Case: Medellin v.

Texas

Notes:

○ Medellin (Mexican national) convicted to gang rape and murder in Texas

○ Treaty that specified that when nationals are abroad and accused of crime,
they have a right to use embassy. US failed to notify him of his rights under the
Vienna convention on Consulate Affairs (Art 36)
○ Went to ICJ. Held against US, saying they should have notified Medellin on
his rights
o ICJ Avena decision
○ What is Medellin's claim now?
o Enforceable - ICJ's decision is enforceable in U.S., so US courts
should review his case
○ Supreme court looks at four sources of law - Whether the ICJ
decision is enforceable:
o Vienna Convention of Consulate Affairs Art 36
□ Court's position - is this a self-executing treaty?
® Not necessary to decide that it is self-
executing b/c there is the ICJ charter, UN Charter, and optional protocol
® Court doesn’t take a position of whether it
is self-executing or not, b/c Medellin did not raise this issue
◊ So even if Medellin did have this right
under Vienna Convention, he waived it b/c he didn’t raise it in Texas (Texas
procedural rules say this - you can't raise it later)
o ICJ Statute - ICJ says its decision are binding / UN
charter (UN security council) - UN Charter says that member states will undertake
to comply with ICJ decision
□ Is this self-executing?
® Nothing in language of treaties is strong
enough to lead us to believe that U.S. intended it to become executable in the
U.S.
□ Dissent - is the functionality of it something that
can be easily enforced? b/c then it is executable. The language still matters, but
can go either way. Can statute be readily enforced by judges? If yes, then
perhaps they are self-executing
® Majority is demanding that the language to be
so clear to be self-executing, that they are making an assumption that treaties
are not self-executing unless it is so narrowly clear that it is
® What is the level? What should the text
say??? Very unclear still.
o Optional protocol to the Vienna convention - says U.S.
agrees to compulsory settlement under the ICJ
□ Is this self-executing?
o ICJ decision
◊ Is this self-executing?
o President's memorandum - Even if decision is not enforceable in U.S.,
the President's memo saying they should review is enforceable (president has this
executive power) Youngstown case
○ Does Constitution give executory branch authority to give
states authority to implement int'l law?
o How do we balance the power btwn the 3 branches of govt?
3 situations:
◊ When congress has spoken - when they are on the
same page, then it would be ok.
◊ When congress has not spoken on the issue.
◊ When there is a clear clash btwn president's and
Congress's interest, that is when courts will NOT defer to the President
® Falls within the 3rd tier here
◊ This is not a self-executing treaty,
and the Pres trying to execute it himself, he is violating the Constitution (Pres
usurping power from other branches)
◊ Very apparent conflict btwn Pres and
Congress's interests
· Court says, yes we have int'l obligation but b/c of dualist problem, wont do
anything about it
· Main issues:
○ How do we determine if a treaty is self executing?
○ Executive power
○ Another issue: from a policy standpoint (another lecture)
· Where clearly self-executing - Footnote 1 on Justice concurring opinion - gives
examples of treaties that are clearly self-executing
○ The convention on the settlement of dispute…
· Where clearly not self-executing - Ex: Missouri v. Holland
○ Not self-executing; language was aspirational. Congress needed to take an
additional step by passing the migratory birds act.

· Asakura v. City of Seattle

○ Court holds that the treaty was self-executing. - language is specific
enough, and it operates in of itself. Congress has to do nothing, only that states
have to refrain from discriminating within its laws.
○ How does this compare to Medellin? How has the doctrine changed between
Asakura and Medellin? (to think about)
o Majority - In Medellin the language is not clear enough
○ Is the binding of the process or the enforceability of the
process
○ Congress needs to pass a law saying that ICJ decisions are
binding
o Dissent
○ Congress need not do anything. Like in Asakura, the judicial
branch can implement the ICJ decision, because its ready to be implemented.
o Still not clear who had the stronger argument in Medellin