23. Sule v.

Judge Biteng
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1018 April 18, 1995
TOPIC: Aspects of the Right to Bail
Summary:
This case is a complaint against the judge questioning his
decision to grant bail to the accused in a murder case without
first holding a trial for the same as mandated by law. The
Court ruled that he did commit an error amounting to grave
ignorance of the law because he freely admitted that he did
not set a trial and he also failed to notify the prosecution
about the said motion.
Doctrine:
Bail not covered under the 1st paragraph of Section 13 is
a matter of discretion and the judge in this case is mandated
to first hold a trial for the bail before it is granted.
Facts:
Judge Biteng was the judge tasked to conduct the
preliminary investigations in the murder case of the child of
Sule. He found during the said investigation that there is a
strong evidence against the accused and recommended that
bail should not be allowed. A few days after, the accused then
asked for bail which Judge Biteng then granted without
conducting a hearing and notifying the prosecution of the
same.
Relevant Issue:
Whether or not the judge committed a gross ignorance
of the law by hastily granting bail to the accused in a murder
without holding a trial where the prosecution could prove
the strength of the evidence against the accused.
Ruling: YES
Ratio:
The judge did commit an error in hastily granting bail to
the accused without first allowing the prosecution to prove
their case. Bail in this case being a matter of discretion and
not a right the penalty being Reclusion Perpetua to Death.
The prosecution should have been afforded ample
opportunity to first prove that the accused should not have
been given bail. In the case at bar the judge failed to give the
prosecution ample opportunity by denying them the trial
required by law, thus depriving them of due process. It must
be remembered that when bail is matter of discretion the
court is mandated by law to first hold a trial for the said bail
before the granting of the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NOLITO BORAS Y DOE, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 127495. December 22, 2000]

Disclaimer: Pasensyahi nalang ni na digest kay wa jud ko

kasabot. huhu

Facts:
For allegedly raping a six year-old girl, Nolito Boras was
convicted of statutory rape by the Regional Trial Court of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. He appealed to the SC, questioning his conviction
for rape, assigning as error the admission of Exhibit B, which
is a photocopy of the certificate of live birth of the victim.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an error in the conviction of the
accused considering the accused-appellant’s contention that
the failure of the prosecution to prove the circumstances that
will warrant the admission in evidence of the said photocopy,
renders the same inadmissible and he cannot be convicted of
statutory rape since the age of the victim was not proven
with reasonable certainty.

Ruling:
No, there is no error in the conviction of the accused.
 Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, objection to
evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.
In this case, the photocopy of the birth certificate was
formally offered in evidence and marked as Exhibit B. It was
offered to prove (a) the fact of birth of the victim, and (b) the
fact that the victim was below twelve years old on December
13, 1991. The defense objected to the purpose for which
Exhibit B was being offered, but did not object to the
presentation of the photocopied birth certificate which is
merely treated as a secondary evidence. Having failed to raise
a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and the same is deemed admitted and the other
party is bound thereby.

Additional info:
The victim testified to other occasions of rape committed
against her by accused-appellant prior to December 13, 1991.
However, accused-appellant cannot be convicted for the
alleged rapes committed other than the one charged in the
information. A rule to the contrary will violate accused-
appellants constitutional rights to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Such other alleged
rapes committed which are not alleged in the information
may be taken only as proof of specific intent or knowledge,
plan, system or scheme.
Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34
GR No. L-54558 May 22, 1987

FACTS:
 June 13. 1980 – the respondent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the
respondent Military Commission No 34 to try criminal
case filed against the petitioners.
 July 30, 1980 – an amended charge sheet was filed for
seven (7) offenses, namely:
(1) Unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices;
(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinetmembers Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose
Roño and Onofre Corpus;
(5) Arson of nine buildings;
(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Fabian Ver; and
(7) Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and
inciting to rebellion.
 December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the
Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed
upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.
  The thrust of petitioner’s arguments is that military
commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses alleged to have been committed during the
period of martial law. They also maintain that the
proceedings before the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right
to due process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
Ruling:
The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and
academic because by the time the case reached the SC
Olaguer and his companions were already released from
military confinement. “When the release of the persons in
whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic.” Inasmuch as the herein
petitioners have been released from their confinement in
military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic.” But the military court
created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it
rendered) still continues to subsist.
Additional Info:
The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military
tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil
courts are open and functioning.
Ruling: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions
rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the
period of martial law in all cases involving civilian
defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law,
over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as
long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that
any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned.