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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FINALS REVIEWER

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PROVISIONS + CASES
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Under Professor Dante Gatmaytan

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BLOCK C 2019

COMPILED BY:
CHRIS Alquizalas, Mau Erni, Yrra Espino, Trixie Peralta,
Reg Rodriguez, Noelle Sanidad, Clar Valdecantos, Nicole Wee
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I. BASIC CONCEPTS
The Politics of Constitutional Law, Tushnet
The law is either conservative or liberal. For instance, the US
Constitution was first created to benefit certain people (Ex.
Banned slavery), and therefore, liberal. But now, the
Constitution is neutral (can be both conservative & liberal) as
to who it serves.
History shows that the government, since it was composed of
different people & partylists and therefore people with different
beliefs & bases of political support, had difficulties in producing
unanimous decisions & coordinated laws.
This is because any party in a case can use and invoke the
Constitution to his/her own advantage. Victories in Court can
either mobilize or demobilize constituencies (they can be good
& progressive for one party and bad for another).
A People’s History of the Supreme Court, Irons
In Brown et al v School Board of Education of Topeka, the law
on segregation of black & white students in public schools was
removed to protect the rights of black children under the 14th
amendment (right to life, liberty & property). However, the
state of Arkansas refused to obey or recognize the new law.
This case was controversial because the Governor of
Arkansas violated his oath to support the Constitution, and the
Constitution is supposed to be the supreme law of the land, &
must be obeyed by all.
Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same Sex Marriage
Litigation, Barclay and Fisher
Cause lawyering (aka “lawyering for the good”) is a practice
that aims to change the law to restructure social systems that
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oppress certain groups. In this article, cause lawyering is used
to fight discrimination against same-sex couples.
Case 1 (1974): same-sex couples fought for same-sex
marriage to be approved
Case 2 (2004): same sex marriage was already legal in other
states & so same-sex couples in states were using this fact to
pressure Courts to give them the same rights
These 2 cases illustrate that cause lawyering & litigation is
actually affected by social movements, and that in deciding
cases, political & social contexts are always taken into
consideration.
An American History, Willrich and Pox
Police power is the power vested in the legislature by the
Constitution to make, ordain, & establish all manner of
wholesome & reasonable laws, statutes & ordinances for the
good and welfare of the people.
In Jacobson v Massachussetts, Jacobson refused to obey the
state’s compulsory vaccination law due to his history with
vaccination (contracted a disease from it—his son did too!) but
the Court ruled that the law was constitutional and that
Jacobson had no excuse but to comply since he was in perfect
health at that time & there was an outbreak of smallpox. This
is a clear example of Courts trying to draw the line between
police power and individual liberty.
The Constitution has always been used to keep police power
in check. Police power measures are subject to judicial review
if they unreasonably interfere with individual rights. But in this
case, the police power measure was found to be imbued with
compelling state interest and the means for executing it are
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“fit” or reasonable. This shows that individual liberty is not
absolute and could be restrained sometimes for the common
good.
Police power, if grounded on inevitable necessity, is allowed to
evade individual rights, especially if such necessity calls for it.
Judicial Review of Anti-Miscegenation Laws : The Long
Road to Loving, Moran
Despite the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme
Court still has the power to check on other branches of
government through judicial review. Judicial review is for the
purpose of assessing the constitutionality of a law or act.
This article traces the history of inequalities between blacks &
whites in the US, and how the Court changed its mind from
upholding racial integration to promoting racial equality.
Although the struggle to find the meaning of racial equality
continues, this article still shows the transformative power of
the Court’s decisions.
The Politics of Judicial Review over Executive Action: The
Supreme Court and Social Change, Agabin
Judicial review in the Philippines is patterned after the US’s
doctrine of judicial review. It is used as a check on the acts of
the executive & legislative branches of government, which is
proof of judicial supremacy.
The political question doctrine is specifically to keep the
exercise of this power of review in check and to avoid
strengthening the Supreme Court’s discretionary act.
Breast Milk Versus Formula: Courts, Marketing, and
Asymmetric Information, Mendoza
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In Pharmaceutical & Healthcare Association of the Phils v.
Health Secretary Duque et al (2007), the validity of the IRR of
the National Milk Code was being questioned. This case
illustrates that judicial review and litigation cannot be used for
policy-making. Bringing it to Court would do away with the
political process (exchanging, bargaining & mediation to
resolve conflict) of the Congress, which is the only body that
has the authority & ability to create effective laws and policies.
Basically, the members of the judiciary are not policy-makers
(too narrow, principle-bound, only tries to maximize benefits &
minimize losses, etc.). They must go to Congress if they want
to implement a law.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION
Chapter 2: Philippine History & the Legal System
• Philippine legal system: a hybrid system (mixture of Spanish
civil law, American common law, Islamic law and indigenous
systems)
o Civil law: have comprehensive written codes
o Common law: based on judge-made law developed on a
case-by-case basis
o Civil law & common law could be traced to the occupation
of the Philippines by the Spanish, Americans US & Japan.
o Muslim laws & indigenous systems are those customary
laws that we have preserved despite occupation by
foreign countries.
• Spanish Occupation
o Imposed the Spanish version of Roman law but allowed
indigenous people to retain their laws as long as they did
not conflict with Spanish traditions
o Introduced a dispute resolution system: mediation &
resolution of conflicts would start with the gobernadorcillo >
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then appeals to alcaldes mayors > then appeals to
Audiencia Territorial de Manila
• US Occupation
o Shifted to common law but permitted certain aspects of
Roman law & indigenous traditions to continue
o Retained Spanish Courts but the highest court of appeals
was the US Supreme Court
o Philippine Commission passed the Judiciary Act: abolished
all Spanish courts and established the SC, COFI,
Municipal Courts, and Courts of the Justice of the Peace
(same as the judicial system of the US)
o But Filipinos protested by retaining Spanish law
o So had to create a Philippine common law composed of
Anglo-American & Spanish principles and local
complementary laws (start of the hybrid system)
o Americans trained the Filipinos
o Filipinos drafted the 1935 Constitution, which was
approved by the US
• Marcos Era
o Declared Martial Law
o 1971 Constitution
• 1986 People Power Revolution
o Marcos fled to Hawaii & Cory Aquino assumed presidency
= established a revolutionary gov’t
o Abolished National Legislature & reorganized the Supreme
Court
o Appointed a 50-member Commission to draft 1987
Constitution (goals: to produce a Constitution close to that
before Martial Law & to prevent “another Marcos”)
• Muslim Autonomy
o During Spanish & American occupation, Muslims in
Mindanao, Sulu & Palawan were displaced & their lands
were distributed
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o Military killed Muslim trainees who were preparing for an
invasion of Sabah, Manila
o ^This caused Muslims to organize & take up arms & fight
back = one of the reasons why Marcos imposed Martial
Law
o 1987 Constitution included creation of ARMM
o Peace agreement between Muslims & national gov’t: GRP-
MILF = failed in the SC
o Finally, there is the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB), which ended all hostilities = will be the
basis for the BBL
• The Philippine SC in History
o Pre-Marcos SC: one of the world’s most independent,
important & prestigious SCs
o After Marcos regime: SC was subservient to Marcos,
partial, narrow, timid, dependent
o 1986: Revolutionary gov’t: abolished 1973 Constitution but
retained Bill of Rights & power of judicial review –
appointed a Commission to draft new Constitution
o Philippine Constitution: patterned after US Constitution
o ^Strengthened the judiciary, especially after Marcos, &
promoted its independence
o ^Judicial & Bar Council: Selects prospective members of
the bench & nominates them to the President for
appointment
• Judicial Hierarchy (4 levels) – followed to prevent inordinate
demands upon SC’s time & attention
o Level 1: Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Shari’a Circuit Courts
o Level 2: Regional Trial Courts
o Level 3: Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax
Appeals, Shari’a Appellate Court
o Level 4: Supreme Court
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• Separation of powers: each of the 3 branches of gov’t has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
• Checks & balances: allows one branch to restrain abuse by
another; supported by the principle of separation of powers
which also ensures that there is no encroachment on matters
w/n the exclusive jurisdiction of the branches
Chapter 3: The Constitution & Its Construction
*Constitution: a system of fundamental laws for the
governance & administration of a nation
-the fundamental paramount & supreme law of the nation
-the basic law to which all laws must conform
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS (1997)
MPH & Renong Berhad (a Malaysian firm) both placed bids for
stocks of Manila Hotel Corporation. Renong Berhad won but
MPH requested to be declared as highest bidder pursuant to
Art 12, Sec 10, par 2. They claim par 2 is not self-executing
(still requires an act of Congress) because pars 1 & 3 of the
same section are also not (1 & 3 mention that “Congress will
enact laws” = meaning these provisions still require
legislation). But Court ruled that par 2 is self-executing, and
that all provisions in the Constitution are assumed to be self-
executing, unless stated otherwise, or else the legislature will
have the power to ignore them.
Endencia vs David (1953)
Petitioners assail the validity of RA 590, which legalizes
collection of income taxes from salaries of judicial officers. This
violates the Constitutional provision on the prohibition against
diminution of judges’ compensation. In the Congress’s
defense, they say that imposing taxes on salaries of judges in
RA 590 is not the same as diminution of their compensation.
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But this statement tantamounts to an interpretation made by
the Congress and the Court ruled that the legislature is not
allowed to interpret the law – only the judiciary can do so.
Francisco vs HOR
2 impeachment cases were initiated against Chief Justice
Davide, which petitioners claimed to be unconstitutional. The
Court laid down 3 ways to interpret the Constitution:
(1) verba legis – words in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed
(2) look at intent of framers
(3) read the constitution as a whole
The Court also ruled that it wasn’t a justiciable issue but a
political one because the Senate has the sole power to try the
impeachment case.
Requisites of judicial review/justiciability:
(1) actual case or controversy
(2) locus standi
(3) pleaded at earliest opportunity
(4) constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
Montesclaros vs COMELEC SK members assail COMELEC
Resolutions that propose to postpone date of SK elections to a
later date & to lower maximum age of membership and officers
of the SK to 20 y/o. The Court ruled that judicial review is not
applicable because the proposed bill hasn’t been passed into
law yet and the Court can only exercise its power of judicial
review only after a law is enacted. The Court can’t restrain
Congress from passing any law, nor can it review a proposed
bill without violating separation of powers.
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A. Interpretation
Nitafan vs Commissioner of internal Revenue Justices
questioned the Chief Justice’s directive ordering the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue & Financial Officer of the
Court to deduct withholding taxes from salaries of the
members of the judiciary. They claimed it is a diminution of
their salaries, which was prohibited under Sec 10, Art 8, 1987
Constitution.
The Court pointed out that the Constitution is the expression of
the sovereign will & governs the resolution of constitutional
issues. It is respected because it is an express declaration of
the people’s will. HELD: Directive was struck down for being
inconsistent with the Constitution.
Filoteo Jr. vs Sandiganbayan Petitioner was accused of
hijacking a postal delivery truck. He said that the extrajudicial
confession that he made can’t be used as admissible evidence
against him because in making it, he waived his right to
counsel without the assistance of a counsel, which is required
by the 1987 Constitution. However, the confession was made
when the 1971 Constitution was still in effect, and the 1971
Constitution doesn’t require the assistance of a counsel to
waive right to counsel. Provisions of the Constitution are to be
prospectively applied, unless provided otherwise.
JM Tuason and Co. vs Land Tenure Administration (p. 47,
Legal Method Essentials)
Landowners questioned validity of RA 2616, which ordered
expropriation of their lands. The Court used the actual
language of the Constitution in determining the extent of the
power of Congress in relation to the exercise of expropriation.
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In this case, they found no limitations of Congressional power
to expropriate lands.
Applied the 3 ways to interpret Constitution:
(1) looked at actual meaning of words
-found no limitations of Congressional power to expropriate
(2) looked at intent of framers
-which was to protect people from evils of the past (In this
case, lack of lands, feudalism, etc)
(3) looked at Constitution as a whole
-in a way that addresses present problems & also applies in
the future
B. Adoption and Amendment of the Constitution (Art 17,
1987 Constitution)
Amendments may be proposed through:
(1) Congress, upon a vote of ¾ of all its members (Sec 1,
Art 17)
(2) Constitutional Convention (Sec 1, Art 17)
(3) People’s initiative (Sec 2, Art 17)
*Bernas says the 4th way: through ¾ vote of the Congress as
in Sec 1, Art 17 (but doesn’t specify if votes of each House or
both)
Revisions may be proposed through:
(1) Congress (Sec 1)
(2) Constitutional Convention (Sec 1, Art 17)
Santiago vs COMELEC
RA 6735 was enacted to govern Sec 2, Art 17 of the
Constitution, which allows amendments to the Constitution to
be proposed through people’s initiative. Respondent Delfin
filed petition to amend the Constitution, specifically to lift terms
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of officials. The Court ruled that RA 6735 is inadequate to
cover the system of amendments through people’s initiative. It
only provides subtitles for amendments of national and local
laws, but not the Constitution.
Gonzales vs COMELEC
Congress passed Resolutions proposing an amendment to the
Constitution, specifically to increase membership of HoR from
120 to 180, and to call a Constitutional Convention for that
purpose.
Congress can propose amendments & call for a Constitutional
Convention at the same time. Sec 1, Art 17 states that
revisions/amendments “may be proposed by the Congress,
upon a vote of ¾ of all its Members OR a constitutional
convention.” Or is often construed to mean “and.”
The Constitution doesn’t indicate if the election (wherein
amendment proposals are submitted to the people for
ratification) should be general or special. This is a political
question, as it can only be addressed by the wisdom of
Congress.
Tolentino vs COMELEC Proposal to lower the voting age to
18 years old; this single amendment was scheduled to be
decided through a plebiscite to coincide with the local
elections. Court ruled that piecemeal ratification of
amendments to the Constitution is not allowed because the
Constitution must always be taken as a whole. All amendatory
proposals must have been made first, and then proposed to
the plebiscites all together.
Planas vs COMELEC Petitioners seek to nullify PD 73,
wherein Marcos submitted the proposed Constitution for
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ratification or rejection by the Filipino people in a plebiscite.
They said it cannot be ratified under the people during Martial
Law because people had no free speech & were kept in the
dark. Afterwards, Marcos issued Proc 1102, announcing the
ratification of the proposed Constitution by the Filipino people.
Court ruled that the Constitution wasn’t validly ratified by
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite (now Sec 4, Art 17, 1987
Constitution), and so the proposed Constitution is deemed to
be not yet in effect. Marcos tried to short circuit the judicial
process by announcing that the people already ratified the
Constitution that he proposed. Problems: (1) PD 86, aka
“Citizens Assemblies,” only held informal public consultations
on the proposed Constitution, (2) during the plebiscite, voters
only raised their hands to cast their votes, (3) minors also
participated in the voting.
Javellana vs Executive Secretary Petitioner Javellana
sought to enjoin the Executive Secretary from implementing
the 1973 Constitution. The ratification of the Constitution is
being contested because Martial Law suppressed media and
all forms of information, so there was no way for the people to
actually know about the contents of the Constitution and the
implications of their ratifying it. Furthermore, there were no
voting precincts, which is a requisite to conduct plebiscites.
Instead, there were only citizen assemblies where there were
no requirements for voters. In some areas, citizen assemblies
were not even constituted at all. In the end, the Court ruled
that issue was a political question that is not under the purview
of the Supreme Court. They concluded that the ascertainment
made by the President as to the validity of the citizen
assembly is presumed to be valid. Moreover, the majority
opinion was of the view that since the constitution was already
being implemented, there was nothing that the Court could do.
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Even passive acceptance must be considered as acceptance
of the people in their sovereign capacity. Such acceptance
must take precedence over procedural matters.
Lambino vs COMELEC The Lambino Group gathered
signatures to commence a constitutional amendment through
people’s initiative. They propose to change the present
bicameral-presidential system to a presidential-parliamentary
form. The Court dismissed their petition on several grounds.
First, because amendments made through initiative are only
considered as such if the petition contained the full text of the
proposed amendment, whether written on its face or attached
to it. Court ruled that the Lambino group’s initiative did not
constitute a people’s initiative, since they circulated only
signature sheets without a copy of the proposed amendments.
Second, the Court also ruled that their proposal equates to a
revision and not an amendment, since it failed the two part test
to classify the change: quality, which examines if the changes
are far reaching, or change principles behind the law; quantity
which examines the number of provisions that will be affected.
It failed the quality test since it will alter the separation of
powers, an important constitutional principle. It likewise failed
the quantity test because the changes proposed span 105
provisions in 3 articles. The distinction is important because
only amendments to the constitution are allowed to be carried
out through people’s initiative, not revisions to the constitution,
which can only be done through a constitutional convention, or
a ¾ vote of all members of Congress.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Separation of Powers
Book, pp. 28-29
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The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. The principle means that legislation belongs
to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of
legal controversies to the Judiciary.
Imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of
powers, which states that what has been delegated cannot be
delegated. Such delegated power constitutes not only a right,
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
In Re: Laureta and Maravilla The decisions of the SC,
whether decided on en banc or as a division, are as credible
as the enrolled bills of the legislature, and are therefore
beyond investigation or inquiry. In their persistence to overturn
detrimental decisions, their threats of exposing the supposed
corruption of the SC to the media, and their unfounded
complaint to the Tanodbayan, Ilustre and Laureta attempted to
subject the judiciary to the executive, which is unjustifiable
under the principle of separation of powers.
Demetria vs Alba Case assailing the constitutionality of PD
No. 1177, or the Budget Reform Decreee of 1977. The Court
ruled that it can declare legislative enactments unconstitutional
if they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits. This does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine, but merely a means to uphold the supremacy
of the Constitution.
B. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review
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Provisions
Art. VIII, Sec, 1 The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regultions, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Book, pages 67- 83
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights, which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government (expanded certiorari
jurisdiction). It is an integral component of the system of
checks and balances.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the
business of an administrative agency, except when it violates
a citizen’s constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
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Angara vs Electoral Commission Involves controversy over
the position of National Assembly Member; question of
legislative supremacy vs judicial supremacy. Court ruled that
the Supreme Court is given the power and the duty to
determine the allocations of power between the spheres of
government through judicial review. Although the Court may
not interfere with the different departments when they are
acting within the limits of their authority, the Court may
determine their limits when there is an actual case or
controversy. Judicial review is an integral component of the
system of checks and balances, which, together with the
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican system of government, and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people it serves.
C. Justiciable and Political Questions
Book, pages 67- 83
Political questions are those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.
The 1987 Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
that the Court, under previous Constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide.
Miranda vs Aguirre Petitioners filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of RA 8528, which changed the status of
Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a
component city. Respondents argued that the issue was a
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political one, and therefore not subject to the power of judicial
review. Court ruled that it can decide on the merits of the case,
since it will not decide on the wisdom of the passage of RA
8528, but on its constitutionality. The SC cannot shy away
from the issue for they alone can decide on the matter.
Francisco vs HOR The HOR filed an impeachment case
against Chief Justice Davide, because of the questionable
disbursements made by his office. First case was dismissed
for being insufficient in substance, so they filed another case.
Petition was filed alleging that the second impeachment case
violated the constitutional provision against initiating more than
one impeachment case against the same official in the span of
one year. Court ruled that the issue does not involve a political
question, contrary to what the respondents posit. It does not
question whether or not the Chief Justice should be
impeached (wisdom of act), but whether or not the process
followed to impeach him is in accord with what is mandated by
the Constitution (legality of act).
Torrecampo vs MWSS Barangay Captain Torrecampo
assailed the entry of the DPWH into the Balara area to
implement the C5 Road Extension Project. Court ruled that it
cannot pass upon the case, because petitioner basically asks
the Court to declare that the RIPADA Area is a better area
than the Balara Area for the implementation of the C5 Project.
This is a political question because it is regarding the wisdom
of the law, and not its legality.
III. D. Requisites of Judicial Review
The requirements for the exercise of judicial review are:
1. Actual case or controversy
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2. Locus Standi
3. Earliest Opportunity
4. Lis Mota
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Book, pages 67-83
Means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination. Courts do not adjudicate academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging they may be.
a. Prematurity
Book, pages 67-83
Courts cannot rule on conjectural or anticipatory questions,
lest its decision would amount to an advisory opinion.
PACU vs Secretary of Education Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA 2706, which gives the Sec. of Education
the power to inspect and permit existence and operations of
private schools. Court ruled that they did not show that any
permits were revoked, or any textbooks were bad, or that any
of their complaints actually happened. Case is premature
because mere fear that something is yet to happen does not
yet constitute a justiciable issue.
Mariano vs COMELEC RA 7854, an act which aims to convert
the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city, is
assailed for violating the constitution for not describing the
area to be converted by metes and bounds, and that it will
bring back to square one the term allocations of LG officials,
thus allowing them to serve more terms than are
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constitutionally allowed. The Court held that the petition is
based on the occurrence of many contingent events that may
or may not happen. Thus, the petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen into an actual case or
controversy.
Montesclaros vs COMELEC Petitioners in this case sought to
prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK Election to a later
date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be
voted for in view of the age limitation imposed on those who
may participate. Court ruled that there was no actual
justiciable controversy. The issue is premature, since the bill
was still pending in Congress. The Court cannot review such
since it would violate the principle of separation of powers, by
allowing the Court to reviewing bills and telling Congress
which bills to enact.
b. Mootness
Book, pages 67-83
There is no case or controversy when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, perhaps due to supervening events, so
that a determination of the issue would have no practical use.
There is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner
would be entitled and, which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.
The Court may decide cases otherwise moot if:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
2. The situation has an exceptional character and the
paramount public interest is involved.
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3. The Constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public.
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Atlas Fertilizer vs Secretary of DAR Case involving RA
6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; petitioners
allege that some portions of the CARL violate the constitution
for extending the agrarian reform program to aquaculture
lands when the constitution limits it to agricultural lands only.
Court ruled that the case is mooted, because the Court
already ruled in Luz Farms that lands devoted to fishing are
not agricultural lands. Moreover, RA 7881 was enacted,
exempting farms and fishlands from CARL.
Lacson vs Perez PGMA, faced by angry and armed
protesters attempting entry into the Malacañang, issued
Proclamation No. 38, declaring a state of rebellion. General
Order 1 was also issued, allowing the warrantless arrests of
leaders of the rebellion. Petitioners pray for TRO to prevent
aforementioned arrests. Court ruled that the lifting of the state
of rebellion was a supervening event, which rendered the
instant case moot and academic.
Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary Consolidated cases
assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No.
42, which declared a state of rebellion, and called out the AFP
to suppress such, and Gen. Order No. 4, which directed the
PNP and AFP to suppress the rebellion. Court rendered the
issue moot and academic, but still passed upon the merits of
the case because it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The reemergence of the case is obvious, since the issue is the
same one raised in Lacson. In the end, the Court upheld the
validity of the challenged issuances, stating that the
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declarations were under the President’s broad executive and
commander-in-chief powers.
2. Proper Party
Book, pages 67-83
Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. A citizen must
establish that the has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.
Proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained
of. Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is
established, the complainant is not clothed with legal
personality to raise the constitutional question.
Joya vs PCGG Involves petition to enjoin PCGG Chairman
Caparas from auctioning off old Masters’ paintings and 18th
and 19th Century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
Court ruled that petitioners did not have legal standing to sue.
They are not the owners of the artworks and silverware in
question. Taxpayers’ suit cannot prosper as well, since the act
sought to be restrained does not involved disbursement and/or
expenditure of public funds, rather, what they allege to be
public properties.
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CHR Employees Association vs CHR CHREA assails the
validity of the upgrading and reclassification scheme of the
CHR personnel positions, arguing that the CHR is a
constitutional commission which possessed fiscal autonomy.
Court ruled that the petitioners had legal standing to sue,
because the upgrading and reclassification of personnel
positions benefitted only a few high-ranking employees. Court
ruled, however, that CHR did not possess fiscal autonomy.
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance vs Romulo
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 135, invoking their
rights as labor unions and taxpayers. The law in question
authorized the DOLE Secretariat to exercise power over the
NLRC. The Court held that petitioners did not have locus
standi, because they did not show that they would sustain
injuries because of the law. The exercise of power of the
DOLE over the NLRC would only affect those personnel who
may find themselves the subject of the DOLE Secretary’s
disciplinary authority, therefore only those would have
standing. Furthermore, no public funds are involved, so
petition cannot prosper as a taxpayer’s suit. The locus standi
requirement cannot be waived because the matter is not of
transcendental importance, and only involves a command from
a superior to an inferior.
a. Citizen Standing
A citizen has standing if he has sustained a direct injury or if
the citizen seeks the enforcement of a public right
ARTICLE 3, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
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or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Exceptions: privileged information rooted in separation of
powers, presidential conversations, correspondences,
discussion during closed-door cabinet meetings, internal
deliberations of SC and other courts, executive sessions of
either house of Congress
Tañada vs Tuvera 1985
Petitioners sought for a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause the
publication of various PDs, LOIs, GOs, Proclamations, EOs,
letters of implementation, and AOs in the Official Gazette. The
Court held that petitioners are the real parties in interest
because the right sought to be enforced is the public right and
the petition compels the execution of a public duty. When the
question is a public right and the object of mandamus is to
procure a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest. One need not show a legal or special interest,
being a citizen is sufficient to have an interest to see the laws
executed.
Chavez vs PEA and Amari
Chaves petitioned for mandamus as a citizen seeking the
enforcement of public rights to ask the Court to compel the
PEA to comply with its constitutionally-mandated duties of
disclosing information on its negotiations with Amari
Corporation for the development of the reclaimed area in
Manila Bay and to prevent the alienation of land of the Public
Domain. The Court held that Chaves has standing because
the mandamus he is asking for involves enforcement of
constitutional rights to information on the sale of public land
and equitable distribution of natural resources.
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b. Associational Standing
The concept of third party standing applies wherein petitioners
can assert the rights of others because of the overbreadth
doctrine. Its members must have standing to sue on their own,
interests sought to be protected must be germane to the
organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the
relief sought may require the participation of individual
members in the suit. The doctrine applies to statutes that
infringe upon the right to freedom of speech or when it
needlessly retrains constitutionally guaranteed rights.
KMU Labor Center vs Garcia Case involving the
constitutionality of Memorandum No. 90-935, allowing
provincial operators to charge passenger rates within a rate of
15% above or 15% below the official rate of the LTFRB for one
year. The Court ruled that petitioner KMU has legal standing to
sue because members of the organization suffered and
continue to suffer because of the fare hikes, being that they
avail of public transportation everyday.
IBP vs Zamora President Estrada deployed the Philippine
Marines to conduct visibility patrols with the PNP in response
to alarming threats to security in Metro Manila. IBP filed the
petition praying for the annulment of such order, and the
declaration of the deployment as unconstitutional. Petitioners
did not have locus standi. IBP’s alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the constitution is too general an
interest. Further, they have not shown any specific injury which
it has or may suffer by virtue of the deployment. Despite such
absence, the Court took cognizance of the case, since the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.
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Executive Secretary vs CA
Private respondents, ARCO-PHIL (Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter), has standing to question certain sections
of the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Act on behalf of its members
who are directly affected by it. In its Articles of Incorporation,
ARCO-PHIL states that it will act as the representative of its
member agencies in matters related to manpower recruitment
agency. However, ARCO-PHIL does not have standing to file
the petition in behalf of unskilled workers.
GMA Network vs COMELEC
Petitioners question the constitutionality of COMELEC Res
9615 that restricts the total amount of allowable airtime for
political ads. The court held that Senator Cayetano has
standing because he is a candidate who is affected by the
resolution; the broadcast companies have standing because
they may suffer due to the burdens that the resolution will
impose on them (regulation, etc.). Third parties have standing
because they can file for their customers who are candidates,
buy the ads, rely on broadcasts, and have the right to
information.
c. Taxpayer’s Standing
A taxpayer has standing when the issue deals with the
unwarranted disbursement or appropriation of public funds or
there is a waste of public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional law.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs
COMELEC
COMELEC is alleged to have abused its power when it
awarded the election automation contract to Mega Pacific
Consortium and disregarded its own rules and procedure on
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bidding. Petitioners are seeking to restrain COMELEC from an
unwarranted use of public funds. The court held that the
petitioners have standing as taxpayers because the case
involved the use of public funds, there is a claim of illegal
disbursement, and public money is being used for an improper
purpose.
d. Voter’s Standing
A voter has the requisite standing when the right of suffrage is
involved.
Tolentino vs COMELEC
Former Senator Arthur Tolentino sued COMELEC questioning
the validity of a special election for a vacant seat in the Senate
held simultaneous with the 2001 elections. The court found
that his interest was too general and that he did not claim that
he has sustained personal injury. Nevertheless, the court held
that he has a right to sue because he raised important issues
on the right to suffrage.
e. Legislative Standing
A legislator must be authorized to sue to question the validity
of any official action which will infringe on his prerogatives as a
legislator.
Ople vs Torres
Senator Ople filed a petition to invalidate AO 308 “Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System”.
The court held that Senator Ople has standing as a legislator
because AO 308 can be seen as an encroachment/usurpation
of legislative power; and as a taxpayer it involves a
misalignment of public funds to implement the order. The court
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invalidated AO 308 because it involves something that should
be passed as a law by Congress and not by the Executive
since it creates a right and duty for citizens to get an ID and
redefined basic parameters of the right of privacy of citizens.
f. Governmental Standing
The state is the proper party in challenging the constitutionality
and has a substantial interest in upholding the validity of its
own laws.
People vs Vera
In questioning the constitutionality of the Probation Act, the
Court held that the government is the proper party to question
the statue because it is always interested in the integrity of its
constitution or the statutes involved and can set aside a law
that violated the Constitution. Moreover, it struck down the
Probation Act because it is an undue delegation of power to
the administrative boards, encroaches on the pardoning power
of the executive, and denies equal protection of the laws
because the Probation Act may apply in some provinces, but
not in others.
g. Standing for Fauna
Section 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation
of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
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Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary Reyes Petitioners
are suing on behalf of marine mammals along Tanon Strait for
their protection because of the damages caused by JAPEX
who conducted oil exploration studies in the area. The court
ruled that the petitioners have standing as stewards who are
seeking to protect animals. Also, court has taken a permissive
position on issues of standing in environmental cases. Under
Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
“citizen suits” are allowed and can permit and any Filipino to
file an action for violation of environmental laws on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature. Sir says that
they can sue on their behalf because they have a right to a
healthy ecology under Art. 2, Sec. 16.
3. Earliest Opportunity
4. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions
Decision on the constitutional question must be
determinative of the case itself.
Arceta vs Mangrobang
The case involves two consolidated petitions regarding the BP
22 or Bouncing Checks Law. The court held that “earliest
opportunity” means that the question of unconstitutionality is
raised immediately in the proceedings in the trial court and not
when it is on appeal in the SC. Thus, Arceta did not fulfill the
requisite for judicial review. Also, the constitutional question of
BP 22 is not the lis mota of the case since every law is
presumed to be constitutional and to justify the nullification of
the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
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Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, and
argumentative.
Angara vs Electoral Commission
The court held that the SC had jurisdiction over the case and
has the duty to determine the allocations of power between the
spheres of government. Laurel: “In times of social disquietude
or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.”
IV. TERRITORY, PEOPLE, AND GOVERNMENT
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
A. Territory
EO 292, Book I, Section 3. What Comprises National
Territory. - The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
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and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial,
and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
RA 9522: AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
The baselines where the Philippines exercises sovereignty
and jurisdiction were redefined to be consistent with Article
121 of the UNCLOS III.
Magallona v. Ermita
Petitioners claim that RA 9522 is unconstitutional because it
decreases the country’s territory as demarcated by the treaty
of Paris, is inconsistent with the PH’s claim over Kalayaan
Island Group, Scarborough Shoal, and Sabah, and converts
internal waters into archipelagic waters. The court upheld the
constitutionality of RA 9522 because it is only a statutory tool
to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and continental
shelfs and does not decrease PH’s territory. RA 9522 and
UNCLOS III does not renounce claim over disputed territories
and has no role in the acquisition, enlargement, and diminution
of territory. States may only acquire/lose territory through
occupation, accretion, cession, and prescription; not by
multilateral treaties on regulations of sea-rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime
zones. In fact, RA 9522 even increased PH’s total maritime
space by 145,216 km through an EEZ, did not repeal claim
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over Sabah, and still allows right of innocent passage rights
which is customary to international law.
Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on the Ancestral
Domain
Petitioners are assailing the validity of the Memorandum of
Agreement on Ancestral Domain of the GRP-MILF because it
gives the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity the status of an
associated state wherein it is practically a state (has a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states) on its own.
However, the constitution does not contemplate any state in
this jurisdiction other than the Philippine state and it does not
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
the PH territory for independence. Declaring the BJE as a
state is against the national sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the republic. It would be more powerful than other
autonomous regions recognized by the state. Regarding BJE’s
territorial jurisdiction over its internal waters, the court did not
rule on the issue definitely, but it ruled that the MOA-AD was
unconstitutional because it violated the provisions on the right
to information of the LGUs and public consultations.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of some provisions of the
IPRA of 1997 and its IRR that deprive the state of its
ownership over lands of public domain, minerals, and other
natural resources violating the Regalian doctrine stated in sec
2, art XII of the Constitution.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
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energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish
workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
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The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
However, due to a tie vote even after re-deliberation, the
petition was dismissed. Also, the court stated that the Regalian
doctrine is not absolute because in Carino v. Insular
Government, it was held that land that was owned by
individuals as far as memory or testimony goes never formed
part of the public land. Thus, the justices who voted in favor of
IPRA stated that under the native title doctrine, there is no
violation of the Regalian doctrine because the public lands
being disputed were never really public anyways. Puno said
that the state still owns the land, but IPs have priority over the
use and development of the natural resources in small-scale
utilizations.
CITIZENSHIP
Article 4 (Citizenship) – Sections 1 – 5
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
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Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Executive Order No. 292 – Book 1, Sections 5 to 9
CHAPTER 2 - THE PEOPLE
Section 5. Who are Citizens. - The following are the citizens of
the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship, unless by the act or omission
they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 6. Effect of Marriage. - Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced
it.
Section 7. Natural-born Citizen. - Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
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having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the Constitution shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
Section 8. Loss or Reacquisition of Citizenship. - Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided
by law.
Section 9. Dual Allegiance. - Dual allegiance is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Aznar vs. COMELEC In the case at bar, petitioner challenged
respondent’s right to hold public office on the ground that the
latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a
Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a
continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter
since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien
registration certificate. The issue before the court was on
whether or not respondent is an alien, and the court held that
he was a Filipino. This is because by virtue of his being a son
of a Filipino, having a Filipino passport, and being a registered
voter, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and remained
Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or
lost his Philippine citizenship. (Modes of losing Filipino
Citizenship: Naturalization, Expressed Renunciation, and Oath
of Allegiance) In addition, possession of an alien registration
certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts
whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate
proof of loss of citizenship. Philippine courts can determine
Philippine citizenship but not American citizenship. – He was
both American and Filipino – dual allegiance is allowed (Juan
and Mario analogy)
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Tecson vs, Commission on Elections Petitioners sought for
respondent Poe’s disqualification in the Presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino
citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. COMELEC
dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on
the case under Article VII, Section 4, Paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution. The issues were WON it is the Supreme Court
which had jurisdiction and WON COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. The 1935 Constitution on
Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s
birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." Tracing
respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as
evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a
Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other
evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death,
such that he would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---
respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son
to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen
by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s
birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child,
thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation
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that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage
had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented. But while the totality of the evidence
may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
Petitioners sought a reversal of the HRET decision declaring
Jose Ong as a natural born citizen who was proclaimed duly
elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar.
The election protest assailed that he was not a natural born
citizen and that he was not a resident of the 2nd district of
Samar. However, HRET ruled in favor of Ong without
committing a grave abuse of discretion because HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications that is able to enjoy an exclusivity of jurisdiction.
The SC is able to inquire into the acts of electoral tribunals
under three situations: clear, unmitigated error, grave abuse of
discretion, and a denial of due process. HRET ruled that Ong
was a Filipino citizen because both his parents were Filipinos
(His father was naturalized, and his mother was a natural –
born Filipino). The court ruled that under Article 4, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, there was no need for him to choose
Filipino citizenship because his father was naturalized when
he was 9 years old before reaching majority.
Yu vs. Defensor – Santiago Respondent CID (Commission
on Immigration and Deportation) intends to deport Yu because
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of allegedly renouncing his Philippine citizenship. Yu petitioned
for Habeus Corpus which the court denied. In a further
investigation of his case the findings revealed that he applied
for Portugese passport, he was naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, the petitioner represented himself as Portugese in
signing the companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd, and he
renewed his Portugese Passport. Court held that Yu had
expressly renounced his citizenship. (Express renunciation –
renunciation that is made known distinctly and implicitly)
through the contracts that he signed. Court held that
“Philippine citizenship is not a commodity that can be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.”
Angat vs. Republic Angat filed a petition to reacquire Filipino
citizenship because he was a natural born Filipino citizen and
he lost it after naturalization. He assailed that he wanted to
regain his status as a Filipino under Commonwealth Act. No.
63, RA 965, and RA 2630. He also took his oath of allegiance
under RA 8171 that provides repatriation is natural born
Filipino lost citizenship because of political and economic
necessity. Under Commonwealth Act 63 one is allowed to
reacquire citizenship provided that the person is not in
opposition to government, teaching/defending violence,
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, or suffering from
an incurable disease. OSG filed for an MoR stating that
implementing RA 8171 means that the case should have been
brought to the Special Committee on Naturalization. The court
held that the petitioner cannot invoke RA 965 and 263o
because these only apply to those rendering service to, or
accepting in Armed Forces of an allied foreign country. The
Court also held that jurisdiction of this case falls under the
Special Committee on Naturalization because when Angat
filed the petition in March 1996, PD 725 was already in effect.
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Bengson III vs. Cruz (2001) Petitioner Bengson assails the
citizenship of Teodor Cruz because they were both candidates
for the representative of the 2nd district of Pangasinan. Cruz
was a natural born citizen of the Philippines and lost his
citizenship because he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
was naturalized as a US Citizen. He reacquired Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. The Court held
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
HRET, and that Cruz is considered a natural born Filipino
because repatriation restored the original status of being a
natural – born Filipino. (Article 4, section 2). There is also a
valid application of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised
Naturalization Law) which provides that former citizens can
reacquire their citizenship in 3 ways, through naturalization,
repatriation, or a direct act of congress. In the case at hand,
there is a valid application of reacquiring citizenship through
repatriation because Cruz served in the US Armed Forces and
the only requisites for attaining Filipino citizenship would be
taking an oath of allegiance and having it registered in the
local civil registry. Petitions were dismissed and the Court held
that repatriation restores original state of natural – born
citizenship.
Tan Co. vs. Civil Registrar of Manila Petitioners are siblings
Hubert and Arlene Co who want to correct entries in their birth
certificate with the civil registrar. (Change their father’s
citizenship) Their father was naturalized under LOI No. 270
and petitioners requested for the change under
Commonwealth Act No. 437 that granted the change because
at the time of naturalization, there were legitimate minor
children. RTC ruled that the Father applied for citizenship
under LOI and NOT CA 437. The Court held that LOI 270 and
CA 473 are Pari Material (Pari Materia – should be read and
construed together because enactments of the same
!
legislature on the same subject should form a uniform system)
Both laws govern naturalization of qualified aliens residing in
the Philippines and they have the same purpose and objective
which is to enable aliens to reside permanently as long as they
have demonstrated love and loyalty for the country, an affinity
for culture, and contributed to the economic, social, and
cultural development of our country. The two should be taken
together – Section 15 of CA No. 473 which extends the grant
of Philippine citizenship of minor children of those naturalized
should also be applied to those naturalized under LOI 270.
Republic vs. Sagun Norma Sagun was a legitimate child of
Chinese National Father and Filipino Mother, she did no elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority and
executed an oath of allegiance but it was not registered with
the Local Civil Registrar. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine
passport but it was denied because she took the citizenship of
her Father (Chinese), and the RTC ruled that she was granted
Philippine citizenship because she was a voter. OSG filed a
petition for reversal. The Court held that Sagun did not
effectively elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance with
procedure. One cannot effectively elect citizenship by
excercising the right of suffrage. CA 625 already prescribes
the procedure which states that a valid election requires:
statement of election under oath, oath of allegiance, and
registration of the statement of election with the local civil
registry. Sagun failed to register her oath. In addition to this
she should have first registered as an alien under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950, and her execution of her oath was
not done in reasonable time, as it was 33 years after reaching
majority age.
Go vs. Republic of the Philippines Go filed for a petition for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473 and states
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that he was born in Manila to Chinese nationals, he lived in
Sta. Cruz, he was exempt from filing a Declaration of Intention
because he was already born and studying in the Philippine.
He presented witnesses to testify his credibility. There was an
appeal to the CA that ruled that Go was unable to prove the
credibility of witnesses and that there was a failure to state all
former places of residence. The court ruled that the petitioner
failed to produce evidence that witnesses were credible
because it was not in compliance with CA 473 which requires
that the 2 witnesses are credible persons who are able to
insure the character of person involved in the case and to
make sure that they are not merely acquiantances who are not
aware of intimate information and knowledge. The witnesses
were not able to prove that they had an intimate relationship
with Go, there was only evidence of socialization and there
was no genuine desire to learn and embrace Filipino ideals
and traditions. The court also held that the OSG was correct in
stating that the petitioner’s failure to state former residences
makes it void because it is a judicial requirement.
Labo vs. COMELEC (1989) In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was
elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed
a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts
that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he
was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did
not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual
citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed
became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen,
such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo
further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian,
his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should
!
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for
him by a vast majority.
Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in
1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him
an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He
did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return
to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship
when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim
that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely
a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through
an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His
claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will
of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not
have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the
Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by
electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for
Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines
have that privilege over their countrymen.
Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through
the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal
obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
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constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of
the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American
citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during
the Martial Law era. The court ruled that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino Citizen. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section
1, of the Constitution. He claims that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims
that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of
the United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really
wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and
!
PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Sobejano – Condon vs. COMELEC Sobejano is a natural –
born Filipino who was naturalized as an Australian through
marriage. She filed to reacquire Philippine citizenship pursuant
to RA 9225, her application was approved and she did her
oath of allegiance. However, she filed an unsworn Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship. She ran for Mayor
and respondent filed an election protest questioning her
eligibility as a dual citizen. Sobejano assailed that running for
office is a express renunciation of Australian citizenship. The
court ruled that petitioner is not eligible to run because
although she reacquired Filipino citizenship through oath of
allegiance but she failed to renounce her Australian citizenship
under oath, making her a dual citizen. The court used Lopez
vs. COMELEC, which states that dual citizens cannot run for
any elective public position unless there is a sworn
renunciation.
R.A. 8171 (1995) “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST
THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO
ALIENS AND OF NATURAL- BORN FILIPINOS”
R.A. No. 9225 or “An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth
Act No. 63, As Amended and for other Purposes”
Not sure if relevant but from DanGat’s blog:
Consequences of using a US passport
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“In Arnado v. COMELEC,the Supreme Court held that an
affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship is deemed
withdrawn when a candidate uses a US passport after
executing the affidavit. The candidate is disqualified from
running for local office and a landslide victory cannot override
the eligibility requirements.”
SUFFRAGE
Article 5, Sections 1 – 2
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled
and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under
existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections
may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Gallego vs. Verra Gallego was a native of Abuyog. The CA
ruled that his election as Mayor is illegal because he did not
have the residence qualification. Gallego was a teacher in
Abuyog, he wan for mayor then lost, he moved away to
Mindanao due to debt and unemployment and worked as a
Nursery – man on a Plantation for the Bureau of Forestry. He
!
was offered Governmental housing but refused and he visited
his family in Abuyog every August. Petitioner assailed that he
was registered as a voter in Malaybay, Bukidnon, he voted
there, and that he has a residence certificate for that area. The
Court ruled that Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog
just because he worked in Malaybay as a government official,
was registered, and voted there. The Court held that
Residence is equivalent to Domicile, and in order to acquire
domicile by choice there must be 1. Residence/bodily
presence 2. Intention to remain there 3. Intention to abandon
old domicile and the change must be VOLUNTARY. In the
case at bar, Gallego did not intend to remain in Malaybay
because he returns to Abuyog every year to visit his family and
he did not leave voluntarily as well as the fact that he refused
land that he was offered. Therefore, registration does not
make you a resident.
Romualdez vs. RTC Romualdez appeals the respondent
Court’s decision to disqualify him from registering to vote.
Romualdez was a natural born citizen and son of former
Governor of Leyte as well as the nephew of Imelda Marcos.
The Petitioner constructed residential house and was
Barangay Captain of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. He left the
Philippines because of the necessary circumstances under the
EDSA revolution. He came back in 1992 and registered as a
voter. Election protest stated that Romualdez should not be
included in the list of voters because he works and resides in
the US, he just recently arrived, and he did not comply with the
1 year residency. Petitioner assails that he was a resident
since the early 80’s, he was only physically absent for 5 years
and this does not equal abandonment. The court ruled that the
respondent erred in finding petitioner ineligible to vote because
of lack of residency. This is because in election cases,
domicile = residence and a domicile is a fixed permanent
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residence to which when absent for business or pleasure one
intends to return. A political situation is not voluntary and
therefore there was not a change of domicile.
AKBAYAN vs. COMELEC Petitioners representing the youth
(AKBAYAN – Youth) sought to direct respondent COMELEC
to conduct a two – day special voter’s registration before the
2001 elections because 4 million youth failed to register.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3854 denying the request
because in Section 8 of RA 8189 it states that there is no
registration shall be conducted during the period 120 days
before a regular election. Petitioner’s assail that it is possible
through “standby” powers of COMELEC (RA 8436) that
empowers it to designate other dates for pre – election acts
including registration. The court held that COMELEC did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in the assailed Resolution
because every new statute should be construed in connection
with those of the same subject matter, they should harmonize
and stand together. RA 8189 and RA 8436 do not contraduct
one another. RA 8436 allows COMELEC to designate other
dates. However, these pre – election acts (registration) should
be capable of being reasonably performed vis – a- vis
remaining period before the election. The court also ruled that
it cannot compel COMELEC to conduct special registration
period, because the Court cannot compel the government
body to perform something that is not
feasible/possible/practical in their standards because the body
itself would know its capabilities under prevailing
circumstances.
Ceniza vs. COMELEC Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted
Batas Bilang 51 providing for local elections because Section
3 states that registered voters of a component city may be
entitled to vote in the election of officials of the province of
!
which city is part so long as the Charter provides. However,
votes in Highly urbanized cities shall not participate nor vote in
the election of provincial officials which highly urbanized city is
geographically located. The COMELEC adopted Res. No.
1421, where Cebu and Mandaue are unqualified to vote for
provincial officials because Cebu is a highly urbanized city
because of its income of above 40 million and Mandaue’s
charter expressly provides that unqualified to vote for
provincial candidates of Province of Cebu. The Court ruled
that the classification of Cebu as a highly urbanized city as the
only base for the qualification of voters is not unconstitutional
because of the autonomy of local government units. Also, in
Article 11, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, highly urbanized
cities are outside supervisory powers of province because of
complex and varied problems due to a bigger population and
greater economic activity. The Charter of Mandaue does not
violate the equal protection clause because it would only be
discriminatory if prohibited an individual or group of votes
within the city to vote.
Gonzalez vs. COMELEC Petition seeks to prohibit the holding
of a nationwide referendum as per proclamation issued by
President Marcos (Presidential Proclamation 1366 – Citizens
Assemblies) The Procedural issue is that the Court ruled that
the petition is premature because the Court cannot determine
constitutionality or validity if it has not yet been issued or
performed by him. The Court also ruled that the decrees and
acts in referendum were issued under Martial
Law/Commander – in – Chief powers because they were
validly promulgated and issued by incumbent President as
Commander in Chief during Martial Law. The court ruled that
the non – qualified voters should be included in the assailed
referendum because they were on separate ballots and will be
counted ahead. Also the court ruled that the referendum can
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be validly held despite the lack of constitutional provisions
providing for authorization because the referendum was purely
consultative. The Dissent (Teehankee): Referedum and PDs
were promulgated under 1973 Constitution and not Martial
Law. It is unconstitutional because it provides the National
Assembly the power to amend, modify, or repeal laws
inconsistent with the constitution.
Macalintal vs. COMELEC Petition for certiorari and prohibition
of RA 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act) Macalintal
questions the constitutionality of particularly allowing
“immigrants” and “permanent residents” to be able to vote so
long as they file an affidavit of intent to come back after 3
years, the Congress power of proclamation, and COMELEC’s
independence. The court held that the essence of RA 9189 is
to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos specifically for
Filipinos abroad. The absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines because of residence equivalency
to domicile. Section 2, article 5 of the 1987 Constitution
removes doubt of inapplicability of residency requirement. The
Committee wanted to enfranchise those who have not
abandoned their domicile (Filipinos residing abroad,
Temporarily abroad on the day of election, and Children of
diplomats)
R.A. 9189 – “An Act Providing for a System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines
Abroad. Appropriating Funds Therefore, and for other
Purposes.”
C. GOVERNMENT
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFINED
!
U.S. vs Dorr Respondents alleged to have committed an
offense of writing, publishing, and circulating scurrilous libel
against the Government of the US as Insular Government of
the Philippine islands as this is a violation of Section 8, Act
292. The article was published in Manila Freedom (April 6,
1902), an editorial issue on the appointment of “rascal natives”
to important Government positions. The question of the case
at hand was whether or not the term “the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands” refers to existing law and institutions
of the Islands or the aggregate of the individuals by whom
government of the islands is administered. The court ruled that
the Manila Freedom does not violate Article 292 because the
editorial does not attack the “Government” in Article 292 but
the men who are entrusted with the administration of the
government. Therefore, publication does not constitute any
“seditious tendency” in violation of Article 292. (Definition of
Government in Article 292 – existing political system, laws,
and institutions)
CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT
Constituent: Promote government objectives as expressed in
constitution; compulsory
Ministrant: promote welfare and progress; advance general
interests of society
Bacani vs. NACOCO (1956)
Stenographers Bacani and Matoto charged NACOCO
for transcripts of another case. The Auditor – General asked
for reimbursement because NACOCO – Government of the
Philippine sand that they should be exempt from paying fees.
NACOCO’s defense was that they were a corporate
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governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised. The Court held that NACOCO
should not be considered included in term of “Government o
the Republic of the Philippines”. NACOCO holds a ministrant
function because it promotes aspects of economic life like
adjusting coconut industry and providing facilities for better
caring and utilization. The Court held that corporate power is
distinct from Government.
ACCFA vs. CUGCO (1969) ACCFA was a government
agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its named
changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land
Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association
and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as
Union in the ACCFA. The Unions and ACCFA entered into a
collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one
year. Few months have passed, however,The Unions,
together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the
ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor
practices and non implementation of said agreement. Court of
Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing
further acts tending to discourage the Union members in the
exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and
implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good
faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but it
was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by
certiorari. The Court ruled that ACCFA exercised
governmental functions. The implementation of the land reform
program of the government according to Republic Act No.
3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary,
function; and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has
placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.
The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office,
!
with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no
longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA,
but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil
Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to
positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the
governmental character of its functions disappears.
C. Government
De Facto and De Jure Government
Black’s Dictionary:
De Jure Government:
• Legally constituted government that has been placed in
power in accordance with the laws of the land
• ‘De Jure’ = Of right; Legitimate; Lawful; By right and
just title
De Facto Government:
• A government that has not been elected to the laws of
the country
• ‘De Facto’ = In fact; In deed; Exists actually and must
be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is
illegal or illegitimate
Kinds of de facto governments: (as stated in Co Cham v.
Valdez)
1. That which gets possession and control of, or usurps, by
force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
government and maintains itself against the will of the
latter
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2. That which is established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force
• Its existence is maintained by active military
power within the territories and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful
government
• It must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
private citizens
• Usually administered by military authority but may
be administered also, by civil authority, supported
directly by military force.
3. That established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against
the parent state
*If asked, the government of Cory Aquino is considered a De
Jure government as it had been affirmed by the community of
nations as well as the people of the PH and as declared by the
Supreme Court (Lawyers League v. Aquino)
Co Cham vs. Valdez Petitioner Co Cham prays that
Respondent Judge Dizon be ordered to continue the
proceedings in a civil case which was initiated during the
Japanese military occupation (2nd kind of de facto
government). Dizon refused on the ground that General
MacArthur issues a proclamation nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts during the said
regime. The Court ruled in favor of Co Cham under the
doctrine in international law that all acts and proceedings of
!
the 3 branches of a de facto government are good and valid.
These proceedings remain valid even after liberation or
reoccupation of the PH by American forces by virtue of the
principle of postliminium, which states that the restoration of a
person to any status/right formerly possessed by him was
considered as relating back to the time of his original
loss/deprivation. Although proceedings and laws of a political
nature are considered suspended during the military
occupation, in practice, the local ordinary tribunals are
authorized to continue administering justice may continue.
Considering MacArthur’s declaration annulling all “processes
of any other government in the Philippines”, it follows under
int’l law that all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are
not of political complexion, of de facto governments were good
and valid.
Lastly, under the legal maxim, except those of political
nature, “Law once established continues until changed by
some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by
change of sovereignty”. This is applicable to judicial
proceedings, a proclamation to this effect is unnecessary so
laws and courts may continue. During the Japanese regime,
they issued a proclamation continuing the already established
PH courts.
Revolutionary Government
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan PCGG wanted to prosecute
Major General Ramas and his clerk-typist Dimaano for
acquiring ill-gotten wealth during the Marcos regime. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed their complaint. The Court ruled in
favor of the Sandiganbayan stating;
(1) The PCGG had no jurisdiction over the case as they are
only tasked, under EO 1, to recover all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
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subordinates and close associates and investigate cases of
graft and corruption. SC rules that Ramas was not a
“subordinate” of Marcos as PCGG has failed to provide prima
facie evidence that Ramas was actually a close associate of
Marcos. The Ombudsman has proper jurisdiction as in RA
6770 to investigate unexplained wealth after Feb. 25, 1986.
(2) The Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case
before the presentation of additional evidence. The
Sandiganbayan gave more than enough time (case pending
for 4 years) for extending period for submitting evidence.
(3) PCGG illegally seized Ramas’ properties. Petitioner is
partly right in arguing that a revolutionary government was in
place, during the interregnum (after the takeover of
revolutionary government of Cory up to March 24, 1986 –
adoption of Provisional Constitution), the ’73 Constitution was
not in force. Thus, the revolutionary government was not
bound by the Bill of Rights. However, Int’l covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as well as the Universal Declaration of
Human rights were still in effect since the Aquino
administration was a de jure government; thus, the
revolutionary gov’t assumed the responsibility of maintaining
the State’s good faith to comply with the covenant in which the
PH is signatory to. Lastly, the raiding team exceeded their
authority when it seized items not included in the search
warrant, unless items were contraband per se.
EO 1 (1986) = Creating the Presidential Comission on Good
Government
RA 6770 = An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for Other
Purposes
Parens Patriae
!
- The right held by the court to take a reasonable decision on
the part of a person who is unable to make one for himself
(Black’s Dictionary)
Conception vs. CA Petitioner Gerardo Conception and Ma.
Theresa Almonte were married with one son, Jose Gerardo.
Petitioner filed to have his marriage to Theresa annulled on
the ground of bigamy – alleging that Theresa’s marriage to
Mario Gopiao was never annulled. The TC ruled that
Theresa’s marriage was valid, thus declaring her marriage to
Gerardo as void ab initio. This deemed Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child. The CA affirmed the TC’s ruling and held that
an illegitimate child cannot use the mother’s surname and that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Gerardo but by Mario during
her first marriage. Only Mario can contest the legitimacy of the
child. The SC held to uphold the presumption of legitimacy.
The Court also ruled that the State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State
safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to
the end that their eventual development as responsible
citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony.
Immunity from Suit
Sec. 3, Art. 16, 1987 Constitution
The State may not be sued without its consent.
Exec. Ord. 292 (1987)
Sec. 10 – Non Suability of the State
No suit shall lie against the State except with its
consent, as provided by law.
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Sec. 11 – The State’s Responsibility for Acts of Agents
(1) The State shall be legally bound and responsible only
through the acts performed in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws by its duly authorized
representatives.
(2) The State shall not be bound by the mistakes or errors
of its officers/agents in the exercise of their functions.
Republic vs. Feliciano Respondent Feliciano prays for the
exclusion of the property he owns in Tinambac, Cam. Sur.
from Proc No. 90. Feliciano filed a complaint against the
Republic of the Philippines (RP), as represented by the Land
Authority. SC ruled in favor of RP under the doctrine of non-
suability of the State. A suit for the recovery of property is not
an action in rem, but an action in personam, It is an action
against a specific party/parties. In this case, it is directed
against the RP, represented by a government agency (Land
Authority). Thus, a suit against the State and is not permitted
except upon showing that the State has consented to be sued,
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. Moreover, Feliciano
contends that the consent of RP may be read from the
Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation,
“subject to private rights, if any there be”. The Court rules in
the negative stating that the waiver of state immunity can only
be made by an act of the legislative body and not by mere
inference to a Proclamation (not even a legislative act). Lastly,
Feliciano asserts his claim through informacion posesoria.
Court rules that this should ripen into a record of ownership
(no showing that Feliciano had this converted into a record of
ownership) in a span of 10 years.
!
Proc. No. 90 (by Pres. Magsaysay) = Reserving for
Settlement Purposes under the Administration and Disposition
of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA) A Certain Parcel of the Public Domain Situated in
the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Province of
Camarines Sur, Island of Luzon
In rem = directed against or with reference to all whom it might
concern, or “all the world”
In personam = directed against or with reference to a specific
person
Meritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands Petitioner
Merritt had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance
when it turned suddenly without any signal/sound resulting to
physical injuries sustained by the petitioner. The Court ruled
that the TC erred in limiting the damages to Php14, 741 as
petitioner was incapacitated to work for a period of 6 months.
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act. No. 2457, authorizing
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands. The SC ruled that by consenting to be sued, the State
simply waives the its immunity from the suit but does not
concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. The government is only liable for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees when they
are acting as special agents (one who is duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim). It
thereby ruled that a chauffer of the General Hospital is not
such a special agent.
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Philippine Agila Satellite v. Lichauco PASI entered into a
MOA with DOTC concerning the creation and launch of PH-
owned satellite into outer space. DOTC Undersecretary
Lichauco allegedly placed one orbital slot up for bidding and
awarded the slot to an unknown awardee. Thus, this
petitioners filed a civil complaint against Lichauco before the
RTC of Mandaluyong with 3 causes of action; (1) injunction to
enjoin awarding of orbital slot, (2) declaration for nullity of
bidding, and (3) for damages due to public defamation.
Lichauco countered with a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the complaint was a suit against the State. The Court held
that acts done in performance of official functions against an
officer of the government by a private citizen which would
result in a charge against or incurring financial liability to the
government = a suit against the State itself.
The SC ruled that the first 2 causes of action sufficiently
impute a grave abuse of discretion against Lichauco in her
capacity as a government official. The defense to State
immunity does not apply to these causes because they do not
seek to impose a charge/financial liability against the state, but
only a mere nullification of a state action. If PASI sought
damages in relation to the first 2 causes, it would have been a
suit against the state. Moreover, the damages sought by PASI
were directed at Lichauco, not at DOTC. For the 3rd cause of
action, Lichauco could raise the defense of State immunity,
however a new trial would be necessary to establish this.
Minucher vs. CA Petitioner Minucher filed a civil case for
damages on the “trumped-up” charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. The CA reversed RTC decision and held that
Scalzo was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during
his term of duty and thereby immune from criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the Receiving State (Philippines, in this case)
pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. The Court
!
ruled that Scalzo is not vested with diplomatic immunity as
only diplomatic agents are vested with this. Being an Attache,
Scalzo’s main functions were to observe, analyze and interpret
trends and submit reports thus, not regarded as a member of a
diplomatic mission. However, Scalzo was found to be immune
from suit, since his acts pursuant to the case at hand were part
of his official functions as an agent of the US Drug
Enforcement Agency. The doctrine of State immunity from suit
extends to individuals so long as they act within their official
functions.
Officials are not clothed with state immunity when:
- Sued in their private/personal capacity
- Unauthorized acts
- Violates or invades personal and property rights of plaintiff
GTZ vs. CA German Government and PH gov’t ratified an
agreement for technical cooperation. This resulted to the
SHINE (Social Health Insurance – Networking &
Empowerment) project. After which, ensued a disagreement
between Nicolay (SHINE project manager) and respondent
employees of the said project. Nicolay interpreted their letter
as a resignation letter, prompting the employees to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. GTZ (implementing arm of
SHINE project) asserts state immunity. The Court held that the
doctrine of State immunity extends to Foreign States. But
since the suit it brought against GTZ, its nature as an
incorporated/unincorporated agency must first be determined.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it
with a separate juridical personality. If the agency is
incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter. GTZ
claims it is not a private corporation but just an implementing
agency of the German government. GTZ’s and the German
government’s websites describes GTZ as a ‘federal enterprise
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founded as a company under private law’ (equivalent to GOCC
here in PH). Thus, its had an independent legal personality
than that of the Federal Republic of Germany. GTZ also failed
to secure a certificate enjoying diplomatic status from the DFA.
Thus GTZ, being proprietary/governmental and not sovereign
in nature, does not enjoy state immunity from suit.
Vigilar vs. Aquino Respondent Aquino entered into a contract
with DPWH for the construction of a dike in Pampanga
amounting to Php 1.87M. This was completed a month after
signing of contract. Petitioners (DPWH) refused to pay amount
as they deemed the project void, violating PD 1445
(Government Auditing Code of the PH) for the absence of
appropriation. CA reversed RTC ruling – declaring the contract
as void ab initio and ordering COA to determine value of the
services rendered by respondent and to compensate him. SC
ruled that;
(1) There are several exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Among which
are; unreasonable delay/ inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant and where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice (both are present in
this case)
(2) On suability of state; the doctrine of State Immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Justice and equity
strenly demand that the State’s cloak on invincibility
against suit be shred and petitioner-contractors be
duly compensated.
!
Arigo vs. Swift US embassy in PH requested diplomatic
clearance for the USS Guardian to enter and exit PH territorial
waters. As USS Guardian was departing Subic Bay, en route
to Indonesia, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of the
South Shoal of the Tubbataha reefs. Petitioners filed suit
against Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th fleet.
The Court held that they did not have jurisdiction over US
respondents under the principle of State Immunity from suit.
US respondents were being sued in their official capacity
(while performing official military duties) as commanding
officers of the US Navy. In cases where judgment against
officials will require the State itself to perform an affirmative act
(ie pay damages), the suit must be regarded against the State
itself. The principle of State Immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the US respondents.
Money Claims
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance Petitioner sought
payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that
in 1927, the Nat’l Gov’t through its authorized reps took
physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of a national road without just compensation nor any
agreement. The Court held that there’s a constitutional
mandate that an owner must be duly compensated for
property taken for public use. Although the government is
immune from suit without its consent, it is a different matter
when the public official is made to account in his capacity for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff.
Unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of the
State, thus not a suit against the State. As the Court may not
return the property to the owner (its already part of the national
road), the only relief would be for the government to make due
compensation on the basis of the price or value of the land at
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the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the
government.
Inherent Powers of the State
Rubi vs. Provincial Board The case is an application for
habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. The alleged deprivation of liberty of the
Manguianes stems from a Resolution issued by the Provincial
Board obliging these "Non-Christians", under pain of
imprisonment, to make permanent settlement on a reservation
site selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. This action was taken in accordance with
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. Rubi and his
fellow Mangyans, challenge the constitutionality of this
provision. The Court held that;
(1) The term “non-christian” as stated in the Admin Code
of 1917 was intended to relate to a degree of
civilization, thus not tending to discriminate according
to religious beliefs.
(2) There was no undue delegation of legislative power
as the it merely conferred upon the provincial
governor the discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law, given the local official is best fit
to select sites which have conditions most favorable
for “non-christians”
(3) Regarding petitioners’ liberty, due process, equal
protection claims; the Court held that liberty has
limitations and is subject to the common good (in this
case, public health, public order and safety). Thus,
that this was a valid exercise of police power to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society. Moreover, due process and equal
protection of the law is when the law is reasonable
!
and is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
class.
Agustin v. Edu Petitioner Agustin challenges the
constitutionality of LOI 229 and its IRR, which requires cars to
be equipped w/ early warning devices. Petitioner says that LOI
229 is oppressive, financially burdensome, discriminatory and
implementation of it is not w/n powers of the State. The Court
held otherwise and said that the implementation of LOI 229
was in line with the inherent police power of the State. Police
power being defined as an inherent authority of the state to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote general welfare and prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order and safety. The law guarantees protection of the
Constitutional rights of people, but it doesn’t make these rights
and freedoms absolute. The police power of the state
balances these rights and freedoms when they obstruct peace,
safety, good order and welfare of society (aka when they hurt
the rights and freedoms of others). However, ‘police power’ is
dynamic in nature and changes through time as what is
critical/urgent in society changes with time as well.
V. The Branches of Government
A. CONGRESS
1. Power, Composition, Qualification and Term of
Office
a. Senate
b. House of Representatives
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Sec. 5, Art. 7, 1987 Constitution
Section 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC 52 petitions from 54
party-list groups and organizations were consolidated into one
assailing the resolutions from COMELEC disqualifying them
form the May 2013 party list elections. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion but
the decision sets new parameters for the party-list (PL)
system;
(1) 3 different groups may participate in the PL system –
national parties or orgs, regional parties or orgs, and
sectoral parties or orgs (as shown in the intent of the
Constitutional framers)
!
(2) National and regional parties/orgs do not need to
organize along sectoral lines nor do they need to
represent any “marginalized and underrepresented
sector” (reversing ruling in Ang Baong Bayani)
(3) Political parites can participate in PL elections as long
as they don’t field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party that fields candidates in a
legislative district can only participate in PL elections
through its sectoral wing separately registered under
the PL system. (reversed ruling in BANAT)
(4) Sectoral parties/orgs may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” (eg. labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, ICC, handicapped, veterans, OFWs) lack
in “well-defined political constituencies” (eg.
professionals, elderly, women, youth). It’s enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector.
(5) A majority of the members of sectoral parties/orgs that
represent the marginalized & underrepresented must
belong to the marginalized & underrepresented sector
they represent. Same thing goes for the majority of the
members of those that lack well-defined
constituencies. Moreover, the nominees that represent
these sectors must either;
a. Belong to their respective sectors; or,
b. Have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors.
While the nominees of national/regional parties/orgs
must be bona fide members of such parties/orgs.
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(6) National, regional, and sectoral parties/orgs shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
Abang Lingkod Party-List vs. COMELEC ABANG Lingkod
presented digitally-altered photographs of its activities to
COMELEC as proof of its continuing compliance with RA
7941. COMELEC denied its registration under the part-list
system because of untruthful statements and failure to present
its track record. The SC ruled in favor of Abang Lingkod that
RA 7941 did not require groups to submit proof of their track
record citing Sec. 5, RA 7941 as only requiring the party/org’s
“constitution, by-laws, platform/program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant info the
COMELEC may require”. The Court ruled that the mentioned
documents were only pieces of evidence reflecting the groups
existence and not requiring documents showing their track
record. In Atong Paglaum, it was stated that for sectoral
parties, “it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interests and concerns of the sector”. Also held in
Atong Paglaum was that nominees of sectoral parties either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. 3 out of 5
ABANG LINGKOD nominees are farmers and are thus not
required to submit a track record. Lastly, the Court held that
ABANG LINGKOD’s faking of its activities could not be
considered an untruthful statement that would constitute a
ground for cancellation of its registration.
RA 7941 = An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor
!
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (ALLP) vs. COMELEC ALLP
petitions SC to annul COMELEC resolutions denying their
registration on “moral grounds”. The Court ruled that ALLP did
comply with requirements set by the Constitution and RA
9471. COMELEC’s argument on ALLP making “untruthful
statement” re their national existence does not stand as ALLP
never claimed to exist in each province but showed their
national statistics. The Court also held that COMELEC’s
resolution did violate the non-establishment of religion clause
in the Constitution as they explicitly cited the Bible and Koran
as basis for rejecting ALLP’s registration and that moral
disapproval on its own is not sufficient to justify exclusion from
participation (benevolent neutrality of the government). The
resolution violates constitutionally protected rights and
international law;
(1) The equal protection clause – if a law neither burdens
a fundamental right nor targets a particular class, the
SC will uphold the classification if it leads to some
legitimate government end – using the rational basis
test (Congress has not criminalized homosexual
conduct, thus should not single out homosexuals as a
separate class),
(2) Freedom of expression and association – holds even if
such ideas are “shocking or unacceptable”, only those
that incite actual violence or tour policies incompatible
with democracy are not protected by these rights,
(3) The Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – stating that
all people are equal before the law and that everyone
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has the right to take part in the gov’t of his country
through directly or chosen representatives
Key concepts:
Benevolent Neutrality = idea that a government should pursue
secular goals but also strive to uphold religious liberty as long
as it doesn’t offend state interests (1) whether there is
substantial burden on religious freedom, and (2) whether the
state-imposed burden is justified by a compelling state
interest.
Rational Basis Test = the courts will uphold a law if it is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest/purpose.
Dayao vs. COMELEC Petitioners filed a complaint
questioning the qualification of LPGMA as a sectoral party-list
organization. COMELEC dismissed the complaint. The SC
rules that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their complaint for the cancellation of the
accreditation of LPGMA for the May 2010 elections. Pursuant
to Sec.6, RA 7941, for COMELEC to validly exercise its
statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group,
it only needs to satisfy; due notice and hearing, and existence
of any ground for disqualification mentioned in the same
action. It does not require an opposition to the petition for
registration be interposed before a complaint for cancellation
be entertained. Sec. 6 states; “Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration” – this is 2 separate powers (could be refusal and
cancellation/ refusal or cancellation). Court also holds that the
accreditation of LPGMA is not final and that LPGMA can be
disqualified on the on the ground that its incorporators,
officers, and members do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector. However, the issue involved in the
!
complaint or cancellation has been deemed settled by a
COMELEC resolution finding that LPGMA and other party-lists
have complied with the qualifications set by law and
jurisprudence.
Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC COMELEC first division issued a
resolution expunging the Certificate of Nomination which
includes the petitioners Lokin and Planas as representatives of
the party-list CIBAC (Citizen’s battle against corruption). 2
different groups representing CIBAC submitted an intent to
participate; one signed by Pia Derla and another signed by
respondents herein (CIBAC President and Secretary General).
After which, COMELEC declared respondents’ faction as the
true nominees of CIBAC because Derla was unable to prove
her authority vis-à-vis respondents’ evidence to prove their
authenticity. The SC rules that COMELEC has jurisdiction over
the case even as Derla claimed that the issue was an intra-
corporate matter and must be dealt with in the commercial
courts. The Court holds that COMELEC has jurisdiction over
cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of
party reps. Moreover, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion as they correctly found that Derla’s alleged
authority was devoid of supporting evidence and were merely
self-serving declarations (she wasn’t even a member of CIBAC
and a virtual stranger to the party-list).
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens (COSC) v.
COMELEC The COSC participated in the 2010 elections and
agreed to an “irrevocable covenant” of term sharing (if they win
2 seats; 2nd nominee to serve 1.5 years and 3rd nominee to
serve 1.5 years). There existed 2 rival factions of COSC; that
of Francisco Datol (3rd Nominee) and Aquiza (incumbent
representative). After serving 1.5 years, 2nd nominee Kho
tendered resignation and Arquiza petitioned with COMELEC to
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have Remedios Arquiza as replacement. COMELEC
dismissed Arquiza’s petition for lack of merit as Kho’s
resignation cant be recognized to create a vacancy and
change tin the order of nominees ruling that the change of
nominees allowed in RA 7941 is only when; nominee dies,
withdraws in writing, or becomes incapacitated. Kho later on
changed his mind and continued with his term. For the 2013
elections, both factions filed intent to participate and the
COMELEC ordered the cancellation for non compliance and
violating election laws through term sharing. The Court ruled
that hearing and due notice are indispensable for COMELEC
before disqualification of candidates – this they did not accord
to COSC. Although the irrevocable covenant is contrary to
election laws and public policy, it was never promulgated nor
actually implemented. Thus, the Court ruled that COMELEC
erred in penalizing COSC as it technically did not violate any
laws. Petition was granted and COMELEC was ordered to
proclaim Senior Citizens among party-list winners.
V. BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
A. Congress
Provision:
Art. VI, Sec. 1 The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision of initiative and referendum.
1. Power, Composition, Qualification, and Term of Office
!
a. Senate
Provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 2 The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters
of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Art. VI, Sec. 3 No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Art. VI, Sec. 4 The term of office of the Senators shall be six
years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
b. House of Representatives
Provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 5 (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
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number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Art. VI, Sec. 5 (2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Art. VI, Sec. 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Art. VI, Sec. 5 (4) Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.
Art. VI, Sec. 6 No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
!
Art. VI, Sec. 7 The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
v Commission on Elections Petitioner’s registration and
accreditation as a party-list organization is cancelled by
COMELEC for its failure to comply with Sec. 8 of RA 7941
(Party-List System Act) that requires party-list organizations to
submit a list of not less than 5 nominees. The fact that a party-
list is entitled to not more than 3 seats in Congress, regardless
of the number of votes it may garner, does not render Sec. 8
of RA 7941 permissive in nature.
Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.
(ARARO) v Commission on Elections Petitioner files an
election protest alleging that COMELEC’s formula for
determining whether a party-list organization gets a seat in
Congress is flawed because ‘spoiled’ votes were not counted .
While the Court ruled that the case is moot and academic
since the terms of the winners who were then proclaimed has
already ended, the Court still discussed the case because it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. The Court agreed
with the petitioner to the extent that votes cast validly for a
party-list group listed in the ballot, but later on disqualified
should be counted as part of the divisor. However, it follows
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that party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known to the
voters prior to the elections should not be included in the
divisor. Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 is clear that only those votes
cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the
computation of the percentage of representation. The formula
in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and
interpreted in the case of Banat v COMELEC is modified as
follows:
# of votes of a party-list group / total # of valid votes for
party-list candidates
= % of votes garnered by the party-list group
Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa v Commission
on Elections
Aquino v COMELEC Petitioner assails COMELEC for
prematurely and (allegedly) erroneously allocating additional
seats to certain party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners
in the 2013 elections. The Court ruled that COMELEC is
authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the
remaining uncanvassed election returns will not affect the
result of the elections. Sec. 233 of the Omnibus Election Code
authorizes the board of canvassers to proclaim winning
candidates in cases of delayed or lost election returns if the
missing returns will not affect the results of the election. In this
case, COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass
reports for party-list. Finally, COMELEC's allocation of
additional seats for party-list in accordance with the Banat
ruling in relation to Art. 11 of RA 7941.
Aquino v COMELEC Petitioner assails COMELEC’s
declaration of his ineligibility and disqualification as
Representative of the new 2nd legislative district of Makati on
!
the ground of lack of residence qualification, thereby making
the suspension of his proclamation as winner final. Firstly, the
Court held that COMELEC has jurisdiction because HRET’s
jurisdiction in accordance to Sec. 17, Art. 6 of the Constitution
is only over the members of the House of Representatives, not
unproclaimed candidates. Second, it held that the petitioner
has failed to provide positive proof and evidence of his
fulfillment of the residency requirement because intention to
lease (his primary evidence being a lease contract) is not the
same as intention to establish a permanent home; obtaining
the highest number of votes will not result to the termination of
the proceedings since evidence of guilt is strong (pursuant to
Sec. 6, RA 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Finally, the Court also held that COMELEC’s Order for the
proclamation of the runner-up as winner is against the Labo
doctrine.
Marcos v COMELEC Petitioner assails COMELEC’s en banc
decision affirming its Division’s declaration of the petitioner’s
disqualification from running for Representative of the 1st
District of Leyte for failing to prove that she met the residency
requirement; even if her original domicile is Tacloban (in
Leyte), she was deemed to have abandoned it in favor of
Manila.. Firstly, the Court held that COMELEC has jurisdiction
because HRET only gains jurisdiction after a candidate had
become a member of the House of Representatives (in this
case, the petitioner is not yet a member because she was not
proclaimed yet, and she has not sworn in yet) (Sec. 17, Art. 6
of the Constitution); in addition, according to Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction
to hear and decide a pending disqualification case even after
the elections. Secondly, the Court held that the petitioner has
not lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of
her marriage with former Pres. Marcos because a wife does
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not automatically gain her husband’s domicile, and in
marriage, she only gained an actual residence or a new home,
not a new domicile. In the absence of clear and positive proof
of change of domicile, the domicile of origin is deemed to
continue.
Torayno v COMELEC Petitioner alleged that private
respondent (Emano) did not meet the residency requirement
to qualify to run for mayor of CDO city; they claim that he
remained a resident of the province of Misamis Oriental
despite him physically residing in CDO city because he
continued to serve as provincial governor of the said province
(note that CDO is NOT part of the province of Misamis Oriental
since it is an independent city). The Court held that Emano
has met the required residence qualification because
provincial officials of Misamis Oriental cannot avoid residing in
CDO since it is where the seat of the provincial government is
located. In addition, there is no law that prevents an elected
official from transferring residence while in office, and no one
challenged Emano’s transfer of residence to CDO.
2. Election
a. Regular election
Art. VI, Sec. 8 Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
b. Special election
Art. VI, Sec. 9 In the case of vacancy in the Senate or in the
House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
!
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Republic Act No. 6645 AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE
MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES
RA No. 6645, Sec. 1 In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at
least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives
at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members
of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a
resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election
to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a
special election by the President of the Senate or by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.
RA No. 6645, Sec. 2 The Commission on Elections shall fix
the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the
date of such resolution or communication, stating among other
things the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however,
that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to
be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
such general election.
Tolentino v COMELEC (2004) Because of sen. Guingona’s
appointment as Vice-President, the Senate issued a
Resolution guiding COMELEC to declare the senatorial
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candidate with the 13th highest number of votes in the next
General Elections to serve Guingona’s unexpired term.
Petitioner is assailing the validity of such special election. The
Court held that the special election is validly held in
accordance with Sec. 1 and 2 of RA 6645 as amended by RA
7166 (“An Act providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations therefor, and for Other Purposes). Though
COMELEC did not state that it would hold a special election
nor give notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate with the 13th highest number of votes and that the
calling of an election is indispensable to an election’s validity,
the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that a special
election be held simultaneously with the next general elections
fixes the date and operates as the call for that election.
3. Organizations and Sessions
a. Election of Officers
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1) The Senate shall elect its President and
the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote
of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary
Santiago v Guingona Petitioners filed a petition of quo
warranto against Sen. Guingona who was chosen as Senate
Minority Floor Leader. They allege that Sen. Tadtad was the
proper Minority Floor Leader since those who did not for Sen.
Fernan who won as Senate President are part of the Minority
(i.e. the petitioners). Firstly, the Court held that it has
jurisdiction based on the Constitution and ruling in Avelino v
!
Castro which defined the court’s power of judicial review
because it involves the interpretation of the Constitution.
Secondly, the Court held that Sec. 16, Art. 6 of the
Constitution does not provide that the members who did not
vote for the winning Senate President shall ipso facto
constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority
leader. It is also silent on the matter of selecting other officers
of the chambers, except for the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House. In addition, there is no law or regulation
that states that the defeated candidate for Senate President
automatically becomes the minority leader. The Senate Rules
on Internal Affairs is also silent regarding “majority” and
“minority,” and thus the Court may not intervene because it is
in the internal matters of the legislature; the legislature must
enact a rule first.
b. Quorum
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such
House may provide.
Avelino v Cuenco Petitioner filed a petition quo warranto
against respondent who was designated as acting Senate
President by Senate Resolutions 67 and 68 . The Court held
that it had no jurisdiction over the election of the Senate
President because the 1935 Constitution grants to the Senate
to power to elect its own president, and thus, such matter is an
internal matter that the Court is not allowed to delve into with
respect to the doctrine of the separation of powers. The Court,
however, held that it does have jurisdiction in light of
subsequent events. Regarding the validity of the said
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Resolutions, the Court held that they were valid because there
was a quorum despite 10 senators walking out (12 remained)
because 1) the minutes said so, 2) there were at least 14
senators in the beginning of the session, and 3) in view of the
absence from the country of Sen. Confesor, 12 senators
constitute a majority. When the 1935 Constitution declared
that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, it
does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the
members present constitute “the House.” Therefore, an
absolute majority (12) of all senators less one (23) constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for purposes of a quorum.
c. Rules of Proceedings
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (3) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
Pacete v Commission on Appointments Petitioner filed a
petition for prohibition against the enforcement of respondent’s
directive for him (petitioner) to vacate his position and
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue him the
Certificate of Confirmation of his appointment. The Court
granted the petition. This is in accordance to Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of the Commission that states, “if a majority of
the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the
appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew,” the
ruling in Altarejos v Molo where the Court held that a mere
filing by a member of the Commission on Appointments to
reconsider the confirmation of an appointment had no effect
without it being duly approved by the Commission as a whole.
and Sec. 10(4), Art. 7 of the 1935 Constitution (applicable
!
because Congress is in recess) wherein ad interim
appointments made by the President take effect at once, as
oppose to Sec. 10(3) (applicable during Congress’ session)
where the President only nominates, and the nominee only
assumes office upon consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
Arroyo v De Venecia Petitioner assails the validity of RA
8240 (an act that amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing certain “sin taxes”)
alleging that its approval was done without following the rules
mandated by the Constitution. The Court held that, according
to local and foreign jurisprudence, it has no jurisdiction to
inquire into allegations that in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals. The Court also held that it
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of
noncompliance Congress did not abuse its discretion in
enacting RA 8240, and thus, the Court cannot declare with the
legislature’s own rules. Finally, the Court held that the Enrolled
Bill Doctrine holds, and the Journal of the House, which notes
the bill that became RA 8240, is conclusive evidence of its
enactment.
d. Discipline of Members
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (3)
Alejandrino v Quezon Petitioner seeks injunction and
mandumus from his 1-year suspension from the Senate due to
his “treacherous assault” claiming that it had no legal basis.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction on the basis of
separation of powers. In addition, Sec. 18 of the Organic Act
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states at either the Senate or the House of Representatives
may “punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member.” The
1935 Constitution, however, is not clear on whether
“punishment” extends to “suspension.”
Osmeña v Pendatun Petitioner, a Congressman, through a
House Resolutio, was suspended from office for 15 months for
serious disorderly behavior on the ground that he refused to
produce evidence to the House Committee created to
investigate the truth of the serious imputations of bribery
against President Garcia he made during a privilege speech.
The Court held that it had no jurisdiction because the House of
Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior of its members and the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Such
facts cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to,
and adjudication by the Court. It also held that while Sec. 15
(now Sec. 11), Art. 6 of the Constitution grants parliamentary
immunity for any speech or debate made in Congress, this
does not prevent him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself, as stated in the clause, “xxx shall not be
questioned in any other place.”
De Venecia v Sandiganbayan Petitioner seeks the
annulment of the Order of Sandiganbayan to implement the
preventive suspension of Cong. Paredes in connection with his
criminal case (violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act) and its resolution that declared the
petitioner, as Speaker of the House, in contempt of court for
not implementing the preventive suspension order. The Court
held that because the suspension provided for in RA 3019 is
mandatory, and is not a penalty, but a precautionary measure,
it is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
!
ranks under Art. VI, Sec. 16 (3) of the Constitution.
Suspension or expulsion in the Constitution is a House-
imposed sanction against its members; it is a penalty for
disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity. The Court
also held that, the doctrine of separation of powers does not
exclude members of Congress from RA 3019. The case is
moot and academic, however, since term of Paredes has
already expired.
Pobre v Defensor-Santiago Petitioner asks for a disbarment
proceeding and other disciplinary actions against the
respondent because in one of her speeches delivered on the
Senate Floor, she insulted the Court, among others, calling it
“the Supreme Court of Idiots.” The Court held that the speech
is covered by parliamentary immunity under Sec. 11, Art. 6 of
the Constitution; she delivered it within her official
parliamentary functions.
Pimentel v Senate Committee of the Whole Petitioner raised
the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole. The Court held that the Constitution
does not require publication of the internal rules of the House
or Senate, unless such rules expressly provide for their
publication before the rules can take effect. In this case,
publication is required because even if the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the
Ethics Committee which had been published before, Sec. 81,
Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
provides that “these Rules shall be effective after publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.”
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e. Journal and Record
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
1. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
According to the Senate website: After both houses
have given final approval to a bill, a final copy of the bill,
known as the “enrolled bill,” shall be printed, and certified
as correct by the Secretary of the Senate and the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives. After
which, it will be signed by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President.
Theory: If a bill was enrolled with its certification by the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both
Houses, the Supreme Court must take this to mean that
the bill indeed underwent the proper lawmaking process.
Casco Chemical Co. v Gimenez Petitioner sought for a
refund of the margin fees it has paid arguing that
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank of the Philippines declared that importation of urea
and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee. This was
denied by the respondent arguing that Sec. 2, par. XVIII of
!
RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde. The Court held
that the the enrolled bill – which uses “urea formaldehyde”
instead of “urea and formaldehyde” – is conclusive upon
the Courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. The Courts
cannot speculate that there had been an error in the
printing of the bill as this violates the principle of separation
of powers.
Philippine Judges Association v Prado Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of RA 7354, specifically sec. 35,
alleging that 1) its title did express its purpose, 2) it did not
pass the required readings in both houses and, 3) that it
was discriminatory and encroaches on the independence
of the judiciary. Court held it did not violate Sec. 26(1), Art
VI of the Constitution because the title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act. It also held
that it did not violate Sec. 26(2), Art VI of the Constitution
because both the enrolled bill and the legislative journal
certify that the measure was duly enacted, and under the
separation of powers, the Supreme Court cannot inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Finally, it held that Sec.35
violates equal protection because it withdraws the franking
privilege from the Judiciary and certain other offices, but
not from the President, Vice President, Senators,
Congressmen, former Presidents, widows of former
Presidents, etc.
2. Probative Value of the Journal
United States v Pons On appeal, respondent raise the
question of the date of adjournment of the legislature to
determine the approval of the Act No. 238, under which the
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respondent must be punished if found guilty of illegal
importation of opium. The Court held that it can take
judicial notice of the journals, and that the adjournment
took place at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after
those of the Federal Government and the various states,
the Court does not hesitate to follow the courts in that
country wherein it is well settled that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a
particular bill became a law or not
3. Matters to be entered in the journal
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4), par. 1
4. Journal Entry Rule v Enrolled Bill Theory
Astorga v Villegas The case involves a controversy about
the passage of HB 9266 which later became RA 4065. The
Court held that Congress’ system of authenticating bill duly
approved by both houses is through the signatures of the
Speaker of the House, the Senate President, and the
Secretaries of both Houses on the printed copy of the
approved bill, but it is not the act of signing that signifies
approval, but both Houses’ approval that is essential. If the
attestation is absent, the courts may resort to the Journals
or other records of Congress for proof of due enactment.
The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the
President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA
4065 or HB 9266, therefore it did not become a law.
Morales v Subido The Petitioner allege that the House Bill
Division deleted an entire provision from the substitute bill
that the Senate Committee on Government Reorganization
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reported, and substituted what is now section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, and thus files the petition to have the
Court assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating
the legislative process. The Court held that it cannot be a
“sleuth” trying to determine what really happened in the
legislative process because it will violate the separation of
powers. It also held that Journals must yield to the enrolled
bill, and the Court cannot decide to what extent the
validity of a legislative act may be affected by a
failure to have certain matters entered on the journal
5. Congressional Record
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4) Par. 2
f. Session
Art. VI, Sec. 15 The Congress shall convene once every year
on the fourth Monday of July for its regular, unless a different
date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for
such number of days as it may determine until thirty days
before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may
call a special session any time.
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (5) Neither House during the sessions of the
Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other place than that which
the two Houses shall be sitting.
1. Regular sessions
2. Special sessions
3. Joint sessions
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* note: these are not in the syllabus/not mentioned by
DanGat. I just did a bit of research and found that these
are the times when Congress convene in joint session
Art. VI, Sec. 23 (1) The Congress, by a votes of two-thirds of
both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war.
Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 4 The returns of every election for
President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate
and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1 xxx Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person
or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President xxx
Art. VII, Sec. 23 The President shall address the Congress at
the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before
it at any other time.
f. Session
!
1. Regular Session
Art 6, Sec 15. The Congress shall convene once every year
on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
2. Special Session
See above provision
3. Joint Session – both houses in one
session.
4. Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications
a. Salaries
Art 6, Sec 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase.
Philconsa v. Mathay Congress enacted RA 4134 and 4642
increasing salaries of Members of the House of Reps and
Senate for the year of 1965-1966. Philconsa assails the
constitutionality of the RA’s on the ground that 8 of the
senators who enacted the bill have terms that will expire on
1969 thus, it violates Art VI, Sec 14 of the 1935 Constitution
(“No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such
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increase.”). Petition granted. Constitution requires that not only
the term of all the members of the House, but also that of all
the Senators who approved the increase must have fully
expire before the increase becomes effective
Ligot v. Mathay RA 4134 (same as previous case) was
enacted during Ligot’s term as Congressman, but he was not
entitled to the salary increase because the 1935 Constitution
provides that this salary increase is not operative until all the
terms of members of Congress who approved the salary
increase have expired. When Ligot retired, RA 4134 became
operative and so he asked for his retirement gratuity to be
computed based on the salary increase. The Court ruled that
the salary increase in RA 4134 only applies to incoming
members of the Congress, not those who are retiring.
b. Freedom from Arrest
Art 6, Sec 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
People v Jalosjos Romeo Jalosjos, a full flegged member of
Congress was confined in the national penitentiary for the
crime of statuatory rape. He asked to be allowed to fully
discharge his duties as Congressman despite his conviction.
He contends that the people he represents are deprived of a
representative in the HoR. The court ruled that Congress
DOES NOT exempt accused and convicted members from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated people.
There is no immunity if crime is punishable with a penalty of
!
more than 6 years and Batasang Pambansa will have to
surrender the member within 24 hours of adjournment
Note: remedy for deprivation of representation Special election
c. Speech and Debate Clause
Art 6, Sec 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Jimenez v Cabangbang Congressman Bartolome
Cabangbang wrote a letter alleging that there are “planners”
who are controlling the petitioners to help fulfill the goal of “an
insidious plan”. The letter was addressed to the President and
was likewise published in several newspapers. Plaintiffs
instituted a libel case against Cabangbang. SC ruled that even
though the letter is not within the purview of “speech or
debate” of Art 6, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution, which
protects the Congressman from suit, the allegation made in
the letter was still insufficient to support the plaintiffs' action as
the letter itself provided the possibility that the plaintiffs are just
“unwitting tools” of the plan of “which they may have absolutely
on knowledge”. The letter was not within the speech and
debate clause because it was not done during session and
was even published in newspapers. The speech and debate
clause covers speech, acts and other forms which are
deliberative and communicative in nature. Requisites: 1) done
while Congress is in session 2) in the discharge of their
legislative functions
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d. Disqualifications
Art 6, Sec 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he
was elected.
Art 6, Sec 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Adaza v. Pacana Adaza and Pacana Jr. filed their certificates
of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa
elections; however, only Adaza won. Pacana Jr. then
succeeded Adaza as governor. Adaza filed a petition claiming
that he is the lawful occupant of both the governor’s office and
member of Batasang Pambasa. However, the Court ruled that
local elective official may NOT hold his position and
simultaneously be a member of Parliament. Court also ruled
that Pacana Jr as V. Governor can succeed Adaza since,
Pacana merely reassumed as VG upon losing. Consequently,
!
he could succeed Adaza pursuant to Sec. 204 of the Local
Government Code.
Note: Sec. 13(2) of BP 697: Governors, mayors, members of
the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing
a certificate of candidacy, shall be considered on forced leave
of absence from office.
Puyat v De Guzman Petitioners seek to reverse the order of
the Associate Commissioner of the SEC granting Estanislao
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747. The
Court held that there was an indirect “appearance as counsel”
before an administrative body by Interim Congressman
Fernandez which violated the Constitution.
Liban v Gordon 1.0 petitioners contend that Dick Gordon
forfeited his seat in Congress after being elected Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors. Court ruled that Gordon didn’t forfeit since PNRC
isn’t a GOCC. However, S1-13 of the Charter is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID since they create the PNRC
to be a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Liban v Gordon 2.0 Gordon & PNRC file a motion for partial
reconsideration of the 2009 case, arguing that the 2009
decision erred in saying that RA 95 (PNRC Charter) was
unconstitutional and void, since it wasn’t raised by the parties
and therefore shouldn’t be arbitrated by the SC. Court ruled
that it’s not exactly a private corporation either – there is merit
in PNRC’s contention that it is sui generis (a class of its own;
unique). The second sentence rendering parts of the PNRC
charter void in the 2009 decision is REMOVED.
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RA 10530 (2013) - AN ACT DEFINING THE USE AND
PROTECTION OF THE RED CROSS, RED CRESCENT, AND
RED CRYSTAL EMBLEMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Note: RA is in syllabus but wasn’t discussed
e. Duty to Disclose
Art 6, Sec 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They
shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of
interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors.
5. Electoral Tribunals
Art 6, Sec 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Art 6, Sec 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
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The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it.
Abbas v SET Abbas suggested the following amendment:
Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of
five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature —- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members
are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and
may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions.Court ruled that the amendment is
unconstitutional. It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to
be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and
“legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative
component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation
in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing
violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
(note: Abbas was suggesting na ok lang if puro justices ang
SET)
Bondoc v Pineda Bondoc is seeking to annul the decision of
the HOR to rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura and
ordering Camasura to continue to discharge his functions of
the HRET. The court granted the petition because the
expulsion of Camasura from the HRET was not for a lawful
and valid cause and violates the constitutional mandate (sec.
17, art 6). HOR is NOT empowered by the Constitution to
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interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
HRET through the ruse of “reorganizing” the representation in
the tribunal of the majority party. SET is independent of the
HoR and disloyalty to a party is not a valid reason for
disqualification. Court also ruled that expulsion of Camasura
violates his right to security of tenure since Members in the
HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as the judiciary
enjoys security of tenure under sec. 2, art 8 of the Constitution
Codilla v De Venecia (2002) Codilla garnered the highest
votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of
Leyte as against Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification
suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of
petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec, petitioner’s
proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that
petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently
disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however
reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s
proclamation as null and void. De Venecia said that they
recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision but Rep.
Locsin said that she will not obey. The Court finds that the
proclamation of Locsin was null and void. COMELEC en banc
has jurisdiction to review validity of proclamation. It is the
HRET who has no jurisdiction because the validity of the
resolution of the COMELEC 2nd div has not be resolved by
the COMELEC en banc. The issue w/in Comelec since the
issue is still not resolved.
Reyes v Comelec Reyes asks w/n COMELEC is has
jurisdiction her who is duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
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the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner
and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are
outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the
HRET exclusive jurisdiction. Court there was no denial of due
process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. Petitioner
has no ground for her qualification to Office, especially with
COMELEC’s cancellation of her CoC before being proclaimed.
After not seeking legal remedy within those 5 days,
COMELEC’s decision became final and executor and thus
averred petitioner’s chances of assuming the office.
Note: Comelec disqualified Reyes for being an American
citizen & falsification of CoC.
Dissent: Evidence was not sufficient it was only a photocopy &
a blog. Majority was in a hurry so case would not reach HRET.
Pimentel v HRET Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two
letters to Senate President Ople and Justice Melo, requesting
them to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
court ruled that the House of Representatives has the power
under the Constitution to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. If party-list
representatives desire to be represented in these bodies, the
primary recourse is the House, not the Court.
Note: There is no unity if Partylist is considered as one block.
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Roces v HRET Case originated on the disqualification of the
Ang Ping’s votes. Roces filed a motion to dismiss protest,
assailing the standing of Mrs. Ang Ping. HRET denied Roces’s
motion to dismiss. Court ruled that normally, COMELEC
resolutions are challenged via petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. In this case, however, Roces himself
submitted the COMELEC resolutions to the HRET as proof
that Zenaida Ang Ping was not a proper party. This allowed
the HRET to review the resolutions. Zenaida was able to
collaterally attack the COMELEC resolutions in the
proceedings in the HRET.
Note: Zenaida Ang Ping was a substitute candidate for
husband, Harry Ang Ping.
6. Commision on Appointments
Art 6, Sec 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall
not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Art 6, Sec 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
!
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it.
Daza v Singson The House revised its representatives in the
COA in accordance with the reorganizing of political parties
(LDP and LP) by withdrawing the seat of Petitioner Daza and
giving it to the newly LDP, respondent Singson. LDP had
already been registered and existing for more than a year and
having 157 members in the House and 6 in the Senate is
enough for it to be considered an eligible pol. party and if
petitioner’s contention be pursued, the members of LDP will be
denied of representation in the COA.
Note: Cunanan v Tan: The Court agreed that Commission
itself was invalidly constituted. It noted that the Allied Majority
was a merely temporary combination as NP members in Allied
Majority are not disaffiliated with NP.
Note: Rule here is different from Bondoc, sir said SC had
different agenda
Coseteng v. Mitra Coseteng and her party, KAIBA (being the
representative thereof) contends that she be appointed as a
member of the Commission on Appointments and House
Electoral Tribunal. Court ruled that KAIBA constitutes only
less than 1% of the House of Membership. Hence, petitioner
cannot contend that she is in fact entitled to one of the 12
seats in the Common on Appointments.
Guingona v. Gonzales Each house must have 12
representatives in the Commission on Appointments, the
parties agreed to use the traditional formula. The results of
such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5
members for NPC, 1.5
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members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-
LABAN. The issue is what to do with the “.5” A party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-
members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in
Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the
parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.
Note: traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x
12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.
Drilon v De Venecia The 2 petitions prayed for the
restructuration of the Commission of Appointments because
there were no representatives for the Liberal Party and the
composition in general was not in accordance with the
Constitutional provision of proportional representation of party
lists. The Court dismissed this petition for being premature
since petitioners did not resort first to the jurisdiction of the
House.
7. Powers of Congress
a. General Plenary Powers
Art 6, Sec 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Sema v Comelec A law (RA 9054) was passed amending
ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to
this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which
!
comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. Court Ruled
that Art. 6 Sec. 19 RA9054 is Unconstitutional because
ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create
are barangays not cities and provinces.
Note: The creation of any of the ff province, city, municipality
or barangay must comply with three conditions.
First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of
the Constitution.
Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Note: Only congress can increase congress therefore creating
legislative districts is only for congress. (Sec 5, Art 6, 1987
Constitution)
Torralba v. Sibagat Petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of BP 56 which creates the Municipality of
Sibagat. They claim that the Local Government Code (LGC)
was not yet enacted when the BP was promulgated yet. Sec 3
Art 11 of 1973 Constitution says that in creating new
municipalities the LGC must be followed. Court ruled that it
was constitutional since LGC is dispensable since constitution
did not say anything about creation of municipalities in
absence of LGC. It is a long-recognized principle that the
power to create a municipal corporation is essentially
legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional
limitations a legislative body may create any corporation (note:
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corporation can be “municipal/public corporation”) it deems
essential for the more efficient administration of government.
7. Powers of Congress
a. General Plenary Powers
Gatmaytan, Method, p. 187
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general
and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged
this power elsewhere. In other words, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest.
Provisions:
Sec. 1, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Sema v COMELEC The ARMM Regional Assembly (ARMM
RA), pursuant to Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 which granted the
ARMM the power to create provinces, enacted MMA Act 201
which created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan (SK). Sema
contests that SK should get a representative by virtue of the
new province created, even though no legislative district was
created. The Court held that Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054,
!
which grants the ARMM RA the power to create provinces and
cities, is void on three instances: 1) only Congress can create
provinces and cities under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI and Sec. 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Also, 2) the creation
of such provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation
of legislative districts. Therefore, the creation of SK by the
ARMM RA and it not having a legislative district is
unconstitutional. Moreover, the ARMM RA 3) cannot enact a
law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of
the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 20, Art. X of the Consti. Thus,
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
For SEMA: Sec. 5(3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one province.
Torralba v Sibagat Petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of BP 56 which created the Municipality of
Sibagat. Under Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Consti, a Local
Government Code must first be enacted to determine the
criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city,
municipality, or barrio. The Court ruled the creation of the
Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative
power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa. It is a long-recognized principle that the
power to create a municipal corporation is essentially
legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional
limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it
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deems essential for the more efficient administration of
government. The absence of an LGC at the time of BP 56 did
not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence
to create municipal corporations. What Sec. 3, Art. XI means is
that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of local government units should conform with the
criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the
enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains
plenary except that the creation of the new local government
unit should be approved by the people concerned in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.
From Prof DG: Congress has the power to create legislative
districts in plenary. (inherent)
b. Limitations on Legislative Power
1. Substantive Limitations
Gatmaytan, Method, pp. 187-203
Judicial Check on Congress
Supermajority Votes – Congress cannot, by its own act, limit
its power to amend or repeal laws. When Congress requires a
higher number of votes to amend a law (e.g. ¾ of each
House), the Supreme Court has the duty to strike down such
act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. Each
House the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote,
provided there is a quorum. The act of one legislature is not
binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.
Irrepealable Laws – these deprive succeeding legislatures of
the power to craft laws appropriate to the current environment.
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The rule is that laws cannot have a provision stating that it is
beyond Congress’ power to repeal it.
Unconstitutional laws – laws can be unconstitutional when it
is beyond the legislative power to enact, or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles, or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution
or its basic principles. The Courts determine whether a law is
constitutional or not. When parts of a law are void while some
are valid, the law can still be enforced unless the parts are so
mutually dependent and connected, that the legislature
intended them as a whole, that the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest.
Fiscal Autonomy of the Supreme Court – By virtue of the
1987 Constitution, Congress does not have the power
anymore to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. For example, Congress
cannot exempt entities from payment of legal fees because it
is proscribed by the Court’s judicial autonomy.
Other Restrictions on Legislation
Riders – a provision that is alien to the subject or purpose of
the bill in which it is incorporated. It is not allowed to prevent
hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation, to avoid surprise or
fraud upon the legislature, and to fairly apprise the people of
the subjects of legislation that are being considered. Sec.
25(2) and Sec 26(1) of Art. VI are provisions against riders.
One subject-one bill rule – the title should be comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where the persons interested are informed
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of the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. (Giron v COMELEC)
Origin of Revenue Bills – From Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, it states that the bills of appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bills, shall originate exclusively from the HoR. It is not the
law, but the revenue bill, which is required by the Constitution
to originate in the HoR. (Tolentino v Sec. of Finance)
No Amendment Rule – From Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, when a
House passes its own version of a bill, it cannot introduce any
amendment on the 3rd reading. This, however, does not
prevent changes to be made once the bill reaches the
Bicameral Conference Committee.
Uniform, Equitable and Progressive System of Taxation –
From Sec. 28(1), Art. VI, equality and uniformity of taxation
means that all taxable articles or property of the same class
must be taxed at the same rate. To satisfy this requirement, it
is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in a similar situation.
(Tolentino v Sec. of Finance)
Appellate Jurisdiction of the SC – From Sec. 30, Art. VI,
Congress should have the advice and consent of the SC when
it passes a law increasing its appellate jurisdiction. (Fabian v
Desierto)
Legislative vetoes – once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete.
The legislative function may go back to Congress only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but
certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR.
Any provision of law that empowers Congress or its members
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to play any role in the implementation of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is unconstitutional.
(Abakada Guro Party-List v Purisima)
2. Procedural Limitations
ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima RA 9335 was
enacted to optimize revenue generation of the BIR and BOC.
Art. 12 of RA 9335 prescribe a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC), composed of members of Congress, to
approve the IRR formulated by the agencies concerned.
Petitioners assail this as an alleged encroachment on the
executive function of “implementing and enforcing the law” by
the Congress. While the issue is moot and academic for the
IRR was approved in 2006, the Court held that any provision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and should be
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of
a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional,
as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the
executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
From Prof. DG. – Congress cannot implement its own laws.
8. Legislative Process
a. Requirements as to Bills
1. Titles of bills
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Provisions:
Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Lidasan v COMELEC RA 4790 created the Municipality of
Dianaton in Lanao del Sur, which also covered 12 barrios
already located in Cotabato. COMELEC issued a resolution
which recognized RA 4790 pursuant to the 1967 elections and
stood by their decision to do so, even if the President ordered
them to suspend the resolution until clarified by correcting
legislation. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of Cotabato,
sought to declare the COMELEC resolution and RA 4790 as
unconstitutional. The Court held that the title of RA 4790 is
misleading and was not sufficient to inform the interested
parties (Congress and those from Cotabato who will be part of
Lanao del Sur) of the real intent of the bill. While the title need
not be an index of all the contents of the law, RA 4790 still
violated Sec. 26 (1), Art. VI.
Cruz v Paras Ordinance 84 of Bocaue, pursuant to RA 938,
prohibited the issuance of license and permits to night club
operators, and also the prohibition of renewal of such licenses.
Petitioners assailed this as unconstitutional as municipalities
are only allowed to regulate businesses, and not prohibit them.
Upon closer inspection, the title of RA 938 only says “regulate”
while in the content of the law, it was amended to include
“regulate and prohibit”. The Court held that RA 938 should be
construed to mean only to “regulate”, as it is mentioned in the
title, for it to remain constitutional. The capacity of
Municipalities which are limited to regulation is also supported
in certain provisions of the Local Government Code.
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Giron vs COMELEC Petitioners assail Sec. 12 and Sec. 14 of
the Fair Elections Act for violating Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, of
the1987 Constitution. They argue that such sections are
unrelated to the main subject of lifting the political ad ban. The
Court held that RA 9006’s title and objectives are
comprehensive enough to include subjects aside from lifting
the ban on media use for election propaganda. Records of
Congress also show that the law was not limited to lifting the
ban, but it was fashioned to address all unfair election
practices.
2. Requirements as to certain laws
a. Appropriation Laws
Provisions:
Sec. 24, Art. VI.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Sec. 25, Art. VI
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by
law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
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enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation
to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may
be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed
by the Congress.
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Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Demetria v Allba Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of Sec. 44(1) of PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree, which
states that the President has the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive in the GAA to ANY program, project,
or activity of ANY department in the GAA. The Court held that
this provision unduly extended the power of the Executive by
allowing him to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard
as to WoN they are actually savings and WoN they will be
used for augmentation, which is what is stated in Sec. 16(5),
Art. VIII, 1973 Consti (now under Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI, 1987
Consti).
Guingona vs Carague Petitioners question the
constitutionality of automatic appropriation for debt service in
the 1990 budget. In the budget, debt service had a higher
allocation than that of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, which for the petitioners, violates Sec. 5(5), Art.
XIV of the 1987 Constitution. The Court held that while there is
a mandate to give education the highest budgetary priority, it
does not deprive Congress of its power to respond to needs of
national interest and other state policies and interests.
For Guingona: Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to
education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
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Philconsa v Enriquez Petitioners assail the veto of the
President on certain provisions in the GAA of 1994.
On the issue of the Countrywide Development Fund,
petitioners assert that this was an encroachment on the
Executive Power for it gave Congress the power to propose
and identify projects to be funded by the CDF. The Court
ruled, however, that Congress only recommends, and that it is
an imaginary claim that Congress directly identifies and
proposes projects that are to be funded.
On the issue of realignment of operating expenses which
allowed individual members of congress to realign certain
allocations, the Court held that this does not violate Sec. 25(5),
Art. VI since members of Congress only determine the
necessity of realignment, which is still subject to the approval
of the Senate President and Speaker.
On the veto of the provision on debt ceiling, petitioners argue
that the President cannot veto the Special Provision without
vetoing the amount for said purpose. The SolGen countered
that the special provision did not relate to the item of
appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the
subject of an item veto. The Court ruled that the GAA is not
the place to introduce amendments to existing budget laws.
Inappropriate provisions such as this should then be regarded
as “items”, which could now be vetoed by the President under
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI.
LAMP v Secretary of Budget Petitioners assail the GAA of
2004, arguing that DBM illegally made and directly released
budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual
members of Congress. They argued that Congress does not
have the power to propose, select, and identify projects to be
funded by the PDAF. The Court ruled that DBM only lays down
the guidelines for disbursement, after which Congress is
requested by the President to recommend projects and
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programs to be funded under PDAF, which is subject to
evaluation and review. Congress, therefore, only recommends.
The PDAF enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and
surmises and conjectures that the PDAF is used illegally are
not sufficient bases to strike down PDAF as unconstitutional.
Belgica v Executive The NBI probe, which investigated the
issue that PDAF has been used for ghost projects and dummy
NGOs, led to the review of the existing entire PDAF system.
The Court held that the PDAF violates various constitutional
principles including:
Principle of separation of powers – since it is tantamount to
participating in the various operational aspects of budgeting.
The prohibition for Congress in implementing their own laws
extends to the “recommending” that they do in identifying
projects under PDAF. The role of Congress stops upon
enactment of a law;
Principle of non-delegability of legislative power – since it
allows individual legislators to exercise the power of
appropriation;
Checks and Balances – items in the PDAF are not subject to
veto since they are made after the GAA has passed. The
President is now forced to accept the entire allocation as a
whole devoid of any specifics or to reject it as a whole to the
detriment of other legislators.
Prof. DG: The Court finally struck down the PDAF system,
which it failed to do under Philconsa and LAMP, since there
was finally public clamor to do so.
Araullo v Aquino Senator Estrada delivered a privilege
speech which revealed the DAP system. In response, the
DBM secretary explained that this was not unconstitutional,
since the funds were sourced from savings derived from the
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pooling of unreleased appropriations and withdrawal of
unobligated allotments that had been released to agencies of
the National Government. The Court held that the DAP
contravened Sec. 25(5), Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution
because what the Executive determined as savings were
contrary to what was prescribed in the GAA, which stated that
savings only exist when funds allocated for a specific purpose
have been already satisfied or the need for such funds have
ceased to exist. Also, it was shown in the evidence that
savings pooled under DAP were allocated to items not
covered by any appropriation in the GAA. While the President
has discretion in implementing the budget, this does not
translate to an unfettered discretion that allowed the President
to substitute his own will for that of Congress. Since DAP also
transferred funds to the COA and HoR, which are not under
the President’s offices, it is considered a cross-border
transaction and is prohibited under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI.
Pichay v Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
Petitioner assails that the President exceeded his powers
when he abolished the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and
transferred its functions to the IAD-ODESLA, and in doing so
usurped the power of the legislature to appropriate funds by
appropriating the funds from PAGC to ODESLA. The Court
held that the reorganization was a valid exercise of his power
as both offices are within the Office of the President, and thus
valid under EO 292. The Court also ruled that while there may
be no specific funds earmarked for IAD-ODESLA, the
President is allowed to source the fund from his own budget,
as allowed by Sec. 25(5), Art. VI.
Nazareth v Villar Congress enacted RA 8439, which grants
Magna Carta benefits, funds for which are to be appropriated
by the GAA of the year following the enactment of RA 8439.
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DOST released the Magna Carta benefits even though no
funds were appropriated in the GAAs for it. They requested
authorization from Exec. Sec. Zamora to use DOST’s savings
for the benefits, which was granted to them. However, they
construed such letter to also cover future GAAs as well. The
Court held that Zamora’s letter is not a blanket authority from
the OP to continually use the DOST savings for the MC
benefits. Sec. 29(1), Art. VI and Sec. 20 of RA 8439 states that
there should be an appropriation purposefully, deliberately and
precisely for that purpose in the GAA. DOST should propose
the MC benefits in the GAA, since the GAA did not mirror
every provision of RA 8439 that referred to it as the source of
funding. Otherwise, the use of DOST savings without an item
or provision in the GAA is illegal.
b. Tax Laws
Provisions:
Sec. 28, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.
(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
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(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government
Tolentino v Secretary of Finance RA 7713 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. It was assailed its constitutionality on various grounds,
which include:
Violation of Sec 24, Art. VI – the Court held that what the
Constitution requires is the bill, not the law, which shall
originate exclusively from the HoR. To insist that the law itself
should only come from the HoR would be a violation of the
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Senate’s power to concur with or propose amendments in the
said provision.
Violated Sec. 26(2), Art. VI – The Court held that since the bill
was certified as urgent by the President, Congress could do
away with the separate days reading and printing requirement
in the provision.
Violated Sec. 28(1), Art. VI – RA 7713 is equitable since it
actually distributes the tax burden as to many goods and
services as possible particularly to those which are within the
reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic
goods and services. Also, petitioners lacked empirical data to
base their conclusion that VAT is regressive. Sec. 28(1) is only
a directive to Congress. It is a moral incentive to legislation,
and cannot be judicially enforceable as a right.
Lung Center v Quezon City Lung Center of the Philippines, a
non-stock and non-profit entity, was assessed real property
taxes in 1993. It argued that it was exempted from paying real
property taxes because it was a charitable institution under
Sec. 28(3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution. The Court held that the
provision cited covers property taxes only, which exempted
lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes, and not the institution itself. Also, for it to be
exempt, the property should be actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes. The
Court ruled that those lands leased by LCP to private entities
were not exempted.
Tan v Del Rosario The Court ruled on 2 cases assailing RA
7496 for violating various provisions, including the principle of
taxation in Sec. 28(1). They argue that RA 7496 desecrates
the constitutional requirement that taxation “shall be uniform
and equitable” in that the law would now attempt to tax single
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proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it
imposes tax on corporations and partnerships. The Court
held that the law did not alter, but confirmed the standing rule
that partners themselves, not the general professional
partnerships, are liable for the payment of income tax in their
individual capacity. There is no evident intention in the law to
place in unequal footing those who practice individually and
those who do through a general professional partnership.
Therefore, RA 7496 is constitutional.
Garcia v Executive Secretary Petitioners assail EOs 475 &
478, issued by the President, which increased tariff rates for
crude oil and other products. They argue that the EOs violated
Sec. 24, Art. VI of the Constitution, which states that
appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills should come from the
legislature. The Court held that while there is a prescription
laid out in Sec. 24, Sec. 28(2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution
gives Congress, through legislation, the power to authorize the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imports within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government. In this case, the Tariff and Customs Code,
specifically Sec. 104 and 401, is the law which authorizes the
President to exercise such powers, which he duly invoked
when issuing EOs 475 and 478. Therefore, the
aforementioned EOs are not unconstitutional.
John Hay PAC v Lim The BCDA act of 1992, RA 7227, set
out the policy of the government to accelerate the conversion
of former military bases for alternative uses. Through this, the
President was given authority to create through executive
proclamations, subject to the concurrence of local government
units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones aside
from Subic. Petitioners assail this as unconstitutional since the
!
President would be exercising powers that are granted only to
Congress. The Court held that RA 7227 limited the privileges
to the Subic SEZ only. Since the privileges given to an SEZ
created by the President have the same nature as a tax
exemption, it encroaches on Congress’ powers because only
Congress should have the sole power to exempt any person or
class of property from taxation, as stated in Sec. 28 (4), Art. VI
of the 1987 Constitution. If tax exemption were the intent of
Congress, it should have been expressly stated in the law. The
intent not to include other SEZs is also supported in the
Senate deliberations.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
(Sec 30, Art 6)
Fabian v Desierto (1998) RA 7610 authorizes an appeal to
the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman.
However, under Sec 30, Art 6, the Supreme Court only has
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of orders of lower
courts (which does not include quasi-judicial agencies or high
Constitutional bodies like Ombudsman). HELD: RA 7610
violates the prohibition in Sec 30, Art 6 against the increasing
of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
advice and consent.
Reason for Sec 30, Art 6: To prevent burdening the Supreme
Court with too much workload. Besides, changes in the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court would require an actual
amendment to the Constitution.
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PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS
Tolentino v Secretary of Finance (1994) RA 7716
(Expanded Value-Added Tax Law) is being questioned for a
number of procedural infirmities:
1. Petitioners contend that it is a tariff bill that resulted
from a consolidation of 2 bills and, therefore, did not
originate from the HoR as required under Sec 24, Art 6.
HELD: It’s the revenue bill (NOT the law) that must
originate from the HoR. This revenue bill is later
passed to the Senate and may undergo extensive
changes. It’s just the initiative for filing bill that must
come from the HoR because it is the HoR that knows
more about local needs & problems.
2. The President’s certification of the bill as urgent can
dispense with requirements in Sec 26(2), Art 6: (a)
printing in final form and distributed 3 days before
approval, and (b) passing reading of bill on 3 separate
days. Petitioners contend that this certification may
only be made for emergencies/calamities, and that in
this case, there was no emergency. However, this
should elicit a standard of review different from the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
3. Petitioners contend that the Constitutional Commission
acted as a 3rd legislative chamber when it made its
amendments to the bills of the Senate and the HoR.
HELD: NO! When there are conflicting provisions in the
Senate & HoR versions of the bill, or disagreements
between the 2 chambers, the Constitutional
Commission will settle them. It can propose
amendments as long as these are germane to the
subject matter of the bill. This doesn’t make the
Constitutional Commission a 3rd legislative chamber.
Besides, the Constitutional Commision’s version is not
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yet final because it still has to be approved by both
Houses.
4. Petitioners say that Sec 26(2), Art 6 requires that the
Constitutional Commission’s report must undergo
separate readings in the 2 houses of Congress. HELD:
This requirement is only for bills introduced for the first
time in either house, and does not include the
Constitutional Commission’s reports.
Gonzales v Macaraig (1990) The President vetoed items in
the GAB of 1989 under his line-veto power in Sec 27(2), Art 6.
In appropriation bills, he is only allowed to veto items or
inappropriate provisions (that will be treated as items) that are
distinct and severable parts. He is not allowed to veto a part of
an item and approve the other part.
NOTE: Items or provisions are those that refer to particular
budgetary appropriations.
NOTE: Sec 27(1), Art 6 refers to the President’s general veto
power, wherein he can only opt to either accept the entire bill
or veto the entire bill.
DanGat: If you disagree with the President, you can’t go to the
SC because the SC would end up telling both branches
(executive and legislative) which law to pass. This would
violate the separation of powers because the President (in
vetoing items) is acting in his own discretion.
Bengzon v Drilon (1992) The retirement pensions of retired
SC and CA justices were removed because they were vetoed
by the President under his veto power in Sec 27, Art 6.
However, this veto power is not absolute because in tariff or
appropriation bills, the President is only allowed to veto items
and not provisions. He also cannot set aside or reverse final
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and executory judgment of the SC through vetoes. Also, the
vetoes of the President in this case violated the fiscal
autonomy of SC (Sec 3, Art 8) because the President is
basically telling the judiciary how it should utilize its funds.
Miller v Mardo (1961) The validity of the Reorganization Plan
# 20-A was challenged because it gave the Regional Offices of
Department of Labor jurisdiction to decide on labor money
claims when it cannot. Petitioners say that its draft was non-
disapproved by Congress (meaning the Congress adjourned
without either approving or disapproving it) and so it cured the
defect in giving DOL quasi-judicial functions. BUT IT
DOESN’T. In fact, it violates Sec 26 (2) and Sec 27 (1), which
requires positive and separate actions by each house of
Congress. A law does not become a law simply because of the
non-action of Congress.
Reason: If non-action is deemed as passing the bill into law,
then it would dispense with the “passage” of measure. It would
overturn democratic processes because then the President
would just propose legislative action by an action taken by
Congress.
Kida v Senate (2011) – Petitioners assail the validity of RA
10153 (which postponed the ARMM elections so that it can
coincide with regular local and national elections) because it
has not undergone 3 separate readings as required by Sec 26
(2), Art 6. However, there is an exception to the requirement of
3 separate readings and that is the certification of the
President of the bill as urgent. Petitioners say that the
certification of the bill as urgent is not valid because there is no
calamity or emergency, but the Court held that this should
elicit a different standard of review from the writ of habeas
!
corpus (because the reasons for issuing writ of habeas corpus
are subject to judicial review).
BUT the Court also noted that despite this, the Congress
should still follow the reading requirement in order to (1) inform
our legislators of matters they will rule on, and (2) give notice
that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
Tanada v Tuvera (1985) and (1986) Publication is mandatory
for all laws, and not just laws that are of general applicability.
Laws that should be published: those that are directly
applicable to one person but may affect public interest, PDs &
EOs, and administrative rules and regulations if purpose is to
enforce/implement the law. There is no need to publish:
interpretative regulations, internal rules and regulations, and
LOIs of administrative superiors to subordinates.
EO 200 (1987) – amended Art 2 of the Civil Code, which
requires laws to be published not only in the Official Gazette
but in a newspaper of general circulation as well.
QUESTION HOUR (Sec 22, Art 6)
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION (Sec 21, Art 6)
Arnault v Nazareno (1950) The Senate conducted an
investigation on a sale made by non-resident American Ernest
Burt to the Philippine Government. They found that Burt’s
lawyer, Arnault, withdrew from Burt’s account to pay a certain
amount of P440k. Arnault didn’t want to reveal the recipient of
the 440k so he was cited in contempt. The Court held that
although the Senate’s power to cite persons in contempt is not
found in the Constitution, it is incidental to its legislative
function. The investigating committee has power to compel a
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witness to answer any question pertinent to an inquiry, but
only if it has direct relation to the subject of inquiry.
Reason for its power to punish for contempt: It has power to
remove any obstruction that interferes with its power to
perform its legislative function.
The Court also held that because the Senate is a continuing
body, its power of contempt is also a continuing power, which
only ends at the termination of the existence of Congress. It
does not matter if this power is exercised when the Congress
is in session or in recess because the Constitution does not
put any time limit as when the Senate can exercise it.
Arnault v Balagtas (1955) This is a continuation of the
preceding case. Arnault finally revealed the name of the
recipient of the P440k. However, the Senate Special
Committee found that the facts that Arnault made in his
statement were false, and so he was ordered to be confined
until he purged himself of contempt. HELD: The Court ruled
that the COFI can’t review means used by the legislative
(particularly the Senate Special Committee) in achieving a
legislative purpose UNLESS the decision of the Senate is
arbitrary, or violates Constitutional rights of a citizen, or there
is grave abuse of discretion.
In Re Sabio (2006) Senate Resolution 455 directed an inquiry
to investigate anomalous losses incurred by 3 GOCCs. PCGG
Chairman Sabio refused to attend the deliberations on Senate
Resoluton 455 because of Sec 4(b) of EO 1: “No member/staff
of PCGG shall be required to testify/produce evidence in any
judicial/legislative/administrative proceedings concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” HELD: Sec 4(b) of EO 1
was already repealed because it was inconsistent with the
!
Constitution, particularly Sec 28, Art 2 (policy of full disclosure)
and Sec 7, Art 3 (right to public information).
How it violates Sec 28, Art 2: It obstructs Congress’s power to
secure from PCGG members and staff information and other
data in aid of its power to legislate.
How it violates Sec 7, Art 3: It violates the right of the citizenry
to be informed. They need to be informed so that they can
participate in decision-making, and so that the government can
respond to their will.
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991) The
SBRC conducted an investigation after Sen. Enrile’s speech,
which revealed that Ricardo Lopa (brother in law of Aquino)
took over the Romualdez companies after the EDSA
Revolution. The Court ruled that the very speech of Enrile
showed that the inquiry was not done in aid of legislation. The
investigations of the Congress must be related to a legitimate
task of the Congress, and NOT merely to “punish” those who
are being investigated.
Senate of the Philippines v Ermita (2006) The Senate
invited Executive branch officials to appear as resource
persons in a public hearing regarding the North Rail Project.
These officials refused because of
EO 464, which says they cannot attend any public hearings
without the President’s consent. HELD: EO 464 is partly
unconstitutional because it violates the Congress’s power of
inquiry, which is an essential function of the legislative to get
necessary information to be able to legislate wisely and
effectively. The following provisions were found to be
unconstitutional:
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• Sec 2(b): Because it enumerates the specific officials
that are covered by executive privilege. However,
executive privilege should be based on the possession
of information, not their position.
• Sec 3: Because it allows exemption without specifying
which kind of executive privilege the information falls
under. Executive privilege should only be invoked
based on the nature of the information being withheld.
The Court also ruled that it is only the President who can
invoke executive privilege, and not his subordinates.
Gudani v Senga (2006) 2 AFP officials appeared to testify
before the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security despite the order of their superior, General Senga,
not to go. HELD: The military must obey the lawful orders of
their superiors irrespective of their personal views. The
President as Commander-in-chief may prevent AFP members
from testifying before a legislative inquiry, but he may still be
compelled by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
AFP members. This is because the President’s Commander-
in-chief powers are not the same as Presidential authority in
that it does not have the same degree of restrictions and
limitations as that which may attach to executive privilege.
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (2008) During an investigation by
the SCAPOI on the National Broadband Project, Neri (a
member of the Office of the President) refused to answer 3
questions on the ground of executive privilege, saying it might
impair the Philippine’s diplomatic & economic relations with
China. The important points the Court made:
• The Congress can only make inquiries that are related
to law-making. It must be proven that the answers to
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their questions are critical to their performance of their
legislative function.
• The presumption of executive privilege can only be
overturned by how critical the information is to the
discharge of a branch of its functions.
• Diplomatic negotiations must be kept confidential
because (1) it would be difficult and more time-
consuming if there are too many suggestions by
different people, and (2) it would make diplomats
uncomfortable airing their ideas and suggestions to the
public.
• Although the Senate is a continuing body, the Senate
NOW is different from the Senate BEFORE. This is
why it is important that the Senate publishes its rules
again in as far as substantive rights are concerned. In
the conduct of legislative inquiries, rights of witnesses
and other persons shall be respected (as a requirement
of due process).
Garcillano v The HoR Committee on Public Information
(2008) The HoR Committee conducted an investigation on the
Hello Garci Scandal, where recorded tapes of President
Arroyo’s conversation with COMELEC Commissioner
Garcillano about the manipulation of the 2004 election results
in her favour were released. The Court held that the HoR
Committee cannot continue with the legislative inquiry until it
fulfils the requirement of having duly published rules in Sec 21,
Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Although the Senate is a
continuing body, it must publish its rules on legislative inquiry
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Publishing it on the internet does not comply with this
requirement.
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AKBAYAN v Aquino (2008) The petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the Executive branch to release the full
text of the Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership agreement.
However, the Executive branch said the text must be kept
confidential because it is still under negotiation, and is covered
by executive privilege. HELD: Executive privilege can also be
invoked in other forums aside from legislative inquiry, such as
diplomatic relations. Diplomatic negotiations are kept
confidential to encourage frank exchange of ideas by
protecting it from public view. Disclosing this exchange of
ideas might make diplomatic representatives uncomfortable,
and discourage them from expressing their own views.
9. Other Powers:
a. Act as board of Canvassers for Presidential Elections
Pimentel vs Congress Sen. Pimentel wanted SC to declare
null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee to
canvass the votes for Pres and VP, since Congress had
already adjourned its last regular session. SC dismissed the
petition because Congress’ adjournment did not affect its non-
legislative functions. It is in fact constitutionally-mandated
(Sec. 4, Art. 7) to canvass the votes and proclaim the
President/Vice-President, and the Joint Committee cannot
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished these.
b. Call a Special Election for Presidency
Provision:
Sec. 10, Art. VII
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
!
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its
approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for
the special election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called
if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date
of the next presidential election.
c. Decide on Disability of the President
d. Legislative Veto or Extension for Suspension of
Writ of Habeas Corpus or Declaration of Martial Law
e. Presidential Amnesties
f. Concur in Treaties
Provision:
Sec. 21, Art. VII
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Petitioners file a petition for
mandamus seeking to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the DFA to transmit the signed copy of the
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Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) to the Senate for concurrence. The Court held that the
interpretation of the petitioners of the provision to mean that
ratification is with the Senate is misplaced. Ratification and
signature are two different steps in treaty-making. E.O. 459
issued by then-President Ramos states that after the treaty
has been signed by the Philippine representative, it shall be
transmitted to the DFA which shall then forward it to the
President for ratification. After this step, the DFA shall only
then transmit it to the Senate for concurrence. Petitioners’
argument about the Philippines being bound to ratify a treaty
which it has signed is without basis as it is ratification that
binds the state to the provisions thereof which the Rome
Statute explicitly states. A treaty that is signed by a state’s
delegated official/representative is not required to be ratified.
Since the Senate’s power is limited only to giving or
withholding consent/concurrence to the ratification, the
President has the discretion to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate, or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. The Court has no jurisdiction therefore to
enjoin the President in the performance of his/her official
duties.
Bayan Muna vs Romulo The Non-Surrender Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America was concluded by Exchange of Diplomatic Notes.
The Court said that an exchange of notes was a form of
executive agreement; this exchange was accepted
internationally as a form of legally binding international
agreement. In the United Nations Treaty Collections, an
exchange of notes was considered a frequently resorted to
!
measure as no legislative approval was needed in that form of
agreement. The Court distinguished between both forms of
international agreements, treaties and executive agreements,
where the former requires legislative concurrence and the
latter does not. Regarding the Agreement, the Court said that
the President validly entered into it.
g. Declaration of Existence of War
h. Delegation of Emergency Powers
Sec. 23, Art. VI
(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
i. Utilization of Natural Resources
Provision:
Sec. 2, Art. XII
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-
workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
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The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
j. Amendment of Constitution
Provisions:
Sec. 32, Art. VII
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereof.
Sec. 1, Art. XII
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
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(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2, Art. XII
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
Sec. 3, Art. XII
The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such
a convention.
k. Power of Impeachment
Provision:
Sec. 3, Art. XI
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
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three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment, according to law.
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(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Gutierrez vs The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions
which found 2 impeachment complaints against the petitioner,
simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice,
sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she was
denied due process and that the said resolutions violated the
one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for
impeachable officers. The Courth held that it is justiciable. and
Francisco case states that the term "initiate" means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. From the records of the
Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that
the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint. “With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints
filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the
same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE
CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle
starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle
the candle.” Thus, it is covered by the one-year bar rule.
Petition dismissed.
Chief Justice Corona vs Senate Former Chief Justice
Corona filed the present petition assailing the impeachment
case initiated against him for being constitutionally infirm and
lacking probable cause. Charges also constitute neither
allegations in law nor facts, being premised on allegations.
Court ruled against the petitioner. The impeachment trial had
been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. He
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immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is
already in the process of screening applicants and nominees,
and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a
new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably,
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted
by supervening events and his own acts.
B. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. The President
a. Qualifications, Election, Term, and Oath
Provisions:
Sec. 2, Art. VII: Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least 40 years old
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years prior to the
elections
Sec. 4, Art. VII: Election and Term:
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the
day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six
years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
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No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination
of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
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Sec. 7, Art. VII: Term:
The President-elect and Vice President-elect shall assume
office at the beginning of their terms.
Sec. 5, Art. VII: Oath:
Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice President, or the Acting President shall
take the ff, oath or affirmation:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help
me God.
Pormento vs Estrada President Estrada, who was
impeached through People Power in 2001, sought reelection
during the May 2010 presidential elections. Petitioner asks
whether Estrada is covered by Sec. 4, Art. VII of the
Constitution, which provides that the President may not be
reelected for a second term. The Court ruled that the petition
must be dismissed because Estrada did not win and therefore
the case is already moot and academic.
b. Privileges and Salary
Provisions:
Sec. 6, Art. VII: The President shall have an official residence.
The salary of the President and Vice President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
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their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any
other source.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan The Republic of the Philippines
was trying to secure the forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten Marcos
wealth -- previously stashed in Swiss Bank accounts but held
in escrow by PNB, valued at $658M -- in its favor. The main
issue is whether there existed sufficient grounds for the
forfeiture of the contested property, pursuant to RA 1379
(specifically Secs. 2 & 6 therein). Court held that the two
grounds to justify forfeiture existed: (1) sufficient wealth was
acquired during incumbency of public official, and (2) said
wealth was grossly disproportionate to public official’s
legitimate income. During the same period that the contested
wealth had been collected by the Marcoses, the legitimate
income of the Marcos spouses only amounted to $304K.
Through the proceedings, Imelda and her family recorded
judicial admission that the properties in question were theirs.
Besides, although the Marcoses asserted that they legitimately
acquired the said properties, they failed to provide sufficient
evidence to back their claims.
Marcos Jr. vs Republic After the decision in Republic vs
Sandiganbayan, petitioners seek reconsideration of their
petition’s denial. Court ruled that proceedings for forfeiture of
properties in a single suit may proceed separately for each
property, and the Sandiganbayan need not acquire territorial
jurisdiction over the proceeds of a foreign-registered dummy
registered to contravene anti-graft laws to enforce its
decisions.
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c. Succession
1. In case of vacancy at the beginning of the
term
Provision:
Sec. 7, Art. VII.
The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume
office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-
elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been
chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died
or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate
or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which
one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
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2. In case of vacancy during the term
Provision:
Sec. 8, Art. VII.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become
the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President
or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
Sec. 10, Art VII.
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its
approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for
the special election shall be charged against any current
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appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called
if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date
of the next presidential election.
3. In case of temporary disability
Provision:
Sec. 11, Art VII. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
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shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Estrada vs Arroyo In this petition for quo warranto, Estrada
contests Arroyo’s occupancy of the office of the president. He
claims that he is merely unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and that respondent is holding the position only in an
acting capacity. Court ruled that resignation must be coupled
with intent to the resign and acts of relinquishment. In the
instant case, the Court found both, and therefore deemed
Estrada to have resigned. These were found in the contents of
the Angara Diary (proposal for a snap election where Estrada
would not be a candidate, his thoughts regarding the 5-day
grace period he could stay in the palace, no defiance to the
request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, “Ayoko na”
as a word of resignation), press release containing petitioner’s
final statement. Moreover, they rejected the claim that he is
only unable to discharge the functions of his office, since by
virute of the Congress’s recognition of Arroyo as president,
they have clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Court
also held that he can already be prosecuted, even if he was
not convicted in the impeachment proceedings. When
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against the President.
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d. Removal
e. Prohibitions
Sec. 13, Art. VII
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
f. Exceptions to Prohibition from Holding Another
Office
Provisions:
Sec. 3, Par. 2, Art. VII
The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment needs no confirmation.
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Sec. 8, Par. 1, Art. VIII
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of EO 284, which allows members
of Cabinet, their undersecretaries and deputies, to hold
additional governmental offices during their tenure. The Court
ruled that the constitutional prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VII is
clear and unambiguous. The only exceptions allowed are
provided in Sec. 3, Par. 2, Art. VII and Sec. 8, Par. 1, Art. VIII,
as regards the Vice President and the DOJ Secretary,
respectively. Since EO 284 is repugnant to these provisions, it
must be struck down as unconstitutional. However, they held
that ex-officio posts, or those which are by virtue of or a
consequence of the office, are not included in such prohibition.
Moreover, officers who received emoluments from their
second position under EO 284 are not required to return such
to the government.
Cruz vs COA Petitioners in this case were members of Board
of Directors of NHA as alternates of their heads. COA issued a
memo directing the aforementioned heads to disallow
compensation given to the petitioners by virtue of their
positions as alternates, as well as to refund the same to the
government. Instant petition assails the disallowance ordered
by the memo. The Court ruled against the petitioners. PD 757
which created NHA provides that the following will sit in the
NHA Board: DPWH Sec, DOTC Sec, NEDA Director General,
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Finance Sec, NHA General Manager. While the petitioners are
not among those officers, however, they are “alternates”
alternates of the said officers “whose acts shall be considered
the acts of their principals”. The Court already rules in Civil
Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
that Cabinet secretaries up to the assistant secretary level
may not receive additional compensation for their ex officio
positions for them not to violate the prohibition on multiple
positions. Since the said department secretaries cannot
receive additional compensation for their ex officio
membership in the NHA Board, it follows that the petitioners
who are their alterns cannot likewise be entitled to such
compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better
right than their principals.
National Amnesty Commission vs COA After personally
attending the initial meetings, the 3 ex-officio members of the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC) turned over their
responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria.
NAC auditor disallowed such payment through COA
Memorandum 97-038. However, NAC eventually passed
Admin. Order No.2, which states that ex-officio members may
designate their representatives to the Commission, and that
shall be entitled to per diems, allowances authorized by law.
The Court ruled that the representatives may not be entitled to
receive honoraria. This is because there is no law or
administrative order creating a new office or position and
authorizing additional compensation therefore. The
representatives assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of
a new appointment, but by mere designation from the ex-
officio members, who themselves were also designated as
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such. The Court also differentiated between an appointment
and a designation, stating that appointment is the selection by
the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office; while a designation
merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of
additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to
receive the salary of the position. Furthermore, the
representatives cannot be considered de facto officers
because they were not appointed, but only designated. Also,
since the 3 ex-officio members were also only designated,
they are not entitled to honoraria either. It would not make
sense for their representatives to receive emoluments, while
they themselves did not.
2. Powers and Functions of the President
a. Executive Power
Sec. 1, Art. VII
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Marcos vs Manglapus After their spending 3 years in exile,
Former President Marcos expressed his desire to come back
to the Philippines. President Corazon Aquino, however,
rejected his request. He filed the instant questioning the
President’s claim that such bar was for the interest of national
safety. He also claimed that his right to travel can only be
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impaired by a court order. Court ruled against Marcos. It stated
that executive power, as contemplated by the Constitution, is
not limited to the specific powers enumerated in the
constitution. The enumerations, like appointing power during
recess of the Congress (Sec. 16), control over all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Sec. 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons (Sec. 21), borrowing
power (Sec. 20), budgetary power (Sec. 22), informing power
(Sec. 23), were put into the Constitution to limit the SPECIFIC
and not the GENERAL powers of the president. Such residual
powers of the president necessarily include all powers which
are neither judicial nor legislative.
Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Petitioners are assailing
the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain of the GRP-MILF because of the suspensive clause it
includes, among others. Basically, this provision states that
any provision of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of
a Comprehensive Contract. They argue that such provision
encroaches upon the constituent power of the legislative and
the people to amend the Constitution. In deciding on the
legality of the clause, the Court looked into the President’s
power to conduct peace negotiations. They stated that this
power is implicity included in her powers as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President
has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. Since
she is in a unique position of being front and center of the
peace negotiations, she is given the leeway to explore all
possibilities to ensure conflict resolution. Moreover, the
provisions are not automatically implemented, meaning that
since it is not within her powers to implement amendments to
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the Constitution, the most that she could actually do is to
recommend such changes to the legislative or to the people.
DENR vs DENR Region 12 Employees DENR issued a
memo directing the immediate transfer of DENR 12 Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato, in
order to implement DENR Admin Order 99-14, which aims to
improve efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering
its services. The Court ruled in favor of the DENR. Firstly, it
held that the exercise of authority to transfer is executive in
nature. Secondly, the DENR Secretary is authorized to
exercise such power through the doctrine of qualified political
agency, which provides that the President can delegate some
of his powers to Cabinet members, except in cases wherein
the Constitution requires that the President has to act
personally. Further, all acts of the heads of the executive
departments personally performed in the regular course of
business are presumed to be acts of the President, unless he
disapproves them.
Banda vs Ermita Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of EO 378 which amends sections of the EO 285, which
created the National Printing Office. The court ruled that the
EO 378 which allows government to avail private printing
services constitutional since it is with in the powers of the
president. The President implicitly has the power to effect less
radical or less substantive changes to the functional and
internal structure of the Office of the President, including the
modification of functions of such executive agencies as the
exigencies of the service may require. This delegated
legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of
the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the
executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the
Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies.
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Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission PNoy issued EO
No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission, which was
tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by public officers in the Arroyo administration. The main issue
here is whether or not the President has the power to create
the PTC. Under the Revised Administrative Code, he did not,
since Sec. 31 only contemplates modification or alteration of
an already existent, not the creation of an entirely new one. It
also does not fall under the President’s power of control since
control is the power to alter, or modify, or nullify, or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter. This is obviously different from the power to create
public offices. Under PD 1416, which delegates the power to
make public office for the purpose of transitioning towards a
parliamentary government, he also cannot create the PTC.
This transitory period is no longer applicable and the power
under said PD was repealed upon the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. However, such power falls under Sec. 7, Art. VIII
of the Constitution, which gives the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The power to
conduct investigations to ensure the faithful execution of laws
is inherent in his power as Chief Executive. This power
includes the power to create ad hoc committees such as the
PTC. However, EO 1 was still struck down since it violated the
equal protection clause.
b. Control of executive departments
Article VII, Section 17
The president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
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Blaquera v Alcala
Petitioners are government employees who were paid
incentive benefits in 1992 pursuant to EO 292 (Admin Code).
In 1993, Pres Ramos issued AO 29 which granted productivity
incentives in 1992 in the maximum amount of P1000 and
directed those employees who got their incentive benefits in
1992 to refund the amount exceeding the maximum of P1000.
He also issued AO 268 which stopped the granting of benefits
without prior approval of the president. The heads of the
departments deducted the excess amount from their salaries.
The court held that AO 29 and 268 does not violate EO 292
because it was issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over the executive departments. The president has the
power to undo, alter, modify, and set aside what his
subordinates had done in the performance of their duties. The
president has the power to limit the benefit amount and stop
the granting of benefits without his approval.
Hutchinson Ports v SBMA
SBMA selected Hutchinson Ports as the winning bidder to
develop a marine container terminal within Subic Bay. The
Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary,
recommended a rebidding. Hutchinson Ports contested this
through a request for injunction because there is already an
enforceable contract. The court held that Hutchinson Ports is
not entitled to an injunctive writ because it failed to present
that it has a clear and unmistakable right to be declared as the
winning bidder. Also, the Office of the President can set aside
the award by SBMA to Hutchinson Ports because all projects
of SBMA require the approval of the President pursuant to LOI
620 and thus, is under the control of the president. In setting
aside the award to Hutchinson Ports, the president exercised
his prerogative and was within his authority.
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the National Internal Revenue is a violation of S6, A10 of the

NEA v COA constitution and the LGC. Also, the president cannot interfere
Pres Ramos issued EO 389 pursuant to RA 6758 (created a with local authorities as long as they act within the scope of
salary schedule for all government positions and NEA). EO their authority. Heads of political subdivisions are accountable
389 directed the salary increase to be made in 2 tranches (in to the people because they are directly elected, and so, they
January and November). NEA accelerated the salary increase are only subject to the president’s supervision unlike cabinet
and paid the lump sum for both tranches in January without members and other executive officials who are under the
any legal basis. COA disallowed the disbursement of the president’s power of control. The president may not
increased salaries. The court held that NEA had no authority withhold/alter any authority given to them by the constitution
to implement the accelerations without the approval of DBM or and laws.
the president and that the president has the power to issue EO
389 under S17, A7. CONTROL SUPERVISION
Power to alter / modify / Oversight function only;
c. General supervision over local nullify what a overseeing to see that
governments/autonomous regions subordinate has done subordinates perform
in performance of their duties which the
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall duties and to substitute president did not make;
exercise general supervision over local governments. his judgment; lay down does not lay down rules
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, rules for the
and cities and municipalities with respect to component performance of
barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units subordinate’s duties
are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Article X, Section 6. Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall d. Power of appointment
be automatically released to them.
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall
Pimentel v Aguirre (1) Nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
President Ramos issued AO 372 which required all gov’t Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments and agencies to: Sec 1-reduce expenditures by departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
at least 25%; and Sec 4- withhold 10% of the LGU’s internal consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
revenue allotment pending the assessment of DBCC. The colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
court said that while Sec 1 is a valid exercise of the president’s appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
power of general supervision over LGUs, Sec 4 is not because
LGUs enjoy fiscal autonomy, so withholding the LGUs share in
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(2) He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
(3) The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
(4) The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
Bermudez v Torres
Bermudez was nominated by the Secretary of Justice to be the
provincial prosecutor of Tarlac, but Quioait was appointed by
President Ramos. Bermudez refused to vacate said office
because the original of Quiaoit’s appointment was not yet
released and because his appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) prescribed
under the Revised Administrative Code – Sec. 9, Ch. 2, Title
III, Book IV: all provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the president upon the
recommendation of the SOJ. The court held that the absence
of the recommendation of the SOJ is not needed because the
president’s power to appoint is discretionary – he has the
power to appoint anyone according to his judgment. The
doctrine in San Juan v CSC does not apply because there was
a sharing of power between the appointing power (governor)
and DBM to appoint a budget officer. In this case, there is no
sharing of power between the SOJ and the president because
the former is only an extension of the latter.
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Sarmiento v Mison
Petitioner is contesting Mison’s appointment as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs because it was not
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
constitution classifies 4 groups of officers that the president
shall appoint:
1. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
2. All other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only the first group requires the consent of CoA while the
second and third group do not. As a bureau head, Mison’s
appointment is not under the first group and needs no
confirmation from the CoA. He is part of the third group
because the president is authorized to make the
appointment of the BOC commissioner by law.
Calderon v Carale
Carele and other respondents were appointed by Pres Aquino
as the chairman and commissioners of the NLRC. Petitioner is
questioning the legality of the appointments of chairman
Carale and the commissioner without submitting it to the CoA
for confirmation because RA 6715 requires that the chairman
and commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed by the
president, subject to the confirmation by the CoA. The court
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held that Congress cannot require the CoA’s confirmation of
appointments to government officers additional to those
mentioned in the first sentence of S16, A7 of the constitution
because it amends the constitution. Also, it imposes CoA’s
confirmation on appointments which are entrusted only with
the president.
Manalo v Sistoza
President Aquino promoted Sistoza and other respondents as
Directors and Chief Superintendent within the PNP. Manalo is
questioning the appointment because it was not confirmed by
the CoA as required under S26 and 31 of RA 6975 (law that
created the DILG). The court held that the appointments do
not require the confirmation of the CoA because officers of the
PNP are not included in the first group. The Congress cannot
expand the CoA’s power of confirmation and amend the
constitution by requiring confirmation of positions not in the
first group. Also, PNP officers cannot be likened to officers of
the armed forces because they are under different provision in
the constitution (S4, A16 for the AFP and S6, A16 for the PNP)
and RA 6975 specifically states in its declaration of policy that
no element of the police force shall be military.
Soriano v Lista
Petitioner is assailing the president’s promotion of 8 officers of
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to Vice Admiral, Rear
Admiral, Commodore, and Naval Captain without confirmation
by the CoA. The court held that since the PCG is no longer
part of the Philippine Navy or the AFP and that the constitution
requires only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or
naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation of the
CoA, the promotions that were made are valid and will not
require the confirmation of the CoA.
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Pimentel v Ermita
While Congress was in session, Pres. Arroyo appointed the
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments who immediately took their oaths and assumed
office without the consent of CoA. Days after the adjournment
of Congress, Pres. Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in acting capacity. Petitioners claim
that the appointments are unconstitutional because they were
appointed in acting capacity without the consent of CoA while
the congress is in session. The court held that the president
may make appointments “in acting capacity” without seeking
confirmation from the CoA even when congress is in session
because under S17, Ch5, T1, B3 of EO 292, the president
may temporarily designate an officer already in government
service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch. The CoA’s
exercise of powers is executive and not legislative; it does not
legislate when it exercises its powers to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments. The essence of an
appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature; it is
only intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent appointee. Acting appointments is
susceptible to abuse and may be used as a way to circumvent
confirmation by the CoA, thus the law mandates that they
cannot exceed 1 year in office as provided in S17(3), Ch5, T1,
B3 of EO 292.
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Ad interim Appointment in acting 1. Nature: an appointments can either be permanent or

appointment capacity temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent
Made if congress is not Made anytime there is appointee can only be removed from office for cause;
in session; requires vacancy (w/n congress whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even
confirmation of CoA; is in session or not); without hearing or cause and does not enjoy security of
permanent in nature; does not require tenure
appointee enjoys confirmation of CoA; 2. Manner in which it is made: an appointment can either be
security of tenure temporary in nature; regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made
does not enjoy security while Congress is in session, while an ad interim
of tenure appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress.
In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments
General v Urra Cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or an
Roces was appointed as acting NAPOLCOM commissioner in ad interim appointment.
2004 and reappointed in 2006. When Roces died in 2007,
General was appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. In Re Valenzuela
Then, Pres. Arroyo appointed Urra in place of the petitioner The president appointed Valenzuela and Vallarta as RTC
whose appointment papers were dated March 5, 2010. judges within the 2-month ban on appointments stated under
Petitioner questioned the validity of Urra’s appointment on the S15, A7: “Two months immediately before the next
grounds that it violates the constitutional prohibition against presidential elections & up to the end of his term, a President
midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres. Aquino issued or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
EO 2 which revoked appointments issued by the previous temporary appointments to executive positions when
administration in violation of the constitutional ban on midnight continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
appointments made on or after March 10, 2010. The court held endanger public safety.” The court held that the appoints were
that the appointments of the respondents were valid and the covered by the ban and that S4(1) (“The Supreme Court shall
petitioner was only appointed in acting capacity which is be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices.
temporary in nature. Also, a staggered term of office is not a Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
prohibition for the issuance of a temporary appointment. A thereof.”) and S9 of A8 (“The Members of the Supreme Court
prohibition against an acting appointment must be specific or & judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President
there must be a repugnancy in the nature of an acting from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial &
appointment and the office itself (acting appointments cannot Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
be done to the CoA, COMELEC, and CSC). confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue
the appointments within 90 days from the submission of the
2 Classification of Appointments: list.”) which requires the president to fill vacancies within the
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time frame provided is subject to the limitation under S15, A7.
Also, the court stated that there are 2 types of appointments
banned under S15, A7: appointments made for buying votes
and for partisan considerations. The exception to the ban on
appointments under S15, A7 refer only to those of temporary
appointments to executive positions if the vacancies prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
De Castro v JBC
Petitioners seek to restrain the JBC from submitting a list of
nominees for the position of CJ Puno upon his compulsory
retirement on May 17, 2010 which is a few days after the May
10 elections because S15, A7 prohibits midnight
appointments. However, S4(1), A8 requires appointments be
made within 90 days from the occurrence of a vacancy. The
court held that the prohibition under S15, A7 does not apply to
appointments in the SC and to other appointments in the
judiciary because it only applies to the executive department,
the nomination and screening process of the JBC would
prevent midnight appointments, and it depoliticizes judicial
appointments. Also, if the framers intended to extend the
prohibition to the appointments of members in the SC, they
would have explicitly said so. The ruling in In Re Valenzuela is
reversed.
De Rama v CA
Upon assumption of office, Mayor De Rama sought the recall
of the appointments of 14 municipal employees on the
grounds that they were midnight appointees of the former
mayor which violates S15, A7 of the constitution. The court
held that the appointees cannot be removed from office
because their appointments were approved by the CSC field
office and that the prohibition only applies to presidential
appointments. There is no law that prohibits local elective
!
officials from making appointments during the last days of their
tenure.
Matibag v Benipayo
Matibag was removed from her office as Acting Director IV of
the EID by COMELEC Chair Benipayo and reassigned her to
the Law department. She alleges that Benipayo’s appointment
as Chair is invalid because it is an ad interim appointment and
was not acted upon by CoA, thus her reassignment is illegal.
The court held that the ad interim appointment of Benipayo is
permanent because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the president once the appointee has
qualified into office; being subject to confirmation of CoA does
not alter its permanent character. It is permanent it is effective
until disproved by the CoA/until the next adjournment of
Congress. The renewal of by-passed ad interim appointments
do not violate the prohibition on reappointments under S1(2),
A9-C because reappointments presupposes previous
confirmed appointments. A by-passed ad interim appointment
does not constitute a term of office because there has been no
final decision on the merits for appointment. It is not equal to a
disproved appointment which is final and binding.
Ad interim: ‘in the mean time’ when Congress is recess - this
does not denote its nature, but the manner of appointment. Ad
interim appointments prevent the disruption in essential
government services during the recess of congress and enjoy
the protection of S2(3), A9-B of the constitution which provides
that no officer of the civil service shall be removed/suspended
except for cause provided by law.
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Ad Interim Regular
Takes effect Does not take effect
immediately; appointee immediately; appointee
assumes office assumes office only
immediately and should after confirmation of the
be later confirmed by CoA; made while
the CoA; made while congress is in session
congress is not in
session
Larin v Executive Secretary
Petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax
Service of the BIR who was convicted for violating S268(4) of
the NIRC and S3(e) of RA 3019 because he allegedly gave tax
credit to Tanduay Distillery. Admin. Order 101 removed him
from his position, but Larin appealed. Pending the appeal,
Pres. Ramos issued EO 132 to streamline BIR and abolished
some positions including the office of Larin as Assistant
Commissioner. He was not part of the 14 newly appointed
Assistant Commissioners, thus he is claiming that he is
illegally dismissed. The court held that he was not validly
dismissed from office because he was part of the career
service, thus he enjoys the right of security of tenure under the
Admin Code. S36 of the Civil Service decree provides that
employees may only be removed for any cause enumerated in
the law. Although he is a presidential appointee, the power of
removal is not inherent in the power to appoint under S16, A7.
Also, the court held that even though the president has the
power to steamline government under RA 7645 which
authorizes him to effect organizational changes and PD 1772
which grants the power to reorganize national government, the
court held that EO 132 was done in bad faith because it
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created a replacement position that had the same functions of
Larin’s office.
Funa v COA Chair
PGMA appointed Carague as CoA Chair for 7 years (2001-
2007) and Villar as Commissioner for 7 years also (2004-
2011). When Carague retired and in the 4th year of Villar, the
latter was designated as Acting Chairman of the COA. Villar’s
appointment papers stated that he was to serve his original
term (until 2011 only), but he insisted that his appointment as
chair gave him a fresh term (until 2015). The court held that
there can be no Acting Commissioner of the COMELEC
because it goes against the spirit of independence of the
commission. Also, S1(2), A9-D does not prevent the
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman as
long as the Commissioner has not yet served the full term of 7
years. The reappointment barred by the constitutional
provision is a reappointment to the same office, not to a higher
office. However, even though he was given a promotional
appointment, it did not give him a new 7-year term because no
appointee can serve for an aggregate term of more than 7
years. Villar’s appointment for a fixed term of less than 7 years
is also void for violating a clear and mandatory constitutional
prescription of a 7-year term.
Conclusion:
1. Appointment of members to any of the 3 Constitutional
Commission after the expiration of the first set of
Commissioners shall be for 7 years. It cannot be shortened
because it will result to the distortion of the rotational
system in the constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, impeachment, disability, and resignation) shall only
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be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor,
so that it will not disrupt the staggering of terms
3. Members who served a full term are barred from
reappointment
4. A commissioner who reassigns after for less than 7 years
is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman
for the unexpired portion of the term provided that the
aggregate period will not exceed 7 years, the vacancy is
from those enumerated in #2, and reappointment is to the
same office
5. Any member cannot be reappointed in a temporary/acting
capacity
Funa vs. Agra (2013)
On March 1, 2010, Agra was appointed as Acting DOJ
secretary when Secretary Devanadera resigned. On March 5,
2010, Agra was also appointed as Acting SolGen by PGMA.
Funa files the case questioning the constitutionality of the
designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position as Acting Solicitor General and that it should
be void because it violates the prohibition under Section 13,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The court held that the
designation is unconstitutional because in violates Section 13,
Article 7. The court held that it is insignificant that Agra was
appointed in acting capacity because the framers of the
Constitution stated that to “hold office” means to possess or
occupy it, whether it is in acting capacity or not. In addition to
the court held that Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting
DOJ Secretary and Acting SolGen did not come within the
definition of an ex officio capacity because the OSG is
independent and autonomous. Also, the magnitude of the
scope of the work of the SolGen if added to the equally
demanding tasks of the DOJ Secretary is too much for only 1
!
official to bear and would ultimately affect the sound
governmental operations and prime performance of one’s
duties. However, the court’s ruling considered that Agra was to
be considered a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting
DOJ Secretary and that all official actions of Agra as a de facto
Secretary, assuming that his later designation, are presumed
valid, binding, and effective as if he was legally appointed and
qualified for office.
Funa vs. Civil Service Commission (2014) (Ex – officio
capacity – part of it by virtue of holding another office)
On January 11, 2010, PGMA appointed Duque as
chairman of the CSC and the appointment was confirmed by
the COA. On February 22, 2010, PGMA issued E.O. 864
which included the chairmain of the CSC as a member of the
Board of Trustees of: Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth),
Employee’s Compensation Commission (ECC). Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). The Petitioner challenged
the constitutionality of E.O. 864 for violating Section 1 and
Section 2 of Article 9, because the ex designation of Duque in
ex officio capacity should not be allowed. The Court ruled that
the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity is not
unconstitutional. Section 1 and Section 2 of Article 9 should be
read in line with Section 7(2) of Article 9. It is not allowed as
ruled in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, Duque
was covered by the general rule that he may hold another
office if it is allowed by law or allowed by the primary functions
of his position. Under Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I – A, Book V of
E.O. 292 the CSC Chairman’s membership in a governing
body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as its Board Member must
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affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government offices and employees.
However, Duque’s designation as Board Member of the said
GOCC’s is in accordance with the Constitution and the
condition laid down in Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I – A, Book V
of E.O. 292 is dependent on the functions of government
agencies under their respective charters. As board member he
was assigned additional compensation which does not
characterize him as an ex – officio officer and his designation
impairs the independence of the Civil Service Commission as
he is given corporate powers that are not related to his job as
CSC Chairman.
Gonzalez III vs. Office of the President (2012 and 2014)
This case involves two consolidated petitions. The first
case involves a tourist bus that was hijacked by Police Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He claimed that he was unjustly
removed and that his dismissal and forfeiture of retirement
benefits were already enforced before solving the case. The
investigation found the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzalez liable for gross neglect of duty and he was
dismissed from service. The 2nd case was a suit against
Wendell – Barreras Sulit who was the Special Prosecutor and
a case was filed with the Office of the President.
In the first case (2012), the court ruled that the Office of
the President had the jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over the Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally – created Office
of the Ombudsman. The Court ruled that the President has the
power to remove the DO and SP because the President’s
administrative disciplinary power is not exclusive. The
Ombudsman’s authority to discipline administratively, covering
all government offices except only those officials removed by
!
impeachment should be interpreted with Section 8(2) of Article
7 which grants the President express power of removal over a
DO or SP. Also, the Congress intended that the Ombudsman
and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction over petitioners. The Court also ruled that vesting
this power to the Ombudsman would result in mutual
protection and the President should exercise power in order to
prevent it. The Court also ruled that the President has this
power for the following reasons:
• Article 11, Section 9 and Section 2: President
power to remove and appoint the Ombudsman
• Doctrine of Implication: power to appoint carries
power to remove
The Court also ruled that Gonzalez is entitled to reinstatement
because his acts do not constitute a betrayal of public trust, it
was out of his hands.
In the 2nd case (2014 Motion for Reconsideration) the
Court ruled that the Office of the President does not have
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
DO and SP who belong to the Office of the Ombudsman. This
is because it would violate the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional. (Agreed with
Brion’s dissent in the first case) The Court also ruled that it
would be an intrusion on the constitutionally granted
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and checks
and balances. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman can
hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her
subordinate officers who are not as independent as she is.
Velicaria – Garafil vs. Office of the President (2015)
4 petitions were consolidated questioning the
constitutionality of E.O. 2 for being inconsistent with Section
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15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Before the May 2010
elections, PGMA issued 800 appointments to various
positions. Petitioners question this because the letters of
transmittal did not show when they were received and that
these dates were within the ban. Aquino revoked these
appointmens and the Appointees questioned the validity of
E.0. 2. The SC referred it to the CA with the following issues to
be addressed.
• WON they were actually midnight appointments
• If they were valid
• If they were made with undue haste
• If they violated the Civil Service Rules on Appointment
The Court ruled that the appointments did violate S15A7 of the
Constitution. The facts showed that none of the appointments
were issued before the ban and that the date of receipt
showed that dates fall within the appointment ban and that the
Petitioners failed to show compliance with the 4 elements of a
valid appointment and took oath during the appointment ban.
The process of appointment includes:
• President must sign appointment paper to vacant office
• Official transmittal of paper through MRO
• Receipt of appointment paper
• Oath of office
The Court held that these appointments were void because
they were not able to complete the process of appointment
before the ban.
e. Executive Clemency
Nature of Pardoning Power – Power to reprieve, commute,
pardon, remit fines and forfeitures after final judgment.
Article 7, Section 19(1): Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
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Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after convictions by final judgment.
Forms of Executive Clemencies (In relation to our lesson, I
won’t focus on Reprieves and Commutations, just Amnesty
and Pardon)
• Amnesty – a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts,
granted by government generally to a class of persons
who have been guilty usually of political offenses and
who are subject to trial but have not yet been
convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to
obedience and duty within a prescribed time.
o Requires concurrence of majority of all
members of Congress (Article 7, Section 19)
• Pardons – permanent cancellation of sentence. It is an
act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is remission of
guilt, forgiveness of the offense.
o Plenary pardon: extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including accessory
disabilities
o Partial pardon: does not extinguish all
penalties imposed
o Absolute pardon: pardonee has no option at
all and must accept it whether he likes it or not
o Conditional pardon: the offender has the right
to reject the same since he may feel that the
condition imposed is more onerous than the
penalty sought to be remitted
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• Limitations on PARDON was not arrested and Jimenez was sentenced to life
o Cannot be granted on impeachment cases imprisonment. Before the period for appeal they decided to
o Cannot be granted in cases of violation of submit their case to the Guerilla Amnesty Corporation (GAC)
election laws without the favorable to avail of amnesty. (Proclamation No. 8 – grants amnesty in
recommendation of COMELED favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized
o Can be granted only after conviction by final under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
judgment or against persons aiding un the war efforts of the enemy)
o Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability However, GAC was returned because they refused to admit to
o Cannot be granted to cases of legislative the crime as charged. The Court ruled that admission to a
contempt or civil contempt crime does not entitle one to the benefits of amnesty.
o Cannot restore public offices forfeited According to the court, amnesty looks backward and abolished
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooked and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged. To entitle a
Pardon Amnesty person to have his case heard by the GAC, he needs the
Infractions of peace of the Addressed to Political following: charged with an offense under the RPC, committed
state Offenses during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when the
Granted to individuals To classes of persons area where the offense was committed was actually liberated.
Exercised solely by the Requires concurrence of If these three are present the GAC cannot refuse.
executive Congress
Private act which must be Public act which the courts Vera vs. People (1963)
pleaded and proved could take judicial notice
Looks forward and relieves Looks backward and puts into Petitioners and 92 others were charged with the
the pardonee of the oblivion the offense itself complex crime of kidnapping with murder of a certain Azarcon.
consequences of the offense Invoking the benefits of Amnesty proclamation of the
Extended after final judgment May be extended at any President, the case was referred to the Eight Guerilla Amnesty
stage Commission, during which, no one admitted having committed
the crime. The Commission held that they could not take
cognizance of the case because they need to plead that the
Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez (1949) commission was in pursuance to resistance. The Court held
that amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and
Petitioners Jimenez and Barroquinto were charged for when the accused maintains that he has not committed a
murder committed during WWII before the CFI of Zamboanga. crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. The invocation of
The case proceeded against Jimenez because Barroquinto amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
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avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations.
Cristobal vs. Labrador (1941)
On March 15, 1930, CFI convicted Teofilo Santos guilty
of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to 6 months of
arresto mayor + accessory penalties, as well as to return to the
offended parties the amounts Php 375 and Php 125,
respectively. On appeal, the confiction was affirmed;
accordingly, he went to jail. During his conviction, Santos
remained a registered elector in his municipality, as well as the
municipal president therein. On August 23, 1938, CA No. 357
(Election Code) was approved by the National Assembly. Sec.
94, Par. B of which disqualifies respondent from voting for
having been declared by final judgment guilty of a crime
against property. In view of this, he applied for an absolute
pardon, which was approved by the President. (Effect of the
pardon: Restored the petitioner’s full civil and political rights,
except that which respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving
no money or property responsibility.) Petitioner Cristobal then
filed a petition for exclusion of Santos’s name from the list of
voters, on the ground that he is disqualified based on CA No.
357, Sec. 94, Par. B. The Court ruled that Santos should not
be removed from the list of electors because There are only
two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative: that the power be exercised after conviction, and
that such power does not extend to impeachment. The
pardoning power cannot be restricted or contolled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign has
placed it. Absolute power not only blots out the crime
committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
!
conviction. Can be granted even after expiration of term of
imprisonment; what pardon does in that case is to remove all
that is left of the consequences of the conviction.
Monsanto vs. Factoran (1989)
Petitioner (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City)
was suspended from office in 1982, and in 1983 was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan with the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents, and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of prision correccional to prision mayor and to
pay fine and other civil liabilities. She filed a MR with the SC
but while the motion was pending, she was extended absolute
pardon by the President in 1984. By reason of said pardon,
petitioner requested that she be restored to her former office
which was still vacant then. The request was referred to the
Ministry of Finance which ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated without the necessity of a new appointment not
earlier than the date the pardon was extended and that the
civil liabilities imposed by the Sandiganbayan be satisfied.
Unsatisfied with the decision, she sought reconsideration
which was referred to the Office of the President where it was
held, through respondent, that petitioner is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement and to backpay for the entire period of
her suspension, and that she is still liable to the civil liabilities
concomitant with her conviction. Her subsequent MR was
denied, and thus, this petition. The Court ruled that a convicted
public officer, pardoned by the President, is not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement to his previous office. The penalty of
prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties,
suspension from public office. Having accepted the pardon,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality. Pardon cannot bring back lost reputation
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for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. It does not ipso facto
restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction.The
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that. To regain her former post, petitioner must
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Torres vs. Gonzales (1987)
Sometime before 1979, Wilfredo Torres was convicted
of two counts of estafa and sentenced to 11y 10m 22d to 38y
9m 1d of imprisonment. But then the President granted him
conditional pardon, which would be in effect as long as Torres
did “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law.” Torres agreed and was
released. In 1982-1986, Torres was charged with a variety of
crimes – estafa and other forms of swindling; grave threats;
grave coercion; illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives; malicious mischief; violation of BP 22 and PD 772
– cases for which were already pending in court. The Board of
Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President
that Torres’ conditional pardon be cancelled. This Resolution
was then transmitted to the Pres. via the Minister of Justice.
The President then cancelled the conditional pardon, after
which the Minister of Justice issued an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against Torres “by authority of the President”.
Torres was arrested and confined to serve the remaining
portion of his sentence. The Court ruled that a conviction by
final judgment is not needed for Torres to be considered to
have “violated the law” and thus in violation of the terms of his
!
conditional pardon because it’s the President’s prerogative to
decide whether or not the terms of the conditional pardon were
violated. By agreeing to be pardoned, an offender impliedly
agrees to leave it to the President to determine whether or
not he has been abiding by the stipulations of that pardon.
f. Commander in Chief
Article 7, Section 18:
1. He may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
2. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeus
corpus or
3. He may proclaim martial law over the entire
Philippines or any part thereof
• The President shall be the Commander – in – Chief
of all the armed forces of the Philippines
o Absolute authority over the persons and actions
of the members of the armed forces
o Ability of the President to restrict the travel,
movement and speech of military officers,
activities which may otherwise be sanctioned
under civilian law
• Graduated powers – the calling out power, the power
to suspend the writ of habeus corpus, and the power to
declare martial law, in the latter two powers, the
Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, an actual invasion or rebellion and that
public safety requires such power.
o However, in IBP vs. Zamora – “these conditions
are not required in the exercise of the calling
out power. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it
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becomes necessary’ the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion, also held in
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
• Call out the AFP to prevent lawless violence –
police measure meant to quell disorder
• State of rebellion – an exercise of her Chief Executive
and Commander – in – Chief powers which are purely
executive (Section 1 and 18 of Article 7)
• Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeus
corpus
o Writ of habeus corpus:
! An order from the court commanding a
detaining officer to inform the court:
• If he has the person in custody
• His basis of detaining that
person
o Privilege of the writ – is that portion of the writ
requiring the detaining officer to show cause
why he should not be tested. Note that it is the
privilege that is suspended, not the writ itself
o The requisites for suspension are:
! Invasion or rebellion
! Public safety requires that suspension
o Duration: Not to exceed 60 days unless
extended by Congress
!
o Effects of the suspension of the privilege:
! Applies only to persons “judicially
charged” for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with
invasion (Article 7, Section 18(5))
! Such persons suspected of the above
crimes can be arrested and detained
without a warrant of arrest
! The suspension of the privilege does not
make the arrest without warrant legal
but military is allowed to make the arrest
anyway
! Arrest without warrant is justified by the
emergency situation and the difficulty in
applying for a warrant considering the
time and the number of persons to be
arrested
! Crime must be one that is related to
rebellion or invasion
! During the suspension of the privilege of
the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged
within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be
released (Article 7, Section 18(6))
! Effect: extend the period during which
he can be detained without a warrant
! If not released after 72 hours, public
officer becomes liable under RPC article
125
• Proclaim Martial Law
o Requisites:
! Invasion or rebellion
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! Public safety requires the proclamation
of martial law all over the Philippines or
any part thereof
o The following cannot be done:
! Suspend the operation of the
Constitution
! Supplant the functioning of the civil
courts and the legislative assemblies
! Confer jurisdiction upon military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function
• “Open Court doctrine” – civilians
cannot be tried by military courts
if civil courts are open and
functioning
! Automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeus corpus
IBP vs. Zamora (2000)
Because of the increase in the violent crimes
(robberies, kidnappings, carnappings, etc) in Metro Manila, the
President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the
Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime
prevention and suppression.The Secretary of National
Defense, DILG Secretary, and the AFP and PNP Chiefs were
tasked to execute and implement the said verbal order. The
PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar Aglipay
then formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI for short)
detailing the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called
Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. This task force
was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro
Manila.The Integrated Bar of the Philippines on January 17,
!
2000 filed this petition to annul the LOI and to declare the
deployment of the Marines as unconstitutional, and therefore
null and void. The President then issued a memorandum on
January 24, 2000 addressed to the AFP and PNP chiefs
confirming his verbal directive and the deployment of the
Marines, invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign
are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The Court ruled that the President did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in deploying the Marines into Metro
Manila because there is a clear textual commitment under
the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. The Court also ruled that the calling of the armed
forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols does not
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions
of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.!
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Ampatuan vs. Puno (2011)
After the massacre of 57 people in Maguindanao,
PGMA issued Proclamation 1946: placed the Provinces of
Maguindanao & Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under
a state of emergency and also directed the AFP & the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in these
places. 3 days later, PGMA issued Administrative Order
273: TRANSFERRED supervision of the ARMM from the
Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) But because of issues on terms used in
AO 273, PGMA issued AO 273-A (which amended AO 273):
which DELEGATED instead supervision of the ARMM to the
DILG Ampatuan & other ARMM officials filed petition for
prohibition. Alleged that the President is encroaching on the
local autonomy of ARMM and that there is no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency. The Court ruled that the
issuance did not violate the principle of local autonomy
under Section 16, Article 10 of the Constitution & Section
1, Article 5 of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act because
DILG Secretary didn’t take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. He didn’t take over the administration/operations of
ARMM. The Court also ruled that PGMA did not invalidly
exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence. Deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2),
Article 6 of the Constitution. PGMA didn’t proclaim a
national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
places mentioned.The Calling out power is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President (no need for act by
Congress) as found in Section 18, Article 7 of the
Constitution:
!
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary (2004) – Oakwood
Mutiny
On July 27, 2003 – 300 junior officers/enlisted
members of the AFP stormed Oakwood bewailing corruption in
the AFP, demanded President, Defense Secretary, and the
AFP to resign. On the same day PGMA issued Proclamation
No. 427 declaring the existence of state of rebellion and
General Order 4: directing AFP and PNP to carry our the
necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell the
rebellion, with due regard to constitutional rights. After
negotiations they agreed to return to their barracks and the
declaration of state of rebellion was lifted. The Court ruled that
the issue was moot because the declaration was already lifted
but provided the members of Congress with legal standing
because a declaration of state of rebellion is tantamount to
exercising emergency powers, which requires the
authorization of Congress. The Court ruled that the declaration
was constitutional under the calling out power in Section 18,
Article 7 and that the prerogative emanates from the Executive
(Section 1 and Section 17, Article 7) and the Commander – in
– Chief powers. The court held that a declaration does not
violate any rights. However, the dissenting opinions (Ynares –
Santiago and Sandoval Gutierrez) rule that a state of rebellion
has no legal meaning and is not found in the Constitution.
Olaguer vs. Military Commission (1987)
On December 24, 1979, Petitioners, who were all
civilians that were arrested by military and detained at Camp
Crame and transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa challenged the
authority of the Military Commission. The Court ruled that the
Military Commission had no authority because Proclamation
No. 2045 that lifted Martial Law, the petitioners were given
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provisional liberty – rendering petitions for Habeus Corpus
moot and academic. The Military Comissions/Tribunals have
no jurisdiction to try cases against civilians when Civil Courts
are already open for functioning.
Navales vs. Abaya (2004)
This case involves consolidated petitions assailing the
jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to conduct the Court –
Martial Proceedings involving the officers in the Armed Forces
hat were involved in the Oakwood mutiny. The Court ruled that
the petitioners are not entitled to writs of prohibition and
habeus corpus because the General Court Martial has
jurisdiction over the cases filed. RTC 148 acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it declared that all charges are not service
oriented and violated Section 1, RA No. 7055. The General
Court Martial has jurisdiction over service – connected crimed
committed by members of the armed forces.
In Re De Villa (2004)
Reynaldo de Villa was convicted for the rape of his
niece who got pregnant and gave birth. The results of a DNA
test showed that the child could not have been his and the
Petitioner argues for habeus corpus because since Reynaldo
is not the father the case should be set aside and requested
for a new trail because of the newly discovered evidence. The
Court ruled that it would not be appropriate to issue a write of
habeus corpus to release an individual already convicted by
final judgment. This is because HC is classified as an
extraordinary remedy, which applies to all cases of illegal
confinement and detention. The person would have to be
deprived of liberty or their rightful custody would have to be
!
withheld but if there is a valid legal process HC is not the
proper remedy. HC cannot be extended to errors of trial courts
acting within its jurisdiction. It would not be appropriate to
grant a new trial because the paternity is not the central issue
but the rape is.
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary (2012)
On 27 November 1990, the President issued
Executive Order No. 438 imposing an additional duty of five
percent (5%) ad valorem on all articles imported into the
Philippines across the board on all imported articles, including
crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. It was increased from 5% ad valorem to 9% by the
promulgation of EO No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.
Department of Finance initiated a process requiring Tariff and
Customs Code for imposition of a specific levy on crude oil
and other petroleum products. A public hearing was held for
the purpose. EO 475 in the meantime returned the ad valorem
tax from 9% to 5% for all article except crude oil alnd other
oil products which still had additional taxes of 9%. After
the Tariffs Commisssion hearing a report was submitted to the
President and he issued EO 478 levying a special duty
aside from the 9% additional tax of P0 .95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter
of imported oil products. The Court held that Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 did not violate the Constitution and
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under Section
24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is
within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive
Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the
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President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress
of the Philippines according to Section 28(2) of Article VI of
the Constitution. The rates of duty herein provided or
subsequently fixed pursuant to Section 401 of this Code shall
be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission
and may be revised by the President upon recommendation
of the National Economic and Development Authority. Sec 401
of the Code further states that the President upon
recommendation of NEDA may increase, reduce or remove
existing protective rates of import duty in the interest of
national economy, general welfare and/or national
security The petitioners contention that interest of national
economy, general welfare and/or national security
described in The Tariff Code pertains only to the “protection of
local industries” is untenable because the protection of
consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of
our population, is at the very least as important a
dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and
national security" as the protection of local industries.
! released. No petitions for habeas corpus have been filed.
Fortun vs. Macapagal – Arroyo (2012)
In response to the Maguindanao massacre, believing
she needed greater authority than her initial PP 1946 declaring
a state of emergency, GMA issued PP 1959 on Dec 4
declaring martial law (ML) & suspending the writ of habeas
corpus on the basis of rebellion & public safety in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, & Cotabato City. 2 days later,
she submitted her report to Congress pursuant to A7S18,
saying she based her PP on the finding that lawless men had
taken up arms in Maguindanao & risen against the gov’t, &
describes their military strength. On Dec 9, Congress
!
convened in joint session to review PP 1959, but on Dec 12,
before they could act, GMA issued PP 1963, lifting martial
law & restoring habeas corpus. Several petitions challenged
PP 1959. The issue was WoN the SC should consider the
constitutionality the declaration of ML and the court ruled that
it should not because there should be respect for co-equal
departments and that means that the issue of constitutionality
of their acts should be the lis mota of the case and that the
resolution of WoN it’s constitutional is unavoidable. It’s not for
2 reasons: Declaring ML is a joint exercise of power, since
Congress has the constitutional mandate to review ML. This
review is therefore initially a political question for Congress
to decide, before the SC can review it. Only when Congress
defaults in its duty to review should the SC step in and review
it and since she withdrew martial law in just 8 days, it has not
been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take
over LGUs, the President did not issue any PDs, no mass
arrests have been reported, and those arrested have been
A7S18 states that the SC must promulgate its decision 30
days upon filing, and it’s been 2 years since then.
In Carpio’s dissent:
1. The lifting of ML DOES NOT moot the petitions, it is
justiciable.
2. “Rebellion” in A7S18 SHOULD HAVE the same meaning
as in the RPC.
3. The suspension of HC writ DOES NOT authorizes
warrantless arrests, searches & seizures.
4. The declaration of ML is NOT a joint & sequential function
of the President & Congress, such that, without
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Congressional action due to the President lifting ML, the
SC has nothing to review.
5. The SC CAN exercise factual review of ML simultaneously
with Congress
6. The SC’s factual review of a lifted state of ML is NOT
critical to resolving the validity of Gov’t acts during ML
7. Proclamation 1959 does NOT have sufficient factual basis
g. Emergency Powers
Art. 7, Sec.18
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.
!
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
David v. Arroyo Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Presidential PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 declaring a state of
national emergency issued by PGMA, and that in issuing such
committed grave abuse of discretion. The factual basis cited
by the Arroyo camp was the alleged existence of plot attempts
from political opposition and the NPA to unseat or assassinate
PGMA. The executive issuances were also lifted by PGMA the
week following the declaration. Court held the petition was not
moot and academic as for the 8 days that PP1017 was
operative, police officers committed illegal acts in
implementing it. The SC also held that PGMA did not act
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arbitrarily in issuing PP 1017 given the factual basis
presented. David’s warrantless arrest was also deemed
unjustified by the Court.
Three emergency powers:
1) Calling out power (1st provision of PP 1017) = As
stated in the 1st sentence of Art. 7, Sec. 18, whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed
forced ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence’. In the
case herein, the President was in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the country. The court
held that PP 1017 only affirms the calling-out power of
the President, therefore valid.
2) Take Care Power (2nd provision of PP 1107) = The
Court ruled that PP 1017 was unconstitutional because
it grants Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
Decrees cannot be created now, as it will violate
separation of powers. Neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. With respect to 'laws,' she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the
like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to
enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
3) Take Over Power (3rd provision of PP 1017) = While
the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however (following the Court’s
interpretation of Sec. 17, Art. 12 invoked in PP1017),
the Executive cannot exercise emergency powers,
which include the power to take over public utilities and
!
corporations, without Congressional authority. The
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Art 7, in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by
congress.
Petitions were partly granted. The Court ruled that PP 1017
was constitutional insofar as it constitutes the calling-out
power to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,
provisions commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, and decrees promulgated by the President
are unconstitutional. The provision in PP 1017 declaring
national emergency is constitutional but this does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.
h. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
Art. 7, Sec. 20
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as
may be provided by law.
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Constantino v. Cuisia Philippine Debt Negotiating Team
negotiated an agreement with the Bank Advisory Committee
(represents all foreign commercial bank creditors) creating a
Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992
(“Financing Program”) which aims to manage the country’s
external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt
strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign
creditors. Petitioners allege that such program violates Sec.
20, Art. 7 of the constitution, the Court held otherwise. The
Court rules that the language of the Constitution is simple and
clear – it allows the President to contract and guarantee
foreign loans, with no prohibition on the issuance of certain
kinds of loans/instruments (foreign loans may be in the form of
bonds) nor restrictions on payment or manner.
i. Foreign Affairs
Art. 7, Sec. 21
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Art. 18, Sec. 25
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.
Nicolas v. Romulo In the case against a member of the US
Armed Forces, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith was charged with
!
rape. Petitioners assert the Philippines should have custody of
Smith as well as assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting
Forces Agreement. RTC ruled that Smith shall temporarily be
committed to the Makati City Jail. Thereafter, PH law
enforcement agents moved Smith to the US embassy in
Manila pursuant to the Romulo-Kenny Agreement stating; RP
and US agree that Smith will be in the US Embassy in Manila,
he will be guarded 24/7 by US military personnel and that the
Philippine police and jail authorities will have access to the
place of detention to ensure the US compliance with the terms
of the VFA. The Court ruled that;
1) The VFA is constitutional as ratified by the Philippine
Senate. Although the US Senate has not concurred
with the VFA, it is considered an internal matter of US
law and also has been recognized as a treaty by the
US as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the US government. The Court also
explained that the VFA is essentially the implementing
agreement of the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty
which was concurred and ratified by both PH and US
Senates.
2) Petitioners also assert that the PH SC has exclusive
power to adopt rules of procedure for all PH courts as
well as asserting the violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court rules that the EPC is not violated.
Under international law, a member of a foreign armed
forces allowed to enter is immune from local
jurisdiction. This is pursuant to Art. 2, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution that adopts generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land.
3) The US SC recently released a decision in Medellin v.
Texas which held that treaties entered into by the US
are not automatically part of their domestic law unless
these treaties are self-executing or there is an
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implementing legislation to make them enforceable. Comm. of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading Eastern Sea
The Court held that VFA is self-executing given that it’s Trading (EST) was the consignee of shipments of onion and
provisions are enforceable and the implementing law of garlic, which arrived at the Port of Manila with no certificates
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA is also required by the Central Bank (CB) for release thereof. The
covered by implementing legislation, the Case-Zablocki goods were also seized and subjected to forfeiture under EO
Act, inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the 328 that seeks to implement an executive agreement
US Congress that executive agreements registered in extending the effectivity of the PH Trades and Financial
this act (like the VFA), within 60 days from their Agreements with Japan. The Court of Tax appeals ruled in
ratification be immediately implemented. favor of EST stating that the CB had no authority to regulate
4) The Court ruled that the Romulo-Kennedy Agreement transactions not involving foreign exchange and that the
is not valid. There is a difference between detention Executive Agreement was of dubious nature. The Court ruled
and custody. After conviction, the rule that applies is in that the CB had the authority to regulate “no-dollar” imports,
the VFA statating that the detention facility must be pursuant to CB’s broad powers to maintain our monetary
agreed upon by both parties and that is shall be under stability and preserve the int’l value of our currency. The SC
PH authorities. Romulo-Kennedy agreement was not also held that the executive agreement sought to be
valid because Smith was being guarded by US implemented by EO 328 is valid despite the fact that senate
authorities with PH authorities only having visitation
had not concurred in said agreement. 1935 Constitution
rights. The Court asks respondents to comply with the
requires the concurrence of the Senate in the making of
VFA and negotiate with the US to agree on the
detendion facilities under PH authorities! “treaties” and not “executive agreements”
!
3 types of treaties in the American system: (Nicolas v. TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
Romulo) Requires ratification with Becomes binding through
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties - advised and consented to by approval of 2/3 of the Senate executive action without the
the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of need of a Congressional vote.
the US Constitution International agreements International agreements
2. Executive-Congressional Agreements: joint involving political issues or embodying adjustments of
agreements of the President and Congress and changes of national policy detail carrying our well-
need not be submitted to the Senate and those involving established national policies
3. Sole Executive Agreements. - agreements entered international arrangements of and traditions and those
into by the President. They are to be submitted to a permanent character. involving arrangements of a
Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under more or less temporary
the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act. nature.
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Go Tek v. Deportation Board Fake dollar checks were found
in Go Tek’s possession after an NBI raid. The chief prosecutor
of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek,
praying that the board recommend his immediate deportation
to the President. The Court ruled that the State has the
inherent power to deport undesirable aliens and that this
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive “when he
deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
transquility of the nation”. The fact that an alien has been
acquitted in a criminal proceeding of a particular charge
doesn’t prejudice the deportation of such alien based on the
same charge. Also, conviction of a crime is not necessary to
warrant deportation.
The deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected
by: (under existing law)
1) Order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and
2) The Commissioner of Immigration (BID Comm) upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section
37 of the immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan).
j. Legislation
1. Address Congress
Art. 7, Sec. 23
The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its
regular session. He may also appear before it at any other
time.
!
2. Preparation and submission of the budget
Art. 7, Sec. 22
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within
thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the
basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.
3. Veto-Power
Art. 6, Sec. 27
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same
he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
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4. Emergency Powers
Art. 6, Sec. 23
(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Art. 7, Sec.18, supra.
Art. 12, Sec. 17
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
k. Immunity from suit
Beltran v. Macasiar Journalist Luis Beltran wrote in a column
in the Philippine Star that P. Cory hid under a bed during the
1987 coup. P. Cory filed a complaint for libel against Beltran
and PH Star officials. RTC Judge issued a warrant of arrest
against Beltran. The Court held that the President of the
Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. There is
nothing in our laws preventing the President from waiving the
!
privilege. An accused in a criminal case in which the President
is a complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against the
accused – only the President may invoke presidential
immunity.
Gloria v. CA Respondent Icasiano was reassigned, upon
recommendation of Sec. Gloria and approved by the
President, from Schools Division Superintendent, QC to
Superintendent of the MIST (Marikina Institute of Science and
Tech). The CA prohibited petitioners from implementing the
reassignment and declared such as being violative of
Icasiano’s right to security of tenure. The Court affirmed the
CA ruling stating that the Presidential Immunity from suit may
not be invoked as the petition is directed against the petitioner
and not the President. Moreover, presidential decisions may
be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion/excess in jurisdiction. The Court held that
Icasiano’s reassignment infringed upon his security of tenure
as the reassignment appears to be indefinite. Security of
tenure extends not only to removal without cause but to cases
of uncontested transfer (tantamount to illegal removal). While
a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible
even without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done
when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or
is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the
provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who
are in the Civil Service.
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3. Vice President
a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
Art. 7, Sec. 3 (qualification)
There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the
same manner, as the President. He may be removed from
office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
Art. 7, Sec. 4 (election & term)
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the
day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six
years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
!
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination
of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
Art. 7, Sec. 5 (oath)
Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice- President, or the Acting President shall
take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President
or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me
God." [In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].
b. Privilege and salary
Art. 7, Sec. 6
The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of
the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law
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and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the term of the incumbent during which such increase was
approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other source.
c. Prohibitions
Art. 7, Sec. 13
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
d. Succession
Art. 7, Sec. 7
The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume
office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-
elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
!
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been
chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died
or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate
or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which
one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Art. 7, Sec. 8
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become
the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President
or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
Art. 7, Sec. 9
Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the
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President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Art. 7, Sec. 10
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its
approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for
the special election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called
if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date
of the next presidential election.
Art. 7, Sec. 11
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
!
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
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C. The Judicial Department
1. The Supreme Court
a. Composition
b. Mode of Sitting
Art. 8, Sec. 4
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall
be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided
or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
!
People v. Gacott Respondent judge was reprimanded by the
Court for failing to acknowledge an LOI issued to implement
PD 1275. The Court maintains that all judges are required to
take judicial notice of all laws of the land and the error
committed by the judge could have been avoided. Respondent
Judge Gacott pleads to the Court based on personal records,
lower chances of promotion, etc. Gacott questions the
competence of the 2nd Division of the Court to administratively
discipline him relying on the 2nd sentence of Art. 8, Sec. 11
which states that
“the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues of the case and
voted therein”
The Court held that the;
1) 1st clause “the SC en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts” is a declaration of the
grant of that disciplinary power to the Court en banc as
well as the determination of disciplinary procedure but
it was not intended that all administrative cases must
be heard and decided by the whole court (it would
result to absurdity).
2) But the 2nd clause; the Court en banc “order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues of
the case and voted therein”, demonstrates that only
cases involving DISMISSAL of judges of lower courts
are specifically required to be decided by the Court en
banc.
Gacott is not being dismissed, therefore 2nd division may
validly rule on his administrative case.
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Cases considered en banc cases:
1) A penalty that is imposed for the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the judiciary
2) Disbarment of a lawyer
3) Suspensions of any of them for a period of more that
one year or a fine imposed that amounts to more than
10,000 or both
c. Appointments and qualifications
Art. 8, Sec. 7
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court
must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for
fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in
the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Kilosbayan v. Ermita Gregory Ong was appointed by Exec.
Sec. Ermita in representation of the Office of the President, as
Associate Justice of the SC. Petitioners contend that Ong is a
Chinese citizen born to Chinese parents as shown in his birth
certificate (prima facie evidence). The Court held that Ong is
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, but a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The subsequent recognition of his natural-born
status by the Bureau of Immigration and DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court that he was naturalized.
!
d. No non-judicial work for judges
Art. 8, Sec. 12
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Meralco v. Pasay Trans Co. A law was passed wherein the
terms and compensation for a right of way shall be determined
by the members of the Supreme Court acting as a Board of
arbitrators. The Court held that the SC has no legal right to sit
as a board of administrators; it cannot perform any function not
connected with administering of judicial functions. It will be a
conflict as they will, in essence, have to review themselves.
The SC is only granted exclusive judicial power and it can’t be
authorized or required to exercise any other power or perform
any other duty that is not judicial in nature.
Garcia v. Macaraig An administrative case was filed against
Hon. Catalino Macaraig as former CFI Judge of Laguna for not
fulfilling his duties yet received salaries for such position. The
Court dismissed the administrative case. It held that the
respondent had a valid, confirmed appointment. After taking
his oath and formally assuming the position as judge of CFI of
Calamba, Laguna, Macaraig had a perfect right to earn the
salary of a judge. Court acknowledged that he had not been
submitting reports of accomplishments nor status of cases but
this was because he hasn’t started performing any judicial
functions (court was still being set up, logistical consideration).
The SC also held that judiciary laws and circulars only apply to
judges actually holding trials, hearings and making decisions.
Moreover, while waiting for the CFI to be set-up, Macaraig
helped out/worked in the DOJ, this the Court ordered to be
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discontinued. Judges must only perform judiciary functions
and are disallowed to perform otherwise. The fundamental
advantages and the necessity of the independence of the 3
branches of government have long been acknowledged as
more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing
governmental conveniences or exigencies.
e. Salary
Art. 8, Sec. 10
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Petitioner
judges seek to enjoin respondents from making any deduction
of withholding taxes from their salaries. The Court affirmed
their previous opinion “In Re: Question of exemption from
income taxation” where they continued the deduction of taxes.
It is within the ’86 Con. Comm. framers’ intent, particularly
Comm. Bernas accepting the amendment that judiciary
members’ salaries would be subject to income tax applies to
all taxpayers. Thus, the commission changes “diminished” to
“decreased” and deleted the phrase “nor subject to income
tax” from the prior constitution. The Court also officially
discarded its ruling in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia v. David.
This new ruling aims to promote equality amongst the 3
branches as well as with all taxpayers.
f. Tenure
g. Removal
!
Art. 11, Sec. 2
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
In Re Gonzalez Letters were sent to the Tanodbayan/Special
Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzales re charges for disbarment
brought by Mr. Cuenco asking the former “to do something
about this”. The Court held that a public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar
as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office. To grant disbarment during
incumbency would circumvent consti mandate stating that the
Members of the SC may be removed only through
impeachment.
** General Rule, Public officers:
1) required to be a member of PH bar as a qualification to
office
2) who may be removed only be impeachment
= cannot be charged with disbarment during incumbency
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= cannot be criminally charged before Sandiganbayan/any
court with offense which carries with it the penalty of removal
of office or that would amount to such
Procedure of removal for SC justices:
1) Impeachment (Sec. 2 & 3, Art 11, Consti)
2) And then Criminal or Administrative Liability
h. Fiscal Autonomy
Art. 8, Sec. 3
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for
the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Re: COA Opinion on Computation of Appraised Value of
Properties Purchased by SC Justices COA determined that
the retiring Justices underpaid for acquisitions of properties
(cars) used during their incumbency because the Property
Division of the SC used the wrong formula in computing the
appraisal values. The Court held that the use of their formula
is part of the Court’s exercise of discretionary authority and
COA’s interference violates not just the Court’s fiscal
autonomy but also it independence. The ruling is hinged on
the intention to reward long and faithful service of the Court’s
justices as well as the rule that the CJ can determine
privileges and benefits granted to members of the judiciary
(therefore, well within his power).
Judicial Impendence has 2 distinct concepts:
1) Decisional Independence = a judge’s ability to render
decisions free from political/popular influence but
based solely on the individual facts and applicable law
!
2) Institutional Independence = refers to the collective
independence of the judiciary like fiscal autonomy
(freedom from outside control)
Re: In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption From
Payment of all Court and Sheriff’s Fees of Cooperatives
Duly Registered in Accordance with RA 9520 (Philippine
Cooperative Code of 2008) PHCCI claims that it is exempt
from court and sheriffs fees based on the Cooperative Code
and issuances of the SC. In reality, this was an exemption
created by Congress (through the Cooperative Code) which
impaired the fiscal autonomy of the SC. However, this
exemption was already removed when the SC decided on a
different case, ruling that the SC alone can promulgate its
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
Executive and Legislature cannot intervene or share in these
powers anymore. The Court ruled this well within their exercise
of fiscal autonomy wherein the other branches must recognize
the power and authority of the court to levy, assess, and
collect fees, including legal fees.
i. Jurisdiction
Felipe v. Leuterio Days after an inter-collegiate oratorical
contest has been conducted and winners announced, one of
the judges confesses he made a mistake. The ratings he gave
the 2nd place winner should have been such that would entitle
her to first place. The other judges refused to alter the verdict.
The Court held that it had the judiciary has no power to
reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
contest. It would not interfere in literary contests, beauty
contests and similar competitions. Only when they have been
awarded as winners can they have a demandable right. The
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Court also held that the respondent judge erroneously
assumed that Imperial suffered a ‘wrong’ at the hands of the
judges. Merely, it was just an ‘error’. Wrong’ as defined in this
case is the deprivation or violation of a right. No rights to the
prizes may be asserted by contestants since they only have
the privilege to compete for them. There may only be a
remedy if such contestant proves that there is fraud.
j. Deliberations
Art. 8, Sec. 13
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted
to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or
abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all
lower collegiate courts.
Art. 8, Sec. 14
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
Prudential Bank v. Castro Prudential bank complained that
Judge Castro issued an order that contravened Art. 8, Sec. 14
for ruling theat they were guilty of fraud and deceit without
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basis. The SC dismissed Judge Castro from the service and
forfeited all his retirement benefits and pay. Judge Castro then
filed a petition for redress and exoneration claiming his
dismissal violated the 1987 Constitution, and a petition for
voluntary inhibition against Chief Justice Teehankee & Justice
Padilla. Judge Castro claims there was no certification by the
CJ and that the conclusion of the Court was reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to a justice for
writing. The Court held that the certification is only required for
judicial and not administrative cases as it would be
superfluous to have such certification in administrative cases
as the SC is a collegiate court (decision of one, is the decision
of all).
Consing v. CA Petitioners assailed the decision of the CA for
its non-compliance with Art. 8, Sec. 13 (certification
requirement). The Court held that the absence of such
requirement would not necessarily mean that the case
submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation
before being assigned to one member for the writing of the
opinion or invalidate the decision of the Court per se given the
presumption of regularity in court proceedings.
j. Deliberations
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc , and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
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majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (3) Cases or matters heard by division shall
be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
isses in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without
the concurrence of at least three such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
In Re: Production of court Records and Documents and
the Attendance of Court officials and employees … The
Impeachment Panel (for CJ Corona’s case) was compelling
through subpoena the appearance of the SC clerk of court with
the SC documents requested to be used during the hearing.
The SC held that although as a general rule, access to court
records has a policy of transparency under Art. III, Sec. 7,
Constitution, it is still subject to the limitations of the laws and
the Court’s own rules. The Internal Rules of the SC (IRSC)
prohibits disclosure of the result of the raffle of cases, actions
taken by the Court on each cases included in the agenda of
the Court’s session, and deliberations of the members in court
sessions on cases and matters pending before it. Court
deliberations are traditionally considered as privileged
communication (deliberative process privilege). While the
IRSC speaks only about the confidentiality of court
deliberations, it extends to documents and other
communications part of or related to the deliberative process.
Thus, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of the
Court, in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties
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k. Voting
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (3) Cases or matters heard by division shall
be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
isses in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without
the concurrence of at least three such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Cruz v DENR This case involves the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) and its
IRR. As the votes among the SC Justices were equally divided
at 7-7, and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, the
voting remained the same. Thus, the petition is dismissed
pursuant to Rule 56, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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l. Requirements as to decisions
Art. VIII, Sec. 13 The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any
case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a
Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties. Any member who took no part, or
dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must
state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be
observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 1 No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law in which it is based.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2 No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Miguel v JCT Group, Inc. The workers of De Soleil Apparel
Mftg (former employees of Glorious Sun Mftg Corp) assail the
CA decision and resolution which set aside the NLRC and
labor arbiter decisions that found that De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG,
and Glorious Sun guilty of illegal dismissal. CA reversed said
decision and remanded the case to NLRC for further
proceedings. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
According to the SC, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC gravely
abused their discretion when they ruled for the petitioners
without determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between them and the respondents JCT and
Cuevas; the failure to express the basis for their Decisions
was an evasion of Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par.1, Constitution. The
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NLRC is subject to the said provision as an administrative
body or court.
Nunal v COA Petitioner is assailing SC’s Resolution of
dismissing his petition to review COA’s decision that
disallowed his claim for separation pay and other emoluments
pursuant to a compromise agreement because the resolution
failed to comply with Art. VIII, Sec. 14, Constitution. The SC
held that the "Resolution" was not a "Decision" within the
meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given
due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or
other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an
Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for
Certiorari.
People v Bugarin Mary Jane Bugarin was raped multiple
times by her father (the accused). Trial court found the
accused guilty, but the SC held that the decisions the trial
court rendered were insufficient and a clear violation of Art.
VIII, Sec. 14 as well as Sec. 2, Rule 120 of 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure since the decisions did not contain an
evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of
the legal questions involved. The SC held the provision
intended to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of
law with which he disagrees, and to assure the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. Normally the case would be remanded, but
the SC decided not to delay the deliverance of justice and
ruled on the case, finding the accused guilty of 4 counts of
rape and 1 count of act of lasciviousness.
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Hernandez v CA The petitioner was found guilty by the trial
court for nine cases of estafa and violation of the BP Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law). This was affirmed by the CA. The
petitioner is assailing the CA’s decision since it merely
adopted the findings of the Solicitor General in the appellee’s
brief. The SC held that the constitutional mandate (Art. VIII,
Sec. 14, par. 1) only requires that the decision should state the
facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the
briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the
same in its own words. Further, the SC held that the CA did
not violate Art VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2, Constitution since the
denial was based on the ground that the CA did not find any
"cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of
the decision sought to be reconsidered.”
Yao v CA The petitioner was found guilty of selling fake GE
lamps by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). In the RTC, the
judge issued a memorandum that only said that it affirms the
findings of the MeTC. The SC held that the RTC decision is a
clear violation of Art. VIII, Sec. 14, Constitution because the
requirements of a factual and legal basis for decisions reached
by the court is applicable even to memorandum decisions.
Memorandum decisions, as differentiated from the regular
decisions rendered by the court, are relatively short, as they
do not include the reasoning of the court to arrive at
such decisions; however, this should not preclude the judge
from mentioning factual basis and conclusions of law. Even if
the judge merely mentioned in the memorandum that he
affirms the MeTC’s decision, he should have at least attached
to it the findings of the MeTC, pursuant to BP 129.
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m. Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration
Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2 No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Tichangco v Enriquez There was a land dispute in Tondo
between the 1) homeowners’ association of Gagalangin,
Sunog Apog, and homeowners of Estero de Sunog Apog
(occupants of the land) and 2) Manotok (who claimed that he
has the Original Certificates of Title covering the land in
dispute). The LRA ruled in favor of Manotok. Upon reaching
the CA, the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration were
denied for lack of merit. Petitioners assail the CA’s decision to
the SC, alleging that it failed to mention about the magnetic
survey, which they deemed crucial to the determination of the
case, and that it merely affirmed the resolution of LRA
Administrator Enriquez. The SC held that the CA decision
complied with Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2 of the Constitution
because what it stated was already complete in itself, being
“essential ultimate facts” (i.e. the necessary antecedents) and
not “any specific finding of facts” (which the petitioners
wanted). For appellate courts, the rule does not require any
comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the applicable
law, but merely a statement of the “legal basis” for denying
due course.
Martinez v CA This case was about a dispute regarding the
ownership of a parcel of land bought by Fr. Martinez through
an oral contract from De La Paz siblings since the same land
was sold to the Veneracion couple. The Deed of Sale was
never delivered to Fr. Martinez. The RTC ruled in favor of the
Veneracions. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner. The petitioner is assailing the CA’s decision
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because (among others) it denied his motion without stating
any legal basis. The SC held that the CA did not violate Art.
VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2 since it stated that all issues have been
considered and passed upon, and that it found no reason to
change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything
new. This in itself is enough legal basis.
n. Periods for deciding cases
Provisions:
Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (1) All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from the date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all lower courts.
Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (2) A case or matter shall be deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon filing of the last
pleading, brief, memorandum required by the Rules of Court or
by the court itself.
Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding
period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within
said period.
Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable
mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence
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thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or mater submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
Re: Delays in the Sandiganbayan The case is about the
intense backlog of cases to be decided in the Sandiganbayan
(SB) under the supervision of presiding Justice Garchitorena.
The SC held that the SB does not fall within Art. VIII, Sec. 15
(1), Constitution since the SB is a special court and the
provision only refers to regular lower or lower collegiate courts.
However, pursuant to PD 1606 (revised PD 1486 which
created the SB) and Rule XVIII, Sec. 3 of the SB Revised
Rules of Procedure, SB’s judgment shall be rendered within 3
months from the date the case was submitted for decision.
The SC finds that the SB has several cases undecided beyond
the reglementary period set by the statutes and its own rules,
and thus to relieves Garchitorena of his powers, functions and
duties as the Presiding Justice and from presiding over the
trial of cases as a justice and Chairman, First Division, so that
he may devote himself exclusively to decision writing, until the
backlog of cases assigned to him as well as cases not
assigned to any ponente.
