, the Philippines. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.

7. RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
FACTS: On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before
December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents allow.
be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground
that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
ISSUES: Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation? Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At
HELD: the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could
Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United States not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila
violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial ISSUE:
are agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has WON Lau Yuen Yeung ipso FACTo became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
no merits and is dismissed with costs. citizen.

B. 1. People HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
8. MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION or naturalized, becomes ipso FACTo a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
FACTS: alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to

go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it After trial, the RTC granted the petition and declared Po Bi as a Filipino citizen, but in his
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. amended application, it failed to file a statement of intent to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen
by birth in this country which is the Philippines. On 30 October 1963 the Solicitor General filed
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to a motion to reconsider the above decision contending that petitioner is not exempt from filing
treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, his declaration of intention, and has not complied with Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of La w, and that his witnesses are not competent and credible persons within the contemplation of
a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she law. On December 1, 1965 petitioner filed a motion alleging therein that more than two (2) years
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a had elapsed since the decision and that he has complied with all th e conditions and requisites,
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that he then prays that after hearing, the decision be executed and he be allowed to take his oath as a
the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, Filipino citizen.
as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative
case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such 1. WON the second amended petition published is in accordance with Section 9 of the Revised
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again Naturalization Law, which requires that the petition itself must be published
and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a 2. WON petitioner sufficiently complied with the requirement of Section 7 of the Revised
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Naturalization Law that the petitioner must allege therein his present and former places of
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. residence?
3. WON the petitioner successfully renounced his Chinese Citizenship?


1. The second amended petition was not published. Neither were the original and the amended
FACTS: petitions. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to prepare and ISSUE notices of the
Po Yo bi a Certified Chinese citizen who was born in the Philippines filed a petition for petition. This is not sufficient compliance contemplated in the legal provision. It was said notices
naturalization in the CFI of Ilo-ilo, when approved and was scheduled for hearing, he moved to alone which were ordered to be published and posted. Non-compliance with the requirements
amend his petition twice which resulted in the moving of the said hearing also twice. In his thereof, constitutes a fatal defect. As a consequence, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction to
second amended petition it contained inserted allegations, however there was no stating that he hear this case and the decision appealed from is null and void.
is a person of good moral character. Upon the moving of his hearing to a final date of Feb. 26,
1962 with orders of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation 2. No, all his allegations were insufficient in specifications. He stated that he studied in Manila,
in Iloilo, however the second Amended Petition itself was not published in the Official Gazette but did not revealed where in Manila he resided during that time. He also declared that he was
or in a newspaper of general circulation, but instead only the amended notice of petition was in Manila from June 1939-1942 but just gave his address as “Salazar Street” which is very vague
published. It was also not posted in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of where in Manila this street is. There is no way it would facilitate the checking up on the activities
Court or in the building where such office is located. of the petitioner which are material to the proceedings. Petitioner deliberately suppressed vital

information to make it extremely difficult for the government authorities to locate his place of contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
residence and check on his activities therein during such time. Besides, a careful reading of the violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
transcripts of the testimony of petitioner on direct 3. RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
3. Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a certificate of naturalization is Issued, the
petitioner shall renounce "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
potentate, state or sovereignty." It is settled that a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic
citizen of the Philippines unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
previous permission of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality .€ In the
instant case, petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he obtained such permission.
B.2. Territory
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
*RA. No. 3026
*RA. No. 5446 The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we
*PD. No. 1599 connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the
*RA. 9522 waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an
10. MERLIN MAGALANO vs. EDUARDO ERMITA explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.

In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
February 27, 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an
their particular arguments are as follows: internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and
continental shelf.
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will
the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties. not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea

lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts
over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to Ratio:
precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and
it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories. Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de FACTo
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de FACTo governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
B.3. Government
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed
1. GO KIM CHAN vs. VALDEZ TAN KEH by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of
insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or
FACTS: the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any
Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation Issued other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial
by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de
defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). FACTo governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which
The court resolved three ISSUES:
would be in violation of international law.

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate
valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur Issued in which he declared
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great
that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal
free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts;
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and

violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the
judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.” rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and who rise in insurrection against the parent state)
courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY FACTS:
CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino Issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
a change. she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the Issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.” Petitioners alleged that the
the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. ISSUE:
DECISION: Writ of mandamus Issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case 2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
no. 3012.
Summary of ratio: In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
1. International law says the acts of a de FACTo government are valid and civil laws continue government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
even during occupation unless repealed. redressed by a favourable action. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the provisional It was the people that made the judgment and accepted the new government.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial Thus, the Supreme Court HELD its legitimacy.
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.

3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de FACTo government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession

No further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
1. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court.
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court.
not have a cause of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the Reason: The Court HELD that the respondent, Lukban had no authority to commence such
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the business agreement. He violated certain laws based on his act of compelling these women to
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is change their domicile, encapsulated in Art. 211 which states: 1) any public officer not thereunto
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de FACTo government authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall
but is in FACT and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distance from his domicile,
recognized the legitimacy of the present government. except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas; 2) any
3. VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., vs. LUKBAN, ET AL., public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character
in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall
suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not
Justo Lukban, respondent and then Mayor of Manila, sent 170 women to Davao. The women
more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. The respondent’s intention to suppress
were confined to their houses in the district by the police from October 16 to October 25, 1918.
the social evil was commendable, however, his methods were unlawful.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao only on October 29, 1918. Lukban claims that
the women were to be laborers and was received by Feliciano Yñigo, a haciendero, Rafael
B.4. Sovereignty
Castillo, and Francisco Sales, the governor of Davao. The women thought that they were being
transported to another police station, while Yñigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that 1. PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
the women being sent to them as laborers him were actually prostitutes. The families of the
prostitutes then filed charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Sales.
Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the
They prayed for a writ for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court to be Issued against
supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other
the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao
necessaries was guilty of the crime of robbery as penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the
against their will. The stipulation of the parties was made to include all of the women who were
same Assembly. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application
August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created during
will be considered as including them. The SC granted the writ, however, the mayor was not able
the so-called Republic of the Philippines. The procedures to be followed during the hearing of
to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
his case should be the one provided by the Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the
Executive Commission
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao.

Petitioner-defendant, petitioned for the writ of the habeas corpus for the reason that Court of 3. if they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the
Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government
No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese
Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political HELD:
purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of 1. The creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the summary
America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that it violated his constitutional rights and that procedure is valid. The existence of such court is to serve as a government instrumentality of
his punishments were created to serve the Japanese Imperial Army not the Philippines making the belligerent occupant, which in this case are the Japanese Imperial Army. It functions solely
the penalties more severe than those provided in the RPC for the same crimes. to apply the law to any case that falls within their jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Prisons, agreed to such claim saying that With regards to the summary of procedure adopted by the Special court, such procedure is also
proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and considered valid. An invader, the Japanese Army for this matter, can set up military courts and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein provide laws to ensure their safety and relations towards the inhabitants of the occupied territory
petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus to preserve public order.
should be granted. He also added that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not
afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional 2. The validity of the sentence that imposes life imprisonment depends on the competence of the
rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. belligerent occupant to promulgate the penalties provided in Art. No. 65 of the National
Assembly. In the present case, the sentence of life imprisonment is within the power and
However, the city fiscal of Manila appeared to the court as amicus curiae andclaimed that the competence of the Japanese to promulgate such law.
petition for habeas corpus be denied for the following grounds:
(1) The court of special and exclusive jurisdical crimes and acts is not a political complexion 3. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid
because the court was created and the specified crimes placed under it in response to the urgency upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime
of such court as stated in Ordinance 7. (2) The right to appeal a criminal case is not against the of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid by the principle of
constitutional rights. Ordinance 7 does not violate Article III of the Commonwealth Act. Postliminy. The sentence of life imprisonment is lifted and the writ of habeas corpus is granted.


1. Whether or not there is a validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court FACTS:
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
2. Whether or not the validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing
occupation; petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo
area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties

in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of HELD:
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy. must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On
the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s
HELD: assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights
The Court HELD that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely
Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity,
even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his
as a defiance of 95th Article of War HELD petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source
Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military hence taxable.
court's jurisdiction.

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
$6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-
the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between
as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland
transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan
to be at P17,912.34 and that his income tax would be P2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is
but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation
that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-
of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation. AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? within its internal waters.

ISSUES: ISSUE 3: The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international
law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples’ right to information on matters of
public concern. ISSUE 4: Yes, there is a violation of the people’s right to information. An essential element of
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government
would be BINDING itself. and the people. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of public interest in the highest order.
Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
question; and provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such
7. Whether MOA-AD is constitutional defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD,
for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
ISSUE 5: No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international
ISSUE 1: The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not
and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under
exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate international law.
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. ISSUE 6:Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of
North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
ISSUE 2: Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the
matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions
government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what
No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing it had done in a number of landmark cases.
amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.

ISSUE 7: Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the HELD: No
present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The
Ratio: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on
The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends.
C. State Immunity from Suit 2. LASCO VS UNRFNRE


Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations
FACTS: Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the
and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat
Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor. Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Island.Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent
Execution was Issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed
garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the diplomatic immunity.
Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment. The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and ISSUE: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP. Petitioner filed a petition against HELD:
Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations
garnishments are null and void. states that ³each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement
of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
ISSUE: specialized agency is a party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the
Whether or not the Writ of Execution Issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid. Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government
and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island.

3. SEAFDEC VS. NLRC such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member.
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations FACTS:
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an
respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner.
IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of
accident. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by
various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the
the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was
public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases. The private respondents, as well as
charged with: (1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if,
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to
indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived
start because of a problem with the car battery, and (3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
its immunity by belatedly raising the ISSUE of jurisdiction.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI Issued
ISSUE: a Notice of Termination to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
damages and attorney's fees. IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys
HELD: immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that
it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. While admitting IRRI's defense of
international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been HELD in Southeast immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order Issued by the Institute to the effect that
Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered
Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit
Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. In this petition
SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by
from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. One of the basic immunities of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as
an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed
legal writs and processes Issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides,

ISSUE: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when his claim was disapproved, and that
employer-employee relationship? he is entitled to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362 amending Section 9 of RA No. 65) as a
permanently incapacitated person, which was increased to P100 a month when RP 1362 was
amended by RA No. 1920 on June 22, 1957, Begosa filed a case against PVA in the Court of
No. P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall
First Instance. CFI ruled in favor plaintiff. Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted
enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
all administrative remedies before resorting to court action and that the plaintiff’s claim is in
immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
reality a suit against the Government which cannot be entertained by this Court for lack of
representatives. The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this
jurisdiction because the Government has not given its consent.
case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been HELD to be
a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department ISSUE: WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.
of Government. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
Yes. Ratio: Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of
liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suitability may appropriately be invoked.
the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
However, it has no application where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other
because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statue appropriating public funds for
officer acting under his direction. The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
the benefit of plaintiff. • Also, where there is a stipulation of FACTS, the question before the
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The grant of immunity to
lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants
IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by
being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not
which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. In cases involving dismissed employees, the
come to play.
Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.


Test to determine if suit is against the state
5. BEGOSO V PVA On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to del Mar) filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil case R-8465) against the Philippine Veterans
Administration (hereinafter referred to the PVA to compel the latter to continue paying him
Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed he was entitled
monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950 to June 20, 1957,
under the Veterans’ Bill of Rights. • He filed his claim for disability pension on March 4, 1955
and thereafter, or from June 22 1957 his monthly life pension, as increased by Republic Act
but was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his dishonorable discharge from the
1920, 1 of P100 and to pay to him as well the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his
army. The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964,
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, 2 pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920
entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to take effect on October 5 of that year. • Believing

which took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages. In his petition below, del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief 7. VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT
judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the OF APPEALS
rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October
20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim presented FACTS:
and after hearing and adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board (the PVA's predecessor Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under
granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that in March 1950, the Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987
said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and
similar pension from the United States Government, through the United States Veterans tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one
during World War II, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the security agency. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3,
Philippine Government; that he wrote the said Board twice demanding that it continue paying subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private
his monthly life pension, impugning the cancellation thereof as illegal; and that his demands Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO Issued by then PC
went unheeded. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims. Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security
agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can file a suit against a Government agency such as the PVA within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such membership requirement in
without consent. PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions
against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. A Memorandum
HELD: of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the immunity of the contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro
Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property." with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for
4 Needless to state, in such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS),
the court has no option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of
no application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply Agreement dated May 12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition,
with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from
by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. 5 As clearly discernible from the circumstances, PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA
the case at bar falls under the exception. affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. As a
result, PADPAO refused to ISSUE a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI
made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and
consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of
membership from PADPAO.

ISSUE: with the ‘notice of Garnishment’ dated May 6, 1970.” The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
State without its consent. ISSUES:

HELD: Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as
Yes. A public official may sometimes be HELD liable in his personal or private capacity if he a grave abuse of discretion.
acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for
which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as
part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies: “An
had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial personality.
Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute If the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.” From the opinion being
an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound
from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself,
consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of
review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto. a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it
descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which
belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.
Suit against gov’t agencies

A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
Issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning
Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: That the the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court Issued a
execution was contrary to law and That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
character.” In thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on
discretion. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
denied for the lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.

They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from 10. GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN .
At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike Whether or not the CA erred in taking three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous
jurisdiction over the subject matter. opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for
damages against the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents
forn dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as
strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and
to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, operation of the Angat Dam. W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its
s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, HELD:
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation and be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned and controlled corporation,
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the
the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.
is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has 11. MALONG V. PNR
jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council which is not granted by law authority to ISSUE writ of injunction in labor disputes FACTS:
within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino,
a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and
Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train was
overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong
spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totaling P136,370. Upon the
Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had no

jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with
the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of the Constitution). The Malong spouses appealed to this Court individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before the courts, the rights and obligation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon the same principles as if both contracting parties
first instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving only were private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in
questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, etc. or the the dealer, contractor and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549). Justice Abad Santos
legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from (Separate Opinion) : All corporations organized by the government are its instrumentality by the
ordinary appeal — i.e., by notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41— very reason of their creation. But that fact alone does not invest them with immunity from suit.
to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45


WON PNR is immune from suit. WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate
capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation WON the
On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and Jesus P. Disini (Disini)
State acted differently when it organized the PNR as successor of the Manila Railroad Company
entered into an Immunity Agreement (the Immunity Agreement) under which Disini undertook
HELD: to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and
documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United
No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International
the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of
did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini
1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed (Herminio), as an executive in the latter’s companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed
and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered
Philippine National Railways. Ratio: The correct rule is that "not all government entities, by one of Herminio’s companies, had been attended by anomalies.
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined
by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse
Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs, Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought
Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.) Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which by the Republic against Herminio.
they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the State
Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republic’s application, the
Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in
Sandiganbayan Issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce
that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function The point is that when
documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved
the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to
to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the
be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904,
motion and Issued a new subpoena directing him to testifybefore it.
6 L. ed. 244, cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73
Phil. 374, 388). There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject, but when the

Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed
the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government’s honesty and
denied Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play,
Court. which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise.

The Republic maintained that the PCGG’s power to grant immunity under Section 5 of If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases as ordered by Sandiganbayan, it was certain to
Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover result in prosecution for criminal contempt (a conduct directed against the authority and dignity
immunity from providing evidence in court. The Republic argued that Disini’s immunity from of the court or a judge acting judicially; an act obstructing the administration of justice which
testifying against Herminio contravened the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect), punishable by a fine or imprisonment or
under the regimeof former President Marcos. both. In criminal contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal
procedure apply. The grant, therefore, of immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify
The Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity
was ultimately a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution, something that fell within the
Agreement which reads: “Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide
express coverage of the immunity given him.
truthful information or testimony,” Disini, despite the immunity given him against being
compelled to testify in other cases, was to “provide truthful information or testimony” in such The questioned immunity did not contravene the state’s public policy respecting the recovery of
other cases. illegally acquired wealth under the regime of former President Marcos. The authority that
adopted such policy, former President Corazon C. Aquino, was the same authority that gave the
For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking
PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses whom it might use to recover illegally acquired
the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide such
wealth during that regime. In the case of Tanchanco vs. Sandiganbayan (______________), the
guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
Court regarded as valid and binding on the government the immunity it gave former National
which provides that “(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
Food Authority Administrator, Jesus Tanchanco, for all “culpable acts of his during his service
officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by
in the Marcos government,” which would include possible prosecution for any illegal wealth
prescription, laches or estoppel.”
that he might himself have acquired during that service. The Court did not regard such immunity
ISSUES: in contravention of the state policy on recovery of ill-gotten wealth under the auspices of the
Marcos regime.
(1) Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the
Immunity Agreement; and (2) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion The last sentence in paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement that enjoined Disini to “provide
when it denied Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena. truthful information or testimony,” despite the guarantee not to be compelled to testify against
Herminio, merely emphasized the fact that such concessions did not affect his obligation to
HELD: “provide truthful information or testimony” in the two Westinghouse cases. The grant of
The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify in “other cases” against Herminio was
extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of quite clear and did not need any interpretation.
criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the

The estoppel Disini invoked did not have the effect, if recognized, of denying the state its right The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
to recover whatever ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have acquired under the Marcos regime. security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA
The action against Herminio could continue, hampered only by the exclusion of Disini’s and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
testimony. And there are other ways of proving the existence of ill-gotten wealth. executory. The Labor Arbiter Issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
Although the government cannot be barred by estoppel based on unauthorized acts of public
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
officers, such principle cannot apply to this case since PCGG acted within its authority when it
provided Disini with a guarantee against having to testify in other cases.
A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent. Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
This applies with more reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms of the
Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at this late HELD:
stage would run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its
it had enjoyed its benefits. consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts.
The Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the
Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
get the best concessions out of it. The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was the law on which the right depends.
free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than
any one, the government should be fair. The law may be sacrosanct, but it is not absolute. The State may at times be sued. The State’s
PCGG’s revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan’s denial of Disini’s motion consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general
to quash the subpoena were both annulled. law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In
this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
13. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. NLRC party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

FACTS: But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have
their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent
the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates
of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the said security agency.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint
performed any act proprietary in character. of trade.

