Sabello v. Department of Education equity dictates that he be given his former rank of
Principal I.
ISABELO T. SABELLO, petitioner,
vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, respondents. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 87687 December 26, 1989
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
Facts: Isabelo Sabello was the Elementary School Principal vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
of Talisay. The barangay high school was in deficit at that
time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay for
their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also, the FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying
President of the Philippines who was earnestly the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
each barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
allotted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
of the high school teachers, with the honest thought in also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and reprieve.
as such, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund. The only The crime of raping his ten-year old either daughter or
part that Sabello played was his being authorized by the step daughter having been committed sometime in April,
said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That in effect, petitioner was inevitably meted out the supreme
was a grave error on the part of Sabello as it involves the penalty of death.
very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in
and of its technicalities. granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
Thus, Sabello, together with the barrio captain, were execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both judgment has already been rendered that by granting the
were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
disqualification to hold public office. The Court of Appeals which is an executive function.
modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision
imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one- is simply the source of power of the President to grant
half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
proceed to the highest court of the land. Finally, Sabello provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of power of courts to control the enforcement of their
the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil decisions after their finality.
and political rights. Sabello applied for reinstatement to Main Point: The power to control the execution of its
the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. The powers
position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former of the Executive, the legislative and the Judiciary to save
position as Elementary School Principal I. the life of a death convict do not exclude for the simple
Issue: WON Sabello should be reappointed to the position reason that there is no higher right than the right of life. To
he held prior to his conviction. contend that only the Executive can protect the right of life
Held: Yes. The absolute disqualification from office or of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
ineligibility from public office forms part of the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of three
punishment prescribed under the penal code and that branches of our government. (Bernas)
pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Since the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines v. San Juan (1996)
petitioner in the instance was actually reinstated and there FACTS:
are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution Marcos issued a decree establishing the Technological
of his rank, justice and equity dictates that he be given his Colleges of Rizal. It directed the Board to provide funds for
former rank of Principal I. the purchase of 4 parcels of land which belonged to Ortigas
Main Point: &Co. For 12 yrs, the land was idle and construction did not
Given absolute pardon and restored to full civil and materialize so the Board authorized the selling of the lot.
political rights. Since the petitioner in the instance was This was sold to Valley View Realty. Ortigas filed for
actually reinstated and there are no circumstances that rescission of contract contending that it violated the terms
would warrant the diminution of his rank, justice and of the contract by selling such lot to Valley View. The
2
Board made a Resolution providing for the rescission of Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was merely
the deed of sale to Valley View. Valley View filed a case exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom
against the Province of Rizal for specific performance but of speech when he said that a decision by the Court
was dismissed. Thereafter, a compromise agreement was declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional
executed between Province and Ortigas to reconvey the “Would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than
lots to Ortigas. those that led to People Power II.” While Atty.
ISSUE: W/N this is a case of taxpayer’s suit. Leonard De Vera admitted to having uttered the aforecited
HELD: To constitute a taxpayer’s suit, two requisites: statements, respondent denied having made the same to
(1) that public funds are disbursed by a political degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to
subdivision or instrumentality and (2) in doing so, a law is bring it into disrepute.
violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act. Issue:
In the case at bar, petitioner’s standing should not even be WON Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable for indirect contempt
made an issue here since standing is a concept in of court for uttering statements aimed at influencing and
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
actually involved. The disbursement of public funds was constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
only made when the Province bought the lands from
Ortigas. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an Held:
illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the Yes, after a careful consideration of respondent’s
alleged fraudulent reconveyance of said property to arguments, the Court finds his explanation
Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect
prevailing market value of neighboring lot. contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor
Main point: of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. Rule 71,
Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the
Art 8. Judicial Review. This case(taxpayer's suit) is not courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty
a proper subject for judicial review. The first requisite of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority
for the exercise of judicial is that there must be before of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of
the court an actual case calling for exercise of judicial justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
power. disrespect.
private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void
by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of and of no effect
Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being *main point/s underscored
used in schools. The Government's legal representative
argued that (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding ARTICLE 8, SEC 14: CONTENTS OF DECISION; PETITION
the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel FOR REVIEW; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts 13. 17 People v Bravo
are constitutionally valid. Facts: Mario Bravo herein accused-appellant was
Issue: WON Act. No. 2706 is unconstitutional convicted of murder for killing his mother-in-law. He
appealed the decision of the RTC contending that such
Ruling: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable does not contain "the facts of the case for or against and
controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered only of selected facts in favor of a party." It is argued that
any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education this is unconstitutional. The relevant constitutional
of such powers granted to him by the said law. provision is found in Article VIII, Section 14, which says
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without
control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
provides for state control of all educational institutions law on which it is based."