Office of the Court Administrator v Fuentes III A Judicial
audit was conducted at the RTC presided over by the
petitioner, and it was found that he had a lot of backlog. The
Court gave him a chance to fix the backlog and explain why he
should not be administratively sanctioned, but he was not able
to comply. The SC held that trial judges are mandated to
decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission for
decision or resolution (Art. VIII, Sec. 15, (1), Constitution) and
corollary to this is Sec. 5, Canon 6, New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which requires judges to
perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness. This also applies to motions or interlocutory
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matters or incidents. Unreasonable delay of a judge in
resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of
judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that
warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction. The SC
recognizes justifiable reasons for delays and allows
extensions, as needed; however, these should be seasonably
invoked, not only when the OCA reports such backlog.
o. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Provision:
Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7 The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Macalintal v PET The case is a motion for reconsideration of
the decision by the SC which dismissed Macalintal’s petition
assailing the constitutionality of the PET. The SC held that the
grant of power in Art. 7, Sec. 4, Constitution does not provide
limitations on its exercise. By doctrine of necessary implication
(if a power is granted, it also implies a grant of other powers
necessary to carry that power into effect), this power includes
the power to carry out such power under its own terms, and
thus allows it to create the PET even absent an act of
legislation. The SC also held that it does not violate Art. VIII,
Sec. 12, Constitution since the resolution of electoral contests
is essentially an exercise of judicial power and derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to the courts of law, expressly
provided in the Constitution.
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p. Administrative powers
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
1. Supervision of lower courts
Provisions:
Art. VIII, Sec. 11 The members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower court shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
In re Demetria CA Justice Demetrio Demetria was accused of
interceding on in behalf of Yu Yuk Lai, a suspected Chinese
Drug Queen, and that he used his influence to pressure the
Special Prosecutor and the Sec. of Justice to give Yu Yuk Lai
special treatment. The SC held that the prosecution’s
testimonial evidence was enough to prove Demetria’s guilt. He
was thus dismissed from the service for undermining the
integrity of the judiciary.
Caoibes, Jr. v Ombudsman Judge Alumbres filed a criminal
case for physical injuries before the Ombudsman against
Judge Caoibes; he also filed an administrative case before the
SC for the same act. Judge Caoibes argues that the
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Ombudsman should defer the criminal case until the SC acts
on the administrative case because the SC has exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel,
under Art. VIII, Sec. 6, Constitution. The SC agrees. Sec.
15(1), RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) does not give the
Ombudsman exclusive authority to investigate felonies
committed by public officers in relation with their office – only
primary authority. Because of the said constitutional provision,
the Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against
judges and court personnel filed before it referred to the SC for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is
involved. It cannot determine whether a criminal complaint
against a judge involves an administrative matter as well. Even
if an administrative case for the same act complained of was
already filed with the SC, the Ombudsman still has to refer the
case filed before it to the SC, so that it can settle first the
administrative aspects of the case.
Re: Conrado M. Vasquez This is an administrative case
against several CA justices due to the their internal squabbling
over a dispute regarding jurisdiction over a case between
MERALCO and GSIS, causing irregularities in the decision it
rendered. Thus, the SC constituted the three-member Panel of
Investigators to investigate the matter and submit their report
to the SC en banc. Upon receiving the report and deliberating
on the matter, the SC rendered different penalties upon the
guilty CA justices as it deemed appropriate: dismissal for
Justice Roxas, suspension for Justice Sabio, and admonition
for Justices Reyes, Dimaraanan-Vidal, and Presiding Justice
Vasquez
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2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public
interest
Provision:
Art. VIII, Art. 5 (3) The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers: xxx (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
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2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public
interest
Section 5 (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
3. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
miscarriage of justice
Section 5. (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice.
People v. Pilotin (1975) - S5(4), A10 gives the court the
power to “order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice”. In this case, it is not merely a
miscarriage of justice, but the personal safety of Crisologo, the
accused. It is absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place
where his life would be in danger. Present hostile sentiment
against the accused at the place of a trial is a justification for
transfer of venue
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Mondiguing v Abad ( 1975) - Change of trial venue in
criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy
reasons. The reason proposed is the biased judge. “The
interests of the public require that, to secure the best results
and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute the criminal in the very place, as near as may be,
where he committed the crime.” The life of the accused would
be in danger if the case was tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should
be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court of Baguio City.
People v. Sola (1981) - The Supreme Court could order "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice." Also, to ensure due process, the prosecution must be
given the opportunity to present evidence showing that the
guilt of the accused is strong before the court rules on the
accused’s motion for bail.
4. Appointment of officials and employees of entire
judiciary
Section 5(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the enforecemnt and
protection of constitutional rights (same provision for 6 –
9)
Section 5(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
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practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Writ of Amparo - The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and
independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.I is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative
roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses,
and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo)
It addresses specific violations or threats against constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security. (dangat’s book)
Habeas Data – provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an
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independent and summary remedy to protect the right to
privacy especially the right to informational privacy the
proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does
not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative
culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through
substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to
the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of;
or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous
data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification. (In the Matter of the Petition of Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodirguez)
In the Matter of the Petition of Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodirguez (2011) - Noriel
Rodriguez filed a petition for a Writ of Amparo and a Writ of
Habeas Data after having been detained and subsequently
freed by a military detachment. After the writs were issued,
Rodriguez filed a petition for a protection order, and also
impleaded the President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court
of Appeals denied this subsequent petition. Writ of Amparo,
Writ of Habeas Data - First, there is no need for an
independent grant of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner
once the Writ of Amparo issued. A temporary protection order
is supposed to assist the court before the writ is issued. Once
the Writ is issued, the respondents are required to avoid
endangering the petitioner and to report to the Court all that
they know about the alleged enforced disappearance.
Meanwhile, after the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, the
respondents are also required to report and to present all the
information they have about the petitioner. Second, while
Arroyo can be held liable because she was no longer
President, she cannot be held liable under the doctrine of
Command Responsibility because there is no evidence that
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she had direct knowledge of the disappearance and she failed
to take adequate measures to prevent such disappearance
Dolot v. Paje (2013) Dolot filed a petition for continuing
mandamus, praying for the immediate cessation of mining
operations in Matnog, Sorsogon, and the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). The lower
court, however, dismissed this petition for lack of jurisdiction
and lack of final judgment on the issue, leading Dolot to appeal
directly to the SC. Continuing Mandamus - A petition for
continuing mandamus can be filed before an RTC, there is no
need for final judgment before continuing mandamus can be
issued, the continuing mandamus is the decree the court
issues. Under Continuing Mandamus, the court has the
authority to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law involving environmental issues and retains
jurisdiction in order to ensure continuing compliance.
Infant Caram v. Segui(2014) - Christina Caram filed a petition
for a Writ of Amparo after the DSWD refused to giver her back
her child, Infant Julian Caram, after Christina gave him up for
adoption. The Writ of Amparo is an extraordinary measure that
is issued in order to provide a rapid response to enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings not as a means to
regain parental authority over a child which should be
instituted through an action for custody
Writ of Kalikasan – enforcement of the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology. The writ is a special civil action suit and
was conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy m, which aims
to provide judicial relied from threatened or actual violations of
right to balanced and healthful ecology. Intended to provide
stronger defense for environmental rights.
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Sec 1 Rule 7; the following must be present to avail of this writ:
1. actual or threatened violation of said constitutional right
2. actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity
3. actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as t
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces
RA no. 10353- AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING
ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE:
6. Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading, Practice and
Procedure " See Section 5 (5)
7. Admission to practice of Law" See Section 5 (5)
Zadivar v. Gonzales (1988) - Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez
was asked to explain himself for ignoring a TRO issued by the
SC, and for making statements that charged members of the
court for pressuring him to defer action against former Justice
Zaldivar. Discipline of Members of the Bar - The Court has the
authority to discipline members of the bar under its mandate to
regulate admission to the practice of law and of the practice
itself (Section 5, Article VIII). Disciplinary cases are not
criminal in nature and are instituted in order to hold officers of
the court to account for their actions. While members of the
bar are free to express their opinions this freedom must be
exercised within the bounds of fair criticism and is qualifed by
the interest to maintain the integrity of the Judiciary.
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Baguio Market Vendors Multipurpose Coop v. Cobato-
Cortez (2010) - Baguio Market Vendors Cooperative sought to
overturn an RTC decision denying them exemptions to
payment of foreclosure fees. The RTC decision is grounded on
the Rules of Court, which exempts only government
instrumentalities from payment of such fees. The Cooperative
cited the Cooperatives Act which exempted cooperatives from
the payment of fees Rule-Making Power - Under the 1987
Constitution, only the Court has the sole power to promulgate
rules of procedure (Section 5(5), Article VIII). Congress cannot
annul rules on the payment of court fees as prescribed the
Court.
Aguirre V. Rana, Bar matter no. 1036 (2003) – Edwin Rana
appeared and acted as counsel for candidates during the May
2001 elections, even before taking his oath and signing the roll
of attorneys. Admission to the Bar - Admission to the bar is a
privelege, not a right and can be withheld under the Court's
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law (Section
5, Article VIII). Since Rana was clearly engaged in
unauthorized practice of law, the Court could withhold his
admission to the bar
In Re: Ong (2014) - The majority adopted the
recommendation of the investigating justice that Justice Ong
be dismissed from the service. The majority held that the
evidence yielded by the instant administrative investigation
was insufficient to establish that Justice Ong acted as liaison
and fixer for Napoles in the Kevlar Cases.14 For the majority,
the evidence on record only establishes that Justice Ong
associated with Napoles two (2) years after the Kevlar Cases
were decided.mBe that as it may, the majority characterized
such association as Grossly Improper, as is equivalent to
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Gross Misconduct, on the part of Justice Ong. (lesson here is
that SC can discipline lower courts)
In Re Edillon - Marcial Edillon, a duly licensed practicing
attorney, refused to pay for his membership dues to the IBP on
the grounds that several provisions of the IBP By-laws (Effect
of non payment of dues, mandatory/automatic inclusion of all
persons in the Roll of Attorneys, and the requirement of
payment of dues for all members) violates his constitutional
rights. As such, the IBP submitted a resolution to the Court
recommending the disbarrment of Edillon should he further
refuse to pay for his dues. The Court ultimately disbarred
Edillon for refusing to pay his fees. To compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional rights. The IBP is merely provides an official
national organization for a group that Edillon is already a
member of (being a lawyer on the Roll of Attorneys). The SC,
which is mandated by the Constitution to administer and
promulgate rules for the Bar, may subject the members to
payment of dues to fund the improvements of the profession
which even Edillon will benefit from, as a lawyer. The Court
further said that the practice of law is subject to the police
power of the State, the Court in particular, since such is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
In Re IBP Elections – the case is about the rumors of
anomalies regarding the IBP Elections back in 1989. The
Court was then forced to hold its own investigation on the
matter, eventually finding that the candidates indeed resorted
to over spending on their campaign and bribery in order to
secure votes, all in violation of the IBP rule that elections
should be apolitical, and elections should be based purely on
merit, not campaign or lobbying by candidates. Court resolved
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that the elections done were null and void since the whole
proceedings were tainted with extravagant and unreasonable
means of campaigning. The Court also amended the by-laws
of the IBP, reviving the previous system where the IBP
President and executive Vice President shall be elected by the
Board of Governors from amongs themselves. The Executive
Vice President shall succeed the President upon expiration of
his term. Also, the Board of Governors shall take turns being
the next Vice President. Anyone who has served as IBP
President cannot be elected as Vice President untill all the
other Board of Governors from the different regions have been
rotated to serve as vice President.
8. Integration of the Bar " See Section 5 (5)
9. Legal assistance to the Underprivileged " See Section 5
(5)
Q. Report on Judiciary
3. Lower Courts
a. qualifications and appointment
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must
have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court
or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges
of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.
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(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list.
b. Tenure
SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reached the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
De La Llana v. Alba (1982) –Petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of BP Blg. 129, an act reorganizing the lower
courts by moving Justices and judges from the Court of
Appeals and municipal circuit courts, for violation of the
security of tenure mandated by the Constitution. They also
allege bad faith in the implementation of such reorganization.
Court ruled that BP 129 was not unconstitutional because
there really was a pressing need for the reorganization of the
judiciary, and BP129 answered that need. There was also no
undue delegation of the authority to fix the compensation of
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the Justices and judges to the executive, because according to
the law, the President will be working within the guidelines
already set by the legislature in a list of ther laws.
5. Judicial Bar and Council
Adverting Diversity: A review of Nominations and
Appointments in the PH Supreme Court (1988-2008)
• Nominations
o Male > Female
o From Judicial > Executive > Academe > Private
> Others
• Appointees
o 60-ish
o Male > Female
o UP> Ateneo > San Beda > UST > FEU > MLQU
o From Judicial > Executive > Academe > Private
> Others
o Luzon > Visayas > Mindanao
• Number of appointees by president : Aroyo Ramos (14
appointees) > Aquino (7) > Estrada (6)
o Note: estrada most female appointees
Dulay v. Judicial Bar and Council (2012) - In light of the
impeachment of Corona, Dulay challenged the constitutionality
of the President's power to appoint the Chief Justice and the
determination of who should head the JBC's should there be
no Chief Justice. According to petitioner, (1) the President
doesn't have the power or duty to select the Chief Justice -- he
may only appoint Justices and judges of lower courts, and (2)
the JBC cannot be headed by a retired Associate Justice
because the Constitution mandates that it should only be
headed by the incumbent Chief Justice. Court held that the
President is mandated by the Constitution to appoint the
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members of the Supreme Court, without distinction of whether
it is the Chief Justice or Associate Justice. As for the JBC, the
Court did not agree to petitioner's theory because if such were
the case, the 90-day period for appointment of the Chief
Justice might be compromised. Also, looking at the
Constitutional Commission's deliberations showed that the
intention of the framers was for the Court to be operational
even without a Chief Justice, though it is preferrable if they
were complete. Also, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act says that
the duties of the Chief Justice will devolve upon the most
senior Associate Justice should there be a vacancy in the
position.
Citizens Adaza v President Aquino and JBC (2012)
Petitioners question the JBC’s action in going over a list of
nominees for the Chief Justice on three grounds: 1) no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the JBC to entertain
nominees for the position of the CJ and to submit a list to the
President; 2) no Constitutional provision authorizing the
President to appoint the Chief Justice; and 3) even if the JBC
has the subsequent powers in question, they cannot exercise
these powers until the Court resolves the petitions questioning
the jurisdiction of the Senate in the impeachment case of CJ
Corona. The Court ruled that the 1st and 2nd issues were
already resolved in Dulay v JBC and Exec Secretary. On the
3rd issue, former CJ Corona himself respected the decision of
the Senate Impeachment Court and did not bring the matter to
the court. The petitions should not bar the JBC from
performing its duties. The 90-day period to fill the vacant
position is mandated by the Constitution and cannot be
defeated by the pendency of the cases referred to by the
petitions.
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Chavez v JBC (2013) The case involves the question on
whether or not Congress is entitled to 2 seats in the JBC [Art.
VIII, Sec. 8(1)]. The Court stated several reasons why the
Constitution only contemplates one seat for Congress: 1) in
opting to use “a” to describe “representative of Congress”, it is
clear that the intent of the framers is that Congress gets 1
seat; 2) a reading of the Constitution would reveal several
provisions were adjusted to conform to the change from
unicameralism to bicameralism; 3) Congress does not legislate
in the JBC, it is there as a contributory non-legislative function;
4) the composition of having the legislative in the JBC is to
recognize Congress as a main branch of government while still
requiring equal participation among the branches; 5) to avoid a
deadlock when it comes to voting.
J. LEONEN’s dissent: 1) The text is clear. No need to revisit
the records for every case. 2) Majority focused on “a
representative” but failed to appreciate the next words “of the
Congress as ex-officio memberS. 3) There is no dichotomous
issue that is resolved by the JBC, therefore the tie-breaker is
immaterial.
Jardeleza v JBC (2014) In the process of filling the
vacancy in the SC due to Justice Abad’s retirement, former
Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza was nominated to the
position. However, questions on his integrity were raised,
particularly on his strategy in the arbitration case (raised by CJ
Sereno), his marital issues and acts of insider-trading (raised
by J. Carpio). A short-list without his name was released after
he refused to answer the questions, claiming his right to due
process was violated. The Court ruled in this case on the basis
of their supervisory authority over the JBC [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)].
Also, the Court ruled that due process is available in the
course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection to an
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application is raised so as to give the JBC a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding it from
making an unsound and capricious judgment. Lastly, the Court
ruled that Jardeleza should be included in the list and as a
result, disregarded the unanimity rule (when an objection is
raised, the candidate must be voted in the list by a unanimous
vote of the JBC) in the process.
J. LEONEN’s Dissent: 1) Conflicts in the narration of facts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutional body. 2)
Supervisory power of SC is merely administrative. 3) No
violation of due process happened, since there was no vested
right to be nominated and Jardeleza was given sufficient
opportunity to be heard. 4) To grant the reliefs prayed for by
Jardeleza inequitably prejudiced the right of 3rd parties not
impleaded in the petition (other nominees).
Villanueva v JBC (2015) Villanueva was an MTC Judge
who applied for the vacant position in the RTC but was denied
since he did not meet the additional requirement of a minimum
of 5 years service as a judge (which was added by the JBC).
The Court ruled that the JBC is not precluded from having its
own sets of rules and procedures in coming up with a shortlist.
The Constitution does not specify a specific process.
Therefore, the JBC can set its own standards or criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy, subject to the
minimum qualifications in the Constitution.
The 5 yr requirement does not violate the Equal Protection
clause since there is a rational basis for the requirement
(experience; length of stay means he has met the
requirements needed to be a judge for 5 years).
Regarding due process, the Court ruled that the JBC should
have been published (since it is not a matter limited to the JBC
and its staff). However, the failure to publish does not
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prejudice his private interest since he has no legal right to be
included in the list of nominees.
On Social Justice & Human Rights for equal opportunity of
employment, no right was violated since he has not
established a clear legal right to be nominated for the office.
As long as fair opportunity is available for all applicants who
are evaluated based on their merits and abilities, the policy
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.
Constitutional Commissions
ARTICLE IX
A. Common Provisions
SECTION 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SECTION 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission
shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of
any business which in any way be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
SECTION 3. The salary of the Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
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SECTION 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall
appoint their officials and employees in accordance with
law.
SECTION 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
SECTION 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it
or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before
it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules
of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
SECTION 8. Each Commission shall perform such other
functions as may be provided by law.
B. The Civil Service Commission
SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by
the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman
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and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven
capacity for public administration, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
SECTION 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by
competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
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(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage,
directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be
given such protection as may be provided by law.
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central
personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the
merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
SECTION 4. All public officers and employees shall take
an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to,
and the qualifications required for their positions.
SECTION 6. No candidate who has lost in any election
shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
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any office in the Government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
SECTION 7. No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as
additional, double, or indirect compensation.
C. The Commission on Elections
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be Members of the
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Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members
for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
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(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and
sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse
to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are
supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and
their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall
be an additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
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investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer
or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
SECTION 4. The Commission may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
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including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
SECTION 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
SECTION 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed
to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article.
SECTION 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
SECTION 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.
SECTION 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in
special cases, the election period shall commence ninety
days before the day of the election and shall end thirty
days after.
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SECTION 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
SECTION 11. Funds certified by the Commission as
necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and
special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and
recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special
appropriations and, once approved, shall be released
automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the
Commission.
D. Commission on Audit
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
certified public accountants with not less than ten years
of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
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any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have
been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control
system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period
as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
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regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
SECTION 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity
of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever,
or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit.
SECTION 4. The Commission shall submit to the President
and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual
report covering the financial condition and operation of
the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities
subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary
to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall
submit such other reports as may be required by law.
TIDCORP v CSC (2013) De Guzman was appointed on a
permanent status as Financial Management Specialist IV of
TIDCORP, a GOCC created pursuant to PD 1080. The
appointment was disallowed because the position title did not
conform to the approved position allocation and was not
included in the DBM’s Index of Occupational Service. Their
EVP appealed because under Sec. 7, RA 8494 (which
amended TIDCORP’s charter), their board was empowered to
create its own organizational structure different from that set
by CSC. They are exempt from existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards and are not bound by DBM’s Index of Occupational
Service. The Court ruled that while RA 6758 applies to all
GOCCs, Sec. 7 of RA 8494 only requires TIDCORP to
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endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible to
RA 6758. Had Congress intended for them to fully adhere to
RA 6758, they would have expressly said so. Therefore, De
Guzman’s appointment is valid.
De los Santos v Mallare (1950) De los Santos was the
incumbent City Engineer of Baguio when Mallare was
extended an ad interim appointment to the same position. De
los Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City
Mayor and other officials ignored him and paid Mallare the
salary corresponding to the position, he commenced this
proceeding. The appointment was unconstitutional for 2
reasons. First, while Section 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code authorized the President to remove at
pleasure the City Engineer, such provision was repealed
already. Second, the appointment of Mallare violates Art. XII,
Sec. 4 of the 1935 Constitution, which states that “No officer or
employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law”. The cause
contemplated by law must be for reasons that law and public
policy recognize as legal and not subject to the whims of the
appointing power. Moreover, such cause must be related to
and affect the administration of the office, and must be
restricted to actions affecting rights and interests of the public.
Also, the entire civil service is subjected to Art. XII, Sec. 4
except positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature (categories where a
City Engineer does not fall under), which may be dismissed at
the pleasure of the appointing officer.
Demaisip v Bacal (2000) Bacal was appointed Regional
Director of the Public Attorney’s Office. She was then
appointed to the rank of CESO III. She was then designated
by the Secretary of Justice, and later on confirmed by the
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President, as the Chief Public Attorney. In 1998, Demaisip was
appointed Chief Public Defender by ERAP. Bacal was
appointed Regional Director of the Chief Public Defender’s
Office, which she contended as an unjust removal from office.
The Court ruled that she was not deprived of Security of
Tenure because the appointment does not automatically grant
it. She also did not have the required rank for a Chief Public
Defender. Rank determines the security of tenure, contrary
to the theory of the dissent that eligibility gives tenure.
Personnel can be shifted from one position to another without
violating security of tenure (such as in cases of public need or
to promote economy and efficiency) because their salaries and
status are based on their ranks. This also allows for mobility
and flexibility in the government.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v Executive Secretary (2001)
President Aquino issued EO 270 which created the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, which was deactivated
by Pres. ERAP through EO 191. The personnel were also
deemed separated from the civil service via EO 223. ERAP
then issued EO 196 which created the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force Aduana (TFA). In this case, the Court
differentiated deactivate from abolish. The former talks about
rendering inactive or dormant an office, while the latter is to do
away permanently with the office. As a general rule, power to
abolish is in the legislature, but as far as bureaus, agencies, or
offices of the executive department are concerned, President’s
power of control (residual powers under EO 292) may justify
him to inactivate the particular functions of an office or certain
laws may grant him the power to carry out reorganization
measures (in this case, the GAA 1999). The reorganization
was also ruled to be valid for the following reasons: no new
employment of personnel was created, a smaller group was
involved, expensed were smaller compared to EIIB, and the
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TFA has additional powers. Last, security of tenure was not
violated since an abolition done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. A valid abolition is neither removal nor separation
of the incumbents. The position just ceases to exist. No
absolute right to hold office except for constitutional
offices which have special immunity re: salary and tenure.
Flores v Drilon (1993) Sec. 13(d) of RA 7227
designated Olongapo City Mayor Richard Gordon as the
Chairman and CEO of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
Petitioners claim that the provision infringes on:
A) Sec. 7(1), Art, IX-B, which states that no elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation to ANY
capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure, and
B) Sec. 16, Art. VII, which gives the President power to
appoint certain government officials.
The Court ruled that Sec.7(1) is there so that a public officer
may serve full time with dedication in his office, and to prevent
a local elective official to work for his appointment and in the
process neglect his constituents. It is more stringent by not
providing any exceptions for ELECTIVE officials except for
those provided by the Constitution. The exemption for
appointive officials under Sec. 7(2) does not extend to elective
officials.
It also goes against Sec. 16, Art. VII for encroaching on the
power of the President to appoint, since he in effect, has no
choice in his appointments. Appointment has to involve an
exercise in discretion. When the Congress gives the President
the power to appoint, it cannot limit the choice to one
candidate. Therefore, Gordon’s appointment is void. (de facto
officer)
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Gaminde v Commission on Audit (2013) Thelma Gaminde
was appointed Commissioner of the CSC. In her appointment
paper, it was stated that her term was set to end on Feb. 2,
1999. She sought clarification from the Office of the President,
which then said that it should instead end on Feb. 2, 2000.
Relying on the clarification, she extended for 1 year but COA
disallowed the release of her emoluments, saying her term
already ended in 1999. The Court first made a distinction
between term and tenure. Term is the time during which an
officer may claim to hold office as a right and fixes the interval
after which several incumbents shall succeed each other. It is
not affected by hold-over, as stated in Art. XVIII, Sec. 15.
Tenure, on the other hand, is the period when an incumbent
ACTUALLY holds office. It may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
Following Republic v Imperial, the terms of office of the first 3
commissioners started on a common date and that any
vacancy due to death, resignation, disability or incapacity
should be filled only for the unexpired term. Therefore, the
starting point of the terms of office must be on Feb. 2, 1987,
the date of the adoption of the Constitution. Therefore, her
term should have expired in 1999. (de facto officer)
DBP v COA (2002) The Philippines obtained a loan from the
World Bank since it was suffering from a financial crisis as a
result of the Marcos Regime. A condition of the loan was for
DBP to have an external audit, which was contested by COA
since they claimed that they have sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks. The Court ruled that
COA’s interpretation of Sec. 2, Art. IX-D is incorrect since its
authority is only exclusive with regard to Paragraph 2, not
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 2. Some transactions require concurrent
auditing from private auditing firms, but COA’s audit would still
be binding on government agencies. Such interpretation of
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exclusive jurisdiction also runs counter to Central Bank’s
power of supervision over all banks’ operations as granted in
Art. XII, Sec. 20. To be clear, they also have concurrent
jurisdiction, but COA’s audit still prevails over CB since COA is
the constitutionally mandated auditor of government banks. To
add, there are also no laws which prohibit government
agencies from hiring private auditors.
SAT, COA v CA (2013) COA created the Special Audit
Team, which was tasked to conduct a special audit of GSIS’
transactions. GSIS contested this saying that the COA had no
power to reorganize itself, and that the SAT’s members were
biased and hostile to them. The Court ruled prohibition should
not have been issued since GSIS can still contest an audit
through a procedure provided by COA. Immediate court action
is not necessary, especially when it involves the expertise of a
government agency. Also, the SAT was validly constituted
under Sec. 2(2) of Art. IX-D, which states that COA has
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination and to establish the techniques and methods it
deems necessary. Pursuant to this authority, COA Memo No.
2002-053 was promulgated giving the General Counsel the
authority to deputize a Special Audit Team. If GSIS had a
cause for complaint, it should have focused on the conduct of
audit and not on the validity of the SAT.
Funa v MECO (2014) Funa contests that MECO, the
“embassy” of Taiwan in the Philippines, is a GOCC and should
be therefore audited by COA. The Court ruled that COA is not
a GOCC because it does not fulfill the requirements to be
classified as one (stock or non-stock corporation, public
character of its function, government ownership). MECO does
not fulfill the last requirement, since there is no controlling
interest of the Government in MECO. The President only
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recommends officials to be appointed, but the board and its

members still decide. It is sui generis. However, certain
accounts may be audited by COA (the verification fees from
DOLE and consular fees received by MECO from government)
since it has the power to do so under Sec. 2, Art. IX-D of the
Constitution (power to audit accounts of non-governmental
agencies receiving subsidy or equity from or through
government). This power is reinforced by Sec. 29(1) of the
Audit Code and Book V of the Administrative Code.

Goh v Bayron (2014) Goh filed a recall petition which

the COMELEC found as sufficient in form and substance, but
suspended any recall elections due to problems with funding.
Sec. 75 of the LGC and Sec. 31 COMELEC Res. 7505 states
that all expenses incidental to recall elections are to be
shouldered by COMELEC, and mandates a contingency fund
included in the GAA for it. However, the Finance Services
Department (FSD) questioned if COMELEC should bear the
burden of funding the entire process of recall, which stalled the
proceedings. Later, COMELEC issued Res. 9882, stating that
while Recall is one of its constitutional mandates under Art. IX-
C, Sec. 2(9), it cannot proceed with elections since it does not
have legal authority to commit public funds for it. The Court
held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the recall of elections since there was a line item
expressly provided in the 2014 GAA. Despite not being a
specific appropriation, this was enough for the COMELEC to
carry out its constitutional functions, including recall elections.
In Socrates v COMELEC, COMELEC was able to conduct
recall elections without a specific appropriation in the 2002
GAA. Also, it was determined that it indeed had savings, which
it can augment under Art. VI, Sec. 25(5) to any deficiency
encountered – which in this case the need for an allocation to
fund the recall election.