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief,
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money
which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service
claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any money claim involving
per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila (Annex B,
liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act
327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on
Audit. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing
VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered
Suit against public officers to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower
than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
14. VMPSI v. CA 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
FACTS: Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its
On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati, Metro license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).
Manila, praying the court to ISSUE a temporary restraining order, to ISSUE a preliminary
injunction to the same effect, and to render decision and judgment declaring null and void the The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s
amendment of Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11. license (Annex E, Petition).
The constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. 5487 (otherwise known as the "Private Security As a result, PADPAO refused to ISSUE a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when
Agency Law"), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint alleging that these are it requested one.
violations of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without
monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. a certificate of membership from PADPAO (Annex F, Petition).

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI’s license was expiring on March 31, 1988, VMPSI
Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on March 28, 1988 against the PC
Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO Issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel Chief and PC-SUSIA. On the same date, the court Issued a restraining order enjoining the PC
V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that "all private security agencies/company Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal
security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region of VMPSI’s license" (Annex G, Petition).
where their main offices are located . . ." (pp. 5-6, Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-471). As such

The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of concerned, for lack of jurisdiction. The writ of preliminary injunction Issued on June 10, 1988,
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds is dissolved." (pp. 295-296, Rollo.)
that the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that VMPSI’s license
VMPSI came to us with this petition for review.
already expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminary injunction would
not serve any purpose because there was no more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). ISSUE:
Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion.
The primary ISSUE in this case is whether or not VMPSI's complaint against the PC Chief and
On April 18, 1988, the lower court denied VMPSI’s application for a writ of preliminary PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
injunction for being premature because it "has up to May 31, 1988 within which to file its
application for renewal pursuant to Section 2 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 199, . . ." (p. 140, HELD:
Rollo.). The answer is yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the
On May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the penalty for its failure to submit its instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of
application for renewal of its license and the requirements therefor within the prescribed period regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard
in Section 2(e) of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended by agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the
P.D. 1919 (Annex M, Petition). Government's consent, especially in this case because VMPSI's complaint seeks not only to
compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual
On June 10, 1998, the RTC-Makati Issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same
P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf, from cancelling or amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees from said public respondents. Even if its action
denying renewal of VMPSI’s license, until further orders from the court. prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not
consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order, but it was
denied by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition). A public official may sometimes be HELD liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra),
On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for certiorari in
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in
the Court of Appeals.
this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross
On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion of its negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is hereby
GRANTED, and the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, is ordered to dismiss the complaint filed by
respondent VMPSI in Civil Case No. 88-471, insofar as petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are

15. LARKINS V. NLRC • Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-
day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill
the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected
to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary
Petitioner was a member of United State Air Force assigned to oversee dormitories of Third
Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended
Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base Pampanga. However, 3 AGS
thus, Shauf was never appointed to the said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was
terminated the contract for maintenance of dormitories with De Guzman Custodial Service
extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed
leaving to a new contractor JAC Maintenance Service, owned by Joselito Cunanan and decided
against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management
whether it would retain services. However, Cunanan decided to bring in his own workers.
& it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Compaint was filed against Larkins, Lt. CorFrankhauser for illegal dismissal and underpayment
of wages and added claims for emergency, cost of living allowance, etc. Petitioner failed to • Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
answer the complaint and appear to hearings, thus the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
granting all claims of private respondents and found both the Petitoner and Lt. Col. Frankhauster
• RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20%
“guilty of illegal dismissal”.
of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Petitioner appealed but NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, but declared that:“In
• Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected
the event this decison is executed and/or enforced and considering our finding that the real party
from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are
respondent is the United States Government through its Armed Forces stationed at Clark Air
immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that
16. SHAUF V. CA the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According
to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
• 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
• Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base
against the US government w/c would require consent.
Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a
qualified dependent locally available. • Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing
suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in
• By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
the Philippines & is not part of international law.
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer)
and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
(female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).

HELD: decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.
acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner
17. Republic v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval
While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it
only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law
& injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates The doctrine of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the Constitution
the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit under Article XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued without its consent.
will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen) Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is,
private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. on its face, against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong
not to the officer but to the government. With respect to the incident that happened in Mendiola
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was
on January 22, 1987 that befell twelve rallyists, the case filed against the military officers was
previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an
dismissed by the lower court. The defendants were HELD liable but it would not result in
interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept
financial responsibility to the government. The petitioner (Caylao Group) filed a suit against the
the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of
State that for them the State has waived its immunity when the Mendiola Commission
Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly
recommended the government to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts
qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff
and utterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's
Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur
waiver of immunity and therefore, the government should also be liable and should be
whereas respondents merely denied allegations.
compensated by the government. The case has been dismissed that State has not waived its
The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer filed apetition for certiorari to review the
regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
Persi&Detwiler violated Shauf’s constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her
right to life. Thus, they should be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should
not be paid for the supposedly unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State be
She never acquired rights over that amount because she was never appointed. liable for the incident?
Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants’ discriminatory acts. HELD:
The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to
file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the indemnification of
initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability
automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders that
took place and the recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State. The acts and

utterances of President Aquino does not mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, ISSUES:
the case does not qualify as suit against the State. While the Republic in this case is sued by 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. The military officials are HELD also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they have exceeded to their 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly and should
guarantee the safety of the people. The court has made it quite clear that even a “high position HELD:
in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.” The court 1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
rules that there is no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by the concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability
respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders. to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
Consent to be sued
Express consent 2. Under the Civil Code (Art. 2180 par. 6), the state is liable when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
*CA 327 as amended by PD1445 to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
*Act No. 3083 commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
*Art 1X, 1987 Constitution concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration
*Art 2180, Civil Code of the Philippines and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
18. DA vs. NLRC pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable.
19. MERITT vs. GOVT OF THE PHIL ISLANDS The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
FACTS: because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
Meritt was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State is not
of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly
The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its
the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the
After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the public interest.
ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the

20. REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
FACTS: verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the
in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising Philippines]
from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed
Service where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration
a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government agreed to had no binding force on the government. Express co nsent of the State may be
unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. manifested thro ugh general or special law. Solicitor General cannot validly waive
immunity fro m suit. Only the Co ngress can (Republic v. P urisima, G.R. No. L‐36084,
Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4,
Aug.31, 1977).
1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid.