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all Issue: WON the trial court violated Art. VIII, Sec. 14 in
education to wit, the development of moral character, rendering its decision
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational Ruling: No. The Court do not find it has been violated in
efficiency, and instruction in the duties of the challenged decision. It is for the judge to determine
citizenship. The State control of private education was from the narration of facts, relevant or irrelevant, and the
intended by the organic law. assertions by the parties, truthful or not, what actually
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal happened in the case before him. Judge Dizon did this
textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. when he made what the appellant calls a "selective finding
This is still part of the power of control and regulation by of facts." Of course, it had to be selective. That is how a trial
the State over all schools. judge separates the chaff from the grain, extracts the truth
from the mass of conflicting claims, and determines the
basis of the decision he will have to make.
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive be questioned because it has become the law of the case
backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of
civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners
commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, contract
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation. ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
MAIN POINT: The one who is given absolute pardon has no
HELD:
demandable right to reinstatement to an office already
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
forfeited from him/her due to the punishment imposed of
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure
their his/her case. He/she only qualifies for a new
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest
appointment.
because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
Garcia v. BOI
LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present
Facts: The Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, a foreign
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
corporation, was attracted to situate its petrochemical
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
plant in Bataan by “initial inducements and other
sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are
circumstances” Subsequently, however, it asked the Board
the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
of Investments to be allowed to move to Batangas on the
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and
ground that it has the right of final choice of plant site. On
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
that basis, the BOI yielded. The capitulation of the BOI is
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
challenged as abuse of discretion.
between the same parties involving a different cause of
Issue: whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of
action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least
discretion when it yield to the wishes of the investor,
when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
national interest notwithstanding.
the second proceeding involves an instrument or
Ruling: Yes. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
in the plant’s remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in
shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near
the second proceeding to make an independent
absolute discretion given by the BOI to investors not only
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
least.
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
The BOI capitulation is adverse to Philippine interest
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue
contrary to the thrust of the Constitution.
is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
MAIN POINT: What appears in the jurisprudence on
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
“standing” is that it is only a rule that assures concrete
adverseness which can sharpen the presentation of issues
but it also involves considerations of policy related to
FACTS:
judicial self-restraint. (the 1987 PH Constitution reviewer
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment
pg 339)
Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the FACTS:
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare President of PROMAT Construction Development
6
Corporation which was engaged in the construction Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
District Engineer of the First Metro enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the would unnecessarily burden the Court.
bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of II. YES. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by
his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of
course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
private respondent. changed.
MAIN POINT: See page 349 of the book.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of Francisco v. Permiskul
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for FACTS: An important constitutional question has been
reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the injected in this case which started out as an ordinary
private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate complaint for a sum of money. The petitioner leased his
and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period
was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who of one year. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
exonerated private respondent from the administrative respondent deposited with the petitioner a certain amount
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. premises except when caused by reasonable wear and
tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that deposit. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed electricity and water bills and the sum for repainting of the
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari leased premises to restore them to their original
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of condition.
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for As a result, the private respondent sued in the
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. A summary judgment
Court. was rendered, sustaining the complainant and holding that
the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
ISSUE: was ordered to pay the plaintiff representing the balance
I. Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman charges.
may be appealed to the Supreme Court. This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on
II. W/N Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum
or procedural in nature. decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RULING: After a careful and thorough perusal,
I. No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly evaluation and study of the records of this
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the case, this Court hereby adopts by
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary reference the findings of fact and
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section conclusions of law contained in the
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to finds that there is no cogent reason to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition disturb the same.
which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this hereby affirmed in toto. 3
7
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his WON the court abused its discretion in granting a
petition for review was denied, as so too was his motion Temporary Restraining Order on the execution of
for reconsideration. He is now before the SC to fault the Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
respondent court, principally for sustaining the already been rendered; that by granting the Temporary
memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His Restraining Order, the Honorable Court has in effect
contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the granted reprieve which is an executive function.
Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the memorandum decision is sufficient Ruling:
compliance with Section 14, Article VIII
RULING: The memorandum in this case was made No. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
pursuant to what is allowed by Section 40 of BP blg 129. Constitution cannot be interpreted as denying the power
Because of the above considerations the rule that should of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
be followed is that, where a Memorandum Decision is after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
used, the decision adopted by reference must be attached convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
to the Memorandum for easy reference. Nonetheless, the and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
Memorandum decision should be sparingly used and used
only where the facts as in the main are accepted by both The suspension of such a death sentence is
parties and in simple litigations only. undisputedly an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
“A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.” usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
However, “The interpretation we make today will not apply effects are the same. In the same vein, it cannot be denied
retroactively to the memorandum decision rendered by the that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 (Death
regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death to life
the respondent court such decision on the strength imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the
substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary
availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of power of the President to commute final sentences of
Judge de la Rama. The memorandum decision as then conviction.
understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at the
time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced Main point: Article VII, Section 19; is simply the source of
binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
respondent court that the summary judgment without a and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
improper.” control the enforcement of their decisions after their
Petition denied. finality.
Jazz
Issue: whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least
discretion when it yield to the wishes of the investor, when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
national interest notwithstanding. the second proceeding involves an instrument or
Ruling: Yes. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
in the plant’s remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in
shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near the second proceeding to make an independent
absolute discretion given by the BOI to investors not only examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
least. concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
The BOI capitulation is adverse to Philippine interest question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue
contrary to the thrust of the Constitution. is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO MAIN POINT: What appears in the jurisprudence on
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995. “standing” is that it is only a rule that assures concrete
adverseness which can sharpen the presentation of issues
FACTS: but it also involves considerations of policy related to
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment judicial self-restraint. (the 1987 PH Constitution reviewer
Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online pg 339)
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to
charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for FACTS:
P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease President of PROMAT Construction Development
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Corporation which was engaged in the construction
Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the
the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of District Engineer of the First Metro
Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the
be questioned because it has become the law of the case bidding for government construction projects, and private
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of respondent, reportedly taking advantage of
Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
have a legal standing because they were not parties to the concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to
contract terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
ISSUES: employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
Whether or not the petitioners have standing? Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against
private respondent.
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for
because no constitutional issues were actually involved. reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the
LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who
sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are exonerated private respondent from the administrative
the same but the cases are not. RULE ON charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27
between the same parties involving a different cause of of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
11
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed electricity and water bills and the sum for repainting of the
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari leased premises to restore them to their original
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of condition.
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for As a result, the private respondent sued in the
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. A summary judgment
Court. was rendered, sustaining the complainant and holding that
the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
ISSUE: was ordered to pay the plaintiff representing the balance
I. Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman charges.
may be appealed to the Supreme Court. This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on
II. W/N Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum
or procedural in nature. decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RULING: After a careful and thorough perusal,
I. No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly evaluation and study of the records of this
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the case, this Court hereby adopts by
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary reference the findings of fact and
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section conclusions of law contained in the
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to finds that there is no cogent reason to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition disturb the same.
which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this hereby affirmed in toto. 3
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction petition for review was denied, as so too was his motion
would unnecessarily burden the Court. for reconsideration. He is now before the SC to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the
II. YES. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of Constitution.
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary ISSUE: W/N the memorandum decision is sufficient
actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested compliance with Section 14, Article VIII
with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to RULING: The memorandum in this case was made
procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to pursuant to what is allowed by Section 40 of BP blg 129.
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. Because of the above considerations the rule that should
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by be followed is that, where a Memorandum Decision is
which the appeal is to be made or decided has been used, the decision adopted by reference must be attached
changed. to the Memorandum for easy reference. Nonetheless, the
MAIN POINT: See page 349 of the book. Memorandum decision should be sparingly used and used
Francisco v. Permiskul only where the facts as in the main are accepted by both
parties and in simple litigations only.
FACTS: An important constitutional question has been “A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.”
injected in this case which started out as an ordinary However, “The interpretation we make today will not apply
complaint for a sum of money. The petitioner leased his retroactively to the memorandum decision rendered by the
apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of
of one year. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private the respondent court such decision on the strength
respondent deposited with the petitioner a certain amount of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was
to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct
premises except when caused by reasonable wear and availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of
property. He thereafter requested the refund of his Judge de la Rama. The memorandum decision as then
deposit. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at the
lessee still owed him for other charges, including the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced
12
binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
respondent court that the summary judgment without a control the enforcement of their decisions after their
formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary finality.
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not
improper.”
Petition denied.
Issue:
WON the CA should have affirmed the trial court’s
decision in view of the delay in resolving the case, and
should have denied the appeal because of the formal
defects in the appellant’s brief.
Ruling:
No. Even when there is delay and no decision or
resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is
no automatic affirmation of the appealed decision. This is
different from the rule under Article X, Section 11 (2) of
the 1973 Constitution which said that, in case of delay, the
decision appealed from was deemed affirmed.