Implied Consent
21. US vs. RUIZ
No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this
provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The
doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes,
military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in
negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on
the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely
which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to
awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him
problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business
against the US.
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought
alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They
could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
able to invoke state immunity.
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington
Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent,
as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is from an objective

independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did
they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial carriers.
and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and o However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether
governmental acts. corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized.”
o The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly corporations.”
given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably, proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways.
a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could
not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the
obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental
FACTS: function.
The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son,
Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was
between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in
view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered FACTS:
to pay them damages totalling P136,370. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for
had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified
against the State. The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440. bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil.
Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional
ISSUE: W/N the PNR is immune from suit? items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine.

RULING: Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of
Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s
by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its
itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however,

of the non-accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply
Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal
Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public
Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that position.
they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez,
Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that
immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in
denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law‖ is
City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case. permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power
conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity liability personally.
will prosper


The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting
within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of FACTS:
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74 security assistance support
complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their personnel (SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of Philippines (JUSMAG-Phils.). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992. When dismissed,
discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned he held the position of Illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.- Filipino Civilian
who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. Employees Assoc., a labor org. duly registered with DOLE. His services were terminated
allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Sacramento filed complaint w/ DOLE on the
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity from suit. Labor
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction". Sacramento
preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and held that petitioner had
lost its right not to be sued bec.

(1) the principle of estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee sovereign or governmental activities (jus imperii) and does not extend to commercial, private
rel. and proprietary acts (jus gestionis).
(2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private
respondent. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N JUSMAG has immunity from suit
HELD: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a
Yes. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant
function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged
the Phils. and America* JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army group and its primary task that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water
was to advise and assist the Phils. on airforce, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have
is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the
latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity of State from suit is circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit
one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Phils. recognizes and constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is
adopts as part of the law of the land. Immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground
state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The
of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional
in violation of the maxim par in parem non habeat imperium (an equal has no power over an mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
equal). As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted
to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
proprietary acts. A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States Government and in
the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG HELD: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there
cannot prosper. is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it
 In this jurisdiction we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its
law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of state from suit is one of these universally agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of
recognized principles. In international law “immunity” is commonly understood as the such donation.
exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is
anchored on the principle of sovereignty of equal states under which one state cannot assert The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of
power has no power over an equal). Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure
 As it now stands, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to set forth in the rules of court. No cost.

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
26. FROILAN VS. ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against
the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive
FACTS: it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level
P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.
favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the
installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the
contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the
defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the FACTS:
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) urges that the premature delivery of the
contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan garnished amount by RCBC to the special sheriff even in the absence of a demand to deliver
Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. made by the latter, before the expiration of the five-day period given to reply to the Notice of
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of Garnishment, without any reply having been given thereto nor any prior authorization from its
replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and depositor, PVTA and even if the court's order of January 27, 1970 did not require the bank to
that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued immediately deliver the garnished amount constitutes such lack of prudence as to make it
the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. answerable jointly and severally with the plaintiff for the wrongful release of the money from
was divested of its possession of said vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of the deposit of the PVTA.
Plaintiff‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to
it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, ISSUE:
Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the 1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment; and
required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, 2) WON it possesses the power "to sue and be sued.
he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said
property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for RULING:
the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. The Court holds that they are not. Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary
corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the
ISSUES: WON the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim. Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power "to sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold
such assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the

provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such operations." [Section 3, of Php64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals collected from the tenants from 1970 up to and
Republic Act No. 2265.] Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: including 1975 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid. In
1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco addition to this, the defendant municipality must pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php3,000.00 for
manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit. Thereafter, the private respondents moved for issuance
2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its of the writ of execution for the satisfaction of the said judgement, however, petitioner, on July
purpose with any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's
any foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said Motion was then denied
3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the writ of execution still stands
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.] in full force and effect.

From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and
separate from the government which owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the possession of the
declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public corporation which provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds
can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment" [Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgement in Civil Case No.
G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 595, 598.] Finally, it is contended that RCBC was 604-B.
bound to inquire into the legality and propriety of the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment issued against the funds of the PVTA deposited with said bank. But the bank was HELD:
in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the Yes, all the funds of the municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel
case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the personality nor the interest to and of Bulacan, are public funds which are exempt from execution as stated under Presidential
assail or controvert the orders of respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same Decree No. 477, "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2, paragraph (a): No
inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial judgment rendered in money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other
favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution of such judgment. specific statutory authority. Furthermore, there must be an ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan containing the corresponding appropriation for the funds before any money
of the municipality may be paid out. Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued
28. MUN. OF SAN MIGUEL BULACAN V. FERNANDEZ without its consent, A municipal corporation is an example of an incorporated agency which has
a charter of its own that grants them the competence to sue and be sued. However, municipal
FACTS: government is generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of its governmental
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. De Imperio, et al. v. Municipal functions. It can be held liable only if it has been proven that they were acting in a proprietary
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al." dated April 28, 1978, under presiding Judge Oscar function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover.
C.Fernandez, rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its
Municipal Treasurer. The court ordered the defendant municipality to pay the plaintiffs the sum

29. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. CA 2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect
payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent
remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced
therefor. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject
payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It then issued the
property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the
pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since
petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending
the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987.
that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so
This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under
arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power of
the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition for review
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
before the SC.
30. NIA v. CA
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon
In a competitive bidding held by NIA in August 1978, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
(hereafter HYDRO) was awarded Contract MPI-C-2 for the construction of the main civil works
of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract provided that HYDRO would be paid
partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S. dollars. HYDRO substantially completed the works
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
under the contract in 1982 and final acceptance by NIA was made in 1984. HYDRO thereafter
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the
determined that it still had an account receivable from NIA representing the dollar rate
properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public
differential of the price escalation for the contract.
use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against
After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with NIA, HYDRO, on 7 December 1994, filed with the
the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
CIAC a Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim. HYDRO nominated six arbitrators for
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
the arbitration panel.
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss 7 alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes. NIA contended
Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance
that there was no agreement with HYDRO to submit the dispute to CIAC for arbitration
appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under
considering that the construction contract was executed in 1978 and the project completed in
the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds
1982, whereas the Construction Industry Arbitration Law creating CIAC was signed only in
of petitioner.
1985; and that while they have agreed to arbitration as a mode of settlement of disputes, they

could not have contemplated submission of their disputes to CIAC. NIA further argued that D. Principles and State Policies
records show that it had not voluntarily submitted itself to arbitration
Section 1
WON NIA has jurisdiction over the Controversy

The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
Contrary to the claim of NIA, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy. Executive
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number
Order No. 1008, otherwise known as the "Construction Industry Arbitration Law" which was
of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
promulgated on 4 February 1985, vests upon CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The disputes may involve government or Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited
submit the same to voluntary arbitration. their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
It is undisputed that the contracts between HYDRO and NIA contained an arbitration clause were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
wherein they agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute between them that may arise before or They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked
after the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the claim of HYDRO having arisen from if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
the contract is arbitrable. NIA's reliance with the ruling on the case of Tesco Services consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
Incorporated v. Vera, 30 is misplaced. representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
As to the defenses of laches and prescription, they are evidentiary in nature which could steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to
dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties
will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. 33 Under the ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
rule 34 the deferment of the resolution of the said issues was, thus, in order. An allegation of
prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban
shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. 35 In the instant case, the issue of committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against
prescription and laches cannot be resolved on the basis solely of the complaint. It must, however, their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law
be pointed that under the new rules, 36 deferment of the resolution is no longer permitted. The punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any
court may either grant the motion to dismiss, deny it, or order the amendment of the pleading. person to change his residence. Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the
Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like

Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their not being a party in interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their Philippines.
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this,
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid
Lukban etal must be severely punished
Section 2
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted
2. SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI,
by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war
FACTS: as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles
of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He
(military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in
was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under
conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally
Executive Order 68.
accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments. (US and Japan)

First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the 2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the its country and people have been greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being
Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations charged of.
covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties
and international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that this commission
and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is
without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner." 3. AGUSTIN V EDU

Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the FACTS:
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles
Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Philippines. Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive.

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted
229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations
had warning lights and did not want to use this. The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. The triangular reflector plates were set when the car of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory. communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."

Petitioner contends that: Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was
oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive. Blinking lights may lead to
1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due
confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.Unlike the triangular
process; and
reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed
2. It was oppressive because this makes manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.There was no constitutional basis
expense of car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision. LOI 229 doesn’t force
motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes the requirement
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the from any source.
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The objective is public safety. The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a recommended enforcement for installation of ewd’s. On the unlawful delegation of legislative
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power. power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power? 4. LAO H. ICHONG vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,

HELD: Yes on both. Petition dismissed. FACTS:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
RATIO: Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act,
Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may among others, are:
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and (1) Prohibition against persons not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. (2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,

particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the 5. GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
property without due process of law.
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn
"by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, Sec. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice
DISCUSSIONS: under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute valid executive
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the
treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or ISSUE:
surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Whether or Not the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme
Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.” agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired

the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such
rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 4
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that FACTS:
he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section
in Spain the course of "Bachillera to Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these
the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied
two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully
and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was
and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said
allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on
year, even though they had been required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to
appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did not
practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
register up to the date of the filing of the information. Appellants argue that they did not register
because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
ISSUE: Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be
killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day of
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?
imprisonment, with the costs.
Held: The court resolved to deny the petition.
ISSUE: WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutional
RATIO DECIDENDI: The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that:
Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own HELD:
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in
expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
desired to exercise the legal profession.The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the
and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission
citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient
to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not

men who volunteer to enlist therein. In US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that and denominations.’
a person may be compelled by force to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. What justifies compulsory military service
is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, Section 10 &11- Relate to Article XIII
in case of need. The circumstances of the appellants do not excuse them from their duty to
present themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain the proper pecuniary 9. MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No.
FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
Section 6 recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage ofmeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional? On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not
considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as
a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of
its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
of all the people?
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of a 46,529-square land situated in
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On September 30, 1968, the
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired
landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio
by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public
Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. The document of sale was
welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote
registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas on March 27, 1969. Respondent-
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
tenant thus seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March 27, 1971, pursuant to
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of
Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.
the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should ISSUE: Is this right of redemption available to tenants in sugar and coconut lands?
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of HELD:
insuring its preserving. We answer yes. Among those exempted from the automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code in 1963 or even after its amendments
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that (Code of Agrarian Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states: Agricultural share tenancy
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby declared contrary to public policy and shall
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of be automatically converted to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. ...
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, Provided, That in order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation by the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally President upon recommendation of' the department head that adequate provisions, such as the
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of organization of cooperatives marketing agreement, or similar other workable arrangements,
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex. have been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization of the
agricultural with the processing phases of such crops ..." Sugar is, of course, one crop covered
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among by marketing allotments
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social
function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The

State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, 12. SALONGA VS FARRALES
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ... ownership and
11. ONDOY vs. IGNACIO 1. Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased.
FACTS: 2. Prior to the acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land, Salonga was already a
lessee of some portion of the land. She had built a house and paid rentals thereon.
Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According 3. Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales filed an Ejectment case
to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was (One of the old forms of action for recovery of the possession of real property) for non-payment of
invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, rentals against Salonga. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Farrales and ordered Salonga
Estrella was asking for compensation from the death of her son while in the respondents and the other lessees (Pascual et al.) to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals
employ. However, the statement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the in arrears, attorney’s fees and costs.
hearing officer and therefore dismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for
4. Even before the rendition of the decision of the lower court, Farrales sold to Pascual
reconsideration was filed, this was also denied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason,
et al. (the other lessees of Farrales) the areas occupied by them.
that is, lack of merit.
5. Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the portion of land that Salonga was
leasing. Farrales persistently refused the offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the
ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is
social justice applicable in this case? ejectment case.
Hence if Salonga’s offer to purchase was persistently refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no
RULING: meeting of the minds took place and no contract was ever perfected between them. It was revealed that
Yes. Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely Farrales wanted the payment of the portion of land under consideration to be in cash but Salonga did
disregarded the statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social not have any money for that purpose that is why Farrales persistently refused to sell the portion of the
justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right leased land to the lessee.
of the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while
in the actual performance of his work. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of Salonga on the ground that no
and protection to labor, The Court quoted another case as between a laborer, usually poor and legal contract exists between Farrales and Salonga.
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice; the law has reason to demand
from the latter the stricter compliance.
Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of perfection. In the case at bar, Farrales rejected and
did not accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there is,

therefore, no contract to sell to speak of. In the case of the other lessees (Pascual et al.) who were able RULING:
to buy the portion of land that they occupy, there was an existing contract between them and Farrales, The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the
unlike Salonga who does not have the right to buy the land in question because the contract between plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
her and Farrales is non-existent. The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint.
The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the
native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution
Section 10, Article II states that “ extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.” The aforementioned must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably
provision is applicable to the case at bar. The social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights regarded as harmful.
of property owners who are also entitled for protection under our Constitution. The social justice
Discussion: Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is
consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to
arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.
another who is not entitled thereto. The plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and
Brief Fact Summary: Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary
Brief Fact Summary: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and
statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.
the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or
Synopsis of Rule of Law: The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation guardian’s right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not usurp
that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.
Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain
academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting
Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the
an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary
teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.The
restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act.
Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.
The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public
school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
ISSUE:Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

ISSUE:Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
the upbringing and education of children under their control?
No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with
RULING: Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she
The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and
received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the
has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed
appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians
already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was
have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children. a Caucasian. However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must
award to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from
civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.

While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in
which their children are educated.
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again,
FACTS: the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked
room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the
foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the outcome
300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional
Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using
forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process
peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3
and equal protection.
months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with

No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission
to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a FACTS:
medical education. On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the writ
of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the preliminary
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meet the strict standard
required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause. (2) He likewise
the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources
alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the
and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be
preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. (3) It was in the amount of
applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of P16, 000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the
satisfaction. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978.
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of
promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was
to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in
the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977,
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8, 000.00.

The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence
that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he of probable cause was constitutionally deficient?
is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled
to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward RULING:
what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the
Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.The Court issued the following Resolution:
who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
“Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our
Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-yearold
system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by
minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco
initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice
Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B.Bandonil, who, in open
Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case
against petitioner being taken in accordance with law.” This Court should, whenever

appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code. Where, however, the right harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
18. OPOSA VS FACTORAN generations.
FACTS: Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; 19. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850.
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?” of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, HELD:
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is

a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by
as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word
conclusion. of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “... he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose
of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government
Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken
Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner
should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by
20. GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS (BOI) Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

FACTS: Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the
products “naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the
21. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of
BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site
Agrarian Reform
transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique
Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the
investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who
risk capital for the project. These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
ISSUE: Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the of 1988". In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228
application of the investors without considering the national interest and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
RULING: compensation. In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for
a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta
should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
as feedstock maintained.
process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual
payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he
No. 229.
wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is

identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims with prayer for temporary
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction (Case No. 29-CAR-09).
President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the Respondent in his capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the National Commission on
petitioners. Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued the following
separate temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far (1) 72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and
not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09; and
writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules. (2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction7 in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power
of Eminent Domain. Hence, this petition asserting that the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were
issued in willful disregard, disobedience, defiance and resistance of this Court’s Decision in
RULING: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there G.R. No. 180206 which dismissed the previous injunction case. Petitioner contends that
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property respondent’s act of enjoining the execution of the demolition orders and demolition advices is
condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation tantamount to allowing forum shopping since the implementation of the demolition orders over
for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property the structures in the Busol Forest Reservation had already been adjudicated and affirmed by this
in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just Court.
compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
Respondent claims that he issued the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in
22. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITYMAYOR NCIP Case Nos. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his jurisdiction was called upon to protect
REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR., vs ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG, and preserve the rights of the petitioners (in the NCIP cases) who were undoubtedly members
of the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples. In addition, he maintains that the
FACTS: orders and writs he issued did not disregard the earlier ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 180206
In pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206, petitioner issued the subject demolition because the Court has in fact affirmed the power of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining
advices for the enforcement of Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 against Alexander orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of said writs when
Ampaguey, Sr.; Demolition Order No. 83, Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen, Sr.,, the main action is for injunction.
all in Busol Watershed, Baguio City. As it is, the aforesaid individuals filed a petition for
injunction (Case No. 31-CAR-09) while Magdalena Gumangan, et al. filed a petition for Issue:
Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.

23. Basco v. PAGCOR
The court ruled in affirmative. FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy
The said orders clearly contravene the court’s ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that Elvin Gumangan, of the government, “ to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of who are owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was subsequently proven to
petitioner are not entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent. be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source
of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.
The court finds that petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly
Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No.180206 and contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.
in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing 1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
officer), the court is constrained by the principle of stare decisis in granting the instant petition.
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and
that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;
Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the demolition advices are simply enforcing
the previous demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or their agents and 3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru
successors-in- interest, only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
respondent. Despite the Court’s pronouncement in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal other vices; and
right exists in favor of those occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition
orders issued by petitioner, and hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their 4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and
implementation, respondent still issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
Respondent has willfully disregarded and defies the Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the 1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition
second time before his office. Hence Atty. Masweng is guilty of indirect contempt under Section of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its police
7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
of the Rule. liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
State Principle and Policies (Section 25)

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987
taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local valid and subsisting, and(e) Making the injunction permanent.
governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
ISSUE: WON the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate.
The case has not been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and
branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power. academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. What
for lack of merit. appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly that "since November, 1987 up to this
writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." To be sure, respondents
24. LIMBONAS VS MANGELIN aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City,"
FACTS: but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly, that avowed
Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. He was then elected speaker substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
of the regional legislative assembly of central Mindanao, composed of 18 members. Later, In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on
House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the
Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within
conference. Petitioner then ordered Acting Secretary Alimbuyao to inform the assemblymen that the confines of the Assembly ---- an act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly
there will be no session on said date as petitioner and Razul are attending the house committee assails their integrity and character as representative of the people," an act that cannot possibly
hearing. The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless the
presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the
Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the courts.
affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.
The petitioner then went to court praying that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the
held by respondents during the session as null and void and holding the election of petitioner as petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to

commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of
process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions.
erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
ISSUE: What is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest
Region IX and XII? development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
Held: government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
Presidential Decree No. 1618. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity can substitute their judgments with his own.
of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," "with legislative and executive Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities"' specified therein. It requires the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
of the National Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the following: "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
(1) National defense and security; the central authorities but to its constituency.
(2) Foreign relations; But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
(3) Foreign trade; Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit
borrowing, constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
(6) Air and sea transport; proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications; autonomy in these two senses
(8) Customs and quarantine; An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the
(9) Immigration and deportation; decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
(10) Citizenship and naturalization; "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted,
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
(12) General auditing." Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our

jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
jurisdiction. exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of security.
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public
in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through
any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government
25. Legaspi vs. CSC
The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a
special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. FACTS
The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
at bar.
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
HELD: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints
in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in custody for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in
absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to violation of the Constitution.

these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
ISSUE: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against an orderly society and a peaceful community.
unreasonable search and seizures?
RULING: MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD
unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to
to the facts of each case.
examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
sought to be examined.
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual
the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private
to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be allowed to examine the board”s record.
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably HELD: The decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
conducted, the former should prevail. concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and

caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny
The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
would be rendered nugatory. from them.

28. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. Yes. There is a violation of the full disclosure of all transaction involving public interest.


On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF FACTS:
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Judge Manzano sent a letter to the SC stating that he was, through Executive Order RF6-04,
designated by Gov. Farinas as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
The Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed Justice, which was created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 and was appointed
as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of as a member of the Committee. With that, he was asking the Court to authorize him to discharge
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to information on the functions and duties of the office and to consider his membership in the Committee as part
matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them of the primary functions of an Executive Judge. He alleged that his membership in the
the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section
slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B),both of the Constitution,
holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementary, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of his present position as Executive Judge
declared unconstitutional. of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of the full disclosure of all its transaction involving ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Manzano can accept the appointment as a member of INPCJ.
public interest.
HELD: It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative
HELD: The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and
officials at all times accountable to the people.

Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Held: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
Dictionary). constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
Justice, which discharges an administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
the Court is constrained to deny his request. election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI
1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
2. JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR election protest filed by Ynsua.


Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province. HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov FACTS:
15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No.
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA
Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition. exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction
to hear the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject RULING:
matter of the controversy; No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall

promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory 4. DANTE O. CASIBANG, vs. HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the
functions of the Administration (POEA)." Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU,
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the FACTS:
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang,
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly and irregularities and other. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to that the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions Constituion and the new parliamentary form of government.
of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute ISSUE: whether or not Sec. 9 Art. XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and
by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to academic.
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. HELD:
These regulations have the force and effect of law. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic
pending election protest cases (Santos vs. Castañeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula,
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative 60 SCRA 211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927,
power: Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]).

1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when
it. the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing
every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9,
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of
the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum
legislative. of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office."' (Santos vs. Castañeda, supra);
and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it
.did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of

the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the
ballot.". In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether
5. TAÑADA vs. CUENCO or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question.
Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
FACTS: legislative acts.
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to
the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost 6. SANIDAD VS COMELEC
the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision FACTS:
the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of
9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then him, as a member of the Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to
before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion. the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas”
clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
HELD: On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar

as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum- time also sits as the legislature.
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the
question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. 7 . DAZA VS SINGSON

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. FACTS:
The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the liberal party formally resigned from
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the their former party to only 17 members.
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of to the newly formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal The Petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the commission on
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition
itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction ,we issued a temporary restraining
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure Commission on Appointments.
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the commission
a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which on appointments because his elections thereto is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the of the House of Representatives in the said body is not based on a permanent political
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases political stability.
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided
by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared ISSUE :
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has Whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine

Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
HELD: covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
No. The court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not regardless of employment status.
a discretionary act of the HOR that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of the act of that chamber in removing the Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
The Term Political questions connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which, under Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
the constitution, are to be decided by the person in. their soverigen capacity, or in regard to violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of implementation and enforcement of the law.
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure. ISSUE:
Even if we assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the HELD:
Constitution clearly provides: No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of
Section 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
courts as may be established by law. influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
branch or instrumentality of the government. authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
FACTS: integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government With this
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se , meaning, it
Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue- neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere,"
F. Delegation of Powers
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself,
any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed,
for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such
in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into
as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
must be confined to the following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of
across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
their departments and its power of confirmation and investigation and monitoring of the
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised
by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject ISSUES:
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, 1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government. HELD:
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
“tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
which authorized the President ot issue the said Eos. provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case
2. PEOPLE VS VERA of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
FACTS: authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power.
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act
the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of
granting freedom, as in pardon. the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
3 . EASTERN SHIPPING LINES vs. POEA of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

FACTS: With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle These regulations have the force and effect of law.
of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA
to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. power:
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
ISSUE: the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
RULING: the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory legislative.
functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the FACTS:
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the

constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with
but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
ISSUE: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional? Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
RULING: and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action
them there for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried ISSUE:
out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure unconstitutional.
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process HELD:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical
5. TABLARIN VS GUTIERREZ Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
FACTS: control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they schools.
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as

amended, and MECS Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provision is Article 14, Section 1
which states “The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at 6. PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.”

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may
Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive
may require…
and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote important interest
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit
and needs -- in other words, the public order -- of the general community. An important
the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez
component of that public order is health and physical safety and well being of the population,
claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been
the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If
the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical
schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his

functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration ISSUE: WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines ass set forth in PD 984
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, RULING:
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA
authority. reveals substantial similarity. The difference is that while Section 19 of EO 192 vested the
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – Pollution Adjudication Board with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general,
which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require
the scope of authority of LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to the Laguna Lake
– is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In
region as defined by RA 4850, as amended. Thus, in Laguna Lake Development Authority v.
the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of Court of Appeals, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” the Pollution Adjudication Board, except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter,
Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires provides for another forum. Further, in Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of
and NOT the creation of municipality. Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently if such power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also
legislative in character not administrative (not executive). such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.
In the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of
its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
FACTS: Laguna Lake region
Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc., petitioner is a company engaged in the business of laundry services.
On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s e±uent which
showed non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still Failed
to conform to the regulatory standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on
5 June 2002, in response to the 17 May 2002 request For re-sampling received by LLDA, finally
showed compliance with the e±uent standard in all parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA
issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be imposed From the date
of initial sampling to the date there quest For re-sampling was received by the Authority
Petitioner fled a motion For reconsideration, which the LLDA denied.